

FINAL REPORT

Final Evaluation Report: Zimbabwe Natural Resources Management Program - USAID/Zimbabwe Strategic Objective No. 1.

CAMPFIRE Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources

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Abbreviations

AA	Appropriate Authority
Action	Action Magazine
Assoc.	Association
ART	Africa Resources Trust
BRC	Bilateral Review Committee
CA	CAMPFIRE Association
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
CASS	The University of Zimbabwe's Centre for Applied Social Sciences
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CCG	CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group
CDF	CAMPFIRE Development Fund
CITES	Convention for the International trade in Endangered Species
CSPs	CAMPFIRE Service Providers
DA	Development Associates
DEAP	District Environmental Action Plan
DNR	Department of Natural Resources
DNPWLM	Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management
FC	Forestry Commission
GOZ	Government of Zimbabwe
IC	Institutional Contractor
ICB	Institutional Capacity Building
JICA	Japanese International Development Agency
LT	Long term
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MLG	Ministry of Local Government
MLGRUD	Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
MLGPWNH	Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing
NACOBTA	Namibian Community Based Tourism Association
NGO	Non Government Organisation
NR	Natural Resources
NRM	Natural Resources Management
NRMP	Natural Resources Management Program
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for International Development
PAC	Problem Animal Control
PET	Project Execution Committee
PMT	Project Management Team
POMS	Process Orientated Monitoring System
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PWC	PriceWaterhouseCoopers
RDC	Rural District Council
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAFIRE	Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources
SASUSG	Southern African Sustainable Use Specialist Group
SCI	Safari Club International
SGI	Sustainable Growth Initiative
SO1	Strategic Objective One
ST	Short Term
TA	Technical Advice
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
USG	United States Government
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
WISDOM	WISDOM Foundation (Wildlife in Sustainable Development of Mankind)
WWF-SARPO	World Wide Fund for Nature, Southern African Regional Programme Office
ZD	Zimbabwe Dollar
ZATSO	Zimbabwe Association of Tour and Safari Operators
ZPG&HA	Zimbabwe Professional Guides and Hunters Association
ZHA	Zimbabwe Hunters Association
ZimTrust	The Zimbabwe Trust

Executive Summary

This report presents the findings of the Final Evaluation of the USAID funded NRMP II support to Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE programme. It is important to distinguish between the two. CAMPFIRE is a long-term programmatic approach to rural development that uses wildlife and other natural resources as a mechanism for promoting devolved rural institutions and improved governance and livelihoods. Its cornerstone is the devolution of the rights to benefit from, dispose of and manage natural resources.

NRMP, by contrast, is a Project with a fixed time horizon. In support of CAMPFIRE, NRMP II has involved two phases. NRMP I spent USD7.6 million and supported four districts in Matabeleland (Binga, Hwange, Tsholotsho and Bulilimamangwe) as well as wildlife management in the Hwange-Matetsi Parks and Wildlife Complex, and some communication, training and research. In 1995, USAID refinanced NRMP II with USD20.5 million, rolling it out as a national project in support of the CAMPFIRE programme. In addition to supporting wildlife management, community development, research and training, NRMP II introduced a grant facility to which communities could apply called the CAMPFIRE Development Fund.

CAMPFIRE

CAMPFIRE was designed by the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management in the mid-1980s, and was initially implemented with limited funding by creating a partnership with three NGOs and the Ministry of Local Government. This grouping – the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group – then created the CAMPFIRE Association, and in 1991 passed the leadership of the programme to the Association with the intention of building its capacity as the legitimate representation of its rural constituency. As it happened, the CCG members were marginalized in the second phase of NRMP II, with the CAMPFIRE Association's composition of RDCs (rather than communities), technical capacity and financial sustainability becoming questions central to the long-term maintenance of the necessary support to "producer communities".

Early Devolution

Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) is now a well recognized, if still controversial, response to the challenge of sustainable conservation. Much of the early impetus to the CBNRM movement was provided by CAMPFIRE, with the key breakthrough being legislation that allowed DNPWLM to devolve "appropriate authority status" to twelve Rural District Councils in 1989 and 1990. Even at this time, DNPWLM recognized that success depended on devolution to sub-district levels, and preferably to the level where communities could meet face-to-face. However, in the absence of legal personality below the level of the RDC, DNPWLM was forced into administrative devolution whereby the legal rights to wildlife were devolved to RDCs, but on the condition that rights and benefits were further devolved to what were termed "producer communities".

Good Performance Despite Macro Economic Environment

This evaluation took place at a time when Zimbabwe was undergoing severe political and economic hardships, with a shrinking economy, controlled pricing and a highly distorted market in foreign exchange. The most important finding, therefore, was that despite these difficulties, CAMPFIRE was still working remarkably well at the level of the RDC and particularly the community. This is a testimony to the efficacy of the principles upon which the programme is based, which appear sound and robust even in trying circumstances, and to the considerable effort that has gone in to creating community capacity, and especially an acceptance of the efficacy and legitimacy of local level management and benefit. USAID funding was important, particularly in expanding the concept of CAMPFIRE beyond the original dozen wildlife districts.

Positive Conservation Impact

There is ample evidence of sound wildlife and natural resource management. In the face of rapid population growth that has over-run large areas on the Sebungwe and Zambezi Valley, the CAMPFIRE programme has protected an area of wild land roughly equivalent in extent to the Parks and Wildlife Estate (i.e. some 50,000km²). In the ten years since its inception, wildlife populations appear to have increased by about 50%, with elephant doubling for 4,000 to 8,000 in CAMPFIRE Areas.

The primary impetus for conservation has been safari hunting. Robust systems of management have been developed and widely adopted at community level, with quota-setting being especially important. Field visits confirmed that most community leaders understand and are able to set and manage quotas and safari

hunting. In at least seven districts, electric fences and other measures are being taken to reduce the impact of problem animals, at least four districts have fire management programmes, and in numerous localities there is evidence of more care being taken to manage and control natural resources. In Mazowe, fishing by-laws are being enforced, and the natural vegetation has been maintained even in the middle of the Mahenye community. Much of the credit for this must go to WWF, and its systematic approach to working with communities to develop appropriate wildlife and natural resource management technology, and then rolling this out with manuals, trainer's manuals, and a carefully designed training methodology that includes site-level training but places most emphasis on the training of trainers. Approximately 18% of NRMP II funds have been spent on improving natural resource management, and the conclusion is that the impact of this money has been high, largely because it has been channeled through people who are recognized experts in their field.

Economic Impact

The economic impact of CAMPFIRE has also been positive. Methods for involving communities in the selection of their private partners using open competitive marketing were developed in the early 1990s. Initially, these rapidly increased the income from wildlife concessions and latterly, in the face of pressures to the contrary, they have maintained these prices and have largely excluded corruption. Together with the increasing wildlife populations mentioned above, revenues from safari hunting increased rapidly to USD2 million annually. Since 1989, CAMPFIRE has generated direct income of over USD 20 million, with an economic impact of USD 100 million.

