July 2014 This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared independently by Erica Holzaepfel, Julia Rizvi, Panhavuth Long, Sophea Seng, and Sophea Touch of Social Impact, Inc., with Veronica Zeitlin of USAID/Washington. Mid-term Evaluation of Counter-Trafficking in Persons II in Cambodia Mid-term Evaluation of Counter-Trafficking in Persons II in Cambodia Mid-term Evaluation of Counter-Trafficking in MID-TERM EVALUATION OF COUNTER￾TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS II IN CAMBODIA July 31, 2014 Cooperative Agreement No. AID-442-A-12-00001 Evaluation Mechanism Contract No. GS-10F0294V Task Order No. AID-OAA-M-13-00011 Cover Photo of Poipet Transit Center Banteay Meanchey Province, Cambodia DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. TABLE OF CONTENTS Acronyms ................................................................................................................................................................................................. iv Executive Summary................................................................................................................................................................................ vi Introduction: Evaluation Purpose & Evaluation Questions........................................................................................................... 1 Evaluation Purpose ............................................................................................................................................................................ 1 Evaluation Questions ........................................................................................................................................................................ 1 I. Project Background ...................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Development Challenge ................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Development Response ................................................................................................................................................................... 4 II. Evaluation Methods & Limitations ............................................................................................................................................ 5 Evaluation Team ................................................................................................................................................................................. 5 Evaluation Design and Data Collection Methods ...................................................................................................................... 6 Gender Perspective ........................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Ethical Considerations ...................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Limitations ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 III. Findings, Conclusions & Recommendations ........................................................................................................................11 Question 1: CTIP II Achievement of Set Program Objectives ............................................................................................. 11 1A: The 4Ps ..................................................................................................................................................................................11 1B: Unexpected / Unintended Results ..................................................................................................................................19 1C: Program Interventions and Gender ...............................................................................................................................22 1D: Program Coordination between Stakeholders ...........................................................................................................25 1E: Program Relevance ..............................................................................................................................................................27 Question 2: Management and Operations ................................................................................................................................30 Question 3: Effectiveness of M&E Systems ...............................................................................................................................34 Question 4: Comparative Advantages ........................................................................................................................................38 Question 5: Sustainability ...............................................................................................................................................................41 Annexes ...................................................................................................................................................................................................45 Annex I: Evaluation Statement of Work ....................................................................................................................................45 Annex II: Map of Evaluation Sites .................................................................................................................................................53 Annex III: Sources of Information ................................................................................................................................................54 Annex IV: Data Collection Protocols .........................................................................................................................................58 Annex V: Evaluation Contacts and Key Informants ................................................................................................................70 Annex VI: Disclosure of Any Conflicts of Interest ..................................................................................................................75 iv ACRONYMS 4Ps Prevention, Protection, Prosecution, Partnership AAPTIP Australia-Asia Program to Combat Trafficking in Persons AHTJPU Anti-Human Trafficking Juvenile Protection Unit APLE Action Pour Les Enfants ARREST Asia’s Regional Response to Endangered Species Trafficking CCPCR Cambodian Center for the Protection of Child Rights CDCS Country Development Cooperative Strategy CoP Chief of Party CTIP Counter-Trafficking in Persons CWCC Cambodian Women’s Crisis Center CYN Community-based Youth Network DFAT Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade DoS United States Department of State DQAs Data Quality Assessments EXCEL Eliminating Exploitative Child Labor through Education and Livelihoods FGD Focus Group Discussions HCC Healthcare Center for Children IEC Information Education and Communication IG Inspector General IJM International Justice Mission ILO International Labor Organization IOM International Organization for Migration IR Intermediate Result IVR Interactive Voice Response KYA Khmer Youth Association KII Key Informant Interviews LAC Legal Aid of Cambodia LSCW Legal Support for Children and Women M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MEP Monitoring and Evaluation Plan MoLVT Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training MoSAVY Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation MOU Memorandum of Understanding MRC Migrant Resource Center NC National Committee NGO Non-Governmental Organization NPA National Plan of Action PCs Provincial Committees PIRS Performance Indicator Reference Sheets PMP Performance Management Plan PTC Poipet Transit Center RA Recruitment Agency RFA Request for Application RGC Royal Government of Cambodia RUPP Royal University of Phnom Penh SHGs Self-Help Groups SI Social Impact SISHA Southeast Asian Investigators into Social and Humanitarian Activities SOPs Standard Operating Procedures SOW Statement of Work v STSLS Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor Exploitation, and Sexual Exploitation TAF The Asia Foundation TIP Trafficking in Persons UIA Undercover Investigative Authority UNIAP United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking USAID United States Agency for International Development USAID/Cambodia United States Agency for International Development, Cambodia Mission USAID/DRG Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance USAID/RDMA United States Agency for International Development, Regional Development Mission for Asia USG United States Government vi EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EVALUATION PURPOSE USAID/Cambodia commissioned Social Impact, Inc. (SI) to conduct a mid-term performance evaluation of the Counter-Trafficking in Persons II (CTIP II) program implemented by Winrock International (Winrock) and managed by USAID/Cambodia. The three main objectives of this evaluation include:  To assess whether the development hypothesis and management structure enable program success;  To assess the extent to which the CTIP II program was able to meet its intended objectives;  To capture lessons learned thus far from CTIP II for consideration in the remaining year of the program, as well as in design of future programs. The evaluation team was charged with assessing the performance of both Winrock and USAID. This report provides USAID/Cambodia, Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (USAID/DRG), Winrock, and its partners with evidence-based recommendations about conducting CTIP initiatives, monitoring and evaluating CTIP programs, and engaging international and local non￾governmental organizations (NGOs) in best practices for CTIP. EVALUATION QUESTIONS This evaluation seeks to answer the following key questions: 1. To what extent and how has CTIP II been successful in achieving set program objectives? a. Which of the 4Ps has been most successful? Which has been the least successful? Is the 4P approach leading to tangible results? b. Have there been positive or negative unexpected/unintended results of the project? c. Have the program interventions affected men/boys and women/girls differently? d. Has the project been successful in coordinating between different stakeholders (sub￾partners and relevant government institutions) in order to achieve program objectives? e. Is the development hypothesis still relevant to the current development circumstances in Cambodia? 2. Have the project management, structure, and operation effectively facilitated achievement of project results? What could be improved to increase project results? 3. Has CTIP II’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system been effectively used to track, monitor, and report results attributable to CTIP II activities? What changes are required or have been incorporated to improve program performance? 4. What are CTIP II’s comparative advantages compared to other anti-trafficking programs? What can be done to further capitalize on comparative advantages? 5. How much progress is CTIP II making in establishing sustainability of results beyond USAID support? What measures should be taken to enhance sustainability? PROJECT BACKGROUND Trafficking in persons (TIP) is a cross-sector issue that reflects ongoing development challenges in Cambodia: poverty, unemployment, socio-economic imbalances, low skills and education levels, lack of safe migration pathways, corruption, and weak rule of law. Despite some notable efforts to combat vii modern slavery over the past decade, a portion of Cambodian government officials remain complicit to trafficking schemes and undermine the political will required to address root causes of exploitation and to achieve justice for victims. Due to inadequate prosecutions of trafficking violators and insufficient protection of trafficking victims by the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), the U.S. Department of State (DoS) downgraded Cambodia to Tier 2 Watch List status in 2013. USAID/Cambodia has supported counter-trafficking activities since 2002 in the context of broader efforts to promote human development, security, and protection for Cambodian citizens. The first Counter-Trafficking in Persons (CTIP I) program implemented by The Asia Foundation (TAF) sought to close the gaps in strategy and coordination mechanisms between civil society and the government, leading to the creation of a National Committee (NC) to Lead the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor Exploitation, and Sexual Exploitation (STSLS) within the RGC, among other results. Building on these positive efforts, the CTIP II program (2011-2015) focuses on both male and female victims of trafficking and labor exploitation. This USD $5.4 million program, which is implemented by Winrock in partnership with the RGC and civil society stakeholders, is designed around the following objectives: 1. Prevention. To promote effective national and local prevention strategies to reduce TIP (including labor trafficking) by investigating TIP patterns, developing appropriate prevention campaigns for all forms of TIP, and establishing centralized locations for pre-decision migrants to obtain information on safe migration or viable economic alternatives to migration. 2. Protection. To enhance survivor protection and care services for all forms of TIP by developing and implementing victim identification (ID) channels and guidelines, promoting practical delivery and evaluation of minimum standards for survivor services, and promoting flexible survivor-driven service delivery and reintegration options, including for male victims. 3. Prosecution. To improve law enforcement capacity to identify and prosecute traffickers and TIP-related crimes by extending standard operating procedures (SOPs) of the Anti-Human Trafficking Juvenile Protection Unit (AHTJPU) to all police forces and by developing a consolidated anti-TIP training strategy and standardized training program. 4. Partnership. To strengthen RGC capacity to design, lead, coordinate, and evaluate in-country and regional efforts to combat all forms of TIP by providing guidance and technical assistance to strengthen the policy framework in labor and cross-border TIP, sexual abuse, and human smuggling. EVALUATION DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS This performance evaluation was carried out between April and June 2014 and involved two and half weeks of fieldwork in Cambodia. The evaluation employed standard rapid appraisal data collection methods: document review, key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and site visits. The evaluation team conducted data collection activities in five of the six provinces outside Phnom Penh including Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Kampong Cham, Siem Reap, and Banteay Meanchey. In total, 164 informants, including 86 males and 78 females, contributed to the evaluation’s findings. Consistent with the USAID Evaluation Policy, the team applied a gender perspective throughout the evaluation. viii FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS QUESTION 1: CTIP II ACHIEVEMENT OF SET PROGRAM OBJECTIVES 1A: Which of the 4Ps has been most successful? Which has been the least successful? Is the 4P approach leading to tangible results? Prevention Research commissioned by Winrock and released by Rapid Asia in December 2012 underscores the need for messaging on safe migration and offers appropriate prevention strategies to address each stage of the migrant recruitment supply chain.1 Based on those research findings and a study of existing IEC materials produced by NGOs, Winrock developed a strategy—which identifies target groups, messages, and tools—to inform CTIP II prevention activities beginning in 2013. The strategy articulates an objective of consensus among CTIP II partners and common use of effective, professional IEC materials to raise awareness about safe migration. The evaluation team reviewed a series of Khmer-language IEC materials and did not find that any content was inaccurate or problematic. However, the lack of readily available IEC materials translated into English raises questions about the level of oversight possible by Winrock expatriate field staff, Winrock headquarters staff, or USAID staff who are not fluent in Khmer. Protection Winrock and its sub-grantees are engaged in a variety of activities related to protection and service delivery for survivors of trafficking and exploitation. Tangible outputs of USAID support for protection activities are evident in quarterly statistics on the number of TIP victims who receive assistance from Winrock sub-grantees. The evaluation team found that most Winrock partners have been active in the CTIP arena for years and, therefore, employ effective referral pathways and follow-up mechanisms for monitoring the status of their clients. However, outcomes of the assistance provided by sub-grantees to clients are not reported to Winrock in a manner that would enable the evaluation team to assess the long-term impact of protection-related interventions. Prosecution Effective prosecution of TIP perpetrators has been a longtime challenge in Cambodia, and key informants provided mixed reviews about Winrock’s activities to improve law enforcement capacity to identify and prosecute traffickers and TIP-related crimes. Furthermore, key informants from multiple target groups noted the acute difficulties of achieving sustainable progress in the prosecution arena due to entrenched corruption within the judicial system. The need for institutionalizing law enforcement capacity-building efforts and for establishing a standardized TIP training strategy was recognized in advance of USAID’s solicitation for CTIP II proposals and is reflected in Winrock’s program objectives.2 However, Winrock has had a hard time achieving this objective, and its work with Cambodian authorities to develop SOPs or a consolidated anti-TIP training strategy and standardized training program has been limited. Indeed, the evaluation team identified a variety of ongoing CTIP training models for law enforcement officers in Cambodia and noted that consolidation in this area is lacking among donors and implementing partners. In this context, a notable best practice is the ongoing collaboration among Winrock, IJM, and others to advocate for the adoption of Undercover Investigative Authority (UIA) and to train law enforcement officials on its implementation. 1 Winrock International and Rapid Asia, Research Report on Sex and Labor Trafficking Network and Pattern in Cambodia, December 2012, Pages 4-5. 2 USAID Counter-TIP Follow-up Project Design, February 2011, page 26. ix Partnership Technical assistance provided by Winrock to strengthen the capacity of the RGC to design, lead, coordinate, and evaluate efforts to combat all forms of TIP builds upon notable achievements by USAID and TAF under the CTIP I program. The establishment and operationalization of the National Committee (NC) Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor Exploitation, and Sexual Exploitation (STSLS) and its corresponding Provincial Committees (PC) STSLSs was a critical step toward improving coordination, monitoring, and local ownership of TIP interventions in Cambodia.3 Despite the challenges and tensions—both implicit and explicit—of fostering partnerships with government entities, Winrock is making incremental progress in leading a variety of long-term initiatives to support the NC’s functions and strategic planning. RECOMMENDATIONS  Winrock should review and refine its TIP prevention campaign strategy for the remainder of the CTIP II project period.  Winrock should ensure that all groups and individuals engaged in conveying messages on TIP prevention and safe migration undergo sufficient training provided by TIP experts.  USAID and Winrock should prioritize funding reintegration activities that are comprehensive and sustainable in design.  USAID should review the nature of its future support for building the capacity of Cambodian law enforcement officers to prosecute TIP perpetrators and crimes.  USAID and Winrock should prioritize funding reintegration activities that are comprehensive and sustainable in design. 1B: Have there been positive or negative unexpected/unintended results of the project? The evaluation found that Winrock and its sub-grantee, Khmer Youth Association (KYA), are not providing sufficient technical and mentoring support to their youth volunteers. The evaluation team identified this as a potential source for unintended negative results in terms of the content and appropriateness of prevention messaging and awareness-raising activities. Two other potential, unintended negative consequences include the risk of undermining trafficking prosecutions and unintentionally endorsing recruitment agencies (RAs) that might engage in trafficking or labor exploitation. The development of new ministerial prakas, or complaint mechanisms, to subdecree 190, which CTIP II is supporting in conjunction with the MoLVT and ILO, allows redress to victims of labor abuse, as well as the possibility to prosecute RAs’ criminal actions. However, there is a possibility that criminal cases will not be tried as such, given the distrust in the judicial system and its low level of functionality. Regarding the endorsement of RAs, the evaluation found that while Winrock is displaying noteworthy efforts to communicate a complex and nuanced message about migration, some of CTIP II’s sub-grantees responsible for prevention activities may equate “legal migration” with “safe migration,” leading to potential negative outcomes for migrants who engage in “legal migration” that is ultimately unsafe. Winrock is aware of these potential negative unintended consequences and is pursuing strategies to mitigate them. The team also identified a weakness in the design of CTIP II’s protection activities that could potentially lead to unintended negative results, which is the lack of consistent, long-term reintegration strategies and planning. Finally, the team recognized an unexpected positive finding of strong data record keeping on victims, including the number of survivors who used RAs, the names of 3 Ruth Rosenberg and Lisa Hammond, Final Report: Evaluation of the Countering-Trafficking in Persons Program in Cambodia, December 2010, page 13-20. x the agencies they used, and how many survivors worked through brokers. Many direct assistance CTIP programs miss the opportunity to learn about CTIP trends because they do not collect data on victims assisted. RECOMMENDATIONS  Winrock should work with MoSAVY and other donors and NGOs in the protection arena, to utilize and apply the standardized guidelines for effective survivor reintegration.  USAID, with input from Winrock, should develop a policy for the endorsement of licensed RAs.  Winrock should continue its commendable efforts to mitigate potential negative unintended consequences associated with sub-grantees’ conflation of “legal migration” and “safe migration.”  In coordination with USAID, Winrock should reach out to and support ILO, which is working with MoLVT, to develop more specific guidelines and tools for the implementation of the prakas that set the criteria for providing RA licenses. .  CTIP II should proactively disseminate prevention messaging that clearly distinguishes safe migration from legal migration.  USAID should work with Winrock to ensure that all prevention materials are in line with USAID’s overarching CTIP Policy. 1C: Have program interventions affected men/boys, women/girls differently? The arc of USG support for CTIP interventions in Cambodia coincides with a paradigm shift toward increased recognition of male labor migrants as a vulnerable group that requires urgent attention. Conducted in 2010, the independent evaluation of the CTIP I program acknowledged that the Cambodian public believed that women and children were the primary victims of trafficking and recommended new activities to provide protection and legal support to men.4 In its subsequent RFA, USAID asked applicants to address the role of gender in CTIP II programming, monitoring, and evaluation.5 Acknowledging past gender imbalances among beneficiaries of CTIP interventions, Winrock’s CTIP II program objectives highlight male victims as a specific target group for its protection and reintegration activities.6 Despite the significance placed on gender by USAID and Winrock, the evaluation team found that gender strategies, program monitoring, and reporting practices to track the impact of CTIP II on male and female beneficiaries were insufficient among Winrock and its partners. Targets and monitoring data are not necessarily disaggregated by sex when appropriate, and CTIP II program achievements are not tracked or analyzed through a gender lens. RECOMMENDATIONS  USAID/Cambodia should commission an in-depth gender analysis of emerging trends and vulnerable groups in trafficking.  USAID/Cambodia should develop a gender strategy to inform its continued support for CTIP interventions.  USAID/Cambodia should require its implementing partners to develop gender strategies to guide prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership activities. 4 Ruth Rosenberg and Lisa Hammond, Final Report: Evaluation of the Countering-Trafficking in Persons Program in Cambodia, December 2010, Page 44. 5 USAID-Cambodia-442-11-002-RFA, June 7, 2011, Page 27. 6 Winrock International, Technical Application, August 25, 2011. Objective 2. xi  Winrock should review its CTIP II prevention strategy to consider whether messages and outreach activities could incorporate gender-specific trends or risk factors related to trafficking.  Winrock should continue to support Hagar and other sub-grantees in examining—and challenging—societal perceptions about the profiles and priorities of trafficking survivors in Cambodia. 1D: Has the project been successful in coordinating between different stakeholders in order to achieve program objectives? At the outset of CTIP II program implementation, prolonged start-up negotiations and Winrock staffing changes introduced delays and challenges to establishing trust and working relationships with the NC Secretariat and government partners. Those initial hurdles have now been overcome, for the most part, but partnerships require continuous attention and thoughtful efforts to sustain a positive rapport. Key informants internal and external to the RGC emphasized that bureaucracy and pending questions about the mandate, authority, and budget of the NC vis-à-vis Cambodia’s line ministries affect the pace and quality of Winrock-led coordination efforts. Disseminated in March 2014 to government actors and other stakeholders in Cambodia’s CTIP arena, Winrock’s evaluation of the 2011-2013 NPA proposed changes to the structure and budget of the NC; if implemented, such changes could enhance the ability of the NC to better utilize technical assistance from Winrock. 7 RECOMMENDATIONS  Winrock and its sub-grantees should clarify expectations, roles, and responsibilities for partnerships with government actors at the national and provincial levels.  Winrock, with support from USAID, should work with the NC Secretariat to continue to advocate for a dedicated budget to support the NC’s operating costs and CTIP initiatives.  USAID and Winrock should increase and formalize their existing, ad-hoc collaboration with other donors and international organizations to prevent duplication of resources and confusion of mandates in Cambodia’s TIP arena. 1E: Is the development hypothesis still relevant to the current development circumstances in Cambodia? It is challenging to assess the current relevance of the development hypothesis—which asserts that progress will be made to combat trafficking in Cambodia by employing a simultaneous, multi-pronged 4Ps approach—without more analysis about why this approach was selected when CTIP II was initially launched. However, because there are ongoing development needs within all four counter-trafficking Ps in Cambodia, supporting program activities that address all 4Ps remains a relevant approach. Tackling all 4Ps simultaneously through a single stand-alone program, as CTIP II has done, is challenging and not the only strategy to address all of the 4Ps. The evaluation team found that while CTIP II made some tangible progress, it did not conduct the monitoring needed or apply the best practices knowledge required to adequately implement a 4Ps CTIP program. To implement an effective 4Ps program, USAID needs to strengthen these program components. Moreover, USAID could explore other avenues for addressing all 4Ps in Cambodia. 7 Winrock International, Quarterly Progress Report: January 1-March 31, 2014, Page 7. xii RECOMMENDATIONS When all 4Ps are addressed through a single program, USAID should:  Consider establishing a project management structure that allows for stronger oversight of the activities in the 4Ps, such as assigning a prime and a sub-prime to share responsibility for the Ps.  Ensure that prime and sub-prime implementers have solid, broad knowledge of TIP and that there is a clear and rigorous monitoring system in place.  Reduce the total number of program activities implemented under each objective to facilitate monitoring.  Rather than addressing all 4Ps through a single, stand-alone CTIP program, USAID should consider other strategies for addressing all the Ps. QUESTION 2: Have the project management, structure, and operation effectively facilitated achievement of project results? What could be improved to increase project results? The evaluation team found that in spite of being presented with several management and operational challenges at the outset of the CTIP II program, Winrock, with support and assistance from USAID, was able to effectively overcome them, avoiding the derailment of major components of its activities. In addition, the team found that CTIP II makes a concerted effort to provide sound management of its sub￾grantees and relationships with sub-grantees and partners, demonstrates strong commitment to building rapport and collaboration. The evaluation team found that USAID provided a substantial amount of support to CTIP II and Winrock HQ during the first year of implementation, working closely with team members through the replacement of the initial CoP however, the evaluation team also found that USAID has not provided the necessary level of feedback and support to CTIP II during subsequent years of the project. Furthermore, despite several meetings USAID has held with the Minister of Interior, as well as with the NC Secretariat, interviews with several key government ministries underscored the widespread lack of understanding and confusion about USAID policies. RECOMMENDATIONS  USAID should undertake a concerted initiative to establish a clear and shared understanding among the RGC, NGOs, and donor community about USAID’s funding approach, rules, and regulations.  USAID should take a leadership role in advocating for coordination and unification of donor policies on per diem rates.  Winrock should adhere as closely as possible to HQ procedures for sub-grantee selection. Question 3: Has CTIP II’s M&E system been effectively used to track, monitor, and report results attributable to CTIP II activities? What changes are required or have been incorporated to improve program performance? In spite of the critical importance that both the CTIP I end of project evaluation and the USAID RFA for CTIP II placed on establishing robust and effective M&E systems, the evaluation team found USAID, Winrock, and the majority of sub-grantees’ M&E capacity and systems to be comprehensively poor. CTIP II’s insufficient M&E systems are grounded in USAID’s lack of key, foundational documents including a Country Development Cooperative Strategy (CDCS), Performance Management Plan (PMP), xiii and CTIP Cambodia Country Strategy as well as inadequate human resources to provide necessary support and guidance to Winrock. In addition to USAID’s challenges with M&E, the team noted that Winrock’s program objectives and activities were generally not informed by comprehensive needs assessments, baseline studies, safety mapping, or surveys. Among the sub-grantees, the evaluation found mixed levels of comprehension and effective application of M&E as well as varying quality of M&E systems and processes. Encouraging modifications have been made to Winrock’s MEP, but only following substantial delays and significant implementation of the project. Notwithstanding these adjustments, the evaluation found several opportunities for further improvements with Winrock’s M&E system. RECOMMENDATIONS  Winrock, should disseminate CTIP II required M&E methodologies to sub-grantees.  Winrock should provide technical training to all sub-grantees on M&E concepts and practices to increase their capacity and contribute to building an effective M&E system for CTIP II.  USAID should provide timely, consistent, and thorough feedback and guidance to Winrock on their MEP and any other M&E related needs.  Winrock should work with sub-grantees and more-closely examine their narrative reports to identify opportunities where qualitative data could inform the development of routinely collected outcome-level indicators.  