

**Foreign Aid, Foreign Policy, and Domestic Government Legitimacy:
Survey Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh**

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April 2015

To understand the effects of information about foreign aid on attitudes toward the donor country, we embedded an experiment in a nationwide survey in Bangladesh. Respondents watched a video about the Smiling Sun Clinics, which have been funded by the United States since 1997. In the treatment condition, the video was branded with the USAID symbol, and respondents subsequently were informed about the history of U.S. funding for the health clinics. We find that only a small proportion of respondents understand the significance of the logo and detect overall small effects of information about U.S. foreign aid on perceptions that the United States has a positive influence on Bangladesh. We find no evidence of a potential negative externality in which information about foreign aid undermines domestic government legitimacy; instead we find evidence that information about U.S. foreign aid increases confidence in the local government among several subgroups of the population.

In the introduction to their book on anti-Americanism, Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) outline three reasons why improving attitudes toward the United States around the world is fundamental to U.S. foreign policy goals. First, in the age of global terrorism, negative opinions toward the United States help to create “breeding grounds for terrorism” in which terrorist organizations can recruit activists and draw on the resources of sympathizers. Since there may be direct security consequences of high levels of negative affect toward the United States, U.S. policymakers have an interest in cultivating positive sentiment among foreign populations. Second, the general character of public opinion is relevant for international cooperation. Given the consequences of climate change, globalized disease, and other transnational threats, security is often dependent on the cooperation of diverse international actors. Positive public attitudes toward potential international partners may be an important facilitator of interstate cooperation. Third and relatedly, the least expensive power to exercise is “soft power,” the power that relies on others wanting what you want and trusting in your judgment (Nye 2002). Where positive affect toward the United States exists, the United States will be able to achieve diplomatic and security outcomes at lower cost.

Spreading knowledge about the identity of an aid project sponsor is one mechanism by which donor governments conduct local level diplomacy with direct beneficiaries and through which they hope to influence public opinion. The most common form of spreading information – or attempting to spread information – about the sponsorship of development interventions is through visual branding.¹ Branding entails the prominent placement of a donor agency logo around an aid intervention to provide information about the identity of the sponsor. Though branding has been policy in the United States since the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the emphasis on this foreign policy tool has been redoubled as part of the post-9/11 National Security Strategy. Spreading information about U.S. sponsorship in

¹ Beyond citizens in developing countries, branding may also target donor publics and donor legislatures, serving as an important tool to communicate to domestic audiences what foreign aid efforts accomplish. Branding increases transparency by providing visual evidence of specific development contributions (Shah 2010)

development abroad is an important stepping stone in a grand strategy that seeks to prevent people from joining terrorist groups. According to Andrew Wilder (2010), U.S. foreign aid in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq has been used as a ‘weapons system’ to promote stabilization and counterinsurgency objectives” (407).² By communicating the origin of sponsorship to local populations, the U.S. government seeks to establish positive associations with and affect toward the United States among people in need. In countries throughout the world today, it is easy to find the USAID logo emblazoned on humanitarian relief supplies, schools, vehicles, conference pamphlets, and other physical manifestations of assistance. Other donor countries, such as the United Kingdom, have followed suit with their own aggressive branding policies.

To date, little rigorous evidence exists about the efficacy of branding foreign aid interventions – or otherwise spreading information about foreign funding of development interventions – on changing peoples’ beliefs about and attitudes towards the donor. More fundamentally, we know little about whether donor’s branding strategies effectively communicate that the foreign donor acts as sponsor of a given intervention. In their publicity materials, USAID cites macro-level observational data on changed attitudes toward the United States in Indonesia following provision of humanitarian relief in the wake of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.³ But the persistence of strong anti-American sentiment in countries to which the United States sends significant amounts of assistance raises questions about whether branding U.S. development activity is having the intended effect, as do not-infrequent official

² According to Wilder (2010), branded foreign aid is codified in U.S. Army COIN policy, which identifies seven lines of effort that are necessary for effectively winning the “armed struggle for the support of the population.” U.S. Army operations during a counterinsurgency effort now include non-military public affairs operations like “publicizing the opening of a water treatment facility” because such public goods, when labeled as being from the U.S. government are thought to facilitate the overarching objective of winning the support of citizens away from insurgents and in favor of the foreign military and the government. Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011) use panel data to show that reconstruction spending in Iraq reduced insurgent violence. See also Lyall and Wilson (2009).

³ Bill Frei, the Director of USAID’s Indonesia program at the time, argued, “The people of [Aceh] (Indonesia) saw the branding; they knew right away the U.S. government was responding. That absolutely had a major impact on their perception of the U.S. Without the branding, USAID would have been just one of 550 NGOs working in the area. I think our new global branding is a major foreign policy achievement” (USAID ND: 3).

requests for the United States to *avoid* branding its interventions (Adelman 2011; Merkovic-Orenstein 2011; Reid-Henry 2011; Birdsall, Vaishnav, and Cutherell 2012).

Some even argue that branding could produce negative developmental consequences. It may be that information about external funding of development interventions undermines citizen support for their domestic governments (Bratton 1989; Fowler 1991; Whaites 1998; Gubser 2002; Brass 2010). At the same time, however, others have argued that successful management of foreign aid relationships may actually legitimate the state. When citizens observe representatives of the state working with non-state actors in a collaborative fashion, this may contribute to state legitimacy (Tendler 1997).

Using an original, nationwide survey experiment in Bangladesh with a number of innovative outcome measures, we shed light on three important questions: Does a donor's logo effectively communicate that the project was funded by a particular foreign country? Does knowledge about donor sponsorship improve attitudes toward that donor? Does this knowledge undermine the legitimacy of aid-receiving governments in the eyes of their own citizens? We also explore whether the effects of branding vary across different types of people (e.g., those who have had greater previous exposure to the project or those who are more politically sophisticated). We research these questions with reference to a USAID-funded network of health clinics that are relatively prominent in Bangladesh.

