


# Ties That Bind: Quantifying China's public diplomacy and its "good neighbor" effect

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Technical Appendix



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# Technical Appendix:

## A-1. Research Design & Approach

The research design for this report uses both quantitative and qualitative data analysis methods and tools to inform insights into the use and effects of Chinese public diplomacy in the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region. On the quantitative side, we sought to collect country-year panel data across five types of Chinese public diplomacy: informational, cultural, exchange, financial, and elite-to-elite diplomacy. As described in section A-3, we were able to identify a set of data for four of the types of diplomacy, but given time and resource constraints of the project, we were not able to identify panel data that captured China's informational diplomacy.

Using the quantitative public diplomacy data across the four types of public diplomacy, we first provide a series of descriptive statistics (Chapter 2) to analyze the volume and focus of China's public diplomacy efforts, and how it deploys those tools in EAP countries.

We then use our quantitative proxy measures in three series of statistical models to test 1) The factors that affect where China deploys its various public diplomacy tools, (2) The effects of public diplomacy tools on EAP public perceptions of China, and (3) the effects of public diplomacy tools on greater foreign policy voting.

In addition to this quantitative analysis, we also conducted three case studies consisting of 64 semi-structured interviews in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Fiji. These case studies provide qualitative information on how China's public diplomacy efforts are perceived on the ground. We used insights from the case studies to identify trends and variables we should test for in our statistical models. We also used desk research to contextualize and verify insights from both our quantitative and qualitative analyses.

## A-2. Public Diplomacy Definition & Taxonomy

The practice of 'public diplomacy' has evolved significantly over the last few decades in an increasingly globalized world where power is diffuse and technological advances have reduced barriers to entry for governments, organizations, and people to communicate with one another.

public diplomacy experts themselves disagree on what counts as public diplomacy activities for any given country. Numerous scholars have put forth competing theories and definitions in an attempt to flesh out the broad contours of what is and is not included within public diplomacy. These differences have significant implications for which activities constitute Chinese public diplomacy investments.

### **A Definition of Public Diplomacy**

The 'Cold War model' (Gilboa, 2008) of public diplomacy envisions state-based actors as attempting to increase their soft power influence through hierarchical, one-way, government-to-people interactions. Under this model, state actors from the 'sending country' usually define a specific message they want to push to a foreign audience in the 'receiving country', and then control the delivery of that message (Zaharna, 2008).

In contrast, the advent of 'new public diplomacy' (Melissen, 2005) expands the scope of diplomacy to include free-form, network-based interactions between non-state actors, governments, and people. In this view, numerous actors from the sending country interact directly with foreign publics, blurring the lines of who carries out public diplomacy activities, in what domains, and through which activities.

Cull (2008) proposes a definition that is widely used, but favors a more narrow view of public diplomacy as a government's attempt to engage directly with foreign citizens to: "manage the international environment," project a positive image internationally, and convince citizens of other countries to adopt its values, culture, and worldview. Under this rubric, public diplomacy consists of the following activities: (a) listening; (b) advocacy; (c) cultural diplomacy; (d) exchange; and (e) international broadcasting. There are two drawbacks of Cull's definition for our purpose of quantifying Chinese public diplomacy efforts -- the state must be the primary actor and the primary intent must be to enhance diplomatic influence.

Broader definitions of public diplomacy overcome these constraints by incorporating activities undertaken by both state or non-state actors, as well as activities that may enhance diplomatic influence, even if this was not the primary

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intention. For example, Zaharna (2008) includes investments such as development aid projects and twinning arrangements (sister cities) to facilitate greater citizen-to-citizen interaction. d'Hooghe (2014) acknowledges an economic dimension of public diplomacy, whereby state or non-state actors undertake activities to promote trade and tourism which ultimately allow the sending country to influence foreign publics.

For the purpose of quantifying China's public diplomacy efforts, this study uses the following definition:

Public Diplomacy is a collection of instruments used by state and non-state actors from a 'sending' country with at least some intention of influencing the perceptions, preferences, and actions of foreign citizens in a 'receiving' country in favor of the 'sending' country's values, culture, and worldview.

While this definition lends itself to capturing both state-centric and network-based public diplomacy activities, one crucial constraint we impose is that the activity must be directed specifically at a single receiving country from the sending country. Under this definition, we would exclude public diplomacy activities that are not targeted at one country in particular, such as China's participation as the host of the 2008 Olympics. We have chosen to exclude such non-targeted activities in this exercise so that are able to collect data that can be disaggregated at the recipient-country level and can be used to assess China's influence in the EAP region.

## **2. A Taxonomy of Public Diplomacy Activities**

Our provisional definition lays out helpful boundary markers for which activities should be included in our analysis of China's public diplomacy efforts. In this section, we operationalize this definition as a guide for our data collection efforts through enumerating our assumptions regarding the relevant actors, audiences, and activity sets to include in this exercise. These assumptions and activity sets will be further refined following consultations with a broad range of public diplomacy experts and practitioners.

### **2.1 Taxonomy of PD Activity Sets and Illustrative Activity Types**

To be included in our taxonomy, public diplomacy (PD) activities must be targeting the citizens in a 'receiving' country (i.e., the country that state or non-state actors seek to influence). The target audiences in a 'receiving country' could include: public officials, the general public, and relevant socio-economic or political sub-groups.

Our taxonomy will include public diplomacy activities undertaken by state actors, sub-state actors, and non-state actors. However, to bound our data collection efforts and analysis, we specify that in order to qualify as a PD activity, there must be intention of influencing citizens or elites in a receiving country.

Multiple actors may be involved in any given PD activity serving in coordination, funding, or implementation roles. We refer to the country undertaking public diplomacy activities as the 'sending country' in that they are attempting to 'export' or 'extend' their influence outside of their own state borders.

Based upon our literature review and prior experience tracking Chinese official finance, we have organized our taxonomy into two activity sets according to whether the main objective of the activity is to "push" Chinese values, culture, or messages out to foreign publics, or whether the activity also "pulls" information or relationships from the receiving country to create a two-way dynamic channel of communication. Under each activity set we have included a working definition and several illustrative activities.

#### **Activity Set #1: Push Strategies**

Definition: Broad-based, one-way activities where the sending country disseminates information or cultural content via state or non-state actors to increase awareness of, or support for, their values, beliefs, norms, and positions among citizens and elites in the receiving country. Push activities are often undertaken with the singular intent of furthering public diplomacy outcomes. They are most often sponsored, funded, and/or implemented by official state actors.

#### **Illustrative activities:**

- Cultural diplomacy activities, such as Chinese culture year activities, cultural exhibition tours, Chinese cultural centers, Confucius Institutes, Confucius classrooms, Sports activities through the External Sports Communication Center

- Informational diplomacy activities, such as efforts to help Chinese media establish or expand their presence in the ‘receiving’ country (e.g., Chinese state-sponsored media bureaus, television broadcasting by CCTV and CNC World, radio broadcasting by CRI, Chinese-language print media).

## Activity Set #2: Push-and-pull Strategies

Definition: Targeted, two-way activities where the sending country uses exchange programs, economic diplomacy, official financing, & traditional govt. to govt. diplomacy via state or non-state actors to promote the cultivation of relational ties with counterparts. Push-and-pull activities may have simultaneous objectives of strengthening political and socio-economic ties between countries, while also pursuing economic interests, for example. These push-and-pull activities can be sponsored, funded, and/or implemented by both state and non-state actors.

### Illustrative activities:

- Elite-to-elite diplomacy activities, such as establishing embassies in-country and high-level visits by Chinese government officials.
- Exchange diplomacy activities, such as political party exchange programs, political party development activities, providing training to various actors (civilian government officials, military officials, etc), sister city programs, and student or professional scholarship and exchange programs.
- Financial diplomacy activities, such as providing direct support to national budgets, debt relief/restructuring, humanitarian relief programs, and investments in infrastructure within the country.