USAID should dedicate time and resources to internal staff trainings in basic M&E, including how to understand and apply the Mission-wide CDCS and its accompanying PMP to office-level strategies and activity-level project monitoring and evaluation plans. QUESTION 4: What are CTIP II’s comparative advantages compared to other anti-trafficking programs? What can be done to further capitalize on comparative advantages? The evaluation team found that donors and NGOs active in Cambodia’s CTIP arena perceive USG￾funded implementing partners as uniquely placed to engage in constructive and results-oriented partnerships with RGC stakeholders. Key informants cited strong bilateral relations between Cambodia and the United States, the diplomatic influence of the U.S. Embassy, and the significance of the annual TIP report produced by DoS as factors that position USAID and its grantees for success in strengthening the policy framework and building the capacity of Cambodia’s institutions to combat all forms of TIP. Nonetheless, the evaluation team found that donors other than USAID and implementers other than Winrock are widely recognized by key informants as providing robust and comprehensive capacity￾building on CTIP for law enforcement officers in Cambodia. Without a thorough examination of all technical assistance and training models, the evaluation team is not in a position to identify the most promising interventions (or implementing partners) for increasing prosecutions or convictions of TIP perpetrators. However, police interviewed by the evaluation team noted their preference for technical assistance that incorporates both training and the application of learning through practicums or on-the￾job mentorship. RECOMMENDATIONS  To maximize its comparative advantages, USAID should identify opportunities to leverage USG momentum and financial support for development priorities related to CTIP.  Direct recipients of USG funding should ensure that local partners offer comparative advantages in relevant CTIP topic areas. xiv  Winrock should maintain and deepen its involvement in the development and dissemination of policies and SOPs for Cambodian law enforcement officers.  USAID should commission a comprehensive analysis of CTIP interventions in the prosecution arena to guide decisions about future programming in Cambodia. QUESTION 5: How much progress is CTIP II making in establishing sustainability of results beyond USAID support? What measures should be taken to enhance sustainability? The evaluation found that elements of sub-grantees’ protection and prevention services demonstrate significant potential for sustainability. Members of CCPCR’s SHG in Svay Rieng Province expressed their ability to continue lending money as long as CCPCR does not withdraw the original seed funding. Additionally, the team found Hagar’s work with both Winrock’s sub-grantees and the Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP) to be especially promising. The evaluation found an alarmingly high level of duplication among hotlines for TIP as well as a lack of attention placed on the sustainability of Winrock’s IVR hotline. Key informants from NGOs and Cambodian government entities informed the evaluation team about at least eight distinct hotlines used at the national and provincial levels for victim assistance, and further examination is required to determine the accuracy and consistency of messaging provided by the hotlines. Provision of protective services is another area of the CTIP II project in which the evaluation team identified a need for increased attention to sustainability. In the shelter facilities visited by the evaluation team, the programs and services were entirely funded and operated by NGO staff members, and there was a lack of evidence that sufficient measures have been taken to integrate MoSAVY human and financial resources into protection services with the goal of ensuring long-term sustainability. RECOMMENDATIONS  Following the second round of lending within the self-help group, Winrock should support CCPCR to conduct an assessment of the activity to understand the strengths and weaknesses and capture lessons learned.  USAID should examine Hagar’s model of building capacity for social work through investing in higher education to determine whether additional courses offerings related to CTIP, for example, rule of law, could also be introduced into the BA and MA programs at RUPP.  USAID should collaborate with other donors and partners in the RGC to reduce duplication of efforts to provide TIP victim assistance hotlines.  Winrock should work collaboratively with the MoLVT, who expressed interest and capacity to take over funding of the IVR, to develop a sustainability plan for the IVR. 1 INTRODUCTION: EVALUATION PURPOSE & EVALUATION QUESTIONS EVALUATION PURPOSE USAID/Cambodia commissioned Social Impact, Inc. (SI) to conduct a mid-term performance evaluation of the Counter-Trafficking in Persons II (CTIP II) program implemented by Winrock International (Winrock) and managed by USAID/Cambodia. The three main objectives of this evaluation include:  To assess whether the development hypothesis and management structure enable program success;  To assess the extent to which the CTIP II program was able to meet its intended objectives;  To capture lessons learned thus far from CTIP II for consideration in the remaining year of the program, as well as in design of future programs. The evaluation team was charged with assessing the performance of both Winrock and USAID. This report provides USAID/Cambodia, Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (USAID/DRG), Winrock, and its partners with evidence-based recommendations about conducting CTIP initiatives, monitoring and evaluating CTIP programs, and engaging international and local non￾governmental organizations (NGOs) in best practices for CTIP. The complete evaluation Statement of Work (SOW) is in Annex I. EVALUATION QUESTIONS This evaluation seeks to answer the following key questions: 1. To what extent and how has CTIP II been successful in achieving set program objectives? a. Which of the 4Ps has been most successful? Which has been the least successful? Is the 4P approach leading to tangible results? b. Have there been positive or negative unexpected/unintended results of the project? c. Have the program interventions affected men/boys and women/girls differently? d. Has the project been successful in coordinating between different stakeholders (sub￾partners and relevant government institutions) in order to achieve program objectives? e. Is the development hypothesis still relevant to the current development circumstances in Cambodia? 2. Have the project management, structure, and operation effectively facilitated achievement of project results? What could be improved to increase project results? 3. Has CTIP II’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system been effectively used to track, monitor, and report results attributable to CTIP II activities? What changes are required or have been incorporated to improve program performance? 2 4. What are CTIP II’s comparative advantages compared to other anti-trafficking programs? What can be done to further capitalize on comparative advantages? 5. How much progress is CTIP II making in establishing sustainability of results beyond USAID support? What measures should be taken to enhance sustainability? 3 I. PROJECT BACKGROUND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE Trafficking in persons (TIP) is a cross-sector issue that reflects ongoing development challenges in Cambodia, including poverty, unemployment, socio-economic imbalances, low skills and education levels, lack of safe migration pathways, corruption, and weak rule of law. Despite some notable efforts to combat modern slavery over the past decade, a portion of Cambodian government officials remain complicit to trafficking schemes and undermine the political will required to address root causes of exploitation and to achieve justice for victims. Due to inadequate prosecutions of trafficking violators and insufficient protection of trafficking victims by the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), the U.S. Department of State (DoS) downgraded Cambodia to Tier 2 Watch List status in 2013. The 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report identifies Cambodia as a source, transit, and destination country for persons subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking.8 Vulnerable groups include men, women, and children—especially impoverished Cambodians -- who seek economic opportunity in urban centers or other countries and ultimately who respond to the consistent demands for forced labor and prostitution in the region. Vulnerability factors are similar for both males and females: “push factors” include debt, the absence of livelihood opportunities, limited or no access to education, breakdown of family relationships, and child sexual abuse; “pull factors” include labor demand, recruitment advertising, and peer encouragement; and “facilitating factors” include social networks, tourism, porous borders, and improved transportation.9 Nearly 75 percent of the total population of Cambodia migrates within the country’s borders for employment or other reasons.10 Victims of trafficking are typically transported from rural areas to the urban centers of Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, Poipet, Koh Kong, and Sihanoukville. Women and girls continue to be trafficked into domestic servitude and prostitution, and both law enforcement officials and NGOs working in this arena cite increasingly clandestine and evasive strategies used by traffickers following Cambodia’s adoption of the law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Commercial Sexual Exploitation in February 2008. Despite improved law enforcement and public awareness, both boys and girls face risks of sexual exploitation by pedophiles, tourists, and consumers of the underground prostitution and virginity trades. In particular, girls 16-17 years old are targeted because they meet the legal age requirement for consensual sex.11 Child labor rates in Cambodia remain high, and incentives persist for children to fall victim to labor trafficking.12 Within the region, Cambodians migrate most frequently to Thailand and Malaysia for employment; incentives include comparatively higher wages in Thailand and lax Malaysian government policies toward 8 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report, U.S. Department of State, June 2014, Pages 120-123. 9 Aimee Brammer and Julia Smith-Brake, “Journey of Change: A Chab Dai Study on the Trends and Influencing Factors on Counter-Trafficking in Cambodia, 2003-2012,” June 2013. 10 2010 Strategic Information Response Network (SIREN) Mekong Region Country Datasheets on Human Trafficking, United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP). 11 Simon Marks, “Children Less Visible in Sex Industry, Yet Abuse Persists,” The Cambodia Daily, May 30, 2013. 12 Cambodia Labour Force and Child Labour Survey 2012, International Labour Organization, November 2013. An estimated 19.1 percent of all children aged 5–17 (755,200 children) were economically active in Cambodia in 2012. Of them, more than 276,000 were younger than 15 years; girls slightly outnumbered boys. 4 undocumented workers.13 Other destination countries include Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Indonesia, Kuwait, Senegal, Fiji, Mauritius Island, and South Africa. Cambodians who pursue opportunities abroad through either formal or informal channels can be subjected to sex trafficking, domestic servitude, debt bondage, or forced labor and undergo abuse, deportation, and even death. For example, there has been an uptick in the reported number of alleged marriage fraud cases and exploitation of Cambodian women by Chinese brokers in recent years. Injustices suffered by male victims of labor trafficking—especially the slave labor force behind Thailand’s fishing industry—have received increased international attention.14 Still, cronyism and known links between Cambodian officials and members of the Association of Cambodian Recruitment Agencies introduce disincentives for the prosecution of perpetrators, and better services and alternatives are required for returned and reintegrating male victims. DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE U.S. Government 4P Framework In the late 1990s, the President’s Interagency Council on Women developed a U.S. Government (USG) policy to combat TIP based on the three “P”s of prevention of trafficking, protection of victims, and prosecution of traffickers. This approach was integrated into both the 2000 U.S. Trafficking in Persons Victims Protection Act and the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, which was developed the same year. At the launch of the 2009 Trafficking in Persons Report, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton added “partnership” as the fourth P, recognizing that governments can only combat trafficking in collaboration with other stakeholders. USAID’s CTIP Policy states that “it is informed by the 4Ps paradigm.” The Agency’s 2013 CTIP Field Guide, developed to assist missions and partners to implement the policy in the field, includes an illustrative programming framework organized by the 4Ps. While the policy embraces the 4Ps approach, it does not encourage missions to address all of the Ps simultaneously. Instead, the policy directs missions to leverage the Agency’s historical experience and expertise in prevention and protection by investing in these two Ps. Moreover, the policy steers missions away from prosecution investments. This is primarily because DoS has historically invested significantly more than USAID in prosecution programs and, therefore, is better positioned to support this program area. Between 2001 and 2009, DoS invested twice as much as USAID on programs that included prosecution activities.15 The policy also urges missions to invest in partnerships, in alignment with this relatively new USG focus. Under its guiding principle entitled “Employ USAID’s Comparative Advantage,” the policy states, “continuing past practice, USAID’s investments will emphasize prevention and protection, enhance our focus on partnership, and complement the focus of the State Department and other USG agencies on prosecution.” The policy’s focus on coordinated DoS and USAID CTIP efforts is sound. However, there are some countries, such as Cambodia, in which USAID is funding CTIP activities and DoS is not. In these countries, in the absence of DoS investments, USAID is justified in incorporating prosecution activities to its CTIP efforts. 13 Annual Report 2011, National Committee to Lead the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor Exploitation, and Sexual Exploitation (STSLS), Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC). 14 Buth Reaksmey Kongkea and Laignee Barron, “Trafficker gets 10 years,” The Phnom Penh Post, April 30, 2014; Kate Hodal and Chris Kelly, “Trafficked into slavery on Thai trawlers to catch food for prawns,” The Guardian, June 10, 2014. 15 DoS spent more than USD $128 million while USAID spent just over USD $64 million. During this same period, DoS and USAID have invested nearly equal amounts on prevention and protection. 5 Counter-Trafficking in Persons (CTIP II) Program USAID/Cambodia has supported counter-trafficking activities since 2002 in the context of broader efforts to promote human development, security, and protection for Cambodian citizens. The first Counter-Trafficking in Persons (CTIP I) program implemented by The Asia Foundation (TAF) sought to close the gaps in strategy and coordination mechanisms between civil society and the government, leading to the creation of a National Committee (NC) to Lead the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor Exploitation, and Sexual Exploitation (STSLS) within the RGC, among other results. Building on these positive efforts, the CTIP II program (2011-2015) focuses on both male and female victims of trafficking and labor exploitation. This USD $5.4 million program, which is implemented by Winrock in partnership with the RGC and civil society stakeholders, is designed around the following objectives: 1. Prevention. To promote effective national and local prevention strategies to reduce TIP (including labor trafficking) by investigating TIP patterns, developing appropriate prevention campaigns for all forms of TIP, and establishing centralized locations for pre-decision migrants to obtain information on safe migration or viable economic alternatives to migration. 2. Protection. To enhance survivor protection and care services for all forms of TIP by developing and implementing victim identification (ID) channels and guidelines, promoting practical delivery and evaluation of minimum standards for survivor services, and promoting flexible survivor-driven service delivery and reintegration options, including for male victims. 3. Prosecution. To improve law enforcement capacity to identify and prosecute traffickers and TIP-related crimes by extending standard operating procedures (SOPs) of the Anti-Human Trafficking Juvenile Protection Unit (AHTJPU) to all police forces and by developing a consolidated anti-TIP training strategy and standardized training program. 4. Partnership. To strengthen RGC capacity to design, lead, coordinate, and evaluate in-country and regional efforts to combat all forms of TIP by providing guidance and technical assistance to strengthen the policy framework in labor and cross-border TIP, sexual abuse, and human smuggling. The program design recognizes the complex nature of human trafficking and exploitation, and the development hypothesis is that a multi-pronged approach—simultaneously addressing the 4Ps of prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership—will improve the ability of Cambodian stakeholders to combat trafficking. Eradication is the desired end goal but would not be a feasible or realistic achievement after a four-year intervention. Instead, CTIP II aims to enhance systems to sustain efforts across this multi-pronged approach. II. EVALUATION METHODS & LIMITATIONS EVALUATION TEAM Erica Holzaepfel (Team Leader/Senior Evaluation Specialist) provided overall responsibility for the evaluation including managing the fieldwork and overseeing the members of the evaluation team. Julia Rizvi (DRG and Evaluation Specialist) provided direct support to the team leader as well as additional subject matter expertise and evaluation support. Veronica Zeitlin (USAID CTIP Expert) provided the team with technical assistance during a portion of the fieldwork period and, as needed, during the data 6 analysis and reporting components of the evaluation. Panhavuth Long (Local Evaluation and Human Rights Specialist) offered technical knowledge of evaluation, rule of law, and human rights. Sophea Touch (Local Evaluation and Gender Specialist) supported the team with technical knowledge of evaluation and gender in development. Sophea Seng (Interpreter and Local CTIP Specialist) provided interpretation services during both the Phnom Penh and provincial fieldwork portion of the evaluation. Ms. Seng also contributed to the technical work of the evaluation as a CTIP Specialist. Sopheak Khoub (Local Logistician and Interpreter) was in charge of scheduling meetings for the team in Phnom Penh and the provinces as well as securing the team’s transportation and lodging and providing interpretation support during the provincial fieldwork portion of the evaluation. EVALUATION DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS This performance evaluation was carried out primarily during a seven-week period between April and June 2014 and included one week of preparatory desk review, two and a half weeks of fieldwork in Cambodia, one week of data analysis, and two weeks of report writing. Following submission of a draft report, additional document reviews and key informant interviews were undertaken at the request of USAID and Winrock. The evaluation employed standard rapid appraisal data collection methods: document review, key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and site visits. The evaluation team identified the following seven categories of target groups as data sources:  USG: Department of Homeland Security / Immigration and Customs Enforcement; DoS/J/TIP; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); USAID/Cambodia, U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh  Implementer: Winrock  Sub-grantees: Cambodian Center for the Protection of Child Rights (CCPCR); Cambodian Women’s Crisis Center (CWCC); Hagar International (or Hagar), Healthcare Center for Children (HCC); Khmer Youth Association (KYA); Legal Support for Children and Women (LSCW)  Beneficiaries: Labor trafficking victims; Self-Help Groups (SHGs)  Cambodian Government Actors: AHTJPU within the General Commissariat of National Police; Commune Councils; Commune Police Commissions; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training (MoLVT); Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSAVY); Ministry of Women’s Affairs; NC-STSLS within the Ministry of Interior; Provincial Committees on the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor, and Sexual Exploitation (PC-STSLS); Provincial Departments of Labor and Vocational Training ; Provincial Departments of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation; Provincial Police Commissions  External Actors – Donors: Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT); International Labor Organization (ILO); International Organization for Migration (IOM); United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP)  External Actors – NGOs: Agir Pour les Femmes en Situation Precaire ; Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association; Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights; Chab Dai Coalition; End Child Prostitution, Abuse, and Trafficking in Cambodia; International Justice Mission (IJM); MTV Exit; World Vision 7 Site Selection CTIP II was implemented in communes and districts across seven provinces. With only one week to conduct fieldwork activities outside Phnom Penh, there were limits to the amount of data the team could collect. Based on conversations with the Mission, it was decided that the evaluation would attempt to mix both breadth and depth. The evaluation achieves breadth in that it covers five of the six provinces outside Phnom Penh including Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Kampong Cham, Siem Reap, and Banteay Meanchey (see Annex II: Map of Evaluation Sites). Koh Kong Province in southern Cambodia was excluded primarily for logistical reasons. However, the evaluation was also able to achieve depth by focusing evaluation activities in each province on a limited number of districts and communes. The team met with provincial authorities in each province as well as with NGOs and sub-grantees that work across the entire province. Winrock selected the communes and districts where the team conducted a small number of KIIs and FGDs. Document Review The evaluation team conducted a comprehensive document review prior to embarking on fieldwork. The document review process included an examination of existing trafficking studies; RGC trafficking data; DoS’ annual TIP reports; relevant USAID policies on C-TIP and gender; relevant RGC documents (National Strategic Development Plan, anti-human trafficking policy, and other documents); and CTIP I and CTIP II program documentation, including program descriptions, amendments, work plans, annual performance management plans, quarterly and annual progress reports, assessment reports, program performance monitoring data, and other program-related reports. Annex III: Sources of Information includes a complete list of documents reviewed by the evaluation team. The evaluation team used the document review to refine the evaluation questions and to develop initial answers to these questions. The team consulted these key documents in drafting interview and focus group protocols and their associated sub-evaluation questions. The team also drew on members’ comparative knowledge and experience with human rights and trafficking programming from other contexts and countries. Annex IV: Data Collection Protocols includes the evaluation team’s lines of inquiry. Subsequent to fieldwork, the evaluation team received a series of additional documents for review. These sources included Winrock’s CTIP II strategy to raise awareness on TIP and safe migration; Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) materials produced by Winrock; training materials used by Winrock sub-grantee KYA to prepare Community-based Youth Network (CYN) to conduct awareness-raising activities; Winrock’s June 2014 report on its internal impact assessment of CTIP II prevention activities; Winrock’s field manual for police training; and CTIP II M&E-related documents. Some of these documents were produced only in the Khmer language, and local evaluation team members provided summary translation support as needed. Key Informant Interviews The evaluation team conducted in-person KIIs in Cambodia from April 28 through May 13, 2014. The team identified key informants from each of the target groups described above based on input and guidance from USAID staff in Cambodia, the Winrock CTIP II program team, and the local evaluation team members. The team conducted the KIIs on an individual basis or in groups to maximize efficiency, depending on circumstances, appropriateness, and availability of resources. Annex V: Evaluation Contacts and Key Informants contains a comprehensive list of respondents for KIIs and FGDs. The KIIs were structured around the five evaluation questions and aligned with the three evaluation objectives in the SOW. KIIs were semi-structured with closed and open-ended questions designed to answer the evaluation sub-questions. Gathering information from some of the key informants required more than 8 one interview; follow-on interviews enabled the team to deepen inquiries, particularly as data collection and analysis proceeded during the course of fieldwork. Number of Key Informants By Province Country Number of Informants Males Females Banteay Meanchey 9 6 3 Kampong Cham 18 6 12 Phnom Penh 56 36 20 Prey Veng 12 5 7 Siem Reap 18 11 7 Svay Rieng 48 22 26 International 3 0 3 Total 164 86 78 Focus Group Discussions The team conducted FGDs when groups possessed unifying characteristics that might distinguish their responses to interview questions from those of other groups. The key characteristic defining FGD participants was their role in project activities. FGD participants represented the following groups:  CYN volunteers working with KYA to promote CTIP prevention messaging  CCPCR and CWCC social workers implementing protection activities  CCPCR SHG that directly benefited from the project  RGC representatives at the commune level The evaluation team facilitated the FGDs by adapting the evaluation questions presented in Annex IV. FGDs with recipients of services provided by CTIP II sub-grantees focused on the following topics: perceptions of the services offered; changes in knowledge resulting from participation in programs; and perceptions of the value and impact of services or support offered. Site Visits and Direct Observation The team divided into two sub-teams to cover a wider range of CTIP II activity implementation sites in the provinces. Sub-team A traveled to Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, and Kampong Cham Provinces in southeastern Cambodia on the border with Vietnam, while Sub-team B visited Siem Reap and Banteay Meanchey Provinces in northern Cambodia on the border with Thailand. Field visits provided the team with the opportunity to visit trafficking survivor service providers and observe the implementation of services outside Phnom Penh. The evaluation team conducted site visits and direct observation of CTIP II’s protection service facilities and community awareness-raising activities. In addition, the team visited relevant service sites operated by NGOs and other donors throughout the provinces. Site observations included visiting the following transit centers, shelters, and community centers, and an awareness-raising activity: 9  Poipet Transit Center (PTC) in Banteay Meanchey  Poipet Border Crossing in Banteay Meanchey  CWCC Drop-in Center in Banteay Meanchey  CCPCR Transit Center in Prey Veng  CCPCR Shelter in Svay Rieng  CWCC Shelter in Siem Reap  KYA Community Bike Ride in Siem Reap GENDER PERSPECTIVE Consistent with the USAID Evaluation Policy, the team applied a gender perspective throughout the evaluation, ensuring that KIIs included both male and female participants and that data collection protocols included several questions aimed at exploring the relationship between the 4Ps and gender. The evaluation team examined gender issues within the context of the evaluation of CTIP II activities, and where possible within existing data.16 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS The team’s collection of primary data respected and took into careful consideration the sensitive nature of the subject matter and the lived experience of trafficking survivors. The evaluation team obtained informed consent from all participants in primary data collection and treated all information as confidential. Personal identifiers have therefore been removed from this report. Due to SI’s strict ethical protocols for human subject research among vulnerable populations, the team did not interview youth or children under the age of 13 years, which included all of CCPCR’s shelter beneficiaries in Svay Rieng Province. LIMITATIONS The CTIP II program seeks to fulfill a broad range of objectives across all 4Ps. Within each of these pillars, CTIP II is engaging with government counterparts to develop national policies and guidelines as well as supporting local NGOs through sub-grants to provide direct services and implement activities. This element of diversity complicates the aggregate snapshot of the CTIP II program. As such, a relatively short evaluation is inherently limited in developing a complete picture of the overall story of what the CTIP II program has accomplished. With firsthand experience designing, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating DRG programs, the SI team understands that security risks, ethical concerns, and fluctuations in political space can also present barriers to effective M&E. Recall Error Recall error is often encountered by evaluators. Trainees, sub-grantees, and government counterparts may respond to evaluation questions with answers blending their experiences into a composite memory, at times including past trainings and collaborative activities implemented by other donor-funded organizations. Additionally, training and activity implementation may have taken place sometime in the past, so respondents may not be able to provide the level of detail needed for an evaluation. 16 See Evaluation Question 1C for further discussion of findings, conclusions, and recommendations. 