Somewhat surprisingly, we find that only a very small portion of survey respondents associate the USAID logo with the idea of United States government funding. This initial result suggests that USAID's branding technique may not be an effective tool of communication in the developing world, although respondents who have previously been exposed to the logo (through interaction with the development intervention) or who have higher levels of education are additionally likely to correctly infer the identity of the project sponsor after exposure to the USAID logo. Among the subset of respondents that learned about U.S. funding (in conjunction with seeing the logo), we do find some evidence of improved attitudes toward the United States. This effect is particularly pronounced among

respondents who were *not* previously familiar with the health clinics and among the *least* educated, two subpopulations in which respondents likely had more room for updating their views about the United States. We also find that our informational treatment has a *positive* effect on how respondents view their own local government and state institutions. This effect is particularly pronounced among those who have used or previously heard of the clinics, groups that might be particularly inclined to credit their government with having arranged for foreign actors to provide needed social services. It is also pronounced among politically active respondents, a group that is likely to be more knowledgeable about the diplomatic process which precedes the locational decision about where to implement the aid project and thus more likely to credit the local government for successfully delivering development funding.

How Does Branding Affect Citizen Attitudes?

To the best of our knowledge, neither USAID nor any other foreign aid donor has ever fully outlined a branding “theory of change.” The USAID branding website (www.usaid.gov/branding) links to guidelines about branding and to files containing some of the actual logos used on USAID materials (see USAID 2005). USAID’s documentation makes it clear that the agency wants to establish its brand, but the specific long-term objectives of this endeavor and the mechanisms of attitudinal change through which they would be realized have not been publicly identified. Similarly, in announcing a more aggressive branding policy in the summer of 2012, the U.K. government said that a new aid logo would “help to drive home the message that Britain deserves credit for the results that UK aid delivers” (Department for International Development (U.K.) 2012), but did not elucidate exactly how it would do so or what the subsequent consequences would be.

We contend that the logic behind foreign aid branding – in terms of the audience in the aid-receiving country – is that development interventions are likely to be perceived, in general, as helpful and beneficial by local populations. By branding their interventions, donors hope to capitalize on this

perception by transferring the positive associations from the development intervention to the donor country that has funded it.

The initial step in this theory of change relies on two critical assumptions about what a brand connotes. First, we must assume that people associate the donor brand – in our empirical case, the USAID logo – with the donor government. Given low levels of literacy and education, it is far from certain that people exposed to a particular donor logo will understand that the logo is meant to make them think about a particular far-away country. Second, for the brand to convey the specific message that foreign aid donors want, we must also assume that people will associate the presence of the donor brand with donor *sponsorship* of the project. While this seems obvious to someone thinking of a development intervention as a “foreign aid project,” it is quite reasonable that a typical citizen in a developing country might think of a logo on a sign or a building as a piece of advertising that is unrelated to financial assistance. That is, the target audience of foreign aid branding may *not* actually infer that the logo has been placed somewhere to indicate financial sponsorship or the transfer of resources. In the empirical section below, therefore, we test the initial hypothesis that *donor branding increases citizens’ awareness of foreign sponsorship of a development intervention* (H1). Our results show that this hypothesis is confirmed for only a limited proportion of respondents.

Assuming that a brand does convey information about the sponsorship of a development intervention,⁴ citizens may then update their opinions of and attitudes about the donor in a positive fashion either through conscious or subconscious processing of the informational treatment. At a conscious level, we can imagine citizens reflecting on the fact that a foreign donor has provided an intervention in a way that generates feelings of gratitude that leads to more positive affect toward the donor. At a subconscious level, it is possible that positive attitudes about or valuations of a

⁴ In the treatment that we employ in our experiment, we directly provide information about sponsorship after exposing respondents to the brand and asking them an initial follow-up question. This allows us to investigate whether the brand is conveying the intended information and then the effects of the *actual information* that donor brands are intended to convey.

development intervention get subconsciously transferred to the project sponsor through the process that Lodge and Taber (2013) refer to as “hot cognition.” In either case, *information about a donor’s sponsorship of a development intervention is expected to make a citizen more likely to view the foreign donor in a positive light* (H2).⁵

Previous results in the literature are mixed. In survey data collected from Indian respondents (see the full description in Dietrich and Winters 2015), we found a small, but not statistically significant effect of information about U.S. sponsorship of a foreign aid project in the health sector on respondents’ perceptions of U.S. favorability.⁶ Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Wood (2014) show that variation in levels of funding from the United States’ President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) positively predict attitudes toward the United States across about 50 PEPFAR-receiving countries. Andrabi and Das (2010) show that attitudes toward foreigners vary based on proximity to the fault line of a 2005 earthquake in northern Pakistan that brought a steady flow of humanitarian aid to the country. A study of foreign assistance in northeast Afghanistan over the period 2007-2009 reveals that foreign aid “did not have an impact on attitudes toward foreign forces” (Zürcher, Koehler, and Böhnke 2010, 5), while qualitative work from Afghanistan reports that “aid and development projects were consistently negatively described by Afghans” (Fishstein and Wilder 2012, 41).

Potential Externalities of Information about Foreign Aid on Domestic Government Legitimacy

While donor branding aims to improve the views of citizens in aid-receiving countries toward the donor, there is also the possibility that information about the external funding of basic welfare benefits influences citizens’ views of their *own* government. What happens to citizen confidence in their

⁵ Other affective associations are possible. If the reaction to a development intervention is negative (e.g., because of poor project implementation or cultural inappropriateness), this affect may be consciously or subconsciously transferred to the foreign donor. We also can imagine beneficiaries feeling ashamed by a development intervention and attaching negative affect to the foreign donor for having made them feel that way. Gubser (2002, 141) describes states as potentially being “embarrassed” by external actors performing state-like duties.

⁶ Results are available upon request.

own state institutions if they learn that foreign donor governments provide essential goods and services? Some have suggested that widespread information about the presence of donors in various social and economic sectors may signal a lack of competence or willingness on the part of the government to provide basic goods and services; rendering governments unable to make legitimate demands of their citizens (Bratton 1989; Fowler 1991; Whaites 1998; Gubser 2002; Brass 2010). For instance, external funding of basic goods and services may undermine the “fiscal contract” between the state and its citizens, lowering the tax morale of citizens. This potential disconnect may ultimately contribute to a pattern in which foreign aid flows undermine the quality of governance in a state (Brautigam 2000; Knack 2001; Hoffman and Gibson 2005).

On the other hand, successful management of relationships with foreign aid donors may actually help legitimize the state and its institutions (Tendler 1997). Since many donor-funded development interventions directly target some local communities but not others and since project implementation usually requires the consent and cooperation of local authorities, citizens might directly credit their local authorities for bringing a project into their community. Indeed, the presence of externally-funded projects can serve as signals of the competence of a local government in providing goods and services to its community (Cruz and Schneider 2014; Guiteras and Mobarak 2014). If citizens perceive local leaders as playing a role in the project negotiation process it is plausible that leaders will receive credit for securing the project for the local area.