Diversification

At least twelve high-end tourism lodges have also been developed in communal areas but the revenues from these, and also from secondary activities such as employment, tourism multipliers and the provision of natural products are generally not captured in the CAMPFIRE revenue database.

Part of the reasons is that some RDCs treat this income as General Revenue. A study commissioned by CAMPFIRE Association (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2001), suggests that natural resources such as timber, fishing and sale of products including sand actually provide some 30% more money than is reflected in the CAMPFIRE accounts. Unfortunately, much of this does not get returned to communities.

Especially after the 1998 Mid Term Review, NRMP II attempted to diversify the commercial base of CAMPFIRE. Some 10 ecotourism ventures were established as were 4 for managing natural products such as bamboo, fishing and mopane caterpillars. These initiatives got off the ground slowly, and their timing coincided with Zimbabwe's economic collapse. While a good proportion (5 and 3 respectively) are likely to be sustainable, at least if the economy returns to normal, they would have benefited from more and better technical evaluation and support, earlier encouragement of private sector partners, better background assessments of the viability and value-added of such projects, and more consideration of the need for coordinated support such as product development and marketing especially as effective diversification of NRM is difficult. Project design may have under-estimated the difficulties of diversification, and was hampered by the declining capacity of the CCG and the declining tourism economy. USAID's procedural requirements were also too cumbersome for community implementation. Implementation was also hampered by working largely with CA and RDCs, whereas working directly with communities may well have been more effective, as was demonstrated late in the project including by the small grant window.

This resulted in a situation towards the close of the Project where tough measures were required to complete many projects before the funding window closed, and this is not always compatible with the process of community development. Nevertheless, we endorse the efforts in this direction, and note improvements such as the development of a small grant window (albeit five years into the programme), a much higher level of tourism and engineering expertise, more insistence on community-private partnerships, and a greater focus on communities including the development of some 16 trusts to manage these projects. An over-sight in this programme was the importance of product development and marketing.

While data suggests that CAMPFIRE is still 95% dependent on safari hunting, this underestimates the level of diversification by approximately 30%. Safari hunting has proven to be robust both environmentally and economically, even in extremely difficult circumstance. It is the reason that many CAMPFIRE communities can be considered sustainable, especially in the original twelve wildlife districts. Diversification, while desirable, is a process that requires a long gestation period and considerable investment in product development. In the short term NRMP's investment was critical to CAMPFIRE's expansion and acceptance

at a time when the programme was under political pressure. It enabled the spread of the CAMPFIRE principles into non-wildlife areas, bringing with it wider political support of the CAMPFIRE process, as well as economic and conservation benefits.

Fiscal Devolution

CAMPFIRE is built around the concepts of fiscal devolution and local responsibility. From 1989 to 1995, the amount and proportion of revenues devolved to producer communities increased rapidly, and from all reports this was the primary impetus for both the wildlife conservation discussed above and for rapid improvements in community institutions and governance. However, from 1996, the rate of devolution plateaued and from 2000 the process began to reverse itself. By 2001, only 38% of revenue was returned to producer communities, some 20% was used for CAMPFIRE management, but over 40% was retained by RDCs for general purposes compared to an agreed upper limit of 15%. A few districts have bowed to the pressure of the majority of councillors, and are spreading CAMPFIRE revenues thinly to a large number of people. This risks earlier successes. We quote the example of Sidinda Wards in Hwange. The community immediately stopped poaching once they received benefits, and the populations of buffalo and sable increased steadily. However, with only one vote in Council, benefits were then shared out amongst eight Wards. The Sidinda community no longer has a significant conservation incentive and poaching has resumed.

While we quote these problems, the concept and level of devolution in many districts is still strong, and we confirm the strength of the correlation reported by ZimTrust (2001) between fiscal devolution and institutional development. We also note that an important benefit of the spread of CAMPFIRE through NRMP II CDF investment is that these principles are being adopted in almost all projects, and what was once a contentious principle is now an accepted norm. Innovation is also occurring. In Chiredzi, for instance, the hunter pays 60% of hunting revenues directly to the village in which an animal is shot within seven days of the hunt. RDC technical staff in several districts recognize the power of such innovations, but are not always supported by councilors. Chipinge RDC, for example, agreed that after a decade of supervising the Mahenye community, it was now time to give them full authority.

Rural District Councils, Services and Taxation

In general, the competence and level of commitment by staff in RDC CAMPFIRE Units was strong, and technical and equipment support provided by NRMP II had created worthwhile capacity. Wildlife districts are likely to be able to maintain much of this capacity using 20% of revenues, although we believe that it would be beneficial to the programme if staff such as resource monitors were employed at community level and this proportion was reduced to 15%. We also recommend that revenues are paid directly to communities, who then pay the RDC on the basis of services. We are concerned at the high level of taxation of producer communities. This includes the official 15% levy by RDCs (plus an additional 25% retained informally) and the 4% levy for CAMPFIRE Association. We strongly recommend that the total figure is kept below 10% and is in line with the taxation of other resources such as cotton or livestock to avoid differential taxation of wildlife.

Intitutional Development

One of the most remarkable achievements of CAMPFIRE has been the strength of institutional development at the level of producer communities. Every year these communities receive their wildlife dividend, and all indications are that use is decided democratically, that people retain and sometimes use their right to have household cash benefits, and that a large number of projects are implemented sensibly and well. Finances appear to be reasonably well managed, with transparency and peer review to a large extent preventing misuse. The system is undoubtedly working, and is an inspiration to rural development.

Lost Opportunities in Institutional Development

Particularly at producer community level, CAMPFIRE provides an important and rare test case of the emerging interest in fiscal devolution¹ and rural governance. Our disappointment is that more has not been made of the opportunity to monitor and develop this experience, to use it to innovate appropriate technology in the manner that has been done for natural resource management. CAMPFIRE provides a cutting edge example of the powerful impact of fiscal devolution, and had it been developed and spread in the manner of devolved wildlife management systems (e.g. quota setting, community-private contracting, revenue distribution, etc.), the benefits to rural development in general are likely to have been huge.

¹ For example, the World Bank (undated, 2001?) emphasises this, whereas Ribot (1999) in a review of such programmes in Africa over the past 40 years is unable to find examples of fiscal devolution.

Perhaps the greatest favour CAMPFIRE can do in the cause of devolved rural governance is to monitor, adaptively develop and record this experience. Our field assessment, including interviews, inspection of projects and of financial records, convinced us of the efficacy and power of this approach. However, unlike wildlife management and economic benefits, we have been unable to support our arguments with data. As with wildlife management, the key to developing institutional management systems will lie in the use of people who are recognized experts in this field. While CAMPFIRE, and especially ZimTrust excelled in advocacy and awareness creation, the programme always lacked the requisite professional expertise in institutional development.

