USAID/ECUADOR
This is a redacted version of the Final Performance Evaluation of 
USAID/Ecuador’s Program to Support Civil Society. August 2014. 
Prepared independently by Mendez England & Associates.
It is an approved official USAID document. Budget contained herein is for 
illustrative purposes. All policy and procurement sensitive information has been 
removed.
Additional information on the evaluation can be obtained from:
Gretchen Ruethling
Ecuador Desk Officer
LAC Bureau
Email: gruethling@usaid.gov
Phone: 202-712-5587
 
EVALUATION 
FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF USAID/ECUADOR’S 
PROGRAM TO SUPPORT CIVIL SOCIETY 
[August 2014] 
This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development. It was 
prepared independently by Mendez England & Associates. 
Final Performance Evaluation of 
USAID/Ecuador’s Program to Support 
Civil Society 
Final Report 
August 2014 
Prepared under RFTOP No. SOL-518-13-000009 
Submitted to: 
USAID/Ecuador 
Submitted by: 
Melanie Reimer, Team Leader 
Anabella Bruch 
Michel Rowland 
Contractor: 
Mendez England & Associates 
4300 Montgomery Avenue, Suite 103 
Bethesda, MD 20814 
Tel: 301- 652 -4334 
www.mendezengland.com 
DISCLAIMER 
The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States 
Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
CONTENTS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 1
Evaluation Purpose, Design, and Methods ............................................................................................. 1
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations for each Project ....................................................... 1
GF PROJECT ....................................................................................................................................... 1
PC PROJECT ....................................................................................................................................... 4
General Conclusions based on findings for both projects ................................................................. 7
General Recommendations based on conclusions for both projects ............................................. 7
1.0 EVALUATION PURPOSE & QUESTIONS .............................................................. 1
1.1 Evaluation Purpose............................................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Evaluation Questions ......................................................................................................................... 1
2.0 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................ 2
2.1 Socio-political Context .................................................................................................................... 2
2.2 Projects’ Description ........................................................................................................................ 3
3.0 EVALUATION METHODS & LIMITATIONS ........................................................... 4
3.1 evaluation Methodology .................................................................................................................. 4
3.1.1 Qualitative Research ........................................................................................................... 5
3.1.2 Quantitative Research ........................................................................................................ 6
3.1.3 Data Analysis ......................................................................................................................... 7
3.1.4 Evaluation Limitations ......................................................................................................... 7
4.0 FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS and Recommendations .............................................. 8
4.1 GF Project ........................................................................................................................................... 8
4.1.1 Question 1: Advocacy and Watchdog Activity ............................................................. 8
4.1.2 Question 2: Engagement ............................................................................................................... 13
4.1.3 Question 3A: Local Capacity Development ................................................................ 16
4.1.4 Question 3B: Sustainability .............................................................................................. 20
4.1.5 GF Project Recommendations ........................................................................................ 23
4.2 PARTICIPACIÓN CIUDADANA PROJECT ............................................................................ 24
4.2.1 Question 1: Advocacy and Watchdog Activity ........................................................... 24
4.2.2 Question 2: Engagement .................................................................................................. 29
4.2.3 Question 3A: Local Capacity Development ................................................................ 33
4.2.4 Question 3B: Sustainability .............................................................................................. 35
4.2.5 PC Project Recommendations ......................................................................................... 38
5.0 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................... 40
5.1 Question 1: Advocacy and Watchdog Activity ......................................................... 40
5.2 Question 2: Engagement .................................................................................................. 40
5.3 Question 3A: Local Capacity Development ................................................................ 41
5.4 Question 3B: Sustainability .............................................................................................. 41
6.0 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................... 42
6.1 Question 1: Advocacy and Watchdog Activity ........................................................................ 42
6.2 Question 2: Engagement ............................................................................................................... 42
6.3 Question 3A: Local Capacity Development ............................................................................. 42
6.4 Question 3B: Sustainability ........................................................................................................... 43
FIGURES 
Figure 1: KII and FGD Participants by Gender 
Figure 2: CSO Views on Effectiveness of Monitoring and Influence Activities 
Figure 3: CSO Views on Quality of UCG and UTPL Training Courses 
Figure 4: CSO Views on Management of Grants Process 
Figure 5: CSO Participant Views on Quality of Coaching Activity 
Figure 6: CSO Views on Relative Importance of Types of Support from GF 
Figure 7: CSO Views on Quality of the PC Project “Marcando la Hoja de Ruta” Training 
Figure 8: CSO Views on Relative Importance of Types of Support from PC 
Figure 9: CSO Level of Confidence in Information Provided by PC 
Figure 10: CSO Views on Significance of Risks Facing Their Organizations 
ANNEXES 
Annex A: Scope of Work 
Annex B: Evaluation Matrix 
Annex C: Sample of Data Collection Tools 
Annex D: Survey Questionnaire 
Annex E: Description of CSO Survey Process 
Annex F: List of Documents Reviewed 
Annex G: Historical Summary of Participación Ciudadana and Its Collaboration with USAID 
Annex H: Certification Regarding Terrorist Financing 
ACRONYMS 
CBO Community-Based Organization 
CECIM Corporación Ecuatoriana de Cooperación e Inclusión de las Mujeres (Ecuadorian Corporation 
for Cooperation and Inclusion of Women) 
CI Ciudadanía Informada (Informed Citizenry) 
CNE Consejo Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Council) 
CONAIE Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nations 
of Ecuador) 
CPCCS Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social (Council of Citizen Participation and Social 
Control) 
CSO Civil Society Organization 
ECOLEX Corporación de Gestión y Derecho Ambiental ECOLEX (ECOLEX Environmental Management 
and Law Corporation) 
ET Evaluation Team 
FEPP Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (Ecuadorian Fund Populorum Progressio) 
FGD Focus Group Discussion 
Fundamedios Fundación Andina para la Observación y Estudio de Medios (Andean Foundation for the 
Observation and Study of the Media) 
GF Grupo Faro 
GF Project Strengthening Civil Society Project implemented by Grupo Faro 
GoE Government of Ecuador 
ICNL International Center for Non-Profit Law 
INCLUIR Corporación Ecuatoriana por el Buen Vivir INCLUIR (Ecuadorian Corporation INCLUIR for 
the Good Life) 
KII Key Informant Interview 
LAPOP Latin American Public Opinion Project 
LEEP Legal Enabling Environment Project 
ME&A Mendez England & Associates 
NDI National Democratic Institute 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
OCA Organizational Capacity Assessment 
PC Corporación Participación Ciudadana
PC Project Strengthening Democracy Project implemented by Participación Ciudadana 
SETECI Secretaria Técnica de Cooperación Internacional (Technical Secretariat for International 
Cooperation) 
SIEL Sistema Integrado de Educación en Línea (Integrated Online Training System) 
SOW Scope of Work 
UCG Universidad Casa Grande (Casa Grande University) 
UN United Nations 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
UTPL Universidad Técnica Particular de Loja (Private Technical University of Loja) 
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
EVALUATION PURPOSE, DESIGN, AND METHODS 
This final performance evaluation was designed to assess two projects supported by USAID/Ecuador: 
1. Strengthening Civil Society in Ecuador (GF Project), which was implemented by Grupo Faro 
(GF) and three partners, all Ecuadorian civil society organizations (CSOs). The project was executed from 
December 2010 to September 2013, with total funding of $1,939,000. The goal was to enhance the 
capacity of local CSOs to advocate for democracy-related issues and support efforts to influence legislation 
and policies related to the CSO sector. 
2. Strengthening Democracy in Ecuador (PC Project), implemented by Corporación Participación 
Ciudadana (PC), an Ecuadorian CSO. The period under evaluation for this project was October 2010 to 
September 2013; however, the activities of that period represented a continuation of long-term USAID 
funding of the organization that ran from April 2003 to March 2014. Support from USAID during the last 
three years was approximately $3,000,000. The overall goal was to promote more effective citizen 
participation in key democratic processes and oversight of democratic institutions. 
The overall purpose of the evaluation was to: 
1. Determine the results of key project interventions, including successes, impediments, and lessons 
learned; and 
2. Document and provide a record of the projects’ results as well as the history of USAID projects 
with the local CSOs. 
The evaluation was structured around four main categories of questions that apply to both projects, 
namely: 1) Advocacy and Oversight; 2) Engagement; 3) Local Capacity Development; and 4) Sustainability. 
The evaluation was conducted during the period March-May 2014, by a team assembled by Mendez England 
& Associates (ME&A). The team consisted of two international experts, including the Team Leader and one 
civil society expert, as well as one local expert and a logistics and data collection assistant. 
The team used a mixed-methods approach that consisted of document review and desk research, briefing 
meetings, key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), a survey, and review of data 
previously collected by the implementing organizations. Overall, the team conducted 91 KIIs and six FGDs 
with 21 participants in total. Direct data collection activities covered nine municipalities in five provinces of 
Ecuador. In addition, the team conducted an online survey with CSO beneficiaries of the two projects, 
from which it received 62 responses from 16 provinces. 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EACH PROJECT 
GF PROJECT 
Question 1: Advocacy and Watchdog Activity 
Findings
 Of 24 CSO initiatives supported with small grants by the GF Project, eight included direct advocacy or 
watchdog activity. The duration (averaging six months) was short, which meant that some projects 
were not able to complete the entire advocacy process. Several grants reported results on the local 
level, such as drafting a new municipal ordinance with citizen input and mobilizing citizen-official 
committees. 
 CSOs report that training gave them increased confidence and knowledge of laws and skills; however, 
actual influence on decision makers was difficult to achieve, mainly because space for this work by 
CSOs was steadily diminishing at the national level and was highly variable at local government levels. 
 GF Project partners were unable to make much progress in their own advocacy and watchdog work, 
which was focused at the national level, due to political developments; however, they did mobilize 
CSOs to speak out on restrictive regulations. Some activities in this area were suspended in 2012 due 
to budget cuts and the political context. 
2
Conclusions 
 How effective were GF Project’s interventions to strengthen advocacy and watchdog roles of 
other CSOs? GF Project support was largely effective in increasing confidence of targeted CSOs and 
their engagement in advocacy and watchdog activity, though tangible influence on government was 
difficult to achieve since the space for this work by CSOs was extremely limited. In spite of short time 
frames, some grants laid the foundations for future engagement on policy.
 How effective were GF’s direct advocacy and watchdog interventions? The general political 
environment affecting the project made it difficult for GF and its partners to have notable influence 
through its advocacy and oversight work during this period, although the project laid foundations for 
longer term results that may eventually be achieved. 
 What interventions were most effective [training, work with media, work on legal environment, 
strategies for engagement with Government of Ecuador (GoE), etc.] and why? Training, coaching, 
and small grants were all effective to some extent, having had an impact on CSOs’ level of engagement 
in advocacy and watchdog work. Joint advocacy on the CSO legal framework has also had a modest 
positive effect by softening proposed regulations. 
Recommendations
1. Grants for advocacy and watchdog work should be long enough (at least 12 months) to enable CSOs 
to achieve meaningful results, and if short grants are the only option, then strategies for continuation of 
activities should be developed in collaboration with grantees. 
Question 2: Engagement 
Findings
 One of the most significant efforts to build linkages among CSOs was El Colectivo (now the Ecuadorian 
Confederation of CSOs). Its support on coping with the CSO legal framework is highly valued by 
members. However, its sustainability is not certain, given the currently challenging environment. 
 The Confederation launched a collective transparency exercise known as Rendición de Cuentas, through 
which CSOs voluntarily share information about their activities and financing. There is growing interest 
among CSOs in this initiative and most informants view it positively. 
 The grants component strengthened connections among grantee CSOs. Sixty-nine percent of CSO 
survey respondents indicated that contact with other CSOs had become more frequent since 2010. 
 Training and grants activities also helped some targeted CSOs to engage more often and more 
effectively with local government officials on various issues of interest. 
Conclusions 
 How successful were GF Project’s interventions at strengthening its engagement and 
collaborative work with other CSOs, the media, their constituencies, and the government? The
GF Project was most successful in improving its engagement with CSOs, in particular through 
promotion and leadership of the Confederation of CSOs. 
 What are the most effective and sustainable mechanisms for CSOs to constructively engage 
with other CSOs, their constituencies, media, and the government? The most effective 
mechanisms have been the Confederation and the CSO transparency exercise. The Confederation has 
the potential to become an important actor on the civil society stage and an interlocutor with the 
national government, if the government is willing to engage in dialogue with them. The CSO 
transparency exercise is a laudable initiative which could help boost the image of CSOs. These two 
mechanisms do not need significant funding to continue at current levels but financial resources would 
be required to expand their scope and have increased impact. 
Recommendations 
1. The Confederation and the collective CSO transparency exercise it has spearheaded should be further 
supported by the GF Project implementers and donors. However, adjustments are needed to optimize 
processes and broaden participation and dissemination so they can achieve greater influence and 
impact.
Question 3A: Local Capacity Development 
Findings
 The GF Project carried out various interventions to build the capacity of Ecuadorian CSOs: 
3
- University-based intensive courses reached 222 individuals with topics identified through advanced 
research. Training was rated highly by most informants, although the e-learning methods used in 
the second course proved less effective than the first course, which relied on a more traditional 
classroom approach. 
- Some grants for CSOs included funds to support networking and/or institutional strengthening, 
which had measurable benefits such as a new website. However, the short duration of grants 
forced CSOs to rush activities. 
- Coaching for improved sustainability was valued by targeted CSOs. 
- Overall, trainings organized by the GF Project were ranked as “good quality” (4 on a scale of 1 to 
5) by surveyed participants. 
- The project developed an interactive map of over 200 CSOs and a directory of over 500 CSOs in 
Ecuador to help users identify relevant organizations using a variety of criteria. However, 
awareness of these tools was limited among CSOs. 
Conclusions
 How effective were GF Project’s capacity development interventions with other CSOs? The 
work of the GF Project to build CSO capacity can be considered fairly effective, according to 
beneficiaries, grant reports, and post-course assessments. However, there is insufficient information 
available to assess actual changes in the capacity of targeted CSOs. In spite of solid support to grantees, 
the short duration of grants made it harder for recipients to “learn by doing”.
 Specifically, what interventions in local capacity development were most effective and why? 
(grants, training, workshops, university training, etc.)? The coaching activity was of a high standard 
and responded to priority needs of CSOs; along with the first university course organized by the GF 
Project, it was the most appreciated activity by the participants. The training/information on the CSO 
legal framework and support to networking through the Confederation also had positive effects, as 
CSOs helped each-other cope with new regulations and expanded their circles of contacts. Some 
grants were also effective in building capacity, especially those that included specific resources for 
institutional strengthening. 
Recommendations 
1. USAID should consider inclusion of hands-on coaching services as part of other civil society 
strengthening programs, especially when CSOs are facing difficult political or financial circumstances.
2. Grants for advocacy and watchdog work should be long enough (at least 12 months) to enable CSOs 
to achieve meaningful results, and if short grants are the only option, then strategies for continuation of 
activities should be developed in collaboration with grantees. 
Question 3B: Sustainability1 
Findings
 USAID has provided significant support to strengthen the financial and administrative systems of GF 
since 2011, contributing to more robust and practical procedures and systems. 
 Lack of familiarity with USAID budget cycles and processes led to misunderstandings over financial 
commitments and confusion within the GF consortium, especially during the first year of project 
implementation. 
 GF has a high level of technical competency and its internal systems are much improved. Financial 
sustainability is strong due to a diversified array of funding sources from private foundations to foreign 
governments, and the wide range of international linkages that GF has developed. 
Conclusions 
 Has USAID/Ecuador’s direct assistance to GF succeeded in building sustainable local capacity of 
the organization? USAID/Ecuador’s support has directly contributed to building sustainable capacity in 
a number of key areas, including financial and administration systems, and project management. 
 How far along the road to sustainability is GF? And in what areas do they still need support? GF, 
as an organization, is very sustainable by most measures. GF has an impressive array of donors and 
healthy annual income supporting a diverse set of activities. However, its ability to continue to support 
civil society strengthening is not clear given the current dearth of funding sources for that area. As a 
 
1
 The focus of the evaluation’s enquiries was on the likelihood that GF would be able to continue to function without 
USAID funding, with similar internal capacities and activities. 
4
result, GF could benefit from support to identify income generation or funding sources to allow their 
continued involvement in civil society strengthening and networking.
Recommendations 
1. Partnership among national CSOs to execute major projects should be encouraged by USAID in 
countries where it works, in order to capitalize on a range of skills, experience and constituencies. 
Where implementers (prime and secondary) may lack strong internal systems, USAID should conduct 
rigorous analyses of capacities, and provide inputs to strengthen capacity of all implementers. 
2. USAID should provide early and continuous training and advice on US Government (USG) budget 
cycles and processes to novice implementers. When reducing budgets, USAID should consider the 
potentially significant political, operational and financial implications for its partners. 
3. The organizational policy of imposing a maximum on the percentage of overall income from a single 
donor (as GF does) is one that should be carefully considered by other CSOs and USAID. 
PC PROJECT 
Question 1: Advocacy and Watchdog Activity 
Findings
 The PC Project strengthened the use at the municipal level of the Silla Vacía (Empty Chair)2 and 
Rendición de Cuentas (Accountability Forums) as mechanisms for citizen advocacy and watchdog work. 
The combined approach of providing tailored technical assistance, coaching, and quality publications/ 
manuals were well received by municipal leaders in targeted areas. Six municipalities adopted 
ordinances for implementation of Silla Vacía as a result. 
 A key oversight role for PC has been election monitoring for which it mobilizes thousands of 
volunteers. PC is the only CSO in Ecuador conducting national level observation; its quick counts over 
the years were considered technically impeccable and helped increase public confidence in elections. 
 Support by the PC Project to 30 government-funded entities to comply with new access to information 
laws on website transparency, including a manual and training of public officials, was highly appreciated 
and helped achieve high rates of compliance. 
 The PC Project also monitored government expenditure on mass media; their work raised awareness 
but also provoked tensions with the government. The method of reporting had to be changed from 
dollar values to air time to respond to the GoE’s concerns about accuracy. 
Conclusions 
 How effective were PC Project’s interventions to strengthen advocacy and watchdog roles of 
other CSOs? The project’s main focus was on direct advocacy and watchdog work as compared to 
supporting other CSOs. PC’s support to CSOs was primarily through the Hoja de Ruta training,3 which 
was effective in increasing skills and involvement in advocacy and watchdog work.
 How effective were PC’s direct advocacy and watchdog interventions? Since 2011, with a changing 
political context, it has been difficult for PC to achieve observable effects with its advocacy—although 
long-term results cannot be ruled out. Election and referendum monitoring has been highly effective. 
Other initiatives such as monitoring compliance with the Access to Public Information Law (LOTAIP) 
have raised awareness and drawn government attention, though effects on policy and practice were 
not possible to ascertain. 
 What interventions by PC were most effective (training, work with media, work on legal 
environment, strategies for engagement with GoE, etc.) and why? PC has played a critical role in 
affording credibility to election processes in Ecuador, and continues to be well respected for its 
technical competency in this area. One of the most effective activities was monitoring of compliance 
with LOTAIP, which combined oversight with technical assistance to build skills and improve 
implementation. High rates of compliance were achieved by targeted institutions, and an innovative 
model for CSO-government cooperation was established. PC’s work with local governments to 
 
2
 The Silla Vacía mechanism for citizen participation was established by the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008. It allows 
for an ordinary citizen to be selected to participate in debates and decision making processes of certain elected 
government bodies. It has since been adopted in other laws at national and local levels. 
3
 “Marcando la Hoja de Ruta para la Sociedad Civil” (Creating a Roadmap for Civil Society) was the main PC initiative to 
strengthen CSO capacity. It is discussed in more detail under Question 3A. 
5
increase understanding and use of Accountability Forums has also been effective in a number of 
targeted municipalities. 
 What interventions by PC were not successful and why? Advocacy for changes to the CSO legal 
framework and the Citizen Participation Law, among others, did not achieve observable results.
Recommendations 
1. USAID should encourage civil society programs in other countries to identify non-controversial ways 
for CSOs to monitor and provide technical support to government (such as promoting government 
compliance with new laws and effective engagement with citizens). 
2. International and Ecuadorian stakeholders should continue to support the role of skilled national CSOs 
such as PC in election monitoring, including through support of collaborative efforts by organizations in 
the same region. 
3. PC should seek to channel more activities outside of Quito through CSOs and volunteers based in 
targeted areas, especially those who are already trained and have shown strong interest in promotion 
of democratic practices. 
Question 2: Engagement 
Findings
 The PC Project has shown a strong capacity to mobilize citizen volunteers in campaigns, election 
monitoring and oversight activities. Participation of volunteers is still high in elections, though the level 
of engagement in other activities has declined since 2010. 
 Creation of the Red Pluralista network was initiated by CSO participants in PC training; PC was a 
member but opted not to take an active leadership role. At that time, the PC Project did not include 
funding to support this network, though in 2013 it funded small grants to two network members. 
 PC has effectively used civic campaigns to engage with citizens. The scale and visibility of campaigns 
have declined since 2012, primarily due to the political context including new legislation that restricts 
public demonstrations, and limited funding support for these activities. 
 The PC Project engaged the media through diverse channels and approaches. The digital newspaper 
“Ciudadanía Informada” has been a key platform with high visitor levels. 
Conclusions 
 How successful were PC’s interventions at strengthening their engagement and collaborative 
work with other CSOs, the media, their constituencies, and the government? The work of PC 
with government institutions was somewhat successful in this area, especially before 2012. The 
creation and maintenance of a widespread volunteer network was a significant achievement for PC. 
Engagement with local government and citizens in targeted areas has improved since 2012 through the 
project’s work on promotion of citizen participation mechanisms. Although a small CSO network (Red 
Pluralista) emerged spontaneously from PC’s activities, the network has been fairly dormant – as have 
various other Ecuadorian CSO networks in recent years. 
 What are the most effective and sustainable mechanisms for CSOs to constructively engage 
with other CSOs, their constituencies, media, and the government? The PC Project did not 
include a significant focus on supporting engagement by CSOs with other stakeholders. However, as a 
CSO itself, PC established effective mechanisms for providing technical assistance to government 
bodies (at national and local levels) to promote compliance with transparency laws. PC’s 
communications are disseminated regularly by the media and, its information – especially regarding 
elections – is well respected. PC’s civic campaigns and involvement of volunteers in election 
observation proved to be effective means of engaging citizens in public life. These mechanisms require 
at least modest levels of funding to be sustainable.
Recommendations 
1. PC should re-examine the role of volunteers in the organization and decide whether they are only to 
be engaged for elections, or whether a broader role is still desirable and feasible. If a wider role is 
envisaged, PC should make a concerted effort to reconnect with volunteers.
2. PC should continue to collaborate with the Red Pluralista’s CSO members, for example by holding joint 
training workshops and promoting members’ leadership in their communities.
6
Question 3A: Local Capacity Development 
Findings4 
 “Marcando la Hoja de Ruta para la Sociedad Civil” (Creating a Roadmap for Civil Society) was the main 
PC initiative to strengthen CSO capacity; a needs assessment in 2010 was followed by four training 
modules for 54 CSOs.5 Quality of the training was highly rated and CSO survey data suggests that it 
may have motivated CSOs to become more active in advocacy and watchdog work. 
 CSO survey results indicate that, on average, respondents consider that assistance from PC helped 
their organization improve the most in the following areas: relations with other CSOs, work with local 
communities, and quality of services. 
Conclusions 
 How effective were PC Projects’s capacity development interventions with other CSOs? The PC 
Project activities to build CSO capacity (notably, the Hoja de Ruta or Roadmap training series) can be 
considered fairly effective. However, the scope of PC’s work in this area was limited after 2011 due to 
funding constraints. 
 Specifically, what interventions in local capacity development were most effective and why? 
(grants, training, workshops, university training, etc.)? The Hoja de Ruta training series was the 
most effective activity due to the careful assessment of needs and the quality of the workshops. It 
helped organizations become more involved and effective in citizen oversight and advocacy activities. 
The creation of the Red Pluralista at the end of the training showed the strong motivation among some 
CSOs to extend the reach of the training. Afterwards, a few members replicated parts of the training 
in their local areas. 
Recommendations 
1. PC should work to expand and activate their existing connections (formal and informal) with CSOs in 
Ecuador in order to find effective and efficient ways of extending the impact of activities. 
2. PC should facilitate collaborative links between volunteers and CSOs based in the same 
provinces/cities, especially those who have already benefited from training in democratic practices. This 
strategy could help build capacity on local levels in areas that PC cannot reach directly with reduced 
resources. 
Question 3B: Sustainability6 
Findings
 In terms of core areas of sustainability, PC is held in high regard for its technical competency. Visibility 
is high for a CSO but is considered to have declined since 2010, particularly outside the major cities. 
Conclusions 
 Has USAID/Ecuador’s direct assistance to PC succeeded in building sustainable local capacity 
of the organization? Yes. The Mission’s support has directly contributed to building sustainable 
capacity in a number of key areas, including technical capacity, credibility with the public, media and 
civil society, visibility, and internal systems. 
 PC would benefit from the following support: 1) strategic planning; 2) facilitation of connections to 
private sector funders; 3) encouragement to develop joint projects with other organizations based in 
the region; and 4) knowledge management support to assist in analyzing and capturing key information, 
systems, methodologies, and strategies used in PC’s key initiatives, in order to mitigate the effects of 
reduction of staffing on technical capacity.
Recommendations 
1. PC should seek out suitable national and regional organizations to develop collaborative projects in 
order to attract funding and bolster PC’s networks of support in the region. 
 
4
 Although CSOs were not a primary target group, PC carried out several interventions to increase the capacity of 
CSOs, citizens, volunteer networks, and youth. 
5
 This initiative was co-funded by the Embassy of Canada. 
6
 The focus of the evaluation’s enquiries was on the likelihood that PC would be able to continue to function without 
USAID funding, with similar internal capacities and activities. 
7
2. USAID should support regular strategic planning processes by its partners in other countries, using 
experienced consultants to ensure that the final product is supported by broad consensus. 
3. As PC goes through its current transition, they and USAID should pay careful attention to 
documentation of knowledge and methods developed and refined by PC over the years, and to secure 
storage of valuable information. 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON FINDINGS FOR BOTH PROJECTS 
Question 1: Advocacy and Watchdog Activity 
 Space is currently very constrained for advocacy and watchdog work, especially on the national 
government level. The situation has changed dramatically since the projects were designed in 2009, and 
it has become more difficult for civil society to have a voice in or to influence public policy, with few 
exceptions. However, the government is still willing to work with civil society in certain sectors, 
notably social service delivery. 
Question 2: Engagement 
 The GF Project was able to work together with several universities in a very productive fashion 
although space for such collaboration with universities is also shrinking. 
 There has been minimal information sharing and coordination of activities between the two projects, 
which gave rise to reluctance to share information, especially as the funding situation became tighter. 
Although actual overlap was not observed, this had the effect of opportunities for synergy and shared 
learning being missed. 
Question 3A: Local Capacity Development 
 The major training interventions by both projects were found to have built valuable skills and 
knowledge in important subject areas. However, either due to funding constraints or not having 
included replication activities in project plans, replication and dissemination of the training modules and 
related publications has been minimal, so the impact to date has been limited. 
 Decree 16 represents a serious threat to CSOs who do not meet the new registration and reporting 
requirements. PC and GF Projects have both provided valuable concrete assistance to CSOs in this 
regard.7 
Question 3B: Sustainability 
 Civil society in Ecuador is faced with a combination of threats: diminishing donor interest, widespread 
wariness about supporting civil society activity, increasingly strict regulation, and reduced opportunities 
for action and influence. 
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON CONCLUSIONS FOR BOTH PROJECTS 
Question 1: Advocacy and Watchdog Activity 
1. Donors and implementers should be realistic in their expectations of advocacy initiatives, since real 
impact on laws or policy can become apparent years later. 
2. Civil society and donors should work to preserve and expand neutral spaces where CSOs can discuss 
relevant advocacy and watchdog initiatives and establish areas of collaboration. Networks and alliances 
of a wide variety can be effective; informal and/or temporary groupings and collaborations may be the 
most feasible and effective option. 
Question 2: Engagement 
1. USAID should recognize and carefully take into account the rivalry that may exist between national 
organizations, especially in small countries. Although there is no surefire method of overcoming the 
potential resistance of implementing parties, USAID should establish detailed strategies from the outset 
that define how relations between projects in related areas will be managed and how information will 
be shared. Strategies could include regular sector-level roundtable meetings, for example, where 
various USAID implementers exchange information.
 
7
 PC’s activity in this area has been funded primarily by another donor, although through this project USAID has still 
provided resources to cover operational expenses of PC. 
8
Question 3A: Local Capacity Development 
1. Since training packages developed by both projects (GF Project’s university course and PC Project’s 
Marcando la Hoja de Ruta) have shown positive results, these should be disseminated further by USAID 
and the implementers so that more CSOs can benefit, within and beyond Ecuador.
2. In future projects with an emphasis on training and/or publications for CSOs, plans and budgets should 
include the dissemination of learning and information beyond the primary beneficiaries, for example 
through replication and/or distribution of training materials in hard or soft copies. 
Question 3B: Sustainability 
1. USAID and other donors should manage their expectations with respect to CSO sustainability. 
Solutions should be sought (such as development of income generation activities) to shore up the long￾term viability of organizations. 
CROSS-CUTTING RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. When dealing with a consortium of either local or international partners, USAID normally conducts all 
discussions about contract and budget with the prime implementer. However, in cases of significant 
budget and/or activity adjustments, it is recommended that USAID staff meet directly with both prime 
and non-prime implementers, in order to explain the adjustments clearly to all parties. This is especially 
important in a situation where the prime has limited experience in managing consortia and with USAID 
funding, so as to minimize misunderstandings which may undermine relationships within the consortium. 
1 
1.0 EVALUATION PURPOSE & 
QUESTIONS 
1.1 EVALUATION PURPOSE 
This is a report on the final performance evaluation of two projects funded by USAID/Ecuador: 1) 
Strengthening Democracy in Ecuador Project (referred to throughout the report as the PC Project), 
implemented by Corporación Participación Ciudadana (PC) from 2003 to 2014; and 2) Strengthening Civil 
Society in Ecuador Project (referred to throughout the report as the GF Project), implemented by the 
Grupo Faro Consortium (GF) from 2010 to 2013. 
The purpose of the evaluation was to: 
1. Determine the results of key project interventions, including successes, impediments, and lessons 
learned; and 
2. Document and provide a record of the projects’ results, as well as the history of the USAID 
projects with these local civil society organizations (CSOs).8
The findings and recommendations of the evaluation are expected to be used by: 1) USAID to inform the 
design of future civil society and local capacity development programs in other countries where USAID 
works; and 2) the two award recipient organizations for their internal learning to use to build their own 
capacity. The full Scope of Work (SOW) of the evaluation is available in Annex A. 
1.2 EVALUATION QUESTIONS 
The evaluation was designed to focus on the following four categories of Evaluation Questions posed by 
USAID: 
1. Advocacy and Oversight 
1.1. How effective were PC’s and GF’s interventions to strengthen advocacy and watchdog roles of 
other CSOs? 
1.2. How effective were PC’s and GF’s direct advocacy and watchdog interventions? 
1.3. What interventions were most effective [training, work with media, work on legal environment, 
strategies for engagement with Government of Ecuador (GoE), etc.] and why? 
1.4. What interventions were not successful and why? 
2. Engagement 
2.1. How successful were PC’s and GF’s interventions at strengthening their engagement and 
collaborative work with other CSOs, the media, their constituencies, and the government? 
2.2. What are the most effective and sustainable mechanisms for CSOs to constructively engage with 
other CSOs, their constituencies, media, and the government? 
3. Local Capacity Development and Sustainability 
3.1. How effective were PC and GF’s capacity development interventions with other CSOs? 
3.2. Specifically, what interventions in local capacity development were most effective and why? (grants, 
training, workshops, university training, etc.)? 
3.3. Has USAID/Ecuador’s direct assistance to PC and GF succeeded in building sustainable local 
capacity of these two groups? 
3.4. How far along the road to sustainability are PC and GF? And in what areas do they still need 
support? 
Each of these questions was defined in more detail by the Evaluation Team (ET), including the development 
of sub-questions for investigation, as shown in the Evaluation Matrix in Annex B. 
 