## A-3. Quantifying Chinese PD: Measures, Sources, & Uses

### A-3.1 Quantitative Measures for Chinese Public Diplomacy

Below are the various quantitative measures used in this report and their corresponding sources.

Table 2.1

Public Diplomacy Category	Measures	Sources
Informational Diplomacy	<i>Given time and resource constraints for producing this report, we were unable to find enough systematic data for the countries and time period in the study to quantify informational diplomacy. Please see Box 2 and Chapter 3 for qualitative information on China's Activities in this sphere.</i>	
Cultural Diplomacy	Cumulative number of Confucius Institutes operating each country-year*	2004-2014 global dataset provided by Xiang and Huang (2015). We extended the dataset for 2015-2016 in EAP using the Hanban website and targeted internet searches.
	Cumulative number of Chinese Cultural Centers operating each country-year	Relevant projects from the AidData Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset (version 1.0). We also conducted targeted internet searches to identify any additional cultural centers in the EAP region during the time period for the study.
	Number of of cultural events carried out each country-year (includes culture years, culture weeks, culture months, china tourism years, friendship years, friendship conference, and culture festivals).	China Foreign Affairs Yearbooks, published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, from 2000-2015. AidData compiled cultural events from the chapter of “China's Relations with Diplomatic Countries” from each yearbook. 2016 yearbook was not available at the time of data collection for this project.
Exchange Diplomacy	Cumulative number of Sister/Friendship Cities for each country-year*	China International Friendship City Association (CIFCA, n.d.) plus supplemental data from targeted internet searches for Japan and Malaysia.

	Number of international students studying in China	China Foreign Affairs Yearbooks, 2002-2015. AidData directly collected 2002-2010, and used the data provided by ChinaPower scraped from the same source for 2011-2016 (China Power Team, 2017). Data for 2000-2001 not available.
<b>Financial Diplomacy</b>	Aggregate amount of Chinese government official finance in the form of direct support to national budgets, humanitarian assistance, Infrastructural investments, or debt relief per year.*	Relevant projects from the AidData Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset (version 1.0) between 2000-2014. We replicated the data collection methodology to extend the coverage to 2016 throughout all of the EAP.
<b>Elite-to-elite Diplomacy</b>	Sum of high-level and provincial-level visits by government officials (civilian and military) between the countries each year.*	China Foreign Affairs Yearbooks from 2000-2015. AidData compiled visits of all levels from the chapter of "China's Relations with Diplomatic Countries" from each yearbook. 2016 yearbook was not available at the time of data collection for this project..

\* These are the proxy variables used for statistical analysis.

#### A-3.1.1 Subsetting Official Finance Projects for Financial Diplomacy

The project draws data from Chinese official finance collected using Tracking Under-reported Financial Flow (TUFF) methodology to quantify Chinese financial diplomacy. While official finance covers a wide range of projects, only a subset of those projects qualify as financial diplomacy. Below is a description of how we identified diplomacy projects from our broader dataset on Chinese official flows to include in our measures of financial diplomacy in the EAP region between 2000-2016. All categories include projects classified as Official Development Assistance (ODA), Other Official Flows (OOF), and Vague (Official Finance). We only included projects that have been classified as "Recommended for Research," meaning that the project has at least entered the commitment stage and is not an umbrella project. For more information on these classifications in our dataset, please see our glossary: <http://aiddata.org/pages/tuff-glossary>

- Humanitarian aid: Humanitarian aid projects are those that are given as emergency response or recovery flows. All projects with a sector code of 700 (Humanitarian Aid). The sector codes are assigned by AidData researchers at the time of data collection and are reviewed by AidData staff during the quality assurance stage. We use the OECD-Creditor Reporting Service (OECD-CRS) sector coding scheme to assign sectors to each project.
- Debt relief: Debt relief includes standard debt forgiveness as well as debt restructuring (e.g. delaying repayment for 10 more years, etc). All projects with a sector code of 600 (Action Relating to Debt) were reviewed and selected to include in this category.
- Budget support: Budget support Includes grants given as "gifts" to the receiving country with no stated purpose, grants and loans given to the receiving country with no purpose stated in available sources. We reviewed project descriptions and identified projects that reported China providing money to the receiving government with no earmarked purpose (mostly coming from the 510 sector).
- Infrastructure: We defined infrastructure financing with diplomatic intent as activities involving construction of physical, permanent structures. It includes "upgrades" to existing infrastructure, but does not include

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“maintenance” of existing structures or “rehabilitation” of existing structures. It also excludes rehabilitation of old, historical buildings/structures. We reviewed all project descriptions on relevant to the study period and region to identify relevant projects. Below are illustrative projects included in each sector:

- 110: Building primary, secondary, vocational, or tertiary school buildings (e.g. classrooms), as well as ancillary structures for vocational or universities (e.g. building a dormitory, gymnasium, pool, library, dining hall, etc).
- 120: Construction of hospital and permanent health clinics/health centers, (roaming health clinics were not included), and drug detoxification centers. Includes building new wings of a hospital, a new specialized laboratory for the hospital, medical dormitories, and disability centers.
- 140: Construction of water control/delivery systems, such as the following: aqueducts, water treatment plants, drilling new wells in rural areas, water delivery systems to deliver water directly to houses.
- 150: Construction of government buildings, such as parliament buildings, executive buildings, buildings to house various government ministry offices, civil servant housing buildings, court buildings, and police headquarters/police stations, etc.
- 160: Construction of structures with cultural or recreational meaning, such as large convention centers, stadiums, sports facilities. Also includes construction of general housing complexes and “cultural palaces.”
- 210: Construction of new transportation infrastructure, including all roads (including highways, roll roads, and rural roads), bridges, railways, airports, ports and shipyards. Does not include “rehabilitation” of roads/railways/ports, but does include upgrades or expansion of existing transportation infrastructure.
- 220: Construction/upgrade of communications infrastructure, such as expanding telecom networks, fiber-optic network linking, broadband networks. Also includes building government information technology buildings and and general development of telecommunications industry (activities unspecified).
- 230: Construction of new/upgraded energy production structures or distribution networks – e.g. oil refineries, hydropower stations, power plants (steam/coal/thermal), electricity transmission lines, power dispatching centers, etc.
- 250: Construction of business complexes.
- 310: Construction of irrigation systems (canals, irrigation dams, reservoirs, water supply networks for agriculture) including integrated water resources development projects focused on agricultural productivity, fisheries infrastructure (fish port complexes, fish storage facilities), and agricultural infrastructure (demonstration farms, agricultural laboratories, agricultural centers), etc.
- 320: Construction of fertilizer plants, paper mills, glass factories, textile factories, industrial zones, and general construction activities (buildings for unspecified purposes).
- 410: Construction of a sea wall
- 430: Construction projects involving structures in multiple sectors

In the statistical models, we also separate the financial diplomacy flows along several other criteria, including the following measures:




- Financial Diplomacy (ODA): Includes all four types of financial public diplomacy (humanitarian aid, debt relief, infrastructure, and budget support) that are ODA flows. (includes committed, implemented, and commitment projects).
- Financial diplomacy (OOF): includes all four types of financial PD (humanitarian aid, debt relief, infrastructure, and budget support) that are OOF flows. (includes committed, implemented, and commitment projects).
- Infrastructure (Visible): Includes all infrastructure funding that went to visible sectors (consisting of 110, 120, 150, 160, 210, 250, and agricultural water/irrigation development from the 310 sector). Includes ODA, OOF, Committed and implemented/completed projects.
- Infrastructure (Not Visible): Includes the remaining infrastructure funding that did not go to sectors specified in the visible variable. Includes ODA, OOF, Committed and implemented/completed projects.
- Financial Diplomacy (Committed): Includes all four types of financial public diplomacy (humanitarian aid, debt relief, infrastructure, and budget support) that have only made it to the commitment stage (so there is no evidence they have been implemented yet).
- Financial Diplomacy (Implemented or Completed): Includes all four types of financial public diplomacy (humanitarian aid, debt relief, infrastructure, and budget support) that have made it past the commitment stage to either be in implementation or to be completed.
- Infrastructure (Government Sector): Includes infrastructure flows that went to the government sector specifically (mostly flows to build government buildings). Includes ODA, OOF, Committed, and implemented/completed projects.