Regional and International Impact

CAMPFIRE has also had a considerable regional and international impact, and we consider the returns on the investment made by NRMP II in this aspect (approximately 10% of project expenditure) to be very high. CBNRM is now generally accepted and practiced in southern Africa, and CAMPFIRE has contributed significantly to this experience, exporting technology and lessons. At an international level, CAMPFIRE has been influential in supporting the rights of local people to benefit from and manage their own natural resources, and in developing an understanding of CBNRM and common property management.

Centralization and Excessive Taxation

We turn now to some of the more negative aspects of NRMP II. We have already noted the increasing propensity of RDCs to extract revenues from communities. It is a pity that NRMP worked through and strengthened the centralizing hand of RDCs (although we have noted how some RDCs, and especially their CAMPFIRE units, have tried, in extremely difficult circumstances, to devolve revenues). We accept that project design was heavily influenced by the general political centralization of Zimbabwe, which exaggerated the prominent role given to RDCs and CA in implementation. However, project effectiveness and impact on the ultimate beneficiaries would have been considerably enhanced by working directly with producer communities rather than through these intermediaries.

CAMPFIRE Association

The project has put considerable efforts into strengthening CAMPFIRE Association as the lead agency. This has been less productive than anticipated. CAMPFIRE Association never evolved real leadership capacity nor, as had been hoped, into an association truly representative of rural producer communities. Its membership still consists entirely of RDCs, and remains too similar to the Rural District Councils Association of Zimbabwe. CAMPFIRE Association's expectations of taking on many implementation and monitoring functions were always over-optimistic, and this was exacerbated by the unexpectedly slow improvements in CAMPFIRE Associations' management capacity. CA also deliberately marginalized NGOs from the programme.

Our recommendations are that CA needs to diversify its membership to include producer communities, private producer communities (e.g. Conservancies) and other supporters (e.g. NGOs). It also needs to diversify and strengthen Board membership and experience (e.g. lawyers, financial managers and industry leaders). This would improve its financial sustainability, technical capacity and strength of leadership. We also recommend that CAMPFIRE Association carefully redefines its mandate and membership to increase accountability and services to producer communities.

CAMPFIRE Development Fund Grants

A significant amount of NRMP II finances have been used to develop the capacity of RDCs to support CAMPFIRE activities and to implement CDF-funded projects, largely through support to an Institutional Contractor and the CAMPFIRE Association. On the one hand, this has enabled CAMPFIRE to spread country wide, with Institutional Capacity Building Grants (including training, vehicles and equipment) to 23 districts and an increase in membership of the CAMPFIRE Association to 52 of Zimbabwe's 57 RDCs. This has been crucial for the political survival of CAMPFIRE in what was perceived as a white-dominated technical initiative, and is therefore a worthwhile investment almost regardless of cost because it lays the social foundation for the programme.

However, conceptually, technically and financially this has been the weakest aspect of NRMP II. The use of funds for diversification is, in any case, difficult, but these difficulties were exacerbated by the marginalisation of the NGOs, their loss of capacity independently of NRMP, and other problems. This maintained the CDF as a fairly ordinary grant-making mechanism where, in the correct environment, CAMPFIRE provides a foundation for considerable innovation and experimentation. In the circumstances,

the efforts to implement the CDF have been steady, albeit with cumbersome mechanism related to USAID procedures. The capacity developed in RDCs by the USD2 million ICB grants is likely to be maintained, at least in wildlife districts, and the USD1.3 million CDF grant has developed over twenty diversification projects, many of which are sustainable at least in normal economic circumstances. Had circumstances been normal and more conducive to devolution and the use of the private sector, we would have criticized the CDF for not emphasizing loans, performance-based grants, private-community partnerships, the development of sinking funds or an endowment mechanism and, above all, a direct focus on working with beneficiary communities. Indeed, the latter stages of the CDF, when the small grant window was opened and projects were targeted directly at communities, yielded superior results, which does pose the question of why this was tried so late into the programme. Generally, results have been mediocre. Delivering financing directly to communities remains the right objective, and this experience should be built on. It is a pity that funding is being withdrawn, just as sufficient experience is emerging on how to improve delivery.

Loss of Intellectual Leadership

During NRMP, the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group has dissipated with the loss of innovation and leadership within the programme. To some extent this has been external to NRMP. However, it may also be consequence of the heavy funding of CAMPFIRE Association, which believed it could go it alone and seldom actively supported NGO-partners in their quest for funding. Other Project-driven factors were the increasing domination of the CDF in its latter stages, and also the reliance on short-term consultants, which, to some extent replaced critical long-term relationships between facilitators and communities. In several communities visited, this was seen as the biggest threat to sustainability. However, the NGOs concerned must also shoulder a good deal of the responsibility, with all of them independently losing technical capacity. One criticism leveled at some (not all) of the NGOs is that they have been provided with a lot of equipment by USAID, and access to funding, yet provided little support to CAMPFIRE after their core funding grants ran out. ACTION Magazine for example, quoted CAMPFIRE Association full market rates although their equipment had been grant funded through NRMP.

Project Delivery Challenges

Heavy funding changed the nature of the programme, especially in the last three years. It empowered CA relative to the partners. It also increased the emphasis on CDF projects – in all five regional reports presented at the 2003 CAMPFIRE Annual General Meeting the only topic reported was the status of CDF projects. In this period, CCG ceased to provide effective programme leadership so, de facto, the key grouping in the programme became the PMT. The PMT is a technical body to review CDF projects, and not well suited to this role.

In preparation for NRMP II, PET had been designed with a careful balance between RDC, government and civic actors to control the flow of resources from NRMP II to communities. However, in interpreting leadership as domination of the programme, the CAMPFIRE Association discouraged PET. NGO participation was weak because of this, but also because of their own increasing capacity constraints. PET did not work, for reasons of personality rather than design, and was therefore replaced by the PMT as the mechanism for administering and distributing projects, which also centered more power with CA. This worked reasonably well as a technical mechanism for project implementation. However, the CAMPFIRE programme lost cohesive, cooperative leadership and vision.

Membership of the PMT comprised only government or quasi-government agencies (i.e. RDCs, DNPWLM, MLGPWNH, and USAID/DA) and lacked civic and technical peer review. Moreover, it was comprised predominantly of RDC persons, yet was responsible for sharing out projects amongst this membership. An unsurprisingly the result was that each RDC was entitled to one large project. The majority of PMT membership was more concerned with handing out projects as quickly and with as little difficulty as possible. This placed both USAID and the Institutional Contractor in the difficult position of having to veto unviable projects, which in the case of the latter conflicted seriously with its second role of providing capacity to the CAMPFIRE Association. There was also insufficient expertise or business experience in the PMT.