We therefore have two competing hypotheses here. It may be the case that *information about donor sponsorship of development interventions undermines domestic government legitimacy* (H3a), or it may be the case that *information about donor sponsorship of development interventions improves citizen perceptions of their domestic government* (H3b).

So far the literature has found little evidence of a negative externality and more often has estimated a positive relationship between non-state service provision and attitudes toward the state.

Using data from the Afrobarometer surveys, Sacks (2012) finds a *positive* correlation between non-state service provision and tax morale (i.e., citizens' willingness to recognize the state's legitimate right to collect taxes). This is also the finding of Zürcher, Koehler, and Böhnke (2010) in northeastern Afghanistan: in places with higher levels of foreign-funded small infrastructure projects, levels of support for the district and provincial government were higher, although this effect did not persist across the four years of the study (see also Böhnke and Zürcher 2013). Guiteras and Mobarak (2014) show in a field experiment that the introduction of subsidies for the construction of sanitation facilities in rural Bangladesh initially increases citizen support for the local government *until* they are given information that the subsidies came from an NGO and that the local government played no role in obtaining them, at which point support for the local government returns to the baseline level. Cruz and Schneider (2014) show how local government officials in the Philippines reap electoral benefits from the presence of a World Bank-funded and central government-implemented development project. In original, survey experimental data from India, Dietrich and Winters (2015) find no evidence that favorability ratings for domestic government officials or institutions decrease when individuals receive information about the foreign funding of a development project.

Research Design

To test our hypotheses we ran an embedded experiment in a nationally representative survey in Bangladesh. Between 7 September and 1 October 2014, enumerators from the BRAC Institute of Governance and Development interviewed 2,294 respondents from 55 subdistricts (*upazila*) spread across all seven divisions of Bangladesh.⁷

After two initial questions about what policy issues were of importance to the respondents and the current state of affairs in Bangladesh, we assigned randomly sampled respondents to one of the two

⁷ The sampling strategy is described in the appendix.

versions of the survey.⁸ Both versions of the survey described and showed a brief video related to the Smiling Sun Clinics, a network of non-profit health clinics catering to poor communities and partially funded by USAID since 1997. Before showing respondents the video, we asked them if they were familiar with the Smiling Sun Clinics and if they, a family member, or a close friend had ever been to a Smiling Sun Clinic. The video was about one minute long and dramatized the way in which the pre-natal services provided by the clinics calmed the anxieties of two expecting parents. In the control version of the survey, the video was branded at the bottom of the screen with the Smiling Sun logo and name. In the treatment version of the survey, the video was branded with the USAID/Bangladesh logo and the tagline (in Bangla) “From the American People.” Figure 1 provides screen shots from both versions of the video.

Immediately following the video, we asked respondents in both conditions an open-ended question about where “most of the financial assistance for the Smiling Sun Clinics” came from. We use this question to examine the first hypothesis that donor branding signals the identity of the foreign sponsor. To examine the lasting impression left by the donor brand, we also asked our respondents toward the end of the survey if they could describe the logo that they had seen in the video.

In order to insure that our respondents in the treatment condition received information that the Smiling Sun Clinics are funded by a foreign donor (i.e., the information that branding is meant to convey), we followed the funding question by informing respondents in that condition:

Since 2007, the United States has been giving assistance to build Smiling Sun Clinics in Bangladesh. The funds have been provided through USAID. The United States has provided more than 4,500 million taka⁹ for supporting the Smiling Sun Clinics.

In the treatment condition only, we then asked if people knew why the United States was providing financial assistance to Bangladesh and also if it was good for Bangladesh to take money from the United

⁸ In the appendix, we show that our treatment and control groups are balanced on a number of background covariates, including previous use of and awareness of the Smiling Sun Clinics that we use in our intervention.

⁹ This is about US\$57 million.

States for the Smiling Sun Clinics and why. In addition to collecting useful information, these questions were meant to strengthen the treatment. They increase the probability that respondents both absorb the factual information that the United States had provided the funding and also think through the relationship between the United States and Bangladesh in a way that would activate the respondents' own sentiments toward the donor-recipient relationship.

The remainder of the survey included outcome measures related to Bangladeshi relations with the United States, confidence in Bangladeshi government institutions, and the quality of the Smiling Sun Clinics. We use a mixture of questions to get at each of these topics. One of the contributions of this paper is that we use policy-specific measures and commercially-relevant measures in addition to more general measures of abstract attitudes toward the foreign aid donor in question.

To measure how the treatment affects citizens' attitudes toward the donor, we ask a straightforward question about the influence of foreign countries on Bangladesh. Respondents were first asked about whether the United States had "a lot" of influence on Bangladesh or "not much" influence on Bangladesh. We asked about the United States in the context of nine other countries. For respondents who said that the United States had a lot of influence, we subsequently asked whether this influence was good or bad.

In addition to this general question, we asked policy-specific questions in the realm of trade and security. For trade, we generally described U.S.-Bangladeshi trading relations and then asked whether respondents thought that Bangladesh should give more priority to continued trade with the United States or rather to diversifying its trading partners. For security, we described Bangladesh's frequent participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and then asked respondents which of nine countries they would most like to see in command of Bangladeshi troops.

Beyond these questions about Bangladesh's foreign policy, we asked two types of questions about international commerce, looking to see if positive attitudes generated by information about

foreign aid spillover into the consumer preferences of citizens in aid-receiving countries. First, we asked respondents to express their level of trust in seven different multinational corporations, two of which are U.S.-based corporations (and were identified as such by the enumerator): Apple and Coca-Cola. Second, we asked respondents about six different types of consumer goods and asked them to choose which country (from a list of nine) produced the highest quality products.¹⁰

To measure domestic government legitimacy, we asked a series of nine questions about institutions in Bangladesh ranging from the “local government” and the “national government” to “NGOs” and “banks and financial institutions.” For each institution, we asked respondents to say whether they had full, partial, or no confidence in the institutions and the people leading them. We study some of these questions individually and also an index of responses to the questions about government institutions. We also included a tax morale question on the survey, asking respondents to agree or disagree with the statement that “the tax department of the government has the right to make people pay taxes.” This question parallels the key outcome variable in Sacks (2012).