### **A-3.2 Chinese Public Diplomacy Data Limitations & Use of Proxy Variables**

Informational Diplomacy: Given time and resource constraints for producing this report, we were unable to find enough systematic data for the countries and time period in the study to quantify informational diplomacy. Given the nature of informational diplomacy, panel country-year data is very difficult to identify, especially since many informational diplomacy activities do not have a centric footprint (i.e. content exchanges would be difficult to track systematically). We initially attempted to track the location of Chinese official media outlets/overseas bureaus across the EAP region, but uncovering data on when those locations were established proved too difficult to verify during the short study period provided. For further research, we believe a data collection exercise to uncover China's formal and/or informal activities in this sphere would enable useful insights on China's use of informational diplomacy.

Cultural Diplomacy: We initially collected data for three indicators of China's activities in the cultural diplomacy sphere for each EAP country: the cumulative number of Confucius Institutes operating each year, the cumulative number of Chinese cultural centers operating each year, and the number of cultural events carried out each country-year (includes culture years, culture weeks, culture months, china tourism years, friendship years, friendship conference, and culture festivals). Out of these indicators, we chose the number of Confucius Institutes in each EAP country per year as our main proxy variable for cultural diplomacy for three reasons: (1) the data on cultural centers and cultural events showed very little variation on a country-year basis, which limits their usefulness for our statistical models, and (2) correlation and principal component analysis shows that the Confucius Institute measure represents the relevant variation for the measures as a group, and (3) Chinese Confucius Institutes are structured to deliver Chinese content (language, culture, messages) and control the narrative around Chinese interests, which represents well the approach and goals of this type of chinese public diplomacy.

### Principal Component Analysis Chart:



Note: Turquoise arrows show only direction of factor loadings (and are proportional to one another), but are not to scale.

**Exchange Diplomacy:** We collected data on two measures of exchange diplomacy, including the cumulative number of Sister or Friendship City arrangements between a Chinese city or province and a city or province in an EAP country as well as the number of students studying in China from each EAP country every year. Between these two measures, the report uses the number of Sister/Friendship Cities as our main proxy variable to represent China's use of exchange diplomacy in each EAP country. While there is a moderate correlation between the number of international students from countries in EAP and number of sister cities in that country, Sister/Friendship city agreements seemed a more reasonable proxy for this type of diplomacy because these arrangements represent a range of engaging, relationship-building activities that require active participation from a Chinese actor (the Chinese city or province). In contrast, the number of students studying in China may be more representative of a given EAP foreign public's current perceptions and relationship with China, rather than China's efforts to create new exchange opportunities. Further research should seek to collect data that more directly reflects China's efforts to deploy exchange tools in other countries each year, such as the number of scholarships offered by the Chinese government, the number of medical team exchanges deployed, or the number of political or technical training exchanges carried out between China and other countries.

**Financial Diplomacy:** To measure how China may be leveraging its power of the purse to woo foreign publics and leaders, we isolated official government financing from China to EAP countries that likely has the most diplomatic intent: Direct budget support, debt relief/restructuring, humanitarian relief programs, and investments in infrastructure within the country. We use the aggregate amount of these flows per EAP country year as a proxy for China's total financial diplomacy in each country. These data represent information curated from official and unofficial sources using the Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) methodology and represent the most complete estimates for Chinese official financing activities available.

**Elite-to-Elite Diplomacy:** We quantify China's efforts to build close, meaningful relationships with other EAP elites using the total number of high- and provincial-level visits by Chinese government and military (including those occurring either in EAP countries, in China, or in a third-party location). If China is interested in building closer relationships and garnering greater influence with a particular EAP, we would expect China's elites to spend more time and effort in engaging those elites with various forms of visits and direct interactions. As such, we believe this measure is a reasonable measure of China's engagement in Elite-to-Elite Diplomacy.

## A-3.3 TUFF Methodology Overview

The financial diplomacy data for this project was drawn from AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, version 1.0. AidData further extended this dataset through 2015 and 2016 for the East Asia and Pacific region for this research study. The Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset captures the known universe of officially-financed Chinese projects in 5 regions of the world from 2000-2014 (including Africa, the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Central and Eastern Europe). It includes concessional and non-concessional sources of funding from Chinese government institutions (including central, state or local government institutions) with development, commercial, or representational intent. More specifically, it captures (a) highly concessional,



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Chinese development projects that meet the OECD's criteria for Official Development Assistance (ODA); and (b) officially-financed Chinese projects that lack development intent or are provided with higher interest rates and lower grant elements (i.e., projects that fall within the OECD's criteria for "Other Official Flows," or OOF). Chinese ODA represents "Chinese aid" in the strictest sense of the term, but Chinese official finance (ODA and Other Official Flows) is sometimes used as a broader definition of aid.

Quantifying and tracking China's public diplomacy efforts is a daunting task, especially with a country that is known for its lack of transparency. Since 2012 though, AidData has been pioneering and refining a methodology called Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) to triangulate information from all available open sources to create a detailed, project-level dataset of all Chinese development finance. The methodology has been adapted to track Chinese financial public diplomacy activities and quantify them in the East Asia and Pacific regions.

The TUFF methodology from AidData is an attempt to resolve the challenges of both unraveling details of Chinese financial flows and making sure the data is comparable to other international standards such as the OECD's Development Assistance Committee standards. It is designed to create project-level data by leveraging information from various sources including media reports, government documents and academic articles. We are in the process of expanding the dataset to cover China's official development finance around the globe from 2000 to 2014. So far our data documents over US\$260 billion of official flows in over 5,000 detailed projects.

The data collection methodology this project uses starts with scraping through Factiva database. In the first stage, researchers search within Factiva, a media database owned by Dow Jones, by country/year using predesigned search terms that follow a consistent pattern across recipients to identify all the projects. Factiva curates content from 33,000 sources in 28 different languages, most of which are news articles. In addition to Factiva, researchers will also scrape official sources including the recipient Aid Management Information Systems (AIMS), the websites of Chinese embassies and IMF Staff Country Reports. Once a project is identified, it will be entered into the data management platform where it will be assigned to a different researcher for the second stage of data curation. During the second stage, researchers verify existing information as well as investigate for more details through triangulating information from media, government sources and academic publications. The triangulation minimizes the inaccuracy caused by incorrect or exaggerated reports. Moreover, the search is not only conducted in English but also in Chinese as well as other recipient languages including Spanish and French by trained language experts and native speakers to fill the data gaps and enhance accuracy. Data recorded for each project include variables such as recipient, year, sector, flow type, participating organization and financial amount. After stage 1 and 2, data go through multiple rounds of rigorous scrutiny by staff and faculty both within and out of AidData before publication.

To simplify the data collection process as well as to increase efficiency and accuracy, AidData also introduced a machine learning technique into the first stage of data collection, which is called the "TUFF robot." The TUFF robot uses sophisticated machine learning software to automate the Factiva searches and identify the relevant search results that are most likely to have project information in them. The software first ingests an exceedingly large amount of training data that "teaches" the software to accurately classify hundreds of thousands of articles into "relevant" and "irrelevant" categories within a few seconds. It has largely reduced the RA time spent on wading through numerous irrelevant articles to identify a project and made data collection on Chinese flows possible. For details on the TUFF methodology, please see the latest version on AidData website: <http://aiddata.org/publications/aiddata-tuff-coder-instructions-version-1-3>

## A-4. PD Typology: Methods

### A-4.1 Creating a Normalized Index of Public Diplomacy Effort Over Time

#### A-4.1.1 - China's PD Portfolio Composition

To create the PD engagement measure, we normalized the 4 variables (sister cities, high-level visits, CIs, and financial PD) across time to a scale of 0-10 and then combined their scores (so we used equal weighting among the 4 types of PD).