8
 The historical summary of PC’s work and relations with USAID is contained in Annex G. 
2 
2.0 BACKGROUND 
2.1 SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT 
President Rafael Correa’s rise to power in 2007 ushered in a radically different era, both politically and 
economically. As a result, the Ecuadorian State - historically weaker than the private sector and civil 
society - began to grow rapidly, driving the economy and becoming the major developer and implementer 
of public policies. In the same year, Correa’s party, Alianza País, convened a Constituent Assembly, which 
met from November 2007 to October 2008 in Montecristi. 
The new Constitution, drafted by the Constituent Assembly and ratified by popular referendum in 
September 2008, established institutions and a regulatory framework that significantly changed citizen 
participation and civil society’s role in Ecuador. Furthermore, it established the Transparency and 
Accountability Branch (also referred to as the “Fifth Power”) as a national level regulatory entity consisting 
of the Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social (Council of Citizen Participation and Social Control 
or CPCCS), the Public Defender or Ombudsman’s Office, the Comptroller General, and others. Among 
other functions, the Fifth Power is responsible for formulating transparent public policy, monitoring the use 
of public resources and government accountability, promoting citizen participation, and preventing and 
combating corruption.9
The new Constitution and the Law on Citizenship Participation enacted in 2010 established the CPCCS’ 
leading role in promoting citizen participation. The Law regulates citizen participation mechanisms 
previously led by civil society and local governments and includes provisions for citizen participation in 
budget development, formulation, and implementation of operational plans and result analysis. 
From the beginning of Correa’s administration, many CSO leaders have been recruited by the GoE. Many 
civil society groups lost strong leaders who were hard to replace, thus weakening their internal structures. 
The new constitution enshrined issues such as the rights of nature, collective rights, the right to wellbeing, 
multi-nationalism, and multiculturalism. Additionally, the GoE made innovative proposals such as keeping 
the Yasuní National Park oil underground and changing the traditional extractive economic model.10
The GoE has moved steadily toward increased regulation of civil society, beginning with Decree 982 issued 
in March 2008 to regulate CSOs. 
In June 2013, Correa issued Decree 16.11 The decree regulates aspects of formation, modification, and 
termination of CSOs, and limits the potential activity and influence of unregistered organizations. 
In December 2013, the GoE used its power under Decree 16 to forcibly close the Ecuadorian 
environmental non-governmental organization (NGO), Pachamama Foundation, on the basis that it was 
"interfering with public policies, undermining the State’s internal security, and affecting peace.”12 
Public and private universities have seen significant reductions in their autonomy and independence as a 
result of the New Organic Law on Higher Education passed in October 2010, which subjected higher 
education centers to rigorous assessments and restructuring. 
Restrictive new legislation has also affected other sectors. The Communications Law, enacted in June 2013, 
has been applied to sanction private media outlets for publishing news and opinion pieces critical of the 
GoE. The Organic Penal Code, passed in January 2014, criminalized social protest and, according to several 
interviewees and subject specialists, instituted some penalties which are disproportionate to the acts 
committed.13
 
9
 Article 206, Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador (2008) 
10 http://yasuni-itt.gob.ec/quees.aspx 11http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Ecuador/ecuad.pdf
12 Agreement N. 125 of the Ministry of Environment, December 4, 2013. 
13 “El nuevo Código Penal legitimará prácticas punitivas arbitrarias”: http://www.elcomercio.com/politica/CodigoPenal￾proyecto-discusion-debate-Correa-Ecuador-Asamblea-leyes-aborto-despenalizacion-delitos_0_1010298972.html 
3 
Since 2008, the GoE has increasingly sought to "ensure that programs financed by international aid agencies 
were aligned with the needs of the plans and policies of the government".14 This practice has intensified 
since 2011 under the Secretariat Técnica de Cooperación Internacional (Technical Secretariat for International 
Cooperation or SETECI), resulting in foreign aid agencies restricting support to non-governmental 
recipients of aid and discontinuing certain sensitive areas of cooperation, notably democracy and 
governance. 
Several informants also noted that since Ecuador reached a medium level of human development,15 it is no 
longer considered a priority country for international cooperation, resulting in several aid agencies closing 
or cutting back programs. This also reduced CSOs’ financial capacity to support citizen participation and 
continue advocacy and watchdog services. 
The dramatic and rapid evolution of Ecuador’s political, economic, and social context had profound effects 
on the two projects being evaluated as well as on the Ecuadorian organizations implementing them. The 
GoE’s public criticism of USAID’s support to civil society between 2012 and 2013, and the eventual non￾renewal of a bilateral agreement between USAID and the GoE, which ultimately led to the decision to 
close USAID/Ecuador, also contributed to the challenges faced by both projects. While some of the above 
changes were already underway at the time the projects were designed and began, others have been more 
difficult to predict. 
2.2 PROJECTS’ DESCRIPTION 
GF Project was implemented by GF with three partners, all Ecuadorian CSOs: Fundación Esquel, Fondo 
Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (Ecuadorian Fund Populorum Progressio or FEPP), and Fundamedios. The 
project was executed from December 2010 to September 2013, with total funding of $1,939,000. The 
project’s stated goal was to enhance the capacity of local CSOs to advocate for democracy-related issues 
and support efforts to influence legislation and policies related to the CSO sector. 
GF Project Objectives 
1. Strengthen the capacity of CSOs to effectively influence democratic processes, institutions, and 
adherence to democratic principles. 
2. Strengthen the capacity of selected CSOs to develop more effective sustainability efforts and function 
more transparently. 
The project included the following key areas of activity: 
 Support of advocacy, oversight, and capacity building efforts of 24 CSOs through small grant funds. 
 Strengthen a national CSO network to build CSOs’ capacities and promote collective action. 
 Develop research studies and publications to enhance the work of the CSO sector. 
 Identify and disseminate innovative practices within the CSO sector. 
 Strengthen CSOs organizationally and institutionally through direct coaching and long-term formal 
courses. 
 Promote CSO sustainability through hands-on development of sustainability plans. 
PC Project, with the goal to promote more effective citizen participation in key democratic processes 
and oversight of democratic institutions, was implemented by PC, an Ecuadorian CSO. Although the 
evaluation covered October 2010 to September 2013, the activities of that period represented a 
continuation of long-term USAID funding of the organization that ran from April 2003 to March 2014. 
Support from USAID during the last three years was approximately $3,000,000. 
PC Project Objectives 
1. Develop domestic observation and parallel vote tabulations of the results of national and local 
elections. 
 
14 “AGECI controlará la ayuda internacional” http://www.eldiario.ec/noticias-manabi-ecuador/84756-ageci-controlara￾la-ayuda-internacional/ 15 http://www.datosmacro.com/idh/ecuador 
4 
2. Promote greater transparency by government institutions and elected officials at the national and local 
level. 
3. Provide constructive input to local and national laws and regulations. 
4. Promote democratic values and education through activities such as civic campaigns and democratic 
practices in high-schools. 
5. Promote dialogue on issues of public interest. 
PC Project 2010-2013 specific objectives 
1. Strengthen the ability of civil society to participate in and influence public policy. 
2. Increase the capacity of selected CSOs in the social audit of key democratic institutions.16 
3. Effectively promote democratic values, attitudes, and practices. 
4. Support PC’s institutional and financial sustainability. 
During this period, PC focused on citizen-based oversight of democratic institutions, processes, and public 
spending; support to transparency and accountability by elected municipal officials; constructive input to 
enhance national and local legislation; consolidation of civic education programs; and promotion of 
dialogues between citizens and public officials or among civil society groups. In addition, the PC Project 
trained other CSOs in oversight and advocacy mechanisms, and promoted a CSO network to advance 
these issues.17 
The project included the following key areas of activity: 
 Monitoring of and support to 30 public institutions to improve compliance with transparency law 
requirements. 
 Monitoring of use of public funds. 
 Promoting citizens’ understanding on key democratic issues and civic responsibility. 
 Advocacy for reforms to policies and legislation. 
 Collaboration with volunteers and other community members to promote citizen participation and 
oversight. 
 Support to a range of CSOs to promote oversight and advocacy efforts throughout the country. 
 Observation of elections and quick count of results. 
3.0 EVALUATION METHODS & 
LIMITATIONS 
3.1 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
The evaluation was designed to assess the effectiveness of the two projects in achieving their objectives, 
and to generate practical recommendations for new directions in general civil society and local capacity 
development programming supported by USAID. Within that broader scope, the evaluation methods and 
data collection tools were carefully crafted to respond as a matter of priority to the core Evaluation 
Questions. Fieldwork was carried out by the Team Leader, Civil Society Expert, and Local Expert in April 
and May of 2014. The ET used a mixed-methods approach that consisted of document review and desk 
research, briefing meetings, key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), a survey, and 
review of data previously collected by the implementers. 
This approach helped to generate accurate findings about the projects context, the changes effected by the 
projects over time, and how different project interventions affected beneficiaries and the civil society 
environment more broadly, either positively or negatively. The ET gathered and analyzed the diverse 
 
16 Note: although the specific objective reads this way, the activities proposed under this objective were primarily 
direct watchdog and advocacy by PC. 
17 This activity was co-funded by the Embassy of Canada. 
5 
opinions and perceptions of government officials, USAID and project staff, and other national and 
international stakeholders about whether and how these projects were able to strengthen citizen 
participation and civil society’s role in Ecuador. The methodology was multidimensional, with the ET relying 
on a number of techniques that balanced each other: quantitative vs. qualitative data; individual vs. group 
responses; and face-to-face meetings vs. online survey. These multiple data gathering techniques also 
helped explore, at various levels, informants’ suggestions for priority interventions in the future. 
To contribute to the collection of honest viewpoints and reliable information, the ET assured informants of 
their anonymity. Interviewees had the option of having their names omitted from the list of informants. 
Because many preferred that option, the ET chose not to include that list in this report. Selection of KII 
and FGD participants was based on the suggested informant list from USAID, participant/beneficiary lists 
from various project activities, desk research, and recommendations by experts. Although implementers 
were asked for suggestions and contact information to facilitate the process of arranging meetings, in all 
cases, the ET made the final decision on informants. The selection took into account such factors as 
geographical location, gender, type of support received from the projects (training, funding, mentoring, 
network facilitation, information, etc.), type of organization (indigenous, women’s, youth, etc.), and 
affiliation of informant (CSO, government, media, donor, academic, etc.). The ET aimed for a reasonable 
balance of these factors among KII and FGD informants to ensure a wide range of voices was heard and 
that no relevant group was left out. 
When analyzing data, the ET used triangulation in order to increase the reliability and validity of its findings 
as well as ensure the rigor and quality of the evaluation. However, those cases where relevant information 
or perspectives emerged from data collection did not fit in with triangulated findings or where there was 
significant variation among informants on a given subject have been mentioned in the report. Although the 
evaluation is mainly qualitative, valuable quantitative data was sourced directly from the project 
implementers, and secondary quantitative data was also collected from other USAID projects and other 
surveys. 
3.1.1 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
The collection of qualitative data was conducted primarily through: 
 A critical desk-top review of materials related directly to the projects, such as progress reports, annual 
work plans, monitoring and evaluation plans, indicator achievement tables, and project publications, as 
well as other materials from various sources, such as civil society studies, media articles, and 
independent research reports and opinion pieces. A full list of documents and websites consulted is 
found in Annex F. 
 Ninety-one KIIs with seven categories of informants including project staff, CSOs, local and national 
government officials, international agencies, media, beneficiaries and academics/thematic experts. The 
ET included gender balance and the inclusion of vulnerable groups as part of its selection criteria. KIIs 
were conducted through protocols and instruments with both standard and customized questions for 
different types of informants. Relevant direct quotations were captured in notes taken by the 
interviewer (or note-taker, where available). 
 Site visits to both PC and GF offices in Quito, nine municipalities (Alausí, Bucay, Colta, Cuenca, 
Guayaquil, Loja, Quito, Riobamba, and Saraguro), five provinces, and two training workshops organized 
by PC.18 
 Six FGDs to obtain additional qualitative information to strengthen analysis and understand the effects 
of certain activities on specific stakeholder groups. The six FGDs were composed of the following 
participants: 
 
18 Since USAID funding had ceased at the time of data collection, these workshops were funded by another donor. 
The evaluators attended with multiple objectives, including: to gain a better understanding of the meaning of Decree 
16 for CSOs, to observe the links of PC with local CSOs, to assess the reactions of participants to Decree 16, and to 
gauge the usefulness of the PC-prepared guide to Decree 16. 
6 
1. CSO members of Red Pluralista – Loja 
2. CSO members of the Ecuadorian Confederation of CSOs – Quito 
3. Participants in a university course implemented by GF Project – Loja 
4. Community members and leaders – Bucay, Guayas province 
5. PC volunteers – Guayas province 
6. Parish council members – Colta 
Figure 1: KII and FGD Participants by Gender
Type of Informant Male Female Total
Key Informant 54 37 91
Focus Group Participant 15 6 21
Total 69 43 112 
Detailed methodology for FGDs 
 Each FGD was designed for up to eight participants who engaged in an open discussion structured 
around predetermined questions (discussion guide) led by a moderator. In all cases, the moderator was 
assisted by a note taker. 
 Discussion guides included 9-12 questions designed for a 90 minute discussion, starting with broad 
questions and moving into narrower or key questions. The types of questions used were: opening, 
introductory, transition, key, and ending. Questions were neutrally worded and neutral probes were 
used (an example of the guides can be found in Annex C). 
 The note-taker recorded the key words, expressions, and non-verbal communications of participants. 
FGD reports included a general summary of participants’ responses to each question and highlighted 
the range of responses, experiences, etc. 
3.1.2 QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 
Quantitative research for this evaluation primarily consisted of an online survey of CSOs that benefited 
from the projects. After analysis of project documents, the ET selected CSOs that participated in the 
following core project activities: GF Project-organized university courses, GF-funded coaching of CSOs, 
PC-organized training series “Marcando la Hoja de Ruta” (Creating a Roadmap for Civil Society), sub￾grantees of both projects, and members of two networks supported by the projects Red Pluralista and El 
Colectivo. The survey targeted 221 CSO representatives and received 62 responses (34 women, 28 men) 
from 16 provinces. The survey questionnaire is found in Annex D, and a detailed description of the survey 
process is found in Annex E. 
Based on the understanding that internet access was high among CSOs that participated actively in the 
projects, the survey was conducted using the Survey Monkey platform19 to ensure confidentiality, ease of 
access, and speed in collecting and analyzing data. The link to the survey, accompanied by a letter of 
introduction, was sent via email - which assured confidentiality of responses and did not require 
respondents to identify themselves personally - to the targeted CSOs. The email survey was heavily 
supplemented with follow-up telephone calls to boost response rates, which were found to be necessary 
due to the poor quality of email contact information and the tendency of recipients to pass over the email 
message as spam, possibly containing a virus. 
While many questions were the same for all respondents, the survey was designed with specific questions 
for the three sub-sets of CSOs – sub-grantees, training participants, and CSO network members – in 
order to receive more in-depth feedback on those areas of intervention and their effectiveness. In this 
manner, the ET avoided burdening CSO respondents with repeated requests to complete separate surveys 
and at the same time facilitated and enhanced the data analysis process since all responses automatically 
became part of the same data set and could easily be compared. 
 
19 https://www.surveymonkey.net/ 
7 
The survey instrument was initially developed in English and, after being approved by USAID, was 
translated, pretested, revised, and implemented. Survey questions were closed-end responses, thus 
removing the need for translating responses back into English. The questions took into consideration 
cultural sensitivities and were carefully worded to ensure clarity while avoiding potentially controversial or 
sensitive terminology. The survey design took into account gender issues and aimed for optimal inclusion 
of women and women-focused CSOs.
3.1.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
To conduct the data analysis, the ET used a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. To increase the 
rigor and quality of the evaluation, the ET triangulated its findings. Triangulation was made possible by the 
various methods of data collection used for each major evaluation question (see Evaluation Matrix in 
Annex B). In addition, the ET asked similar questions to different stakeholders involved in the same issue. 
The different data collected was analyzed, including through the use of a matrix where each KII response 
on six core issues was summarized, and the results have been related to each other as appropriate. 
The ET worked closely with the Mendez England & Associates (ME&A) Data Analyst to prepare, conduct, 
and analyze the survey results. Data from survey responses was used to confirm and substantiate the 
findings from document review, KIIs, and FGDs. In addition to examining the descriptive information and 
scale of CSO responses to different questions, the ET cross-tabulated various responses based on the type 
of involvement with the projects (grantees vs. non-grantees, for example).20 The results were used to 
enrich data analysis and allow comparisons between survey responses and data obtained using other 
methods. The ET also looked for any significant differences in responses based on respondent gender. 
Once data collection was completed, the ET held three separate briefing meetings with the implementers 
of each project and with USAID to discuss preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations. That 
process was a valuable opportunity to receive additional information and clarifications from the key project 
stakeholders and to adjust the analysis as required. 
3.1.4 EVALUATION LIMITATIONS 
Several limitations presented challenges to this evaluation, the most serious of which included: 
1. Most people asked to be informants were willing to participate, although many requested anonymity. 
Taking into account informant’s concerns, a list of informants is not included in this report. Some 
individuals or institutions declined to participate (or simply did not respond to invitations), therefore, 
there is a possibility of selection bias, i.e. those who chose to participate might differ from those who 
did not in terms of their attitudes and perceptions, affiliation with government/non-government 
structures, socio-demographic characteristics, etc. 
2. It proved difficult to secure meetings with national government. This constrained the ET’s ability to 
fully understand and take into account the viewpoints held within national government circles. 
3. Reaching the targeted numbers for FGDs was challenging for various reasons. In most FGDs, the 
number of participants was either three or four, as compared to the planned six to eight. The ET 
sought particular individuals to participate in a variety of FGDs in order to investigate some specific 
aspects of the two projects. In some cases, the number of potential participants with the desired 
characteristics in a given location was only six or seven, not all of whom were available.21 This factor 
limited the scope of the exchange of experiences and viewpoints in FGDs, although the discussions 
were still fruitful. 
4. Since a number of questions dealt with issues that took place in the past or changes that took place 
since the projects began, recall bias may have occurred. On occasion, informants found it difficult to 
offer opinions on activities or the implementing organizations when the relevant interaction dated back 
 
20 It should be noted that due to the relatively small total sample of 62 responses, and the smaller numbers of 
respondents that belong to particular sub-sets such as grantees, in some cases the data generated by cross-tabulations 
may not be statistically significant. 21 In one case, the team worked with the PC volunteer coordinator to invite participants, but later learned that he 
had not maintained contact with the volunteers in that city, and in fact was no longer the coordinator. 
8 
more than a year. There was also some confusion of the two projects and their different phases among 
informants. 
5. There is a known tendency among informants to adapt responses to approximate what they perceive 
as the social norm (halo bias). Informants may not have revealed their sincere opinions in all cases, 
especially when questions required them to assess the work of colleagues, friends, or allies, or 
comment on GoE actions. To mitigate this limitation, the ET consistently guaranteed informant 
confidentiality and anonymity and did not insist on names being included in a list of informants nor in 
the completed surveys. As well, the ET made every effort to arrange interviews and FGDs in 
comfortable and private settings, and worked to establish rapport between the interviewer and 
respondent. 
6. Researching the details of two projects carried out over more than three years (as well as the complex 
context) involved the collection and analysis of a large amount of data from a wide variety of 
informants and documents. The projects’ various modifications also required intensive investigation. 
The task was further complicated by the fact that PC has not yet had time to prepare its project’s final 
report, and the GF’s final report focused primarily on its project’s last year. These factors meant that 
extra time was required to comb through quarterly reports, workplans, and other documents to 
extract the necessary information. 
7. Given the lack of experience in Ecuador with online surveys, it was anticipated that the response rate 
for the CSO survey would be relatively low. The ET assured survey recipients of confidentiality and 
worked to obtain responses using email and telephone follow-ups in order to address this factor. The 
follow-ups were hampered by the fact that many contacts in the databases provided by implementers 
were no longer correct. Ultimately, 62 surveys were completed, representing a response rate of 28 
percent. While there are many variables that affect survey response rates, this can be considered a 
good response rate according to expert views sought by the ET. However, it should be noted that the 
data on some sub-sets of respondents is not statistically significant. 
4.0 FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 GF PROJECT 
4.1.1 QUESTION 1: ADVOCACY AND WATCHDOG ACTIVITY 
 1.1 How effective were GF’s interventions to strengthen advocacy and watchdog roles of other CSOs? 1.2. How 
effective were GF’s direct advocacy and watchdog interventions? 1.3. What interventions were most effective 
(training, work with media, work on legal environment, strategies for engagement with GoE, etc.) and why? 1.4. 
What interventions were not successful and why? 
4.1.1.1 Findings 
Strengthening of CSO advocacy and watchdog roles 
The GF consortium dedicated considerable efforts to strengthening CSO’s capacities, including in the areas 
of advocacy and watchdog activities, in accordance with the overall project objective. The project 
supported a wide range of CSO initiatives through two rounds of small grants of up to $10,000 each. 
According to project documents, the first round in 2012 was aimed almost entirely at promoting advocacy 
and citizen participation, including through building the knowledge and skills of CSOs. The second round in 
2013 included those themes but broadened the scope of eligible projects to include organizational 
development of CSOs (including grantees), and encouraged a focus on women and children/youth. 
Thirteen projects were funded in the first round and 11 in the second (8 projects in all included advocacy 
or watchdog activities), all lasting an average of six months. Originally intended to last up to 18 months 
(according to the consortium’s proposal), the grants were cut short by a combination of factors: the slow 
first year of implementation, uncertainty among partners about roles, and the breakup of the consortium. 
9 
As a result, the project had two 6-month rounds of small grants. Grant documents and interviews with 
grantees indicated that a variety of activities related to advocacy and government oversight were 
implemented, ranging from a multi-stakeholder observation of human trafficking problems on a national 
level to the development of proposals to local authorities in the Andean canton of Sigchos to combat 
violence against women and ensure equal access by women’s groups to community facilities. 
CSOs that benefited from GF Project small grants reported some interesting results from their initiatives. 
In some cases, the grant funds contributed to an ongoing or wider process so not all results can be 
attributed to GF Project’s support. A number of grantees mentioned that the implementation period was 
short, which meant that some activities could not be followed through effectively to ensure that the 
expected results were achieved. It was found that some projects were able to lay foundations for advocacy 
but not necessarily carry the process to its logical conclusion within the grant period. 
The ET received firsthand information from the following grantees regarding their achievements in relation 
to advocacy and oversight: 
 Jatun Kawsay Foundation22 in Saraguro used its first grant to build the capacity of various 
indigenous community groups to promote citizens’ rights, and the second grant to develop concrete 
proposals for community-based management of natural resources. A new ordinance on natural 
resource protection in Saraguro communities was drafted in a consultative manner and delivered to 
the municipal government. Although the mayor at the time did not adopt the ordinance, Jatun Kawsay 
hopes that the incoming mayor will support their initiative. 
 Corporación Ecuatoriana por el Buen Vivir (INCLUIR)23 (Ecuadorian Corporation for the 
Good of Life) worked closely with La Merced Parish in Quito, Pichincha to support the expansion and 
consolidation of citizen participation mechanisms. The parish council has established six citizen 
committees to develop solutions to the community’s priority problems. There is a high likelihood, 
according to INCLUIR, that the example of La Merced will be replicated by two neighboring parish 
councils that have just joined with La Merced to form a mancomunidad (formal grouping of parishes). 
According to the CSO survey data, whether or not a CSO had received or applied for a grant from one of 
the projects appeared to have little or no effect on their frequency of contact with local and national 
government officials. However, grantees were much more likely to engage in activities that aimed to 
influence or monitor the actions of the national government compared to those who did not apply for or 
receive a grant. A full 75 percent of CSO grant recipients said that their activities aimed at influencing and 
monitoring government were either more effective or much more effective now than in 2010 – a 
surprising result given the obstacles that such activities face in the current context.24 Figure 2, next page, 
illustrates this finding for both projects (although only two grants were made by PC). 
In addition to the grants, support to citizen participation in (and oversight of) government decision-making 
processes was highlighted in various GF-organized training workshops, according to project documents and 
interviews with CSOs. Additionally, advocacy was the focus of one entire module of the training courses 
for CSO leaders organized by the project in collaboration with Universidad Casa Grande (Casa Grande 
University or UCG) and Universidad Técnica Particular de Loja (Private Technical University of Loja or UTPL) 
(described in the section on Local Capacity Development). CSO representatives interviewed by the ET 
repeatedly affirmed that the training improved both their confidence and skills for planning and carrying out 
advocacy and watchdog work.25 
 
22 http://www.kawsay.org/home.aspx 
23 http://www.incluirecuador.org/ 
24 Since this data only became available at the end of data collection, it was not possible to explore this response 
pattern further with CSOs. 
25 This data is supported by the course assessment completed by consultants in 2013 which found that 92% of 
surveyed participants rated their knowledge of advocacy and participation as sufficient or moderately sufficient – this 
topic received the highest knowledge rating among those surveyed. 
10 
Two informants mentioned that they used the training materials in their community work to promote 
citizen watchdog activities, enabling them to more easily pass on what they learned. The results of the CSO 
survey indicated that participants in the UTPL course had significantly lower levels of engagement in 
advocacy and monitoring activities (in terms of both frequency and effectiveness) than respondents from 
the UCG course (and PC’s Marcando la Hoja de Ruta training). 
In addition, project reports indicate that the GF Project provided funding and advisory support to CSOs to 
implement at least three mechanisms to monitor local government bodies (veedurías) in different provinces. 
CSOs that participated in GF-supported activities reported that they had improved knowledge of the legal 
frameworks for civil society and citizen participation, which helped them comply with legal norms and 
inform citizens and government officials about their rights and obligations. Some interviewed CSO 
representatives indicated they had increased their engagement with the government after receiving support 
from the GF Project. The CSO survey shows that 56 percent of respondents supported by the GF Project 
have increased the frequency of their advocacy and monitoring activities since 2010, while 45 percent 
reported being more effective or much more effective.26 Others described difficulties or concerns with 
pursuing such engagement due to political factors, especially after Decree 16 was promulgated. 
With respect to influence on government policies and practices, CSOs’ experience was also mixed. A few 
CSOs stated they found receptivity at local government levels, and thus had some input in decision-making 
through mechanisms ranging from the “Silla Vacía” to regular roundtables that included government officials 
and civil society bodies. Others reported that local government leaders, even those (such as accountability 
forums) that are now obligatory according to the Law on Citizen Participation, were resistant to their 
attempts for dialogue and to promote the use of watchdog and accountability mechanisms. Those CSOs 
who tried to engage the national government reported very low levels of receptivity. Generally, CSO 
respondents supported primarily by the GF Project indicated that due to the project, their relations with 
local governments had changed by a factor of 2.28 [slightly better on scale of 1 (no improvement) to 5 
(great improvement)] and relations with the national government were also slightly better (2.03). 
However, nearly half of these respondents reported no improvement at all in government relations. 
 
26 Advocacy activity is one of the few areas of questioning where notable differences emerged between male and 
female survey respondents. Female respondents were much more likely to say their organization conducted no 
activities aimed at influencing or monitoring government (36% chose this response), while only 18% of males indicated 
no activities of this nature. Although the sample group for the following question on advocacy effectiveness became 
much smaller because of the response, 36% of females indicated that their activities had become more effective or 
much more effective since 2010, while 57% of males selected these two responses. Note: This cross-tabulation 
combined responses of CSOs working with both projects. 
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
Yes No
8.33%
14.29% 16.67% 14.29%
66.67%
57.14%
8.33%
14.29%
How has the 
effectiveness of such 
activities changed since 
2010?
Did your CSO receive a grant from either PC or GF since 2010?
Figure 2: CSO Views on Effectiveness of Monitoring and Influence Activities 
Much Less Effective
Less Effective
No Change
More Effective
11 
Advocacy by GF Project partners 
The GF Project selected the following public policy fields in early 2011 as their focal areas for advocacy 
attention: the Communications Law, regulations under the Access to Public Information Law, and CSO 
legislation. With respect to the Communications Law, the GF Project carried out an in-depth analysis and 
submitted proposals to the GoE, but ultimately they were not adopted. The GF Project was ultimately 
unable to achieve measurable results related to access to information due to political developments that 
limited their involvement (see the section on Watchdog activity.) 
The GF Project’s most significant advocacy work focused on the legal framework for CSOs. Due to budget 
constraints and potential political sensitivities around the involvement of a foreign organization, the GF 
consortium ultimately decided against having the International Center for Non-Profit Law (ICNL) 
participate in the project. As a result, GF itself assumed responsibility for activities aimed at improving the 
legal environment. In 2009, GF was instrumental in rallying CSOs to respond to Decree 982 (with ICNL’s 
technical assistance), with the formation of El Colectivo a direct result of that process. In early 2011, GF 
played a leading role in drafting a manifesto by El Colectivo in response to a GoE-drafted proposed law on 
civil society. (Although not a GF Project activity, the manifesto and other statements laid the foundation 
for later activities supported by GF). 
The GF Project then supported El Colectivo’s preparation of a draft law on CSOs in 2011-12 through 
lengthy consultative processes with other CSOs and analysis of the experiences of other countries. GF and 
some CSOs believed this was the best way to address the fragile situation of civil society in view of 
increasing tendencies toward tight government control. However, the draft law was not presented to the 
government nor publicly circulated at that time; GF staff indicated this was due to divided opinion within 
civil society and financial constraints. 
In June 2013, when Decree 16 was promulgated, GF assumed a key role in the consultative process to 
draft a pronouncement on behalf of Confederation members which proposed the development of CSO 
legislation based on dialogue between the GoE and CSOs. To date, the GoE has not given any indication of 
its intention to enter into such dialogue. For the time being, the draft law prepared by the Confederation 
has been shelved. 
Although Decree 16 contains many elements that GF (and most other informants) considers highly 
prejudicial to civil society interests, the decree in fact incorporated some recommendations made by El 
Colectivo prior to the GF Project. For example, it refers to the duty of the government to promote the 
development of civil society and its entities, establish grant funds for joint government-CSO projects, and 
promote transparency among CSOs. 
Watchdog activities of GF Project partners 
The GF Project’s watchdog or government oversight activities were focused on establishing two 
observatories: the Observatory of Public Policy, and the Observatory of Rights and Liberties. The 
Observatory of Public Policy, led by GF, began in May 2012. First, the documentation and analysis of GF on 
transparency and access to information was collected. This resulted in the development of a methodology 
for monitoring the provision of public information by government institutions. Subsequently, the 
Ombudsman invited GF join a small working group to collaborate in two areas: 1) a consistent 
methodology for monitoring public body websites for compliance with Article 7 of the Access to Public 
Information Law (LOTAIP); and 2) recommendations for reforming the legal framework on transparency 
and access to information. Shortly after the working group was formed, the Ombudsman suspended the 
activity for political reasons related to changes in key government officials, according to GF staff 
informants. 
The Observatory of Rights and Liberties, led by Fundamedios, focused on analyzing events as well as laws 
and policies related to freedom of expression and communication. It worked in coordination with 
Fundamedios’ Media Observatory (a separate entity). In April 2012, the Observatory of Rights and 
Liberties published a detailed analysis of the proposed Law on Communications with the aim of 
protecting freedom of expression in Ecuador. 
Due to the increasing political difficulties facing the project implementers in mid-2012, the GF Project 
reports and personnel indicated that both observatories had to adjust their activities and operations. In 
12 
the case of the Observatory of Public Policy, activities ceased completely because there was a high risk of 
political misinterpretation. The Observatory of Rights and Liberties first reduced its public profile, and 
later suspended operations. 
4.1.1.2 Conclusions 
1. In spite of significant contextual constraints on advocacy and watchdog work, the GF Project had some 
positive results, notably achieved by CSOs working at the local government level. Although it was not 
feasible for most CSO grantees to launch and achieve concrete results with oversight or advocacy 
activities within short timeframes, especially given the constrained space for interaction with 
government, a number of grants helped lay foundations for future CSO and citizen engagement on 
policy issues by strengthening networks and building awareness. While the eventual outcomes of that 
preparatory work cannot be predicted with any accuracy, the combination of grants and training 
encouraged targeted CSOs to either get involved or stay involved in advocacy and watchdog work. 
2. Efforts spearheaded by GF Project achieved some modest influence on the CSO legal framework, 
though the current situation is far from ideal and the Confederation has not persuaded the national 
government to discuss their concerns. The difficulties of the project in making progress on policy 
influence at national level cannot be attributed to any weakness in project design, methods or 
strategies. 
3. It is not possible to determine whether ICNL’s continued technical assistance to the GF Project would 
have made a difference in the endeavors to enhance the CSO legal framework in this context, though 
an international perspective and expert view on best practices can often be helpful in crafting possible 
solutions and building greater consensus among civil society actors.27 Although local understanding and 
expertise are essential, based on the ET’s experience, an objective external voice can add significant 
value in such delicate situations. On the other hand, the overt participation of ICNL could have had 
negative repercussions given the highly sensitive political context in 2012. 
In sum: 
How effective were GF’s interventions to strengthen advocacy and watchdog roles of other 
CSOs? GF Project support was largely effective in increasing the confidence of targeted CSOs and their 
engagement in advocacy and watchdog activities, though tangible influence on government was difficult 
to achieve since the space for this work by CSOs was steadily diminishing at the national level and highly 
variable (but generally limited) at local government levels. 
How effective were GF’s direct advocacy and watchdog interventions? The general political 
environment affecting the project made it difficult for GF and its partners to have notable influence 
through advocacy and oversight work, which was focused at the national level, although longer term 
results may eventually be achieved. 
What interventions were most effective (training, work with media, work on legal environment, 
strategies for engagement with GoE, etc.) and why? Training, coaching, and small grants were all 
effective to some extent, having had an impact on CSOs’ level of engagement in advocacy and watchdog 
work, in spite of the obstacles inherent in the environment. Advocacy on the CSO legal framework, 
based on development of common positions with other organizations, has also had some positive effect. 
What interventions were not successful and why? As the project’s planned work on freedom of 
expression was suspended in 2012, due to the political environment, it was unable to achieve any real 
impact. Attempts through the Confederation of CSOs to engage with the GoE to discuss the effect of 
Decree 16 on civil society have not, to date, met with receptiveness. 
 