We draw our inferences about the way in which the branding of foreign aid affects people’s attitudes by looking for differential responses across these variables between the group that was told about and asked to consider the fact that the United States funds the Smiling Sun Clinics and the group that was not exposed to information about U.S. funding of the clinics. In addition, we examine heterogeneous treatment effects across groups that were and were not familiar with the Smiling Sun Clinics before the survey. We might expect to see the largest treatment effects among those who were not previously aware of the Smiling Sun Clinics – slightly more than half of our sample – since these individuals are the most likely to be receiving the information about the foreign sponsorship of the

¹⁰ Extensive research in product marketing suggests that effective branding has significant effects on product perceptions and consumer behavior. Of particular note, the evidence shows that overall beliefs and judgments about a foreign country influence individuals’ perceptions and judgments of consumer products associated with that country (Peabody 1985). For instance, studies suggest that unfavorable country images will negatively affect a consumer’s product assessment (Cattin, Jolibert, Lohnes 1982; Han and Terpsta 1988).

clinics as completely new information. While this hypothesis is validated when looking at the effects on attitudes toward the United States, we find that the positive domestic government legitimacy effects that we observe originate primarily in respondents who previously *were* aware of the Smiling Sun Clinics. As we discuss below, we believe that this is because these respondents had particularly positive views of the clinics and therefore rewarded their local governments for securing foreign funding for the clinics. We also provide subgroup analyses related to levels of education and levels of political involvement. Respondents with higher levels of education and political involvement are more likely to understand the process through which foreign aid projects are distributed across localities and may thus be more likely to reward their local government for securing the project.

Are Donors Successfully Spreading Information about Foreign Aid with Brands and Logos?

As described above, for the branding of foreign aid projects to have the intended effect, the first thing that must be true is that respondents must associate the donor agency's logo with the idea that a foreign donor has provided funding for a particular intervention. In this section, we provide two pieces of evidence that the absorption of the USAID brand was fairly limited among our respondents, although we also provide evidence that our treatment condition subjects were able to absorb the information about U.S. sponsorship that was given to them directly by the enumerator following the video.

In both the treatment and control conditions, respondents were asked, immediately after watching the video, "Do you know from where the Smiling Sun Clinics get most of their financial assistance?" Despite the fact that the treatment condition used a video where the USAID logo and the statement "From the American People" (in Bangla) were present across the bottom of the video for the duration of the video, the modal answer in both the treatment and control conditions was for the respondent to say that he or she *did not know* the source of funding for the Smiling Sun Clinics, as can be seen in Table 1. Although the effect size is smaller than expected, the USAID branding in the

treatment version of the video alerted at least some of the respondents to the fact that the United States was funding the intervention. The proportion of respondents saying that the Smiling Sun Clinics were funded by the United States increased by 13 percentage points between the control and treatment conditions. Most of the movement came from people who otherwise would have said that they did not know. An additional three-to-four percent of respondents in both conditions said that the funding came from “foreign aid” or “foreign countries” or something similar.

The remainder of Table 1 shows the patterns in the data for several select subgroups. In the control group, among those who say that they had previously used the Smiling Sun Clinics, 26 percent were able to correctly identify the United States as the funder, which is statistically significantly different from the 8 percent of non-previous users in the control group who are able to do so ($p < 0.01$). Among previous users, the treatment increases the proportion that cites the United States as the sponsor of the clinics by 14 percentage points ($p < 0.01$). Among those who were previously aware of the clinics (but who had not personally used them or had family or friends use them), only 16 percent of the control condition respondents were correctly able to identify the United States as the funder, a proportion that increased by 18 percentage points in the treatment condition ($p < 0.01$). These effects suggest that the brand will be more effective at informing people (or reminding people) that a donor has sponsored an intervention when those people have pre-existing awareness of or connection to that intervention.

We also looked at highly educated respondents (i.e., respondents with a completed secondary education or above). We find the largest effect of the branding treatment among this group: a 23 percentage point increase over a relatively high baseline of 21 percent naming the United States in the control condition. As one might expect, more highly educated respondents seem the most capable of fully absorbing the meaning of a brand – perhaps simply because their literacy allowed them to read the “From the American people” tagline – and drawing a correct inference about its relationship to financial

sponsorship. Nonetheless, 47 percent of our highly educated respondents in the treatment group still said that they did not know from where the Smiling Sun Clinics had received their funding.

That a one-minute video with prominent placement of the USAID logo and tagline resulted in only a 12 percentage point average shift in the proportion of people who could correctly identify that funding was coming from the United States suggests that, overall, the USAID brand is not well known in Bangladesh or is not understood to connote financial assistance. This impression was confirmed by field visits to Smiling Sun Clinic locations where people approached on the street near the clinics were unable to identify the funder or to say what the USAID logo on the clinic meant. After the tagline was read to these individuals, they were able to say that money for the clinics must have been coming from the American people.

In the treatment condition of the survey, subsequent to asking this question, we then had our enumerators directly inform the respondents that USAID had been funding the Smiling Sun Clinics for almost 20 years and asked two questions about why the United States was providing money to Bangladesh and why Bangladesh was taking money from the United States. For both of these questions, respondents tended to assign earnest development motives to both the United States and Bangladesh. Slightly more than half of respondents in the treatment condition provided their thoughts on why the United States supplied funds. With the exception of one respondent who said that the United States provided funds “for [its] own benefit,” all other respondents described the United States as wanting to provide health care services or otherwise encourage development in Bangladesh. Many more people provided a response as to why Bangladesh receives the foreign aid, and these were nearly all development-oriented reasons. Three respondents took the opportunity to say that it was “not good” for Bangladesh to accept foreign money; one of these respondents related his opposition to his Islamic faith, while the other two did not say why they felt this way.

We did not ask respondents to confirm after hearing this information that they understood that the United States was providing money. We did subsequently ask respondents to identify which of seven foreign donor countries or international financial institutions it would be best for Bangladesh to ask to financially support the Smiling Sun Clinics in the future. Among those who had a preference, 65 percent in the treatment condition said the United States, while only 52 percent named the United States in the control condition, a difference that is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$).¹¹ This suggests that a subset of respondents in the treatment condition were absorbing the information, although the magnitude of the change is still smaller than we would expect to see if the information had been absorbed by a large proportion of respondents.