#### A-4.2. Creating a Normalized Index of PD Allocation By Country

#### A-4.2.1 - Engagement Score of China's PD

To create the PD engagement measure, we normalized the 4 variables (sister cities, high-level visits, CIs, and financial PD) across countries to a scale of 0-10 and then combined their scores (so we used equal weighting among the 4 types of PD). Using this method, DAC countries rise to the top of the list even though they receive no financial PD - but the exchange, cultural, and elite-to-elite diplomacy activities within their countries outweigh other low income or middle income competitors.

#### A-4.2.2 - Diversity Score of China's PD

To create the diversity score, we took the normalized scores of the 4 PD types for each country, and calculated the distance between what we would expect for a well-balanced portfolio (where each type of PD took up 25% of the total engagement). E.g. Japan was just about 33% sister cities, CIs, and visits each, with 0% financial PD. So its calculations looked like  $|33\%-25\%|+|33\%-25\%|+|33\%-25\%|+|0\%-25\%| = .49$ . To transform these scores so they are more intuitive (with higher values representing higher levels of diversity), the value was then inverted using this equation:  $2 - (\text{diversity score, e.g. .49 in the example above}) = 1.51$ . While the actual value does not represent much valuable information, the comparison of the value across countries reveals useful and interesting differences in the mix of tools that China uses in each EAP country.

### A-5. Case Studies: Methods & Approach

#### A-5.1 - Case study approach

The three country case studies were used to gather on-the-ground insights in addition to capturing the idiosyncrasies of China's public diplomacy engagements in the EAP region. The expectation is that a combination of these three countries provide the study a representative sample of opinions across the EAP region.

For each country case study, interviewees were recruited by the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) using their organizational networks. This initial list for each country was supplemented with snowball sampling by each of the country teams once they were on the ground. All interviewees agreed to speak with AidData on the condition of anonymity.

In each country, AidData deployed the teams of two staff members - one as the primary interviewer, and one as the primary notetaker. All information gleaned from the interviews was vetted and contextualized using desk research.

#### A-5.2 - Breakdown of interviewees across four cohorts of individuals interviewed in each country

	Philippines	Malaysia	Fiji
Academics/Journalists/Think Tanks	11	15	5
Government Officials	8	7	4
Foreign Embassies	3	2	4
Social/Cultural Organizations	2	1	2
Total = 64	24	25	15

#### A-5.3 - Interview guide for semi-structured interviews:

Overarching Questions to Answer with Interviews:

- Extent of Chinese PD: What are the motivations behind Chinese public diplomacy in [insert country]? What types of PD activities does China undertake with citizens vs. policymaking elites in [insert country]? To what degree do individuals in [insert country] attribute specific public diplomacy investments/interventions to

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China? How does this compare with the public diplomacy activities undertaken by the US or others in [insert country]?

- Perceptions of Chinese PD: How are China's public diplomacy efforts perceived at the country level in terms of motives and influence? To what extent do officials and citizens view their country as being aligned (or not aligned) with China in terms of economic, political, and security preferences? What are the mechanisms by which PD efforts generate the desired attitude and behavior changes among citizens and policymakers in line with China's interests?
- Results of Chinese PD: What do officials and citizens see as the discrete downstream consequences (or ripple effects) of China's public diplomacy efforts in [insert country]? How does public diplomacy lead to a change in the perception of China in [insert country] or improved strategic ties? To what extent do PD overtures work in concert with, or are undercut by, China's other foreign policy tools?

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#### Introduction [2-3 min]

[Insert formal name of interviewee], thank you very much for taking the time to talk with us.

My name is [say your name]. My colleagues, [insert names of team], will be assisting me in taking notes today. Before we begin, I wanted to provide some additional background about our study and how we will be using the information you share with us in today's interview. Would that be okay?

As we mentioned in our previous correspondence, we work with AidData, a research and innovation lab based at the College of William and Mary in the U.S.

We are implementing a project to measure and analyze China's public diplomacy activities in the East Asia and Pacific regions that we hope will help spur new research, greater understanding, and increased dialogue regarding the role of public diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy.

As part of this project, we are conducting 3 country case studies in Philippines, Malaysia and Fiji to explore, in depth, the drivers of China's public diplomacy activities and assess whether and how Chinese investments have influenced, or failed to influence, strategic ties with China. For the purpose of this study, we define public diplomacy as... "a collection of instruments used by state or non-state actors from a 'sending' country with the intention to influence the perceptions, preferences, and actions of foreign citizens in a 'receiving' country in favor of the 'sending' country's values, culture, and worldview."

The information from this interview will provide us insights as we attempt to build greater understanding on the dynamics, methods and modalities of Chinese Public Diplomacy in the East Asia-Pacific region. To be clear, we will not directly quote or cite you at any point in our research without your explicit consent. We have prepared questions today to guide our conversation, but please also feel free to share additional insights as you feel appropriate.

To make sure that you are aware of the minor risks associated with this study, we would like you to read the following document [note to interviewer: give Informed Consent Statement to the person you are interviewing]. If you agree, please sign it at the bottom.

The interview itself should take approximately 45-60 minutes. Does this time frame still work for you?

With your consent, we would also like to record this interview. Is this agreeable to you? Only the interviewers will have access to the voice memos.

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#### Experience with PD Questions [10 mins]

Interviewer: First, I'd like to start off with some questions about how you and your [insert organization/department] are involved with public diplomacy activities in [insert country].

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1. How do you or your colleagues at [insert organization] typically define or conceptualize public diplomacy in your own work? What do you think are the defining characteristics that make a given activity part of public diplomacy?
  2. In your role at [insert organization] or previous positions, please describe any experience you've had participating in, evaluating, or monitoring public diplomacy activities in [insert country].
    1. Optional drill-down: What are some specific examples of public diplomacy activities you've experienced yourself or are aware of in [insert country]?
  3. In your experience, which foreign countries are most active in carrying out public diplomacy activities targeted towards citizens or policymaking elites in [insert country]?
    1. Optional drill-down: To what extent do you see these public diplomacy activities in [insert country] being carried out by official representatives of a foreign government (i.e., an embassy official) versus unofficial, non-state actors (i.e., foreign media, universities)?
- 

### **Extent and Drivers of PD Questions [10 mins]**

Interviewer: As I mentioned at the start of the interview, we are particularly interested in Chinese public diplomacy efforts in the East Asia and Pacific region. With that in mind, I'd like to ask some follow-up questions about how you view the reach and motivations behind Chinese public diplomacy in [insert country].

1. In your experience, what are the major types of activities China engages in as part of their public diplomacy in [insert country]?
    1. Optional drill-down: In what ways does China use broad-based channels to "push" out information or cultural content about Chinese values, norms, and policy positions to the general public in [insert country]?
    2. Optional drill-down: To what extent does China employ more targeted strategies to cultivate relational ties, generate good will, or facilitate the exchange of ideas between its citizens and those in [insert country]?
  2. What do you think is China's motivation for investing in these public diplomacy activities? What do they hope to gain or achieve?
  3. How would you compare the extent of China's public diplomacy activities to that of other foreign powers in [insert country]?
- 

### **Perceptions of the 'sending country' Questions [10 mins]**

Interviewer: We would like to ask you some questions about public perception as well as your own perception of the benefits and pitfalls of Chinese public diplomacy investments in your country.