10 Selection Bias While the evaluation team visited six of the seven provinces in Cambodia where the CTIP II program is implemented, it was only able to visit a small number of districts and communes within each province. While this approach to site selection was reasonable based on established criteria and limitations of time and budget, the sample size of local units observed is small compared to the actual number of districts and communes that CTIP II investments actually reach. There is also the risk of bias in the selection of FGD participants and some key informants. A majority of FGDs conducted by the evaluation team included individuals with direct involvement in the CTIP II program. As the contacts were provided by the implementer, Winrock, the evaluation runs the risk that the team only heard from people with positive experiences. To address this challenge, the team did meet with a selection of external individuals and organizations operating in the CTIP arena in Cambodia; however, more time to obtain feedback and input from villagers, government staff, and additional civil society members and organizations would have provided more opportunities to obtain a wider range of beneficiary and stakeholder perspectives regarding the quality, effectiveness, and appropriateness of the CTIP II program. Response Bias A potential limitation faced by the evaluation team relates to response bias that may occur if respondents think that providing or withholding certain information may lead to various consequences. For example, participants in a professional development program may provide the interviewer with positive remarks because they hope that such opportunities will continue in the future, regardless of the effect of the activity. The SI team fully expects that direct beneficiaries, sub-grantees, and government counterparts may understand that a negative evaluation could mean the end of a project that provided them with needed benefits. Due to the restricted timeframe, the evaluators were not able to interview the majority of sub-grantee staff members, CYN volunteers, government officials, or beneficiaries of protection services on a one￾on-one, confidential basis. This would have been optimal for gathering in-depth perspectives on sensitive topics or service needs; in a group setting, such perspectives may not have been fully disclosed by these individuals due to internal relationships and power imbalances between respondents. To overcome this limitation, the team consistently provided interviewees with assurances of anonymity and confidentiality as the foundation to establishing an open, trusting environment for discussion and data collection. The evaluation team actively sought to prevent bias as much as possible by using multiple sources of data to triangulate on an evaluation issue, with the assistance of qualitative evidence matrices. By combining information from multiple sources, i.e., documents, interviews, site visits, and available metrics, the effect of biases on the analysis were mitigated as much as possible. The team also employed an interview approach to mitigate bias that involves the use of questions about specific examples of knowledge to probe general responses more thoroughly and verify respondent familiarity with the material discussed. Evaluation Timeframe The evaluation team was limited by the amount of time allocated for data collection in Cambodia. Changes in the evaluation timeframe forced the team to terminate their data collection activities aone week early due to a national holiday that had not been properly considered during the evaluation planning stage. Consequently, the team was only able to conduct data collection activities in Cambodia over a period of two, rather than three, weeks. For an evaluation of this scope, the team would have greatly benefitted from an additional week to circle back to USAID and CTIP II staff at Winrock to triangulate data gathered from sub-grantees, external actors, and other stakeholders. 11 In a related vein, the availability of key informants affiliated with CTIP II was also a limiting factor for the evaluation. Ideally, the team would have conducted individual interviews with CTIP II staff members at the beginning of the evaluation, with several days allocated to this critical activity. Due to limited time in country to interview and follow-up with Winrock staff, however, correspondence and KIIs with the CTIP II implementer continued after international team members departed Cambodia. These important communications led to the receipt of a substantial number of documents for review following the conclusion of fieldwork. Review of these documents during the data analysis and report-writing phase presented challenges to ensuring the effective integration and consideration of critical information. III. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS QUESTION 1: CTIP II ACHIEVEMENT OF SET PROGRAM OBJECTIVES 1A: The 4Ps Which of the 4Ps has been most successful? Which has been the least successful? Is the 4P approach leading to tangible results? The evaluation team conducted a macro-level review of progress toward achieving CTIP II program objectives that correspond with each of the 4Ps: prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership. Findings are organized by each of these components, followed by overall evidence-based conclusions and recommendations that address the evaluation questions. FINDINGS Prevention Research commissioned by Winrock and released by Rapid Asia in December 2012 underscores the need for messaging on safe migration and offers appropriate prevention strategies to address each stage of the migrant recruitment supply chain.17 Based on those research findings and a study of existing IEC materials produced by NGOs, Winrock developed a strategy—which identifies target groups, messages, and tools—to inform CTIP II prevention activities beginning in 2013. The strategy articulates an objective of consensus among CTIP II partners and common use of effective, professional IEC materials to raise awareness about safe migration. Winrock indicated that it has strived to achieve clarity and uniformity of messaging by training its sub-grantees on the correct identification of TIP victims and by reviewing concepts at routine partner meetings. At the same time, Winrock and key informants across a number of target groups spoke to the evaluation team about challenges related to terminology in Cambodia. Indeed, during KIIs and FGDs, some CTIP II stakeholders demonstrated lack of clarity about the distinctions between human trafficking and labor exploitation as well as how to apply those definitions effectively to their work.18 The evaluation team reviewed a series of Khmer-language IEC materials and did not find any content to be inaccurate or problematic. However, the lack of readily 17 Winrock International and Rapid Asia, Research Report on Sex and Labor Trafficking Network and Pattern in Cambodia, December 2012, Pages 4-5. 18 See Evaluation Question 1B for discussion about potential unintended results of interpretation-related challenges. 12 available IEC materials translated into English raises questions about the level of oversight possible by Winrock expatriate field staff, Winrock headquarters staff, or USAID staff who are not fluent in Khmer. It should also be noted that the evaluation team did not collect data on the extent to which CTIP II partners are employing common IEC materials and messages. Winrock’s primary focus in promoting effective national and local TIP prevention strategies has been the development of IEC materials and the dissemination of those materials and complementary messages via hotlines, interactive voice response (IVR), kiosks, training, and community events. The effectiveness of these prevention messages is difficult to assess based on output-level monitoring data provided by Winrock and its sub-grantees. Moreover, quantitative data on the number of IEC materials produced or attendees at community events does not necessarily translate into perceptible shifts in knowledge, attitudes, or practices. In June 2014, Winrock completed its own assessment of the impact of its prevention activities, which involved a survey, KIIs, and FGDs with 227 people across six provinces who participated in CTIP II activities.19 Using research conducted by Rapid Asia as a baseline, the assessment indicates an increase in the number of TIP information sources consulted by vulnerable groups since 2012. While the assessment cites opportunities to enhance community members’ knowledge about the stages of preparation for safe migration, less than 10 percent of citizens interviewed indicated an attitude of uncertainty or unwillingness to take action in the event of a potential incident of TIP or exploitation. Perhaps most promising, 50 percent of commune council authorities interviewed as part of the assessment reported that—as a result of participating in CTIP II prevention activities—they subsequently allocated a portion of their community development budgets to address TIP-related issues and independently organized events to share information on TIP and safe migration with community members. To support this finding about behavior changes among local authorities, 75 percent of CYN respondents cited an increase in commune council members’ support for CTIP II prevention activities. Meanwhile, the evaluation team identified concerns related to the capacity of a major provider of CTIP II prevention messages. Winrock sub-grantee KYA specializes in civic activism and relies on other NGOs or external specialists to provide TIP expertise to the primary disseminators of its prevention messages: secondary school students recruited by their village chiefs to serve as CYN volunteers. KYA provides support to CYNs to conduct community outreach on a variety of topics including HIV/AIDS, maternal health, elections, natural resources, and others. Thus, select youth leaders gain general knowledge from KYA—and other NGOs—on select topics, with the expectation that they will convey knowledge to their peers in preparation for educating community members at public events. Youth are a key target group for engagement in TIP prevention, and their involvement in CYNs is a productive form of civic participation. Yet, most CYN volunteers have limited exposure to CTIP topics prior to participation in KYA training, and KYA faces limitations in providing follow-up coaching on this complex and specialized subject matter to more than 300 volunteers in 36 CYNs across six provinces. Winrock’s June 2014 assessment cites that, on average, 60 percent of CYN respondents trained by KYA were able to correctly match terms with definitions and demonstrate knowledge about the steps of safe migration. Given that CYN activities reached more than 15,000 people during the project period—which accounts for one-quarter of the total audience of CTIP II prevention activities20—the evaluation team asserts that a higher number of CYN volunteers should demonstrate adequate knowledge of these critical topics. The evaluation team’s direct observation of a KYA-supported community event and FGDs with CYN members revealed that some youth were unprepared to convey prevention messages to vulnerable audiences.21 When reflecting on their implementation of a community event, CYN volunteers relayed 19 Winrock International, Report on Impact Assessment of Prevention Activities, June 30, 2014. Winrock estimates that 37,730 people have participated in CTIP II prevention activities—both directly and indirectly. 20 Winrock International, Report on Impact Assessment of Prevention Activities, June 30, 2014, Pages 9, 6. 21 See Evaluation Question 1B for further discussion of potential unintended results related to the capacity of CYNs. 13 that attendance rates of peer educators at KYA training were low and retention of CTIP knowledge was limited among some trainees. One peer educator cited a need for more information about the consequences of unsafe migration, and key informants reported that CYN volunteers would benefit from more robust training on both CTIP and public speaking to increase the effectiveness and persuasive delivery of their prevention messages. Protection Winrock and its sub-grantees are engaged in a variety of activities related to protection and service delivery for survivors of trafficking and exploitation. Tangible outputs of USAID support for protection activities are evident in quarterly statistics on the number of TIP victims who receive assistance from Winrock sub-grantees. The evaluation team found that most Winrock partners have been active in the CTIP arena for years and, therefore, employ effective referral pathways and follow-up mechanisms for monitoring the status of their clients. However, outcomes of the assistance provided by sub-grantees to clients are not reported to Winrock in a manner that would enable the evaluation team to assess the long-term impact of protection-related interventions.22 In the first year of CTIP II program implementation, Winrock commissioned an assessment of service delivery models in Cambodia that compared and contrasted residential shelters and community-based care, offering strengths and weaknesses of each model—including primary users, relative costs, gaps in services, and recommendations. Winrock indicated that the assessment report was disseminated to CTIP II partners and used to integrate guiding principles for improving interventions into Winrock’s protection activities. The assessment found that, “Residential shelter care is widely seen as the least favorable option for alternative care however the majority of alternative care for survivors of TIP in Cambodia is based on a residential care model.”23 Despite this finding, CTIP II sub-grantees engage in both models of service delivery; Winrock noted various challenges related to community-based care— including high mobility of clients—but indicated that discussions are underway about guidelines and national standards for that model. The evaluation team conducted site visits to several residential shelters and transit centers supported in part by USAID funding. Key informants reported that Winrock’s development, in collaboration with MoSAVY and UNIAP, of Minimum Standards on Residential Care for Victims of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation meets a critical need. Furthermore, the facilities visited were judged by the evaluation team to be of high quality and offer comprehensive services for women and children. Nonetheless, it is important to note that given time constraints and ethical considerations, the evaluation team did not gather firsthand perspectives about client satisfaction levels among beneficiaries.24 Aftercare provided at the CWCC shelter in Siem Reap predominantly serves female victims of domestic violence and their dependents; although the shelter is open to female survivors of trafficking or exploitation, key informants reported that clients are generally not trafficking survivors. Instead, informants reported that the majority of trafficking victims in the province prefer to seek community-based care. USAID CTIP II funding covers expenses for each trafficking victim that uses the CWCC shelter in Siem Reap, while other donors support the shelter’s operating expenses and staff 22 See Evaluation Question 3 for further discussion of M&E practices. As underscored in USAID Counter-TIP Follow-up Project Design, February 2011, page 11: “Another problem is that victim support programmes have largely been unmonitored for the past decade, and there is very little information available as to how victims have perceived services. Several stakeholders have expressed concerns as to the quality and appropriateness of many of the services offered.” 23 Robin Mauney and Rachana Srun, Assessment of Shelter Versus Community Based Services, Winrock International, October 12, 2012, Pages 29, 35. 24 See Data Collection Methods for further discussion on the evaluation team’s selection of key informants. 14 salary. Proactive outreach to victims of trafficking and exploitation could be improved to ensure that available residential care facilities attract CTIP II’s target beneficiaries.25 The resource-intensive nature of protection introduces constraints for USAID to support adequate services for all vulnerable groups. Community-based care activities conducted by Winrock sub-grantees offer flexible alternatives—especially for victims of labor trafficking who seek immediate return to their families and engagement in sustainable livelihoods. However, the evaluation team found the number of beneficiaries of USAID-funded reintegration activities to be strikingly small and observed inconsistencies in the standards applied to income generation and prevention of re-victimization. In correspondence, Winrock reported that over the life of the project 176 victims of human trafficking and labor exploitation were reintegrated into their home communities. Among of them, 38 received vocational training skills, 17 received business grants, 57 received life start-up grants, and 8 VoTs received job placement services. In addition, 30 reintegrated victims of trafficking and labor exploitation were assessed so far as fully reintegrated with secure employment SHGs supported by Winrock could be a promising model of community-based care. The SHG in Svay Rieng is composed of 30 members identified by CCPCR to be at high-risk for labor exploitation and trafficking. Children of several SHG members reside at the CCPCR shelter. CCPCR conducts a small savings and loan program for SHG members. During its FGD with SHG members, the evaluation team heard that the first round of borrowing was extremely successful, with nearly 100 percent compliance with loan repayment policies.26 Members reported that Winrock sub-grantee CCPCR teaches them about farming techniques, child rights, migration, and the detriment of sending their children far away to earn money. One member shared, “Now many children stop migrating… with the money we borrow we are able to earn further from extra jobs… so children can stay at home to go to school.” Prosecution Effective prosecution of TIP perpetrators has been a longtime challenge in Cambodia, and key informants provided mixed reviews about Winrock’s activities to improve law enforcement capacity to identify and prosecute traffickers and TIP-related crimes. Furthermore, key informants from multiple target groups noted the acute difficulties of achieving sustainable progress in the prosecution arena due to entrenched corruption within the judicial system. The need for institutionalizing law enforcement capacity-building efforts and for establishing a standardized TIP training strategy was recognized in advance of USAID’s solicitation for CTIP II proposals and is reflected in Winrock’s program objectives.27 However, Winrock has had a hard time achieving this objective, and its work with Cambodian authorities to develop SOPs or a consolidated anti-TIP training strategy and standardized training 25 See Evaluation Question 1C for further discussion on the accessibility and use of residential shelters by men. 26 CCPCR initially committed USG $4,500 to the SHG and increased funding by USD $1,500 since the project started one year ago. Based on a micro-credit association model, SHG members are eligible to borrow funds at an interest rate of 2 percent for investments in activities that are likely to yield returns, such as farming and animal-raising. Interest is collected each month, amounting to approximately USD $3 per family. The borrowing period coincides with the lead-up to farming season (May-June), and the loan must be paid back following harvest (November). In one exception, a member passed away and the money borrowed by that individual was not recovered. 27 USAID Counter-TIP Follow-up Project Design, February 2011, page 26: “With regard to prosecution it seems clear that, while there is a need for ongoing training, there is more of a need for strengthening the value of training by locating training activities in a stronger institutional context. In this first instance, this could involve the General Commissariat for National Police developing a formal training strategy for TIP, which is likely to be linked to a wider training strategy as well as promotion procedures. This could also assist the USG to maximize the benefits of the law enforcement training currently provided by a range of different agencies. As well as this training, there is a need to address the basic foundations and building blocks on which this training is based, including investigating procedures.” 15 program has been limited. Indeed, the evaluation team identified a variety of ongoing CTIP training models for law enforcement officers in Cambodia and noted that consolidation in this area is lacking among donors and implementing partners.28 In this context, a notable best practice is the ongoing collaboration among Winrock, IJM, and others to advocate for the adoption of Undercover Investigative Authority (UIA) and to train law enforcement officials on its implementation. At the outset of CTIP II program implementation, Winrock provided a one-year sub-grant to Southeast Asian Investigations into Social and Humanitarian Activities (SISHA) to conduct criminal investigation training for 104 provincial police officers. SISHA was unable to provide evidence of causal links between increased knowledge of police and successful prosecution of TIP cases, and Winrock came to recognize that the provincial training program duplicated activities conducted under CTIP I as well as training underway by IJM. Informed by a needs assessment conducted by Winrock in 2012,29 USAID approved the redirection of funds to train police at the commune level. Winrock commissioned two trainers from the General Commissariat of National Police AHTJPU to design and implement CTIP training for more than 400 police officers at commune levels in five provinces.30 The training involves classroom instruction but does not include fieldwork to help police apply what they learn in the classroom. Winrock conducts pre- and post-tests to measure increases in knowledge, and the number of TIP cases reported by trainees serves as an indicator of knowledge application. Program records suggest that TIP reporting has increased among trainees; however, the evaluation team found that in some instances, the number of TIP cases reported by commune police to provincial police is actually the number of persons migrating away from their communes each month. Winrock’s police training efforts garnered both praise and criticism. Key informants indicated to the evaluation team that Winrock’s decision to refocus law enforcement resources on commune-level police is innovative because it prepares officers with previously limited exposure to investigate and report cases where they most often occur. At the same time, however, Winrock’s training model was critiqued for lacking a longer-term practicum component that could support officers in preparing TIP cases for prosecution. More importantly, while commune police report TIP cases to provincial police, commune police do not generally build those cases for prosecution. As such, it was not clear to the evaluation team that Winrock’s intervention could have a positive effect on TIP prosecutions without a parallel focus on provincial police, prosecutors, or judges. Partnership Technical assistance provided by Winrock to strengthen the capacity of the RGC to design, lead, coordinate, and evaluate efforts to combat all forms of TIP builds upon notable achievements by USAID and TAF under the CTIP I program. The establishment and operationalization of the NC-STSLS and its corresponding PC-STSLSs was a critical step toward improving coordination, monitoring, and local ownership of TIP interventions in Cambodia.31 Despite the challenges and tensions—both implicit and explicit—of fostering partnerships with government entities, Winrock is making incremental progress in leading a variety of long-term initiatives to support the NC’s functions and strategic planning. 28 See Evaluation Question 4 for further discussion of comparative advantages. 29 Winrock International, Brief Assessment on Local Police’s Capacity Building in Relation to TIP Issue, July 2012. 30 See Evaluation Question 1C for discussion about the gender imbalance among Winrock trainees. 31 Ruth Rosenberg and Lisa Hammond, Final Report: Evaluation of the Countering-Trafficking in Persons Program in Cambodia, December 2010, page 13-20. 16 While key informants highlighted opportunities for improved communication, time management, and negotiation by Winrock during working group meetings, they acknowledged that nurturing political will and cooperation among RGC counterparts is a difficult task and expressed gratitude for Winrock’s efforts to date.32 For example, key informants noted that early deliberations about the structure of the 2014-2018 National Plan of Action (NPA) were circular and indicative of competing priorities; the NC Secretariat preferred to follow its standard activity-based model, and the RGC voiced resistance to the outcomes-based model advocated by Winrock. Developments were underway as the evaluation team completed its fieldwork, and Winrock’s ability to balance the mutually-reinforcing priorities of “process” and “product” will be central to securing buy-in from stakeholders in the RGC and CTIP arena. The evaluation team found Cambodia to be a particularly challenging environment to implement partnership activities to strengthen RGC and NGO coordination to combat trafficking because of rapidly shrinking civil society space. NGOs anticipate the RGC’s enactment shortly of a restrictive NGO law, and the evaluation team observed that levels of distrust of the government by civil society were significant. One provincial level department of labor representative told the team, while talking about his office’s efforts to combat trafficking, that he is also active in a government committee for the suppression of public demonstrations. In this environment, it was not surprising that the several government representatives reported that Winrock and CTIP II sub-grantees were not collaborating closely with them. CONCLUSIONS Based on the evaluation team’s findings, Winrock is making tangible progress toward achieving some of the intended results of the CTIP II program. A critical component of the CTIP II program, prevention activities conducted by Winrock have achieved notable results and would benefit from a more robust and strategic implementation plan that enlists a broader profile of message providers. Winrock and some of its sub-grantees provide needed protection services and reintegration options for trafficking survivors and other vulnerable groups; opportunities for targeting additional beneficiaries and incorporating innovative approaches could be considered during the remainder of the project period. However, the evaluation team found that Winrock’s prosecution-related activities made limited contributions thus far to the goal of institutional capacity-building. Finally, Winrock’s partnerships with the RGC are strategic for incrementally improving the ability and readiness of Cambodian institutions to combat all forms of TIP.  Based on Winrock’s internal assessment, CTIP II prevention activities have improved TIP￾related knowledge, attitudes, and behavior at the local level. At the same time, the number and type of message providers is narrow, and message content is not necessarily aligned with an overarching prevention campaign strategy. Cambodian youth are a key entry point for raising awareness about safe migration among their peers, local authorities, and community members; however, many youth may have limited authority or power in their communities, and CYNs are overburdened and require technical training on CTIP and outreach skills in order to be effective.  Winrock and its sub-grantees contributed to enhancing protection and care for trafficking survivors—especially through flexible service delivery and reintegration activities such as SHGs. However, beneficiaries of USAID-supported reintegration activities are relatively low in number, and the evaluation found that CTIP II sub-grantees could be more proactive in identifying and recruiting survivors to benefit from shelter services. While outputs of Winrock’s protection 32 See Evaluation Question 1D for further discussion of stakeholder coordination as it relates to partnership. 17 activities are evident, this evaluation is not able to speak to the long-term impact of interventions on vulnerable groups.  The challenging operating environment and the reality that Winrock lacks a comparative advantage in the prosecution arena have constrained CTIP II program efforts to improve law enforcement capacity to identify and prosecute traffickers and TIP-related crimes.Winrock’s mid-course adjustment to shift the target group of its prosecution activities from provincial police to commune police aimed to address a clear knowledge gap at the commune level. Moreover, the application of knowledge by Winrock trainees contributed to increased identification and reporting of TIP cases at the commune level.The need remains for donors and implementing partners to support the institutionalization of law enforcement capacity-building efforts—following the model of collaboration on advocacy for UIA—and the establishment of a standardized TIP training strategy in Cambodia.  Realistic expectations for Winrock’s achievements related to partnership should take into account the structural and budget constraints currently faced by the NC, Winrock’s primary partner in the RGC. Winrock plays a strategic and useful—if underappreciated—role in coordinating disparate RGC actors and partners to build consensus around objectives and action-items for CTIP interventions in Cambodia. Continued guidance from USAID, as well as diplomatic support from the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, is required for sustainable impact in this area. RECOMMENDATIONS  Winrock should review and refine its TIP prevention campaign strategy for the remainder of the CTIP II project period. The campaign strategy should continue to build on thefindings from Winrock’s June 2014 assessment of the impact of its prevention activities, best practices and regional models for TIP prevention, and relevant resources on Behavior Change Communication. In particular, Winrock should increase the capacity of CYN volunteers as well as work with commune councils and commune police to consolidate and expand upon progress achieved at the local level.  Winrock should ensure that all groups and individuals engaged in conveying messages on TIP prevention and safe migration undergo sufficient training provided by TIP experts. Training should cover relevant terminology, vulnerability factors, and available resources for victims to ensure that messages are accurate, consistent, effective, and aligned with Winrock’s prevention campaign strategy.  USAID should articulate a protection strategy that clearly identifies its preferred model of service delivery, primary intended users of the services, and intended outcomes of the model. The protection strategy would be incorporated in the pending USG strategic statement for Cambodia on TIP and should align with one or more of the objectives outlined in the 2012 USAID CTIP Policy. In developing its strategy, USAID should consult assessments of protection service delivery models in Cambodia commissioned by Winrock and other actors.  Winrock should encourage its sub-grantees to conduct proactive outreach to victims of trafficking and exploitation to ensure that high quality residential care facilities serve CTIP II’s intended beneficiaries. Public outreach should be conducted in alignment with Winrock’s TIP prevention campaign strategy. 18  USAID and Winrock should prioritize funding reintegration activities that are comprehensive and sustainable in design. Reintegration services are increasingly recognized as a critical element of protection and require standardized criteria for ensuring consistency and quality in the provision of services as well as a comprehensive tracking system to prevent the delivery of duplicative services. Reintegration programs should dedicate sufficient human and financial resources to provide counseling support, vocational training, and income generation funds to survivors—as well as to monitor long-term outcomes of interventions.  Winrock should review its CTIP training model for police at the commune level and consider improvements to achieve greater impact during the CTIP II project period. In particular, Winrock and law enforcement trainers should consider conducting follow-up activities with trainees to support the practical application and testing of knowledge gained during classroom training. IJM, Action Pour Les Enfants (APLE), Australia-Asia Program to Combat Trafficking in Persons (AAPTIP), and USG Interagency personnel should be routinely consulted for lessons learned about best practice models in the Cambodian context. In addition, USAID supported strong prosecution program designs in the Philippines implemented by IJM and in Nigeria implemented by the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative.33  USAID should review the nature of its future support for building the capacity of Cambodian law enforcement officers to prosecute TIP perpetrators and crimes. Through collaboration with other donors and USG agencies, USAID should assess the political will and capacity of the General Commissariat of Police to establish and implement SOPs and a standardized TIP training strategy. For future programming, USAID should reassess the needs of various target groups—police, prosecutors, and judges at the national, provincial, and commune levels—to ensure that capacity-building interventions are strategic and serve unmet demands for support. Interventions may need to go beyond capacity-building and entail supporting specialized units or embedding law enforcement consultants.  Winrock should identify opportunities to improve its management of strategy sessions and negotiation processes with the NC and RGC counterparts. For example, Winrock should set clear and realistic expectations, establish agendas and manage time accordingly, and delineate roles and responsibilities for working group meetings. Winrock should also continue to communicate closely with the NC Secretariat prior to meetings with wider audiences to confirm that office’s buy-in and promote a unified partnership approach.  USAID should continue to support Winrock in consolidating investments made in the RGC by the USG, international actors, and local stakeholders under CTIP I. Support from USAID should include technical guidance on CTIP when appropriate and requested, consultation with country and regional USAID Missions to identify promising practices and models for government capacity-building, and coordination with the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh to pursue opportunities for leveraging synergies between diplomatic and development objectives in Cambodia. 