While accepting that the CDF was designed in an antagonistic environment, noting that it was important for expanding the CAMPFIRE programme and diversifying its economic base, and noting that the CDF was a useful (if not innovative) contribution, we are nevertheless critical of several design features.

First, it provided too much free money. Therefore projects were allocated one to each district (each member of the PMT got one project), equity criteria dominated technical or economic factors (although DA/USAID

constantly emphasized the projects must be sustainable), and the process lacked the discipline and incentivisation of either loan repayment or performance criteria.

Second, we question the process whereby RDCs were given Institutional Capacity Building Grants (USD2 million), and only three years later CDF Grants (USD1.3 million). In contrast to this typical blue-print approach, we suggest adaptive management using pilot projects and a learning process may have reaped quicker results. We note the relative inefficiency of the earlier period when projects were channeled through RDCs compared to the improvements introduced by the small grant window and direct funding to community level. However, we also wonder why it took five years to initiate the relatively simple small grant window. With the funding of NRM projects being universally problematic, an interesting opportunity might have been to design it as a learning opportunity as well as to deliver diversification. However, we also note that the loss of capacity and synergy within the CCG, weakened the CAMPFIRE programme's ability to create and use learning processes.

Thirdly, and linked to this, we are concerned that the stiff criteria imposed by USAID limited the appropriateness and flexibility of the CDF. The simple and community-friendly guidelines developed in the first year of the Project did not fulfill USAID's administrative requirements, and it was four years into the project before the CDF Guidelines were finalized. These guidelines were cumbersome, and are an example of the bureaucratic tail wagging the developmental dog.

Fourthly, the short implementation period (at least in the time scale of rural development and institutional change), and the fact that this funding mechanism was not extended through a sinking or endowment fund, was not ideal. Opportunities to build on emerging lessons could not be used. The funding profile did not match the rate of uptake by communities. And the funding profile did not match the requirements of diversification or product development, which is also a long-term process.

The grant approval process was slow and cumbersome, a large part had to do with meeting USAID financial review requirements before a grantee could receive project funds. It also tackled a difficult areas (ecotourism and NRM diversification). Consequently, delivery was slow. Almost half of the CDF projects are still incomplete although USAID and DA estimate that 80% will be completed. Initially intended to deliver USD6 million to communities, only USD 1.3 million was actually spent on CDF projects (6% of NRMP II funds), with a further USD 2 million spent reasonably effectively to support RDC CAMPFIRE capacity. In this regard we must state that the management capacity of communities is not the limiting factor. Every year they invest over USD1 million in a large number of highly participatory community projects, suggesting that over the project lifespan they have invested seven times as effectively as the project in terms of the amount of money spent, and probably considerably more than this in terms of value added. The problem lies in the structure and complexity of the CDF, and the political circumstances that exerted pressures to use it as a centralized, grant facility. For these reasons, it could not be adapted to effectively reach and use sub-district capacity, and initiating this towards the end of the project required a lot of hard work in difficult circumstances.

We have repeatedly stressed the importance of the CDF in ensuring the spread of CAMPFIRE and its political survival. This alone is enough to justify this funding. While, generally, we might not support grant funding allocated in this manner on developmental grounds, in the difficult circumstances of the time our conclusions is that the CDF had far greater positive effects than drawbacks. We nevertheless suggests that, as a financing mechanism, the CDF was steady but unimaginative and that, for whatever reasons, opportunities to create further innovation around the CAMPFIRE programme were not taken. The need for long lead times, and strong technical support to a learning process, are an important lesson of the Project.

Future Funding Mechanisms Should be Goal Specific

We have suggested that any future funding should be structured much more carefully. If the intention is to promote devolution, funding should be matched directly to the amount of money devolved to community level. If the intention is to promote enterprise diversification, funding should support private-community partnerships in the form of loans (which also allows the possibility of a sustainable fund) and should introduce the formal banking system using an under-writing systems. If the intention is to support social or environmental projects, grants should use stringent criteria for involvement and benefit, and should also reward performance (as is now done commonly with social investment funds where).

Conclusions

In conclusion, NRMP II and CAMPFIRE confirm the concept that the devolution of natural resource management can be a highly effective mechanism for the participatory management of wildlife and natural resources, and for improving local institutions and governance. The time frame of donor projects is usually too short for the behavioral and institutional changes that are central to this process, and heavy levels of funding have to be managed extremely carefully to avoid upsetting these delicate and important processes. The timing of the withdrawal of NRMP II is unfortunate, given the importance of supporting CAMPFIRE during a period of serious economic decline, and the opportunities to learn from what has happened. Nevertheless, while economic circumstances will set CAMPFIRE back, it appears robust enough to survive.

NRMP II funding has been extremely effective where it has capitalized on the presence of long-term recognized expertise to develop natural resource management systems (18% of budget) and to research and promote the concept of devolved community management (10%). Institutional capacity building (25%) has been weaker, largely owing to the absence of such expertise, and represents a significant lost opportunity. While management (40%) and funding of the CDF (7%) has spread the CAMPFIRE concept broadly, better design and monitoring on this component would have significantly increased the level of benefit and devolution. It is important to place these comments within the institutional dynamics of the project and to note that (in agreement with DA) over-ambitious project design, institutional rivalries, reluctance to use technical assistance and the private sector and to innovate, and uneven quality of TA contracted by some Project participants, were also important constraints.

In order to promote the original CAMPFIRE principles of devolution of authority over natural production systems to producer communities, CAMPFIRE stakeholders need to emulate regional experience to press for legislation to provide for appropriate authority status, and even land rights, at sub-district units of decision-making, and preferably at the level of the village. Effort to promote local-level proprietorship, such as at the experimentation with community trusts, must be continued. Community and district capacity is not a limiting factor, but to achieve devolution the long term leadership of the programme needs to be strengthened. The greatest contribution of the CAMPFIRE programme has been the lesson that fiscal devolution leads to improved rural democratization, governance and management. Building improved organizational technology around these opportunities, and monitoring and documenting these lessons, might go a long way to demonstrating the value of devolution.

To complete the executive summary, we summarise the positive impacts and weaknesses of NRMP.