1. Of the activities you mentioned, which do you think are most effective in increasing visibility and awareness of Chinese people, culture, and viewpoints in [insert country]?
  1. Optional drill-down: Do you think most of China's public diplomacy investments in [insert country] are visible/quantifiable? Why?
2. To what extent do think China's public diplomacy activities contribute to a greater understanding of, and interest in, Chinese people, culture, and viewpoints among citizens in [insert country]?
  1. Optional drill-down: What specific examples have you observed in practice of this type of attitude change in [insert country]?

- 
2. Optional drill-down: Why do you think that these public diplomacy activities were able to bring about this change?
  3. How would you say that China is perceived by the general public in [insert country] and has this changed over the years?
    1. Optional drill-down: Is there a difference between how the Chinese government is perceived versus the view of Chinese people, culture, or society more broadly? If so, what do you see as the main differences? Why do you think that is?
    2. Optional drill-down: Are there specific events that have reinforced or changed the dynamic between the two countries dramatically? If so, what might those be?
    3. Optional drill-down: Are there established/influential pro or anti China lobbies in [insert country]? How prominent or influential do you think these groups are in influencing the attitudes of citizens and policymakers?
  4. Do you think there is a difference in how the general public and policymaking elites view China in your country? If so, why do you think that is?
- 

#### **Results of PD Questions [10 mins]**

Interviewer: Thank you very much for sharing these insights about China's public diplomacy activities and how China is perceived in [insert country]. Now, we would like to ask you some questions about your views on the effectiveness and some specific impacts of China's public diplomacy investments in [insert country].

1. To what extent do you feel that citizens and policymakers in [insert country] support China's specific foreign policy positions or more broadly have adopted China's values, norms, and viewpoints as their own?
  1. Optional drill-down: Can you give us some specific examples that you've observed as to why you think this is the case?
2. What role, if any, do you see China's public diplomacy efforts playing in terms of influencing these attitudes in [insert country]?
  1. Optional drill-down: Are there specific public diplomacy efforts that worked well for bolstering China's national image in your country? If so, how did these efforts change people's perception of China in your country?
3. In what ways do you think that exposure to, or participation in, Chinese public diplomacy activities has led to specific changes in the behavior of the general public in [insert country]?
4. To what extent have you seen indications that policymakers in [insert country] are adopting Chinese viewpoints or foreign policy positions through their exposure to, or participation in, Chinese-sponsored public diplomacy activities?
  1. Optional drill down: Are there specific public diplomacy efforts that were particularly influential in changing some of these behaviors or attitudes that you have observed in practice? If so, why were these activities so influential? What was the end result?
5. How would you compare the relative effectiveness of China's public diplomacy activities to that of other foreign powers in [insert country]?
  1. Optional drill-down: Do you see that China's public diplomacy efforts are generating a positive or negative response from citizens and policymakers in [insert country]?
  2. Optional drill-down: To what extent do China's other interactions with [insert country] in terms of security, diplomacy, and development either reinforce or undercut the ability of its public diplomacy efforts to generate the desired results?

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### Closing [1-2 minutes]

Interviewer: We've come to the end of our prepared questions for you. Thank you very much for your time today and for sharing your thoughts with us. We appreciate your insights which will add great value to our study. Over the next few days, we will be interviewing other experts to discuss Chinese public diplomacy in your country.

- Are there any other individuals with whom we should speak to address one or more of the questions that we asked you during this interview?
- Additionally, do you have any relevant documents to share with us that may be helpful to us in this study?

Please don't hesitate to be in touch if you have any questions or additional insights. We will be analyzing the input from our interviews and producing an assessment report over the next couple of months. We will be in touch with you as soon as we have a final product to share.

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## A-6. Survey Data & Methods

### A-6.1 Asiabarometer Overview

In estimating the relationship between country-level measures of public diplomacy inputs and public attitudes at the individual level, we use data from the AsiaBarometer survey. We use responses from Waves 3 and 4 of the survey, which were administered between March 2010 - March 2012 and June 2014 - November 2015, respectively. For details on the sampling methodology (nationally representative surveys with standardized questionnaire instruments), see Asiabarometer's detailed description on their website at <http://www.asianbarometer.org/survey/survey-methods>. Countries surveyed in Wave 3 include: Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Mongolia, Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Vietnam, Hong Kong, China, and Cambodia. Countries surveyed in Wave 4 include: Taiwan, Singapore, Philippines, Mongolia, Thailand, Malaysia, China, Myanmar, Indonesia, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Cambodia. However, at the time of writing, AsiaBarometer has only released the Wave 4 results for Mongolia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, South Korea, and Cambodia.

### A-6.2 Asiabarometer: Relevant Questions

These waves included questions that gauged respondents' perceptions of China in various ways. We use three core questions in our analysis. First, respondents were asked, "Which country has the most influence in Asia?" We code a respondent's answer as '1' if she responded with "China," and zero otherwise. Second, respondents were asked, "Which country should be a model for your country's future development?" Again, we code a respondent's answer as '1' if she responded with "China," and zero otherwise. Finally, respondents were asked "What is the character of China's influence on your country?" We code a respondent's answer as '1' if she selected "Positive," "Somewhat positive," or "Very positive," and 0 otherwise.

## A-7. Statistical Models: Methods & Results

As part of the research design for this study, we ran three series of statistical models to test (1) The factors that affect where China deploys its various public diplomacy tools (A-7.1), (2) The effects of public diplomacy tools on EAP public perceptions of China (A-7.2), and (3) the effects of public diplomacy tools on greater foreign policy voting (A-7.3). For details on these statistical models, please see the sections below.



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## A-7.1 - Determinants of Chinese Public Diplomacy

### A-7.1.1 Model Specifications

In explaining the distribution of Chinese public diplomacy investments, we focus on four outcome indicators: the number of “Sister Cities” in a given country during a given year, the number of Confucius Institutes in a given country during a given year, the deployment of financial diplomacy (budget support, infrastructure financing, humanitarian support, and debt relief), and elite-to-elite diplomacy (official and military visits). We include a variety of factors that capture potential political, economic, cultural attributes of recipient countries as well as their relationships with China in terms of how they correlate with Chinese diplomacy.

Our models use the following potential drivers to identify relevant relationships with our outcome measures.

**Economic.** We also include a number of factors capturing the economic environment in the host country. First, we include a measure of resource rents as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP) from the World Development Indicators. Second, we include a measure of GDP divided by population to understand how the baseline level of development in a country correlates with Chinese diplomacy. Third, we include a measure counting the number of new Chinese firm entries in a given country during a given year to understand how Chinese employs public diplomacy in contexts where Chinese firms are investing. Finally, we include the logged total of Chinese imports to the country in question to help determine whether Chinese public diplomacy efforts tend to concentrate in contexts that are more valuable export markets for China.

**Security and Foreign Policy.** To understand how security-related factors influence Chinese public diplomacy, we include a measure counting the number of Militarized Interstate Disputes that a country experienced with China during the previous year (Jones et al., 1996). Jones et al (1996) defines militarized interstate disputes as “united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. Disputes are composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war.” This measure is a commonly-used measure of territorial disputes in security literature, and provides data until the year 2010, giving us coverage until the year 2011 with the one-year lag. In addition, we use a dichotomous indicator of whether or not a given country had a defense pact with the United States during a given year (Gibler, 2004). This source provides data until 2012, and we extend the last value for each country in 2012 through 2016. To determine how if at all a country’s foreign policy alignment influences patterns of Chinese public diplomacy investments, we include a measure that records the distance between a given country’s “ideal point” and China’s ideal point in the United Nations General Assembly (Bailey et al., 2015).