33 Combining classroom instruction with assisted fieldwork is a best practice in prosecution programming. USAID supported effective police training programs in both the Philippines and Nigeria that followed this design. In the fieldwork component, trainers accompanied police through the legal process (from investigating cases, to arresting traffickers, to gathering evidence to prepare for trial and conviction), helping them to apply new techniques. Moreover, the content of the classroom instruction focused on building concrete skills—such as how to arrest and charge traffickers—to help advance legal proceedings against traffickers. In both the Philippines and Nigeria, this program model facilitated increased prosecutions and convictions of traffickers. 19 1B: Unexpected / Unintended Results Have there been positive or negative unexpected/unintended results of the project? FINDINGS The team identified a potential unintended negative result of the CTIP II program, which has already been alluded to above. Winrock and its sub-grantee, KYA, are not providing sufficient technical and mentoring support to their youth volunteers. The evaluation team identified this as a potential source for unintended negative results in terms of the content and appropriateness of prevention messaging and awareness-raising activities. Winrock’s prevention work through KYA places excessive responsibility on the volunteers, which potentially results in inaccurate or uncomprehensive messaging on CTIP, particularly the topic of safe migration. One clear manifestation of this problem is evident in the presentation of “legal migration” versus “safe migration.” While CTIP II does not equate legal migration with safe migration, interviews with youth volunteers in Kampong Cham revealed that some volunteers conflate the two concepts, leading to potential negative outcomes for migrants who engage in “legal migration” that is ultimately unsafe. In addition, the evaluation team interviewed a youth volunteer in Prey Veng who reported giving community members the names of licensed RAs when educating them about safe migration. Furthermore, KYA has partnered with the Migrant Resource Center (MRC)34 in three large, public forums on safe migration and trafficking in Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, and Kampong Cham. MRC as an organization endorses the government's list of licensed RAs as being safe and also disseminates the message that legal migration is safe migration. Representatives from the MRC in two provinces reported that they distribute the list of licensed agencies and said that legal migration is safe migration. One of the MRC representatives—who said he hands out the list of licensed RAs and argues that legal migration is safe migration—was a guest speaker on safe migration at one of these safe migration forums. There has been an attempt to facilitate safe migration through the government licensing of RAs. In fact, CTIP II provided support to ILO and MoLVT on developing the prakas that set criteria for providing licenses and guidelines on the process to inspect and provide rewards and penalties. These prakas have already been endorsed. However, there are concerns with the licensing process. While the new prakas set criteria for obtaining a license and also monitor the RAs, it appears to depend primarily on whether agencies pay the government licensing fee. There is no evidence that the government is actually monitoring these agencies’ operations or that RAs are required to fulfill clear safety standards to obtain a license. It also appears that some of these agencies have victimized migrants, as was recently revealed in the high-profile Giant Ocean Case. ILO and UNIAP have investigated some of the legal migration channels and have found that these channels do not necessarily offer protection from exploitation, deception and mistreatment, thus limiting their appeal to potential migrants.35 In addition to the well￾known Giant Ocean Case, CTIP II’s routine monitoring data on assisted survivors indicates that some survivors used the RAs on the government’s list. 34 The Migration Resource Center is a regional NGO that receives funding from DFAT and ILO under the Triangle Program to work across the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) countries providing counseling on safe migration, legal assistance, and educational materials on safe migration. In Cambodia MRC works in Kampong Cham, Prey Veng, Battambang, and Phnom Penh. As noted in the year two, second quarterly report MRC collaborates with KYA to organize public forums on safe migration and the prevention of human trafficking. 35 International Labor Organization (2008). An Honest Broker – Improving cross-border recruitment practices for the benefit of Government, Workers and Employers. Bangkok: ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. 20 While the evaluation team was concerned about the number of survivors reporting victimization by the RAs, the team identified CTIP II’s data on victim protection as a promising practice. The team found a wealth of useful information in the annexes to the Year 1 and 2 annual reports, including the number of survivors who used RAs, the names of the agencies they used, and how many survivors worked through brokers. Many direct assistance CTIP programs miss the opportunity to learn about CTIP trends because they do not collect data on victims assisted. At the same time, however, it is not clear whether CTIP II shares information on the RAs used by survivors with law enforcement officials (with the exception of Giant Ocean International). Another potential unintended negative consequence is the risk of undermining trafficking prosecutions and unintentionally endorsing RAs that might engage in trafficking or labor exploitation. Regarding the former, Winrock has provided support to the ILO, which is working with MoLVT, to develop a series of ministerial prakas, or complaint mechanisms, to subdecree 190. Because Cambodia does not have a labor court, proceedings that go to court are criminal cases. According to a staff member from the ILO: The idea behind the complaint mechanism (prakas) is that it’s administrative not judicial – migrant workers don’t have a lot of information about when they have been cheated or exploited. They don’t want to go to court and they don’t have money for legal representation; they just want their money back and the thinking behind the complaints mechanisms is that it is quick and easy. If there are criminal complaints then they are escalated to the judicial process. In theory, the complaint mechanisms and courts are two parallel systems and a victim could pursue both mechanisms. Given the transaction costs in pursuing two parallel processes, however, it is possible that a victim would only pursue the comparatively easier complaint mechanism. This is not to say that the complaint mechanism is not a valuable innovation; however, efforts should be taken to assess whether or not this mechanism is further reducing cases of criminal prosecution. The team identified a weakness in the design of CTIP II’s protection activities that could potentially lead to unintended negative results, which is the lack of consistent, long-term reintegration strategies and planning. Winrock’s reintegration activities do not appear to be effectively designed to prevent repeat trafficking or exploitation. In specific cases the team examined, reintegration activities conducted by Winrock sub-grantees did not sufficiently employ long-term holistic approaches or undertake economic viability analysis of the selected business plan and thus could possibly lead to repeated cases of trafficking and exploitation. For example, a male labor trafficking survivor interviewed by the evaluation team received USD $174 from a Winrock sub-grantee to launch his production of fermented rice dessert, which his family sells to consumers via bicycle; due to insufficient funds, he now purchases rice on credit and lacks a sustainable income in Cambodia. Finally, during a visit to the PTC, which is partially funded by CTIP II, the team found that male and female survivors are hosted in separate rooms in the same building, under supervision of the shelter manager. The center manager informed the evaluation team that the cohabitation was not a problem because male and female survivors are transported together by Thai authorities back to Cambodia during the deportation process, underscoring that males and females get to know each other before they arrive at the transit center. This portrayal of the situation does not account for the fact that the deportation process can be traumatizing and confusing for survivors. It is an unlikely environment in which males and females get to know one another to the extent that they are comfortable sharing accommodations, such as the single bathroom in the transit center. Although the manager mentioned that the majority of survivors received in the shelter are boy labor trafficking survivors, the center does, on occasion, receive female sex trafficking survivors. These females may feel threatened or traumatized sharing a living space with males. The shelter also cares for some female labor trafficking survivors. Such 21 survivors often experience sexual abuse in the context of their trafficking experience and may, therefore, not wish to share shelter quarters with males. Winrock indicated to the evaluation team that the new planned center will provide separate buildings for female and male clients. CONCLUSIONS The utilization of prakas to penalize RAs raised concerns with the evaluation team about whether these complaint mechanisms may be facilitating agencies’ ability to avoid prosecution, rather than increasing the effectiveness of TIP law enforcement. In light of the misgiving that surround the relationships between government officials and the licensed RAs, the team questioned Winrock’s focus on developing additional administrative guidelines governing penalties for RAs rather than increasing judges’ and prosecutors’ dexterity to draw upon the existing TIP law and related laws to prosecute these entities. Recommendations from the evaluation of CTIP I as well as USAID/Cambodia’s Request for Application (RFA) for CTIP II both highlight the need for creative approaches to victim protection services including community-based care models for rapid reintegration. Given the seeming importance placed on this aspect of CTIP programming, the team was concerned about both the lack of systemic planning and analysis that Winrock and their sub-grantees appeared to be dedicating to developing sustainable community care and reintegration models as well as to the minimal number of survivors the program has assisted. The team was concerned about the delivery mechanism of KYA’s prevention activities, which relies heavily on the work of volunteer youth (see findings under Question 1A above for a fuller discussion of this point). Insufficient subject matter expertise and preparation among the volunteers who are delivering awareness-raising information and activities risks providing inaccurate or ineffective messages to beneficiaries. This can contribute to negative consequences for beneficiaries acting on inaccurate or poorly delivered information, and can also thwart the achievement of higher-level prevention outcomes in the CTIP II program design. Conversations with Winrock about this finding have catalyzed an extensive response, and Winrock is working diligently to provide additional support to KYA and ensure that their prevention messaging is consistent and on point. RECOMMENDATIONS  Winrock should work with MoSAVY and other donors and NGOs in the protection arena, to utilize and apply the standardized guidelines for effective survivor reintegration. Guidelines should be enhanced to include a thorough analysis of the local economy and the required development of a business plan and sustainability plan for each survivor who is reintegrated. Guidelines should also consider and integrate best practices highlighted in Winrock’s 2012 “Assessment of Shelter versus Community Based Services Report.”  USAID, with input from Winrock, should develop a policy for the endorsement of licensed RAs. In doing so, USAID should carefully review ILO’s 2008 report and communicate with ILO regarding the current initiative they are undertaking to develop a set of criteria to measure the quality and reliability of licensed RAs.  Winrock should continue to work closely with its prevention sub-grantees, particularly with KYA, to increase support for CYN volunteers and ensure that their message dissemination on safe and legal migration is clear, consistent, and on point. 22  In coordination with USAID, Winrock should continue to support ILO and work with MoLVT on the development of specific guidelines and tools for the implementation of the new prakas.  CTIP II should proactively disseminate prevention messaging that clearly distinguishes safe migration from legal migration. The messaging should be designed in a way that is not critical of the government. In fact, some RGC officials the evaluation team spoke with acknowledged that migrant victimization through the RAs can happen.  USAID should work with Winrock to ensure that all prevention materials are in line with USAID’s overarching CTIP Policy. In addition, USAID should ensure that all CTIP implementing partners conducting safe migration awareness activities and producing IEC materials clearly educate beneficiaries on the difference between safe migration and legal migration.  Winrock should monitor CTIP II’s safe migration messaging on a regular basis to ensure its integrity and that CTIP II is not promoting the use of government-licensed RAs as a safe migration strategy. All CTIP IEC materials should be translated into English before finalization and approval to enable close review by any CTIP experts, Winrock staff, and USAID staff who are not fluent in the Khmer language.  CTIP II should share its data on victims assisted, such as the number of survivors who used RAs, which agencies they used, and how many used brokers, with law enforcement to encourage investigations. 1C: Program Interventions and Gender Have program interventions affected men/boys, women/girls differently? FINDINGS The arc of USG support for CTIP interventions in Cambodia coincides with a paradigm shift toward increased recognition of male labor migrants as a vulnerable group that requires urgent attention. Conducted in 2010, the independent evaluation of the CTIP I program acknowledged that the Cambodian public believed that women and children were the primary victims of trafficking and recommended new activities to provide protection and legal support to men.36 In its subsequent RFA, USAID asked applicants to address the role of gender in CTIP II programming, monitoring, and evaluation.37 Acknowledging past gender imbalances among beneficiaries of CTIP interventions, Winrock’s CTIP II program objectives highlight male victims as a specific target group for its protection 36 Ruth Rosenberg and Lisa Hammond, Final Report: Evaluation of the Countering-Trafficking in Persons Program in Cambodia, December 2010, Page 44. “The general public, although aware of labor trafficking, still believes that trafficking victims are primarily women and children. New activities could focus on preventing trafficking of men, developing improved mechanisms for identifying trafficked persons among people deported back to Cambodia; pilot initiatives to provide a range of support to adult male-trafficking victims in the communities in which they wish to reside; encourage trafficked men to file complaints with the police so that their cases are investigated and the perpetrators brought to justice.” 37 USAID-Cambodia-442-11-002-RFA, June 7, 2011, Page 27. 23 and reintegration activities.38 Despite the significance placed on gender by USAID and Winrock, the evaluation team found that gender strategies, program monitoring, and reporting practices to track the impact of CTIP II on male and female beneficiaries were insufficient among Winrock and its partners. Targets and monitoring data are not necessarily disaggregated by sex when appropriate, and CTIP II program achievements are not tracked or analyzed through a gender lens.39 Key informants across international organizations, Cambodian government entities, and local NGOs— both recipients and non-recipients of USAID funding—reported enhanced awareness about male victims of labor trafficking in recent years. Some key informants cited USAID and Winrock as leaders in refocusing CTIP interventions on males. At the same time, the evaluation team noted that a comprehensive and shared understanding of the shifting trends and needs of men, women, and children in Cambodia’s trafficking landscape is lacking among Winrock and its partners. Overall, key informants could not speak to whether cases of sexual exploitation of women and children have decreased or are less frequently reported due to underground trafficking tactics. Key informants cited increased reports of forced marriage but provided inconsistent perspectives on the prevalence and urgency of the trend. Research commissioned by Winrock and conducted by Rapid Asia indicates that “females are generally a bit more vulnerable than men but the difference is marginal.” 40 However, the research does not analyze vulnerability factors by gender or provide sex-disaggregated data on types of migration work sought by vulnerable groups. The evaluation team found that Winrock and its partners are in the initial stages of identifying gender￾sensitive responses to various forms of trafficking. Winrock and sub-grantee KYA have not yet considered whether CTIP prevention messages and outreach activities could be tailored to address gender-specific trends or risk factors. Some key informants indicated that societal perceptions of gender roles introduce barriers for men and boys to discuss their experiences with exploitation—whether sexual or economic. Winrock sub-grantee Hagar seeks to challenge gender-based perceptions about survivor needs in its training modules for service providers. Winrock’s CTIP training for law enforcement officers includes a module on gender, but key informants acknowledged that the content could be improved and tailored. For instance, male police officers require additional preparation to interact effectively with male victims of trafficking.41 The evaluation team found that female police officers are vastly underrepresented in Winrock’s training program, despite their role in raids, rescue operations, and case interviews with trafficking victims—especially women and youth. While not expressly required within the project scope, there was no evidence of concerted efforts to involve women police officers, a potential missed opportunity to reduce gender disparities. .42 Men require a different approach to protection than do women and children. Based on firsthand experiences with male victims of labor exploitation who seek immediate reintegration and employment, key informants reiterated that demand for male-only shelters is low, and community-based care models 38 Winrock International, Technical Application, August 25, 2011. Objective 2: “To enhance survivor protection and care services of all forms of TIP by developing and implementing victim ID channels and guidelines, promoting practical delivery and evaluation of minimum standards for survivor services, and promoting flexible survivor-driven service delivery and reintegration options, including for male victims.” 39 See Evaluation Question 3 for additional discussion of M&E practices. 40 Winrock International and Rapid Asia, Research Report on Sex and Labor Trafficking Network and Pattern in Cambodia, December 2012, Pages 2, 27. 41 USAID/Cambodia Gender Assessment 2010, Page 21. 42 Winrock training for police at the commune level targets only two officials from each local authority. Invitations are extended only to 1) the chief or deputy of the police post and 2) the chief or deputy of the commune. 24 should be adopted instead. Winrock and its sub-grantees have made some important strides to promote flexible survivor-driven service delivery and reintegration options for male victims of labor trafficking. Building upon its own research and advocacy, LSCW adapted its programming model years ago, and is recognized within the NGO sector as a provider of legal services for men; Winrock revised LSCW’s sub-grant budget in 2013 to include repatriation funds for men. The PTC—funded in part by Winrock— is perhaps the only facility accessed by male returnees (albeit on a short-term basis), but the center accommodates men, women, and children simultaneously in adjacent rooms given its funding and space constraints.43 CWCC offers community-based care, financial support for reintegration, and anger management training to male victims of labor trafficking. At the same time, other initiatives remain focused on female trafficking victims. CWCC is committed to preserving its longtime mandate of providing services for female victims and their dependents, and male victims of trafficking across Cambodia are not eligible to receive legal services from CWCC’s in-house lawyers. Winrock sub-grantees CCPCR and HCC provide protection services to all survivors of trafficking and refer individuals to other NGOs for legal support as well as any other services that survivors require beyond those provided by CCPCR and HCC. Additional coordination is required to guide a consistent and adequate approach toward service provision for male victims. CONCLUSIONS The CTIP II program has responded to emerging needs of vulnerable groups by devoting attention and resources to male victims of labor trafficking. Winrock and its partners made some important strides in offering flexible survivor-driven service delivery and reintegration options for men, and some Winrock sub-grantees demonstrated flexibility in expanding their mandates to provide men with rehabilitation and legal support. At the same time, Winrock and its partners are still in the initial stages of identifying gender-sensitive responses to various forms of trafficking. By swinging the pendulum to accommodate male victims of labor exploitation, it may be the case that both male and female victims of sexual trafficking have been underserved in recent years. Additional information-sharing and coordination is required to investigate current TIP patterns and ensure that all at-risk populations are sufficiently incorporated into gender-sensitive strategies for prevention and protection services. More robust program monitoring and reporting practices on the part of Winrock and its sub-grantees could help to inform decision-making around gender-based priorities for future interventions. RECOMMENDATIONS  USAID/Cambodia should commission an in-depth gender analysis of emerging trends and vulnerable groups in trafficking. Building upon past gender assessments completed for USAID/Cambodia and Winrock’s assessment of shelters and community-based care, the analysis should include participatory assessments to assess the current landscape of trafficking in terms of how it is affecting men, women, boys, and girls. Data collected should be disaggregated by sex and age. The analysis should involve risk mapping, identification of immediate and root causes of trafficking, and the use of international and domestic legal standards as a frame work for analysis and action in target provinces. Informed by the analysis, USAID and Winrock should collaborate with other actors in the CTIP arena—in Cambodia and throughout the region—to review strategic approaches and identify gaps in meeting the needs of male victims of labor trafficking. 43 See Evaluation Question 1B for further discussion about the potential unintended results of this model. 25  USAID/Cambodia should develop a gender strategy to inform its continued support for CTIP interventions. USAID/Cambodia should articulate its priorities for addressing the specific needs of men, women, boys, and girls in future CTIP programming. Potential resources to inform the gender strategy include Winrock’s assessment of shelters versus community￾based care, this mid-term evaluation of CTIP II program achievements, and the gender analysis recommended above. USAID/Cambodia could request support and expertise from the USAID/RDMA Gender Advisor to develop its gender strategy.  USAID/Cambodia should require its implementing partners to develop gender strategies to guide prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership activities. Gender strategies should systematically consider and address gender disparities, constraints, and opportunities in each programming area. Gender strategies should also identify approaches and means for tracking the effects of program activities on men, women, boys, and girls.  Winrock should review its CTIP II prevention strategy to consider whether messages and outreach activities could incorporate gender-specific trends or risk factors related to trafficking. The review should analyze whether IEC materials developed by Winrock and its partners could be tailored to specific audiences based on gender and age. Community outreach activities could also be redesigned to engage various target groups with appropriate messages.  Winrock should continue to support Hagar and other sub-grantees in examining— and challenging—societal perceptions about the profiles and priorities of trafficking survivors in Cambodia. Winrock-supported training modules should prepare both male and female service providers to offer a range of support to all victims. Support should encompass medical, psychological, and economic needs of both male and female survivors.  Winrock should work with AHTJPU at relevant levels to promote participation of qualified female police officers in CTIP training. Winrock should encourage efforts by the General Commissariat of National Police to increase female representation in the police force to 20 percent by 2015. Winrock should also engage in opportunities to influence the National Police Training Plan and training plans for officers at the provincial and commune levels in order to prepare both male and female officers to file and prosecute cases on behalf of both male and female victims of trafficking and exploitation. 1D: Program Coordination between Stakeholders Has the project been successful in coordinating between different stakeholders (sub-partners and relevant government institutions) in order to achieve program objectives? FINDINGS At the outset of CTIP II program implementation, prolonged start-up negotiations and Winrock staffing changes introduced delays and challenges to establishing trust and working relationships with the NC Secretariat and government partners. Those initial hurdles have now been overcome, for the most part, but partnerships require continuous attention and thoughtful efforts to sustain a positive rapport. Key informants internal and external to the RGC emphasized that bureaucracy and pending questions about the mandate, authority, and budget of the NC vis-à-vis Cambodia’s line ministries affect the pace and quality of Winrock-led coordination efforts. Disseminated in March 2014 to government actors and 26 other stakeholders in Cambodia’s CTIP arena, Winrock’s evaluation of the 2011-2013 NPA proposed changes to the structure and budget of the NC; if implemented, such changes could enhance the ability of the NC to better utilize technical assistance from Winrock.44 Overall, Winrock and other organizations interviewed by the evaluation team shared concerns about the prevalence of instances in which the RGC has intentionally approached multiple donors to request collaboration and funding for initiatives that Winrock is leading. At the same time, Winrock noted cases of donors approaching the RGC to propose partnerships on initiatives for which Winrock is responsible. For example, during its start-up phase in 2013, the AAPTIP approached several ministries to propose collaboration on various activities that Winrock supports. Winrock encouraged AAPTIP to attend stakeholder meetings and requested support from USAID in ensuring donor coordination; Winrock was never informed as to whether USAID raised this concern with Australia’s DFAT. Winrock also reported that following its agreement with the NC Secretariat to lead the 2014-2018 NPA development process, other organizations approached the NC to request a leadership role. Winrock was later informed by the NC that it was unaware of Winrock’s intentions. In contrast, the evaluation team found that effective coordination exists among donors and NGOs on building momentum around UIA policies and regulations. Regarding the nature of collaboration with Winrock on various initiatives, government actors reported overall satisfaction with the quality of products developed or events conducted. Some key informants voiced frustrations with the process of arriving at those products. Ministries observed inefficient coordination and delegation in the development of the 2014-2018 NPA and other policy and guideline documents. Key informants requested increased involvement in the production of IEC materials on TIP prevention and safe migration. For example, the MoLVT contended that Winrock did not provide sufficient status updates or opportunities to provide feedback on its “joint” development of the IVR and videos to support pre-departure trainings for migrants. While the ministry did not raise concerns about the content or quality of the products, its lack of participation in the process amounts to lukewarm endorsement of the deliverables. At the same time, CTIP II reported to the evaluation team that the MoLVT was involved in all stages of the IVR development, while also acknowledging MoLVT’s dissatisfaction about CTIP II’s lack of financial support to the Ministry. Government officials at the provincial level provided similar comments about collaboration with Winrock sub-grantees, which lead CTIP II’s provincial partnerships with PC-STSLSs and other local stakeholders. Apart from tensions and project implications related to USAID regulations detailed below in this report,45 the evaluation team is not aware of other coordination-related issues that affect the ability of sub-grantees to achieve CTIP II program objectives. CONCLUSIONS Winrock has overcome internal challenges that introduced barriers for building rapport and working relationships with government partners at the outset of the CTIP II program. However, consistent feedback from government actors indicates that Winrock has not sufficiently established roles, responsibilities, and expectations for CTIP activities at the national level. Winrock’s ability to balance the mutually-reinforcing priorities of “process” and “product” will be central to securing buy-in from stakeholders in the RGC and CTIP arena. The absence of a dedicated budget for the NC exacerbates the tendency of RGC stakeholders to request external funding for CTIP initiatives. Despite some 44 Winrock International, Quarterly Progress Report: January 1-March 31, 2014, Page 7. 45 See Evaluation Question 2 for further discussion on challenges related to management and operations. 27 initiatives, the lack of effective coordination among implementing partners and donors—including USAID—enables the NC Secretariat and ministries to play external actors against each other to the advantage of the RGC, resulting in duplication of efforts, resources, and mandates. RECOMMENDATIONS  Winrock and its sub-grantees should clarify expectations, roles, and responsibilities for partnerships with government actors at the national and provincial levels. Winrock should take a proactive approach to establishing roles and expectations, articulate responsibilities in writing at the outset of each initiative, and accompanying each memorandum of understanding (MOU) or agreement with a work plan that outlines anticipated deliverables with timelines and sustainability plans when appropriate. These practical tools should help to foster Winrock’s partnerships with the NC and ministries, enable collaborative working relationships, and promote sustainability. Winrock should model and encourage this approach for its sub-grantees—providing technical assistance to enhance their partnerships with local government actors when needed.  Winrock, with support from USAID, should work with the NC Secretariat to continue to advocate for a dedicated budget to support the NC’s operating costs and CTIP initiatives. Winrock’s evaluation of the 2011-2013 NPA offers strategic proposals related to the NC’s structure and budget, and those recommendations should be pursued and reiterated by USAID when appropriate. Dedicated funding for NC-led CTIP initiatives would better position the committee for sustainability and lessen some of the impetus for the RGC to seek external funding from donors.  