27 Note: ICNL collaborated closely in 2009 with GF and other CSOs in Ecuador through the USAID-funded Legal 
Enabling Environment Project (LEEP) providing support to civil society’s response to government initiatives to 
introduce tight sector regulation. ICNL is currently working with PC to further train Ecuadorian civil society on the 
national legal framework. 
13 
4.1.2 Question 2: Engagement 
2.1. How successful were GF’s interventions at strengthening their engagement and collaborative work with other 
CSOs, the media, their constituencies, and the government? 2.2. What are the most effective and sustainable 
mechanisms for CSOs to constructively engage with other CSOs, their constituencies, media, and the government? 
4.1.2.1 Findings 
Role of GF 
GF is perceived by most informants as a hybrid entity that combines elements of a think tank (research and 
analysis functions) with characteristics of an advocacy/capacity building organization. This combination of 
functions is illustrated by its slogan: “ideas and collective action.” Generally, the ET found that GF’s public 
profile is low, especially outside of Quito. Among those who know the organization, GF and its leaders are 
seen as diplomatic and skilled at maintaining civil relations with government officials and international 
stakeholders. 
Success of GF Project interventions 
One of the most significant GF Project-supported efforts to build linkages and strengthen engagement 
among CSOs was the Ecuadorian Confederation of CSOs. The origins of this initiative (as El Colectivo) are 
described in detail in the Section 4.1.1 above. (See below under “Mechanisms for CSO engagement” 
section for additional findings on the Confederation). 
The GF Project served to expand and strengthen GF’s network of contacts among Ecuadorian CSOs to 
some extent, especially in provinces outside of Pichincha and Guayas. This was achieved as the Consortium 
members implemented activities targeting a broad range of CSOs across the country, especially through 
training and grant initiatives. However, it should be noted that the Ciudadanía Activa brand (the original 
name of the project) and partners Esquel Foundation and FEPP continue to be more familiar to CSOs and 
other informants outside of Quito since those two organizations have long track records of working in 
various parts of the country, and were responsible for executing the CSO training and grants activities in 
the first two years of the project. 
The grants component strengthened connections among grantee organizations, whose representatives 
were brought together for training on grant management, as well as to share experiences at the end of 
each of the two grant phases. Grantees reported that these events helped them become aware of other 
CSOs doing interesting work in their own provinces and beyond, and learn from their experiences. Some 
grantees were motivated to join the Confederation, while others have maintained links with GF without 
joining the Confederation. 
When asked, “How has the frequency of your organization’s direct contact with other CSOs changed since 2010?”, 
41 out of 59 CSO survey respondents (69 percent) indicated that contact had become more frequent or 
much more frequent. Among respondents who stated that they had received more support from the GF 
Project, 72 percent indicated increased frequency of contact while only 6 percent said it had become less 
frequent. Respondents that received support from both GF and PC were even higher on the scale, with 80 
percent mentioning more frequent contact. Respondents said that the networks to which they belong 
were most useful for obtaining information, receiving training, and connecting with other CSOs, but least 
useful for gaining access to funding. 
Most CSO grants also contributed to some extent to establishing new links and strengthening existing links 
between grantee CSOs and their constituencies or target populations. A number of CSOs supported with 
grants (direct recipients as well as their beneficiaries) mentioned that the grant project strengthened their 
interaction with the government, especially at local levels. For example, Corporación Ecuatoriana de 
Cooperación e Inclusión de las Mujeres (Corporation for Cooperation and Inclusion of Women or CECIM) 
utilized grant funding to forge strong new bonds with community members in La Merced Parish which 
continue to this day. At the same time, they significantly boosted their engagement with the parish council, 
becoming a source of training and information for members. 
The ET found that engagement, through information sharing and coordination, between implementing 
CSOs and the GF and PC Projects was minimal notwithstanding similarities between their respective 
objectives and activity areas. According to informants and ET observations, the willingness of these 
14 
prominent CSOs to coordinate was limited, partly due to competition (both were involved in bids for the 
GF Project) and partly owing to later disagreements in strategy over the legal framework for CSOs, which 
led PC to leave El Colectivo. While USAID did encourage the implementers to meet periodically, there was 
no system in place to facilitate coordination or direct information exchange, and roundtable meetings of 
USAID Democracy and Governance Program implementers were infrequent. The ET found little 
duplication of effort, although both projects prepared and published similar CSO manuals related to 
Decree 1628 (reflecting each organization’s particular approach) and participation overlap was minimal. 
The development and delivery of two courses for CSO leaders, in collaboration with UTPL and UCG 
universities, contributed to stronger relations between Esquel Foundation and the GF consortium on the 
one hand, and universities on the other hand. While GF itself played a secondary role to Esquel in design 
and delivery of the training, it actively engaged with at least five universities in Ecuador in the closing 
months of the project to share the final curriculum and explore future collaboration on similar trainings. 
Project engagement with the media was minimal. 
Engagement by the GF Project with regional and international CSOs was limited; the international advisory 
group that was planned to serve as a sounding board for consortium members as they implemented the 
project never became active as a group. GF staff indicated that convening the members proved difficult due 
to their busy schedules, though they did consult with individual members of the group from time to time. 
Mechanisms for CSO engagement with other actors 
The Confederation is one of the most significant mechanisms for engagement supported by the GF Project, 
although its membership of 63 CSOs, some of which are networks whose members are also considered 
Confederation members, is relatively small considering that there are reportedly more than 45,000 CSOs 
in Ecuador. Further, membership is heavily concentrated in Quito and Guayaquil. The Confederation’s 
activities have so far focused on exchange of information and viewpoints on the evolving legal framework 
(notably Decree 16), for which members have expressed unanimous appreciation in interviews and FGDs. 
Members especially value the Confederation’s role in connecting a variety of CSOs working in different 
sectors whose leaders are now realizing their commonalities and how they can help each other cope with 
difficulties. Some informants criticized the Confederation for trying to speak for all CSOs and for being 
slow to react to issues such as the closure of Pachamama, an environmental and indigenous CSO. 
However, Confederation members generally commented that decision-making processes on such issues 
were consultative and inclusive, and that it was not easy to reach consensus on sensitive topics – which 
understandably affected the speed with which the body was able to speak out publicly. Members 
interviewed by the ET believe that the Confederation is playing an important role as a rallying point for 
CSOs with shared concerns (especially smaller ones who otherwise would be voiceless). 
Members who participated in FGDs highlighted the additional confidence that belonging to the 
Confederation gave them as a key benefit, as well as the importance of having a credible national platform 
for CSOs that crosscuts thematic areas and thus plays an advocacy role with the government on issues 
affecting the entire civil society sector. The CSO survey data indicates that 36 percent of the respondents 
who chose the Confederation as the network in which they were most active rated it as very useful or 
extremely useful. On the other hand, 24 percent considered it not useful. The Confederation has no direct 
funding and no Secretariat; although some activities were funded by the GF Project, it now survives on 
volunteer labor and in-kind support from its members. Its sustainability is far from assured due to current 
challenges in funding civil society initiatives in Ecuador, although members have shown a firm commitment 
to its existence. 
Another notable new mechanism for CSO engagement with other sectors of society is the collective 
transparency exercise, known as Rendición de Cuentas, where CSOs voluntarily share information about 
activities, beneficiaries, and financing which is then amalgamated in a detailed report and presented publicly. 
The first exercise was carried out in 2011 by El Colectivo and included 37 CSOs; the second was organized 
 
28 The two publications were: Guía para la Aplicación de Decreto 16 by the PC Project, which was co-funded by ICNL, 
and Manual Legal para Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil by the GF Project. 
15 
by the Confederation in 2012 and involved 102 CSOs.29 In both cases, GF guided the process and 
channeled funds from the GF Project. Informants reported that there is growing interest among CSOs in 
this transparency initiative, especially since there has been no negative reaction by the Government to the 
first two reports. However, several interviewed CSOs did not consider the process to be beneficial for 
them or for civil society generally. 
The Government’s reaction has not been easy to measure, but some national level officials attended the 
second event and a few CSOs reported that their government counterparts seemed to appreciate the 
effort to improve transparency. Most informants view the process in a positive light and believe that 
additional transparency by CSOs is a step towards enhanced credibility and social responsibility by the 
sector. For the third round of transparency reporting in 2014, participating CSOs were asked to pay a fee 
to cover the costs of the process. Half the required amount was committed at the time of data collection, 
which suggests that there is enough interest in the activity to sustain it without donor funding (which is 
also being sought). 
A number of obstacles have been reported for both of these mechanisms, including: lack of resources to 
fund Confederation services, hire a coordinator, and recruit new members; and difficulty in drawing in 
CSOs from outside Quito and Guayaquil. Additionally, some CSOs have simply opted for other strategies 
and platforms to advance the interests of civil society and their own organizations, rather than joining these 
mechanisms. 
4.1.2.2 Conclusions 
1. The Confederation is a promising initiative that has attracted a small but committed core group of 
members and has the potential to become an important actor on the civil society stage in Ecuador. It 
clearly has the potential to act as an interlocutor with the national government but success in that area 
will depend almost entirely on the GoE’s willingness to engage in dialogue with civil society through it – 
which to date has not been demonstrated. For now, the Confederation has provided an important 
forum for a diverse set of civil society actors to come together, exchange views, share problems and 
develop joint strategies on legal frameworks. 
2. The CSO transparency exercise is a laudable initiative in response to government criticism of the 
sector. While still limited in scope, this kind of proactive effort is a useful way for CSOs to boost their 
collective and individual images with the public and government and demonstrate their value and 
contribution to society when this has been repeatedly questioned by the government. The methods 
used for the exercise could, however, be refined further; the current method combines administration 
and operating costs and reports that they account for more than 40 percent of CSO expenditures. 
This figure that could readily be misunderstood to mean that this amount goes to “overhead” and not 
activities, which could have negative repercussions for civil society. 
3. The GF Project’s engagement with regional and international CSOs was limited, due to the difficulties 
with activating the international advisory group and the decision by the consortium to proceed without 
ICNL’s participation in the project. 
In sum: 
How successful were GF’s interventions at strengthening its engagement and collaborative work 
with other CSOs, the media, their constituencies, and the government? GF was most successful in 
improving its engagement with CSOs, in particular through promotion and leadership of the 
Confederation. Interaction with the Government was primarily at the national level; however, relations 
deteriorated from 2012 onwards due to the political environment. GF had limited engagement with media 
and the public, in part due to the same political situation. 
What are the most effective and sustainable mechanisms for CSOs to constructively engage with 
other CSOs, their constituencies, media, and the Government? The most effective mechanisms used 
by the GF Project have been the Confederation and the CSO transparency exercise. These mechanisms 
 
29 Participating CSOs were mostly members of the Confederation, but other CSOs also showed interest and were 
included in the process. 
16 
do not need significant funding to continue at current levels but financial resources would be required for 
them to expand in scope and have increased impact. Sustainability may also be jeopardized if strong 
leadership by GF were not able to continue. 
4.1.3 QUESTION 3A: LOCAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. How effective were GF’s capacity development interventions with other CSOs? 3.2. Specifically, what 
interventions in local capacity development were most effective and why? (Grants, training, workshops, university 
training, etc.)? 
4.1.3.1 Findings 
As part of their core mandate under the project, the GF consortium designed and carried out a series of 
interventions to build the capacity of Ecuadorian CSOs. The most important of those activities are outlined 
below, together with an analysis of their effectiveness. 
University-based courses
In partnership with UCG in Guayaquil, Esquel Foundation led the design of an innovative intensive course 
for CSO leaders, the pilot of which was delivered in 2012 to 30 participants using a classroom learning 
approach. The course was then analyzed, modified, and scaled up in late 2012 for eight modules to be 
delivered by UTPL using a methodology heavily based on e-learning and other distance learning methods in 
order to reach a larger number of participants across the country. A total of 192 people participated in the 
course, although the 2013 post-course assessment found that there was a high level of participant 
dropout.30 
The ET conducted interviews and FGDs with participants in the UTPL course, who were satisfied with the 
quality and relevance of the course. Some of those interviewed had used the course’s information and 
materials in their organization’s work. However, informants noted some difficulties with online 
participation including limited interaction with professors and the strict schedule for participation. GF 
indicated that the e-learning technology had indeed posed problems for many participants, even those who 
were already accustomed to computer use. Although the student evaluation process used in the courses 
was found to be quite rigorous, there was no system for monitoring the use of learning after the course or 
the effect of the course on the operation of the CSOs in which participants were active. 
The survey of CSOs indicated that the respondents who received any kind of training from the GF Project 
rated its importance to their organization at 3.6 on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 3 being moderately important, 4 
very important). Training in general was ranked highly by survey respondents and as one of the most 
important types of support provided to civil society by the GF Project. The survey asked respondents who 
worked closely with GF to choose what they believed were the project’s two most important services 
from a list; 53 percent (18 of 34) selected training as one of their two choices. 
More specifically, among the 34 survey respondents who participated in one of the university courses, 83 
percent rated the quality of the UCG training as either good or very good (4 or 5 on a scale of 1 to 5), 
while 58 percent rated the UTPL course at those levels (see Figure 3, next page). 
These ratings correspond with the findings of GF post-course assessments, indicating that UCG’s 
classroom approach was more effective. The analysis of survey responses suggests that course participants’ 
organizations have engaged more frequently in activities aimed at influencing or monitoring government 
since 2010 and that they see those activities as more effective. However, the sample size is too small to 
draw any solid conclusions, since 14 of the 34 respondents who took these courses said their organizations 
were not involved in this kind of activity at any level of government. GF refined its curriculum and methods 
again after this second experience and tried to interest several Ecuadorian universities in offering all or part 
of the course. Those efforts were constrained by end of project funding shortly after the new curriculum 
was finalized and by the challenges that universities are currently facing under new education sector 
 
30 The assessment report contracted by GF in 2013 indicates that the assessors were unable to reach many 
participants with the contact information in project files for a rigorous followup regarding the reasons for dropout or 
effects of the course. This evaluation attempted to include all those who completed the courses in the CSO survey 
but had similar difficulties in contacting them; only 23 responded to the survey. 
17 
regulations, as mentioned in the context section. 
Grants
As mentioned under Question 1 on Advocacy, the GF Project supported various CSO initiatives with small 
grants, several of which focused specifically on networking and institutional strengthening, while the 
remainder emphasized activities on awareness raising, civic education, participation, and advocacy. All 10 
GF Project grantees that responded to the survey rated the grant they received as either very useful or 
extremely useful to their organization (4 or 5 on scale of 1 to 5), and rated their own grant activities as 
very or extremely useful. Perhaps owing to the small size and short duration of the grants, only two of 34 
respondents that worked with the GF Project (10 of which had received GF grants) selected grants as one 
of the most important types of support from the GF Project. 
On the other hand, interviewed grantees unanimously pointed to the grants’ short duration as an obstacle 
to achieving meaningful results. Nevertheless, the evaluation found evidence that some grants had a modest 
direct positive effect on the organizational capacity of recipients; according to grantees and GF Project 
implementers, change was especially marked when specific activities, such as website development, were 
included in the funding. 
CSO beneficiaries of some grant activities also saw indirect capacity benefits, for example, eight grassroots 
organizations were assisted by CECIM to improve their structures and systems in compliance with the law 
in preparation for seeking official Confederation registration and membership. However, these processes 
have been slowed and, in some cases, suspended as groups grapple with the implications and costs of 
registration, and worry about being associated with the Confederation.31 Informants reported that some 
CSO grantees were adversely affected by political fallout from the “crisis” that affected the consortium and 
USAID/Ecuador. Two grantees described how certain activities had to be abandoned once the relevant 
government entities suddenly refused to cooperate further. It is worth noting that USAID and GF were 
very flexible with grantees in terms of branding activities and did not require the use of USAID branding 
once the government began to criticize the project. According to document review and grantees, the 
grants were well managed and closely monitored by the GF consortium during both phases, and especially 
well supported with mentoring from GF during the second round. Those grantees rated the management 
of the grants by GF Project as 4.42 (on average) on a scale of 1 to 5. Figure 4, below, shows the 
breakdown of ratings by percentage of respondents that chose each response. 
 
31 The ET attempted to organize a FGD with representatives of these community organizations to better understand 
the positive aspects and challenges of the grant-supported project but was advised that it would be difficult to 
arrange, partly due to the anxiety of those organizations about being associated with USAID and the GF Project 
implementers. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Cursos de la Universidad Casa
Grande (Guayaquil)
Cursos de la Universidad Técnica
Particular de Loja (UTPL)
0% 0% 0%
10.71%
16.67%
32.14%
66.67%
39.29%
16.67% 17.86%
How would you rate 
the quality of the 
training?
What type of training did you receive? 
Figure 3: CSO Views on Quality of UCG and UTPL Training Courses
Very Poor Quality
Poor Quality
Satisfactory Quality
Good Quality
Very Good Quality
18 
Coaching
The GF Project, in recognition of the difficult situation facing many CSOs in securing their futures, 
contracted experienced consultants to deliver a combination of training and one-on-one coaching to 22 
selected organizations with a focus on 
planning for sustainability and social 
responsibility. The first round of 
support in 2012 was focused on 
analysis and planning and the second 
round was based on lessons learned 
from the first phase and included 
significant support for implementation 
of plans. Reactions by the nine 
interviewed CSO beneficiaries was 
very positive, although the 12 survey 
respondents that received coaching 
gave it a moderate endorsement at an 
average rating of 3.7 (on scale of 1 to 
5, with 4 being good quality and 3 
being satisfactory) and its relevance a 
3.58 (5 being extremely relevant), and its impact as 3.42 (5 being extremely important). 
Figure 5 shows the breakdown of quality ratings by percentage of respondents that chose each response. 
The fact that the interviewed CSOs and project staff were unable to point to tangible effects on the 
financial sustainability of beneficiary organizations needs to be understood in the current Ecuadorian 
context, which is characterized by severe reductions of civil society funding from international donors and 
the private sector. More time will be 
needed to properly assess the effects 
of the coaching activity, which aimed 
to build sustainability on more than 
just financial levels. There was no 
apparent effect of coaching on the 
risks that CSO survey respondents 
perceived for their organizations; of 
the 12 surveyed CSOs that received 
coaching, nine (75 percent) identified 
lack of funding as the most significant 
risk. 46 percent of other CSO 
respondents identified lack of funding 
as their most significant risk. However, 
it is worth noting that none of the 12 
that received coaching pointed to internal problems as their most significant risk, compared to 10 percent 
of CSOs that had not received coaching.
Legal framework
The GF Project provided assistance to CSOs to understand and comply with the Ecuadorian legal 
framework, with particular emphasis by GF in late 2013 after Decree 16 was proclaimed. A legal manual, 
based on consultations with various CSOs, was already underway at that time so its final form included 
guidance on Decree 16 and the effect on the regulation of CSO affairs. Activities also included meetings 
with Confederation members to brief them on the new requirements, discuss their impact, and agree on 
steps to be taken in response. Confederation members and other CSOs commented that meetings 
facilitated by GF (both during the final months of the GF Project and subsequently) were very useful in 
helping them comprehend the changed legal requirements. Although some informants also appreciated the 
legal manual, most CSO representatives interviewed, including some active members of the Confederation, 
had not seen the document (in either physical or electronic format). 
16.67%
58.33% 25.00%
Figure 4: CSO Views on Management of 
Grants Process
How would you rate the grant-giving organization’s 
management of the grants process, based on your 
experience of applying for, receiving and reporting on the 
grant? 
very bad
bad
satisfactory
good
excellent
16.67%
16.67%
50%
16.67%
Figure 5: CSO Participant Views on Quality 
of Coaching Activity
How would you rate the coaching activities’ quality?
very poor quality
poor quality
satisfactory quality
good quality
very good quality
19 
Networks 
As described in the section on Engagement, the GF Project and GF in particular were instrumental in 
creating the Confederation and promoted the involvement of a cross-section of Ecuadorian CSOs in the 
network and in the Rendición de Cuentas collective transparency process. The overall effects of these 
processes on involved CSOs (and on broader civil society) are discussed in that section. Although the 
project plans included GF establishing an “Information and Communications Center for CSOs” (in 
collaboration with the Confederation), and some project funding has gone towards equipment and 
furniture for the Center, to date it has not advanced far beyond preparatory stages.32 The project 
developed an interactive map33 of over 200 CSOs and a directory34 of over 500 CSOs in Ecuador to help 
users identify relevant organizations using a variety of criteria. Both are hosted on the Confederation 
website. At least 10 CSO informants were asked about these resources but none were aware of them, 
even though some were members of the Confederation, so it was unclear how useful they had been. 
In general, the GF Project’s capacity building interventions were well researched and based on careful 
assessment of needs, and activities were adapted to reflect lessons learned through earlier activities. 
Overall, trainings organized by the GF consortium were ranked as good quality (4 on a scale of 1 to 5) by 
surveyed participants. CSO survey respondents that were primary beneficiaries of the GF Project chose 
“advocacy to promote civil society participation in matters of public interest” as an important type of 
support provided by the GF Project, second only to training. Following closely behind was “sharing of 
information.” Figure 6, below, shows the breakdown of CSO responses about the most important types of 
support from GF Project. 
4.1.3.2 Conclusions 
1. University courses: Participants were generally satisfied with the courses, though the e-learning 
experience posed difficulties for many learners. It is not possible to judge the overall effect the training 
may have had on the capacity or operations of the CSOs in which participants were active without 
extensive additional research. 
2. Grants: In spite of the GF consortium’s solid support to grantees, the short duration of grants was a 
significant constraint on their ability to design and implement projects that could achieve meaningful 
results. The rushed process also made it harder for recipients to “learn by doing” through reflecting on 
 
32 GF is currently fundraising to establish permanent premises for the Center. 
33 http://www.confederacionecuatorianaosc.org/confederacion/mapa-interactivo-osc 34 http://confederacionecuatorianaosc.org/confederacion/content/directorio-georeferenciado-de-organizaciones-de-la￾sociedad-civil
32.4%
52.9%
5.9%
38.2%
20.6%
26.5%
5.9%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
Figure 6: CSO Views on Relative Importance of Types of Support 
from GF
What are the two most important services or types of support provided to civil society by 
Grupo Faro?
20 
and adjusting activities, which would have added value to the grants component. However, the grants 
did enable some recipient CSOs to broaden their networks of contacts and gain experience in new 
areas of activity. The few GF grants that included modest resources for institutional strengthening led 
to specific benefits for some recipient CSOs, such as a new website or a new consensual action plan 
for a network. These were valuable benefits of a kind that are not often possible to achieve with the 
project-based funding approach preferred by many donors. 
3. Coaching: The GF Project’s coaching methodology was of a high standard and responded to priority 
needs of targeted CSOs, particularly in the second phase when the activity included hands-on support 
for implementing plans. This was especially useful to CSOs in an environment with reduced donor 
funding and confined space for action. The coaching helped CSOs envision a future where they would 
not depend completely on international donors and identify creative options for internal restructuring 
and income generation. Although only a limited number of CSOs benefited, the coaching was a positive 
innovation of the GF Project although in fact it was not part of the original project plans. 
4. General: The survey results indicate that, on average, respondents consider that GF and GF Project 
support helped their organizations improve the most in the following areas: relations with other CSOs, 
work with local communities, and quality of services. Least improvement was noted in CSOs’ relations 
with the national government and access to funding. Although the project has developed some 
potentially useful resources, such as the map/directory of CSOs and the legal manual, their effect 
appears to be limited, at least in part due to inadequate systems for dissemination of information (but 
also probably affected by the end-of-project funding). 
In sum: 
How effective were GF’s capacity development interventions with other CSOs? The GF Project’s 
work to build CSO capacity (including university courses, coaching, training on the CSO legal framework, 
and small grants) can be considered fairly effective based on the perceptions of CSO beneficiaries, grant 
reports, and post-course assessments. However, there is insufficient information available to assess 
actual changes in the capacity of targeted CSOs. 
Specifically, what interventions in local capacity development were most effective and why? 
(grants, training, workshops, university training, etc.)? The coaching activity and first university 
course at UCG were the types of activities most appreciated by participants, while the 
training/information on the legal framework for civil society and support to networking through the 
Confederation also had positive effects on capacity. Some grants were effective in building capacity. 
4.1.4 QUESTION 3B: SUSTAINABILITY 
3.3. Has USAID/Ecuador’s direct assistance to GF succeeded in building sustainable local capacity of this group? 3.4. 
How far along the road to sustainability is GF? And in what areas does it still need support? 
To assess organizational sustainability, the ET focused on the likelihood that GF could continue to function 
with internal capacities and principal activities roughly similar to the situation that existed prior to the 
termination of USAID funding. The ET took into account the following aspects of sustainability: technical 
competency, credibility (especially with the government and other CSOs), public visibility, current funding 
and future funding prospects, internal governance, and external linkages. In responding to this question, the 
ET considered only the situation of GF as a direct recipient of USAID funding and did not analyze the 
sustainability of GF consortium members. 
4.1.4.1 Findings 
Impact of USAID assistance 
In terms of the support provided by USAID, several aspects of the GF Project were directly aimed at 
promoting the sustainability of GF. First and foremost, USAID provided significant support since 2011 to 
strengthen GF’s financial management and administrative systems and procedures. The assistance took 
several forms but of primary importance were: 
1. Consultant facilitation of two Organizational Capacity Assessment (OCA) processes in September 
2012 and August 2013. GF staff participated actively and reported that the assessments were very 
21 
helpful in identifying priority areas and strategies for improvement. 
2. Consultant support to the GF finance team to prepare for annual audits of both the project and the 
organization. GF and USAID recognized this assistance as having made a significant contribution to 
obtaining clean audit reports each year since 2011, despite what informants described as a highly 
disorganized financial and administrative records within the organization. 
3. Regular financial reviews and ongoing mentoring by USAID staff. In addition to consultants paid with 
project funds, members of the Mission’s local capacity development team (especially the finance 
personnel) provided considerable advice and mentoring support to GF throughout the Project to 
ensure that procedures and reports were in line not only with USAID rules but also with international 
accounting standards. GF and USAID staff agreed that although the process was difficult at times, the 
end result was a much stronger set of internal procedures and systems that have made the 
organization more able to handle funding conditions from other donors. 
In addition to the foregoing types of support from USAID, taking a leadership role in the GF Project gave 
GF a platform from which to establish and strengthen links with CSOs across the country, bolstered GF’s 
role as a key player in El Colectivo and later the Confederation, and generally raised the organization’s 
profile among civil society actors – although that effect was limited during the first two years by the 
consortium approach and use of the brand Ciudadanía Activa. 
As a first time USAID prime implementer, GF struggled to understand USAID’s budgeting cycles and 
budget modification processes. USAID and GF staff reported misunderstandings about the possibility of 
budget reductions during the first year of project implementation. GF and consortium members described 
a series of discussions with USAID staff over pending budget cuts that led to complex budget and activity 
revision exercises. When USAID obligated $1.4 million in September 2011 as per the Modification #2 to 
the GF Project, GF understood that the project budget had been cut and that no further funds would be 
available for the project. This amount represented only 58 percent of the original budget. These changes 
coincided with increased political sensitivities and were exacerbated by weaknesses in GF’s financial 
management staffing and systems. The uncertainty that accompanied these budget and activity revisions 
contributed to tensions and distrust among consortium members. Some consortium members viewed the 
budget reductions and requests by USAID to modify activities as a sign of wavering USAID commitment to 
the project and to Ecuadorian civil society at large. They felt that support was being reduced just at the 
moment when they (and broader civil society) were at greater risk, although USAID explained to GF that 
this was part of global cost-cutting and not driven by local considerations. 
Level of sustainability 
According to the second OCA in August 2013, GF’s strongest areas of institutional capacity were human 
resources and financial management, both of which improved significantly since the 2012 assessment. The 
areas that were still in need of the most attention were administration (especially procurement and 
logistics) and program/project management. In terms of the core areas of sustainability examined by the 
evaluation, the following are the key findings: 
1. GF’s technical competency appears to be high, based on observations by various informants. Although 
it should be kept in mind that consultants performed a significant part of the work implemented by GF 
under the Project, the ET found the documents and analyses produced to be of a high standard. 
Beneficiaries, such as grantees and training participants, were generally of the view that GF and its 
consultants were competent and professional. The organization has a strong capacity for innovation, 
which is demonstrated by the diversity of their current project portfolio, as well as the fact that the 
Executive Director is part of the Ashoka Fellows35 network and benefits from the innovative 
discussions on leadership and social entrepreneurship it nurtures. 
2. GF’s credibility with the national government was initially high (as demonstrated by the Ombudsman’s 
invitation to join the working group on the LOTAIP) but has suffered a decline due to the political 
circumstances that have affected the entire consortium and USAID since 2011-2012. 
 
35 More information available at https://www.ashoka.org/fellows 
22 
3. With respect to CSOs and the public at large, GF has a low profile and is not well known beyond 
Quito, although among most Confederation members that the ET consulted, its credibility is high. Most 
of the 34 CSO survey respondents who received support primarily from the GF Project indicated a 
high level of confidence in the information it provided, with an average rating of 3.74 on a scale of 1 to 
5. With respect to the importance to civil society in Ecuador of GF’s work, the same respondents gave 
an average rating of 3.76, or very important.
Its primary vehicle for financial transparency and accountability to the public is its website, where 
information on annual income, budget, and donors is posted. Although this data was more complete 
than the information shared by many Ecuadorian CSOs, it was at least a year out of date in some key 
areas and donor information was not clearly stated. The misperception that GF was receiving 
substantial funding from the GoE (discussed in a previous section) underlines the importance of 
ongoing transparency by CSOs in relation to their financial backers, especially in this type of tense 
environment.36 
4. GF’s visibility with the public, as noted above, is low. Since the organization works in a wide variety of 
subject areas that do not necessarily fit with the typical role of a think tank, it does not have a clear 
identity among external stakeholders. 
5. With respect to internal systems and governance, GF has made significant progress in recent years. 
Initially identified as weak areas, the Board of Directors’ involvement and internal decision-making 
processes have been strengthened since 2012 according to OCA records and informants. Several 
sources commented on the unusually high rates of staff turnover, some linked to the political 
difficulties that affected GF and its partners but also to evidence that unclear roles and procedures 
were contributing factors. Regular performance evaluations are now being implemented and job 
descriptions are kept updated, which should contribute to increased stability. Internal financial and 
administrative systems and procedures have also improved greatly according to staff and advisors and 
should no longer pose difficulties for the organization’s future. The lack of a comprehensive strategic 
plan was identified as an area for action by the 2012 and 2013 OCAs but it has yet to be developed. At 
present, the organizational direction is guided by annual operating plans and a research agenda. The 
OCA process identified the challenge that may be posed by an eventual change of leadership of GF, a 
concern that was echoed by various interviewees. 
6. Insofar as financial sustainability is concerned, GF has an extremely diversified funding base of about 30 
donors, primarily consisting of international bodies that range from bilateral and multilateral 
government agencies to a variety of foundations. GF has a policy that specifies that any single donor 
cannot fund more than 30 percent of their entire budget. This policy has been respected during the 
years for which financial information was obtained (2010-2014). GF conducts consulting and research 
work for various parties such as private foundations and other think tanks which somewhat reduces 
their dependency on traditional donors and project grants. 
7. In addition to the linkages within Ecuador that have been described in the Engagement Section 4.1.2 of 
this report, GF has extensive international contacts, on the regional level and beyond, which have been 
cultivated through frequent travel and other contacts by the Executive Director in particular. Those 
formal and informal networks include a significant number of past and current donors and a wide range 
of other allies that work in complementary areas. Those contacts have proven valuable in helping GF 
deal with the challenges of the last few years, for example, by identifying a highly skilled regional 
consultant to assist with their communications strategy during the crisis period in 2011-12. 
4.1.4.2 Conclusions 
1. Steady USAID finance staff support, periodic consultant expert assistance funded by the project, and 
two OCAs processes were instrumental in GF being able to put its finance and administration systems 
in good order, and have thus made a significant contribution to the organization’s sustainability. 
 
36 This misperception may have been based in part on some confusing information on GF’s website which listed 
several major projects that appeared to focus on work with the government. In reality, the funds for those activities 
do not come from the GoE, and the ET has notified GF of this possible source of confusion. 
23 
2. GF’s determined efforts since it was established to have a diversified funding base have paid off with an 
impressive array of donors and healthy annual income. Thus, the end of the GF project and closure of 
USAID/Ecuador will have minimal effect on their overall financial health. However, it is far from certain 
that they will be able to continue playing a leadership role in strengthening Ecuador’s civil society, given 
the current dearth of funding sources for that area of activity. To date, GF has not been able to obtain 
new donor resources to support the Confederation nor the CSO accountability exercise. 
3. Misunderstandings based on lack of experience and possible miscommunications about budgets and 
funding obligations made it difficult for GF to cope well with potential budget reduction scenarios. The 
uncertainty that accompanied these budget discussions and cuts were key factors in the weakening and 
eventual dissolution of the consortium. 
4. Human resources is a persistent challenge for GF, which struggled to maintain a consistent corps of 
staff for a variety of reasons, including weak internal management systems, a well-educated and very 
mobile staffing pattern, and the high-level political criticism of the organization and its partners. This is 
their primary sustainability challenge, along with ensuring continued strong leadership. 
5. Taking into account all of the above findings, the evaluation considers that GF is a more sustainable 
organization than when the GF Project began, in part owing to USAID’s support. 
In sum: 
Has USAID/Ecuador’s direct assistance to GF succeeded in building sustainable local capacity of 
the organization? Yes, USAID’s support has directly contributed to building sustainable capacity in a 
number of key areas, including financial and administration systems, and project management. 
How far along the road to sustainability is GF? And in what areas do they still need support? GF, 
as an organization, is very sustainable by most measures. They could benefit from support to: 1) improve 
retention of personnel and mitigate the impact of potential transitions in key leadership positions; and 2) 
identify income generation or funding sources to allow their continued involvement in civil society 
strengthening and networking. 
4.1.5 GF PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are intended to inform future GF programming in Ecuador, as well as 
future interventions by USAID in other countries. 
4.1.5.1 Question 1: Advocacy and Watchdog Activity 
1. In the future, grants aimed at supporting advocacy and watchdog work should be of long enough 
duration to enable CSOs to plan and carry out activities that have time to culminate in meaningful 
results. While the exact duration will depend on the capacity of grantees and nature of proposed 
activities (among other factors), at least 12 months is recommended for this type of grant. Where 
short-term grants are unavoidable, donors, implementers, and grantees should collaboratively seek 
strategies (and other sources of funding as needed) to support complementary activities that build on 
the foundation of earlier activities. 
2. The GF Project implementers and others (including CSOs, donors, think tanks, academics and other 
experts) should continue careful monitoring of the CSO legal framework in Ecuador, and seek to 
develop creative strategies for advocacy to improve the current law and/or alleviate its impact on civil 
society. Where serious differences about strategy emerge among CSOs, such as the advisability of 
presenting a draft CSO law, it is important that spaces for open discussion and exchange on those key 
issues be maintained, in order to minimize the risk that disagreements will weaken the sector.37
4.1.5.2 Question 2: Engagement 
1. The Confederation and the collective transparency exercise it has spearheaded should be encouraged 
 