**Domestic conditions & context.** To capture the domestic political context, we use three measures. First, we include the polity2 composite democracy variable from the Polity IV project (Marshall et al., 2017). This measure varies between -10 (least democratic) and 10 (most democratic). Second, we use the Cross-National Time Series Archive data set to construct a measure that counts the total number of strikes, riots, and anti-government demonstrations that occurred during a given country-year (Banks 2013). We call this measure Domestic unrest. Finally, we also include a measure of Domestic coalition turnover from the Change in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS) data set (Mattes et. al., 2016). This data set examines instances of leadership turnover in all countries with a population of at least 500,000 and determines whether new leaders represent societal groups that differ from their predecessors (e.g., leaders that represent different political parties). The original data set covers the period of 1919-2008, we use DiLorenzo and Cheng’s (2017) extended version of the data which extends coverage to 2014.

We also include a number of time-invariant factors in our statistical models that serve as proxies for the overall political relationship between China and potential recipients. First, we include a snapshot measure of Chinese migrants in a given country in 2010. Second, we include a measure that counts the number of historical periods during which a country received aid from China as recorded in Bartke (1989), Lin (1993), and Dreher and Fuchs (2016). Finally, we include a dummy variable that records whether or not a given country is a DAC member or not. We include these variables to examine their relationship with Chinese investments in a context where we do not account for country-level unobservables. Like the US ally indicator variable mentioned above, these variables drop out of the models that include country-fixed effects since they do not vary during our temporal domain.

To account for variation in the ease with which China can engage in public diplomacy in different country contexts, we include a measure of Internet users per capita from the Cross-National Time Series Archive data set (Banks 2013).

In explaining China's public diplomacy investments, we fit panel regression models to estimate the relationship between various country-year-level factors and Chinese public diplomacy inputs in East Asia and the Pacific. Our units of analysis are East Asian and Pacific countries (excluding Taiwan) throughout the period of 2000-2016. To allow for examining country-level characteristics that do not or are slow to change over time, we estimate models with and without country- and year-fixed effects. To account for nonconstant variance in errors, we estimate heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Since we are interested in looking at how conditions in (potential) recipient countries influence China's public diplomacy investments (and not the other way around), we lag all of our explanatory variables by one year to ensure that the measurement of those factors is temporally prior to the measure of our dependent variables.

### A-7.1.2 Model and Data Limitations

We ran both fixed effects and non-fixed effects models for this analysis. Unfortunately many of our covariates of interest did not vary over time, so they were dropped in the fixed effects model. We have included a copy of the non-fixed effects model to show the potential relationships between those covariates and the dependent variables. In addition, we would have liked to include a variable measuring the country's perception of China, but the data coverage was not detailed enough for a panel regression.

### A-7.1.3 Statistical Results Tables

**Table A-7.1.3.1: Determinants of Chinese public diplomacy efforts - Country & Year Fixed Effects**

	Dependent Variable:			
	Sister cities (1)	Confucius Institutes (2)	Financial diplomacy (3)	Traditional diplomacy (4)
Militarized disputes with China	-1.096 (1.540)	-0.641 ** (0.247)	1.822 (2.532)	-0.162 (1.490)
Resource rents (pct. GDP)	-0.319* (0.149)	-0.073* (0.033)	0.056 (0.090)	0.225 *** (0.065)
GDP per cap. (2000 USD)	-0.003 *** (0.001)	-0.001 *** (0.0001)	-0.0003 (0.0002)	0.0004* (0.0002)
New firm entries	0.313 ** (0.116)	0.071 ** (0.023)	0.028 (0.027)	-0.023 (0.023)
Chinese imports (log)	-4.632 (2.915)	-0.035 (0.651)	3.214* (1.282)	-4.623 *** (1.385)
Distance from China in UNGA	-1.997 (2.312)	-1.596* (0.758)	-3.460* (1.749)	0.718 (2.550)
Internet users per capita	53.026 ** (18.190)	10.222 *** (2.732)	-2.727 (3.548)	-37.771 *** (6.754)
Polity IV score	0.491* (0.199)	-0.206 (0.187)	-0.754 (0.478)	-0.284 (0.197)
Domestic coalition turnover	1.538 (1.231)	-0.110 (0.224)	-0.968 (1.842)	-0.127 (1.662)
Domestic unrest	0.365 (0.248)	0.204* (0.103)	-0.137 (0.551)	-0.062 (0.238)
N. countries	14	14	15	15
Country FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	194	194	208	208
R <sup>2</sup>	0.604	0.503	0.101	0.232
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.510	0.385	-0.095	0.065

\* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

Two-tailed tests. Robust (HC1) estimated standard errors in parentheses.

Models 1 and 2 include lagged outcome variable (1 year).

All explanatory variables lagged by one year.

Table A-7.1.3.2: Determinants of Chinese Public Diplomacy, no fixed effects.

	Dependent Variable:			
	Sister cities (1)	Confucius Institutes (2)	Financial diplomacy (3)	Traditional diplomacy (4)
Militarized disputes with China	27.375 (15.820)	-1.037** (0.378)	2.339 (2.229)	-5.314 (3.124)
Defense pact with US	95.241** (32.683)	0.594 (0.499)	-1.030 (1.393)	-3.881 (2.631)
Resource rents (pct. GDP)	1.487** (0.576)	-0.014 (0.016)	0.118* (0.055)	-0.130* (0.065)
GDP per cap. (2000 USD)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.00004 (0.0001)	0.0004* (0.0002)
New firm entries	0.584** (0.188)	0.063*** (0.018)	0.041* (0.020)	-0.024 (0.030)
Chinese imports (log)	-10.629** (3.796)	-0.335** (0.113)	1.080 (0.616)	1.992* (0.883)
Distance from China in UNGA	6.525 (14.159)	0.527 (0.391)	0.417 (2.282)	-2.540 (2.161)
Internet users per capita	75.681* (34.264)	7.938** (3.033)	-5.925 (5.706)	-36.606*** (10.236)
Polity IV score	-0.062 (0.743)	0.022 (0.062)	-0.159 (0.189)	-0.013 (0.172)
Domestic coalition turnover	-0.655 (4.264)	0.491** (0.168)	-0.305 (2.011)	-0.418 (1.430)
Domestic unrest	-0.168 (0.973)	0.177 (0.131)	-0.170 (0.498)	0.252 (0.306)
Chinese migrants in 2010	0.0003** (0.0001)	0.00001*** (0.00000)	-0.00001** (0.00001)	-0.00001 (0.00001)
No. historical aid periods	15.158* (6.207)	0.243 (0.239)	2.727*** (0.589)	-1.117 (1.040)
DAC member	142.133*** (40.059)	4.226*** (1.274)	0.345 (2.296)	14.146*** (3.718)
Constant	0.500 (17.116)	0.663 (0.681)	-0.973 (3.043)	3.549 (4.846)
N. countries	14	14	15	15
Country FEs	N	N	N	N
Year FEs	N	N	N	N
Observations	194	194	208	208
R <sup>2</sup>	0.907	0.711	0.493	0.414
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.900	0.686	0.456	0.371

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Two-tailed tests. Robust (HC1) estimated standard errors in parentheses.

Models 1 and 2 include lagged outcome variable (1 year).

All explanatory variables lagged by one year.

## A-7.2 - Effects of PD on Perceptions

### A-7.2.1 Model Specifications

In examining the relationship between Chinese public diplomacy efforts and perceptions of China, we estimate a set of probit models where the outcome variable is an individual survey respondent's response to various survey questions.

To determine what factors might drive positive perceptions of China, its regional influence, and its development model, we test three types of potential determinants: Bilateral Chinese public diplomacy activities, respondent characteristics, and country characteristics.

Chinese Public Diplomacy Activities: Consistent with other statistical models in this report, we test the effects of 1) the number of sister city agreements between cities or provinces in the receiving country and a city or province in China as a measure of exchange diplomacy, (2) the number of established Confucius Institutes in the country as a measure of cultural diplomacy, (3) the total amount of official financing with diplomacy intent, and (4) the number of official visits between political or military elites as a proxy for elite persuasion diplomacy.