Toward the end of the survey, we reminded respondents that there had been a small logo in the video that they had watched earlier, and asked them if they could tell us what that logo had indicated. In the treatment condition, five percent of respondents mentioned USAID in their answer, while less than one percent of respondents in the control condition did. However, several control condition respondents still cited USAID, even though they had not seen the logo. In both conditions, the vast majority of people responded to the question by talking about the Smiling Sun Clinics in general. Often, they described the video in general and not the logo per se. In both conditions, 27 percent of respondents said that they did not remember what had been in the video or did not know how to describe the logo that they had seen. This is an additional piece of evidence that, insofar as the USAID logo was observed in the treatment, it did not register with our respondents in a deep way.

If the success of foreign aid branding depends on citizens correctly linking a donor logo with the donor country and drawing an inference that the presence of the logo implies sponsorship of the development intervention, our evidence is not encouraging. Although there is a statistically significant difference between the treatment and control groups in terms of the proportion of people who said

¹¹ In the control condition, 24 percent of respondents did not supply an answer, while only 17 percent of respondents in the treatment condition declined to name a preferred donor.

that the United States had been funding the Smiling Sun Clinics, the modal response in the treatment group was for the respondent to say that they did not know who had funded the clinics. This was true even in the groups where we observe larger treatment effects: individuals who have either a connection to or awareness of the clinics or who are highly educated.

Effects of Information about Foreign Aid on Attitudes toward the Donor

Recently, scholarly work has emerged that explores the effects of information about foreign aid on attitudes toward the donor country. Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Wood (2014) find macro-level evidence that countries receiving more health aid from the United States have more positive views of the United States, and Andrabi and Das (2010) find that Pakistanis who were plausibly exposed to more humanitarian relief have more positive views of foreigners in general. Both Böhnke and Zürcher (2013) and Fishstein and Wilder (2012), however, find that Afghan perceptions are either not affected by the presence of foreign aid or else are negatively affected.

To see if information about U.S. sponsorship of the Smiling Sun Clinics changes Bangladeshi opinions toward the United States, we study a general attitudes question, a set of policy-specific questions that have to do with the United States, and then a set of questions related to U.S. commercial interests. We therefore examine the extent to which the information that we provide in our treatment affects diffuse attitudes toward the United States but also respondents' willingness to express a pro-U.S. opinion on trading with the United States or allowing the United States to command peacekeeping operations and respondents' views of commercial goods from the United States.

To measure diffuse attitudes toward the United States, we told respondents that we wanted to know what they thought "about the overall influence of some other countries on Bangladesh." They first told us whether they thought that the country had a large influence or not, and among those who answered a large influence, they told us whether it was positive or negative. The United States was one

of 10 countries about which we asked. In both the treatment and control conditions, around 90 percent of respondents said that the United States had a large influence. The proportion was slightly (and statistically significantly) higher in the treatment condition ($\delta=0.03$, $p < 0.01$). Among those who said that the United States had a large influence, 95 percent of respondents said that this influence was positive. In the first row of Table 2, we report a difference-in-means test on a three-category variable about U.S. influence. Given that most respondents say that the United States is influential in a positive way, the treatment effect is small, but there is a statistically significant increase within the treatment group in terms of how respondents regard U.S. influence.

In Table 3, we present subgroup results for the U.S. influence outcome variable for two subgroups. First we compare respondents who had previous knowledge about Smiling Sun Clinics to those who did not. Second we compared more highly educated respondents to their less educated counterparts. The results reveal that the treatment effect that we observe in the overall population is particularly likely to be observed among those respondents who were *not* previously aware of the Smiling Sun Clinics and among *less* educated respondents. Since respondents who were not previously aware of the Smiling Sun Clinics at all were also less likely to have been previously aware of U.S. sponsorship of the clinics, we might be seeing more updating of attitudes toward the United States among this group. Among less educated respondents, it appears that we are seeing more updating of opinions about the United States because of more negative baseline perceptions (as indicated by the average value taken on by the influence variable in the control condition). However, the subgroup treatment effects are not statistically significantly different from one another in either case.

When respondents were asked about specific policy preferences relevant to the United States, our treatment elicited less movement in attitudes. As the second row of Table 2 shows, when asked whether “Bangladesh should put more emphasis on trading with the United States or more emphasis on diversifying its trading partners,” respondents in the treatment condition were slightly more likely to say

that Bangladesh should trade more with the United States, but the effect was not statistically significant. When asked which country (from a list of nine) should command Bangladeshi troops in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, very few respondents in either treatment or control conditions named the United States as the preferred commander, and the proportion of respondents doing so, if anything, decreased between the control and treatment conditions.¹²

To measure the extent to which U.S. foreign policy actions in the form of financing development interventions might spill over into improved commercial relations for U.S. companies, we tried to gauge consumer sentiment in two ways. First, we showed respondents logos for eight different global companies and asked respondents to rate the company on a scale from one to seven with regard to how much they trusted the company. We included two U.S. brands in this question: Coca-Cola and Apple. As the first two rows of Table 4 show, there were small positive increases in the levels of trust for both companies, although the increase for Apple (which had a lower overall level of trust) was greater than that for Coca-Cola and statistically significant.

We then named six different categories of consumer products and asked our respondents to name the country that they thought did the best job of producing high quality products in that category. Overall, our respondents did not regard the United States as a producer of high-quality consumer goods. Among respondents who provided an answer for at least one of the categories of consumer goods, almost 70 percent did not mention the United States for any of the goods. Sixteen percent of respondents mentioned the United States at least once – most commonly for cars.¹³ The treatment appears to have had some marginal influence here. The third row of Table 4 demonstrates that the average number of times the United States was mentioned as a producer of high-quality consumer

¹² While 29 percent of respondents said that they did not know who should be in command of a U.N. Peacekeeping Operation, the clear favorite among those who answered the question was Malaysia, named by 57 percent of respondents who provided an answer. India and China were the second and third most common answers.

¹³ India was highly regarded as a producer of motorcycles. China was the most highly regarded producer of televisions, refrigerators, mobile phones, and watches. Substantial numbers of people also mentioned Malaysia as a producer of high-quality televisions and refrigerators.

goods was higher in the treatment condition, but the difference just misses conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.14$).