USAID and Winrock should increase and formalize their existing, ad-hoc collaboration with other donors and international organizations to prevent duplication of resources and confusion of mandates in Cambodia’s TIP arena. Given the widely recognized challenges related to the RGC’s reliance on external funding for CTIP activities, the need for donors and implementing partners to present a coordinated and transparent approach to development interventions in this area is paramount. In the absence of sufficient formal structures for donors and implementers to “speak in one voice,” more frequent communication and information-sharing is required. 1E: Program Relevance Is the development hypothesis still relevant to the current development circumstances in Cambodia? FINDINGS The CTIP II development hypothesis “assumes that progress can be made in CTIP efforts through a multi-pronged approach, which addresses the problems of prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership simultaneously.”46 USAID/Cambodia and Winrock program documents, however, do not provide background information or analysis about why this approach was identified as most effective for addressing Cambodia’s specific trafficking situation. Such an analysis is critical to justify a hypothesis that 46 CTIP II Evaluation Scope of Work, Page 2. 28 embraces a complex 4Ps program design. Without an initial justification for the hypothesis, it is challenging to assess whether it remains relevant to Cambodia’s development circumstances. The Scope of Work for this evaluation indicates that “the hypothesis is based on the acknowledgement that trafficking in persons exists in Cambodia, both in the labor sector and in sexual exploitation, and that eradication as a goal is impractical and unrealistic during the four-year life of the program; however, measurable results to improve the ability to combat trafficking can be achieved.” This statement, however, pertains more directly to the overall goal of the program rather than to the hypothesis. Moreover, this statement would apply equally to a range of CTIP program designs and does not directly reference the multi-pronged 4Ps approach. While the program documents do not offer this justification for the hypothesis, the decision to adopt a multi-pronged 4Ps approach to combat trafficking at the time that CTIP II was launched was relevant because there were development needs within all four counter-trafficking Ps.47 Currently, there remain needs in all 4Ps, so combating trafficking through interventions in all of the Ps is still pertinent to Cambodia’s development context. With regard to prevention, awareness of trafficking—particularly the link between migration and trafficking—is weak, and there are identifiable root causes of trafficking in Cambodia, such as the lack of educational and livelihood opportunities, that need to be addressed. With regard to protection, victims continue to need assistance. Prosecution and conviction rates of traffickers are low, justifying prosecution interventions. Moreover, as this evaluation highlights, Cambodia’s counter-trafficking efforts would be more effective with improved coordination within the RGC and between the RGC and civil society and donors. Continued partnership activities are, therefore, justifiable. The CTIP II development hypothesis is in line with the USG’s counter-trafficking approach, which embraces the 4Ps paradigm. The paradigm, however, does not require that all 4Ps be addressed simultaneously within a single CTIP program. In fact, USAID’s 2012 CTIP Policy, which endorses the 4Ps framework, does not encourage mission programs that address all 4Ps. The majority of USAID-funded counter-trafficking programs have either focused on a single P or addressed protection and prevention simultaneously. From 2001–2010, 83 percent of USAID’s CTIP funds supported projects that included a prevention component, 85 percent supported programs that included a protection component, and 40 percent went to projects that included prevention activities.48 In FY 2012, while new USAID funds were obligated for counter-trafficking programs in 19 countries, only five of these programs addressed three or more Ps simultaneously.49 While CTIP II’s complex 4Ps program design, which has historically not been the norm at USAID, can be a dynamic approach, it is also challenging to implement. In addition to advocating for a multi-pronged approach, the hypothesis asserts that progress will be made by addressing all 4Ps simultaneously through a single program. While the program documents do 47 A relevant justification for the 4P approach is that DoS was not investing in CTIP programming in Cambodia at the time. If DoS funding had been available, a sensible division of labor would have been for DoS to support prosecution activities in accordance with its experience as a donor, while USAID supported prevention and protection activities. Because DoS was not programming in Cambodia, it was justifiable for USAID to address prosecution in addition to the other 3Ps. Currently, DoS/J/TIP does not support CTIP programming in Cambodia, and, thus, justification for the hypothesis is still relevant. However, DoS/J/TIP shared with the evaluation team that one reason it has not supported activities in Cambodia is because USAID is already programming in all 4Ps. Further discussion between USAID/Cambodia and DoS/J/TIP about future programming approaches may be merited. 48 USAID DCHA/DRG C-TIP Database. 49 USAID FY 2012 C-TIP Program Spreadsheet. 29 not indicate why a simultaneous approach was adopted, this assertion is less of a hypothesis than it is a program design model. In assessing the success of CTIP II’s multi-pronged, simultaneous 4P program design, the evaluation team found that while Winrock and its partners achieved some progress in the areas of partnership and protection, overall CTIP II did not undertake the needed activity monitoring or apply the technical expertise in CTIP programming required to implement a 4Ps program. As a result, there were negative unintended results,50 and a number of CTIP II program activity designs were not informed by knowledge of strong program models. Winrock’s police training model is one example.51 The evaluation team concluded that for CTIP II to implement a more effective 4Ps program, stronger activity monitoring and increased attention to—and knowledge of—programming best practices is needed. A 4Ps program requires rigorous monitoring of program activities because they are diverse and span a range of sectors. In addition, rigorous monitoring is particularly important in the Cambodian context where corruption is widespread and has the potential to compromise implementation of activities. There are alternatives to focusing on all Ps in a single counter-trafficking program. In countries such as Cambodia, where there are a number of active counter-trafficking donors and implementing organizations, all the Ps can be addressed simultaneously through donor coordination. This also involves leveraging the respective strengths that donors and implementing partners have in addressing a particular P. Most CTIP implementing organizations do not specialize in all 4Ps but rather focus their efforts in one or two programmatic areas. In addition, a USAID mission can address all 4Ps by integrating CTIP components into its development programs across sectors rather than tackling all of the Ps through a single, stand-alone CTIP program. CONCLUSIONS It is challenging to assess the current relevance of the development hypothesis—which asserts that progress will be made to combat trafficking in Cambodia by employing a simultaneous, multi-pronged 4Ps approach—without more analysis about why this approach was selected when CTIP II was initially launched. However, because there are ongoing development needs within all four counter-trafficking Ps in Cambodia, supporting program activities that address all 4Ps remains a relevant approach. Tackling all 4Ps simultaneously through a single stand-alone program, as CTIP II has done, is challenging and not the only strategy to address all of the 4Ps. The evaluation team found that while CTIP II made some tangible progress, it did not conduct the monitoring needed or apply the best practices knowledge required to adequately implement a 4Ps CTIP program. To implement an effective 4Ps program, USAID needs to strengthen these program components. Moreover, USAID could explore other avenues for addressing all 4Ps in Cambodia. RECOMMENDATIONS When all 4Ps are addressed through a single program, USAID should:  Consider establishing a project management structure that allows for stronger oversight of the activities in the 4Ps, such as assigning a prime and a sub-prime to share responsibility for the Ps. For example, USAID/Nepal’s Combating Trafficking in Persons in Nepal program follows a model in which the prime is responsible for protection and prosecution, while the sub-prime is responsible for prevention. 50 See Evaluation Question 1B for further discussion of unintended results. 51 See Evaluation Question 1A and Evaluation Question 4 for additional discussion of prosecution interventions. 30  Ensure that prime and sub-prime implementers have solid, broad knowledge of TIP and that there is a clear and rigorous monitoring system in place. A 4Ps program design requires implementers with broad knowledge of CTIP in order to conduct effective monitoring. Expertise is needed in all 4Ps and should include an understanding of the criminal justice and broader legal system; victim care networks and psychosocial, economic, and other reintegration needs; and effective prevention strategies. In addition, strong knowledge of CTIP program designs across all Ps is needed.  Reduce the total number of program activities implemented under each objective to facilitate monitoring. Programs addressing all of the Ps involve a high volume of activity components, and as a result, there are more opportunities for complications in implementation as compared to programs with a more narrow focus. A CTIP program focusing on one P, such as prevention for example, will have more uniform activities. Monitoring will be simpler and will involve oversight of similar activity components. Rather than addressing all 4Ps through a single, stand-alone CTIP program,  USAID should consider other strategies for addressing all the Ps. Strategies to be explored include coordination with other donors and USG Interagency partners, as well as integration of CTIP activities into broader development programs across sectors such as food security, health, and others.52 For example, in Cambodia, where farmers are particularly vulnerable to trafficking, a CTIP prevention and awareness activity could be incorporated into a food security program. Similarly, USAID/Cambodia could integrate a counter-trafficking component into an HIV/AIDS program. QUESTION 2: MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS Have the project management, structure, and operation effectively facilitated achievement of project results? What could be improved to increase project results? FINDINGS The evaluation team found that in spite of being presented with several management and operational challenges at the outset of the CTIP II program, Winrock, with support and assistance from USAID, was able to effectively overcome them, avoiding the derailment of major components of its activities. In the face of significantly delayed start-up, high staff turnover (including the Chief of Party [CoP] and other central staff positions), the replacement of key sub-grantees, and the temporary suspension of a key sub￾grantee’s programming due to an Inspector General (IG) audit, Winrock has managed to make notable progress toward achieving project objectives. Furthermore, the evaluation found that the CoP and staff members are well-regarded by members of the international CTIP community.53 USAID Management and Operations - Key informant interviews with USAID staff raised several concerns about weaknesses in the CTIP II program including challenges with project start-up and the management capacity of the first CoP, strained relationship with the NC during initial years of the project, as well as an overreliance on technical direction and support from USAID. USAID was proactive in identifying CTIP II’s start-up challenges as well as taking action to mitigate those challenges by 52 See Evaluation Question 4 on comparative advantages for additional related recommendations. 53 Specific details of project achievements are provided under Evaluation Question 1A. 31 initiating communication with Winrock HQ staff including the Program Manager, Technical Manager, and Vice Presidents. While he evaluation team found that USAID provided a substantial amount of support to CTIP II and Winrock HQ during the first year of implementation, working closely with team members through the replacement of the initial CoP, the evaluation team also found that USAID has not provided the necessary level of feedback and support to CTIP II during subsequent years of the project. In particular, USAID’s concerns about CTIP II’s reporting and M&E system have not been communicated effectively with Winrock and USAID has not provided sustained and proactive support to Winrock to address and resolve them. Details of M&E-related management issues are provided under question 3, below. The evaluation found that USAID is lagging in its review and provision of feedback on Winrock’s monthly, quarterly, and annual progress reports. Winrock did note, however, a very strong management relationship with USAID’s budget and finances office, from which it receives regular feedback and support on financial issues. During the team’s interviews with Winrock, staff expressed frustration with USAID pressure to implement activities without equal recognition of the obstacles the team faces due to restrictive per diem policies. At the same time, USAID underscored the point that the CTIP II team is obliged to respond to the cooperative agreement and that USAID’s role is to ensure that CTIP II meets the terms of this agreement. Winrock expressed concern that USAID’s per diem policy has had a major impact on its ability to execute certain activities. The zero tolerance policy forced Winrock to cancel events and created difficulties for its cooperation and relationship with the ministries. Winrock personnel felt that their strict adherence to the per diem policy while also managing to implement the majority of planned activities warrants positive recognition from USAID. For example, a recent training for the PCs met with numerous requests to provide ministry participants with training fees. Winrock refused and was still able to successfully execute the training. Winrock shared that it has raised the issue of per diem policy limitations in its progress reports and would like to see increased action and support from the donor community in explaining the policy and encouraging participation without per diems. At the same time, USAID emphasized to the evaluation team the actions it has taken to communicate with the NC Secretariat on several occasions to explain USAID’s per diem policy, which it reports, was well received. Winrock reported that instances in which it has received direct support from USAID in explaining the importance of the policy have proven very effective. Despite several meetings USAID has held with the Minister of Interior, as well as with the NC Secretariat, interviews with several key government ministries underscored the widespread lack of understanding and confusion about USAID policies. According to key informants, from the outset of the CTIP II program, there was a lack of clarity about whether CTIP II would be funded via Winrock or directly through USAID, despite USAID’s detailed program launch ceremony speech, which clearly identifies Winrock as the recipient of USAID’s CTIP II funding.54 The evaluation team was informed by numerous sources about a misunderstanding of how the activity was to be funded, with many sources understanding that approximately USD $5 million would be available to the NC via direct funding from USAID. This type of confusion has created tension and obstacles for Winrock throughout program implementation. Winrock reported that at the start of the project, the former CoP shared with the NC the tentative CTIP II budget allocated to support the NC; however, following the NC’s request to receive direct funding, which created tensions between CTIP II and the NC, Winrock decided to discontinue discussions with the NC about the annual budget and instead to focus on a workplan with tasks and targets. As a result, Winrock reported continuing challenges working with the NC, due to the initial misunderstanding on the process of providing funds to the Committee. It was decided not to 54 USAID CTIP II Launching Ceremony Speech. Chargé D’Affaires, Jeff Daigle. January 9, 2012. 32 agree with NC on an annual budget, but to agree on a workplan with tasks and targets, without committing specific funds. Winrock Management and Operations – Winrock, in its relationships with sub-grantees and partners, demonstrates strong commitment to building rapport and collaboration. The evaluation found that Winrock makes a concerted effort to provide sound management of its sub￾grantees by meeting with other donors that are providing funding to the same organizations to ensure that their polices are as closely aligned as possible. According to one grantee: The partners are honest about what the frustrations are… That relationship is impressive to be so honest. We thought that we wouldn’t be able to say anything to Winrock about challenges because they are providing funding, but this is not the case. When questioned about its relationship with the sub-grantee that underwent the IG audit, Winrock staff reported that they do not perceive any challenges, and that they have not experienced any problems working with that sub-grantee. Though the sub-grantee’s budget has been cut due to the temporary hold placed on its operations by USAID, Winrock expects project results to be achieved as planned. In the same vein, the sub-grantee reported a good working relationship with Winrock, including provision of guidance on adjusting project activities, consultation on important events, and participation in regular meetings. Many sub-grantees cited difficulties understanding and adhering to Winrock and USAID reporting and budgeting regulations and requirements. Sub-grantees expressed interest in receiving more in-depth orientation, which they reported would be helpful to understand prior to designing proposals for funding. In one instance, a sub-grantee had budgeted funding for a survivor reintegration assistance package that included purchasing a motorbike for a tuk. The sub-grantee worked with the survivor to develop the business plan and build the carriage only to wait many months for USAID approval of the expenditure. In the end, the sub-grantee was informed that the motorbike did not meet USG regulations. According to the sub-grantee, “the survivor was very upset and we were very embarrassed… it disturbed the process and we were so ashamed.” Another grantee shared: …with Winrock there are so many requirements with documentation and preparing everything… we find it very difficult with the management to work with Winrock and filing all of the documents is not easy… we want to allocate more time for service delivery, but with all of the requirements from USAID it is not possible. While KIIs with Winrock HQ staff reported a clear protocol and comprehensive series of steps for sub￾grantee recruitment and selection, the evaluation revealed that Winrock’s selection of sub-grantees during the proposal phase—and USAID’s approval of those sub-grantees—may not have been as well informed as possible. Winrock reported that the selection of the original, three sub-grantees was not as thorough or comprehensive as it should have been, and as a result, contracts with two of the sub￾grantees were terminated shortly after project start-up. The selection of additional sub-grantees followed Winrock’s quality assurance processes including open competition, bidders meeting, review panel, and field visits to prospective sub-grantee’s activities. Nonetheless, the evaluation found sub￾grantee performance to be quite varied in terms of general organizational capacity including, financial management; diplomacy and political nuance; and project management—reporting, monitoring, and evaluation. . Internally, Winrock staff report effective and constructive program management and a strong working relationship with the CoP. However, several individuals cited the need for increased delegation to relevant program staff. 33 CONCLUSIONS It is evident that Winrock confronted many management challenges during the initial period of the agreement, which led to, among other problems, a poor process for the selection of sub-grantees. Currently, however, Winrock’s management and operations appear sufficiently strong. Winrock occupies a very challenging leadership role in the CTIP arena by seeking to address each of the 4Ps while striving to work collaboratively with the NC and simultaneously managing six sub-grantees. Nonetheless, Winrock has been able to execute its activities rather effectively given the entrenched political and institutional barriers it faces. One area where Winrock could improve its management is in developing clear and comprehensive guidance for sub-grantees about understanding and meeting both Winrock and USAID rules and regulations. The evaluation found USAID’s management and operations to be rather weak and in need of substantive review. Several areas within USAID’s purview warrant particular examination, including how to better support Winrock with feedback on its deliverables; how to better assist Winrock with navigating the complexities of the CTIP donor landscape in terms of USG policies; and how to improve USAID’s review, assessment, and approval of proposed sub-grantees to ensure that higher quality and more reliable organizations are selected for funding. While USAID performed in compliance with the terms of the cooperative agreement in approving sub-grantees, increased examination of sub-grantee capabilities, particularly given USAID’s familiarity with Cambodia’s CTIP landscape and actors, could have avoided the selection of sub-grantees that lacked sufficient capacity to effectively implement the project activities. The team found that USG policies related to direct funding of Cambodian government counterparts places limitations on the capacity of USAID implementing partners to achieve effective program implementation across all four Ps. While USG policy change might not be possible or desirable, CTIP II would benefit from greater and ongoing USAID support in explaining its policy to RGC officials. RECOMMENDATIONS  USAID should undertake a concerted initiative to continually establish a clear and shared understanding among the RGC, NGOs, and donor community about USAID’s funding approach, rules, and regulations to avoid any further obstacles for Winrock and future implementing organizations. Furthermore, to prevent future misunderstanding among RGC counterparts about project funding, USAID should communicate with the RGC in advance of program launches to reiterate the structure and process for program funding to avoid any confusion about its policy on direct funding of host country governments.  USAID should take a leadership role in advocating for coordination and unification of donor policies on per diem rates. In the short-term, USAID should increase its assistance to Winrock in navigating the political challenges associated with the USG per diem policy.  USAID should develop a plan for providing more timely feedback and responses to Winrock requests for support and assistance. USAID could reach out to Winrock to gather suggestions about how the working relationship might be improved through greater dialogue and closer collaboration.  Winrock should adhere as closely as possible to HQ procedures for sub-grantee selection to ensure that selected local NGOs are capable of effectively carrying out their activities and to prevent unnecessary complications with project implementation. 34 QUESTION 3: EFFECTIVENESS OF M&E SYSTEMS Has CTIP II’s M&E system been effectively used to track, monitor, and report results attributable to CTIP II activities? What changes are required or have been incorporated to improve program performance? FINDINGS In spite of the critical importance that both the CTIP I end of project evaluation and the USAID RFA for CTIP II placed on establishing robust and effective M&E systems, the evaluation team found USAID, Winrock, and the majority of sub-grantees’ M&E capacity and systems to be comprehensively poor. CTIP II’s insufficient M&E systems are grounded in USAID’s lack of key, foundational documents including a Country Development Cooperative Strategy (CDCS), Performance Management Plan (PMP), and CTIP Cambodia Country Strategy as well as inadequate human resources to provide necessary support and guidance to Winrock. Interviews with USAID staff members revealed that M&E was not carefully considered at the time of project design. At the time the RFA was issued, the Mission lacked adequate M&E personnel and only hired a dedicated, full-time M&E staff member in February, 2013 In February, 2011 subsequent to the CTIP I end of project evaluation, USAID/Cambodia commissioned a much-needed concept paper to inform the design of CTIP II, which was finalized in February, 2011. Interviews with USAID indicate that the design paper may not have been used to develop the activity design document or the RFA for CTIP II, which was issued in June, 2011. Subsequent to expanding the human resources within the Program Office, USAID has increased its oversight of Winrock’s data quality by conducting data quality assessments (DQAs) for five CTIP II standard indicators. While the DQAs were carried out at a high level and did not involve examining data at the sub-grantee level, they did serve to help streamline indicators that were deemed redundant and unnecessary. USAID reported that they also worked with Winrock to develop outcome-level indicators to monitor the implementation of provincial plans of action as well as police trainee’s application of knowledge on TIP, among others. In light of these indicator modifications, Winrock has made several revisions to their Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (MEP) with the most recent version submitted in April 2014. Interviews with both USAID and Winrock staff revealed ongoing challenges with the development and finalization of the MEP, including instances when the MEP was approved for “time’s sake,” even though additional revisions were necessary. USAID highlighted a number of issues with Winrock’s M&E including the dual role of the Deputy CoP and M&E Specialist, the capacity of the M&E Assistant to independently strengthen and reinforce CTIP II’s weak M&E system, and the format Winrock uses for quarterly reporting. At the same time, the evaluation team found that USAID and CTIP II have met on very few occasions to specifically discuss M&E. Both Winrock and USAID staff members reported that USAID’s human resources devoted to M&E are overstretched, particularly in light of the CTIP I evaluation findings and recommendations and the value the Mission places on strong M&E and results. In addition to USAID’s challenges with M&E, the team noted that Winrock’s program objectives and activities were generally not informed by comprehensive needs assessments, baseline studies, safety mapping, or surveys. The team identified three reports that Winrock conducted during the life of their project including one examining shelters and community-based services, another investigating sex and labor trafficking networks and patterns, and an “Assessment of Local Police’s Capacity Building in Relation to TIP Issue.” While greatly informative, these reports were published after implementation of CTIP II was well underway and thus did not inform the design of CTIP II interventions at the outset. Furthermore, it’s not clear to the team whether, and to what extent these research reports have been 35 used to make any subsequent changes to the design of CTIP II activities. The evaluation team reviewed the recommendations from the study on shelters versus community-based care, which indicated retrospective activities CTIP II had implemented, which were in line with the recommendations, but it did not identify forward looking actions CTIP II proposed to take to implement each of the study recommendations. Upon review of the latest quarterly report, the team learned of an assessment that Winrock is undertaking of its prevention activities, and the draft report was provided to the team following fieldwork. The Assessment intends to examine whether evidence of trafficking patterns is disseminated and accessible to TIP stakeholders, if commune councils are allocating their funds to TIP￾related issues, if people in the community are aware of migration and human trafficking issues including safe migration, and the number of people accessing information at kiosks, information centers, and hotlines. While the objective of the assessment is clearly stated, the intended use of the report has not been identified or elaborated. Encouraging modifications have been made to Winrock’s MEP, but only following substantial delays and significant implementation of the project. Notwithstanding these adjustments, the evaluation found several opportunities for further improvements with Winrock’s M&E system. Concerns identified include the following:  Many indicators as they are currently written conflate the measurement of two separate items, such as policies reviewed and policies strengthened.  The MEP is not designed to effectively accommodate sex-disaggregated data, which several indicators are completely missing. However, Winrock reported that its CTIP II database disaggregates all individual-level data by sex, age range, and other categories depending on the indicator definition. Winrock acknowledges that it has not reported in detail all types of disaggregated data in the MEP and that reporting can be improved, particularly as most of the information is available. Winrock also shared that it does face some challenges with obtaining fully disaggregated data for some indicators; for instance, age is considered to be a sensitive topic in Cambodia and related data is sometimes difficult to obtain.  A number of indicators are missing values as well as explanations for those missing values.  It is unclear whether indicators are cumulative or discrete; in several instances where it appears that an indicator is cumulative, the summation of annual targets does not match the life of project target.  There is a lack of explanations for significantly underperforming indicators that have not achieved their target values as well as a lack of details about how targets are set or are modified.  There is an overreliance on indicators that are only measured on an annual basis and many indicators are not capable of measuring the intermediate results (IRs) they are intended to inform, such as indicator 4.1 b: number of people trained on safe migration and use of technologies for TIP prevention as a means of measuring IR4.1: specific trafficking patterns identified as a means to promoting safer migration.  In the same way, CTIP II’s indicators for Objective 3, the identification and prosecution of TIP and TIP-related crimes, set a low standard for the achievement of this objective and potentially contribute to misunderstanding about the accomplishments of the program.  The design and monitoring of Winrock’s police training undermines the potential for achieving success because it equates knowledge gain and self-reported application of TIP knowledge with the ability to address and prosecute cases. Additionally, two of the three primary indicators for this objective are focused on the police, whose mandate does not include prosecution. Furthermore, solely relying on self-reported data leads to this indicator being a potentially feeble measure in the absence of complementary and triangulated sources with which to verify applied behaviors, such as police reports detailing the type, number, and nature of cases reported as well as an overview of actions taken.  