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Based on our theory of change, we expect public diplomacy efforts that build strong relationships or increase familiarity with Chinese culture, values, people, or worldview between the receiving country and China will result in increased perceptions of China's influence in the region. We expect these public diplomacy efforts would also decrease the influence of other major players in the region, such as the US.

**Respondent Characteristics:** We test whether different characteristics specific to the respondent affect their perceptions of China and the US, such as gender, age, education level, urban or rural home location, employment status, and income level.

**Country Characteristics:** As a person's broad perceptions are likely influenced by the concepts and perceptions they are socialized to in their country, we also test for some broad country characteristics that could affect how a person interprets China's actions in the international sphere. This includes characteristics such as trade openness, level of inflation, unemployment rate, level of democracy/autocracy in the country, and income level for the country as a whole.

We analyze responses to three questions contained in Waves 3 and 4 of the Asiabarometer survey (see section A-6 for details on our use of Asiabarometer data). We take averages of our measures of Chinese public diplomacy investments and country-level control variables across the 10-year period preceding each survey wave. This was necessary to run statistical models for EAP because not all countries were included in both waves, so to expand our country base, we averaged the measures across the countries for the two years.

#### **A-7.2.2 Model and Data Limitations**

Given limitations in the data available from Asiabarometer, we were not able to build a statistical model that measured the actual changes in public's perception of China over time. As such, our current models provide a snapshot view of how factors over the previous 10 years might effect or relate to a person's perception of China. Caution should be used therefore before asserting causation rather than association in our results.

## A-7.2.3 Statistical Results Tables

Table A-7.2.3.1: Perceptions of China and public diplomacy investments (Asiabarameter)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	China positive influence? (1)	China best dev't model? (2)	China most regional influence? (3)
Sister cities	−0.002 (0.001)	−0.008*** (0.002)	−0.0005 (0.001)
Confucius Institutes	0.061*** (0.012)	0.013 (0.015)	0.081*** (0.012)
Financial diplomacy	0.151*** (0.012)	0.095*** (0.014)	0.017 (0.011)
Traditional diplomacy	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	−0.007*** (0.001)
Female	−0.008 (0.024)	−0.075* (0.029)	−0.151*** (0.023)
Age	−0.0002 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
College	−0.037 (0.029)	−0.039 (0.036)	0.153*** (0.027)
Urban	−0.089** (0.028)	0.030 (0.035)	0.276*** (0.027)
Employed	0.017 (0.026)	0.047 (0.033)	0.009 (0.025)
Low income	−0.021 (0.027)	−0.001 (0.033)	−0.130*** (0.026)
Trade openness	0.003** (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Inflation	−0.085*** (0.013)	−0.020 (0.017)	0.096*** (0.013)
Unemployment rate	0.105*** (0.014)	−0.086*** (0.018)	−0.090*** (0.014)
Polity IV score	−0.062*** (0.011)	0.084*** (0.015)	0.025* (0.011)
GDP / pop. (2000 USD)	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.0001*** (0.00001)	0.00003** (0.00001)
Wave 4 dummy	0.064 (0.037)	0.015 (0.045)	−0.286*** (0.037)
Constant	−3.274*** (0.368)	−3.614*** (0.482)	−0.462 (0.369)
Observations	13,538	13,862	13,520
Log Likelihood	−7,441.011	−4,727.245	−8,339.854
Akaike Inf. Crit.	14,916.020	9,488.490	16,713.710

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors in parentheses.

Table A-7.2.3.2: Interacting public diplomacy with respondent age

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	China positive influence? (1)	China best dev't model? (2)	China most regional influence? (3)
Sister cities	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.010*** (0.002)	−0.0003 (0.002)
Age	0.028*** (0.005)	0.012* (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)
Confucius Institutes	0.073*** (0.019)	0.045* (0.022)	0.125*** (0.018)
Financial diplomacy	0.192*** (0.013)	0.111*** (0.016)	0.046*** (0.013)
Traditional diplomacy	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	−0.012*** (0.001)
Female	−0.011 (0.024)	−0.075* (0.030)	−0.150*** (0.023)
College	−0.027 (0.029)	−0.039 (0.036)	0.156*** (0.027)
Urban	−0.092** (0.028)	0.027 (0.035)	0.273*** (0.027)
Employed	0.025 (0.027)	0.053 (0.033)	0.012 (0.026)
Low income	−0.024 (0.027)	−0.003 (0.033)	−0.135*** (0.026)
Trade openness	0.003** (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Inflation	−0.087*** (0.013)	−0.021 (0.017)	0.095*** (0.013)
Unemployment rate	0.105*** (0.014)	−0.087*** (0.018)	−0.090*** (0.014)
Polity IV score	−0.062*** (0.011)	0.086*** (0.015)	0.025* (0.011)
GDP / pop. (2000 USD)	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.0001*** (0.00001)	0.00003** (0.00001)
Wave 4 dummy	0.067 (0.037)	0.016 (0.045)	−0.281*** (0.037)
Age × Sister cities	−0.00002 (0.00001)	0.00002 (0.00002)	−0.00001 (0.00001)
Age × Confucius Institutes	−0.0002 (0.0003)	−0.001 (0.0004)	−0.001*** (0.0003)
Age × Financial diplomacy	−0.001*** (0.0002)	−0.0004* (0.0002)	−0.001*** (0.0001)
Age × Traditional diplomacy	−0.0001* (0.00003)	−0.00003 (0.00004)	0.0001*** (0.00003)
Constant	−4.382*** (0.413)	−4.093*** (0.529)	−0.531 (0.407)
Observations	13,538	13,862	13,520
Log Likelihood	−7,416.648	−4,719.986	−8,320.848
Akaike Inf. Crit.	14,875.300	9,481.973	16,683.700

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors in parentheses.



Table A-7.2.3.3: Disaggregating financial diplomacy as determinants of attitudes (Asiabarameter)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	China positive influence?	China best dev't model?	China most regional influence?
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Fin. PD (ODA)	0.099 (0.077)	-0.010 (0.082)	-0.354*** (0.067)
Fin. PD (OOF)	0.022*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.004)	-0.008* (0.003)
Infrastructure (visible)	0.048** (0.018)	0.013 (0.019)	-0.057*** (0.016)
Infrastructure (not)	0.007 (0.007)	0.021** (0.008)	-0.004 (0.006)
Fin. PD (commit.)	0.034 (0.018)	0.034 (0.019)	0.076*** (0.016)
Fin. PD (impl.)	-0.038 (0.046)	0.037 (0.046)	0.137*** (0.039)
Infrastructure (gov't)	-0.029* (0.015)	-0.008 (0.015)	0.025 (0.013)
Female	0.001 (0.026)	-0.072* (0.030)	-0.142*** (0.025)
Age	-0.0002 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)
College	-0.033 (0.031)	-0.028 (0.037)	0.134*** (0.029)
Urban	-0.063* (0.030)	0.075* (0.036)	0.307*** (0.029)
Employed	0.006 (0.028)	0.038 (0.034)	0.006 (0.027)
Low income	-0.049 (0.030)	0.001 (0.034)	-0.150*** (0.028)
Trade openness	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)
Inflation	-0.260*** (0.034)	-0.115** (0.035)	0.033 (0.031)
Unemployment rate	-0.137*** (0.033)	-0.259*** (0.035)	-0.122*** (0.028)
Polity IV score	0.096*** (0.020)	0.213*** (0.025)	0.058** (0.018)
GDP / pop. (2000 USD)	0.0001*** (0.00002)	0.0001*** (0.00002)	-0.0001** (0.00002)
Wave 4 dummy	-0.184* (0.082)	-0.338*** (0.086)	0.117 (0.073)
Constant	0.403 (0.792)	-1.580 (0.857)	3.528*** (0.698)
Observations	12,068	12,408	12,039
Log Likelihood	-6,493.186	-4,538.588	-7,348.725
Akaike Inf. Crit.	13,026.370	9,117.175	14,737.450

\* p&lt;0.05; \*\* p&lt;0.01; \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors in parentheses.