Summary of Positive Impact

1. Conservation impact

In the face of 10% population growth in some areas, and doubling of rural populations between 1980 and 2000:

1. Wildlife areas were demarcated (often informally, sometimes with fences) and were largely maintained (but area/size data not available)
2. Elephant populations increased steadily, and buffalo populations were maintained (despite crash in 1992 drought)
3. Trophy quality was largely maintained
4. With diversification, small "community conserved areas" were established or protected in non-wildlife ecoregions – Gairezi, Vhimba, Mavuradonna, Mazowe Mountain, caves in Matobo, etc.
5. Reduced or contained veld fires in Chiredzi, Chipinge and Gokwe North
6. Poaching contained or reduced levels of illegal off-take (wildlife populations, but data on fish not available)
7. Anecdotal narrations suggest reduction in tree-felling (Nyanga, Ntanjambili, Maitengwe)

2. Economic benefit Impact

1. Revenues from hunting were increased rapidly and then maintained at USD1.5-2.0 million annually although NRMP II moved away from promoting hunting due to policy reasons;
2. At least 12 high-end ecotourism projects are operational in communal areas – Ngami, Gorges, Bumi, Mahenye, Binga (but no income data)
3. Increased number of households (from 7,861 in 1989 to over 80,000 in 1993) benefited directly (in cash) from wildlife and many of these communities made social investments and built small businesses (no full records available) prior to NRMP and continued throughout the NRMP period.
4. Secondary benefits in terms of services, goods and supplies, employment creation at local levels around successful tourism projects can be assumed (no data available)

3. Diversification

1. At least 18 middle range eco-tourism ventures were started (of which 4 have been completed – Nyanga, Vhimba, Banje, Gonono)
2. New areas of revenue were promoted (e.g. fisheries in Beitbridge, Mazowe; honey collection in Nyanga, Gokwe South, and Masau (fruit) in Muzarabani and Guruve)

4. Devolution

1. CAMPFIRE movement and its supported structures have led to increased awareness of entitlements and rights and demand for these at local level (Chitsike Report mentions demand and the team's impression from site visits confirms this)
2. At least 17 trusts established at sub-district level and 7 are functioning (bank accounts, regular minuted meetings, paid employees)
3. In 1 hunting District (Chiredzi) and 2 Eco-tourism projects (Gairezi and Karunga Trusts) payments are being made directly to sub-district level
4. In 5 out of 7 sites visited by evaluation team, Council and CAMPFIRE unit officials strongly supported devolution and were taking measures to implement it (but reportedly there is less commitment by Councillors with some notable exceptions)
5. 2002 CAMPFIRE Revenue Guidelines reinforce principles of administrative devolution
6. In 6 out of 7 RDCs visited, there was full acceptance of the right of communities to utilize income as they saw fit.

5. Institution and Capacity Building at Sub-District, District and National Levels

1. Over 100 village and ward CAMPFIRE committees in 23 Districts learned basic organizational skills – book-keeping, minutes, meetings, etc.
2. In at least 13 districts, natural resource monitors and community leaders in particular learned wildlife management skills – setting quotas, selling wildlife, monitoring hunting, managing electric fences, problem animal monitoring, counting wildlife, ecological management
3. Systems of controlling off-take of natural resources were put in place – e.g. fish poachers were fined, with fines paying guards and providing community benefit
4. Fire management implemented in 4 areas (Chipinge, Chiredzi, Gokwe North and Guruve)
5. CAMPFIRE Support Units established at RDC level in 23 districts and are still providing training to sub-district levels in Wildlife districts

6. Over 100 village and ward wildlife committees established and functioning
7. NRM by-laws and constitutions developed for use in the village and ward wildlife committees
8. Training of members of Board of Trustees
9. Asset management and books of accounts kept in order at RDC units
10. In most producer wards basic record keeping is in place
11. Communities undertaking project identification and implementation in wildlife districts (but weak monitoring and no centralized database)
12. CAMPFIRE Units in wildlife districts generally operate well, maintaining expenses at 20% (but could devolve more functions to communities and reduce this percentage to between 10-15%).

6. Governance

1. High level of transparency and community participation in revenue distribution and use at village and ward levels
2. CAMPFIRE structures have provided a forum for high levels of community participation in decision-making on NRM and other issues
3. Generally, funds were well accounted for at sub-district level and in RDC CAMPFIRE Units
4. CAMPFIRE committees at village and ward levels are elected
5. Transparent flow of information at ward and village and between some wards and villages concerning issues, action plans and projects

7. Technologies and Innovation

1. Development of cutting edge knowledge about the process of empowerment (e.g. quota setting, contract negotiation with private sector etc.)

8. National, Regional and International Impact

1. With broadening of base, CAMPFIRE enjoyed a growing social and political acceptance at national level (by Parliamentarians and within Central Government)
2. NRMP II ensured survival of the earlier CAMPFIRE principle (see Constitution of CAMPFIRE Association and the CAMPFIRE Principles) to a large extent by funding its expansion to non-wildlife districts in the country
3. Consumptive forms of wildlife utilization and non-consumptive use of wildlife (eco-tourism) on communal lands became acceptable forms of land use
4. CAMPFIRE principles have proved resilient and have spread to non-wildlife areas
5. Other countries in the SADC Region (Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, Mozambique) have adopted CAMPFIRE principles adapting methodology and approach by devolving authority to sub-district community organizations rather than district level administrative units
6. Technologies developed by CAMPFIRE were widely adopted in the region
7. CAMPFIRE contributed significantly to promote acceptance of sustainable use principles at the international level
8. CAMPFIRE put Zimbabwe squarely on the international scene by its activities in CITES (particularly 1997), becoming a fertile ground for research and learning and producing a vast amount of literature (over 300 publications) on CBNRM and common property resource management.

9. Sustainability

1. Systems, infrastructure and capacity are being maintained in wards and villages receiving revenue from wildlife utilization, and in some community eco-tourism initiatives
2. CAMPFIRE units are probably sustainable in wildlife districts
3. Most CSPs have diversified funding base and several have made a shift towards regional activities
4. At this point in time the team has concerns over the long-term sustainability of some of the CDF-funded activities, particularly those ecotourism projects with weak market links and those projects that have not yet been completed.

Summary of Weaknesses of NRMP II

The following weaknesses have been noted by the evaluation team:

1. RDC Performance

1. NRMP has strengthened RDC control and role as gatekeepers in relation to producer communities
2. Poor management by RDCs of approved community projects
3. Misuse of project vehicles in some RDCs (Muzarabani) without monitoring and corrective mechanisms
4. In the face of the current economic crisis, RDCs retaining an increasing amount of revenue, thereby disadvantaging the intended primary beneficiaries of the NRMP Project and the CAMPFIRE Programme

2. CAMPFIRE Association Performance

1. Current membership of CA does not include producer communities and conservancies
2. Current membership of CA has made no room for associate membership for supporters, promoters and well-wishers of CAMPFIRE
3. Marginalization of collaborative partners by CA from core decision-making forum – the exact opposite to the recommendations of the Mid-Term Review
4. Policy of marginalization of CCG-NGO members and conversion into service providers has removed the opportunities for long term facilitation and partnership with producer communities
5. At times weak leadership of CA Board and Secretariat (strategic plans remained unimplemented, sustainability issues neglected, poor coordination)
6. No synergies created with private sector
7. The SGI continues in the same flawed vein in proposing the establishment of a CAMPFIRE Institute providing services as an implementer without seriously looking at its income projections, costs and role change implications (no documentation of financial analyses)
8. Discontinuation of team review processes (annual reviews) diluted the powerful dynamic and unity of the CAMPFIRE movement and inhibited NRMP implementation
9. Heavy funding by USAID inhibited diversification of donor base
10. Board membership lacks diversity, specialisation and external input (particularly private sector)
11. CA has failed to take up policy issues in a formalised manner with Government (devolution of AA to sub-District level, weak follow up on required legislative harmonization)
12. CA should have remained a membership and advocacy agency