Finally, many indicators have not been disaggregated as their Performance Indicator Reference 36 Sheets (PIRS) indicate they should be, such as indicator 4.2: Number of people seeking advice about trafficking or on legal and safe way to migrate for employment opportunities. The PIRS for this indicator states that it should be disaggregated by sex, destination country, and type of participant however the evaluation team was unable to locate this data in the MEP. Among the sub-grantees, the evaluation found mixed levels of comprehension and effective application of M&E as well as varying quality of M&E systems and processes. Most grantees are only reporting on low-level outputs, such as the number of people trained, while outcome-level data that could be monitored with routine indicators is instead captured in one-off weekly email updates or monthly progress reports. The evaluation found Hagar’s knowledge of M&E as well as their M&E system and processes to be particularly strong. Prior to implementation, Hagar conducted a thorough needs assessment, which included a strong gender analysis, of all the sub-grantees. Hagar used the results of the assessment to directly inform the development of its course materials, exercises, and coaching activities to appropriately target the skill levels of participants. Hagar has also planned to conduct a mid￾term assessment and a final evaluation of this work to assess the effectiveness of this training methodology. Hagar reported strong collaboration with USAID in the development of their MEP, including the selection of appropriate indicators to monitor participants’ learning and behavior change. Hagar would like to assess client satisfaction, rather than participant knowledge gain, to gauge the effectiveness of the program, however they lack the necessary resources to do so. CONCLUSIONS The importance of establishing a results-based culture and strong M&E systems is widely acknowledged at USAID and has been highlighted as a priority in several recent assessments and reports. At the same time, USAID is confronting significant challenges in its ability to effectively support robust performance monitoring of the CTIP II program. While USAID has taken some noteworthy steps to improve its provision of oversight and guidance to Winrock, significant gaps remain, which USAID must continue to address. Winrock’s lack of comprehensive needs assessments focusing on trafficking survivors or baseline assessments of program beneficiaries undermines the learning potential of the CTIP II program. Furthermore, Winrock’s indicators, which still largely rely on output-oriented data, prevent higher-level understanding of activity achievements. Information on trafficking remains largely anecdotal, and Winrock and its sub-grantees lack an accurate characterization of the problem at large. Winrock and its sub-grantees have a clear understanding of some aspects of trafficking within various segments of the population, but they have not fully explored and sought to understand the evolving nature of trafficking; this not only threatens the development and implementation of effective programs, but also hinders reliable understanding about the outcomes of trafficking prevention and protection programs. The lack of data for sub-grantees to use in targeting prevention and protection efforts toward high-risk geographic areas and sub-groups results in a failure to translate knowledge into practical prevention and protection strategies, and reduces the effectiveness of trafficking prevention and protection programs. Baseline assessments are necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of programming, and mapping of available services is important to identify gaps and develop comprehensive referral pathways for survivors. Sub-grantee efforts to develop data collection tools, and plan and conduct evaluations to better understand their program participants and beneficiary populations are laudable. However, to maximize the benefits of this information, the efforts need to be well-coordinated, and findings should be used to inform the design and implementation of current and future programs. 37 RECOMMENDATIONS  Winrock, should disseminate CTIP II required M&E methodologies to sub-grantees. Required M&E methodologies should allow flexibility related to context, while supporting the need for standardization of CTIP indicators, timeframes, tracking of unintended positive and negative consequences, and staff accountability to ethical conduct in sensitive settings and when engaging with vulnerable populations. Use of common M&E methodologies—including standardized indicators monitored by each of the sub-grantees—will enable Winrock (and USAID) to make comparisons across program activities and to aggregate results for USAID’s (forthcoming) results-based management system (CDCS and PMP).  Winrock should provide technical training to all sub-grantees on M&E concepts and practices to increase their capacity and contribute to building an effective M&E system for CTIP II. Sub-grantees are using multiple methods for M&E as well as diverse indicators across similar programs. M&E capacity building workshops would provide NGO staff with increased understanding of required M&E methodologies and important tools to collect and report evidence about the successes of their activities. Training should cover basic M&E topics such as setting targets, developing qualitative outcome indicators, and using monitoring tools for measuring contributions to changes in perceptions and behaviors toward TIP. Winrock should also work with sub-grantees to develop logic models that link their program goals to specific indicators and data collection methods (at the process, output, and outcome levels) to Winrock’s CTIP II higher-level results framework.  USAID/Cambodia/DG Office should develop a 5-year CTIP Strategy for Cambodia. The strategy should be directly connected to the Mission CDCS and PMP underpinned by a set of standard indicators at both the output and outcome level.  USAID should develop a PMP to support the implementation of the recently completed Mission CDCS, including a logic model that demonstrates the sequence of cause-and-effect relationships between activities, outputs, outcomes, and goals. The logic model could explicitly cover CTIP activities and demonstrate how CTIP could be integrated across activities within USAID’s portfolio.  USAID should provide timely, consistent, and thorough feedback and guidance to Winrock on their MEP and any other M&E related needs. To achieve this, USAID should consider increasing internal human resources within the Program and Technical Offices to ensure that staff members have sufficient availability to provide implementers with necessary M&E support.  Winrock should work with sub-grantees and more-closely examine their narrative reports to identify opportunities where qualitative data could inform the development of routinely collected outcome-level indicators. In contrast to USAID’s standard indicators, qualitative outcome indicators could be project- and context-specific.  Winrock should identify case studies about positive deviants—migrants who have had successful experiences working through legal channels—and highlight these cases within their prevention and protection activities and IEC materials. Reliance on stories of individuals who have had traumatic experiences may overshadow opportunities to provide individuals with understanding of and exposure to safe migration options. 38  USAID should require Winrock, as well as any organizations implementing future CTIP activities, to conduct routine assessments of prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership activities to understand project impacts on beneficiary and target populations and to use these assessments to make necessary changes and adjustments to activities. Assessments should also be used to address gaps in knowledge about trafficking in Cambodia.  USAID should dedicate time and resources to internal staff trainings in basic M&E, including how to understand and apply the Mission-wide CDCS and its accompanying PMP to office-level strategies and activity-level project monitoring and evaluation plans. Multiple contractual vehicles exist, which the Mission could utilize to receive state of the art M&E technical training for staff members.  USAID, Winrock, and sub-grantees should work together to utilize information collected for M&E purposes to inform routine program management and decision￾making.  All sub-grantees providing direct services to at-risk populations and survivors should routinely collect confidential feedback from their clients about their levels of satisfaction and perceptions about quality of treatment and services received. This kind of information should be reported to Winrock on a quarterly basis using standardized outcome-level indicators.  Working collaboratively with the sub-grantees, Winrock should develop standardized service delivery protocols that all implementing partners should be responsible for following, which should help to improve the desired outcomes of service delivery activities to ensure that every survivor is offered and provided a comprehensive package of services including medical, psychosocial, legal, and economic enhancement opportunities. Winrock could also request that sub-grantees monitor their own use of these protocols and provide explanations in quarterly reports about any instances in which they were unable to follow them. Such protocols could also be built into a checklist form or tool for sub-grantees, which could help to encourage their use. Depending on the utility and effectiveness of these protocols, Winrock could then work with MoSAVY to translate them into national-level protocols for standardized application and use. QUESTION 4: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES What are CTIP II’s comparative advantages compared to other anti-trafficking programs? What can be done to further capitalize on comparative advantages? FINDINGS The evaluation team found that donors and NGOs active in Cambodia’s CTIP arena perceive USG￾funded implementing partners as uniquely placed to engage in constructive and results-oriented partnerships with RGC stakeholders. Key informants cited strong bilateral relations between Cambodia and the United States, the diplomatic influence of the U.S. Embassy, and the significance of the annual TIP report produced by DoS as factors that position USAID and its grantees for success in strengthening the policy framework and building the capacity of Cambodia’s institutions to combat all forms of TIP. 39 Meanwhile, the evaluation team found that donors other than USAID and implementers other than Winrock are widely recognized by key informants as providing robust and comprehensive capacity￾building on CTIP for law enforcement officers in Cambodia. Key informants identified a variety of past or ongoing—potentially joint, possibly duplicative—models for technical assistance in the prosecution domain. The evaluation team’s non-exhaustive list is below:  Winrock, through the CTIP II program, trained police at the provincial level on criminal investigation and now offers training to police at the commune level  USG Interagency, with cooperation from the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, is building the capacity of a cadre of judges, prosecutors, and police to prepare cases against non-Cambodian TIP perpetrators for prosecution in U.S. courts of law  IJM, in collaboration with the Ministry of Interior, has been a longtime provider of training and casework mentorship to officers in the General Commissariat of National Police AHTJPU  Australia’s DFAT supports the AAPTIP, a five-year AUD $50 million regional initiative launched in 2013, which will target police in select Cambodian provinces for advanced training55  Australian funding also supported the design of a curriculum on TIP that is used at the Royal Academy for Judicial Professions and training for the Royal Police Academy  Cambodia’s Ministry of Interior trained police in 13 provinces through the Law Enforcement Against Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking of Children project funded by UNICEF, World Vision, Terre des Hommes Netherlands, and Kamonohashi  Legal Aid of Cambodia (LAC) supports stakeholder meetings for prosecutors to discuss legal proceedings and collect data on pending TIP cases with representatives from police at the national and district levels, Royal Gendarmerie of Cambodia, relevant ministries, and NGOs  APLE provides technical assistance to police at the provincial level throughout the prosecution of TIP cases from start to finish  UNIAP, through the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against Trafficking, developed comprehensive CTIP training modules  IOM provided its CTIP curriculum to the Ministry of Justice for use in training judges, prosecutors, and police Without a thorough examination of all technical assistance and training models, the evaluation team is not in a position to identify the most promising interventions (or implementing partners) for increasing prosecutions or convictions of TIP perpetrators. However, police interviewed by the evaluation team noted their preference for technical assistance that incorporates both training and the application of learning through practicums or on-the-job mentorship. Key informants repeatedly identified IJM and Australian-funded programs as leaders in the prosecution arena due to their in-house technical specialists and longstanding relationships with the Ministries of Interior and Justice. Winrock was not identified by key informants as possessing a comparative advantage in the prosecution arena. Finally, it is unclear to the evaluation team whether the CTIP II sub-grantee selection process involved a thorough assessment and mapping of the comparative advantages of the many Cambodian NGOs engaged in CTIP prevention, protection, and prosecution.56 Key informants at both national and provincial levels cited CWCC and LSCW as well-known and well-recognized for their work in protection and prosecution, respectively; at the same time, a variety of other NGOs were cited by key informants as leading providers of protection and prosecution services for TIP survivors. Based in Phnom Penh without field offices in the provinces, Winrock’s name recognition and reputation in the 55 Australian Agency for International Development, Australia-Asia Program to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Project Design Document, June 2012. 56 See Evaluation Question 2 for further discussion about CTIP II sub-grantees. 40 CTIP arena was limited among key informants outside the capital. On a related note, as a relative newcomer to Cambodia’s community of CTIP implementers, Winrock may have had comparatively less historical knowledge about the performance and reputation of local NGOs at the outset of the CTIP II project period. CONCLUSIONS USG-supported implementing partners are perceived to possess a comparative advantage in partnering with the RGC on CTIP policymaking and capacity-building activities. However, Winrock may not be best placed to fulfill the CTIP II program objective of consolidating Cambodia’s anti-TIP training strategy and developing a standardized training program through work with the General Commissariat of National Police and relevant ministries. Implementing partners with historical perspective on law enforcement training and in-house technical specialists could contribute more to this much-needed goal. Mapping the many local and international actors involved in CTIP protection and prosecution initiatives—and reflecting upon best practices and opportunities for collaboration—would enable more innovative programming and strategic uses of USG resources.57 RECOMMENDATIONS  To maximize its comparative advantages, USAID should identify opportunities to leverage USG momentum and financial support for development priorities related to CTIP. Potential cross-cutting approaches should be explored with USAID programs that promote the rule of law, human rights, good governance, food security, and education in Cambodia. USAID should also consider synergies with initiatives funded by other USG agencies, such as the Eliminating Exploitative Child Labor through Education and Livelihoods (EXCEL) program launched in 2012 with support from the U.S. Department of Labor.58 Once opportunities are identified, USAID should collaborate with its grantees to enable and reinforce synergies throughout program implementation.  USAID should learn from—and, if appropriate, participate in—regional anti￾trafficking initiatives funded by the USAID Regional Development Mission in Asia (USAID/RDMA). For example, Asia’s Regional Response to Endangered Species Trafficking (ARREST) program implemented by the Freeland Foundation incorporates prevention, prosecution, and partnership components to combat trafficking of illegal wildlife products across the region, including in Cambodia.59 In particular, RDMA’s strategy for enhancing the capacity and institutional sustainability of the Association of South East Asian Nations Wildlife Enforcement Network is relevant to USAID/Cambodia’s model for partnership with the NC Secretariat. Lessons from the ARREST demand reduction campaign could also be applicable for CTIP prevention activities. USAID/Cambodia should also reference the Senior Policy Operating Group Grantmaking Committee’s July 2012 report on Promising Practices: A Review of U.S. Government-Funded Anti-Trafficking Programs.  Direct recipients of USG funding should ensure that local partners offer comparative advantages in relevant CTIP topic areas. Particularly in the case of 57 See Evaluation Question 1E for discussion of the 4P development hypothesis and related recommendations. 58 The U.S. Department of Labor issued its solicitation for the USD $10 million program in August 2012: The EXCEL program is implemented by World Vision. 59 Social Impact, Inc., Mid-term Performance Evaluation of Asia’s Regional Response to Endangered Species Trafficking (ARREST) Program, October 2013. 41 implementing partners with gaps in historical knowledge and local perspectives on the leading providers of innovative services for TIP survivors, a thorough assessment and mapping of the comparative advantages of the many Cambodian NGOs engaged in CTIP prevention, protection, and prosecution is critical for programming decisions. In cases when USAID’s primary implementing partner is relatively new to the CTIP arena in Cambodia, USAID should take extra steps when reviewing applications for funding to ensure that proposed sub-grantees offer comparative advantages in relevant CTIP topic areas. .  Winrock should maintain and deepen its involvement in the development and dissemination of policies and SOPs for Cambodian law enforcement officers. Contributions in this area would align with and build upon Winrock’s leadership on the development of policy and strategy through partnership with the NC Secretariat. For example, Winrock should continue to work with IJM, AAPTIP, and other stakeholders to advocate for guidelines on UIA. Winrock should also collaborate with its peers to standardize training for police at all levels on the utility of UIA for identifying, reporting, and prosecuting TIP cases.  USAID should commission a comprehensive analysis of CTIP interventions in the prosecution arena to guide decisions about future programming in Cambodia. The preparation of a design paper to inform USAID’s CTIP II solicitation60 and the needs assessment conducted by Winrock during the first year of CTIP II program implementation61 were useful activities. An independent mapping and analysis of CTIP prosecution interventions should incorporate the findings presented in those reports; identify both past and current implementing partners and beneficiary groups; assess the effectiveness of various technical assistance models; and provide recommendations for programming priorities beyond 2015. QUESTION 5: SUSTAINABILITY How much progress is CTIP II making in establishing sustainability of results beyond USAID support? What measures should be taken to enhance sustainability? FINDINGS With such a strong emphasis placed on cultivating effective partnerships with the NC and associated line ministries—toward the goal of building capacity and ownership within the RGC to combat TIP, sustainability is critical to the success of CTIP II. The foundation for sustainability was laid in CTIP I and its importance reinforced in the RFA for CTIP II, which calls for “…a realistic and sustainable plan to transfer responsibility to partners….” The evaluation found that elements of sub-grantees’ protection and prevention services demonstrate significant potential for sustainability. Specifically, the team conducted a FGD with members of CCPCR’s SHG in Svay Rieng Province.62 When asked about the potential for the groups’ sustainability, several members expressed their ability to continue lending money as long as CCPCR does not withdraw the original seed funding. Although the group demonstrates potential to remain financially sustainable, the evaluation found 60 USAID Counter-TIP Follow-up Project Design, February 2011. 61 Winrock International, Brief Assessment on Local Police’s Capacity Building in Relation to TIP Issue, July 2012. 62 See Evaluation Question 1A for discussion of the CCPCR savings and loan initiative. 42 weaknesses in the prevention and awareness-raising dimensions of the program as members lacked understanding of TIP and the purpose of the CCPCR shelter; particularly members whose children were presently residing at the shelter. One member intimated: For me my child is not an orphan but I want the child to stay there to learn more, the child speaks English now and I am so happy. My child used to go to Vietnam and they placed my child in the detention center and now I am so happy to have my child safe in the center to study. When asked when her child would be coming back to the village, another member shared, “They want to send my child back but I asked them for the child to stay longer and study longer. Here they play a lot and they don’t study well, if they are in the center they will study better.” According to the team’s interview with CCPCR, the goal of the SHG is to engender support among the members for child rights and women’s issues, as well as to inform one another about potential cases of trafficking. One CCPCR staff member shared: We think there is sustainability because they are able to pay back the money they have borrowed. We provide continuous support to the leaders of the group to coach and guide them. This is the first step, that’s why we limited it to 30 families; if we can sustain them we will spread it to other communes and make the project bigger. It’s hard to really say it’s sustained because the project just started seven months ago and we are still working on capacity building for their committee. The families we work with are the families of our survivors and we really try to raise their awareness of the risks of trafficking. Some people in their committee are also the commune counselors who have received training on safe migration and TIP so they disseminate that information to the members of their self-help group about safe migration and the importance of children education. With the money they borrow they are able to start a small business and then don’t have to migrate for money. However, the team found that group members were more interested in, and focused on, the rice production improvement, fish farming, and pig-raising training they received, rather than TIP-related knowledge and skills. One member reported, “I tell other people who are not in the group that in the self-help group they come to teach us about animal raising, they want to join the group but it is full.” The team found Hagar’s work with both Winrock’s sub-grantees and the Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP) to be especially promising. Hagar’s program with RUPP is designed to address the shortage of qualified social workers in the country to support the growing number of survivors in need of clinical services. The goal is to deliver two university-level courses in the psychology department; one at the BA level and one at the MA level. Hagar has hired an expat instructor with expertise in traumatology (how trauma affects survivors), to develop the course outline, prepare the course materials, and deliver two courses over the next two semesters. The expat lecturer will work closely with, and build the skills of, the Cambodian lecturer, who will eventually take over the full delivery of the course on a permanent basis. The courses will train psychology students in trauma with a new batch of students graduating each year. Hagar has signed an MOU with RUPP and is committed to working with them beyond this year if they are able to secure additional funding. Hagar is also building elements of sustainability into their social work training program with Winrock’s sub-grantees. The methodology is to foster a professional culture of peer review within social work organizations where colleagues can provide one another with targeted feedback and constructive criticism and where people feel open to discussing methodologies and theories about this new 43 profession. Hagar’s model is focused on clinical supervision, which is provided in three targeted ways: group supervision, supervision in the field, and team supervision. The evaluation found an alarmingly high level of duplication among hotlines for TIP as well as a lack of attention placed on the sustainability of Winrock’s IVR hotline. Key informants from NGOs and Cambodian government entities informed the evaluation team about at least eight distinct hotlines used at the national and provincial levels for victim assistance, and further examination is required to determine the accuracy and consistency of messaging provided by the hotlines. Both Winrock and USAID/Cambodia reported attempts to consolidate the hotlines via requests to the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and discussion at informal quarterly donor meetings; in the absence of a sustainable RGC-driven solution, NGOs remain concerned about the effectiveness of a centralized government-managed hotline and dedicated to their own tactics—however disparate they may be. Winrock has been working with MoLVT to develop an IVR to provide the public with information on legal channels of migration. Once the IVR is operational, any call that is placed will be free of charge for the duration of the CTIP II program. The evaluation found, however, that there are currently no plans in place to continue funding the IVR following the close of the program. While MoLVT reported its ability to identify and secure long-term funding for the IVR, the evaluation team is concerned about the strained collaboration, as reported by MoLVT, between Winrock and MoLVT, which presents another threat to the sustainability of the hotline. MoLVT reported significant dissatisfaction with Winrock’s lack of collaboration on the development of the hotline, which MoLVT asserts was done almost entirely in isolation from MoLVT. Provision of protective services is another area of the CTIP II project in which the evaluation team identified a need for increased attention to sustainability. The sub-teams visited two shelter facilities and two transit centers and learned about the reintegration programs run by the sub-grantees CCPCR, CWCC, and HCC. In each case, the programs and services are entirely funded and operated by NGO staff members, and there is a lack of evidence that sufficient measures have been taken to integrate MoSAVY human and financial resources into protection services with the goal of ensuring long-term sustainability. The PTC is the only example that the evaluation team found where MoSAVY provides direct supervision of center activities and seconded two social workers to complete short-term rotations at the center. However, cost-sharing measures with Winrock, World Vision, and UNIAP sustain the center’s operations costs and director’s salary. CONCLUSIONS While certain components of CTIP II reveal great potential for sustainability, other, critical elements appear destined for termination. Acknowledging the particular focus of CTIP II on sustainable outcomes, there is a well-founded need for Winrock and USAID to identify concrete ways in which other elements of the program could be strengthened for RECOMMENDATIONS  Following the second round of lending within the self-help group, Winrock should support CCPCR to conduct an assessment of the activity to understand the strengths and weaknesses and capture lessons learned. If the groups are continuing to demonstrate financial sustainability, Winrock should consider expanding the scope of this activity to reach other vulnerable villages.  USAID should examine Hagar’s model of building capacity for social work through investing in higher education to determine whether additional courses offerings 44 related to CTIP, for example, rule of law, could also be introduced into the BA and MA programs at RUPP.  Winrock should examine Hagar’s model of peer review and supervision to determine whether this model might also be appropriate for activities within the prosecution component, such as the juvenile justice meetings that LAC has started implementing. LAC has established regular legal strengthening meetings between prosecutors and relevant ministries where the prosecutor reports about the challenges under the legal proceedings and opens a discussion about how to address the case.  USAID should collaborate with other donors and partners in the RGC to reduce duplication of efforts to provide TIP victim assistance hotlines. USAID should work with its partners to resolve duplication of efforts and consider the possibilities of consolidating parallel hotline initiatives. Partners should coordinate with government actors at the national, provincial, and commune levels to devise efficient and sustainable models for hotline maintenance.  Winrock should conduct an assessment to test the functionality of the IVR and ensure that it is working properly. In addition, Winrock should ensure that all of their sub￾grantees are fully-informed about the IVR and advertising it among all of their clients.  Winrock should work collaboratively with the MoLVT, who expressed interest and capacity to take over funding of the IVR, to develop a sustainability plan for the IVR. The sustainability plan should include a discussion of both financial resources and technical maintenance and marketing of the site. In addition, the plan should ensure that resources and service providers that are advertised on the site are still in operation and continuing to provide reputable and effective services.  USAID should ensure that any CTIP activities following CTIP II include an explicit action plan for working with MoSAVY on protection. Specifically, the plan of action should include cost-sharing determinations as well as human resource allocations for staffing shelters and supporting community-based reintegration programs. 45 ANNEXES ANNEX I: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK Statement of Work For Counter-Trafficking in Persons II (CTIP II) Mid-term Performance Evaluation USAID/Cambodia Office of Democracy and Governance Program Identification Data Program Title: Counter-Trafficking in Persons II (CTIP II) Program Number: Cooperative Agreement No. AID-442-A-12-00001 Program Dates: October 16, 2011 – October 15, 2015 Program Funding: $5,400,000 Implementing Organization: Winrock International (WI) AOR: Serey Chan I. Background Cambodia is a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children who are trafficked for both sexual and labor exploitation. Trafficking is a long-standing problem that reflects the economic and social vulnerabilities of many Cambodians, as well as the steady demand for forced labor and prostitution in the region. This cross-sector issue reflects many development challenges: poverty, unemployment, socio-economic imbalances between rural and urban populations, low skill and education levels, a lack of safe migration, corruption and a weak rule of law. The U.S. Department of State placed Cambodia in Tier 2 – Watch List in the Trafficking in Persons Report 2013, a drop in its tier ranking from the previous three consecutive years (2010-2012), due to the government’s failure to make progress in holding trafficking offenders and child sex tourists accountable stemming from inadequate prosecutions of violators and protection of victims. In the past, the main challenges facing Cambodia’s fight against human trafficking were the absences of a coherent coordination mechanism and strategy between government and civil society. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) helped address these gaps through its first Counter-Trafficking in Persons (CTIP I) program, implemented by The Asia Foundation, which led to the creation of a National Anti-Trafficking Committee within the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC). USAID’s CTIP II program builds off of CTIP I and supports the RGC as it further improves its capacity and readiness to combat all forms of human trafficking. The CTIP II program, implemented by Winrock International focuses on both male and female victims of trafficking and labor exploitation in seven targeted provinces: Kampong Cham, Prey Veng, Phnom Penh, Banteay, Meanchey, Svay Rieng, Koh Kong, and Siem Reap, in line with the U.S. Department of State TIP report. The program addresses the three major pillars associated with anti-trafficking measures known as the 3P’s: prevention, protection, and prosecution. Additionally, the program identifies a fourth ‘P’: partnership. This reflects the program’s relationship with the RGC’s National Anti-Trafficking Committee to support its efforts to coordinate the RGC’s overall response to the human trafficking. Based on the 4P’s mentioned above, the specific program objectives are as follows: 46 1. To promote effective national and local prevention strategies to reduce TIP, including labor TIP by investigating TIP patterns, developing appropriate prevention campaigns for all forms of TIP, and establishing centralized locations for pre-decision migrants to obtain information on safe migration or viable economic alternatives to migration. 