37 In this respect, Grupo Faro and other CSO leaders could consider use of the deliberation methodology developed 
by Kettering Foundation, among other tools. For more information, see http://kettering.org/periodicals/deliberative￾pedagogy-an-education-that-matters/ 
24 
with ongoing support by donors and leaders in the CSO community. Adjustments are needed to 
optimize processes and include more CSOs in order for both efforts to be consolidated and have 
increased impact. For example, the manner in which CSO expenses are presented in the transparency 
report should be changed in order to clarify the information that suggests that CSOs are spending 
unduly large amounts on administration. 
4.1.5.3 Question 3A: Local Capacity Development 
1. USAID should consider inclusion of hands-on coaching for individual organizations as part of civil 
society strengthening programs in other countries, especially when CSOs are facing difficult political or 
financial circumstances. Such coaching could include financial planning and legal advice, depending on 
the context and local priorities. 
4.1.5.4 Question 3B: Sustainability 
1. In cases where implementing organizations may not yet have strong internal systems and procedures, 
USAID should conduct a rigorous pre-award analysis of all project implementers (prime and 
otherwise) and provide resources for periodic analysis of capacities and for inputs to strengthen 
institutional capacity in crucial areas. This is especially important in situations where one organization is 
expected to manage a consortium or partnership. In this case, only the prime implementer was 
assessed, and then heavily supported by USAID’s local capacity development team and consultants 
once internal weaknesses came to light during the first year. 
2. Partnerships or consortia among capable national CSOs to execute major projects should be 
encouraged by USAID when appropriate, in spite of the grave difficulties that arose in this situation. 
Well-structured alliances can capitalize on the skills, experience and constituencies of several 
organizations to achieve results that would never be possible with a single implementer or with a 
foreign consortium. However, the allocation of project roles needs to be clear and correspond to the 
individual capacities of each organization. Having a very capable consortium management staff it is also 
very important.. 
3. USAID should provide early and continuous training and advice in US Government budget cycles and 
processes to novice prime implementers (and other consortium members, if any) so they can better 
understand the implications of budget reduction discussions and plan accordingly. 
4. The organizational policy of imposing a maximum on the percentage of overall income that can be 
sourced from a single donor should be carefully considered by other CSOs and USAID. While this may 
not prove realistic in all cases, such a practice can serve as a constant reminder of the importance of 
diversified funding sources for CSOs. 
5. GF should continue to strengthen its human resources management systems, including consideration of 
incentives and other mechanisms to ensure that personnel remain with the organization for longer 
periods of time. In case of internal conflicts, it may be advisable to seek professional mediation or 
counseling services. In order to enhance management of the organization and all of its internal and 
external relations, consideration should be given to creating a deputy director position or similar role. 
The division of leadership responsibilities would promote internal stability and make the organization 
better able to cope with future leadership changes. 
4.2 PARTICIPACIÓN CIUDADANA PROJECT 
4.2.1 QUESTION 1: ADVOCACY AND WATCHDOG ACTIVITY 
1.1 How effective were PC’s interventions to strengthen advocacy and watchdog roles of other CSOs? 1.2. How 
effective was PC’s direct advocacy and watchdog interventions? 1.3. What interventions were most effective 
(training, work with media, work on legal environment, strategies for engagement with Government of Ecuador, etc.) 
and why? 1.4. What interventions were not successful and why? 
4.2.1.1 Findings 
Strengthening of CSO advocacy and watchdog roles 
The Silla Vacía and Accountability Forums are mechanisms for citizen and civil society participation in 
government decision-making and, as such, are ways in which citizens can perform advocacy and watchdog 
25 
roles. PC has sought with this project to strengthen their use at the municipal level throughout the period 
under evaluation. Although CSOs do not have specifically allocated roles in these participation mechanisms 
under the Law on Citizen Participation and were not the primary targets of the PC Project’s work, 
community-based organizations (CBOs) were involved in some of the Project’s activities. Key PC Project 
activities included training for municipal officials, citizens and community organizations on how to use the 
Silla Vacía mechanism, and technical assistance in preparing regulations at the local level.38 As a result of 
these activities, six municipalities adopted ordinances for the use of Silla Vacía. The PC Project also assisted 
three local authorities at the provincial level, 18 at the canton level, and five at the parish level, to hold 
Accountability Forums, after training public officials on their duties to hold forums and coaching them to 
prepare information. In parallel, training was provided to citizens and community organizations on their 
rights to information.39 
FGD participants valued PC Project’s support and recognized their role in starting these forums. However, 
the forums’ effectiveness was limited, as informants noted that local government authorities delivered 
activity reports with limited opportunity for dialogue. Many civil society and other informants commented 
that the Silla Vacía mechanism had become more bureaucratic since being entrenched in legislation, which 
has to some extent discouraged its utilization and citizen participation. Although a good number of CBOs 
and CSOs participated in activities supported by the PC Project, the ET was not able to assess the impact 
of these activities on their capacity and roles in advocacy and oversight.40 
The combined approach of providing tailored technical assistance, coaching, and quality 
publications/manuals were well received by municipal leaders in targeted areas. Respondents commented 
on the personalized support provided by the PC Project, which they found more useful than the assistance 
received from other entities such as the Municipal Association and the CPCCS. It is important to note that 
several municipal and national government informants with responsibilities for citizen participation 
mechanisms expressed openness to collaboration with CSOs like PC, and recognized the need among local 
authorities for more support than the CPCCS is currently able to provide. 
CSOs’ role in advocacy and watchdog activities was also supported by the PC Project through the design 
and delivery of the Marcando la Hoja de Ruta training in 2011-12 (co-funded by the Embassy of Canada and 
described further in the section on Local Capacity Development). The training focused heavily on themes 
related to advocacy and oversight, which were included in every module. Interviewees highlighted the 
relevance and importance of these topics as well as the training quality. Of the survey respondents 
supported primarily by the PC Project, 55 percent have increased the frequency of advocacy and 
monitoring activity since 2010, and 55 percent reported being more effective or much more effective in 
that work. Generally, CSO respondents supported primarily by the PC Project, indicated that the project’s 
support had helped them change their relations with the local government by a factor of 3.14 [moderately 
better on a scale of 1 (no improvement) to 5 (great improvement)] thanks to support from PC. As for 
relations with national government, they felt that relations were only slightly better – 25 percent reported 
no improvement at all, and the average rating was 2.42 (with 2 being slightly better, 3 being moderately 
better).
In the final stage of the PC Project, two CSOs (both members of the Red Pluralista) were given short-term 
grants of $5,000 each to carry out activities related to citizen oversight and participation. The Federación 
 
38 Targeted municipalities were Latacunga and Cuenca in 2011, Machala, Tulcan, Riobamba, Morona, Cuenca 
(reformed) in 2012, Pallatanga, Cumandá, Bucay and Santa Lucía in 2013 
39 In 2010, this process started in Machala (El Oro province) and continued in Tulcán, Riobamba, Morona and 
Latacunga. In 2012, target municipalities were Pimampiro, Mira, Pastaza, Santa Lucía, Daule, and Playas. In 2013 
Cumanda, Bucay, Santa Lucía and Pallatanga were targeted. Three provincial authorities: El Oro, Carchi and 
Chimborazo; 18 cantonal authorities: Milagro, Ibarra, Lago Agrio, and Tena, Pimampiro, Mira, Espejo, Tulcán, 
Latacunga, Chambo, Colta, Pallatanga, Gonzalo Pizarro, Cuyabeno, Loja, Playas, Santa Lucía and Daule; and five parish 
level authorities: Alluriquin, Puerto Limón, San Isidro, La Libertad, and El Goaltal. 
40 Since CSOs were not a specific target group for PC in these activities, no records were available to verify the level 
of CSO participation, and securing contact details in order to seek more information directly from participating CSOs 
proved difficult. 
26 
Clasista de Trabajadores de El Oro implemented the “Strengthening Civil Society Organizations for the 
Implementation of Mechanisms of Citizen Participation” project, and the Fundación de Ayuda por Internet
(FUNDAPI) carried out the “Territorial Networks and Citizenship: the Cantonal Oversight Systems 
Citizen Participation of the Province Guayas” project.41 
Advocacy and watchdog activities by the PC Project 
The PC Project played an important role in expanding and enhancing the role of citizens as watchdogs in 
several ways. According to informants, its work in election monitoring is especially well respected and 
highly visible. In addition, PC is the only CSO in Ecuador that performed national level election 
observation and quick counts. Interviewees highlighted the importance of these activities to the country’s 
democracy at a time when the government, in general, and the Consejo Nacional Electoral (National Electoral 
Council or CNE) in particular, had little credibility. Results reported by PC’s quick counts (in at least six 
elections, before and during this Project) were considered reliable, technically impeccable, and helped 
increase confidence in the election processes. These activities served to mobilize thousands of volunteers, 
mostly youth, some of whom reported that they still value this experience as a first step to involvement in 
democratic practices. 
Notwithstanding its long track record of monitoring, the PC Project’s role in the February 2014 local 
elections was minimized by budget constraints as its final USAID funding was drawing to a close42. 
Informants described how PC volunteers and other citizens waited for PC’s reports on those polls and 
wondered why they did not come. The CNE itself has now begun to perform quick counts, adopting some 
of PC’s processes, and evaluation sources indicated that the CNE no longer sees the need for PC or other 
CSOs to monitor elections. 
Another important activity of the PC Project in the area of advocacy and watchdog work was centered on 
efforts to promote compliance by government institutions with Article 7 of the LOTAIP,43 which specifies a 
long list of information that government-funded bodies are required to keep updated on their websites. 
Prior to 2010, 18 public and private institutions were monitored and a manual for monitoring indicators 
was developed by PC at the request of the Ombudsman’s Office. The manual was validated by the targeted 
public institutions (and by the Ombudsman) in 2011 for obligatory compliance of all public institutions. In 
2010, 12 new national public institutions were added to the combined monitoring and mentoring process 
led by PC. In terms of quantitative impact, project reports indicate that in January 2011, the average 
compliance of the 30 institutions was 87.92 percent, but by 2013 most had reached 100 percent 
compliance.44 
On a qualitative level, interviews with relevant staff of these entities highlighted PC’s technical expertise, 
the importance of knowing their work was being monitored, and the usefulness of the technical manual, all 
of which helped them improve their website’s compliance. Some expressed a sense of abandonment when 
the PC Project’s support ended, but stated their commitment to continue the work. Senior government 
officials at times publicly boasted of the high levels of compliance by these institutions. Much of this 
initiative was led from PC’s Guayaquil office, where many young volunteers had the opportunity to become 
involved and learn about the LOTAIP in the process. On the other hand, some informants raised questions 
regarding the quality of the information on the websites and the commitment to real transparency by 
government-funded institutions. 
In another major watchdog initiative, PC has monitored nine TV channels with national coverage in order 
 
41 As of the time of report writing, the ET has insufficient information to assess these activities. 
42 USAID support to domestic observation in Ecuador had been mainly focused at national elections. 
43 LOTAIP available for download at http://www.ecuadorestrategicoep.gob.ec/images/leytransparencia/LOTAIP.pdf 44 Based on the high rates of compliance achieved by 2012, PC agreed with USAID to shift the focus of LOTAIP 
support to local government authorities in 2013. At that time, the political situation had changed for USAID and PC, a 
different Ombudsman had taken office, and there seemed little chance of PC having further impact on national level 
institutions, although it was hoped that the Ombudsman’s Office would replicate the work of PC based on methods 
and materials already developed. It is unclear to what extent that occurred, since the Ombudsman has not shown 
willingness to meet with either PC or the evaluation team. 
27 
to promote the appropriate use of government funds on mass media.45 A team of three monitors 
produced monthly reports and PC sent press releases to a wide range of media outlets. A highlight of this 
work was the process in which the PC Project tracked and publicized detailed information on the official 
publicity used in the 2011 Constitutional Referendum. According to KIIs conducted by the ET, that process 
helped build public awareness of the government’s use of public funds during the campaigns. The PC 
Project’s regular press releases were disseminated widely by the media, which created discomfort in 
government circles and provoked tensions between them and PC. The organization has defended its legal 
right to monitor this issue, but had to change its methods from reporting expenditures to reporting 
minutes of air time in order to ensure accuracy, since it cannot obtain complete data on the (discounted) 
cost of air time purchased by the government. 
In terms of direct advocacy, PC had some notable successes in earlier years,46 but during the period 
evaluated it faced more challenges in its efforts to promote public policies, laws, and regulations or 
procedures at the national and local levels. For example, the PC Project’s recommendations on the 
Organic Law on Citizen Participation, on the reform of rules for election for members of the CNE, and on 
questions to be posed by the Referendum were not included in the final documents approved by the 
government.47 These difficulties were attributed by informants to the reluctance of the government to 
recognize the voice of civil society in public policy matters. On the positive side, the PC Project has 
successfully advocated some aspects of the local regulations on the use of the Silla Vacía and for the 
adoption of several ordinances at local levels related to accountability forums. 
The PC Project also tried to carry out oversight of other key entities at the national level but those efforts 
had little impact. Monitoring the National Assembly was not considered effective by informants since the 
legislative body is now weak relative to the executive branch. The PC Project sent a permanent oversight 
delegate to the CPCCS as well, and monitored the process of appointments to the Council. However, the 
Project’s recommendations were not ultimately adopted by government. 
4.2.1.2 Conclusions 
1. Over the years of USAID support, PC built an engaged and knowledgeable citizen-base that 
participated in effective advocacy and watchdog campaigns and initiatives, strengthening democratic values 
and processes in Ecuador. PC succeeded in placing oversight of and respect for the use of public funds on 
the radar of the general public, government, donors, and media through its work on monitoring spending 
on mass media. However, the impact of the activity in terms of public interest has diminished now that 
reporting has to be done by minutes of air time rather than expenditure. The awareness generated by this 
initiative also generated negative attention from the government and thus may have impeded the PC 
Project’s other efforts to advocate for change. 
2. The monitoring of compliance with the LOTAIP served as a mechanism for civil society (specifically 
PC) to engage meaningfully with public sector institutions and to help them achieve high levels of 
compliance with these new regulations. This initiative was successful in encouraging and assisting these 
organizations in complying with new transparency regulations, and although longer term impact is hard to 
predict, motivation to maintain high compliance seems high in at least some of those entities. This activity 
was especially valuable in a political context where direct interaction by CSOs with the public sector has 
been significantly reduced; this type of cooperation kept the doors open for PC to work with some 
national government bodies in a productive fashion. 
3. PC has played a critical role in affording credibility to election and referendum processes since its 
creation in 2002, a time of democratic instability in Ecuador. It continues to be well respected for the 
technical competency of its work in this area. This involvement has strengthened PC, civil society and the 
 
45 Since 2012, most funds for implementation of this activity were provided by NED. TV stations monitored included: 
ECUAVISA, Teleamazonas, Gama TV, TC Televisión, RTS, Canal del Estado, RTU, Canal UNO, and Telerama. 
46 For details of influence on earlier legislation, refer to Annex G, point 1.5. 
47 PC also presented suggestions for the adoption of other laws, such as the Communications Law, the presidential 
veto on the Law of Citizen Participation and Social Control, the referendum in relation to the Water Act, and the 
regulations for oversight committees by the Council on Citizen Participation and Social Control (CPCCS) – which 
took into account nine out of 11 recommendations by PC. 
28 
government, and ultimately democratic processes and values. PC’s quick counts produced results that 
were very close to the final official results, and therefore did not give rise to controversy. Some might 
therefore question the utility of the exercise, especially given that recent elections in Ecuador have been 
declared largely free and fair.
48 However, having prompt results from a reliable source served to bolster 
public confidence in elections, since election authorities have generally been slow to announce results. 
4. Although the PC Project’s support to the implementation of Silla Vacía and Accountability Forums by 
targeted local authorities has been welcomed by citizens and officials in most cases, these mechanisms have 
had mixed results. Some of PC’s strategies for mobilizing participation have been adopted by government 
bodies; for example, the “Clean Walls, Honest Candidates” campaign49 was replicated in 2013 and 2014 by 
the CPCCS and CNE. In a few cases, the methods taught by the PC Project have been adopted for ongoing 
implementation. In others, the authorities have chosen less interactive ways of reporting on their work to 
the public. The effectiveness of these mechanisms and others - and thus the effectiveness of the project’s 
support - has depended on the political will of elected officials, understanding of the mechanisms by the 
government and/or civil society. Although change has been slow and there have been obstacles, there is 
evidence that the work of the PC Project has made a difference and that there is demand for more 
activities of this nature. There is a definite role for PC and other CSOs to play in promoting broader and 
more effective use of these mechanisms across the country, especially in conjunction with local 
governments. 
5. Regardless of the limited results of the PC Project’s advocacy efforts, it is important for civil society 
to maintain a dialogue with relevant government institutions and remain involved and proactive in the 
debate and formulation of relevant laws and policies. The ET found no evidence of weakness in the PC 
Project’s design, technical analysis or strategies for advocacy, but there was no willingness on the other 
side of the table to give credence to their inputs. On the positive side, PC gained valuable experience in 
advocating and monitoring institutions and processes created under the new Constitution. 
In sum: 
How effective were PC’s interventions to strengthen advocacy and watchdog roles of other CSOs?
The project’s main focus was on direct advocacy and watchdog work, as compared to supporting other 
CSOs. PC’s support to CSOs was primarily through the Hoja de Ruta training, which was effective in 
increasing skills and involvement in advocacy and watchdog work. 
How effective were PC’s direct advocacy and watchdog interventions? Since 2011, with a changing 
political context, it has been challenging for the PC Project to achieve observable effects with its 
interventions, especially in advocacy - although long-term results cannot be ruled out. Election and 
referendum monitoring has been highly effective. Other oversight initiatives have raised awareness of 
important issues and drawn government attention, though effects on policy and practice were not 
possible to ascertain. 
What interventions by PC were most effective (training, work with media, work on legal 
environment, strategies for engagement with GoE, etc.) and why? One of the most effective project 
activities was monitoring of compliance with the LOTAIP, which was particularly useful due to the 
combination of oversight with technical assistance to build skills and boost compliance. High rates of 
compliance were achieved, but perhaps more importantly, an innovative model for CSO-government 
cooperation was established. At the local level, the PC Project’s work with municipal governments to 
increase the understanding and practice of Accountability Forums has also been effective in a number of 
targeted municipalities.
What interventions by PC were not successful and why? Advocacy for changes to the CSO legal 
framework and the Citizen Participation Law, among others, did not achieve observable results. The 
 
48 See for example http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186722.pdf and 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/ecuador#.U4IpRYVMyOI 49 This civic campaign was organized by PC beginning in 2008 to promote greater transparency and respect for public 
and private spaces by candidates for public office, and to press for candidates to remove their publicity materials after 
elections. 
29 
difficulty did not lie with PC Project’s design, positions or strategies, but rather with the resistance by 
government to recognize the role of civil society in public policy. Government criticism made it 
necessary to change the methods for monitoring public spending on media, which has diluted its impact.
4.2.2 QUESTION 2: ENGAGEMENT 
2.1. How successful were PC’s interventions at strengthening their engagement and collaborative work with other 
CSOs, the media, their constituencies, and the government? 2.2. What are the most effective and sustainable 
mechanisms for CSOs to constructively engage with other CSOs, their constituencies, media, and the government? 
4.2.2.1 Findings 
Role of PC 
PC has played an important role within Ecuador in building citizen involvement. Several informants noted 
that PC is a political organization but not a political party and, as such, it contributes to developing citizen 
skills in democratic processes and educating them on their rights and responsibilities. Its presence and 
multiple activities have provided thousands of citizens with the opportunity to debate and learn about 
issues of national and local importance. 
Informants noted that PC had an enormous convening capacity in its earlier years, and that their annual 
conventions were massive; this was an uncommon achievement for NGOs in Ecuador. Some informants, 
especially outside of Quito, noted that with a decrease in civic campaigns and volunteer activity in the last 
three to four years, PC’s visibility and, to a lesser degree, its credibility in their communities, had 
decreased.50 Some lamented PC’s transformation from a “citizen movement to becoming just another 
NGO.” Key informants commented on this shift as a response to the political context that made citizen 
campaigns a higher political risk for volunteers and the organization. In addition, the transformation reflects 
the different styles and priorities of PC’s leaders over time, given that the original director was very much 
a citizen activist and mobilizer, while the current director can be considered a more technical and 
professional manager. 
Success of PC Project interventions 
As described in the Advocacy Section, PC was successful in engaging citizens in its initiatives through an 
effective grassroots citizen base. PC was able to mobilize citizen volunteers in campaigns, election 
monitoring, and oversight activities such as compliance with the LOTAIP, as noted previously. Volunteers 
form an integral part of PC’s organizational structure and have representation on its Board of Directors, 
according to the organization’s statutes. Volunteers were organized by provincial coordinators (in all 24 
provinces), and in the case of Guayas, this structure also included three additional canton-level 
coordinators.51 
Volunteers were offered periodic training (including through the PC Project’s online training platform) and 
until 2010, each provincial coordinator received modest funding for operating expenses. More recently, 
PC’s engagement with volunteers has been focused on election monitoring, though some long-time 
volunteers said they were not informed about PC’s plans regarding the 2014 local elections, which were 
limited to Azuay province due to funding constraints.52 Although regular involvement in PC activities has 
declined, at least some volunteers are continuing to promote citizen participation in their communities. A 
number of former PC volunteers have become civic and political leaders, and several currently hold public 
office. When interviewed, they credited their commitment and skills in citizen participation to what they 
learned as PC volunteers. (However, some of these leaders consider that the government has responded 
to civil society demands, and see a diminished role for CSOs in the country.) 
 
50 As described below under Sustainability, the LAPOP Americas Barometer surveys have shown a slightly increasing 
level of public confidence in PC, among those who have heard of the organization. 
51 Coordinators were provided funds for internet, office space and computer equipment 
52 PC did mobilize approximately 10,000 volunteers for the 2013 election, which is a testament to its well developed 
election monitoring systems and methodologies. Several informants noted that there is a notable difference between 
long-term engaged volunteers and those that participate in one-time activities. The on-going volunteer network is 
what is discussed in this section.
30 
The Guayaquil PC office, in particular, involved and trained youth in political leadership and democratic 
values through youth clubs and the “Vive la Democracia” (Live Democracy) initiative.53 PC coordinated with 
public and private schools to recognize the students’ activities with the PC Project as part of their 
community service requirements, and coordinated with local universities to recruit students for election 
monitoring. 
In examining PC’s current linkages to other sectors and CSOs, the ET found that engagement by PC with 
other CSOs was most prominent through the “Marcando la Hoja de Ruta” initiative, which included a civil 
society needs assessment and a training program that led to the creation of the Red Pluralista by CSO 
participants. This network started with enthusiasm but has not been very active. It recently elected new 
leadership and, according to network members who participated in the evaluation, there is new hope for 
increased levels of interaction and activity. From the outset, PC decided that the network should have full 
autonomy and promoted a horizontal style of organization, especially since PC’s financial resources were 
diminishing. As a result, the PC Project provided minimal support to the network. The CSO survey data 
indicates that 58 percent of the 12 respondents that chose the Red Pluralista as the network in which they 
were most active, rated it as very useful or extremely useful. Only eight percent considered it not useful. 
As stated earlier, 69 percent of CSO survey respondents said that their contact with other CSOs had 
become more frequent or much more frequent since 2010. Among respondents who indicated having 
received more support from the PC Project, 64 percent indicated increased frequency of contact, while 27 
percent said it had become less frequent. The significant variation in responses may be related to the fact 
that the PC Project did not emphasize support to CSOs or networking among them since 2010, although 
there are other factors that could be at play such as PC’s lower profile in recent years. 
An examination of PC’s current linkages to networks in Ecuador found them to be relatively weak at 
present. PC has participated in a number of national level networks, such as the Justice Network, which is 
now barely active, and the Access Coalition, which is no longer operational. PC was initially part of El 
Colectivo but left due to differences of opinion over the advisability of proposing an NGO law and the best 
way to respond to Decree 16. Informants identified some currently active thematic networks, in the 
environmental sector for example, but few remain active in areas of relevance to PC’s priorities, such as 
justice and governance. 
The PC Project engaged the media through diverse channels and approaches, and through the media, 
engaged a broad cross-section of the population. The main vehicle for media-related activities has been its 
digital newspaper, Ciudadanía Informada (Informed Citizenry or CI), online since 2004, which has the 
objective of providing citizens with quality information on topics of public interest and it is one of only five 
Ecuador-based digital newspapers. PC hired part-time correspondents in five provinces to generate articles 
for the newspaper that would capture news from various parts of the country and presented the stories 
from a citizen perspective. PC Project records, based on Google Analytics, show that the site generated a 
progressive increase of visitors during the 2006 to 2012 period. In 2006, the site received 493,263 page 
hits and reached 1,360,461, its highest number, in 2012. The site had 14 percent fewer hits in 2013, and 
data as of March 2014 showed a similar number of hits for this year. 
Other communication products included frequent press releases and bulletins, which many informants 
described as well received by the media and widely disseminated. PC is frequently cited by the mass 
media54 and its information is generally considered credible and relevant by the media and the public, 
according to KIIs. However, informants outside of Quito noted that media coverage had diminished in the 
last couple of years. Among CSO respondents to the survey, awareness of information products was low; 
65 percent were unaware of the Pulso Ciudadano (Citizen’s Pulse) bulletin55 produced by PC, and 54 
 
53 In 2010, PC worked with 13 schools in Guayas; in 2011, 672 students trained in democratic values, supported 13 
student government elections, held 45 workshops and completed 13 citizenship campaigns. In 2012, PC trained 1,212 
youth in political leadership, held workshops for 43 youth facilitators and completed a publication on the results.
54 In 2011, PC and PC events were mentioned or PC staff interviewed by media 515 times; in 2012, 453 times and in 
2013, on average twice a week (according to data provided by PC staff). Figures include TV, radio and print media. 55 Pulso Ciudadano is a bulletin or newsletter produced by PC to update citizens on developments in the political life of 
the country, including new or amended legislation, and to share PC’s analysis of developments related to democratic 
31 
percent were unaware of PC’s website. The most likely reasons are that the PC Project has not focused in 
recent years on working with CSOs, and that PC has not prioritized high visibility in the current political 
context. 
Through the CI branch of its operations, PC also engaged with the media through provision of training on 
topics such as social networking, new communication laws, and ethics in journalism.56 Initially focused on 
the PC correspondents, training was expanded to include other journalists and journalism students, which 
increased the reach of the project as well as provided correspondents and CI with valuable linkages to the 
professionals and media outlets that disseminated their reports and articles. Informants praised the training 
received from PC for its quality and the topics covered, as well as for the opportunity to network with 
other journalists. PC correspondents highlighted the importance of the training offered by PC in their 
personal and professional development, and the value of training to other journalists in order to interest 
them in civil society issues. 
As discussed in the Advocacy Section, PC has maintained its pre-2010 ties and developed new links with 
certain government institutions at the national level, and in 2013 forged new links with selected local level 
governments through its watchdog and related activities. Activities by Silla Vacía and Accountability Forums 
by government bodies to support implementation of access to information obligations have been 
particularly important in this regard. 
A PC mechanism that cut across several areas of engagement was Sistema Integrado de Educación en Línea
(Online Integrated Training System or SIEL), which was established as a training platform in 2010. The PC 
Project used this online system to offer training to volunteers in areas such as public access to information, 
alternative dispute resolution, and citizen participation mechanisms. SIEL was also used to train 70 
representatives of organizations being monitored by the PC Project. Over the time in which platform was 
used for training purposes (2010-2012), a diverse set of subjects were covered in its courses.57 Interviews 
found a variable level of satisfaction with SIEL; some informants found the topics interesting and the 
platform user-friendly, while others did not. The ET did not observe any process for assessing the 
effectiveness of this training mechanism or satisfaction of users. The SIEL website was no longer active at 
the time of the evaluation due to the pending termination of USAID funding. 
Mechanisms for CSO engagement with other actors 
Over the years PC has led various national civic campaigns with high levels of citizen interest and 
participation. The “Being on Time”58 and “Clean Walls” campaigns were mentioned repeatedly by 
informants as examples of successful PC activities, highlighting the effectiveness of these mechanisms in 
constructively engaging citizens, especially youth, in issues of public concern. Most recently (in 2010, 2011 
and 2012), the Ojo Ciudadano (Citizen Eye) campaign of the PC Project provided training to citizens in 
several topics, including tolerance, transparency, freedom, justice, and security. Some respondents and the 
PC Project technical staff noted that the current political context and new legislation that restricts public 
demonstrations (and in fact, any activity that may “disrupt public order”59) make this type of activity more 
difficult for CSOs to undertake effectively. As a result, PC decided in 2012 to reduce the scale and visibility 
of its civic campaigns. In 2013, the PC Project supported small-scale local civic awareness activities as part 
 
governance. Examples can be seen on the website at 
http://www.participacionciudadana.org/pc10/index.php?option=com_virtuemart&page=shop.browse&category_id=10&
Itemid=75 56 PC offered five workshops for 183 journalists in 2011; five in 2012 with 200 participants; and several workshops on 
journalism and elections in 2013. The total number trained between 2010 and 2013 was 758, in Azuay, Imbabura, 
Guayas, Manabí y Pichincha provinces. 
57 (2010) Political Advocacy, Accountability, Political Communication and Leadership, Democracy and 
Communication. (2011) On-line Studies and use of the platform, Conflict Resolution, Research. (2012) Project 
Development (Basic and Intermediate). 111 participants. Political and Social Use of New Communication 
Technologies (Basic and Intermediate). 12 participants. 
58 This popular campaign led by PC in 2003 raised awareness among citizens of the need to respect the time of others 
and of the importance of meeting their commitments on time. 
59 For example, the Penal Code of Ecuador (Art. 559) now makes it a crime to disseminate messages (through any 
means) that incite the commission of offences of disturbance of public order. 
32 
of two grants to CSOs, rather than conducting any campaigns directly. 
A role that PC has continued to play under this Project is that of preserving spaces for civil society to 
participate as an advocate and watchdog in light of an ever-stronger government presence. The use of 
monitoring of media as a mechanism for informing the public on important issues (ranging from the legal 
use of public funds in publicity to violence against women), has been made effective through collaboration 
with the mass media, as many outlets have disseminated PC’s press releases and reports. Various 
informants commented that the public and government officials have greater awareness of the use of public 
funds on publicity due to PC’s work in this area. Informants both within and outside of PC noted that the 
PC Project’s strategy, which is careful to focus on compliance with laws and regulations in its reports and 
publications, has allowed PC to continue its work in a difficult political context where criticism of the 
government may bring harsh consequences. 
The PC Project’s support of and engagement with municipal governments in the use of Silla Vacía and 
Accountability Forums has been well received in localities where there has been political openness, but 
results have been modest, as discussed in the Advocacy Section. 
4.2.2.2 Conclusions 
1. PC was professional and technically competent in the civic campaigns, watchdog work and advocacy 
initiatives it promoted. Its combination of regular citizen engagement across the country and strong 
technical capacity afforded the organization a high level of legitimacy and visibility, which few other 
Ecuadorian CSOs could claim. Lately, its level of engagement with citizens has declined, primarily due 
to the political context and budgetary constraints. 
2. The creation and maintenance of a widespread volunteer network was a significant achievement for 
PC. However, the network is not as strong now as in PC’s early years and has lost momentum since 
this Project began in 2010. Since that time, and given funding constraints, the organization’s 
management decided to allocate less human and financial resources to these areas of activity and focus 
volunteer engagement primarily in election monitoring related activities. 
3. The spontaneous emergence of the Red Pluralista network was an indication of a strong motivation 
among a core group of CSOs to strengthen civil society in their areas and work with the PC Project to 
extend the reach of its training. For CSOs, the network also represented a shared space to discuss 
common needs and challenges. This represented an opportunity for PC and the Project to take a 
supporting role in a small network of interested organizations, which could potentially have 
collaborated with PC volunteers or otherwise contributed towards achievement of project objectives. 
However, PC’s strategy was to allow the network to grow “under its own steam” without a more 
active participation and leadership from PC, in part due to funding constraints; therefore, it did not 
capitalize on (or perhaps recognize) that opportunity. 
4. PC has been effective in maintaining and establishing links with some government institutions at 
national and local levels through its access to information support activities, both preceding and during 
this Project. Such activities have helped establish positive and collaborative relations between public 
sector institutions and PC. 
5. The PC Project was effective in attracting citizen and media interest through its different media 
outreach initiatives. It generated high levels of visitors to its website and regular media presence. This 
media presence was stronger in Quito and less evident in other parts of the country in the last year. 
6. The sustainability of many of the PC Project mechanisms for engagement is largely dependent on the 
context; the scarcity of resources to replicate training and support networking, the fear of engaging in 
advocacy activities (or even linking to others involved in advocacy), and regulatory challenges of 
conducting civic campaigns, all pose constraints to mechanisms used by PC in the past. 
In sum: 
How successful were PC’s interventions at strengthening their engagement and collaborative 
work with other CSOs, the media, their constituencies, and the government? The work of PC with 
government institutions was somewhat successful in this area, especially before 2012. Outreach to 
grassroots constituencies, volunteers, CSOs and the media were also limited during this period by 
33 
declining financial resources. However, engagement with local government and citizens in targeted areas 
has improved since 2012 through the project’s work on promotion of citizen participation mechanisms.
What are the most effective and sustainable mechanisms for CSOs to constructively engage with 
other CSOs, their constituencies, media, and the government? The PC Project did not include a 
significant focus on supporting engagement by CSOs with other stakeholders. However, as a CSO itself, 
PC established effective mechanisms for providing technical assistance to government entities (at national 
and local levels) to promote compliance with LOTAIP. The PC Project’s communications are 
disseminated regularly by the media, and its information – especially regarding elections - is well 
respected. PC’s civic campaigns proved to be effective means of engaging citizens in public life, especially 
when based on the mobilization of young volunteers. These mechanisms require at least modest levels of 
funding to be sustainable. 
4.2.3 QUESTION 3A: LOCAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. How effective were PC’s capacity development interventions with other CSOs? 3.2. Specifically, what 
interventions in local capacity development were most effective and why? (Grants, training, workshops, university 
training, etc.)? 
4.2.3.1 Findings 
Although CSOs were not a primary target group of the PC Project, PC carried out several capacity 
development interventions to further the project’s objectives and increase the capacity of CSOs, citizens, 
volunteer networks, and youth. Key initiatives are described below. 
Marcando la Hoja de Ruta para la Sociedad Civil was a PC initiative (co-funded by the Embassy of Canada and 
USAID) that aimed to strengthen civil society in Ecuador through several activities. PC carried out an 
assessment in 2010 to identify CSOs’ key needs60 and then designed a series of four training modules to 
respond to those priorities.61 Fifty-four CSOs (as well as some universities and government institutions) 
received training in diverse subjects that included citizen participation and the new constitutional 
mechanisms for participation, new information technologies, legal framework, and advocacy, among others. 
Training participation was variable, averaging 25 CSOs per module; 30 organizations completed at least 
two modules. 
The ET received positive feedback on the training from participants who considered it to be highly 
relevant. 
The survey of CSOs indicates that respondents who received any kind of training from PC on average 
rated its importance to their organization at 4, on a scale of 1 to 5. More specifically, among the 10 survey 
 