## A-7.3 - Effects of PD on Foreign Policy Alignment

### A-7.3.1 Model Specifications

To measure how and whether Chinese public diplomacy investments correlate with greater foreign policy alignment with China, we use data on patterns in voting in the United Nations General Assembly. This is a variable that is widely used in the foreign policy literature to study foreign policy change and similarity (e.g., Dreher et al. 2018). Bailey et al. (2017) estimate a country's foreign policy "ideal point" in a given year based on its voting record in the United Nations. We calculate the difference between a given EAP country's ideal point and China's ideal point in a given year as our dependent variable. In interpreting the coefficients from the models, negative coefficients indicate

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that as the given covariate increases, the distance between a country's ideal point and China's ideal point becomes smaller, i.e., they have more similar foreign policy interests. So that these changes can be interpreted in terms of convergence / divergence, we control for a country's similarity to China in the previous year and include country-fixed effects in our estimation.

To determine what factors might drive increased foreign policy alignment, we test four types of potential determinants:

- **Chinese Public Diplomacy Activities:** Consistent with other statistical models in this report, we test the effects of 1) the number of sister city agreements between cities or provinces in the receiving country and a city or province in China as a measure of exchange diplomacy, (2) the number of established Confucius Institutes in the country as a measure of cultural diplomacy', (3) the total amount of official financing with diplomacy intent, and (4) the number of official visits between political or military elites as a proxy for elite persuasion diplomacy.
- **Economic Conditions:** How much do economic conditions or opportunities affect foreign policy alignment with China? We test whether resource rents, income level, Chinese FDI, trade openness, or unemployment rate affects a country's alignment. These are measured by resource rents as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP per capita, the number of new firm chinese entries into a country every year, trade as a percentage of GDP, and the unemployment rate.
- **Foreign Policy and Security Alignment:** We test whether previous foreign policy alignment and security ties or threats might affect current UNGA voting. We include a measure for how aligned a country's UNGA votes were the previous year, as we would expect close alignment in one year would predict close alignment in the next year. We also include a measure for the number of militarized disputes with China, with the theory that such events would decrease foreign policy alignment.
- **Domestic Political Context:** Domestic political environments may also impact a country's alignment with China. Aspects that we test include level of democratization (Polity IV measure), domestic unrest, and domestic coalition turnover.

In examining the relationship between Chinese public diplomacy efforts and alignment with China, we estimate a set of panel regression models with country- and year-fixed effects. Our units of analysis are East Asian and Pacific countries (excluding Taiwan) throughout the period of 2000-2016. To account for correlated errors within countries, we estimate country-clustered standard errors.

## A-7.3.2 Statistical Results Tables

Table A-7.3.2.1: Chinese public diplomacy and alignment with China in the UN General Assembly

	Dependent Variable:				
	Distance from China's ideal point in UNGA				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Sister/friendship cities	−0.001 (0.001)				0.001 (0.001)
Confucius Institutes		−0.009* (0.004)			−0.011* (0.004)
Financial diplomacy			0.002 (0.002)		0.002 (0.002)
Traditional diplomacy				−0.002 (0.001)	−0.002* (0.001)
Resource rents (pct. GDP)	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.001 (0.002)	0.00003 (0.003)	−0.001 (0.002)
Domestic turnover	−0.018 (0.040)	−0.020 (0.039)	−0.022 (0.038)	−0.023 (0.038)	−0.023 (0.039)
Conflict events	−0.001 (0.008)	−0.0001 (0.007)	−0.001 (0.007)	−0.002 (0.008)	0.0005 (0.007)
Polity IV score	0.002 (0.007)	−0.0005 (0.007)	0.003 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	−0.0002 (0.007)
Militarized disputes with China	0.033 (0.021)	0.027 (0.021)	0.034 (0.020)	0.040 (0.022)	0.023 (0.018)
GDP per capita (constant 2000 USD)	−0.00002** (0.00001)	−0.00002** (0.00001)	−0.00001** (0.00000)	−0.00002** (0.00000)	−0.00002* (0.00001)
New firm entries	0.002 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Trade openness	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)
Unemployment rate	0.011 (0.014)	0.009 (0.012)	0.007 (0.013)	0.011 (0.013)	0.007 (0.013)
Distance from China in UN voting (t-1)	0.584*** (0.073)	0.582*** (0.075)	0.588*** (0.074)	0.580*** (0.073)	0.585*** (0.075)
Country FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	228	228	228	228	228
R <sup>2</sup>	0.367	0.374	0.370	0.367	0.382
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.231	0.240	0.236	0.231	0.237

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Two-tailed tests. Robust (HC1) estimated standard errors in parentheses.

Table A-7.3.2.2: Disaggregating financial diplomacy in explaining voting similarity

	Dependent Variable:							
	Distance from China's ideal point in UNGA							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Fin. PD (ODA)	-0.002 (0.002)							-0.007* (0.003)
Fin. PD (OOF)		0.003* (0.001)						0.004* (0.002)
Infrastructure (visible)			0.002 (0.002)					0.0003 (0.002)
Infrastructure (not)				-0.0004 (0.001)				-0.006*** (0.001)
Fin. PD (commit.)					0.002 (0.001)			0.003* (0.001)
Fin. PD (impl.)						0.002 (0.002)		0.007 (0.005)
Infrastructure (gov't)							-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
Resource rents (pct. GDP)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.0005 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Domestic turnover	-0.041 (0.034)	-0.035 (0.033)	-0.040 (0.033)	-0.040 (0.034)	-0.038 (0.032)	-0.038 (0.034)	-0.037 (0.033)	-0.032 (0.035)
Conflict events	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Polity IV score	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.0002 (0.003)
Militarized disputes with China	0.011 (0.019)	0.008 (0.018)	0.006 (0.019)	0.010 (0.019)	0.005 (0.020)	0.006 (0.016)	0.009 (0.018)	0.009 (0.017)
GDP per capita (constant 2000 USD)	-0.00001** (0.00000)	-0.00001** (0.00000)	-0.00001** (0.00000)	-0.00001** (0.00000)	-0.00001** (0.00000)	-0.00001** (0.00000)	-0.00001** (0.00000)	-0.00001* (0.00000)
New firm entries	0.002*** (0.0005)	0.001*** (0.0004)	0.002*** (0.0004)	0.002** (0.0005)	0.002*** (0.0004)	0.001** (0.0005)	0.002*** (0.0005)	0.001*** (0.0004)
Trade openness	-0.001* (0.0004)	-0.001* (0.0004)	-0.001* (0.0004)	-0.001* (0.0004)	-0.001* (0.0004)	-0.001** (0.0004)	-0.001* (0.0004)	-0.001 (0.0005)
Unemployment rate	0.019* (0.007)	0.015* (0.006)	0.014* (0.007)	0.016* (0.007)	0.014* (0.007)	0.013 (0.007)	0.016* (0.007)	0.013 (0.007)
Distance from China in UN voting (t-1)	0.535*** (0.054)	0.545*** (0.055)	0.541*** (0.052)	0.534*** (0.054)	0.528*** (0.054)	0.539*** (0.056)	0.532*** (0.053)	0.557*** (0.058)
Country FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	214	214	214	214	214	214	214	214
R <sup>2</sup>	0.398	0.407	0.397	0.395	0.400	0.398	0.397	0.448
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.263	0.274	0.262	0.259	0.265	0.263	0.262	0.300

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Two-tailed tests. Robust (HC1) estimated standard errors in parentheses.

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