In sum, we find some evidence that providing information about the foreign funding of development projects to Bangladeshi citizens leads them to mildly update their attitudes toward the donor and companies associated with the donor. It is, of course, worth highlighting that Bangladeshis already widely believe that the United States has a large and positive influence on their country. The treatment results in some additional people saying that the United States has a large and positive influence on Bangladesh. On specific foreign policy issues – increasing trade with the United States or wanting Bangladeshi troops to serve under U.S. command – the treatment does not meaningfully change Bangladeshi opinions. With regard to U.S. commercial brands, there is a slight effect of the treatment on how people view Apple, although no effect on the already trusted Coca-Cola. In all of the analyses in this section, we are limited to studying intent-to-treat effects. If we were able to analyze the treatment effects on the treated, these changes would appear more substantial. They also might plausibly increase in size with repeated exposure.

Effects of Information about Foreign Aid on Domestic Government Legitimacy

The notion that non-governmental provision of social services might threaten state legitimacy goes back at least to Tocqueville (Brass 2010). If non-governmental organizations – by which we mean, in this instance, national NGOs, international NGOs (INGOs), and donor agencies – are providing essential goods and services that one might expect the state to provide, why then would a citizenry accord legitimacy to a state and respect its authority in other realms?¹⁴ This concern has been widely

¹⁴ An alternative argument that foreign funding of service provision allows non-responsive governments to stay in power is also widespread in the literature (see Guiteras and Mobarak 2014 for discussion). We return to this idea below.

discussed in the literature on NGOs, although the collection of large-N data in support of the proposition has lagged behind.

The evidence that does exist so far tends to be either null (Dietrich and Winters 2015) or else in the opposite direction, finding that non-state provision of social services *increases* state legitimacy (Brass 2010; Zürcher, Koehler, and Böhnke 2010; Sacks 2012). In this section, we examine how our informational treatment affects the level of confidence that citizens express in their domestic government institutions. We also look for effects of the informational treatment on tax morale, an attitudinal outcome that has been studied elsewhere as an indicator of the strength of the fiscal contract between a government and its citizens (Sacks 2012; Paler 2013).

Our primary outcome variables are drawn from a series of questions about the respondent's level of confidence in Bangladeshi organizations and institutions. Respondents were asked whether they had "full confidence, partial confidence, or hardly any confidence" in their local government, the national government, and their village leader, alongside other institutions such as the military, NGOs, and political parties. In addition to studying several of these individual questions, we also create a scale that ranges from 0 to 14 based on the answer to seven of the questions (i.e., central government, local government, village leader, political parties, judiciary, military, and police). We also asked respondents to indicate the degree to which they agreed (on a five-point scale) with the following statement: "Those who govern the country are engaged in rampant corruption."

Before presenting our results, it is worth highlighting that the level of confidence in the national government is quite in general: 50 percent of the respondents indicated that they had "full confidence," and 13 percent said that they had "partial confidence." Citizens' confidence in their local governments is somewhat lower, with 34 percent saying that they had "full confidence" and 53 percent indicating that they had at least "partial confidence."

As Table 5 indicates, we find no initial evidence that our treatment undermines domestic government legitimacy. Instead, we find some evidence that our respondents express more positive opinions about their own government in the treatment condition. Although there is no discernible difference between the treatment and control conditions for confidence in the national government, we detect a statistically significant *increase* in the levels of confidence in the local government. We also find that treated respondents indicate more confidence in the overall set of state institutions captured in our additive index. This difference is statistically significantly different between treatment and control groups. Our treatment also caused our respondents to view politicians as *less* corrupt than respondents from the control group. Again, the difference between groups is statistically significant.

Through a series of subgroup analyses presented in Table 5, we identify three groups for whom the information treatment has a particularly pronounced effect on their level of confidence in the local government: (1) previous users of the Smiling Sun Clinics, (2) people who report being active in politics, and (3) the highly educated (i.e., those with a completed secondary education or above). For each group, there is a plausible explanation for why we see larger treatment effects linked to these groups viewing the development intervention as beneficial for their community. Previous users, for instance, are particularly likely to have positive perceptions of the clinics (since the clinics generally are regarded as quite successful in delivering healthcare to the population that they serve). Therefore, if these users perceive that their local government played a role in arranging for the clinics to be located in the area where they use them *and* for having obtained foreign financing for the clinics, they might have increased confidence in their local government. For politically active and more educated respondents, we similarly might expect that these individuals perceive the difficulties of securing foreign funding, such that they are likely to credit the local government for securing foreign-funded Smiling Sun Clinics for their locality. As requests for health clinics originate from local governments that lack resources for

service provision, more politically active and educated respondents may view external provision as complementary to – and not in conflict with – service provision through the state.

When comparing previous users of the Smiling Sun Clinics to non-users, the estimated treatment effect is with regard to confidence in local government is substantially larger among previous users of the clinics. On a three-point scale, previous users express opinions of their local government that are 0.26 points higher in the treatment group as compared to the control group. Among non-previous users, the control and treatment groups are indistinguishable. The different treatment effects within the subgroups are statistically significantly different from one another ($p < 0.01$).

We then estimate heterogeneous treatment effects based on respondents' self-reported political activism.¹⁵ Among respondents who consider themselves at least somewhat politically active stark differences exist between treatment and control conditions. Table 6 shows that, among politically active respondents, our treatment increases confidence in local government by 0.22 points ($p < 0.01$), whereas among respondents who do not consider themselves politically active, there is no significant difference between the treatment and control groups in terms of confidence in the local government. Whereas our politically active respondents have lower opinions of the local government in the control condition than non-politically-active respondents, the treatment improves their opinions of local government to the extent that they are higher than those of non-politically-active respondents in the treatment condition. The difference between the treatment effects for the two subgroups is statistically significant.

Finally, we estimate conditional average treatment effects across levels of education. Among respondents with secondary education and higher, the treatment improves attitudes toward the local government by 0.16 points ($p < 0.01$). Among less educated respondents we do not observe a significant improvement in attitudes. When comparing the treatment effects within these two

¹⁵ Respondents could describe themselves as “not at all,” “somewhat,” or “very much” politically active.

subgroups, we find that the difference just misses conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.14$).

As with our previous work, we overall do not find evidence of a negative externality of foreign aid on domestic government legitimacy. In fact, we find instead that information about the foreign sponsorship of a development increases some respondents' confidence in their local governments. This effect is particularly concentrated in previous users of the Smiling Sun Clinics, who might be combining their positive attitudes toward the clinic with the perception that foreign donor money is difficult to obtain and thereby crediting the local government with having obtained such funding, and among the politically active, who might undertake a similar diagnosis of why the local government deserves credit for having obtained foreign funding for health clinics.