60 Marcando la Hoja de Ruta para la Sociedad Civil: Una investigación cualitativa para determinar el estado actual de las 
OSC y contribuir a su fortalecimiento 
61 The four modules were entitled 1) Constitutional Principles and Citizen Participation, 2) Tools for Citizen 
Oversight and Monitoring of Government, 3) Leadership and Policy Advocacy, and 4) Strategies for Communication 
and Policy Dialogue.
0%
20%
40%
60%
Very Poor
Quality
Poor Quality Satisfactory
Quality
Good Quality Very Good
Quality
0% 0%
30.00%
20.00%
50.00%
Figure 7: CSO Views on Quality of the PC Project “Marcando la Hoja 
de la Ruta” Training
How would you rate the quality of the training?
34 
respondents who participated in this particular series of workshops, 50 percent rated the training quality as 
“very good,” the maximum on a scale of 1 to 5, while the rest considered it to be either satisfactory (30 
percent) or good (20 percent). 
Eighty-two percent of those respondents said they engage in activities aiming to influence or monitor the 
actions of government. Of those, 64 percent said they had increased the frequency of these activities since 
2010, and 55 percent said the impact of these activities was either more effective or much more effective 
since 2010. Although this sub-set of survey respondents was only 10 individuals, and many other factors 
could have affected responses, this data suggests that this training series may have motivated CSOs to 
increase their focus on this type of engagement. More surprising is the fact that respondents perceived 
their advocacy and watchdog work as more effective - especially given the complex environment for such 
activities since 2010. At least two organizations replicated the training for other organizations in Cuenca 
and Loja provinces, and had the opportunity to present their experience in a workshop organized by the 
PC Project with 50 CSOs. 
The formation of the Red Pluralista is attributed to the above-described training, as a group of 12 
participating CSOs wanted to continue the process of addressing and discussing shared areas of interest 
with other CSOs. Members have received assistance from the PC Project in the form of materials for 
replicating trainings, and some have collaborated in training events offered by PC. 
Afro-Ecuadorian women training initiative
Consistent with the project’s objective to increase the knowledge of afro-descendent groups regarding 
citizen rights and obligations, the new Constitution, and international legal instruments to strengthen 
democracy, PC contracted with the Ecuadorian NGO Corporación de Gestión y Derecho Ambiental ECOLEX 
(ECOLEX Environmental Management and Law Corporation or ECOLEX) for afro-descendent women.62 In 
2010-11, the project trained 103 female leaders in Guayaquil, Ibarra and other locations with significant 
afro-descendent populations, and some trainees went on to provide legal aid in their communities as part 
of a wider ECOLEX program. Key informants highlighted the importance of this activity as a way to 
strengthen relationships among these women (most of whom were CSO leaders) and develop increased 
confidence levels in their abilities to represent their constituents. One participant gave credit to this 
training for her organization having an international representative and a broader understanding of where 
they could go for support and funding. This initiative represented the only project activity focused 
specifically on this minority group. 
Training on Decree 16 
Training on Decree 16 was another notable PC activity that has aimed to directly contribute to CSO 
capacity.63 Activities have included a series of one-day workshops in various cities to brief CSOs on the 
contents and implications of Decree 16, accompanied by a guide or manual that presents the most 
pertinent aspects of the decree and a new registration system in a relatively simple format and language. 
Feedback from participating CSOs indicates that these events have been helpful, but the ET observed that 
considerable confusion was still evident among participants – apparently because many aspects of how the 
decree will actually work are still unclear, so PC facilitators were hard pressed to explain the inexplicable. 
With respect to the general effect of the PC Project’s support to CSOs, the survey results indicate that, on 
average, respondents believe that assistance by PC helped their organization improve the most in the 
following areas: relations with other CSOs, work with local communities, and quality of services. Least 
improvement was noted in the organizations’ relations with the national government and access to funding. 
CSO survey respondents that benefited primarily from the PC Project chose training as an important type 
of support provided by the organization, second only to “advocacy to promote civil society participation in 
 
62 Note: This activity was essentially a pass-through of funds by PC to ECOLEX, undertaken at the request of 
USAID/Ecuador. 
63 This work is primarily funded by Konrad Adenauer Foundation with additional support from ICNL under the global 
LEEPII project funded by USAID. However, until March 2014 USAID funding of the PC project covered most indirect 
costs. 
35 
matters of public interest.” The third highest ranking was for “sharing of information.” Figure 8, below, 
shows the breakdown of CSO responses about the most important types of support from the PC Project. 
4.2.3.2 Conclusions 
1. The PC Project’s key CSO capacity building intervention, “Marcando la Hoja de Ruta,” was well 
researched and responded to CSOs’ needs at that time. Although there was variability in attendance 
and few organizations completed all modules, the strong positive reaction from interviewed and 
surveyed CSOs indicates that the training was relevant and useful. There is convincing evidence that 
the additional knowledge and confidence helped participating organizations become more involved and 
more effective in citizen oversight and advocacy activities. 
2. The spontaneous emergence of the Red Pluralista at the end of the training series was an indication of 
the training’s relevance and a strong motivation among a core group of CSOs to strengthen other 
CSOs and work with the PC Project in this area. However, the initiative – which did not receive 
funding support from the PC Project, except $10,000 for grants to two network members in 2013 – 
did not get off the ground in any meaningful way. It is worth nothing that two additional network 
members mobilized resources to implement some training replications. 
In sum: 
How effective were PC’s capacity development interventions with other CSOs? The PC Project 
activities to build CSO capacity (notably, the Hoja de Ruta training series) can be considered fairly 
effective, overall, although the scope of their work in this area was limited after 2011 due to funding 
constraints. 
Specifically, what interventions in local capacity development were most effective and why? 
(grants, training, workshops, university training, etc.)? The Hoja de Ruta training series was the most 
effective activity, due to the careful assessment of needs that preceded them and the quality of the 
workshops. It helped organizations become more involved and effective in citizen oversight and advocacy 
activities, and afterwards a few members replicated parts of the training in their local areas.
4.2.4 QUESTION 3B: SUSTAINABILITY 
3.3. Has USAID/Ecuador’s direct assistance to PC succeeded in building sustainable local capacity of these two 
groups? 3.4. How far along the road to sustainability is PC? And in what areas does it still need support? 
With respect to organizational sustainability, the evaluation focused on analyzing the likelihood that PC 
could continue to function with internal capacities and principal activities roughly similar to the situation 
that existed prior to the termination of USAID funding. The ET has taken into account the following 
aspects of sustainability: technical competency, credibility (especially with government and other CSOs), 
public visibility, current funding and future funding prospects, internal governance, and external linkages. 
31.6%
42.1%
10.5%
63.2%
21.1% 15.8%
0.0%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
Figure 8: CSO Views on Relative Importance of Types of Support from 
PC
What are the two most important services or types of support provided to civil society by 
Participacion Ciudadana? 
36 
4.2.4.1 Findings 
Impact of USAID assistance 
PC recently celebrated its 10th anniversary. Heavily supported by USAID since the moment it was created 
[originally for election monitoring in collaboration with the National Democratic Institute (NDI)], PC has 
developed unique technical skills in various areas and is held in high regard for its technical competency. 
Over the years, this organization has developed and grown into an important, respected, and competent 
Ecuadorian CSO. Direct assistance to the institutional strengthening of PC has included fundraising and 
strategic planning consultants, OCA exercises in which some USAID staff participated, and travel to the 
USA for promoting alliances. 
Discussions with various informants indicated that some donors may have been disinclined to fund PC, 
precisely because it was so steadily supported by USAID, and others simply did not consider PC to be a 
priority, especially in times of shrinking resources for Ecuador cooperation projects. 
Level of sustainability 
The following are the key findings regarding PC’s financial sustainability and its ability to continue playing 
the same role for civil society: 
1. PC’s credibility with the national government was high in the past, as demonstrated by its close 
relationship with the Ombudsman’s Office in the LOTAIP monitoring initiative, its ability to provide 
inputs to various pieces of legislation, and close coordination with the CNE in elections. This credibility 
has suffered to some extent as the President has criticized PC for certain activities (notably, 
monitoring of public spending on publicity). These developments in the political context have limited 
PC’s ability to influence national-level institutions. 
With respect to CSOs, the media and the public at large, PC’s reports, press releases, and bulletins are 
considered reliable and credible. Its election monitoring information is highly regarded for its reliability 
and informants consider its methodology impeccable.64 In addition, Americas Barometer surveys 
conducted in Ecuador by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) indicate that public 
confidence in PC is relatively high; in 2014, those respondents who knew of PC gave it a rating of 58.8 
points out of 100, on a scale ranging from no confidence to great confidence. That proportion has been 
increasing modestly but steadily since 2006, when the confidence rating was 48.1 out of 100.65 
The 19 CSO survey 
respondents that indicated 
receiving support primarily 
from PC indicated a 
relatively high level of 
confidence in information 
provided by the 
organization, with an 
average rating of 3.53 on a 
scale of 1 to 5. With 
respect to the importance 
of PC’s work to civil society 
in Ecuador, the same 
respondents gave an 
average rating of 3.89, or 
very important. Figure 9, above, shows the breakdown of CSO responses by percentage of those who 
selected each possible response. 
In terms of transparency practices, which are important for an organization that promotes these 
values, since 2008 PC has produced an annual report on its activities that is available on its web site 
 
64 The high quality of the methods being used by PC for Parallel Vote Tabulation (Quick Count) were verified by an 
independent expert in election monitoring contracted by USAID in 2009. 
65 Data sourced from LAPOP Americas Barometer 2004-2014, draft report shared with USAID/Ecuador in June 2014. 
15.79%
26.32% 36.84%
21.05%
Figure 9: CSO Level of Confidence in 
Information Provided by PC
What level of confidence do you have in the information provided 
by the implementing organization? 
no confidence
little confidence
moderate confidence
much confidence
absolute trust
37 
and convenes an annual meeting where results are presented. Beyond these, the organization does not 
currently provide information to the public regarding its donors or financial status. 
2. PC’s technical competency is highly regarded by informants. PC has acquired unique technical skills in a 
broad set of areas that range from election observation and quick counts to understanding the citizen 
participation mechanisms created under the new Constitution. It has proven capacity in leading 
advocacy and watchdog initiatives, mobilizing civil society campaigns, and engaging citizens in 
democratic processes. 
3. PC documentation and informants indicated that although its public profile has diminished over the last 
few years, the organization still enjoys significant levels of visibility. That is especially true in Quito and 
Guayaquil where the mass media regularly covers the organization’s activities (most recently the use of 
government funds for publicity in media), and in areas where election monitoring activities and civic 
campaigns have been strongest. The LAPOP Americas Barometer study mentioned above found that 
39 percent of Ecuadorians surveyed in February 2014 had heard of PC (595 out of 1512 
interviewees).66 
4. With respect to internal systems and governance and management structures, PC’s internal systems 
are relatively strong according to the OCA self-assessment performed in 2013. The organization rated 
its overall capacity at 3.6 out of 4, with 4 demonstrating high capacity. The assessment process also 
identified weaknesses in key areas. The organization performs very well in the financial management 
and project management areas. Areas of concern include organizational structure and strategic 
planning. The assessment noted “there is no strategic institutional plan that is not linked to a specific donor. 
Decisions for new projects are based on USAID’s plans...and there is no sustainable financial planning.” The ET 
also observed some weakness in the preservation of important documents related to PC’s past work 
and methods, which were not readily accessible.67 Although not investigated in depth by the evaluators, 
this suggests that as PC downsizes its activities and staff, and possibly relocates its offices, valuable 
institutional memory may be at risk. 
PC’s volunteer network, which was a unique and important part of its organizational structure, has 
been somewhat weakened since 2010 by a combination of factors, including USAID budget cuts and 
changes in PC’s priorities. The level of regular engagement by volunteers has declined in recent years, 
communications are weak between volunteer coordinators and PC’s headquarters, and information 
sharing has diminished according to interviewed volunteers. 
5. Interviews with PC leaders and staff revealed considerable efforts towards resource development, with 
20 potential donors identified, contacted, and numerous proposals submitted in the past year. 
Prospects for grants are uncertain, as the current funding environment in Ecuador is very difficult for 
bilateral/multilateral donors as well as the private sector, especially for activities related to promotion 
of enhanced democracy and governance. 
Two consultants were contracted to support PC with developing a financial sustainability plan, the first 
in 2010 and the second in 2013. Some PC staff noted that the first produced a good diagnostic of the 
situation but did not offer useful ideas regarding funding, whereas the second one generated some 
innovative ideas that may be pursued. PC has also considered fee for service projects, such as the sale 
of media monitoring services to the private sector, the marketing of training seminars with university 
backing, training local governments in the new citizen participation mechanisms, and conducting 
research, among others. To date, efforts to diversify funding have not been successful and, currently, 
staffing is significantly reduced with some key personnel working on a pro bono basis. 
 
66 Informants at LAPOP provided the following figures for those survey respondents who responded “yes” to the 
question “Have you heard of the NGO Participación Ciudadana?” 35% in 2004; 39% in 2006; 40% in 2008; 32% in 2010; 
48% in 2012; and 39% in 2014.
67 Many reports and other documents were only listed on the PC website, but not downloadable—only a few 
publications are available for viewing on the website. 
38 
6. An organization’s national, regional and international support networks can increase their resiliency 
and sustainability. PC belongs to several international networks, including the Latin American Network 
for Democracy and the Acuerdo de Lima. Membership in the latter has provided PC the opportunity to 
participate in election monitoring in other countries and to gain recognition for its expertise in that 
subject. PC’s competency in election monitoring has been recognized by the Organization of American 
States, which has consulted with it on several occasions. In addition, PC has been part of several 
thematic networks in Ecuador, although those are minimally active at present. 
4.2.4.2 Conclusions 
1. PC has a limited window of opportunity to identify funding to carry on its work of promoting citizen 
participation, accountability, and democratic processes in Ecuador. It cannot currently be described as 
sustainable in terms of the role it has played in Ecuador to date. 
2. Limited efforts to collaborate on funding proposals with other organizations (nationally or regionally 
based) may have contributed to ongoing dependency on USAID funding, although efforts to secure 
funding in the last two years have been laudable. Donor reluctance to fund PC has also been a 
significant factor in inability to secure major funding. 
3. PC’s robust governance structure, with well respected members on their Board of Directors, strong 
credibility, and committed leadership are all important assets for its future. 
4. A strategic plan with organizational priorities based on a consultative process with staff and volunteers 
would have been an asset for PC as it faced reduced levels of funding since 2010. The lack of clearly 
defined priorities for development of the organization and its programming has impacted its 
effectiveness and ability to cope with shrinking resources. 
In sum: 
Has USAID/Ecuador’s direct assistance to PC succeeded in building sustainable local capacity of 
the organization? Yes. The Mission’s support (under this Project and previous ones) has directly 
contributed to building capacity in a number of key areas, including technical capacity, credibility with the 
public, media and civil society, visibility, and internal systems. 
How far along the road to sustainability is PC? And in what areas do they still need support? PC is 
still far from being financially sustainable, partially due to external circumstances. It would benefit from 
the following support: 1) strategic planning to clearly identify its priorities and the way forward; 2) 
facilitation of connections to private sector funders who prioritize the type of work done by PC; 3) 
encouragement to develop joint projects with other organizations based in the region; and 4) knowledge 
management support to assist in analyzing and capturing the information, systems, methodologies, and 
strategies used in PC’s key initiatives, in order to mitigate the effects of reduction of staffing on technical 
capacity.
4.2.5 PC PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are intended to inform future PC programming in Ecuador, as well as 
future interventions by USAID in other countries. 
4.2.5.1 Question 1: Advocacy and Watchdog Activity 
1. PC should assess the costs and benefits of the monitoring of media spending activity in its current 
format, and consider whether the method or focus needs to be adjusted to generate more public 
interest and/or discussion about change in government practices. The impact of this activity outside of 
electoral periods needs to be weighed against the political costs, as the balance between them is not 
evident. 
2. In countries with a similar political environment, USAID should encourage civil society programs to 
identify non-controversial ways in which CSOs can monitor and provide technical support to 
government entities. An initiative such as monitoring fulfillment of transparency obligations by state￾funded institutions or helping government officials interact effectively with citizens can be an important 
avenue to keep doors open between the sectors, and can help develop mutually beneficial institutional 
and personal relations between actors on both sides. 
39 
3. International and Ecuadorian stakeholders should continue to support the role of skilled CSOs such as 
PC in election monitoring, including pre-election processes. Such organizations provide a means of 
mobilizing ordinary citizens to engage in locally-owned oversight of some of the most significant 
democratic processes in their country. As well, the combination of national and international actors 
tends to lend more credibility to observation findings and has the potential to have more influence on 
government and election authorities. 
4. PC should capitalize on existing contacts with and capacity of CSOs and volunteers based in other 
provinces to extend the reach and impact of their citizen participation work so they can be translated 
into real participation at the grassroots level. Ways of further collaborating with locally based CSOs 
and volunteers (both existing and new ones) in this work, rather than direct implementation by PC in 
communities, should be actively explored. While PC has taken some steps in this direction (including 
through two small sub-grants in 2013), CSOs and volunteers already trained by PC and/or GF in citizen 
oversight and advocacy could play a more regular and active role in carrying out work at community 
level to support use of participation mechanisms by local government bodies. These kinds of strategies 
can be both effective and economical, while also providing a boost to legitimacy and strengthening PC’s 
base of citizen support. 
4.2.5.2 Question 2: Engagement 
1. Volunteers have been an integral part of the organization, while their role has changed over time. This 
role should be re-examined to determine if the sole purpose of volunteers is to support election 
monitoring initiatives, or if they should have a broader role within PC. If a larger role is desired, efforts 
should be made to reconnect with volunteers to inform them of current priorities and plans of the 
organization, as this was last done in 2010, and to re-energize them.
2. PC should continue to collaborate with the Red Pluralista by holding joint training workshops and 
promoting members’ leadership in their communities, to the extent possible with available funding. 
Periodic virtual (via Internet) gatherings of the members of the network should be promoted (but not 
necessarily convened) by PC to keep lines of communication alive among the members. 
4.2.5.3 Question 3A: Local Capacity Development 
1. PC should build on local capacity development initiatives, such as the Marcando la Hoja de Ruta training 
series, in order to expand and activate their existing linkages with CSOs in Ecuador and broaden the 
impact and dissemination of their activities. One commendable strategy that PC has recently begun to 
use is the co-hosting of training events with locally-based CSOs of the Red Pluralista. 
2. PC has built capacity among a broad network of former and current volunteers, especially on topics 
related to election monitoring, and successfully trained a core group of CSOs in certain subjects, 
notably related to citizen participation and advocacy. PC should consider ways that the volunteers and 
CSOs could complement each other’s skills, resources and networks, for example by collaborating on 
election monitoring or civic awareness campaigns. Some CSOs might wish to take on the role of 
“hosting” PC-mobilized volunteers in their area, for example by allowing them to use some CSO 
facilities, and in exchange may gain access to a valuable source of human capital for supporting their 
own activities. In this way, PC could deepen and broaden the reach of its initiatives and facilitate cross￾linkages in various provinces. 
4.2.5.4 Question 3B: Sustainability 
1. PC should actively seek out national and regional organizations with complementary skills and 
experience, in order to identify and develop collaborative projects that could form the basis for 
attractive funding proposals. Those partnerships based on co-execution of projects would not only 
open up new financing opportunities (as some donors prefer to support such collaborative efforts), but 
would also bolster PC’s networks of support. 
2. USAID should strongly encourage and support regular strategic planning processes (and reviews) by its 
implementing partners, using experienced consultants to facilitate the processes and ensure that the 
final product is supported by broad consensus. Those exercises should go beyond financial planning, to 
examine closely the current priorities, risks and opportunities of the organization, and to provide a 
solid foundation for programming and fundraising decisions. 
40 
3. As PC goes through its current re-structuring and adjustment of office arrangements, which may 
include the departure of key staff members, they should pay careful attention to the documentation of 
knowledge and methods that may not yet have been captured, in order to ensure valuable knowledge 
capital is not lost. 
5.0 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 QUESTION 1: ADVOCACY AND WATCHDOG ACTIVITY 
1. Space is currently very constrained for advocacy and watchdog work, especially on the national 
government level. Monitoring government bodies such as the National Assembly and advocating for 
changes in national policies such as the Communications Law or Decree 16 has had minimal impact, 
due to the government’s increasing reluctance to dialogue with CSOs or take into account civil society 
inputs - or, in some cases, to even acknowledge its role in contributing to legislation or public policy. It 
has become more difficult for civil society to have a voice in or to influence public policy, with few 
exceptions. This situation has deteriorated over the life of the projects. 
2. In many instances, the ability of CSOs to influence on or even dialogue with local government depends 
heavily on personal relationships and the inclinations of individual leaders, as well as their political 
affiliations. However, there is also evidence that the government, on various levels, is willing to engage 
with and listen to civil society in certain sectors - notably those related to social service delivery, 
where in some cases the state is contracting with CSOs to tap into their expertise in order to build 
the government’s own human resource capacity. While that type of engagement has definite advantages 
for organizations struggling to make ends meet, there is also a risk that CSO advocacy will be 
undermined by financial links to the government, and that the relevance or “niche” of some CSOs will 
diminish as they share their expertise with civil servants. 
5.2 QUESTION 2: ENGAGEMENT 
1. The evaluation found substantial evidence that CSO networks, as mechanisms to support engagement 
among organizations with shared interests, are facing challenges in the current political context. Others 
are struggling to survive and simply do not have the capacity or resources to undertake outside 
activities. All of these factors present obstacles to the active and open engagement of CSOs, including 
PC and GF project implementers, with other actors. 
2. The collaboration of the GF consortium with two universities took advantage of existing resources and 
had positive outcomes for all parties, at a relatively low cost. This was a good example of the synergies 
that can be developed between CSOs and institutions of higher learning such as universities in Ecuador, 
many of which are highly respected, have good relations with government, and maintain a neutral 
image. 
3. Rivalry between PC and the GF consortium organizations, and disagreements on strategy for improving 
the legal framework for CSOs, were key obstacles to open information sharing between the projects. 
USAID’s low-key efforts to encourage interaction had little effect, especially in the tense political 
context and tighter funding situation that prevailed from 2012 onwards. According to informants, due 
to the difficult nature of this situation, it was more feasible for USAID to focus on avoiding overlaps 
between the projects (in which they succeeded), as compared to insisting on coordination or sharing of 
information among the reluctant parties. This had the effect of opportunities for synergy being missed 
– for example, in the research and design of CSO training modules, and in the preparation of manuals 
to guide CSOs on legal issues.68 In many respects, the isolation of the two projects divided the range of 
relevant actors between those who worked with the PC Project and those who worked with the GF 
Project. Although overlap was largely avoided by this division of “territory,” the projects and 
 