3. Devolution

1. No enabling Legislation has been passed to provide proprietorship at producer community level (Traditional Leaders Act provides assembly and boundaries but no entitlement and legal personality)

4. Diversification

1. Compared with total investment inflow, the output (increase in revenue generation from non-wildlife sources) has been minimal
2. In spite of diversification efforts under NRMP, consumptive wildlife revenue provides more than 70% of the benefits
3. Insufficient investment in product development and marketing
4. Eco-tourism projects were embarked upon with minimal marketing and product feasibility except in cases where collaboration with private sector was already in existence (e.g. Nyanga Downs Fly Fishing Club where the project builds on existing demand and use of the Gairezi River for fly fishing)

5. Project Design

1. Technical criteria and requirements of USAID in CDF implementation far too complicated for producer community projects
2. Insufficient attention and resources were devoted to diversification
3. The thrust to turn a fledgling association like CA to take on implementation responsibilities was questionable given the CA's primary role as an organisation representing the interests of its members and carrying out advocacy on their behalf
4. It was a design flaw of NRMP to expect an RDC membership organization like CA to push for devolution below the district level

5. Ratio of direct deliverables to community versus other components was skewed (1:10)
6. Phasing out of CCG input after 1998 mid-term evaluation threatens long term collaborative partnerships and capacity within CAMPFIRE
7. PMT after 1998 represented only CA, Government and the donor without civic society and private sector
8. CDF did not succeed in rewarding devolutionary process and good performance, although the CDF guidelines had adopted such an approach. Funding was awarded based on each district receiving some support.

6. Project Delivery and Coordination

1. Absence of technical peer review of proposal approval processes (while some CCG members did not want to be part of the process due to potential conflicts of interest, the PMT did not succeed in co-opting external reviewers with appropriate expertise)
2. Training in the Institutional Capacity Building phase 1995-1997 of RDCs/Communities on USAID requirements of accessing CDF funds was insufficient; CDF manual came out late (early 1998) and insufficient orientation and follow up training was done on applying the CDF manual
3. Distribution of projects across districts was not based on sound economic and business criteria but was most often based on equity
4. Role conflict, lack of team spirit and commonality of purpose between key actors in NRMP implementation (CA and DA)
5. DA and USAID were pushed more and more into an unintended implementational role on CA institution building and overall guidance of the CDF by default (CA's own leadership weakness after 1998)
6. CA/DA took 5 years to innovate a small grant window enabling speedier processing of projects
7. No piloting of CDF and accompanying development of sound methodology based on piloting results
- 8.

7. Project MIS and Monitoring of Socio-Economic Impact

1. No centralized MIS on NRMP implementation and key monitoring aspects of the program are missing or weak (e.g. income data at HH level, socio-economic data, capacity and institution-building data etc.)
2. No collated and analyzed information to substantiate capacity building effort and income generation at RDC and sub-district levels
3. Despite overall aims of promoting diversification, devolution, ICB and accountable decision-making, impact and performance indicators were not developed and monitored either by the Project or the CAMPFIRE Programme

8. Project Sustainability

1. No sustainable mechanism put in place to maintain the database already set up by service providers (e.g. WWF, ZIMTRUST)
2. Unsustainable installation of units at RDC level in non-wildlife districts thereby increasing overheads of the districts
3. Early efforts from 1997 at establishing financial sustainability were not followed up by CA and many opportunities thereafter missed (creation of endowment fund/trust for CA or NRM at large).

9. Project Collaborating Partners/Service Providers

1. DNPWLM took a back seat or remained passive in program implementation (involvement mainly confined to the PMT), particularly when it came to policy issues, monitoring of wildlife and compliance with conditions of AA.
2. Some of the CSPs did not perform up to expectations (SAFIRE on providing training on trusts, ZIMTRUST on institution building, accessing CDF, application of POMS and financial management, WWF on Decision Support System models, CASS on institutional training, time lags in submitting reports and weak dissemination at RDC level)

10. Role of USAID

1. USAID remained too optimistic about the capabilities of CA in spite of early warnings by DA
2. USAID misread signals of absorption and institutional efficiency at RDC levels

I. Introduction

A. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to assess the extent to which the Natural Resources Management Program's (NRMP) original goal, purpose and outputs, and any subsequent revisions of these, were achieved over the life of the Program (1995-2003), and to recommend actions that should be considered by stakeholders responsible for the future development of the Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). The evaluation assesses the relationship between impact, structure and financing over the entire period of the program but, given the work done in earlier reports (e.g., Mid Term Evaluation), focuses on the post-1998 period in terms of data collection and analysis. This evaluation represents the closing analysis of a thirteen-year investment, and presents an overview of what has happened, problems faced, and what can be done in the future.

CAMPFIRE is a world-renowned program. It was an important example in support of the global shift towards what is now commonly referred to as community-based conservation or conservation-based development. The devolutionary principles² upon which CAMPFIRE is based are well recognised and, where properly implemented, powerful. However, the process of institutional, organisational and political change leading to the implementation of these principles is fraught with challenges. The CAMPFIRE programme is no exception. At the start, we must emphasise that the NRMP is not the same as CAMPFIRE, but is a project designed to build on a highly promising start to roll out the initial intent of the CAMPFIRE programme.

While project design and implementation is important, any analysis of the efficacy of NRMP must recognise that its nature has been affected by an increasingly centralising political system, by pressure emanating in the USA to move away from the initial focus on wildlife management and hunting and, latterly, by serious macro-economic problems. This has affected the weighting of the programme in terms of its emphasis on commercial, biological and political sustainability; wildlife versus diversification; and the ability to translate CAMPFIRE's devolutionary principles into reality. The central objective of this evaluation is to use the CAMPFIRE and NRMP experience to elucidate the links between projects and the socio-political systems in which they are implemented, and especially what worked, what did not, and why.

The evaluation uses the key reference documents that provide the framework for the program management, especially the 1998 Mid-term Evaluation and the project documents (NRMP II and 1998 Amendment). It uses the large amount of written, published and unpublished materials associated with the programme. It is supplemented by interviews with key informants and by invaluable site visits to programmes and projects in seven Rural District Councils (RDCs). Finally, all members of the team have considerable experience of CAMPFIRE dating back to its inception, experiences with similar regional and national initiatives, and considerable insight into the reality of the issues involved.