Conclusions

In Bagerhat District, Bangladesh, in the village of Gaptullah, there is a large sign on the side of a newly built school building. The sign depicts two women building a cyclone shelter along the side of a mangrove tree. Clockwise from the upper-right-hand corner of the sign, an observer can find logos for three different nonprofit development organizations headquartered in the United States or the United Kingdom (ACDI/VOCA, PCI, and MuslimAid) and for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the overall funder of the project. What are the consequences of branding development projects, and which citizens are most affected by such information about the foreign sponsorship of projects?

In an embedded survey experiment on a nationally representative sample of Bangladeshi citizens, we find that providing information about U.S. sponsorship of a popular health intervention has a detectable, though weak, effect on foreign policy attitudes. From a high baseline belief that the U.S. has a large, positive influence on Bangladesh, we find a small additional increase in positive perceptions

of the United States among our treatment group. We also find small increases in the positive perceptions of one U.S.-based company and of U.S.-produced consumer goods. The estimation of heterogeneous treatment effects reveal that our treatment is especially likely to improve attitudes toward the United States among respondents who had previous awareness of the Smiling Sun Clinics and who completed at least secondary education. Our experiment allows us the opportunity to look at the direct effect on people's perceptions.

We find no evidence of an often-cited potential negative externality of branding – that it might undermine the legitimacy of the aid-receiving government. Instead, we find evidence for the opposite hypothesis: information about external sponsorship improves attitudes toward the local government. The treatment effect is particularly pronounced among previous clinic users, the more politically active, and respondents with higher levels of education. While we do not find evidence that citizens' perceptions of government are undermined by the presence of foreign aid projects, this does not mean that the presence of foreign aid does not, in fact, lead to reductions in government effort in the realm of service provision.¹⁶

Perhaps the most surprising finding revealed by the survey is how limited the information transfer from branding seems to be. Immediately after watching a branded video, only a small proportion of our respondents in the treatment group are able to identify the United States as the funder of the intervention portrayed in that video. Later in the survey, we find few respondents remembering the logo that had been included in the video. It may be that Bangladeshi citizens are not particularly interested in where the funding for health clinics comes from but rather just in the presence of the health clinics.

¹⁶ A large number of studies argue that foreign aid undermines the quality of governance in aid-receiving countries (e.g., Brautigam 2000; Knack 2001). Indeed, it is possible that, if we were able to account for reduced confidence in the government originating in reduced effort that is linked to foreign aid, then the net effect of foreign aid on government legitimacy would still be negative.

The exact ways in which people are affected by knowledge about the foreign funding of development projects remains very much an open question. While the embedded survey experiment allows us to make credible inferences about the effects of information because of the randomized design and the obvious differences between the treatment and control condition, an important predictor of brand acceptance is repeat exposure, and our single-shot survey experiment cannot approximate the effects of seeing a brand in multiple contexts over an extended period of time. Nonetheless, we do observe some small effects of how information about the foreign aid donor affected perceptions of the donor and of companies and products from the donor country. And we observe that there may be a direct, positive effect of information about foreign aid on how citizens view their local governments.

Our initial findings form the basis of future research. In the current survey, we have allowed respondents to draw their own conclusions about the implications of foreign aid projects. In the real world, however, people often rely on information sources to provide an interpretation of politically-relevant information. That is, aid projects may be described positively or negatively by local elites and/or media. In a follow-up survey we plan to impose information about project quality by designing survey vignettes that describe U.S.-funded projects in positive and negative ways. If respondents are given information about project-failure or corruption within a project, will this knowledge influence their attitudes toward the project sponsor and their local government? Will a negative project description offset our observed positive effects on respondent attitudes toward their local government?

We also plan to address an important question that arises from our current project findings: Do our findings apply to domestic sectors beyond health? Since the project we study is specific to mothers and newborn children and is highly valued across Bangladesh, the results may mask important differences across sectors. For instance, respondents may evaluate government responsibilities differently in the security sector where the state is viewed as central to the provision of order.

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Tables and Figures



Figure 1. Screenshots from Control and Treatment Videos.

Do you know from where the Smiling Sun Clinics get most of their financial assistance?	Don't Know	United States	Unnamed Foreign Aid	Specific, Non-U.S. Foreign Aid	Government	Other
Overall Control Group (N=1,073)	0.81	0.11	0.04	0.0009	0.03	0.008
Overall Treatment Group (N=1,163)	0.69	0.24	0.03	0.0009	0.03	0.004
Previous Users Control Group (N=168)	0.65	0.26	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01
Previous Users Treatment Group (N=198)	0.49	0.40	0.07	0.01	0.04	0.00
Previous Awareness (But Not Use) Control Group (N=332)	0.74	0.16	0.06	0.00	0.03	0.01
Previous Awareness (But Not Use) Treatment Group (N=376)	0.60	0.34	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.003
High Education Control Group (N=251)	0.72	0.21	0.06	0.00	0.02	0.004
High Education Treatment Group (N=263)	0.47	0.44	0.05	0.004	0.04	0.00

Table 1. Perceived Origins of Health Clinic Financing. High education is defined as respondents with a completed secondary education or above. p-value for a Pearson χ^2 test of independence between the rows and the columns: p < 0.01 for overall, previously aware, and high education; p < 0.05 for previous users.

Outcome	Control (Smiling Sun Brand Only)	Treatment (USAID Brand and Information)	Difference	p-value for H ₀ : No Difference
U.S. Influence: Negative, Null, or Positive (-1, 0, 1)	0.80 (0.02) N=1,086	0.84 (0.01) N=1,177	0.05 (0.02)	0.03
Should Bangladesh trade more with U.S. or else diversify its trading partners? (proportion saying “trade more”)	0.16 (0.01) N=1,024	0.17 (0.01) N=1,111	0.01 (0.02)	0.41
Bangladeshi troops serve under the command of military officers from other countries in U.N. PKOs. Which country would you want? (Proportion of respondents with any answer saying “United States”)	0.03 (0.006) N=761	0.02 (0.005) N=845	-0.007 (0.007)	0.42

Table 2. Responses to Foreign Policy Questions. Cells present mean responses in each treatment group with standard errors in parentheses. The p-values are based on t-tests of H₀: No difference in means between the treatment and control groups.