68 Although the approaches of each project to their respective legal manuals/guides were slightly different and their 
funding sources were different for manuals related to the application of Decree 16, the evaluation found that much of 
the content was similar, thus there was some duplication of effort. 
41 
implementers would have benefited from having more awareness of what their counterparts were 
doing. 
5.3 QUESTION 3A: LOCAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 
1. The major training interventions by the GF Project (university courses) and the PC Project (Marcando 
la Hoja de Ruta) were highly valued by CSO participants and were found to have built valuable skills 
and knowledge in subject areas that were important to civil society at the time. Unfortunately, the 
universities have not adopted the university training curriculum at this point and further replication of 
that course is uncertain. Likewise, there has been little replication of the PC Project training by 
participating CSOs nor project financial resources to support these activities. In both cases, the 
training topics were relevant to CSOs, but the impact of these capacity building initiatives has been 
confined to a narrow group of targeted organizations. As well, publications produced by the projects 
have not been disseminated to CSOs (either in hard or soft copy) on a systematic basis. 
2. Decree 16 represents a potentially serious threat to CSOs who do not meet the new registration and 
reporting requirements. PC and GF have both provided valuable concrete assistance and helped CSOs 
cope with the new environment by providing manuals, training, networks, and forums for discussion. 
5.4 QUESTION 3B: SUSTAINABILITY 
1. The current environment in Ecuador for CSO sustainability can only be described as extremely 
difficult. Civil society is faced with a combination of threats, including most notably: diminishing level of 
interest among international donors generally, widespread wariness among donors and the private 
sector about supporting any civil society activity that may not be valued by government, increasingly 
strict regulation of CSO activity and international cooperation channels, and diminishing space for 
citizen and civil society action (in many fields) and influence. Figure 10, below, indicates the 
breakdown of survey responses among CSOs with respect to the significance of risks facing their 
organizations. It shows that more than half of respondents consider lack of funding to be their greatest 
risk at present. 
2. It must be recognized that some CSOs that are now aligned with government actors and priorities, 
especially those working in areas such as service provision to vulnerable populations, have found new 
opportunities for government funding in the form of grants and/or service contracts. Therefore, some 
CSOs are benefiting in certain ways from the changes that the government has instituted in recent 
years. 
52.8%
15.1%
22.6%
7.5%
1.9% 0.0%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
Figure 10: CSO Views on Significance of Risks Facing 
Their Organizations
What is the most significant risk faced by your organization at present? 
Lack of funding
Political developments
The legal framework for
CSOs
Internal conflict
Lack of skills
Other
42 
6.0 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations have been derived from the preceding general conclusions as well as the 
conclusions related to each project. They are intended to inform future programming of the implementing 
partners in Ecuador and of USAID in other countries. 
6.1 QUESTION 1: ADVOCACY AND WATCHDOG ACTIVITY 
1. Donors and implementers should be realistic in their expectations of advocacy initiatives since real 
impact on laws or policy can become apparent years later. The mere act of putting alternative 
viewpoints into the public sphere is important, whether or not the state ultimately accepts them 
(which will often be unrealistic). Likewise, the lessons learned from a failed initiative can serve to 
inform a subsequent successful advocacy strategy. 
2. Civil society and donors should work to preserve and expand neutral spaces where CSOs can discuss 
relevant advocacy and watchdog initiatives, share what works and doesn’t work, and establish alliances 
and areas of collaboration. Informal gatherings as well as more formal networks are useful in this 
regard, whether at the national or local level. It would be useful, for example, for forums to be 
convened where CSOs with different viewpoints on Decree 16 could openly debate their ideas, with 
the support of moderators. Networks and alliances of a wide variety can be effective - they should not 
be considered weak or failures just because they are not formalized, or because they do not last for a 
long time, since some collaborations have a specific purpose that can lose relevance after a certain 
period. 
6.2 QUESTION 2: ENGAGEMENT 
1. USAID should recognize and carefully take into account the rivalry that may exist between national 
CSOs such as GF and PC in this kind of context, especially in small countries with relatively few major 
NGOs in the democracy and governance sector. In the process of making award decisions, the 
potential impact on such organizations should be evaluated carefully, especially in cases of similarity of 
objectives and potential overlap of activities. USAID should establish detailed strategies from the 
outset that define how relations between projects in related areas will be managed, and that make 
clear to what extent implementers will be required to share information and coordinate with other 
projects. 
2. There is no surefire method of overcoming the potential resistance of implementing parties, and actual 
collaboration may not be achievable. The use of indicators or conditions to insist upon mechanisms for 
information sharing and coordination should be considered and, if needed, USAID staff should act as a 
go-between to ensure that relevant information (including planned activities and published materials) is 
shared among various projects in order to reduce possibilities for overlap and confusion. The regular 
convening of roundtable meetings on a sectoral level for Democracy and Governance implementers is 
another strategy that can be very effective, if meetings are well organized and facilitated. In extreme 
cases, professional mediation or counselling services could be considered to facilitate the process of 
opening channels of communication. 
3. PC, GF and other CSOs should continue to seek collaborative relationships with reputable and capable 
universities and other institutions of higher learning. Such strategic alliances can improve outreach 
capacity and reduce political vulnerability of CSOs, although in the current environment, educational 
institutions are also subject to increasing government regulation. 
6.3 QUESTION 3A: LOCAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 
1. Since both the GF-supported university course and the PC-supported Marcando la Hoja de Ruta
training packages are the fruit of intensive research of needs and have shown positive results, these 
should be disseminated through USAID networks and platforms so that CSOs in other countries can 
benefit. Implementing organizations should also disseminate these training packages throughout their 
own networks so that more CSOs in Ecuador can be supported with this kind of training. Those who 
43 
offer the courses on an e-learning basis should consider including introductory classes on how to take 
such courses, in order to minimize dropout rates and optimize the learning experience for students. 
2. In projects that place significant emphasis on training and/or publications for CSOs, project plans and 
budgets should take into account (as much as possible) the need for strategies to share the 
information/learning tools beyond the primary beneficiaries, whose number is usually fairly limited due 
to budgetary constraints. The strategies for extension of training may include a certain amount of 
replication by targeted CSOs, or they may focus on the distribution of training materials, in either 
electronic or hard copy, which ideally would be adapted for the use of secondary beneficiaries. With 
respect to publications, there should be plans to ensure that project-developed resources are 
systematically made available on relevant websites, and that interested audiences are made aware of 
those resources. 
6.4 QUESTION 3B: SUSTAINABILITY 
USAID and other donors should manage their expectations with respect to CSOs. Creative solutions 
should be sought to shore up the long-term viability of organizations that are seen as important parts of 
the counter-balancing role played by civil society in democratic societies. For example, donors could 
support the establishment of affiliated income generation “branches,” and the creation of endowment funds 
or the investment of funds that would normally be spent on office rental in the purchase of permanent 
premises. 
6.5 CROSS-CUTTING RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. When dealing with a consortium of either local or international partners, USAID normally conducts all 
discussions about contract and budget with the prime implementer. However, in cases of significant 
budget and/or activity adjustments, it is recommended that USAID staff meet directly with both prime 
and non-prime implementers, in order to explain the adjustments clearly to all parties. This is especially 
important in a situation where the prime has limited experience in managing consortia and with USAID 
funding, so as to minimize misunderstandings which may undermine relationships within the consortium. 
1
ANNEXES 
2
ANNEX A: SCOPE OF WORK 
3
SECTION C – STATEMENT OF 
WORK
FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF 
USAID/ECUADOR’S CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAM: 2010-2013
I. BACKGROUND
Civil society in Ecuador has been significantly weakened from its much more advanced position in past 
decades, when Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) made significant improvements to
the legal framework in many areas, including human rights and the environment. The sector has 
faced a series of challenges over the last few years. Namely, (i) a leadership crisis,
following an exodus of many CSO leaders to take on government positions; (ii) a financial crisis
driven by a reduction of donor funds; and (iii) a political crisis as the operating environment for
CSOs has become constrained by challenging regulations and increased controls.
USAID/Ecuador has a long history of support to local Ecuadorian CSOs who seek to promote citizen
participation in advocacy and oversight of democratic institutions and processes (including elections). 
This final performance evaluation will assess the results of the Mission’s two main civil society 
programs:
1. Strengthening Democracy in Ecuador 
Project Dates: April 4, 2003 – March 31, 2014 
Project Funding: $ 10,387,400 
Period to be evaluated: October, 2010 – September, 2013 
Estimated Project funding during last 3 years $3,000,000 
Implementing organization: Participacion Ciudadana (PC) 
2. Strengthening Civil Society in Ecuador 
Project Dates: December 29, 2010 - September 30, 2013 
Project Funding: $ 1,939,000 
Implementing organization: Grupo Faro (GF)
USAID’s Strengthening Democracy in Ecuador project has been active for over ten years. However, 
only the work of the last three years is to be evaluated recognizing the difficulty of conducting a 
retrospective evaluation over a decade of work and given the more recent political changes in Ecuador. 
USAID’s Strengthening Civil Society in Ecuador project overlapped with the Strengthening Democracy
in Ecuador project. 
Strengthening Democracy in Ecuador (SD), Participacion Cuidadana (PC), 2003-2014
USAID/Ecuador began its support to PC in 2003. It is an early example of mission support for Local 
Capacity Development (LCD.) The Strengthening Democracy in Ecuador project sought to promote 
more effective citizen participation in key democratic processes and oversight of democratic 
institutions. The project supported PC’s efforts to (a) develop domestic observation and parallel vote 
tabulations of the results of national and local elections, (b) promote greater transparency by 
government institutions and elected officials at the national and local level, (c) provide constructive 
input to local and national laws and regulations, (d) promote democratic 
4
values and education through activities such as civic campaigns and democratic practices in high￾schools, and (d) promote dialogue on issues of public interest; among others.
From 2010-2013, PC’s project has mainly focused in citizen-based oversight of democratic institutions, 
processes, and public spending; transparency and accountability by elected municipal officials; 
constructive input to enhance national and local legislation; consolidation of civic education programs, 
and promotion of dialogues between citizens and public officials or among civil society groups, and 
events on issues of public interest. Also, the project supported PC’s institutional strengthening. In
addition, PC trained other CSOs in oversight and advocacy mechanisms and promoted the 
establishment of a CSO network to advance these issues. This last activity was co-funded by the 
Embassy of Canada. 
During the period 2010-2013 the award included the following specific objectives: 
● To strengthen the ability of civil society to participate in and influence public policy; 
● To increase the capacity of selected civil society organizations in the social audit of key 
democratic institutions; and
● To effectively promote democratic values, attitudes and practices.
In addition, the award included activities to support PC’s institutional and financial sustainability. The
project had the following key achievements: 
● Increased the compliance rate of 30 public institutions according to transparency law 
requirements reaching 98% compliance (from a baseline of 36%); 
● Improved the advocacy and oversight capacity of 36 local civil society organizations;
● Provided effective monitoring of use of public funds, producing useful information for
public control institutions to trigger some investigations; 
● Increased citizens understanding on key democratic issues; 
● Advocated and introduced reforms to policies and legislation;
● Built a cadre of provincial volunteers, promoting citizen participation and oversight;
● Helped established a network of 12 organizations throughout the country to promote
oversight and advocacy efforts. 
● Pioneered Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) in Ecuador.
● Mobilized volunteer election observers, deploying roughly 10,000 volunteers in 2013;
Please refer to Annex A for project’s Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) and/or project 
indicators/data.
Strengthening Civil Society in Ecuador (SCS), Grupo Faro (GF), 2010- 2013
In 2010, USAID/Ecuador partnered with implementer GF on this activity. The Strengthening Civil 
Society in Ecuador project aimed to enhance the capacity of local CSOs to advocate for democracy￾related issues and support efforts to influence legislation and policies related to the CSO sector. The 
project also used formal courses and coaching sessions to enhance targeted CSOs' organizational 
capacities. The project had two specific objectives: 
● Strengthen the capacity of CSOs to effectively influence democratic processes, 
institutions, and adherence to democratic principles; and 
● Strengthen the capacity of selected CSOs to develop more effective sustainability efforts and 
function more transparently. 
5
The project had the following key achievements: 
● Supported advocacy, oversight and capacity building efforts of 24 small CSOs through small 
grant funds (13 during Phase 1 and 11 during Phase 2); 
● Strengthened a CSO network (El Colectivo) to build CSOs’ capacities and promote 
collective action on behalf of the CSO sector. 
● Developed research studies/publications to enhance the work of the CSO sector
● Disseminated innovative practices within the CSO sector through a call for CSO best
practices; 
● Strengthened CSOs organizationally and institutionally through direct coaching and long- term 
formal courses; and 
● Promoted CSO sustainability through hands-on development of sustainability plans
II. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION
Conduct a final performance evaluation1
for two civil society projects: (1) Strengthening Democracy in 
Ecuador, Participacion Cuidadana (PC), 2003-2014; and (2) Strengthening Civil Society in Ecuador, 
Grupo Faro, 2010- 2013. 
The purposes of this final performance evaluation are to: 
• Determine the results of key project interventions, including successes, impediments, and 
lessons learned; 
• Document and provide a record of the projects’ results, as well as the history of the 
USAID projects with these local civil society organizations (CSOs); 
In turn, the final performance evaluation is expected to be used by: 
- USAID to enhance the design of future civil society and local capacity development 
programs in the region or in other countries; 
- The two award recipient organizations for their internal learning, to use the evaluation 
findings to build their own capacity. 
The results will also be useful for USAID/Washington’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human
Rights, and Governance and the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, which collects findings 
on best practices and lessons learned globally, and regionally, on both civil society strengthening and 
LCD; and USAID/Washington’s Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning, which encourages USAID 
project evaluation globally. 
The contractor must comply with the USAID Evaluation Policy (www.usaid.gov/evaluation), also codified
in USAID’s Automated Directives System Chapter 203 (www.usaid.gov/ads/policy/200/203).
1
Per USAID Evaluation Policy (www.usaid.gov/evaluation), and USAID’s Automated Directive Systems 203.1.1 
(http://www.usaid.gov/ads/policy/200/203): “performance evaluations often incorporate before-after comparisons, 
but generally lack a rigorously defined counterfactual. Performance evaluations focus on descriptive and normative 
questions: what a particular project or program has achieved; how it is being implemented; how it is perceived an 
valued; whether expected results are occurring; and other questions pertinent to program design, management, and 
operational decision-making.”
III. EVALUATION QUESTIONS
The evaluation will answer the following questions: 
1. Advocacy and Oversight 
1.1. How effective were PC’s and GF’s interventions to strengthen advocacy and watchdog roles of 
other CSOs?
6
1.2. How effective was GF’s and PC’s direct advocacy and watchdog interventions? 
1.3. What interventions were most effective (training, work with media, work on legal environment, 
strategies for engagement with Government of Ecuador, etc.) and why? 
1.4. What interventions were not successful and why? 
2. Engagement
2.1. How successful were PC and GF’s interventions at strengthening their engagement and 
collaborative work with other CSOs, the media, their constituencies, and the government? 
2.2. What are the most effective and sustainable mechanisms for civil society organizations to 
constructively engage with other CSOs, their constituencies, media, and the government? 
3. Local Capacity Development and Sustainability 
3.1. How effective were PC and GF’s capacity development interventions with other CSOs?
3.2. Specifically, what interventions in local capacity development were most effective and why? 
(grants, training, workshops, university training, etc.)? 
3.3. Has USAID/Ecuador’s direct assistance to PC and GF succeeded in building 
sustainable local capacity of these two groups?
3.4. How far along the road to sustainability are PC and GF? And in what areas do they still need 
support? 
IV. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY, DESIGN, AND LIMITATIONS
This performance evaluation will be conducted in accordance with USAID’s Evaluation Policy, to produce 
reliable data to support evidence based findings, and provide a sound basis for analysis and 
recommendations for future programming. 
The evaluation will be participatory to include stakeholder values but at the same time unbiased and 
transparent. The contractor will actively engage USAID/Ecuador and the implementing partners, as well 
as other stakeholders as needed, through all phases of the evaluation, including: identification of questions 
and informants; selection of the appropriate data collection methods; identification of relevant 
documentary sources; finalization of the timeline; and reaching consensus about findings,
conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations. This participatory approach will allow beneficiaries’
and stakeholders’ views to be incorporated in the design, which can result in improved acceptance and 
buy-in of the final conclusions and recommendations. In addition, this approach will allow the 
contractor to determine and refine the most important evaluation questions and come up with valuable 
recommendations for civil society and local capacity development programs. 
The evaluation will be multi-dimensional. The contractor will collect quantitative and qualitative data 
from a broad range of stakeholders, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to ensure independence of the 
process, as well as accuracy and completeness of the findings, 
conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned. To gather data, the contractor will use a number 
of techniques. Moreover, it will combine techniques that balance each other: quantitative vs. 
qualitative data, individual vs. group responses, in-depth interviews vs. direct observation, mini-surveys, 
etc. Such techniques will help the contractor capture the diversity of opinions and perceptions of 
beneficiaries and stakeholders about SD-SCS’s strengths and weaknesses, as well as the degree of their 
satisfaction from participation in these two projects. They will also help uncover unexpected positive
or negative impacts of the SD and SCS projects, what has occurred because of their implementation, 
and what would have occurred in their absence. Finally, they will assist in generating sound and evidence￾based conclusions and recommendations on important issues to the projects and USAID. 
Given the length and scope of the projects, ME&A will proceed systematically when conducting the
evaluation. First, it will map all major activities under each project. Second, it will prioritize the key 
intervention areas. Third, within each of these areas the contractor will identify the stakeholders and 
beneficiaries that need to be interviewed. Because both projects have worked with a large number of 
7
public institutions, CSOs, media outlets, NGOs, journalists, etc., the team will conduct interviews with 
random samples of assisted beneficiaries. The contractor will communicate with USAID on the selection
of samples to make sure that they are reasonably representative. Throughout the evaluation, the
contractor will collect - whenever possible - sex- disaggregated data and observe gender-sensitive 
indicators in order to measure SD-SCS’s impact on both genders. If a gap or difference is noted, the 
contractor will examine what has caused it and seek to identify the barriers that have prevented men or 
women to realize equal outcomes from the projects. In addition, ME&A will highlight best practices and 
models as lessons learned and potential for replication. 
When determining the projects’ impact, the contractor will keep in mind that the SCS project was
designed to have long-term benefits, some of which may have not been fully realized yet given the short 
time of implementation and the political environment in Ecuador. In addition, the contractor will 
consider the challenges faced by the implementers and their impact (or not) on the implementers’
ability to achieve project results. Throughout the evaluation, the contractor will adjust the data 
collection methodologies in order to respond to limitations or opportunities presented during fieldwork, 
while also taking care to maintain methodological rigor in the evaluation. 
To increase the rigor and quality of the evaluation, the contractor will triangulate its findings. 
Triangulation will be made possible by the various methods of data collection that will be used for
each major evaluation question. In addition, the contractor will ask similar questions to different 
stakeholders that are involved in the same issue. Whenever possible, it will link qualitative with 
quantitative techniques. The different data collected will be analyzed, and the findings will be related
to each other. However, even though the triangulation method may yield convergent findings, this 
does not mean that these findings are unquestionable. For this reason, the Evaluation Team will 
present the preliminary findings - as a basis for further consultation and gaining further information and 
evidence from the Mission - before drafting the Final Report. 
EVALUATION DESIGN
This evaluation will be completed through two sub-activities to be carried out simultaneously: 
qualitative and quantitative data collection. 
The work for the qualitative data collection will be primarily conducted through interviews and other 
interactions with those organizations and individuals, as well as other stakeholders and partners that 
were involved in the activities of the two projects. In addition, the contractor will conduct a 
comprehensive review of historical information and reports pertaining to both projects since 2010, and 
earlier as necessary, for the PC project. This information will be analyzed and the results will be 
tailored to answer the main evaluation questions outlined above under Section III Evaluation
Questions. 
Qualitative data will be collected by using a number of methods including: 
• A critical desk review of materials related to SD, SCS and other relevant projects, as well as any 
material that will be provided by USAID such as project reports and annual work plans, project 
performance management plan, data on achievement of performance indicators, etc. This review will 
also extend to documents external to the projects that are identified by the team through its own 
research or through informants which have a bearing on the evaluation questions. 
• Interviews with USAID/Ecuador staff and staff of project implementers (PC and GF). 
• In-depth, semi-structured interviews with representatives from civil society and public sector 
institutions knowledgeable of the civil society, citizen participation, and other DG areas in which
these projects have been active. The final list will be determined after the careful desk review of
materials and after the discussion with USAID and the implementers.
8
• In-depth interviews with a wide variety of representatives of the CSOs, CSO coalitions and 
networks, think tanks, NGOs, volunteer groups, former CSO leaders, universities, and public sector 
institutions who participated in each project. 
• Field visits and meetings with project partners in Quito, Guayaquil, and at least 2 additional cities. 
These visits will be an opportunity to meet some of the beneficiaries, conduct field observations, 
and gather best practices and lessons learned from project implementation. Particular attention will 
be paid to interviews with women who participated in the projects in order to gauge the impact of 
SD-SCS activities on them. 
• Review of project outputs against objectives and performance indicators.
• Interviews with other international donors or implementing agencies, especially those involved
in supporting civil society development in Ecuador, as well as representatives of other USAID 
projects.
• Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) to obtain qualitative information to strengthen the 
contractor’s analysis and understand the relationship between the projects and the results they have 
achieved, within the given context in the country. The evaluation team will invite up to 12 
participants for each FGD, keeping in mind refusals and no-shows. ME&A will aim at having a 
minimum of 4 participants to conduct the FGD; if fewer than 4 participants show up, it will change to 
having a key informant interview (KII) instead. 
The contractor will focus on the following categories of people for FGDs. This list may change after the
desk review and discussions with USAID. 
• Representatives of CSOs 
• Representatives of women’s or women-focused organizations 
• Citizens belonging to youth, indigenous and afro-descendant population groups 
• Media journalists 
• NGOs 
Quantitative data collection methods will consist of: 
• Review of data sourced from the projects on indicators such as number of reports and 
articles with clear information on democracy strengthening issues. 
• Collection and review of secondary data from the analysis of the legal framework for citizen
participation and access to information. 
• Review of data from available surveys and other studies. 
• Mini-surveys (See additional details below). 
Mini-Surveys
Information from small grant recipients, training participants, members of CSO networks and coalitions, 
and other beneficiaries will be key to understanding the projects’ successes and challenges in 
strengthening democratic institutions and processes. To solicit this information from the broadest 
possible range of informants in the limited time available, the evaluation team will develop three different 
mini-surveys. The first mini-survey will target the recipients of small grants primarily to explore in what 
ways they have benefited from project support and measure the reach of their small grant activities. 
The second mini-survey will be focused on gathering perceptions and feedback regarding capacity 
building activities implemented within projects. The focus will be on any changes in structures and 
operations of organizations that have happened as a result of their participation in the project(s). The
third mini-survey will reach out to members of the CSO networks and coalitions that PC and GF have 
promoted and supported, with a view to understanding the range of perspectives that members may 
have on the utility of the networks and coalitions, and the results and challenges related to support 
offered by the project(s). 
9
The survey instruments will first be developed in English for approval by USAID, before being translated
into Spanish. If the respondents fail to send the surveys back within the given time, the evaluation team 
will attempt to reach them via phone and conduct phone interviews. Survey questions will have closed
responses, thus removing the need for translating responses back into English. The questions will take 
into consideration the country’s political context and clearly assure respondents that their responses will 
be anonymous to encourage frank and open answers. Mini-surveys will be conducted within a limited
timeframe and will correspond with the level of technical resources of CSOs and other respondents. As 
internet access is high among medium-sized CSOs that participated in the project, at least one mini￾survey will be conducted by using an internet survey tool, SurveyMonkey, to ensure confidential, easily 
accessible, and fast methodology of collecting and analyzing data. Another method of data gathering that 
will be used will be phone interviews for those respondents that do not have access to internet and are 
in remote areas. 
Questions
Questions for the interviews, FGDs and mini-surveys will be formulated after conducting a thorough 
review of materials that will be provided by USAID. While the main thrust of the questions can be 
identified before the start of the mission based on evaluation questions outlined above (Section III), 
the refinement of questions will happen based on desk review of relevant documents and after the team 
members have had a chance to identify the exact nature of the interventions, by activity or component. 
Sampling Methodology
Given the large number of project beneficiaries, ME&A will apply different selection mechanisms for
different mini-surveys. The two projects worked on building advocacy and oversight capacity for a 
total of 60 CSOs (36 worked with SD and 24 with SCS), making up the universe of the sample for the 
first mini-survey. The contractor will include all targeted CSOs through an online mini-survey using the 
Survey Monkey tool. The mini-survey will consist of different questions for the SD and SCS projects 
but, at the same time, will also have general questions applicable to both projects. The second mini￾survey will reach out to members of the CSO networks and coalitions that SD and SCS have 
promoted and supported, with a view to understanding the range of perspectives that members 
may have on the utility of the networks and coalitions, and the results and challenges related to 
support offered by the project(s). The mini-survey will reach out to 12 organizations that are 
members of the SD-initiated network working on promotion of oversight and advocacy efforts, 
while the exact number of CSOs that are members of the SCS-supported CSO network (El 
Colectivo) will be determined during the inception phase. 
Gender
When designing the evaluation, the team will pay special attention to methodologies that will allow 
it to collect information on the extent to which the projects have integrated gender considerations 
throughout the activities. Some of the methods and applications that will be used are described below: 
Methods Application Data Collection
Quantitative
Methods
Number of news stories and programming on 
gender-based themes
Review of Data
Number of training sessions received on 
addressing gender issues
Review of Data, PMP plan
Has the coverage of gender issues 
increased in the new content?
FGDs combined with mini- survey
Disaggregation of received data by gender, 
particularly through mini surveys
Mini surveys
10
Qualitative
Methods
How did your project contribute to increase 
coverage of gender issues?
Semi-structured interviews, 
Round Table Discussions
Did the training contribute to your increased 
attention to covering gender issues in your
work?
Semi-structured interviews, Focus
Groups
Comparison and contrast between beliefs
and practices between genders
Group interviews
Gender differences in accessing information Semi-structured interviews
Differential access by gender to markets 
and services
Semi-structured interviews
Opportunities and barriers for women in the 
civil society sector
FGDs
Men’s and women’s role in civil society 
sector
Semi-structured interviews/FGDs
Data Analysis
After finishing data collection, the evaluation team will process and consolidate the raw quantitative and 
qualitative data collected. The analysis will be based on the Evaluation Matrix developed during the first
phase of the evaluation process. More specifically, the standard evaluation criteria adopted by the 
Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD-DAC) will be approached as follows:
a) Effectiveness: Using the project’s Logframe and Performance Management Plan, the 
evaluation team will analyse to what extent the results obtained following the implementation of 
activities have contributed to the attainment of the planned objectives. Using evidence collected 
during the first two phases of the evaluation, the report will explain the factors that contributed
to or hampered the achievement of results in terms of mobilization and capacity building of 
selected CSOs, increase of access to information and the development of new services or further 
expansion of existing ones.
Analysis of coordination and synergy between activities on national and local levels will be also
done. The report will discuss the additional/indirect effects (positive or negative)
of the project. 
b) Sustainability: The evaluation report will review sustainability factors in terms of project 
design, process, implementation and national context. Sustainability will be analyzed from 
various perspectives: legal, institutional, capacity building, and financial. The report will highlight
the factors that facilitated or decreased the sustainability prospects of the results of the project 
(legislation, synergy with similar initiatives, engagement and ownership by local stakeholders,
etc.). 
Quantitative data collected will be analyzed using established evaluation techniques and industry 
standard data analysis tools. These tools will enable evaluators to evaluate not only descriptive 
statistics (such as the number of CSOs assisted by USG programs, number of CSO advocacy campaigns
supported by the USG, percentage of citizens that participate in public opinion debates regarding 
democracy issues, etc.) but also more advanced analytical exercises such as measures of correlation (say, 
between geographic region and success rate). 
For qualitative data resulting from stakeholder interviews, where much of the evidence may be anecdotal
or inferred, the team will use triangulation to identify any inconsistencies and ensure reliability. 
Triangulation will assist the team to reduce the “response bias” in which respondents tend to tell the
evaluators what they want to hear. 
Throughout the analysis process, the team members will share and compare notes taken during the
interviews and FGDs, identify any variations in the information provided to them by different 
11
stakeholders, and reveal their different expectations and opinions about the projects. 
Evaluation findings and recommendations for civil society interventions will be presented to the Mission
for comment before the team’s departure. The final report will be submitted after comments of the
Mission are fully integrated. 
EVALUATION LIMITATIONS
There are several limitations inherent to the design of this evaluation. 
1. As some informants may decline to participate, there is a possibility of selection bias, i.e. those 
respondents who choose to participate might differ from those who do not in terms of their 
attitudes and perceptions, affiliation with government/non-government structures, and socio￾demographic characteristics and experience. This may apply to in-person interviews, FGDs and mini￾survey.
2. Since a number of questions will deal with issues that took place in the past or changes that have 
taken place since the projects began, recall bias cannot be excluded. As SD was launched in 
2003, and SCS activities began in 2010, some respondents may find it difficult to accurately 
compare organizational arrangements/capacity three or more years ago to the current situation. 
3. There is a known tendency among respondents to under-report socially undesirable 
answers and alter their responses to approximate what they perceive as the social norm (halo bias). 
The extent to which respondents will be prepared to reveal their true opinions may also vary for some 
questions that call upon the respondents to assess the performance of their colleagues or people on
whom they depend for the provision of services. To mitigate this limitation, ME&A will: provide the 
respondents with confidentiality and anonymity guarantees, where possible; conduct the interviews in 
settings where respondents feel comfortable; and establish rapport between the interviewer and the 
respondent. 
4. The large number of modifications for the projects will require an intensive review of project 
materials.
5. Differentiation/separation of results of the two projects. Informants may confuse them, or both 
projects may have targeted the same beneficiaries. 
6. Results of the SD project in the first seven years and in the last three years may not be very easily 
separated. 
7. The large amount of data that is going to be collected and analyzed. The team is expected to 
collect and analyze program information from before 2010 on PC activities. 
V. ESTIMATED LEVEL OF EFFORT LOE by Task / Deliverable
Level of Effort (Days)
Tasks/Deliverables Team
Leader
2 Technical
Specialists
Planning and Document Review Phase
Desk research and familiarization with projects 
Orientation/planning meeting with USAID Evaluation
Design (Work plan/Timeline/Other data) Document
Review
3
1
3
2
6
2
6
8
Data Collection Phase
Data collection including meetings, interviews, surveys, and focus
groups. 20 48
12
Analysis and Reporting Phase
Data analysis
Mid-term briefing with USAID
Drafting of evaluation narrative (core report without annexes) 
Final Briefing with USAID and presentations
Submission of draft evaluation report, revisions, submission of
final evaluation report
10
1
5
2
10
10
2
5
2
10
Total 57 99
13
ANNEX B: EVALUATION MATRIX 
14
Research Questions & 
Sub-Questions
Key Areas of Enquiry Data Sources Data Collection 
Methods
Data Analysis
1. Advocacy and 
Oversight 
1.1. How effective were 
PC’s and GF’s interventions 
to strengthen advocacy and 
watchdog roles of other 
CSOs? 
1.2. How effective was GF’s 
and PC’s direct advocacy and 
watchdog interventions? 
1.3. What interventions 
were most effective (training, 
work with media, work on 
legal environment, strategies 
for engagement with 
Government of Ecuador, 
etc.) and why? 
1.4. What interventions 
were not successful and 
why? 
1.1. To what extent did targeted 
CSOs (from local to national level) 
improve their capacity in these areas? 
Did they improve their knowledge of 
the relevant laws and policies? Did they 
become more involved in 
advocacy/social control? Did they have 
more influence? If not, what were the 
obstacles?
1.2. Did PC and GF demonstrate 
full understanding of relevant laws and 
policies? To what extent did they form 
useful alliances? allies and Were their 
proposals for change clearly articulated? 
Were the reports of watchdog activity 
considered credible? Did their efforts 
make a difference – in 
policy/law/practice, or in action taken in 
response to watchdog activity? What 
were the limiting factors?
1.3 Which activities contributed 
to observable results or change? How 
did those activities contribute to 
achievement of the overall objectives of 
the projects? What characteristics did 
effective interventions have (in 
common)?
Project documentation: 
quarterly reports, M&E 
indicator data, CSO capacity 
assessments, reports on 
LOTAIP compliance and 
other observatory activity
USAID, PC and GF staff
Staff/leaders of targeted 
CSOs, coalition members 
and others
Local government officials 
and community leaders in 
targeted municipalities
Central government officials
Media/journalists
Academics/experts
International DG sector 
stakeholders (donors, other 
projects)
Document review
Key informant interviews 
with various data sources
Focus groups with 
supported CSOs and 
coalition members 
Targeted survey of CSOs
Analysis of targeted 
results, outputs, and 
outcomes 
Verification of PC and 
GF reporting
Reporting of 
perceptions and 
experience of focus 
group participants
Quantitative analysis of 
the results of the survey 
including cross￾tabulation (by gender, 
province, and project, 
among others)
Critical synthesis and 
triangulation analysis of 
opinion data
15
1.4 Which activities had minimal 
or no observable effect (or negative 
effect)? What were the main reasons? 
How did PC and GF deal with 
obstacles? What could have been done 
differently?
2. Engagement 
2.1. How successful were PC 
and GF’s interventions at 
strengthening their 
engagement and 
collaborative work with 
other CSOs, the media, their 
constituencies, and the 
government? 
2.2. What are the most 
effective and sustainable 
mechanisms for civil society 
organizations to 
constructively engage with 
other CSOs, their 
constituencies, media, and 
the government? 
The focus will be on the 
following mechanisms: 
discussion forums, dialogues, 
policy/law proposals, social 
control mechanisms such as 
Silla Vacia, and 
creation/support of 
networks of CSOs. 
2.1 What new links/alliances have been 
made between CS and others? What 
new links (including networks) have 
been made among CSOs themselves? 
How have pre-existing links been 
affected by the projects? What positive 
or negative effect have those links had, 
on the members and on civil society 
more broadly?
2.2 What roles do PC and GF play 
within Ecuadorian CS? What 
mechanisms have they used to support 
CSO engagement with their 
constituencies, media and GOE? How 
effective were those mechanisms and 
what were the limiting factors? (Analyze 
Red Pluralista, Confederación de OSC, 
and other mechanisms for their 
achievements to date and potential 
sustainability)
Project documentation: 
quarterly and final reports, 
M&E indicator data
Reports on international 
experience and best 
practices 
USAID, PC and GF staff
Staff/leaders of targeted 
CSOs, coalition members 
and others
Local government officials 
and community leaders in 
targeted areas
Central government officials
Media/journalists
Academics/experts in 
Ecuador and the region
International DG sector 
stakeholders (donors, other 
projects)
Document review
Key informant interviews 
with various data sources
Focus groups with 
supported CSOs and 
coalition members 
Targeted survey of CSOs
Analysis of targeted 
results, outputs, and 
outcomes 
Verification of PC and 
GF reporting
Reporting of 
perceptions and 
experience of focus 
group participants
Quantitative analysis of 
the results of the survey 
including cross￾tabulation (by gender, 
province, and project, 
among others)
Critical synthesis and 
triangulation analysis of 
opinion data
3A. Local Capacity 
Development 
3.1. How effective were PC 
and GF’s capacity 
3.1 To what extent and in which areas 
did targeted CSOs improve their 
Project documentation: 
quarterly and final reports, 
M&E indicator data, capacity 
assessments, evaluation of 
Document review
Key informant interviews 
with various data sources
Focus groups with 
Analysis of targeted 
results, outputs, and 
outcomes 
Verification of PC and 
16
development interventions 
with other CSOs? 
3.2. Specifically, what 
interventions in local 
capacity development were 
most effective and why? 
(grants, training, workshops, 
university training, etc.)? 
Analysis of CSO capacity will 
focus on their level of skill 
and confidence in 
engagement with 
government, understanding 
of the legal frameworks for 
CS and citizen participation, 
and their access to 
resources (financial, human, 
and technical). 
capacity? Did some CSOs change more 
than others? What difference, if any, has 
increased capacity made in their work as 
an organization? How did PC and GF’s 
interventions affect CSO’s access to 
resource/information/networks?
3.2 Which activities (or combination) 
contributed significantly to changes in 
capacity? Were certain activities linked 
to certain types of capacity 
improvement? Were capacity 
development interventions adapted to 
the strengths, needs, networks, and 
culture of targeted groups? If so, how 
and to what effect?
training courses
USAID, PC and GF staff
Staff/leaders of targeted 
CSOs, coalition members 
and others
Government officials with 
close links to CSOs
Community leaders and 
members where CSOs are 
working
Academics/experts on civil 
society
University officials (Loja and 
Guayaquil) and other CSO 
trainers/coaches 
International DG sector 
stakeholders (donors, other 
projects)
supported CSOs and 
coalition members 
Targeted survey of CSOs
GF reporting
Reporting of 
perceptions and 
experience of focus 
group participants
Quantitative analysis of 
the results of the 
survey, including cross￾tabulation (by gender, 
province, and project, 
among others)
Critical synthesis and 
triangulation analysis of 
opinion data
3B. Sustainability
3.3. Has USAID/Ecuador’s 
direct assistance to PC and 
GF succeeded in building 
sustainable local capacity of 
these two groups? 
3.4. How far along the road 
to sustainability are PC and 
GF? And in what areas do 
they still need support? 
Note: Sustainability analysis will 
focus on perceived and 
observed technical competency, 
3.3 Are PC and GF more sustainable 
organizations now as compared to 
before these projects? If so, what has 
changed? What factors/activities have 
had a significant impact on their 
sustainability (organizational, financial, 
technical/programmatic, etc.) 
3.4 Do PC and GF have realistic plans 
and systems in place for future 
development? Do they have reasonable 
prospects for financial sustainability? 
Project documentation: 
quarterly and final reports, 
M&E indicator data, OCA 
reports, strategic plans, staff 
training plans, organigrams, 
financial projections and 
fundraising plans
Reports on international 
experience and best 
practices for sustainability
Laws, policies and reports 
related to status of civil 
society
USAID, PC and GF staff
Document review
Key informant interviews 
with various data sources
Focus groups with staff of 
each organization (if 
possible)
Site visits to PC and GF 
offices and affiliates
Reporting of 
perceptions and 
experience of focus 
group participants
Critical synthesis and 
triangulation analysis of 
opinion data
17
credibility (especially with 
government and other CSOs), 
public visibility, current funding 
and future funding prospects, 
internal governance structures, 
and external linkages.
What are the key risk factors for their 
continuation at current or similar levels 
of activity? What type of support would 
best help them to manage those risks 
and shore up sustainability?
Staff/leaders of CSOs and 
coalition members 
Local community 
members/beneficiaries
Central and local 
government officials
Academics/experts in 
Ecuador and the region
International DG sector 
stakeholders (donors, other 
projects)
18
ANNEX C: SAMPLE OF DATA 
COLLECTION TOOLS 
19
ILLUSTRATIVE INTERVIEW AND FGD GUIDES 
A. Preguntas para entrevistas con OSC (CSO Interviews) 
A. Incidencia y Control Social 
1. ¿En general, cómo ve usted la situación de la sociedad civil en Ecuador? (¿De qué manera las 
organizaciones de la sociedad civil se relacionan actualmente con el gobierno? ¿Qué cambios o 
tendencias se están dando? 
2. ¿Qué tipo de relaciones/interacciones tiene su organización con el gobierno nacional/local? ¿Ha 
cambiado esta relación en años recientes? Cómo ha cambiado? (¿Es más frecuente, es con diferentes 
representantes o agencias/departamentos, es más o menos difícil trabajar conjuntamente?) 
3. ¿En relación con lo anterior, su organización ha recibido apoyo o ha participado en actividades 
realizadas por Grupo Faro o Participación Ciudadana? ¿Qué tipo de apoyo? ¿El apoyo que recibió le 
sirvió para atender alguna necesidad concreta de su organización o alcanzar alguno objetivo concreto? 
¿Le ayudó a ser más efectivo en su trabajo? ¿De qué manera? ¿Si no es así, porqué? ¿Cuáles actividades 
fueron más efectivas? Cuales fueron menos efectivas? ¿Por qué? 
4. ¿Se produjo algún cambio en la forma en la que su organización trabaja en temas de incidencia, gracias 
al apoyo recibido? ¿Si ha cambiado, puede dar ejemplos?
5. ¿Qué otro tipo de acciones ha llevado a cabo Grupo Faro y Participación Ciudadana para fortalecer las 
interacciones entre la sociedad civil y el gobierno? Conoce de sus actividades para vigilar la gestión 
pública de manera directa? (Sondear difusión de información pública, entrenamiento a organizaciones 
ciudadanas, dotación de pequeñas donaciones, monitoreo del informes LOTAIP, auditorias sociales al 
CPCCS y la Asamblea Nacional, creación de la Confederación, trabajo en las limitaciones legales de la 
sociedad civil, etc.) 
6. ¿Las acciones mencionadas, han generado algún cambio? ¿Si no, cuáles han sido los obstáculos? ¿Cuáles 
acciones han tenido mayor impacto? ¿Cuáles han tenido menor impacto? 
7. ¿Las acciones tomadas por Grupo Faro o Participación Ciudadana han tenido algún efecto negativo en 
las organizaciones de la sociedad civil, en el gobierno o en el marco legal? ¿Alguna de sus actividades 
de incidencia tuvo algún efecto negativo reflejado en las organizaciones de la sociedad civil o el marco 
legal? 
B. Integración/interacción 
8. ¿Cuáles considera usted que son los contactos/aliados/stakeholders más importantes de su 
organización? (Sondeo – Otras organizaciones civiles, la iglesia, los medios, gobiernos locales, 
comunidades locales, miembros, donantes etc.)? ¿Cómo colaboran y se ayudan entre sí las OSC en el 
contexto actual?
9. ¿Dónde acude su organización cuando necesita información o apoyo relacionado con políticas públicas 
o con la interacción con el gobierno nacional/local? ¿Para buscar información sobre otros temas? 
¿Existen otras organizaciones formales o informales que acuden a usted para solicitarle información o 
apoyo? (ejemplos)
10. ¿Su organización forma parte de alguna coalición o red de algún tipo? ¿Cuál(es)? ¿Esta conexión o 
participación está relacionada de alguna manera con las actividades de GF o PC? ¿Han recibido algún 
beneficio de esta asociación? 
11. ¿Esa coalición/red de organizaciones (u otras) ha beneficiado a la sociedad civil ecuatoriana en general? 
¿Si así ha sido, de qué manera? ¿Ha sido perjudicial para la sociedad civil? ¿Ha afectado de alguna 
manera el modo en el que la sociedad civil interactúa con el gobierno, los ciudadanos, los medios, la 
comunidad internacional etc.? 
12. ¿Cómo podría tener la sociedad civil una participación más efectiva o una voz más fuerte en otros 
sectores de la sociedad, como los medios de comunicación, el gobierno y la comunidad?
13. PC ha producido una variedad de productos informativos. ¿Conoce usted alguno de estos productos? 
(Pulso Ciudadano, boletines semanales, “PC en 5 minutos”, comunicados de prensa, sitio web 
ciudadanía informada, etc.) ¿Cuál su opinión sobre estos productos? ¿Han sido útiles? ¿Y a quien le han 
resultado útiles? Si no han sido útiles, ¿porqué? 
20
C. Desarrollo de Capacidad Institucional: 
(Depending on answer to Q. 3 and 17, this section will apply to either GF or PC or both. Repeat the questions 
for GF in this section if the informant has had significant contact with both PC and GF.) 
14. ¿Que tipo de interacciones ha tenido su organización con PC desde el 2010? (sondear: capacitaciones 
de corto-largo plazo, donaciones coaching, participación en una red/coalición, información, fórums, 
etc.) 
15. ¿El apoyo recibido por parte de PC ha tenido algún impacto en usted personalmente? ¿En su 
organización? ¿Qué ha cambiado o qué ha mejorado específicamente como resultado de ese apoyo? 
(Sondeo- tiene nuevos servicios? Hace más incidencia? ¿Nuevos donantes? ¿Más miembros?) 
16. ¿Qué tipo de apoyo por parte de PC generó mayor impacto en su organización? ¿Puede dar ejemplos? 
¿Por qué fue efectivo? ¿Qué tipo de apoyo generó el menor impacto o no tuvo ningún impacto? ¿Por 
qué? 
17. (Solo si ha habido cambios) ¿Cómo ha impactado esto en su organización? 
(Additional questions added for sub-grantees for more details about their grant experience.) 
18. ¿Considera usted que las actividades apoyadas por PC han beneficiado a otras organizaciones? De qué 
manera? Considera usted que las actividades apoyadas por PC han afectado a otras organizaciones? De 
qué manera? ¿Cómo evalúa el proceso aplicado por PC para seleccionar organizaciones de la sociedad 
civil para participar en las actividades del proyecto? (Sondeo – fue justo, accesible?) ¿Cómo pudo haber 
sido mejor (el proceso)? 
19. ¿Qué pudo haberse hecho de manera diferente para mejorar la capacidad de las OSC? 
(Repeat same questions for GF in this section if the informant has had significant contact with both PC and 
GF. 
D. Sustentabilidad: 
20. ¿En una escala de 1 a 5, cómo calificaría la credibilidad de PC?¿ GF? Ha cambiado su nivel de 
credibilidad en los últimos 3 años? 
21. ¿En una escala de 1 a 5, cómo calificaría la capacidad técnica de PC? ¿GF? ¿Ha cambiado su nivel de 
competencia técnica en los últimos 3 años? 
22. ¿En una escala de 1 a 5, cómo calificaría la visibilidad pública de PC? ¿GF? ¿Ha cambiado su nivel de 
visibilidad en los últimos 3 años? 
23. ¿Cómo ve usted el rol de PC dentro de la sociedad civil Ecuatoriana? ¿Y el de GF? 
24. ¿Qué efecto ha tenido PC en general sobre la sociedad civil? ¿GF? ¿Le parece importante para la 
sociedad civil que PC y GF continúen actividades similares en el futuro? (En caso afirmativo), Cómo 
deben continuar? Qué tipo de actividades deben realizar? ¿Deberían otras organizaciones de la 
sociedad civil u otros actores asumir un rol más activo y abarcar dichas actividades? Cuáles 
organizaciones? (brindar ejemplos) 
25. ¿Cuáles son los mayores factores de riesgo para la sociedad civil si quiere continuar con el mismo 
nivel de actividades en estas áreas? 
21
II. Preguntas para Representantes del Gobierno Nacional (National Government Questions) 
A. Incidencia y Control Social 
1. En general, ¿cómo ve usted el rol de la sociedad civil ecuatoriana hoy en día? ¿Existen muchas 
organizaciones de la sociedad civil que interactúan continuamente con el gobierno? ¿Cuáles son? ¿Con 
que instancias de gobierno interactúan más activamente? (Sondeo – que ministerios, rama judicial, rama 
ejecutiva, a nivel local) 
2. ¿Ha tenido usted alguna relación con Participación Ciudadana? ¿Ha tenido usted alguna relación con 
Grupo Faro? ¿Si la ha tenido, cómo describiría esa relación? 
3. Ha escuchado del trabajo de estas organizaciones o de las actividades que llevan a cabo? ¿Cuál es su 
lectura de las actividades que han impulsado estas instituciones durante los últimos tres años? ¿Cuáles 
actividades fueron más útiles para su institución y por qué? ¿Cuáles fueron las menos útiles? 
4. ¿Cómo ve los esfuerzos de PC y GF para relacionarse e interactuar con el gobierno? (Sondeo –
cometarios sobre la incidencia en temas de interés público, vigilancia ciudadana de acciones del 
gobierno, capacitación en LOTAIP, etc.) 
5. ¿Cuáles han sido los resultados de esa interacción? (Ejemplos positivos y negativos) ¿Cuáles han sido las 
dificultades, si es que las han habido? 
6. Ambas organizaciones, GF y PC, han apoyado a otras organizaciones de la sociedad civil para que 
interactúen con el gobierno más efectivamente a nivel local y o nacional. ¿Cree usted que esto ha 
generado alguna respuesta positiva o cambio? ¿Las relaciones entre organizaciones de la sociedad civil y 
el gobierno han sido afectadas positiva o negativamente? (Ejemplos) 
B. Integración/interacción 
7. ¿Qué redes y coaliciones de OSCs conoce? ¿Qué rol están jugando dichas redes y coaliciones en el 
campo de la sociedad civil? ¿Qué relación tienen estas redes con instancias de gobierno local y/o 
nacional? 
8. ¿Han generado algún cambio en la forma en que la sociedad civil interactúa con – el gobierno, los 
medios de comunicación, la comunidad internacional? ¿De qué manera? 
C. Desarrollo de Capacidad Institucional 
9. Desde el 2010 GF y PC han trabajado capacitando a otras OSC a través de talleres, donaciones, 
acompañamiento o coaching, difundiendo/compartiendo información y proveyendo contactos. ¿Tiene 
usted conocimiento de alguna de estas actividades o de las organizaciones que participaron en ellas? 
10. ¿Cree usted que el apoyo y soporte técnico brindado a las organizaciones de la sociedad civil 
contribuyeron en algo a fortalecerlas? ¿Por qué? (Ejemplos) 
11. ¿Ha notado usted algún cambios en la capacidad de organizaciones de de la sociedad civil para 
relacionarse con instancias de gobierno en los últimos años? Si los hay, ¿a que le atribuye esos 
cambios? ¿Ejemplos? 
D. Sustentabilidad 
12. En una escala de 1 a 5, ¿Cómo calificaría la credibilidad de PC al interior de las instancias de gobierno? 
¿GF? ¿Ha cambiado su nivel de credibilidad en los últimos 3 años? ¿Por qué? 
13. En una escala de 1 a 5, ¿Cómo calificaría la competencia técnica de PC? ¿La de GF? ¿Ha cambiado su 
nivel de competencia técnica en los últimos 3 años? 
14. En una escala de 1 a 5, ¿Cómo calificaría la visibilidad pública de PC? ¿Y de GF? Ha cambiado su nivel de 
visibilidad en los últimos 3 años? 
15. PC ha producido una variedad de productos informativos. ¿Conoce usted alguno de estos productos? 
(Pulso Ciudadano, boletines semanales, “PC en 5 minutos”, comunicados de prensa, sitio web 
ciudadanía informada, etc.) ¿Cuál su opinión sobre estos productos? ¿Han contribuido positivamente 
en algo? ¿Quién los usa? Cree que deben mejorarse? Cómo? 
16. ¿Dentro de la sociedad civil ecuatoriana, cuál es el rol que han jugado PC y GF? ¿Cómo ve esos roles 
en el futuro? 
17. ¿Le parece importante que PC y GF continúen ejecutando actividades similares en el futuro? Por qué? 
22
18. ¿Cómo ve usted las relaciones e interacción entre las organizaciones de la sociedad civil y el gobierno 
en el futuro? 
19. ¿Cree que las organizaciones civiles podrán cumplir con el nuevo marco legal? ¿Por qué? 
23
III. Preguntas para Expertos/Académicos (Questions for Experts) 
A. Incidencia y Control Social
1. En general, ¿cómo ve usted la situación de la sociedad civil Ecuatoriana? Cómo ve usted el entorno 
para su trabajo? (¿De qué manera las organizaciones de la sociedad civil se relacionan actualmente 
con el gobierno? ¿Qué cambios o tendencias se están dando? ¿Cuál ha sido el efecto del decreto 
16? Y de otras leyes aprobadas recientemente como la de comunicación o el Código Integral 
Penal?) 
2. ¿Qué sabe usted sobre Participación Ciudadana? ¿Qué sabe sobre Grupo Faro y sus actividades 
para fortalecer otras organizaciones de la sociedad civil? (Ha tenido usted algún contacto directo 
con esas iniciativas? ¿Si lo ha tenido, de que manera? 
3. ¿Cuál es su lectura de la efectividad de las actividades que han impulsado estas instituciones 
durante los últimos 3 años? ¿Cuáles actividades fueron más efectivas y por qué? ¿Cuáles fueron las 
menos efectivas? 
4. ¿Cómo ve los esfuerzos de PC y GF para relacionarse e interactuar directamente con el gobierno 
nacional/local? (Sondeo – comentarios sobre la incidencia en temas de interés público, vigilancia 
ciudadana de acciones del gobierno, capacitación en LOTAIP, etc.) 
5. ¿Han generado acciones concretas o cambio alguna de esas iniciativas? (Ejemplos). ¿Si no 
generaron cambios, cuáles han sido los obstáculos? ¿Cuáles han tenido mayor impacto? ¿Cuáles 
han tenido menor impacto? ¿Han sido negativas en algún sentido? 
6. Ambas organizaciones, GF y PC, han trabajado apoyando otras organizaciones de la sociedad civil 
para incidir e interactuar con el gobierno más efectivamente a un nivel local y/o nacional. ¿Cree 
usted que esto ha generado alguna respuesta positiva o cambio? ¿Cree usted que la efectividad de 
organizaciones de la sociedad civil para incidir en asuntos de interés público ha sido afectada? 
Si/no, ¿Por qué? (Ejemplos) ¿Las acciones tomadas por GF o PC han tenido algún efecto negativo 
para la sociedad civil en su conjunto? en el gobierno? o en el marco legal? 
B. Integración/interacción 
7. Hablando sobre las organizaciones de la sociedad civil que usted más conoce ¿Donde acuden 
estas organizaciones cuando necesitan información o soporte para resolver un problema o 
mejorar su trabajo? ¿Cuáles son las organizaciones o contactos más importantes para los grupos 
de sociedad civil que usted conoce? ¿Existen organizaciones de la sociedad civil que son 
reconocidas ampliamente porque suelen brindar apoyo a otras OSCs? ¿Cuáles son? (sondeo- son 
estas PC o GF? ¿Si no, por qué no?) 
8. ¿De qué manera colaboran y se ayudan entre si las organizaciones civiles en el contexto actual? 
9. ¿Qué rol están jugando las redes y coaliciones en el campo de la sociedad civil? ¿Cuál es el 
beneficio para las organizaciones que participan en redes/coaliciones? 
10. ¿Qué tendencias ha visto usted en cuanto a colaboración y coordinación entre organizaciones de 
la sociedad civil durante el 2009-14 en Ecuador? ¿Cuáles son los factores que han contribuido a 
avances o retrocesos durante ese periodo? ¿Ha influido PC o GF en este cambio? 
11. ¿Qué sabe usted sobre la Red Pluralista, el Colectivo y la Confederación de OSC? ¿Han 
contribuido a la sociedad civil del Ecuador? ¿De qué manera? En su opinión, cómo podrían ser más 
efectivas las redes/agrupaciones de OSC? 
12. PC ha producido una variedad de productos informativos. Conoce usted alguno de estos 
productos? (Pulso Ciudadano, boletines semanales, “PC en 5 minutos”, comunicados de prensa, 
sitio web ciudadanía informada, etc.) ¿Cuál es su opinión sobre estos productos? ¿Han contribuido 
positivamente en algo? ¿Quién los usa? ¿A quién han ayudado? 
13. ¿Cuál es el rol que PC y GF han jugado dentro de la sociedad civil ecuatoriana? 
C. Desarrollo de Capacidad Institucional 
14. Desde el 2010 GF y PC han trabajado capacitando a otras organizaciones de la sociedad civil a 
través de talleres, donaciones, coaching, difundiendo/compartiendo información y proveyendo 
contactos. ¿Tiene usted conocimiento de alguna de estas actividades o de las organizaciones que 
participaron en ellas? 
24
15. ¿Cree usted que el apoyo y soporte técnico brindado a las organizaciones de la sociedad civil 
contribuyeron en algo a fortalecerlas? ¿Por qué? (Ejemplos). ¿En qué cree usted que se han 
fortalecido específicamente? ¿En qué han podido mejorar? (Sondeo- tiene nuevos servicios? 
¿Nuevos donantes? ¿Más miembros?) ¿Por qué si? ¿Por qué no? 
16. ¿Cree usted que ese tipo de apoyo/ayuda tuvo un impacto más amplio en el sector de la sociedad 
civil en Ecuador? ¿Si lo tuvo, como explica ese efecto? 
17. ¿Qué pudo haberse hecho diferente para mejorar la capacidad de las organizaciones de sociedad 
civil? 
18. ¿Qué tipo de ayuda/soporte considera usted que es más efectivo para fortalecer a las OSCs? ¿Por 
qué? 
19. ¿Cuáles experiencias o lecciones aprendidas en el área de fortalecimiento de la sociedad civil y 
participación ciudadana en Ecuador podrían ser aplicables en otros países? 
D. Sustentabilidad: 
20. En una escala de 1 a 5, ¿Cómo calificaría la credibilidad de PC? GF? ¿Ha cambiado su nivel de 
credibilidad en los últimos 3 años? 
21. En una escala de 1 a 5, ¿Cómo calificaría la competencia técnica de PC? GF? Ha cambiado su nivel 
de competencia técnica en los últimos 3 años? 
22. En una escala de 1 a 5, ¿Cómo calificaría la visibilidad pública de PC? ¿Y de GF? Ha cambiado su 
nivel de visibilidad en los últimos 3 años? 
23. ¿Qué efecto tuvo el apoyo de USAID sobre PC desde el 2003? ¿Que efecto tuvo el apoyo de 
USAID sobre GF desde el 2010? 
24. ¿Cómo van a verse afectadas estas organizaciones y sus actividades con el cierre de operaciones de 
USAID en el Ecuador? ¿Cree usted que esto tendrá algún efecto dentro de la sociedad civil 
ecuatoriana en general? Cuál? 
25. ¿Le parece importante para la sociedad civil que PC y GF continúen actividades similares en el 
futuro? Por qué? ¿Pueden otras organizaciones asumir un rol más activo y abarcar ese tipo de 
actividades? 
26. ¿Cuáles serían los mayores factores de riesgo para organizaciones de la sociedad civil si quisieran 
continuar con actividades en estas áreas? 
25
IV. FGD Guide for UTPL course participants, Loja 
Introductions 
 Introduce our team and purpose of meeting 
 Ask each one to give name, organization and choose one word to describe what motivated them 
to sign up for the course at UTPL (on leadership) 
Questions 
1. What were you expecting from the UTPL course? (building on the single words they mentioned) 
a. To what extent were your expectations met? (probe for usefulness, quality, 
timing/duration, participation, materials, etc.) 
2. Thinking about the various modules and what you learned – what has had the most effect on the 
way that you work? What do you do differently now? 
a. What effect has that had on your organization? (probe for sharing with colleagues, changes 
in modus operandi, etc.) 
b. How could the course have been better/had more impact? Should the course be offered to 
others in future? If so, how and to whom? 
3. What other kinds of training and assistance have you or your organization received from GF or 
PC? What is your view of those activities? 
4. What are the top priorities for capacity building of CSOs in the current environment? 
5. How do you see the situation of civil society in Loja, and Ecuador more broadly, at present? 
Strengths? Weaknesses? What are the key challenges or obstacles facing civil society? 
6. How are CSOs interacting with local government bodies? Has that interaction or relationship been 
changing? How? What factors have affected that interaction (probe for effects of GF and PC work 
as well as RP)? 
7. How much are citizens engaging with government at local levels? Is that increasing or decreasing? 
What factors are affecting that interaction? (probe for various mechanisms, support from 
government or projects/NGOs, etc.) 
8. What kinds of networks are you aware of or involved in? What role are those networks playing? 
Are they effective/useful? If not, why not? 
26
V. FGD Guide for members of Confederation, Quito 
Introductions 
 Ask each one to give name and describe the first time they heard about El Colectivo or the 
Confederation 
 Introduce our team and purpose of meeting 
Questions 
1. What attracted you to join the Confederation? What do you see as its main objectives? (probe 
about who and where are members, interaction among members, any changes in scope over time) 
2. Has the Confederation been able to make progress towards its objectives? What have been the 
achievements? (probe about interaction with govt, Rendicion de Cuentas, joint position 
statements) What about challenges or obstacles? 
3. How does the Confederation make decisions? Have you felt included in the process of decision￾making? Why or why not? 
4. What kinds of support have you received from the Confederation? What other kinds of support 
should be offered by the Confederation? 
5. What do you think of the joint process of Rendicion de Cuentas, facilitated by the Confederation? 
(probe for who has participated or plans to participate) Is it useful? If so, why? If not, why not? 
What about high % of admin costs? Could that have a negative effect? 
6. Has the interaction of CSOs with government been changing over the past few years? How? What 
factors have affected that interaction? Do networks such as the Confederation have a role in 
contributing to these relationships? 
7. How do you see the future of the Confederation? How can it raise funds for its operations? How 
can more members be attracted? What are the most important areas of activity for the 
Confederation to pursue? Why? 
27
ANNEX D: SURVEY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
28
CSO Survey Questionnaire 
1. What is the full name of your organization? ___________________ 
2. What is the acronym of your organization? ______________________ 
3. What is your position in the organization? 
 Executive/senior management (direccion ejecutiva o gerencia de organizacion) 
 Project manager or coordinator (direccion de proyecto) 
 Technical specialist or coordinator (tecnico/coordinador/especialista) 
 Administration, finance or logistics (administracion/finanza/logistica) 
 Other _______________ 
4. What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
5. Which province do you consider to be your organization’s primary base of operations? 
(choose one) 
 Azuay 
 Bolívar 
 Cañar 
 Carchi 
 Chimborazo 
 Cotopaxi 
 El Oro 
 Esmeraldas 
 Galápagos 
 Guayas 
 Imbabura 
 Loja 
 Los Ríos 
 Manabí 
 Morona Santiago 
 Napo 
 Orellana 
 Pastaza 
 Pichincha 
 Santa Elena 
 Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas 
 Sucumbíos 
 Tungurahua 
 Zamora Chinchipe 
6. What is the primary sector of focus for your organization at present? (max. 2 choices) 
 Citizen participation 
 Transparency/accountability 
 Media/information sharing 
 Health 
 Education 
 Economic development 
 Community development 
29
 Women 
 Youth 
 Culture 
 Justice/human rights 
 Environment/natural resources 
 Other __________________ 
7. How regularly does your organization engage or have direct contact with the following 
types of people and organizations: (Scale 1 to 5, never – rarely – sometimes – often – very 
often 
 Local government officials 
 National government officials 
 Staff or leaders of other CSOs 
 Community members from your targeted population 
 Media personnel such as journalists 
 Participacion Ciudadana 
 Grupo Faro 
 Universities 
 Other ______________________ 
8. How has the frequency of your organization’s direct contact with other CSOs changed 
since 2010? 
 much less frequent less frequent no change more frequent 
 much more frequent 
9. Do you believe that CSOs should work to influence or monitor the actions of 
government? 
 Yes 
 No
 Not sure 
10. Does your organization engage in any activities that aim to influence or monitor the 
actions of government? (choose one) 
 Yes, only at level of local government 
 Yes, only at level of national government 
 Yes, at both levels 
 No (skips to 13) 
11. How has the frequency of such activities changed since 2010? 
1=much less frequent 2=less frequent 3=no change 4=more frequent 5=much 
more frequent
12. How has the effectiveness of such activities changed since 2010? 
1 = much less effective 2 = less effective 3 = no change 4 = more effective 5 
= much more effective 
13. In which network(s) or coalition(s) is your organization currently a member? (multiple 
choices allowed) 
 Red Pluralista 
 Confederacion Ecuatoriana de OSCs 
 Asociación Red de ONG de Guayaquil (AROG) 
 None (skip to Q15) 
30
 Other ____________________ 
14. In which network or coalition is your organization most active? 
 Red Pluralista 
 Confederacion Ecuatoriana de OSCs 
 AROG 
 None (skip to 17) 
 Other ____________________ 
15. Considering the network or coalition in which you are most active (selected in Q.12 
above), how useful is that network or coalition to civil society in general? 
Not useful somewhat useful moderately useful very useful
 extremely useful 
16. How would you rate the services or benefits your organization has received in the 
following areas since 2010 from the network/coalition that you selected in Question 12 
(Not useful, somewhat useful, moderately useful, very useful, and extremely useful)? 
 Information 
 Training 
 Access to funding 
 Advocacy support 
 Relations with other organizations in Ecuador 
 Relations with other organizations outside Ecuador 
 Other __________________ 
17. Participacion Ciudadana has produced a variety of information products. How useful 
do you consider the following publications and information websites? (Scale of 1 to 5, 1 
- not aware, 2 – not useful, 3 – somewhat useful, 4 – moderately useful, and 5 - very 
useful) 
 Revista Pulso Ciudadano newsletter 
 “PC in 5 Minutes” weekly bulletins
 Web site Ciudadanía Informada 
 Other ______________________ 
18. Did your organization apply for a grant from either Participación Ciudadana or Grupo 
Faro since 2010 (From 2011-2012 Grupo Faro was known as Ciudadanía Activa)? 
 Yes 
 No (skip to 24) 
19. Did your CSO receive a grant from either PC or GF since 2010? 
 Yes 
 No (skip to Question 24) 
20. When did you receive the grant: (select one or more) 
 2012 (Grupo Faro or FEPP) 
 2013 (Grupo Faro) 
 2013 (Participación Ciudadana) 
21. How useful was the grant to your organization? 
Not useful somewhat useful moderately useful very useful
 extremely useful 
31
22. How useful was the grant-funded activity to the beneficiaries of your organization? 
Not useful somewhat useful moderately useful very useful
 extremely useful 
23. How would you rate the grant-giving organization’s management of the grants 
process? 
very bad bad satisfactory good excellent 
24. Both PC and GF have organized capacity building for CSOs, financial support for 
CSOs, and support for CSO networks or coalitions between 2010 and 2014, among 
other activities. From which organization did you receive support during that period? 
 Only Participacion Ciudadana 
 Only Grupo Faro 
 Both PC and GF 
 From neither organization 
25. Please indicate the organization with which you has had more contact and received 
more services since 2010. 
 Participacion Ciudadana 
 Grupo Faro 
26. /37.Did your organization participate in training supported or facilitated by PC/GF 
since 2010? 
 Yes 
 No (skip to Q31) 
27. /38. What type of training did you received from GF / PC? (Choose all that apply) 
 Cursos de la Universidad Casa Grande (Guayaquil) 
 Cursos de la Universidad Técnica Particular de Loja (UTPL) 
 “Marcando la Hoja de Ruta para la Sociedad Civil” programa de 
capacitación 
 Otro____________ 
28. /39. Approximately how many days of training did your organization receive from 
PC/GF since 2010? 
 1 a 5 
 6 a 10 
 11 a 20 
 Más de 20 
29. /40. How would you rate the quality of the training organized by PC/GF? 
very poor quality poor quality satisfactory quality good quality 
 very good quality 
30. /41. How would you rate the impact of that training in your organization? 
none unimportant moderately important very important 
 extremely important 
31. /42. How would you rate the overall quality of services or activities of PC/GF? 
very poor quality poor quality satisfactory quality good quality 
 very good quality 
32
32. /43. How would you rate the overall relevance of services or activities of PC/GF? 
irrelevant somewhat relevant moderately relevant very relevant 
 extremely relevant 
33. /44. In what ways has your organization been affected by the support you received 
from PC/GF? (Each with a scale of 1-5, no improvement, some improvement, 
moderately better, much better, absolutely better) 
 Skills of our staff and volunteers 
 Knowledge of our staff and volunteers 
 Our relations with local government 
 Our relations with national government 
 Our relations with other civil society organizations 
 Our work with local community/beneficiaries 
 The quality of our services 
 The quantity of our services 
 Our access to information 
 Our access to grants and other funding sources 
 Our internal management 
 Other _______________________ 
34. /45. What level of confidence do you have in the information provided by PC/GF? 
no confidence little confidence moderate confidence 
 much confidence absolute confidence 
35. /46. How important is PC/GF to civil society in Ecuador? 
Unimportant somewhat important moderately important very important 
 extremely significant
36. /47. What are the two most important services or types of support provided to civil 
society by PC/GF? (choose max. 2) 
 Information dissemination 
 Training 
 Funding 
 Advocacy to promote civil society participation in public interest topics 
 Support to networking and coalitions 
 Coordination among civil society organizations 
 Other ________________________ 
48. Did your organization participate in any sustainable coaching activity or strategic 
planning organized by Grupo Faro? 
 Si
 No (Skip to 53) 
49. How would you rate the coaching activities’ quality?
very poor quality poor quality satisfactory quality good quality 
 very good quality 
50. How would you rate the overall relevance of the coaching activities? 
irrelevant somewhat relevant moderately relevant very relevant 
 extremely relevant 
33
51. How would you rate the impact of the coaching activities? 
none unimportant moderately important very important 
 extremely important 
52. How would you rate the impact of the coaching activities for the sustainability of your 
CSO ? 
none unimportant moderately important very important 
 extremely important 
53. What is the most significant risk faced by your organization at present? (choose one) 
 Lack of funding 
 Political situation 
 Legal framework for civil society 
 Internal problems 
 Lack of internal capacity/skills 
 Other ____________________________ 
54. Who do you believe can help you the most in addressing that risk? (choose two) 
 International agencies/donors 
 Other actors outside of Ecuador 
 Confederacion Ecuatoriana 
 Participacion Ciudadana 
 Red Pluralista 
 Grupo Faro 
 Local government 
 National government 
 Universities 
 Other ___________________________ 
34
ANNEX E: DESCRIPTION OF CSO 
SURVEY PROCESS 
35
Summary of CSO Survey Process 
1. Selection of target populations 
The survey process for this evaluation began with the identification of the target population. This was 
largely defined by USAID in the Request for Proposal (RFTOP), where it was suggested to carry out three 
mini-surveys among various CSOs in the following words: “The purpose of the mini-surveys for this 
evaluation is to reach out to a majority of partners and beneficiaries of the PC and GF Projects, particularly 
those with whom the Evaluation Team will not meet personally during the limited field phase. One mini￾survey should be conducted to small grant recipients while another to other beneficiaries. Members of the 
CSO networks and coalitions that PC and GF have promoted and supported should also be surveyed.” 
After learning the details of the two projects to be evaluated, Mendez England & Associates (ME&A) 
decided to conduct a single survey with multiple targets, rather than three mini-surveys with very small 
target populations. This decision was based on the realization that there was significant overlap among the 
three sub-sets of CSOs defined in the RFTOP. In this manner, we sought to avoid burdening respondents 
with repeated requests to complete separate surveys, and to enhance the data analysis process, since all 
responses would automatically become part of the same data set and could easily be compared. 
In order to achieve a broad coverage of the universe of CSOs affected in a significant way by USAID civil 
society programming, the Evaluation Team (ET) decided to survey all those CSOs that had directly 
participated in the principal CSO-directed activities of the two projects since late 2010, including those 
involved as sub-grantees, participants in intensive training, beneficiaries of sustainability coaching, and 
members of two key networks (the Red Pluralista, and those who had been members of El Colectivo prior 
to it becoming the Ecuadorian Confederation of CSOs). 
2. Selection of methodology 
The RFTOP suggested that “the survey respondents will be contacted either by phone or face-to-face”. 
However, in order to reach a greater number of CSOs and ask a larger number of questions, ME&A 
proposed a web-based survey. As internet access was understood to be high among CSOs that 
participated in the project, this was identified as the best option in order “to ensure confidential, easily 
accessible, and fast methodology of collecting and analyzing data” (as stated in the evaluation workplan). To 
conduct the survey, ME&A chose to use Survey Monkey due to its user-friendly nature for both survey 
administrators and survey respondents. 
When choosing the survey methodology, ME&A realized that not all targeted informants would have 
sufficient access to Internet to readily respond to an online survey, and also anticipated that some CSOs 
might be nervous about participating in any kind of survey related to these particular projects and 
implementers, given the context in Ecuador. Therefore, the online survey was supplemented with 
telephone interviews for those respondents who may have difficulties with Internet access, and by 
telephone follow-ups to boost response rates. That process is described further below. 
 