2. To enhance survivor protection and care services of all forms of TIP by developing and implementing victim ID channels and guidelines, promoting practical delivery and evaluation of minimum standards for survivor services (SS), and promoting flexible survivor-driven service delivery and reintegration options, including for male victims. 3. To improve law enforcement (LE) capacity to identify and prosecute traffickers and TIP-related crimes by extending standard operating procedures (SOPs) of the Anti-Human Trafficking Juvenile Protection Unit (AHTJPU) to all police forces and by developing a consolidated anti-TIP training strategy and standardized training program. 4. To strengthen RGC capacity to design, lead, coordinate and evaluate in-country and regional efforts to combat all forms of TIP by providing guidance and technical assistance (TA) to strengthen the policy framework in labor and cross-border TIP, sexual abuse, and human smuggling. The development hypothesis assumes that progress can be made in counter-trafficking in person efforts through a multi-pronged approach, which addresses the problems of prevention, protection, prosecution and partnership simultaneously. For example, by increasing public awareness on safe migration and livelihood alternatives, Cambodians can make informed choices that may reduce their risk and prevent them from becoming trafficking victims. Through prosecution of perpetrators, violators will be taken out of the trafficking marketplace and other would-be traffickers may be deterred. Due to limited budgetary resources and to increase the likelihood of sustainability, the program will focus on developing and modeling best practices for providing protection to victims, including rehabilitation and reintegration interventions, rather than solely on provision of direct services. Through this intervention, systems will be enhanced to improve victims’ lives. Through policy development and coordination, the RGC will be better equipped to lead efforts to counter trafficking in persons. The hypothesis is based on the acknowledgement that trafficking in persons exists in Cambodia, both in the labor sector and in sexual exploitation, and that eradication as a goal is impractical and unrealistic during the four-year life of the program; however, measurable results to improve the ability to combat trafficking can be achieved. II. Evaluation Purpose This performance evaluation comes mid-way through the third year of the CTIP II program. The objective of this mid-term evaluation is to assess if the development hypothesis and the management structure allow the success of the project, the extent to which the project was able to meet its intended objectives, and to capture lessons learned thus far from CTIP II, for consideration in the remaining year of the program, as well as in design of future programs. The audience of the evaluation report will be the USAID/Cambodia Mission, USAID/DRG, WI, and its partners as well as the Royal Government of Cambodia’s National Committee Secretariat on Anti-Human Trafficking. The evaluation report will be submitted to the Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC). III. Evaluation Questions This Statement of Work is for a mid-term performance evaluation of the CTIP II program implementation from October 2011 to October 2015. Below are a series of evaluation questions to be considered. The 47 final list of evaluation questions will be determined in discussions with the Mission, DRG, and the Evaluation team. The evaluation should make conclusions based on the findings, identify opportunities and make recommendations for improvement. In answering these questions, the Evaluation Team should assess both the performance of USAID and that of the implementing partner. 1. To what extent and how has CTIP II been successful in achieving set program objectives? a. Which of the 4Ps has been most successful? Which has been the least successful? Is the 4P approach leading to tangible results? b. Have there been positive or negative unexpected/unintended results of the project? c. Have the program interventions affected men/boys and women/girls differently? d. Has the project been successful in coordinating between different stakeholders (sub￾partners and relevant government institutions) in order to achieve program objectives? e. Is the development hypothesis still relevant to the current development circumstances in Cambodia? 2. Have the project management, structure, and operation effectively facilitated achievement of project results? What could be improved to increase project results? 3. Has CTIP II’s M&E system been effectively used to track, monitor, and report results attributable to CTIP II activities? What changes are required or have been incorporated to improve program performance? 4. What are CTIP II’s comparative advantages compared to other anti-trafficking programs? What can be done to further capitalize on comparative advantages? 5. How much progress is CTIP II making in establishing sustainability of results beyond USAID support? What measures should be taken to enhance sustainability? IV. Proposed Evaluation Methodology It is recommended that the evaluation team employ a mix-method evaluation approach. Efforts may include a desk review; selected key informant interviews with stakeholders, including USAID personnel, implementer staff, media, government officials, CSOs and trafficking survivors who were involved in the implementation of CTIP II and benefited from the program; and focus group discussions (FGDs). It should be noted that interviews with trafficking survivors should be handled with the utmost care and sensitivity given the trauma associated. The study should investigate the effect of CTIP II activities on the levels and nature of trafficking in Cambodia. Trafficking figures will be sourced from program and publicly available data. Cambodia-based interviews of field staff and stakeholders under this study should be reasonably spread across the seven provinces in which CTIP II works. The proposed evaluation methodology is as follows, but not limited to: 1. Desktop Review of Key Documents and Initial Analysis The Evaluation Team shall review relevant USAID documents, as well as key documents from USAID’s implementing partners and outside sources. The Evaluation Team will use this literature to develop an initial response to the questions listed in Section III above, and to set forth hypothesized cause-effect relationships that can be tested 48 through field research and interviews. The Evaluation Team will also use the information from the desk review to design tools for conducting key informant interviews and focus group discussions. 2. Conduct Interviews and Field Research The Evaluation Team will conduct interviews with USAID/Cambodia staff, program participants, implementing partner (WI field and home office staff), sub-contractors and sub-grantees, relevant government representatives, civil society representatives, business, the media, donors, stakeholders, and other relevant beneficiaries. The Team should create a sampling frame to conduct interviews of stakeholders and field visits with some sub-grantees under each type of sub￾grant. The Evaluation Team’s work plan should include an interview list and proposed field visits. The Mission’s Office of Democracy and Governance will provide the evaluation team a stakeholder list for the interviews. 3. Conduct Focus Group Discussions The evaluation should include focus group discussions with a sample of the target beneficiaries (if appropriate given traumatic experiences of survivors) and other stakeholders involved in the implementing of the CTIP II program. The Team will build on the proposed methodology and provide more specific details on the evaluation methodology in their Proposal (see Deliverables below). The evaluation will be participatory in its design and implementation and the evaluation methodology will be finalized through further discussions between USAID/Cambodia, DRG and the Evaluation Team. The methodology narrative should discuss the merits and limitations of the final evaluation methodology. The Evaluation Team will design appropriate tools for collecting data from various units of analysis. Any data collection tools developed will be submitted to USAID/Cambodia and DRG LER COR prior to fielding. The information collected will be analyzed by the Evaluation Team to establish credible answers to the questions and provide major trends and issues. USAID requires that evaluations explore issues of gender; thus, the evaluation should examine gender issues within the context of the evaluation of CTIP II activities. V. Existing Sources of Information USAID/Cambodia DG Office will provide documents for the desk review and contact information for relevant interviewees. The list is not exhaustive and the Evaluation Team will be responsible for identifying and reviewing additional materials relevant to the evaluation. Documents for review will include, but are not limited to the following:  CTIP I and CTIP II program descriptions, amendments,, work plans (year 1, 2 and 3), annual MEPs (year 1, 2 and 3), quarterly progress reports, and other program-related reports  CTIP II initial TIP assessment report  USAID Counter Trafficking in Persons Policy, Field Guide, Code and relevant gender policies  RGC National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP), anti-human trafficking policy, and other relevant government policies/documents  Department of State’s Annual Trafficking in Persons Reports (2011, 2012 and 2013)  RGC trafficking data 49 VI. Deliverables All deliverables are internal to USAID and the Evaluation Team unless otherwise instructed by USAID. 1. Evaluation Design Proposal (including include notional lists of meetings, site visits, and interviews). 2. Briefings: The Evaluation Team will provide an entrance briefing to the USAID/Cambodia Democracy and Governance Office and other interested Mission staff at the beginning of the evaluation to present to the Mission the objectives and methodology for the evaluation. A brief mid-term status meeting is required. The Evaluation Team will also provide an exit briefing of its findings and recommendations to the USAID/Cambodia Democracy and Governance Office and other interested Mission staff at the conclusion of the evaluation. 3. Data Collection Instruments: Development and submission of data collection instruments to COR during the design phase. Any resulting data set must be submitted at the time of the draft evaluation report. 4. Regular Updates: The Evaluation Team Leader (or his/her delegate) will brief the DG Office and the Evaluation POC on progress with the evaluation on at least a weekly basis, in person or by electronic communication. Any delays or complications must be quickly communicated to USAID/Cambodia as early as possible to allow quick resolution and to minimize any disruptions to the evaluation. Emerging opportunities for the evaluation should also be discussed with USAID/Cambodia. 5. Debriefing with Partners: The Team will present the major findings from the evaluation to USAID partners (as appropriate and as defined by USAID) through a PowerPoint presentation prior to the Team’s departure from the country. The debriefing will include a discussion of achievements and activities only, with no recommendations for possible modifications to program approaches, results, or activities. The Team will consider partner comments and incorporate them appropriately in drafting the evaluation report. 6. Draft Evaluation Report: The Evaluation team will analyze all data collected during the evaluation to prepare a draft evaluation report and submit the report within 10 working days after the departure of expat team members from Cambodia to USAID/DRG. The contractor should substantiate all findings and recommendations through citations of information sources, while protecting the identity of TIP survivors USAID/Cambodia will distribute the draft report to WI and sub-partners for comments as instructed in the USAID/Cambodia Mission Order on Evaluations. Any sensitive information will be redacted, as determined by USAID/Cambodia and DCHA/DRG prior to sharing with external partners. Comments will be provided to the Evaluation Team Leader within 10 working days of receiving the initial draft. 7. Final Evaluation Report: The Evaluation Team will submit the final report in an electronic PDF and Microsoft Word version, within 10 working days following the receipt of comments from USAID. All quantitative data, if gathered, should be (1) provided to USAID/Cambodia and the DRG LER COR in an electronic file in an easily readable format; (2) organized and fully documented for use by those not fully familiar with the program or the evaluation; (3) owned by USAID and made available to the public barring rare exceptions. VII. The report should be no more than 25-30 pages excluding annexes. 25 pages. 50 VIII. Team Composition/ Technical Qualifications and Experience Requirements for the Evaluation Team The team should include experience in a relevant Cambodian/Southeast Asia context, along with comparative experience with other countries or regions in the democracy and governance sector. At least two members of the team will have experience with anti-trafficking in persons initiatives or significant familiarity with the subject. At least one member of the team must understand the overall macro-economic and political situation in Cambodia and understand the structure of government and public administration in both urban and rural areas. At least one team member must have knowledge of civil society and civic participation in Cambodia and/or the region. Team Leader (International): A mid-level social scientist/political scientist with an advanced degree in a relevant discipline and at least ten (10) years of experience. Human rights experience is required; TIP experience is preferred. Asian/regional experience is desired. Prior experience and ability to conduct high quality evaluations, in particular on human rights issues and to write well in English is required. Knowledge of USAID policy guidance and program design is preferred. The team leader will be responsible for development of the final evaluation and overall team coordination, including ensuring that team members adequately understand their roles and responsibilities, and for assigning individual data/information collection, and reporting responsibilities. Two Team Members (Cambodian nationals preferred): Team experience should include post￾graduate level social science, law, economics, and/or political science experience. In-depth knowledge of issues relating to public opinion in developing and/or transitional economies and democracies is required. Familiarity with social science “best practices” methods and programming is essential. Experience in conducting assessments and designing strategic responses in developing countries is required. Substantial experience in conducting evaluations or assessments is expected of all members. Ability to conduct interviews and discussions and write well in English is essential. At least one member of the team shall have training and experience in facilitating group processes, such as focus group discussions. Two team members should be resident Cambodian nationals, who are exceptionally knowledgeable about Cambodia’s political, social, and economic situation; have TIP expertise with knowledge of human rights more generally; has preferably some understanding of USAID’s programs; and has no political or other affiliations that would unduly influence (or could reasonably be perceived as influencing) their recommendations. Overall the Team will need expertise in USAID practices and expectations in program evaluation; program design and analysis; quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis; survey design and analysis; program issues, innovations and challenges in promotion of public sector transparency and accountability; and USAID practices and requirements in program performance measurement. USAID/Cambodia will assign 1-2 USAID staff to work with the team throughout the evaluation. The USAID staff will likely have an M&E background and/or technical TIP expertise, dependent upon the skillsets of the other team members. IX. Scheduling and Logistics/Logistical Support and Government Furnished Property The proposed evaluation will be funded through USAID/Cambodia’s DG office and coordinated with the Program Office as they manage assessments and evaluations. The Evaluation Team will be responsible for all offshore and in-country administrative and logistical support, including identification and fielding appropriate consultants. The Evaluation Team’s responsibilities also include arranging and scheduling meetings, international and local travel, hotel bookings, working/office spaces, computers, printing, photocopying, arranging field visits, local travel, hotel and appointments with stakeholders. 51 The Evaluation Team will be required to perform tasks in Phnom Penh, Cambodia and also will travel to activity sites within the seven identified provinces. The evaluation Team should be able to make all logistic arrangements including the vehicle arrangements for travel within and outside Phnom Penh and should not expect any logistic support from the Mission. The Team should also make their own arrangement on space for Team meetings, and equipment support for producing the report. A six-day work week will be authorized to conduct fieldwork in Cambodia. USAID Reporting Resources Standard USAID format for an evaluation report can be visited here: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadw117.pdf. The following content (and suggested length) should be included in the report: Suggested Table of Contents Acronyms Executive Summary - concisely state the program purpose and background, key evaluation questions, methods, most salient findings and recommendations (1-3 p.); Introduction – country context, including a summary of any relevant history, demography, socio￾economic status etc. (1 pp.); The Development Problem and USAID’s Response - brief overview of the development problem and USAID’s strategic response, including design and implementation of the CTIP II program and any previous USAID activities implemented in response to the problem, (2-3 pp.); Purpose of the Evaluation - purpose, audience, and synopsis of task (1 pp.); Evaluation Methodology - describe evaluation methods, including strengths, constraints and gaps (1-2 pp.); Findings/Conclusions - describe and analyze findings for each objective area using graphs, figures and tables, as applicable, and also include data quality and reporting system that should present verification of spot checks, issues, and outcomes (7-10 pp.); Lessons Learned - provide a brief of key technical and/or administrative lessons on what has worked, not worked, and why for future program implementation or relevant program designs (3-4 pp.); Recommendations – prioritized for each key question; should be separate from conclusions and be supported by clearly defined set of findings and conclusions. Include recommendations for future program implementation or relevant program designs and synergies with other USAID program and other donor interventions as appropriate (3-4 pp.); Annexes – to include statement of work, documents reviewed, bibliographical documentation, data collection instruments i.e. interview guides, raw data i.e. datasets, interview transcriptions (in soft copy), interview lists (persons, meetings, focus group discussions), activity timeline/schedule, Disclosure of any Conflicts of Interest Forms, Statement of Differences (if any), and others.. Annexes should be succinct, pertinent and readable. Annexes should also include if necessary, a statement of significant unresolved difference of opinion by funders, implementers, or members of the evaluation team on any of the findings or recommendations. The report format should be restricted to Microsoft products and 12-point type font should be used throughout the body of the report, with page margins one-inch top/bottom and left/right. 52 The final report should meet the following criteria to ensure the quality of the report:  The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well-researched and well-organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the project, what did not and why.  Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the scope of work.  The evaluation report should include the scope of work as an annex. All modifications to the scope of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation Team composition, methodology or timeline need to be agreed upon in writing by the technical officer.  Evaluation methodology shall be explained in detail and all tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists and discussion guides will be included in an Annex in the final report.  Evaluation findings will assess outcomes on males and females.  Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).  Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people’s opinions. Findings should be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.  Sources of information need to be properly identified and listed in an annex.  Recommendations need to be supported by a specific set of findings.  Recommendations should be action-oriented, practical and specific, with defined responsibility for the action. 53 ANNEX II: MAP OF EVALUATION SITES Site Selection and Data Collection in Provinces Sub-Team A Sub-Team B Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Kampong Cham  Team Leader: Erica Holzaepfel  Rule of Law and Human Rights Specialist: Panhavuth Long  Interpreter and CTIP Specialist: Sophea Seng  CTIP Expert: Veronica Zeitlin Siem Reap, Banteay Meanchey  Evaluation Specialist: Julia Rizvi  Gender Specialist: Sophea Touch  Interpreter and Logistics Coordinator: Sopheak Khoub  CTIP Expert: Veronica Zeitlin 54 ANNEX III: SOURCES OF INFORMATION Laws  Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia, Law on Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation, March 2008 Policy Documents  Aimee Brammer and Julia Smith-Brake, “Journey of Change: A Chab Dai Study on the Trends and Influencing Factors on Counter-Trafficking in Cambodia, 2003-2012,” June 2013  Andrew Jones, Rhonda Schlangen and Rhodora Bucoy, An Evaluation of the International Justice Mission’s “Project Lantern:” Assessment of Five-year Impact and Change in the Public Justice Sector, 2010  International Labour Office, Hard to see, harder to count: Survey guidelines to estimate forced labour of adults and children, 2012  International Labour Organization, Cambodia Labour Force and Child Labour Survey 2012, November 2013  International Organization for Migration, Handbook on performance indicators for counter￾trafficking projects  Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, JHU Protection Project 100 Best Practices, 2012  Mike Dottridge for the European Commission, Measuring Responses to Trafficking in Human Beings in the European Union: an Assessment Manual. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, 2007  United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, UN Global Report, February 2009  United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking Cambodia and International Organization for Migration, Strategic Information Response Network, Cambodia Trafficking Database, 2007  United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking Cambodia and International Organization for Migration, Strategic Information Response Network, Datasheet Cambodia, March 2008  United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking Cambodia and International Organization for Migration, Strategic Information Response Network, Mekong Region Country Datasheets on Human Trafficking, 2010  United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking Cambodia and International Organization for Migration, Strategic Information Response Network, Statistical Methods for Estimating the Number of Trafficking Victims, 2008  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, 2009  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Training Manual, Assistance for the Implementation of ECOWAS Plan of Action Against Trafficking in Persons., 2006  United States Department of State of to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Minimum Standards for the Elimination of Trafficking in Persons, 2000  USAID, Best Practice for Programming to Prevent Trafficking in Human Beings in Europe and Eurasia, September 2004  USAID, Counter-Trafficking in Persons and Contractor/Recipient Compliance: Agency-Wide Standard Operating Procedure, June 2012  USAID, Counter-Trafficking in Persons Policy, February 2012 55 National/International Press  Simon Marks, “Children Less Visible in Sex Industry, Yet Abuse Persists,” The Cambodia Daily, May 30, 2013  Kate Hodal and Chris Kelly, “Trafficked into slavery on Thai trawlers to catch food for prawns,” The Guardian, June 10, 2014 USAID/USG Partner Documents  AusAID, Project Design Document, June 2012  Chemonics, USAID Report, Asia Synthesis TIP Final Report, November 2009  Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against Human Trafficking, Q2 Progress Report, Annex 03 – Signed Joint Declaration, Hanoi, Year 1 (2011-2012)  Creative Associates International, JBS International, USAID CTIP Evaluation Framework, December 2009  ILO, An Honest Broker – Improving cross-border recruitment practices for the benefit of Government, Workers and Employers, 2008  ILO, UN Women, UNIAP, USAID, UNODC, Q1 Progress Report, Annex E Parliamentary Forum Conference Final Report 2012, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Khmer Youth Association, Agenda [Khmer Language Source]  Khmer Youth Association, All-Case Study [Khmer Language Source]  Khmer Youth Association, Human Trafficking Presentation [Khmer Language Source]  Khmer Youth Association, Safe Migration Presentation [Khmer Language Source]  Khmer Youth Association, Suppression of Human Trafficking [Khmer Language Source]  Khmer Youth Association, Table of Contents – Adult Learning [Khmer Language Source]  Khmer Youth Association, Table of Contents – Communication [Khmer Language Source]  Khmer Youth Association, Training Curriculum [Khmer Language Source]  Khmer Youth Association, Updated of Safe Migration [Khmer Language Source]  Legal Support for Children and Women, Travel Safe Book [Khmer Language Source]  National Committee to Lead STSLS, Annual Report 2011  National Committee to Lead STSLS, Q1 Progress Report, Annex B Strategic Framework for the NPA-STSLS in Cambodia, Year 3 (2014-2018)  National Committee to Lead STSLS, Q2 Progress Report, Annex E National Committee to Lead STSLS 2012 Annual Report, Year 2 (2012-2013)  National Committee to Lead STSLS; Lourdes Ureta Autenico, Jane Banez-Ockelford, Sophea Seng, Q1 Progress Report, Annex A NPA Evaluation Report, Year 3 (2013-2014)  Senior Policy Operating Group Grantmaking Committee, Promising Practices: A Review of U.S. Government-Funded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Programs, 2012  Social Impact, Midterm Performance Evaluation of the Actions from Combatting Trafficking in Persons (ACT) Project, July 2013  The Asia Foundation, Cambodia’s Labor Migration: Analysis of the legal framework, April 2011  The Asia Foundation, CTIP Project Document, Asia Foundation Combatting Human Trafficking  The Asia Foundation, Review of a Decade of Research on Trafficking in Persons, Cambodia, May 2006  The Asia Foundation, TAF Legal Framework, April 2011  The Asia Foundation, Annuska Derks, Roger Henke, Ly Vanna, TAF TIP Research, 2006  USAID, Modification of Assistance No. 4, October 2011  USAID, Policy Document, USAID CTIP Compliance Operating Procedure, June 2012  USAID, An Evaluation Framework for USAID-Funded TIP Prevention and Victim Protection Programs, December 2009 56  USAID, Evaluation Report, Evaluation of CTIP Final Report, December 2010  USAID, Counter-trafficking in Persons Field Guide, April 2013  USAID, Counter-TIP Follow-up Project Design, February 2011  USAID/Cambodia, Gender Analysis & Assessment Volume II: Gender Assessment, 2006  USAID/Cambodia and DevTech, USAID/Cambodia Gender Assessment, September 2010  USAID/Cambodia, Counter Trafficking in Persons Program, Request for Assistance USAID￾Cambodia-442-11-002-RFA, June-July 2011  U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, 2014  Winrock, Agenda, 3 Days Training Session on “Combatting Trafficking in Persons” for Local Law Enforcement Officials  Winrock, Annual Progress Report, Annex M Provincial Plan of Action for 7 Provinces under the CTIP II, Year 1(2011-2012) [Khmer Language Source]  Winrock, Annual Progress Report, Cambodia Counter Trafficking in Persons (CTIP II) Program, Year I (2011-2012)  Winrock, Annual Progress Report, CTIP II Annual Report 2013, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Winrock, Annual Progress Report, Annex A Analysis Report of Survivor Assisted by CTIP II, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Winrock, Annual Progress Report, Annex B Assessment Report of The Practice Knowledge Learned from CTIP Training, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Winrock, Annual Progress Report, Annex E Performance Monitoring Plan, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Winrock, Annual Progress Report, Draft Summary Annual Report, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Winrock, Brief Assessment on Local Police’s Capacity Building in Relation to TIP Issue (July 2012)  Winrock, Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children Right “CCPCR” Presentation  Winrock, Cambodia Counter Trafficking in Persons Program: M&E Plan Performance Indicators, April 2014  Winrock, Counter-Trafficking in Persons II Program, Fact Sheet, Launch Agenda and Speech Fact Sheet, January 2012  Winrock, Counter-Trafficking in Persons (CTIP II) Newsletter, Issue No. 1, January-March 2013  Winrock, Counter-Trafficking in Persons (CTIP II) Newsletter, Issue No. 3, April-June 2014  Winrock, Counter-Trafficking in Persons Project, Report on Impact Assessment of Prevention Activities, June 2014  Winrock, Counter-Trafficking in Persons II Mid-term Evaluation Presentation  Winrock, Counter-Trafficking in Person (CTIP II) Presentation Sheet  Winrock, “CTIP II Performance Management Plan” [No Date]  Winrock, Feedback on Recommendations of Draft Mid-Term Evaluation Report, Cambodia Counter Trafficking in Persons Program (CTIP II), June 2014Winrock, Strategy Paper, Awareness Raising on Human Trafficking and Safe Migration 2013-2015, June 2014  Winrock, Flyer with IVR Number [Khmer Language Source]  Winrock, and International Justice Mission, Q1 Progress Report, Annex C Report of UIA Workshop, Year 3 (2013-2014)  Winrock, Human Trafficking [Khmer Language Source]  Winrock, Minute Meeting with KYA [Khmer Language Source]  Winrock, Meeting Minutes between WI & KYA, June 27, 2014  Winrock and National Committee to Lead STSLS, Q1 Progress Report, Memorandum of Understanding, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Winrock, PMP Indicator Data Collection Form  Winrock, Police Training Manual [Khmer Language Source] 57  Winrock, Q1 Progress Report, Annex D Case Study, Year 3 (2013-2014)  Winrock, Q1 Progress Report, Annex E Progress against Year 3 PMP Indicators (1), Year 3 (2013-2014)  Winrock, Q1 Progress Report, CTIP II 1st Quarter Progress Report, Year 3 (2013-2014)  Winrock, Q2 Progress Report, Annex A Success Stories, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Winrock, Q2 Progress Report, Annex A PMP, Year 3 (2013-2014)  Winrock, Q2 Progress Report, Annex B Case Studies, Year 3 (2013-2014)  Winrock, Q2 Progress Report, Annex B Performance Management Plan, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Winrock, Q2 Progress Report, Annex D Research Report on Sex and Labor Trafficking, December 2012  Winrock, Q2 Progress Report, Annex 01 – CTIP II One Pager Design, Year 1(2011-2012)  Winrock, Q2 Progress Report, Annex 02 – CTIP Mapping Target Provinces, Year 1 (2011-2012)  Winrock, Q2 Progress Report, CTIP II 1st Quarter Progress Report, Year 3 (2013-2014)  Winrock, Q2 Progress Report, CTIP II Q2 Report, Year 1 (2011-2012)  Winrock, Q2 Progress Report, CTIP II 2nd Quarterly Report, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Winrock, Q2 Progress Report, Letter to CO, Year 1 (2011-2012)  Winrock, Q3 Progress Report, CTIP II Q3 Progress Report, Year 1 (2011-2012)  Winrock, Q3 Progress Reports, CTIP II 3rd Quarter Report, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Winrock, “Where is the horizon? Trafficked on fishing vessels” [Forthcoming]  Winrock, Work Plan, CTIP II Year One Work Plan Narrative, Year 1 (2011-2012)  Winrock, Work Plan, CTIP II Year One Work Plan Matrix, Year 1 (2011-2012)  Winrock, Work Plan, CTIP II Year Two Work Plan Narrative, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Winrock, Work Plan, CTIP Year Two Work Plan Comments, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Winrock, Work Plan, CTIP Year Two Work Plan Matrix, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Winrock, Work Plan, CTIP Year Three, Work Plan Narrative, Year 3 (2013-2014)  Winrock, Work Plan Matrix, CTIP Three Work Plan, Year 3 (2013-2014)  Winrock and Robin Mauney and Rachana Srun, Q2 Progress Report, Annex C Final Report  Winrock, Recommendation from the Study of Shelter vs. Community Based Care Integrated into CTIP II Strategy, June 2014  Winrock, Request for Program and Budget Modification, April 2013  Winrock, Safe Migration [Khmer Language Source]  Winrock, Shelter vs. Community Based Service, Year 2 (2012-2013)  Winrock, Technical Application, August 2011 58 ANNEX IV: DATA COLLECTION PROTOCOLS Implementer: Winrock International Sub-grantees: CPCR, CWCC, HAGAR, HCC, KYA, LSCW Government Entities: National Committee, Ministries, Provincial Departments Beneficiaries: Victims and Survivors External Actors: Cambodian NGOs, Donors, International Organizations Evaluation Question: 1. To what extent and how has CTIP II been successful in achieving set program objectives? a. Which of the 4Ps has been most successful? Which has been the least successful? Is the 4P approach leading to tangible results? Sub-questions: What do you think about the 4 P approach? Do you think it is effective? Do you think that one P more important than the others? If so, which one and why? Which of the 4 P’s has Winrock been most successful working in? Which of the 4 Ps has Winrock experienced the most challenges working in? Have you experienced any challenges in meeting your project objectives? Sub-questions: What are your program objectives? Describe your progress in meeting these objectives Have you experienced any challenges in achieving certain objectives? How have you overcome these challenges? Which objectives have been easiest to achieve and why? Which of the 4 P’s do you focus on? In your opinion, which of the 4 P’s of the entire CTIP II Project have been most successful/least successful and why? Sub-questions: What do you think about the 4 P approach? Do you think it is effective? Do you think that one P more important than the others? If so, which one and why? Which of the 4 P’s has Winrock been most successful working in? Which of the 4 P’s has Winrock experienced the most challenges working in? Are you aware of any challenges that Winrock has experienced in achieving project objectives? Sub-questions: What services have you received from Winrock/sub￾grantee? How would you describe the quality of the services you received? Did you experience any challenges receiving the services you needed? What aspect of the services you received has been most helpful to you? Sub-questions: What do you know about the CTIP II Project? Are you familiar with their program objectives? In your opinion, has CTIP achieved their program objectives? Are you aware of any challenges that CTIP has experienced in achieving project objectives? Have they been able to overcome these challenges? Which of the CTIP objectives is the easiest to achieve and why? Which of the 4 P’s has the CTIP project been most successful with and why? 59 What do you think about the 4 P approach? Do you think it is effective? If so, in what ways? If not, how could it be improved? Which of the 4 P’s has the CTIP project been least successful with and why? What do you think about the 4 P approach? Do you think it is effective? If so, in what ways? If not, how could it be improved? Do you collaborate with Winrock or any of the sub￾grantees of the CTIP Project? If so, how? Evaluation Question: 1. To what extent and how has CTIP II been successful in achieving set program objectives? b. Have there been positive or negative unexpected/unintended results of the project? Sub-questions: Are you aware of any unexpected positive results/outcomes of the project? Are you aware of any unexpected negative results/outcomes of the project? What are your ideas and recommendations for how to improve your project? Sub-questions: Have you seen any unexpected positive results/outcomes of the project? Have you seen any unintended negative effects of the project? What are your ideas and recommendations for how to improve your project? Sub-questions: Are you aware of any unexpected positive results/outcomes of the project? Have you seen any unintended negative effects of the project? What are your ideas and recommendations for how the CTIP Project could be improved? Sub-questions: Did you have any positive experiences through your interaction with Winrock/sub-grantee? Did you have any negative experiences through your interaction with Winrock/sub-grantee? Do you have any suggestions for how the sub-grantee can improve the program/services? Sub-questions: Are you aware of any unexpected positive results/outcomes of the project? Have you seen any unintended negative effects of the project? What are your ideas and recommendations for how the CTIP Project could be improved? Evaluation Question: 60 1. To what extent and how has CTIP II been successful in achieving set program objectives? c. Have the program interventions affected men/boys and women/girls differently? Sub-questions: In your opinion, does the CTIP project equally target both women/girls and men/boys? If so, in what ways? If not, in what ways? Does the CTIP II Project have a gender strategy? Which group do you think the CTIP Project has had more successes working with and why? Do you have any ideas for how the CTIP Project could improve their work with women and girls? With men and boys? Do you require all of your sub-grantees to have gender strategies? How do you ensure that your sub-grantees are maintaining a gender focus with gender equity within their activities? Sub-questions: How is your work under the CTIP Project designed to include men and boys? How is your work under the CTIP Project designed to include women and girls? Have you experienced any challenges reaching men and boys? Have you experienced any challenges reaching women and girls? Do you think your work has affected men/boys differently than women/girls? If yes, in what ways? Which group have you had more successes working with and why? Do you have any ideas for improving your work with women and girls? With men and boys? Sub-questions: In your opinion, does the CTIP project equally target both women/girls and men/boys? If so, in what ways? If not, in what ways? Do you think the Project has faced any challenges reaching women/girls? If so, how? Do you think the Project has faced any challenges reaching men/boys? If so, how? Do you think the CTIP Project has affected men/boys differently than women/girls? If yes, in what ways? Which group do you think the CTIP Project has had more successes working with and why? Do you have any ideas for how the CTIP Project could improve their work with women and girls? Sub-questions: Do you see any differences in the services sub-grantee provides to men/boys compared with women/girls? If so, what are these differences? Do you have any suggestions for how the sub-grantee can improve services for men/boys? Fr women/girls? Sub-questions: In your opinion, does the CTIP project equally target both women/girls and men/boys? If so, in what ways? If not, in what ways? Do you think the Project has faced any challenges reaching women/girls? If so, how? Do you think the Project has faced any challenges reaching men/boys? If so, how? Do you think the CTIP Project has affected men/boys differently than women/girls? If yes, in what ways? Which group do you think the CTIP Project has had more successes working with and why? Do you have any ideas for how the CTIP Project could improve their work with women and girls? 61 Do you think the Project has faced any challenges reaching women/girls? If so, how? Do you think the Project has faced any challenges reaching men/boys? If so, how? Do you think the CTIP Project has affected men/boys differently than women/girls? If yes, in what ways? With men and boys? With men and boys? Evaluation Question: 1. To what extent and how has CTIP II been successful in achieving set program objectives? d. Has the project been successful in coordinating between different stakeholders (sub-partners and relevant government institutions) in order to achieve program objectives? Sub-questions: How would you describe your relationship with USAID? How often do you meet with USAID? What are the benefits of working with USAID? What are the challenges you face in working with USAID? Do you have any suggestions for addressing those challenges? Sub-questions: Are you familiar with the work/activities that other sub-grantees under CTIP are doing? How would you describe your relationship with the other CTIP sub-grantees? How often do you meet with the sub-grantees? Which of the sub-grantees do you work most closely with? Sub-questions: How would you describe your relationship with Winrock? How often do you meet with Winrock? What are the benefits of working with Winrock? What are the challenges you face in working with Winrock? Do you have any suggestions for addressing those challenges? Sub-questions: How would you describe your relationship with sub￾grantee? How often do you meet with sub-grantee? How is sub-grantee perceived in the community? Are there other services providers that are better than sub-grantee? If yes, what makes them better? Sub-questions: Do you coordinate at all with Winrock or the sub-grantees on the CTIP Project? How would you describe your relationship with Winrock? With the sub-grantees? How often do you meet with Winrock? With the sub￾grantees? Which of the sub—grantees do you work most closely with? 62 How would you describe your relationship with the sub -grantees? How often do you meet with the sub -grantees? Are there any challenges you face with any of the sub - grantees? How would you describe your relationship with the government/NC? How often do you meet with the government/NC? Are there any challenges you face working with the government/NC? How do you think Winrock is perceived in the CTIP community? Do you think Winrock is the best organization to be leading the work on CTIP? Are there benefits to working with the other sub - grantees? What are the challenges to working with the other sub - grantees? How often do you meet with Winrock? How would you describe your relationship with Winrock? Do you face challenges in working with Winrock? If yes, what are they? If yes, what are your ideas for how to alleviate these challenges? How would you describe your relationship with the RGC? Which of the RGC ministries do you work with directly? How often do you engage with them? Do you think Winrock is the best organization to be leading the work on CTIP? How would you describe your relationship with USAID? How often do you meet with/interact with USAID? What are the benefits of working with USAID? What are the challenges you face in working with USAID? Do you have any suggestions for addressing these challenges? Do you think that USAID is the best donor agency to be leading the work on CTIP? What do you think about the CTIP sub -grantees? Are you familiar with the work they are doing? Are there other organizations that Winrock and USAID should be working with? If so, which ones? Are there benefits to working with Winrock and the sub - grantees? If so, what are they? Are the challenges to working with Winrock and the subgrantees? If so, what are they? How would you describe Winrock’s relationship with the RGC? Do you think that Winrock faces any challenges in working with the RGC? If yes, what are they? If yes, what are your recommendations for how they could improve their relationship with the RGC (alleviate these challenges?) 63 Do you face any challenges in working with the RGC? Do you have any suggestions about how you could alleviate these challenges? Evaluation Question: 1. To what extent and how has CTIP II been successful in achieving set program objectives? e. Is the development hypothesis still relevant to the current development circumstances in Cambodia? Sub-questions: Do you think that the 4 P approach is the best way to address CTIP in Cambodia? Do you think it might be more effective to focus on 1 or 2 Ps? Do you have suggestions for alternative approaches to addressing the challenge of CTIP? Sub-questions: What do you think about the 4 P approach? Should interventions be pursued simultaneously in all Ps? Is it better to focus on just one? Do you have recommendations for a different kind of approach that would be more appropriate/effective? Sub-questions: Do you think that the 4 P approach is the best way to address CTIP in Cambodia? Do you have suggestions for alternative approaches to addressing the challenge of CTIP? Sub-questions: Sub-questions: What do you think about the 4 P approach? Should interventions be pursued simultaneously in all Ps? Is it better to focus on just one? Do you have recommendations for a different kind of approach that would be more appropriate/effective? Evaluation Question: 2. Have the project management, structure, and operation effectively facilitated achievement of project results? What could be improved to increase project results? Sub-questions: What are the strengths of Winrock’s project management, staffing, and operations? Has Winrock encountered any challenges related to Sub-questions: What are the strengths of your project management, staffing, and operations? Have you encountered any challenges related to project Sub-questions: What are the strengths of Winrock’s management? Have you encountered any challenges related to their management and operations? Sub-questions: Do you trust the staff members of sub-grantee? Do you think the staff members of sub-grantee are effective/doing a good job? Sub-questions: What is your perception of the strengths of Winrock’s project management, staffing, and operations? Are you aware of any challenges related to Winrock’s 64 project management, staffing, and operations? If yes, please describe whether and how the challenges affected the achievement of program results. What steps has Winrock taken to address related challenges? Have the approaches been successful? What improvements could be made to project management, staffing, and operations to increase program results? What has been the nature of USAID’s interaction with Winrock before and during program implementation? Examples? What are positive and negative aspects of interacting with USAID? Do USAID and Winrock collaborate regarding the selection of sub-grantees? Please describe. Does USAID provide technical guidance related to CTIP or M&E to Winrock? If yes, is the guidance helpful? What further guidance would be useful? management, staffing, and operations? If yes, please describe whether and how the challenges affected the achievement of program results. What steps have you taken to address related challenges? Have the approaches been successful? What improvements could be made to project management, staffing, and operations to increase program results? What has been the nature of Winrock’s interaction with you before and during program implementation? Examples? What are positive and negative aspects of interacting with Winrock? How does your experience with USAID/Winrock funding compare to your experience with funding from other sources? Do these considerations affect If yes, please describe whether and how the challenges affected the achievement of program results. Have you taken any steps to address these challenges? Have the approaches been successful? Do you have any recommendations to improve Winrock’s management and operations to increase program results? How does your experience with USAID/Winrock funding compare to your experience with funding from other sources? Do these considerations affect program results? If yes, how so? Does Winrock provide you with technical guidance related to CTIP or M&E? If yes, is the guidance helpful? What further guidance would be useful? What are the strengths of the staff members of sub￾grantee? What are the weaknesses of the staff members of sub￾grantee? Do you have any recommendations for the staff members of sub￾grantee? project management, staffing, and operations? If yes, please describe whether and how the challenges affected the achievement of program results. What improvements could be made to project management, staffing, and operations to increase program results? What are positive and negative aspects of interacting with Winrock? With USAID? 65 program results? If yes, how so? Does Winrock provide you with technical guidance related to CTIP or M&E? If yes, is the guidance helpful? What further guidance would be useful? Evaluation Question: 3. Has CTIP II’s M&E system been effectively used to track, monitor, and report results attributable to CTIP II activities? What changes are required or have been incorporated to improve program performance? Sub-questions: How was the CTIP II M&E plan developed? Who was involved (HQ, Field Staff)? Which models were used? Did USAID provide input to the M&E plan? If yes, what was the nature of the input? Was it incorporated? What kind of data is collected to monitor progress against indicators? Who collects data? How often? Do the indicators adequately capture CTIP II program successes on the outcome level? If not, what are the challenges? What guidance is provided to Winrock sub-grantees related to M&E and reporting? How Sub-questions: Did your NGO develop an M&E plan to track results? What kind of data is collected to monitor progress against indicators? Who collects data? How often? Do the indicators adequately capture your NGO’s program successes on the outcome level? If not, what are the challenges? Are you familiar with the M&E plan that Winrock developed to track CTIP II program results? If yes, does your M&E plan share any common indicators with Winrock’s M&E plan? Sub-questions: Does your ministry have an M&E plan to track results on CTIP? What kind of data is collected to monitor progress against indicators? Who collects the data? How often? Is your M&E system sufficient or would you like to make improvements and strengthen this area? If so, what improvements would you like to make? Does Winrock provide you with any guidance or support with your M&E? Sub-questions: Sub-questions: Does your organization track data against indicators that measure the success of CTIP interventions? If yes, what kind of data is collected? Do the indicators adequately capture CTIP successes on the outcome level? If yes, please describe your best practices. If not, what are the challenges? Are you aware of the extent to which common indicators are used in the CTIP community? What are the benefits and disadvantages of common indicators in this topic area? To what extent are program achievements attributable to any one program intervention in Cambodia? 66 does Winrock assess the capacity of sub-grantees to collect data and report program successes on the outcome level? What is the process for analyzing and writing about monitoring data in reports for USAID? Is Winrock familiar with the M&E-related challenges documented in the CTIP I evaluation report? If yes, were lessons learned addressed in the CTIP II M&E system? How so? If not, why not? To what extent are program achievements attributable to Winrock’s CTIP II program? What is the process for analyzing and writing about monitoring data in reports for Winrock? Did Winrock provide input to your M&E plan? If yes, what was the nature of the input? Was it incorporated? What M&E-related guidance and/or training did Winrock provide to sub-grantees? Has Winrock provided feedback about the nature of your reports? If yes, please describe. To what extent are program achievements attributable to your program? If so, please describe. Would you like additional support and guidance with your M&E? If so, in what ways? Evaluation Question: 4. What are CTIP II’s comparative advantages compared to other anti-trafficking programs? What can be done to further capitalize on comparative advantages? Sub-questions: What is Winrock’s comparative advantage in CTIP compared with other actors and programs? Who are the primary actors (NGOs, donors, agencies) involved in CTIP interventions in Cambodia? Sub-questions: Who are the primary actors (NGOs, donors, agencies) involved in CTIP interventions in Cambodia? Who is the leading actor working in each P? Do you observe duplication of efforts in any one P? Sub-questions: Who are the primary actors (NGOs, donors, agencies) involved in CTIP interventions in Cambodia? Who is the leading actor working in each P? Do you observe duplication of efforts in any one P? Sub-questions: Sub-questions: Who are the primary actors (NGOs, donors, agencies) involved in CTIP interventions in Cambodia? Who is the leading actor working in each P? Who is the leading actor funding work in each P? 67 Who is the leading actor working in each P? Do you observe duplication of efforts in any one P? If Winrock was to prioritize its CTIP II interventions, which P would you recommend that it phase out based on other actors’ existing activities? Should Winrock partner with any specific actors to leverage existing work in any one of the Ps? Given all of the NGOs operating in Cambodia, what are the comparative advantages of the NGOs Winrock has chosen to partner with? If Winrock was to prioritize its CTIP II interventions, which P would you recommend that it phase out based on other actors’ existing activities? Should Winrock partner with any specific actors to leverage existing work in any one of the Ps? If Winrock was to prioritize its CTIP II interventions, which P would you recommend that it phase out based on other actors’ existing activities? Should Winrock partner with any specific actors to leverage existing work in any one of the Ps? Do you observe duplication of funding in any one P? If Winrock was to prioritize its CTIP II interventions, which P would you recommend that it phase out based on other actors’ existing activities? If USAID was to prioritize its funding for CTIP interventions, which P would you recommend that it phase out based on other actors’ existing activities? Should USAID partner with any specific actors to leverage existing funds dedicated to any one of the Ps? Evaluation Question: 5. How much progress is CTIP II making in establishing sustainability of results beyond USAID support? What measures should be taken to enhance sustainability? Sub-questions: What does sustainability mean to you? What have you done to build sustainability into the work you are doing? What effects/changes/outcomes of the work you are doing will Sub-questions: Do you think the work you are doing will continue once the CTIP Project ends? What does sustainability mean to your organization? Sub-questions: Do you think the work you are doing will continue once the Winrock CTIP Project ends? What does sustainability mean to you? Sub-questions: Sub-questions: Do you think the work that CTIP is doing will continue once the project ends? What does sustainability mean to your organization? In your opinion does the CTIP project focus on sustainability 68 continue once the Winrock CTIP Project ends? Do you face any challenges to sustainability? If so, how do you overcome these challenges? Do you think the political will of the RGC is an obstacle to sustainability? Do you think that the capacity of the RGC is an obstacle to sustainability? Do you have any ideas or recommendations for how to improve project sustainability? Does your team focus on sustainability of project activities? If so, in what ways? Do you think that your work is sustainable? If so, how? If not, why not? Do you face any challenges to sustainability? If so, what are they? If so, how do you overcome these challenges? Do you think the political will of the RGC is an obstacle to sustainability? Do you think that the capacity of the RGC is an obstacle to sustainability? Do you think that the CTIP Project is sustainable? If yes, in what ways? If no, why not? Do you have any recommendations for how How do you build sustainability into the work you are doing? Does your team focus on sustainability of project activities? If so, in what ways? Does your team focus on sustainability of project activities? If so, in what ways? Do you have any recommendations for how to improve project sustainability? of its activities? If so, in what ways? Do you think that the CTIP Project is sustainable? If so, how? If not, why not? Does the CTIP Project face any challenges to sustainability? If so, what are they? How does the CTIP Project overcome these challenges? Do you have any recommendations for how the CTIP Project could improve its sustainability? Do you think that the political will of the RGC is an obstacle to sustainability? Do you think that they capacity of the RGC is an obstacle to sustainability? 69 to improve project sustainability? 70 ANNEX V: EVALUATION CONTACTS AND KEY INFORMANTS Affiliation/Organization63 Province Beneficiary of Cambodian Women’s Crisis Center (CWCC) Banteay Meanchey Cambodian Women's Crisis Center (CWCC) Banteay Meanchey Poipet Transit Center (PTC) Banteay Meanchey Poipet Transit Center (PTC) Banteay Meanchey Poipet Transit Center (PTC) Banteay Meanchey Provincial Department of Labor and Vocational Training (PDoLVT) Banteay Meanchey Provincial Department of Labor and Vocational Training (PDoLVT) Banteay Meanchey Provincial Department of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (PDoSVY) Banteay Meanchey Provincial Department of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (PDoSVY) Banteay Meanchey Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC) Kampong Cham Commune Police Commission Kampong Cham Commune Police Commission Kampong Cham Community Youth Network Kampong Cham Community Youth Network Kampong Cham Community Youth Network Kampong Cham Community Youth Network Kampong Cham Community Youth Network Kampong Cham Community Youth Network Kampong Cham Community Youth Network Kampong Cham Community Youth Network Kampong Cham Community Youth Network Kampong Cham Khmer Youth Association (KYA) Kampong Cham Mean Commune Kampong Cham Mean Commune Kampong Cham Mean Commune Kampong Cham Migrant Worker Resource Center Kampong Cham Provincial Committee on the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor, and Sexual Exploitation Kampong Cham Provincial Department of Labor and Vocational Training (PDoLVT) Kampong Cham 63 SI provided a complete list of contacts and key informants in the draft report, but names and positions have been removed from this list to preserve the confidentiality of respondents. Of the 165 individuals listed, 87 are male (53%) and 78 are female (47%). 71 Anti-Human Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Department, General Commissariat of National Police Phnom Penh Anti-Human Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Department, General Commissariat of National Police Phnom Penh Australia-Asia Program to Combat Trafficking in Persons (AAPTIP) Phnom Penh Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Phnom Penh Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Phnom Penh Cambodian Women's Crisis Center (CWCC) Phnom Penh Cambodian Women's Crisis Center (CWCC) Phnom Penh Chab Dai Coalition Phnom Penh CTIP II/ Winrock International Phnom Penh CTIP II/ Winrock International Phnom Penh CTIP II/ Winrock International Phnom Penh CTIP II/ Winrock International Phnom Penh CTIP II/ Winrock International Phnom Penh CTIP II/ Winrock International Phnom Penh CTIP II/ Winrock International Phnom Penh CTIP II/ Winrock International Phnom Penh CTIP II/ Winrock International Phnom Penh Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australian Embassy Phnom Penh Phnom Penh Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australian Embassy Phnom Penh Phnom Penh End Child Prostitution, Abuse, and Trafficking in Cambodia (ECPAT) Phnom Penh Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Phnom Penh Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Phnom Penh HAGAR International Phnom Penh HAGAR International Phnom Penh Healthcare Center for Children (HCC) Phnom Penh Healthcare Center for Children (HCC) Phnom Penh Healthcare Center for Children (HCC) Phnom Penh International Justice Mission (IJM) Phnom Penh International Labor Organization (ILO) Phnom Penh International Labor Organization (ILO) Phnom Penh International Organization for Migration (IOM) Phnom Penh International Organization for Migration (IOM) Phnom Penh International Organization for Migration (IOM) Phnom Penh Legal Support for Children and Women (LSCW) Phnom Penh 72 Legal Support for Children and Women (LSCW) Phnom Penh Ministry of Justice Phnom Penh Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training (MoLVT) Phnom Penh Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSAVY) Phnom Penh Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSAVY) Phnom Penh Ministry of Women's Affairs Phnom Penh MTV Exit Phnom Penh National Committee to Lead the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor Exploitation, and Sexual Exploitation (STSLS) Phnom Penh National Committee to Lead the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor Exploitation, and Sexual Exploitation (STSLS) Phnom Penh U.S. Department of Homeland Security Phnom Penh U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh Phnom Penh U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh Phnom Penh U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh Phnom Penh United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP) Phnom Penh USAID Cambodia Phnom Penh USAID Cambodia Phnom Penh USAID Cambodia Phnom Penh USAID Cambodia Phnom Penh USAID Cambodia Phnom Penh USAID Cambodia Phnom Penh USAID Cambodia Phnom Penh World Vision Phnom Penh Angkor Tret Commune Prey Veng Angkor Tret Commune Prey Veng Choeung Toek Commune Prey Veng Commune Police Commission Prey Veng Community Youth Network Prey Veng Community Youth Network Prey Veng Community Youth Network Prey Veng Khmer Youth Association (KYA) Prey Veng Khmer Youth Association (KYA) Prey Veng Khmer Youth Association (KYA) Prey Veng Migrant Worker Resource Center Prey Veng Salao Village Prey Veng 73 Agir pour les femmes en situation precaire (AFESIP) Siem Reap Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC) Siem Reap Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO) Siem Reap Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO) Siem Reap Cambodian Women's Crisis Center (CWCC) Siem Reap Cambodian Women's Crisis Center (CWCC) Siem Reap Cambodian Women's Crisis Center (CWCC) Siem Reap Cambodian Women's Crisis Center (CWCC) Siem Reap Community Youth Network Siem Reap Community Youth Network Siem Reap Community Youth Network Siem Reap Community Youth Network Siem Reap Khmer Youth Association (KYA) Siem Reap Leang Dai Commune Siem Reap Provincial Committee on the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor, and Sexual Exploitation Siem Reap Provincial Committee on the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor, and Sexual Exploitation Siem Reap Provincial Police Commission Siem Reap Provincial Police Commission Siem Reap Angkrong Village Svay Rieng Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC) Svay Rieng Community Youth Network Svay Rieng Community Youth Network Svay Rieng Community Youth Network Svay Rieng Community Youth Network Svay Rieng Community Youth Network Svay Rieng Community Youth Network Svay Rieng Kagn Chhet Village Svay Rieng Khmer Youth Association (KYA) Svay Rieng Kompong Ampil Svay Rieng Provincial Committee on the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor, and Sexual Exploitation Svay Rieng Provincial Committee on the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor, and Sexual Exploitation Svay Rieng Provincial Committee on the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor, and Sexual Exploitation Svay Rieng Provincial Department of Labor and Vocational Training (PDoLVT) Svay Rieng Srormor Village Svay Rieng 74 Svay Rompea Commune Svay Rieng Svay Rompea Commune Svay Rieng Svay Thom Village Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Beneficiary of Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CCPCR) Svay Rieng Provincial Committee on the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor, and Sexual Exploitation Svay Rieng Provincial Committee on the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor, and Sexual Exploitation Svay Rieng Provincial Department of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (PDoSVY) Svay Rieng Provincial Department of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (PDoSVY) Svay Rieng Winrock International Philippines Winrock International United States U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (J/TIP) United States 75 ANNEX VI: DISCLOSURE OF ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 76 77 78 79 80 U.S. Agency for International Development 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20523