U.S. Has a Good Influence on Bangladesh (-1, 0, 1)	Previous Awareness of SSC	No Previous Awareness of SSC	Completed Secondary or Above	Less Than Completed Secondary
Treatment (USAID Brand and Information)	0.87 (0.02) N=575	0.82 (0.02) N=602	0.88 (0.03) N=269	0.83 (0.02) N=908
Control (Smiling Sun Brand Only)	0.84 (0.02) N=500	0.75 (0.02) N=586	0.86 (0.03) N=252	0.77 (0.02) N=834
Difference	0.03 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.02)
p-value for H ₀ : No Difference	0.37	0.04	0.77	0.02
p-value for H ₀ : No Difference between CATEs	0.37		0.49	

Table 3. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for Perceived Influence of U.S. Outcome variable is coded -1 for respondents who think that the U.S. has a large and negative influence on Bangladesh, 0 for respondents who think that the U.S. does not have an influence on Bangladesh, and 1 for respondents who think that the U.S. has a large and positive influence on Bangladesh. Cells present mean responses in each treatment group with standard errors in parentheses. The p-values are based on t-tests of H₀: No difference in means between the treatment and control groups. p-value for difference between conditional average treatment effects (CATEs) is based on a randomization-inference-based test of the kind described in Gerber and Green (2012).

Outcome	Control (Smiling Sun Brand Only)	Treatment (USAID Brand and Information)	Difference	p-value for H ₀ : No Difference
Trust in Brand: Coca-Cola (1 – 7)	4.47 (0.06) N=1,086	4.53 (0.05) N=1,177	0.06 (0.08)	0.45
Trust in Brand: Apple (1 – 7)	3.60 (0.07) N=1,086	3.87 (0.06) N=1,177	0.25 (0.09)	0.01
Number of six products (e.g., cars, mobile phones) for which respondents thought U.S. made “highest quality products” (0 – 6)	0.44 (0.03) N=972	0.50 (0.03) N=1,085	0.06 (0.04)	0.14

Table 4. Responses to Commercial Questions. Cells present mean responses in each treatment group with standard errors in parentheses. The p-values are based on t-tests of H₀: No difference in means between the treatment and control groups.

Outcome	Control (Smiling Sun Brand Only)	Treatment (USAID Brand and Information)	Difference	p-value for H ₀ : No Difference
Level of Confidence in National Government (no, partial, or full, 1 – 3)	2.36 (0.02) N=1,086	2.38 (0.02) N=1,177	0.01 (0.03)	0.72
Level of Confidence in Local Government (no, partial, or full, 1 – 3)	2.18 (0.02) N=1,086	2.24 (0.02) N=1,177	0.07 (0.03)	0.02
Additive Index of Confidence in Seven Government / Political Institutions (0 – 14)	8.37 (0.09) N=1,086	8.62 (0.09) N=1,177	0.25 (0.13)	0.06
Tax department has the right to make people pay taxes (strongly disagree ... strongly agree, 1 – 5)	4.08 (0.03) N=1,019	4.09 (0.03) N=1,102	0.00 (0.04)	0.91
Those who govern the country are engaged in rampant corruption (strongly disagree ... strongly agree, 1 – 5)	3.61 (0.03) N=1,086	3.50 (0.03) N=1,177	-0.10 (0.05)	0.03

Table 5. Responses to Domestic Government Legitimacy Questions. Cells present mean responses in each treatment group with standard errors in parentheses. The p-values are based on t-tests of H₀: No difference in means between the treatment and control groups.

Level of Confidence in Local Government (no, partial, or full, 1 – 3)	Previous Use of SSC	No Previous Use of SSC	Politically Active	Not Politically Active	Completed Secondary or Above	Less Than Completed Secondary
Treatment (USAID Brand and Information)	2.35 (0.04) N=201	2.22 (0.02) N=976	2.28 (0.04) N=192	2.23 (0.02) N=985	2.34 (0.04) N=269	2.21 (0.02) N=908
Control (Smiling Sun Brand Only)	2.09 (0.05) N=170	2.19 (0.02) N=916	2.06 (0.05) N=185	2.20 (0.02) N=901	2.18 (0.04) N=252	2.18 (0.02) N=834
Difference	0.26 (0.06)	0.03 (0.03)	0.22 (0.06)	0.03 (0.03)	0.16 (0.06)	0.04 (0.03)
p-value for H₀: No Difference	0.01	0.40	0.01	0.26	0.01	0.25
p-value for H₀: No Difference between CATEs	0.01		0.01		0.14	

Table 6. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for Level of Confidence in Local Government. Cells present mean responses in each treatment group with standard errors in parentheses. The p-values are based on t-tests of H₀: No difference in means between the treatment and control groups. p-value for difference between conditional average treatment effects (CATEs) is based on a randomization-inference-based test of the kind described in Gerber and Green (2012).

Appendix

Sampling Strategy

The primary sampling unit (PSU) for the survey was the mouza, an administrative unit roughly equivalent to a village. We randomly sampled 96 mouza using a probability-proportional-to-size weighting based on the 2011 population census. The 96 mouza cover 53 out of 64 districts in Bangladesh. For each PSU, 25 households were selected using a random walk where every tenth household was chosen. Within each household, a Kish grid was used to identify a respondent over the age of 18. Not all sampled units were eventually surveyed, resulting in a total N of 2,294, rather than the anticipated N of 2,400.

Balance Checks

Variable	Control Group Mean (SE) N=1,076	Treatment Group Mean (SE) N=1,167	Difference (SE) (0.02)	p-value for H ₀ : No Difference
Female (0/1)	0.54 (0.02) N=1,076	0.51 (0.01) N=1,167	0.03 (0.02)	0.13
Age	37.6 (0.42) N=1,086	37.9 (0.41) N=1,177	-0.29 (0.59)	0.62
Education (7-point scale)	3.82 (0.06) N=1,086	3.92 (0.06) N=1,177	-0.10 (0.09)	0.25
Minority Group (0/1)	0.17 (0.01) N=1,086	0.15 (0.01) N=1,177	0.02 (0.02)	0.27
Importance of Health Care as a Policy Issue (4-point scale)	3.80 (0.01) N=1,082	3.81 (0.01) N=1,174	-0.02 (0.02)	0.30
Previously Used Smiling Sun Clinic (0/1)	0.16 (0.01) N=1,086	0.17 (0.01) N=1,177	-0.01 (0.02)	0.37
Previously Aware of Smiling Sun Clinics (0/1)	0.46 (0.02) N=1,086	0.49 (0.01) N=1,177	-0.03 (0.02)	0.19