3. Design of questions 
The evaluation workplan (which was finalized once the ET was in country) defined the main subject areas 
of the survey as follows: “For recipients of sub-grants, the survey will explore how CSOs view the financial 
support received, how the work of those CSOs has been affected, and how the small grants were 
administered, among other topics. For those who participated in intensive capacity building activities, the 
focus of questions will be on changes in structures, activities, alliances, and sustainability linked to 
participation in the project(s). With respect to members of the major CSO networks and coalitions that 
the PC and GF Projects have supported, questions will be oriented towards understanding the range of 
CSO perspectives on the overall utility of such networks and coalitions, and the effect that membership in 
those bodies has had for the CSO members.” The priority topics for the survey were based on those 
issues, with some other general questions added as well. 
36
The design of specific questions was largely guided by the evaluation matrix contained in the workplan, 
which defined the evaluation questions in detail. The aim was to try to cover as many areas of investigation 
as possible, insofar as they related to the projects’ work with and effects on civil society. A number of 
demographic and other identifying questions were also included. Survey questions were closed-ended, 
although in some cases respondents had the option to select “other” and explain the details of that choice. 
The most difficult part of designing the survey questionnaire was the fact that not only were targeted 
CSOs involved in a variety of different activities, but they could also be placed into three broader 
categories: those who worked only/primarily with PC, those who worked only/primarily with GF 
consortium, and those few who worked with both projects. In order to ensure that the survey questions 
were relevant for each respondent, and to make it possible to differentiate responses relating to each 
project and implementer, it was decided to create a sub-set of 11 questions that would be answered by 
respondents in accordance with which project they had MORE interaction with since 2010. 
One result of the breadth of subjects to be covered by the survey was that the questionnaire ended up 
rather long – 54 questions in total, some of them with several sub-questions, although no respondent was 
asked to answer more than 44 questions because of the “split” described above. Many respondents in fact 
answered less than 44 questions, because there were “skips” built into the survey structure. For example, 
if a respondent indicated that they had not received a grant, they would automatically be skipped past the 
questions related to grants. Otherwise, almost all of the questions were mandatory – meaning that if the 
respondent tried to pass to the next page without answering all questions, they would not be allowed to 
do so (so, the only way to avoid completion was to close the page). 
4. Collection of contact info and testing of survey 
The next step in the process, which was ongoing while questions were being defined and refined (and 
translated), was the collection of contact information from the implementing organizations. This involved 
several exchanges of emails and review of lists of contacts provided by PC, GF and Esquel Foundation. 
Since those lists were incomplete, the ET had to conduct extensive research on the Internet to find email 
addresses and phone numbers for many CSO respondents. Once the lists were in place and the questions 
set up in Survey Monkey, the ET proceeded with testing the survey in two different ways. First, the survey 
instrument was tested to ensure that the mechanics of the survey were working properly. 
The other type of testing was with a group of 10 potential respondents from the list of participants in the 
UTPL course organized by the GF Project (since those were the first targets for whom we had email and 
phone contacts.) Ten names were selected at random from that list of 129 participants, and emails were 
sent on 22 April 2014 to explain the purpose of the survey, and ask them to complete the survey at the 
link provided in the email within a few days. Assurances of confidentiality were included, as well as 
reference to the independence of the ET. (We decided not to ask respondents to include their own names 
in the survey, due to potential sensitivities linked to the political context. However, the survey did ask for 
the name of their CSO, so that follow-ups would be possible.) When no responses were received for two 
days, telephone calls were attempted and emails were sent again on 24 April, setting a deadline of 26 April 
for completion. 
By the time the deadline ran out, only two individuals had completed the survey. At that point, the ET 
made phone calls to the others on the list, to verify if they had received the email, offer assistance, and 
enquire about any resistance to completing the survey. We then had our first difficulties with the contact 
list, but we did manage to reach three of the intended respondents, and learned that at least one had 
suspected that the email was spam or contained a virus, while the others had simply not paid attention to 
the email. Based on that learning, we decided to make the subject line of the survey email request more 
specific. For each group of respondents (grantees of PC, grantees of GF, etc.) we developed more specific 
subject lines, rather than using a generic subject that might not catch the interest of the recipient. We also 
decided to include a deadline (3-4 days after sending) for completion of the survey. 
5. Emailing of survey 
37
Although the test of the survey had generated few responses that could be analyzed, the test had not 
brought to light any problems with the survey tool. Therefore, the ET decided to proceed with the mass 
emailing without further testing, due to time pressures. Therefore, the next step was to email the survey 
on 27-28 April 2014 to the entire list of 221 potential respondents. As with the test, the email included a 
short introduction to the survey and explanation of its purposes, together with assurances of 
confidentiality of responses. Respondents were asked to complete the survey by 30 April 2014. At least 25 
of the emails were rejected by servers as undeliverable or no longer valid. 
6. Follow-up process 
The chart below shows the response pattern for the survey, indicating the two that responded to the test 
on 25 April, then the rush of responses on 27-29 April to the first mailing. 
Once the survey was emailed, the process consisted of twice-daily tracking on Survey Monkey to see how 
many responses had been received, and to check how many of them were complete (the entire survey 
finished) in order to identify any problems early. Follow-up phone calls by the ET began on 1-2 May, to 
verify receipt and investigate any difficulties. 28 people had completed the survey by 3 May, at which point 
follow-up emails were sent to ALL the targeted population. On 7-8 May, the next round of phone calls 
began, focused on the other types of respondents, whose organizations generally had closer or more 
recent links to the projects. 
38
The table below gives an idea of the responses that were received from targeted individuals who were 
reached by telephone: 
Type of respondent
Said they had 
already sent
Promised 
to send
Not wanting to 
participate
UTPL student 13 28 2
UCG student 4
Grantee CSO member 8 9
CSO participants in coaching 1 5
El Colectivo member 2 19
Red Pluralista member 6 3
CSO participant in Marcando la Hoja de 
Ruta 5
TOTAL 30 73 2
In addition to the above-noted 105 calls, there were at least as many calls made to numbers that did not 
work, were busy or rang without being answered. It was interesting to note that of all those contacted by 
phone, none expressed interest in doing the survey by telephone (with the ET member entering the 
responses on her computer), although this option was offered. Only two respondents indicated (though 
not in so many words) that were just not interested in doing the survey. 
With 62 surveys completed, it was decided to suspend follow-ups on 10 May 2014—thirteen days after the 
survey was mailed to all respondents—and proceed to the analysis stage. 
7. Response level 
Research of the response rates to other surveys complemented by the experience of ME&A and the ET 
members indicates that there is a vast number of variables that can affect the rate of survey response, 
including the closeness of the respondents to the activity/service that is being evaluated, invitation wording, 
perceived benefit from participating in survey, and methodology used (telephone, email, email plus phone 
calls, etc.) According to one website, “Internal surveys (i.e. employee surveys) generally have a much higher 
response rate than external surveys (e.g. customer satisfaction surveys). Internal surveys will generally receive a 30-
40% response rate or more on average, compared to an average 10-15% response rate for external surveys.
81 An 
Ecuadorian statistical expert consulted by the ET following the survey advised that “30% for an Internet 
survey is high; normally one would expect 10-20%. It depends a great deal on the target group, but even so, 30% is 
high."
In addition, the particular environment in which the survey is carried out can have a significant impact, 
especially for web-based surveys. Not only are there factors related to access to the Internet (and cost 
thereof to the respondent), but also one needs to consider the level of comfort and familiarity respondents 
have with doing surveys on the Internet. In this specific situation, there were more complex factors to 
consider as well, such as the fact that both projects had ended and that USAID was known to be leaving 
the country shortly under tense circumstances. These elements could well have affected the motivation of 
 