To avoid repeating the caveat that NRMP II coincided with a particularly difficult period on Zimbabwe's history from the perspective of devolved natural resource management, we quote an import observation by DA:

"One general observation is in order. The Evaluation describes/analyses well the most important aspects of the Project, but does not give a feel for the project dynamics and complexity in terms of the high level of coordination/rationality expected of implementers and other stakeholders matched against institutional rivalries, diversity of purpose, very different levels of organizational development among agencies, sometimes hostile Government oversight/threats, etc. Many decisions made in the course of the project were made on very pragmatic grounds – what can be done rather than what should be done, the least of two evils, etc. The report sometimes reflects this, but seems to conclude that things would have been much better had more tech expertise been used or had better systems been established when they were obviously needed, etc. Project dynamics made it very difficult for this to happen – for example forces were unleashed that resisted TA or otherwise rendered it ineffective, particularly with respect to CA. Institutional rivalries often precluded collaboration. This Project was much more ambitious and

² Murphree (2000a: 5.) distinguishes between decentralisation and devolution as follows: "Decentralisation is the delegation of responsibility and limited authority to subordinate or dispersed units of hierarchical jurisdiction, which have a primary accountability upward to their superiors in the hierarchy. Devolution involves the creation of relatively autonomous realms of authority, responsibility and entitlement, with a primary accountability to their own constituencies."

complicated than most donor efforts at the onset and also had to deal with some difficult economic/political externalities during its implementation.”

Circumstances were undoubtedly difficult. GOZ was increasingly wary of NGOs. CA responded to this, and to the opportunities provided by significant funding, to sideline many of the NGOs who, in turn, demonstrated only weak commitment to CAMPFIRE (with the exception of WWF) and also lost capacity. This was an antagonistic period. At a time it faced strong political challenges, the CAMPFIRE movement lost the leadership capacity to deal with these. The innovating potential of NRMP was seriously affected by these events. It did well to survive, and to ensure the survival of CAMPFIRE. The difficult question to answer is whether USD 20.5 million could have been used more pro-actively as leverage to circumvent such problems. We provide this caveat up front, and also find ourselves repeating it in defence of project implementers, but nevertheless believe our best contribution lies in providing a critical inspection of NRMP.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CAMPFIRE

1. Phase I: Initiating CAMPFIRE

For the purpose of analysis, CAMPFIRE breaks conveniently into three phases. Having successfully experimented with devolved proprietorship on private land starting in the 1960s, DNPWLM officials attempted to transpose these principles to communal lands from the mid-1970s. Technical wildlife officers in DNPWLM, who saw in the power of localised economic benefit a means of both conserving wildlife and promoting sound land use, initiated the programme, starting in the early 1970s to push through parliament an acceptance that wildlife revenues should be returned to producer communities.

In 1989, Appropriate Authority was first given to Districts, and DNPWLM co-opted three NGOs to support their quest. Between 1989 and 1995, the program experienced rapid conceptual growth to a level that is sophisticated even by today's standards. It was coordinated informally, and the balance between financial support and wildlife revenues was well in favour of the latter (there was almost no aid money at this time). Wildlife revenues generally derive from safari hunting, but also from tourism operations. CAMPFIRE was always seen as a long-term programmatic approach that used the fiscal devolution of wildlife revenues to revolutionise rural resource governance.

However, from the start the program was viewed with some suspicion, and the greatest threats to it were political. Recognising that political survival depended on 'indigenising' the programme, and that it needed leadership and legitimate representation, the founding group nurtured the CAMPFIRE Association (CA), a body representing RDCs to which Appropriate Authority over wildlife has been given. From CAMPFIRE Association's inaugural workshop at the Park Lane Hotel in 1990, the need to have direct representation by "producer communities³" was recognised. The other key implementing persons, who worked closely with a small technical group at the programme's centre, were the Executive Officers of what were then District Councils and their crucial role and commitment is seldom recognised in the literature.

Managerially, a key event was a workshop at Hunyani Hills in which the six partners agreed to a common vision and clear division of responsibility. This diverse group of Government and non-governmental partner organizations were key to the early success of CAMPFIRE. Called the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG), this was initially chaired and led by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM). The CCG comprised:

- Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism,
- Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD);
- The Zimbabwe Trust (ZIMTRUST);
- The University of Zimbabwe's Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS);
- The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and
- The CAMPFIRE Association.

³ "Producer communities" is a term coined by the CAMPFIRE programme to refer to those communities in which animals are utilised or tourism occurs. Conceptually, the intention is to internalise the costs and benefits of wildlife management.

In 1989 and 1990, "Appropriate Authority" was granted to the twelve 'wildlife' districts, giving legal control of wildlife to District Councils but under the administrative condition that control was further devolved. Thus we have a situation with legislated devolution to RDCs, supported by administrative devolution to producer communities. In fulfilment of their legislated mandate to conserve wildlife throughout the country, DNPWLM replaced the nationalised control of wildlife with conditionalities that wildlife revenues should benefit producer communities directly. The initial conditions attached to appropriate authority status were laid out in a letter by the then Deputy Director of DNPWLM, Mr. George Pangeti. These conditions stated that:

- At least 50% of revenues should be devolved to producer communities,
- No more than 35% should be used for management,
- No more than 15% should be extracted for council overhead.

These conditions were later (1990) elaborated in the "CAMPFIRE Guidelines", a four page document that set out the "CAMPFIRE Principles" (see Annex P). In these guidelines, DNPWLM set the target of ensuring that **fully 80% of wildlife revenues** should accrue directly to producer communities. In 1993, the Director of DNPWLM wrote to all RDCs with appropriate authority stipulating this condition and a four-year time frame to achieve it (see Annex P).

DNPWLM recognised the power of legislated devolution, but also that this must be extended to producer communities legally. The use of administrative devolution reflected the absence of administrative institutions with legal personality below the RDC, and was always seen as only a stepping-stone to fully legislated devolution. However, DNPWLM's attempt to translate its recognition of the critical importance of devolution to sub-district level into legal institutions, was thwarted.

Nevertheless, by persuading key district officials of the importance of linking the benefits from wildlife as closely as possible to the producer communities, and by working closely and mutually with these officials to monitor financial devolution, tremendous progress was made. By 1993, 73% of wildlife revenues were reaching the producer communities, with 66% of these revenues under direct community control (Child, *et al*, 1997). The relationship between fiscal devolution and the improving performance of community institutions is now well recognised (e.g., see Child 1993, 1996; ZimTrust 2001, 2003)

Contrary to the common belief that the program was aimed at wildlife conservation, its protagonists viewed it as primarily about institutional economics and governance. The initial objective was to internalise costs and benefits at the local level, making for more rational and sustainable decision-making. It soon became apparent that grass-roots economic empowerment also had far-ranging political and governance implications. Thus wildlife was perceived not so much in its own right, but as the economic fuel to build a bottom-up system. Having been nationalised for decades, there were few local vested interests in the newly devolved wildlife resource. By devolving economic power to communities, DNPWLM hoped to use this 'new' resource to initiate and experiment with market-like systems for allocating resources to best use. The economic arguments about property rights, exclusion, price and resource allocation figure prominently in the original CAMPFIRE documents (Martin, 1984, 1986). While initially based on this economic and land use rationale, the realisation of the political implication of devolved rural governance was not far behind.