81 http://www.surveygizmo.com/survey-blog/survey-response-rates/ The same site indicates: “Response rates can also 
fall below 2% when the respondent population is less-targeted, when contact information is unreliable, or where there is less 
incentive or little motivation to respond.”
39
respondents to participate (what would they gain?), and some may have been nervous of being linked with 
USAID through the survey. 
Taking into account all of the above (including the significant difficulties experienced with contact 
information), the 28 percent response achieved with this survey should be considered a good response 
rate. It should be noted that the follow-up phone calls played a crucial role in achieving that rate; without 
that significant effort, the response rate would probably have been no higher than 20%. 
8. Analysis 
Survey Monkey generates automatic analysis of responses to each question in the form of tables and 
graphs, and is also capable of doing some cross-tabulation. However, Survey Monkey does not allow for 
advanced control over cross-tabulations and more in-depth analysis. Therefore, after data collection was 
complete, the database of responses was converted to SPSS format and sent for further cleaning and 
analysis by the ME&A data analysis expert. Relevant variables labels were changed to PC or GF accordingly. 
Special cleaning rules were applied to check for any errors. For facilitation of data analysis, special coding 
was used to treat multiple choice questions. As well, case status variables were added to identify complete 
and partial “cases” (surveys either completely or partially filled), taking into account that not all questions 
were mandatory for all respondents. 
For cross-tabulations and other data extraction, an SPSS syntax file was created in order to employ 
automated/replicable procedures during analysis of the data. Descriptive statistics along with the cross￾tabulation were created for all variables and pivot tables were outputted for key variables like grantees and 
non-grantees, trainings received from GF or PC, etc. 
40
ANNEX F: LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
REVIEWED 
41
I. USAID documents 
 Request for Applications for Strengthening Civil Society in Ecuador (RFA-518-10-000003), 2009 
 Cooperative Agreements and modifications for both projects, 2010-2014
 Democracy and Governance assessment, 2005
 Democracy and Governance assessment update, 2009
II. Project Documents 
A. GF Project (and Grupo Faro) 
 2010 Proposal for SCS Project by Grupo Faro consortium, and 2012 proposal for revised third 
year of project 
 Final report – November 2013 
 List of sub-grant recipients and evaluation matrix for proposals 
 Sub-grant reports, indicator tables and related documents 
 Quarterly Progress Reports (since 2011) 
 Annual operational plans 2011- 2013 
 M&E indicator tables 
 Project budgets and amendments, 2011-13
 Organizational Capacity Assessments of Grupo Faro and related documents (2012-2013) 
 2013 Budget (GF) 
 2008-2013 Audit Reports (GF) 
 Table of Income and Sources, 2012-14 (GF) 
 Investigation and Action Agenda, Grupo FARO 2012-2015. 
 Sub-grants competition announcements (2012 and 2013) 
 Premio a la Innovación Cívica, 2013 
 Legal Manual for the operation of Ecuadorian CSOs. “Manual Legal para el Funcionamiento de las 
Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil del Ecuador”, GF, 2013
 Gender perspective in the management of CSOs. “Incorporación de la perspectiva de género en la 
gestión de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil”, GF, 2013
 CSO networks: benefits and services. “Redes de OSC: beneficios y servicios”, GF, 2013
 UCG and UTPL Courses Diagnostic Report. “Evaluación y Rediseño del Programa de Formación 
para Líderes de Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil”, Diagonal, June 2013
 Diagnostic report on sustainability coaching activity, 2013 
 Statute of Ecuadorian Confederation of CSOs, 2013 
 Sistematización: elaboración de la Planificación Estratégica de la Confederación Ecuatoriana de 
OSC (description of Confederation’s strategic planning process) 
B. Strengthening Democracy Project (and Participación Ciudadana) 
 Monitoring and Evaluation Methodology (annual) 
 Quarterly Progress Reports since 2003 
 Annual operational plans since 2009 
 M&E indicator tables 
 Budget information, 2010-14
 Table of Income and Sources, 2002-2014 
 Draft Sustainability Plan, 2010 
 Organizational Capacity Assessments and related documents, 2013 
 Sub-grants competition announcements, 2013 
 Training materials “Marcando una hoja de ruta para la sociedad civil”, PC, 2010
 Bulletins “Marcando una hoja de ruta para la sociedad civil”, PC, November 2010 
 Memory “Marcando una hoja de ruta para la sociedad civil, PC, January 2011 
 Monitoring public management: LOTAIP, Vigilancia de la Gestión Pública, PC, 2012 
 PC Annual Reports, 2009-2013 
 Special edition “PC ten years: 2002 – 2012”
 Red Pluralista Founding Document, PC, 2013 
42
 PC Statutes, approved 2005 
 PC Strategic Plan, 2005-2010 
 Guía para la Aplicación del Decreto 16, PC, 2013 
III. Other Documents 
 Legislation and Decrees 
a. Constitución Política del Ecuador 
b. Ley Orgánica de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública (LOTAIP) 
c. Ley Orgánica de Participación Ciudadana 
d. Ley Orgánica del Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social 
e. Ley Orgánica de Comunicación 
f. Ley Orgánica de Educación Superior 
g. Decreto 699/2007 (international cooperation) 
h. Decreto 429/2010 (international cooperation) 
i. Decree 982/2008 (NGO regulation) 
j. Decree 16/2013 (NGO regulation) 
 El Poder de una Ciudadanía Informada, PC, 2004
 Ecuador 2012 Human Rights Report, US Department of State, 2012
 New Directions in Local Capacity Development: Embracing a Systems Perspective, The Capable 
Partners Learning Agenda on Local Organization Capacity Development, 2013
 La Silla Vacía: el nuevo escenario para el diálogo de la sociedad civil y el Estado. Un diagnóstico, 
Esquel, CEDA, Grupo Faro, Participación Ciudadana, 2011 
 Informe Final del Índice de la Sociedad Civil en el Ecuador, Fundación Esquel y CIVICUS –Alianza 
Mundial para la Participación Ciudadana, 2006
 The role of Legal Reform in supporting Civil Society: an introductory primer, ICNL – UNDP, 2009. 
 La relación Estado – Sociedad Civil: develando mitos, 2009 
 Manifiesto del Colectivo de Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil (OSC) sobre el proyecto de 
reglamento para personas jurídicas de derecho privado con finalidad social y sin fines de lucro, 
January 2011 
 Pronunciamiento de la Confederación Ecuatoriana de las Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil sobre 
el Decreto 16, 2013 
 Informe Sobre Derechos Humanos, UASB, 2011 
 Informe Estado del País 1950-2011, Varios Autores, 2011 
 Informe IECG Ecuador, Fundación Esquel, 2011 
 Ecuador Human Rights Report, US Department of State, 2012 
 Cultura política de la democracia en Ecuador, 2012 
 Temario de Consultas Sobre Sociedad Civil, Fundación Esquel, undated
 Ecuador: Clampdown on Civil Society, Human Rights Watch, 2012 
 Ecuador: Un Régimen Híbrido, Simón Pachano y Sergio García, Fundación Latinoamericana de 
Ciencias Sociales, 2013 
 Sistematización: Elaboración de la Planificación Estratégica de la Confederación Ecuatoriana de 
OSC, Fundación Metis, 2013
 How Transparent are Think Tanks about Who Funds Them?, Transparify, May 2014 
 LAPOP Americas Barometer 2004-2014, draft report shared with USAID/Ecuador in June 2014
IV. Websites 
 Grupo Faro 
 Participación Ciudadana http://www.participacionciudadana.org/pc10/ 
 Ciudadanía Informada http://www.ciudadaniainformada.com/ 
 USAID/Ecuador http://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/latin-american-and-caribbean/ecuador 
 Confederación Ecuatoriana de OSC http://www.confederacionecuatorianaosc.org/ 
43
 Websites of various sub-grantees and sub-contractors, including http://guiaosc.org/ , 
http://cecimec.org/ , http://www.kawsay.org/home.aspx , http://www.ecolex-ec.org/ , 
http://www.fundapi.org/ , http://www.incluirecuador.org/ 
 Consejo Nacional Electoral http://www.cne.gob.ec/ 
 Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social http://www.cpccs.gob.ec/ 
 Asociación Red de ONGs de Guayaquil (AROG) http://ongecuador.blogspot.com/2011/05/10-anos￾de-creacion-de-arog.html 
 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ 
 International Center for Non-Profit Law (ICNL) – page on Ecuador 
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/ecuador.html 
 Barcelona Center for International Affairs – Ecuador profile and associated documents 
http://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/dossiers/ecuador_elecciones_2013/dossier_especial_ecuado
r_elecciones_2013 
 Transparify http://www.transparify.org/ 
 Human Development Indicators http://www.datosmacro.com/idh/ecuador 
 Catalogue of International Cooperation (Secretariat of International Cooperation of Ecuador) 
http://www.cooperacioninternacional.gob.ec/catalogo-de-la-oferta-de-cooperacion-internacional￾no-reembolsable-2/ 
 It’s (almost) all about leadership – INTRAC blog by Rick James 
http://www.intrac.org/blog.php/54/itacirceurotrades-almost-all-about￾leadership?utm_source=It%27s+%28almost%29+all+about+leadership+-
+New+blog+post&utm_campaign=Blog_update_leadership&utm_medium=email 
 Close the NGOs: Asserting Sovereignty or Eroding Democracy? | North American Congress on 
Latin America https://nacla.org/blog/2013/12/31/close-ngos-asserting-sovereignty-or-eroding￾democracy 
 Pretensión de Coerción o Cierre de 31 Organizaciones de Sociedad Civil ~ RedLad Blog 
http://blog-redlad.blogspot.com/2014/04/pretension-de-coercion-o-cierre-de-31.html 
 Ciudadanía Informada: Citizens’ Participation - Ecuador — IICD
 Participación Cantonal http://participacioncantonal.org/sobre-este-sitio/ 
 La libertad de prensa en Ecuador vive una continua confrontación 
http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2014/05/04/nota/2912431/libertad-prensa-ecuador￾vive-continua-confrontacion 
 Hoy newspaper, Interview with Ruth Hidalgo, July 2012 http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias￾ecuador/quinto-poder-utilizado-politicamente￾557252.html?fb_action_ids=4060843074499&fb_action_types=og.likes&fb_source=timeline_og&act
ion_object_map={%224060843074499%22%3A10151090018367249}&action_type_map={%224060
843074499%22%3A%22og.likes%22}&action_ref_map 
 Hoy newspaper, article on freedom of press in Ecuador, May 2014 http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias￾ecuador/ecuador-esta-en-el-grupo-de-paises-sin-libertad-de-prensa-605638.html 
 Centro Virtual para la transparencia y la rendición de cuentas de la sociedad civil 
http://rendircuentas.org/ 
44
ANNEX G: HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
OF PARTICIPACIÓN CIUDADANA 
CORPORATION AND ITS 
COLLABORATION WITH USAID 
45
Historical Summary of Corporación Participación Ciudadana 
and its Collaboration with USAID 
2002 – 2014 
General Objective
The main objective of Corporación Participación Ciudadana when founded in 2002 was to contribute to 
building a democracy based on both an ethical and political commitment between the ruling party and the 
citizens of Ecuador, through the exercise of citizenship in a responsible, informed and deliberative way. As 
of 2014, the overall objective had evolved to become the following: 
Corporación Participación Ciudadana is a non-partisan and pluralistic Ecuadorian 
nongovernmental nonprofit organization, legally constituted in July 2002 to provide input from civil 
society to strengthen democracy in Ecuador. It is made up of citizens who promote the deepening 
of democracy and transparency of public activities and political processes. 
Creation 
The origin of PC dates back to 2001, when a group of Ecuadorians, including Valeria Merino (Executive 
Director of the Latin American Development Corporation), Horacio Sevilla (Former Ambassador of 
Ecuador to Peru), and Cornelio Marchán (former President of the Esquel Foundation), saw the need to 
establish a citizen group to oversee electoral processes in the country to ensure transparency of the 
process and validity of the results. The proximity of the 2002 national elections prompted them to create 
PC as a corporation, and its legal status was approved on July 12, 2002. In a general meeting of the 
founding members, César Montúfar, an academic and pro-democracy activist, was chosen as Executive 
Director. PC opened its offices in Quito and Montúfar immediately began negotiations to launch the 
process of electoral observation. He contacted the National Democratic Institute (NDI), a US-based NGO, 
in order to receive advice from that institution. That link eventually led to NDI supporting the first election 
monitoring by PC in October 2002, with financial support from USAID.82 
Leadership 
PC has had three executive directors during its 12-year history. The first was Cesar Montúfar, who led the 
organization since its inception until early 2006. PC volunteers and other stakeholders remember him as a 
charismatic and hands-on leader who was very focused on working with the people. He passed the baton 
to his Deputy Director and former Legal Director, José Valencia, who headed the organization from early 
2006 until mid-2007.83 With a more technical and less citizen-focused political advocacy approach, Valencia 
began a systematic search of funds other than USAID and sought to strengthen the institutions of PC 
through the adoption of a procedures manual, a code of ethics and a five-year strategic plan term. In 2008, 
Ruth Hidalgo took over as Executive Director, at which point President Correa was in power and the 
political landscape was changing (as outlined in the Context section of this report). Since its creation, and 
at specific points in time, PC has faced hostility on the part of state institutions, limiting their field of action. 
Government questioning of PC’s independence (including references to Cesar Montúfar’s current role as 
an opposition politician, international funding support to PC (including from USAID) and certain activities 
that have challenged government actions) have placed PC in a vulnerable position, and led its current 
Executive Director to be criticized in the official media. Despite this situation, PC has made major efforts 
to maintain high visibility and credibility. 
Financing 
PC has consistently received significant funding support from USAID since it was founded, as can be seen in 
the graph below. The annual funding has gone as high as $1.5 million, though in the last five years it has 
 
82 "We worked with NDI to prepare a proposal for Qualitative Observation and Quick Counts of the Electoral 
Process. This was initially approved with a value of $160,000, and then received an extension of an additional 
$250,000. For this expansion, the efforts of USAID office in Quito were crucial.” El Poder de una Ciudadanía 
Informada: Elecciones 2002, Crónica de una Experiencia, Corporación PC, 2003.
83 Jose Valencia is currently the Ecuadorian Ambassador in South Africa. 
46
averaged $790,000. Since 2004, the institution has approached other donors, including various international 
organizations, with the aim of generating and strengthening international linkages and establishing 
alternative sources of financing. Nevertheless, the diversification of funding has always been a challenge for 
PC. 
PC Funding Amounts and Sources 2002-2014, according to organizational records 
Institutional Development 
Between 2003 and 2004, members of the institution proposed to consolidate PC as a nonpartisan civil 
society group at both national and local levels. Several meetings between PC’s Board of Directors, the 
technical team, and the first volunteers were held for this purpose. In 2003, the online news agency 
"Informed Citizenry"84 began operations in Quito and its coverage soon spread to other cities with the 
support of local correspondents. The website became an important part of PC’s operations, particularly 
during electoral events. 
In 2003, PC created a Volunteer Network comprised of 26 teams and 25 Youth Clubs. A volunteer 
coordinator was appointed in each province of Ecuador, with three canton-level coordinators in Guayas. In 
2005, the youth training program called “School of Leadership” was created to improve volunteers’ skills, 
and in 2006, modules on Democratic Theory, Constitutional Law and Political Communication were 
included in the training curriculum. However, between 2011 and 2014 the network was weakened, as PC’s 
monthly funding support for volunteer coordinators’ operational costs was suspended due to overall 
budget limitations and difficulties to obtain other donors funding, and the level of attention paid by the 
central office to the network decreased. PC’s satellite office in Guayaquil was closed for the same financial 
reasons, and the completion of specific projects based in Guayas such as monitoring of compliance with 
access to information laws by national and provincial institutions, and the youth training project Vive la 
Democracia. 
In 2004, PC opened an office in Guayaquil because it was considered essential to have a permanent 
presence on the Coast of Ecuador. The regional office, led by the lawyer Anunziatta Valdez, a strong 
 
84 www.ciudadaniainformada.org 
$0
$200,000
$400,000
$600,000
$800,000
$1,000,000
$1,200,000
$1,400,000
$1,600,000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
F
U
N
D
I
N
G
All Other Funders
USAID total
47
gender advocate and former member of the Congress,85 focused on gender issues, developed an intensive 
collaboration with volunteers in Guayas province for electoral observation, with school-age youth through 
the project "Living Democracy", and with various government institutions for monitoring of compliance 
with the Access to Information Law. Due to the reduction of financial resources from USAID, difficulties in 
accessing other funding, and a lower level of activity in Guayas (especially on Access to Information Law), 
the Guayaquil office was closed by PC in 2013. 
By 2005, PC had developed (a) a system for monitoring and evaluating its impact; (b) a five-year Strategic 
Plan; (c) a network of internal communication for better coordination and interrelation between PC’s 
different branches; and (d) a system for external communication. In 2009, PC began to publish annual 
reports known as “memorias” to present their work to external stakeholders. Although a strategic planning 
process was held in 2010, the resulting draft plan was never adopted. The annual operational plan was the 
guiding document for activities of the organization. In 2013, an Organizational Capacity Assessment was 
conducted on the basis of self-evaluation by the organization, leading to the identification of several areas 
for internal strengthening. 
Activities 
The early initiatives of PC were largely focused on election and referendum monitoring, civic campaigns, 
and advocacy and watchdog activities, all with a considerable emphasis on educating and mobilizing citizens. 
Changes in the political context in 2007 and the new 2008 Constitution prompted a change in PC’s focus 
and approach. In 2009, PC’s Democracy Strengthening Project shifted its emphasis from “electoral reform 
and observation to the promotion of greater transparency in other important processes, such as the 
establishment and functions of new democratic institutions to be organized under the Constitution”. Since 
2010, PC has reduced its focus on grassroots volunteer-based action to place a heavier emphasis on direct 
implementation relying on the technical skills of its staff. PC has developed its advocacy and watchdog skills 
in relation to the new structures and systems created by the Constitution, and provided training about 
those systems to government officials, CSOs, CBOs and individuals. 
The following is a description of the evolution of PC’s work since it was established, based on five main 
categories of intervention: Citizen Oversight, Citizen Action, Dialogue and Governance, Democracy 
Education and Informed Citizen. 
1. Citizen Oversight
Objective: To promote transparency in political activities and processes. 
1.1. Citizen Participation Mechanisms: Silla Vacía: Between 2010 and 2013, Silla Vacía proceedings were 
conducted in 10 municipalities, technical assistance was provided to six cantons, and a total of 5000 
citizens were trained on this mechanism. Accountability: Beginning in 2005, PC developed a 
methodology for a system of ongoing accountability among local government officials such as Prefects, 
Mayors and Presidents of Parish Boards. In 2006, four Accountability Forums were held. Between 2010 
and 2013, forums were held in three prefectures, 18 municipalities and five parishes, and a total of 
4820 people participated. Results: Participants are more aware of their rights and now know that 
elected officials must be accountable to citizens. Obstacles: PC’s activities encountered the same 
challenges imposed by the political context on any CSOs seeking to contribute to strengthening 
democracy: the political class viewed it with suspicion and some actors alleged that PC was not 
representing the people. As well, PC was not able to provide sufficient support to keep these 
processes alive because of funding and staff limitations. 
1.2. Citizen Observatories and Oversight Committees: In 2005, PC monitored the appointment of the 
judges of the new Supreme Court. In 2006, PC held meetings with representatives of civil society86 to 
establish agreements to enhance the work of PC’s Observatory of the National Congress. In 2007-
 
85 Now known as the National Assembly 
86 Fundación Esquel, Grupo Faro, CONAMU, Escuela de Leyes de la Universidad de San Francisco, Foro de la Niñez y 
de la Adolescencia
48
2008, PC oversaw the work of the National Constituent Assembly and in 2008, the Assembly’s 
Legislative Commission. From 2009-2010 PC oversaw the selection process of the new national 
authorities established to support citizen participation (including the Citizen Participation and Social 
Control Council). Unfortunately, PC’s recommendations had limited impact on the process and the 
ultimate selections. Obstacles: Political pressure from national government to support specific 
candidates was reportedly a key factor affecting the transparency and neutrality of the process. 
1.3. Election Monitoring87: PC observed the elections of 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2013 and 
conducted “Quick Counts” in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2013. PC organized the 
following voter education campaigns: "Responsible and Informed Vote" (2004); "Getting Informed, 
Comparing and Choosing" (2007)88; "Clean Walls, Honest Candidates" (2008); "The Value of 
Choosing" (2011); and "Because your Vote has Power" (2013). From its beginning, PC has run 
campaigns against the use of public resources for political publicity. Before 2006, PC also tracked the 
process of official review of expenditures of several elections. Results: Through a rigorous and 
systematic methodological work, PC reached a high level of credibility, transparency and visibility in 
election monitoring. Large numbers of volunteers have consistently been mobilized by PC for 
elections. Obstacles: Tracking these processes was challenging, especially before 2007 as the Supreme 
Electoral Court and provincial courts tried to impede PC’s actions in some elections. Logistics of 
organizing observation activities across the country were always complex and confronted different 
challenges, depending on the specific norms determined by the electoral institutions. In 2006, PC 
proposed to the TSE the design of an Electoral Information System but it was never implemented. 
1.4. Promoting Transparency: In 2005, PC supported the drafting and promotion of the Ley Orgánica de 
Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública ((LOTAIP) Organic Law on Transparency and Access to 
Public Information) through the local NGO network “Access Coalition”, and generally promoted the 
Right of Access to Public Information. In 2006, it began the "Monitoring the implementation of 
LOTAIP in 10 public entities in Guayaquil" project. Between 2008 and 2012, PC monitored 30 state 
institutions’ compliance with the Law, jointly with the Ombudsman. Results: The outcomes were 
satisfactory: 98% compliance, six institutions developed action plans to improve services, and 12 did 
assessments of user satisfaction. Obstacles: Lack of consistent political will from the Ombudsman 
Office to replicate monitoring among other government institutions in accordance with their mandate 
has limited the impact, especially after the end of PC’s intervention (since 2012), though some 
institutions are continuing to strive for compliance. 
1.5. Legal Reforms and Policy Proposals: PC proposed several law reforms between 2004 and 2006, 
including reforms to the Organic Law on Electoral Spending and the Law on Electoral Publicity. The 
final text included several issues raised by PC, such as advertising slots, accountability in spending 
limits, proportional penalties, and transparency in the reporting of information. PC also worked in 
2006 on draft laws on Impeachment and Accountability. In 2008, it proposed constitutional reforms 
and reforms to the Election Law, and in 2009, it proposed ideas for the Law of Citizen Participation 
and Social Control, and for the Organic Code of Territorial Organization, Autonomy and 
Decentralization. In the years that followed, PC proposed amendments to the Code of Democracy 
(2010), Communications Law (2011), and Access to Information Law (2012). Between 2013 and 2014, 
PC analyzed Decree 16 and the Regulation for Electoral Campaigning. Obstacles: Since 2007, the spirit 
of the bills introduced was usually diluted in the debates of the National Assembly.
2. Citizen Action
 
87 Electoral Calendar 2002–2014. National Elections: October 20 and November 24, 2002; October 15 and 
November 26, 2006; April 26, 2009; and, February 17, 2013. Sectional Elections: October 17, 2004; April 26, 2009; 
and, February 23, 2014. National Constituent Assembly Elections: September 30, 2007. Referendum: 
September 28, 2008. Popular Consultation: April 15, 2007, and May 7, 2011. Source: National Electoral Council. 
88 Meetings were held with Grupo Faro y Alianza Equidad to coordinate activities. In 2007, Grupo Faro’s “Agreement 
of Commitment for Transparency and the Protection of Public Funds for Social Programs in the Electoral Campaign” 
was adopted.
49
Objective: To encourage citizen participation through the exercise of political rights and the practice of 
civic values. 
2.1. Media Monitoring: PC has systematically monitored the use of public resources for official publicity 
and personal promotion by public authorities. Between 2004 and 2008, PC published 50 monitoring 
reports. In 2008, PC sought to promote greater action by control agencies such as the Comptroller 
General, the National Electoral Council and the Electoral Disputes Tribunal, so that they would 
exercise their roles more effectively. PC has gathered information on key aspects of the use of media 
spaces (print, radio and television) for political purposes. It promoted research and discussion on the 
impact of violence on national television and supported processes of informed debates and search for 
consensus on how to handle the problem of violence. Results: Between 2009 and 2012, 34 monitoring 
reports on the use of public resources for official publicity were published. This activity continues to 
date with NED funding. Obstacles: The government has repeatedly questioned PC’s media monitoring 
reports, and finally PC had to change its methodology from measuring the amount paid by government 
to measuring the media time used by the government for self-promotion. This resulted in a reduction 
of impact since the dollar values were of more interest to the media and the public than the data on 
air time.89
2.2. Research: In 2006, PC identified specific qualitative indicators to measure the democratic culture of 
the country, based on studies by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and local 
research, which led to publishing of the "What do Ecuadorians Think when Speaking about 
Democracy?" study and a follow-up study on “Citizen Perceptions on Democracy in the Ecuador of 
2012”, published in late 2013. In 2010, it conducted an analysis of CSOs’ activity and interaction with 
different sectors of the population, other similar organizations and the State in Quito and Guayaquil. 
PC sought to know: (a) if the new political and constitutional scenario was positive or negative for 
promoting civil society activities, and (b) how CSOs were affected by its members joining the new 
government. Results: A baseline survey on the subject of democracy and values; and a qualitative study 
for the project "Creating a Roadmap for Civil Society" which ran between 2011 and 2012. 
2.3. Other activities: Between 2010 and 2011, PC promoted: (a) steady support to the group of public 
institutions being monitored for compliance with the Access to Information Law; (b) a project called 
"Monitoring the Work of the Constitutional Court, the National Court of Justice, the Attorney 
General, and the Management Unit of the Public Defender's Office” which generated a comprehensive 
report; and (c) a project called "Evaluation of the Soundness of Constitutional Court Sentences” 
(2008-2009).
3. Dialogues and Governance: 
Objective: To promote dialogue and generate consensus between political and social actors. 
In 2004, PC held Citizen Forums to present the work plans of candidates running for mayors and 
provincial prefects. In 2006, 2009, and 2013, PC organized citizen forums with candidates for the 
National Assembly. In 2006, PC held the "100 Societal Organizations and 17 Urgent Issues for a Real 
Democracy" Forum. In 2007, PC developed the "Impact of Civil Society in the National Assembly" 
program to discuss issues of political reform, economic models, decentralization and autonomy, and 
human rights, in which over 15,000 people participated. Since 2009, a series of "democratic breakfasts" 
were developed to encourage open debate on issues related to democracy. 
4. Democracy Education
Objective: Dissemination of information on civil, political, and social rights as well as citizens’ 
responsibilities. 
4.1. Work with Civil Society: Starting in 2010, PC developed the "Creating a Roadmap for Civil 
Society" program mentioned above, through which it trained 54 NGOs on issues of: (a) citizen 
participation and constitutional principles, (b) tools for social oversight, (c) leadership and 
advocacy, and (d) communication strategies. In 2011, it held a series of lectures on "Obstacles, 
 
89 PC had to proceed in this manner because the government argued that the media outlets gave them substantial 
discounts, so PC could not rely on established average costs. 
50
Challenges, Opportunities and Threats of CSOs" in several provinces. These activities led to the 
formation of the “Red Pluralista” (Pluralistic Network) of Civil Society Organizations in early 
2012.90 In recent years, PC has organized workshops for citizens and community leaders on 
“Tools for Participation and Social Oversight”, and for journalists and civil society members on 
“Electoral Advertising and Promotional Segments”, “News Coverage and Constitutional Court 
Rulings”, “Advertising Bans”, “Electoral Districting”, and “Formula for Allocating Seats”.
4.2. SIEL: PC launched the Integrated Online Education System (SIEL) in 2010, to offer online training on 
topics such as Access to Information, Alternative Dispute Resolution, and the Law of Citizen 
Participation, among others. It was intended for a range of users, but in practice it was mainly 
used by the Volunteer Network. In 2010, courses were offered on Advocacy, Accountability, 
Political Communication and Leadership, and Communication and Democracy. In 2011, SIEL was 
used to train users on online study techniques and use of the platform, conflict management, and 
research techniques. In 2012, a training course on the Access to Information Law was held for 
officials from public institutions that were part of the targeted group of organizations being 
monitored by PC to help them comply with the Law’s requirements (70 attendees). Other recent 
courses were: "Design of Development Assistance Projects" (111 participants); "Political and 
Social Uses of ICTs" (12 participants). As of May 2014, the website is no longer available. 
Obstacles: Some informants mentioned that the SIEL was not attractive as a learning mechanism 
and others commented that, because of limited access to internet in rural areas, its impact was 
limited.
4.3. Civic Campaigns: The "Delivering on Time" Campaign was launched in 2003, based on 
partnerships with various public and private entities. 600 promoters were trained and 29 events 
were held simultaneously throughout the country. The "Citizen Eye" campaign, which promoted 
respect, tolerance, transparency, freedom, justice, security and solidarity, was implemented in 
2010, 2011 and 2012. Another major project was the "Live Democracy" Campaign implemented 
between 2008 and 2012, which benefited over 2000 young students in Guayas province by 
promoting political leadership and good citizenship practices. 
4.4. Other projects: Between 2005 and 2006, two documentary film competitions known as "Look out 
for Democracy" were held, and between 2006 and 2008, a traveling exhibition of the 
documentary films developed under this activity was held in six provinces. Between 2008 and 
2011, several initiatives were implemented: (a) a radio project for the promotion of civil, social, 
and political rights and civic participation through the CORAPE Network;91 (b) a pilot project of 
Political Training for the PC coordinators Guayas province; (c) a project for Organizational 
Strengthening of Ecuadorian Immigrants in Loja and Madrid and for Use of Remittances for 
Agricultural Development Initiatives; and (d) a training for Afro-Ecuadorian women's on rights and 
participation. 
5. Informed Citizenry
Objective: To provide quality information to citizens on issues of public interest. 
5.1. Digital Newspaper: The digital daily newspaper "Informed Citizenry" has been published on a 
continuous basis between 2004 and 2014. Internal reports from 2008 to 2012 indicate a high level 
of visits. PC trained and supported the participation of five local journalists in various provinces to 
research and submit articles for the website, and has also worked closely with other journalists in 
recent years. In 2011, PC conducted 5 workshops in several cities that benefited 183 people on 
topics such as constitutional rights and mechanisms, citizen oversight, access to information rights 
and investigative journalism. In 2012, PC conducted 5 training workshops for 200 people, including 
independent journalists, alumni and students of social communication on the "New Challenges for 
Journalism: Access to Information Law, Legal Framework and Investigative Journalism". In 2013, 
 
90 This network and the training initiative are discussed in depth in the body of the evaluation report, notably in the 
Engagement and Local Capacity Development sections. 
91 CORAPE (Coordinadora de Radio Educativa Popular de Ecuador) is a media network. 
51
PC hosted an event on media self-regulation in which international speakers participated, and one 
workshop on Journalism and Elections for the coverage for the 2013 elections.
52
ANNEX H: CERTIFICATION 
REGARDING TERRORIST 
FINANCING 
CERTIFICATION REGARDING TERRORIST FINANCING IMPLEMENTING E.O. 
13224 (Revision 2) 
By signing and submitting this application, the prospective recipient provides the certification set out 
below: 
1. The Recipient, to the best of its current knowledge, did not provide, within the previous ten 
years, and will take all reasonable steps to ensure that it does not and will not knowingly provide, 
material support or resources to any individual or entity that commits, attempts to commit, 
advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to commit, 
facilitated, or participated in terrorist acts, as that term is defined in paragraph 3. 
2. The following steps may enable the Recipient to comply with its obligations under paragraph 1: 
a. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient 
will verify that the individual or entity does not (i) appear on the master list of Specially 
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, which list is maintained by the U.S. Treasury’s 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and is available online at OFAC’s website : 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/t11sdn.pdf, or (ii) is not included in any 
supplementary information concerning prohibited individuals or entities that may be provided by 
USAID to the Recipient. 
b. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient 
also will verify that the individual or entity has not been designated by the United Nations 
Security (UNSC) sanctions committee established under UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999) (the 
“1267 Committee”) [individuals and entities linked to the Taliban, Usama bin Laden, or the Al 
Qaida Organization]. To determine whether there has been a published designation of an 
individual or entity by the 1267 Committee, the Recipient should refer to the consolidated list 
available online at the Committee’s website: 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm. 
c. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient 
will consider all information about that individual or entity of which it is aware and all public 
information that is reasonably available to it or of which it should be aware. 
d. The Recipient also will implement reasonable monitoring and oversight procedures to 
safeguard against assistance being diverted to support terrorist activity. 
3. For purposes of this Certification￾a. “Material support and resources” means currency or monetary instruments or financial 
securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false 
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or 
religious materials.” 
b. “Terrorist act” means- 
(i) an act prohibited pursuant to one of the 12 United Nations Conventions and Protocols 
related to terrorism (see UN terrorism conventions Internet site: 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp); or 
(ii) an act of premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents; or 
(iii) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any 
other person not taking an active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, 
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or 
to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act. 
 
c. “Entity” means a partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, group or 
subgroup. 
d. References in this Certification to the provision of material support and resources shall not 
be deemed to include the furnishing of USAID funds or USAID-financed commodities to the 
ultimate beneficiaries of USAID assistance, such as recipients of food, medical care, micro￾enterprise loans, shelter, etc., unless the Recipient has reason to believe that one or more of these 
beneficiaries commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, 
or has committed, attempted to commit, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts. 
e. The Recipient’s obligations under paragraph 1 are not applicable to the procurement of 
goods and/or services by the Recipient that are acquired in the ordinary course of business 
through contract or purchase, e.g., utilities, rents, office supplies, gasoline, etc., unless the 
Recipient has reason to believe that a vendor or supplier of such goods and services commits, 
attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, 
attempted to commit, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts. 
f. Applicants that have never received a cooperative agreement, grant or contract from the U.S. 
Government are required to submit a copy of their accounting manual. If a copy has already 
been submitted to the U.S. Government, the applicant should advise which Federal Office has a 
copy. 
This Certification is an express term and condition of any agreement issued as a result of this 
application, and any violation of it shall be grounds for unilateral termination of the agreement by 
USAID prior to the end of its term. 
Signed: _18 March 2014 
 
CERTIFICATION REGARDING TERRORIST FINANCING IMPLEMENTING E.O. 
13224 (Revision 2)
By signing and submitting this application, the prospective recipient provides the certification set out 
below:
1. The Recipient, to the best of its current knowledge, did not provide, within the previous ten 
years, and will take all reasonable steps to ensure that it does not and will not knowingly provide, 
material support or resources to any individual or entity that commits, attempts to commit, 
advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to commit, 
facilitated, or participated in terrorist acts, as that term is defined in paragraph 3.
2. The following steps may enable the Recipient to comply with its obligations under paragraph 1:
a. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient 
will verify that the individual or entity does not (i) appear on the master list of Specially 
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, which list is maintained by the U.S. Treasury’s 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and is available online at OFAC’s website : 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/t11sdn.pdf, or (ii) is not included in any 
supplementary information concerning prohibited individuals or entities that may be provided by 
USAID to the Recipient.
b. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient 
also will verify that the individual or entity has not been designated by the United Nations 
Security (UNSC) sanctions committee established under UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999) (the 
“1267 Committee”) [individuals and entities linked to the Taliban, Usama bin Laden, or the Al
Qaida Organization]. To determine whether there has been a published designation of an 
individual or entity by the 1267 Committee, the Recipient should refer to the consolidated list 
available online at the Committee’s website:
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm. 
c. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient 
will consider all information about that individual or entity of which it is aware and all public 
information that is reasonably available to it or of which it should be aware.
d. The Recipient also will implement reasonable monitoring and oversight procedures to 
safeguard against assistance being diverted to support terrorist activity.
3. For purposes of this Certification￾a. “Material support and resources” means currency or monetary instruments or financial 
securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false 
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or 
religious materials.”
b. “Terrorist act” means- 
(i) an act prohibited pursuant to one of the 12 United Nations Conventions and Protocols 
related to terrorism (see UN terrorism conventions Internet site: 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp); or


(ii) an act of premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents; or
(iii) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any 
other person not taking an active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, 
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or 
to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act.
 
c. “Entity” means a partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, group or 
subgroup.
d. References in this Certification to the provision of material support and resources shall not 
be deemed to include the furnishing of USAID funds or USAID-financed commodities to the 
ultimate beneficiaries of USAID assistance, such as recipients of food, medical care, micro￾enterprise loans, shelter, etc., unless the Recipient has reason to believe that one or more of these 
beneficiaries commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, 
or has committed, attempted to commit, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts.
e. The Recipient’s obligations under paragraph 1 are not applicable to the procurement of 
goods and/or services by the Recipient that are acquired in the ordinary course of business 
through contract or purchase, e.g., utilities, rents, office supplies, gasoline, etc., unless the 
Recipient has reason to believe that a vendor or supplier of such goods and services commits, 
attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, 
attempted to commit, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts.
f. Applicants that have never received a cooperative agreement, grant or contract from the U.S. 
Government are required to submit a copy of their accounting manual. If a copy has already 
been submitted to the U.S. Government, the applicant should advise which Federal Office has a 
copy.
This Certification is an express term and condition of any agreement issued as a result of this 
application, and any violation of it shall be grounds for unilateral termination of the agreement by 
USAID prior to the end of its term.
Signed: __________________________________ _____March 18, 2014________ 
 Date