Local "proprietorship" became a central tenet of CAMPFIRE, in its three facets: the right to manage; the right to benefit from; and the right to sell. Murphree (1994) articulated these as early as 1990. These principles are encapsulated in three of CAMPFIRE's most important innovations:

- Community quota-setting, which implies the right to manage⁴,
- Cash revenue distribution⁵, which implies both the right to benefit and the right to choose how to use these benefits, and
- Community tendering and sale of hunting and lodge concessions⁶, which provides the right of disposal or sale.

⁴ These field-developed tools are now captured neatly in WWF-SARPO manuals.

⁵ See Child and Peterson (1991) for a detailed anecdotal description of the first community revenue distribution in Beitbridge. Gurube paid out Z\$200 to people in Masoka earlier than this, but this decision was made centrally. See also Child, *et al*, (1997)

These tools provided the vehicles for instrumentalising these principles and thereby revolutionised the programme. Cash distribution, in particular, provided a huge impulse, and effectively converted wildlife from a public to a private asset. Improved marketing resulted in a four-fold increase in hunting revenues in the early 1990s.

An important aspect of this phase of the programme at this time (1989-1995) was the low level of top-down funding. Some technical support was provided by CASS, ZimTrust and WWF in the form of a few workshops and the availability of technical specialists to communities. From 1993 DNPWLM received minor but critical support from NORAD in the form of a vehicle. Nyaminyami, as the first CAMPFIRE district to be funded, failed to recover from the centralised organisation and imposed overheads that resulted from this funding. This became an important lesson for the programme, especially as several non-funded districts performed better (e.g. Chipinge, Beitbridge). Moreover, at the time CAMPFIRE was designed, donor-aid was still a rarity in Zimbabwe, and DNPWLM never really considered this possibility. This is why the determination to create wealth by producing wildlife was so strong at all levels of the programme.

The key support was the work and effort of a small number of dedicated professionals, the clarity and efficacy of the CAMPFIRE Principles and their devolutionary spirit. Indeed, donor money was seen as largely harmful. In 1989, the same year as the ivory ban and when elephant conservation and trade was receiving heavy publicity, USAID decided to support this innovative, home-grown CBNRM concept, with a pilot initiative in four districts in Matabeleland. USAID provided some USD4.18 million to four districts in Matabeleland, out of a total of USD7.6 million, the remainder of which was used specifically for wildlife management by DNPWLM. As with Nyaminyami, unpublished DNPWLM reports (Martin, pers. comms.) indicated a concern that funding by itself gave districts no discernable performance advantage, and while funding was important for some support functions, there was a lot to learn about how to effectively inject finances into communities without causing as much harm as good.

From its inception, CAMPFIRE revenue grew steadily, reaching approximately US\$2 million by 2000. By the late 1990s, an estimated 90,000 households (630,000 people) were benefiting from CAMPFIRE revenue (Muir-Leresche et al, 2003).

As early as 1991, the collaborating partners recognised the legitimacy and political importance of genuine constituency representation and supported the development of the CAMPFIRE Association (CA), passing to it the role of 'lead agency' in recognition of this legitimacy. While cognisant of its capacity constraints, a founding principle of CAMPFIRE was that "authority is a pre-requisite for responsible management and should not be held out as a reward for it" (SASUSG, 2002). The legal absence of sub-district bodies corporate resulted again in a compromise, with CAMPFIRE Association legally representing Rural District Councils (RDCs) rather than being directly accountable to producer communities. CA's mission was to promote and facilitate CAMPFIRE by engaging RDCs, their constituent communities and other relevant public and private agencies to implement and support activities conducive to the development of CAMPFIRE (USAID, 2003).

2. Phase II: Funding, Programme Diversification, CAMPFIRE Association and RDCs

1996 was an important change point in the programme. DNPWLM rapidly lost capacity, including several of the early champions of the programme. The CAMPFIRE Association exerted itself as the lead agency, and began to marginalize some of its NGO partners. With considerable suspicion of the part of government as to the motivation of NGOs, and indeed the CAMPFIRE programme as a whole (which was perceived as protected white commercial interests), the expansion of the programme to new areas using USAID financing was important for creating a wider political constituency and ensuring the political sustainability of CAMPFIRE.

Thus, 1996 marks the start of significant national funding from USAID, and a desire to include more districts and diversify the programmes economic base from a heavy dependence on wildlife (i.e. mainly hunting, but also high-end tourism). Winning political support by "indigenising" the programme had significant costs in terms of the loss of skills that had originally developed CAMPFIRE, and reduced the experience and

⁶ See Child and Bond (1994) for an early description of innovations in community-private negotiations; see Child (1995) for an assessment of the impact of marketing innovations on wildlife revenues; and see the WWF manuals for a "how to do it" description.

flexibility to create an innovative funding mechanism that was commercial-orientated and re-enforced devolution. Consequently, the CDF was much more similar to the typical top-down donor fund than it might have been.

On the positive side financial support to dedicated CAMPFIRE staff at district level improved natural resource management and facilitated diversification. Unfortunately, it also re-enforced centralisation and a donor-dependency mentality. Whereas the designers of CAMPFIRE wanted to foster a spirit of self-help and production, the temptation for CA and the RDCs was to maintain an easy supply of free money, which shifted incentives towards accessing donor funding. The wish list of 150 project submitted by RDCs in the first year of NRMP II is an indicator of this mentality. Learning how to use grant money effectively was an important part of NRMP II, and is discussed in detail in the text. So are some of the problems caused by this money such as an increased rivalries and jealousies.

With a large amount of money to be allocated centrally, leadership was transferred from the more intellectual CCG to the more project- and administratively-oriented Project Execution Committee (PET). In designing the PET, great care was taken to balance the competing forces of economic and technical effectiveness, and political largesse. PET provided for political representation by giving CAMPFIRE Association more power and resources, but ensured that CAMPFIRE's civic and technical proponents retained significant influence.

However, CA undermined the role of PET, which became non-functional and an impediment to CDF project implementation and was consequently replaced by the PMT. The CA used their strengthened leadership role to dictate the composition of the PMT, which lost civic and technical capacity and further empowered CA, RDCs and government agencies. In the face of PET non-performance and CA's more dominant position in the program, this revised structure for the project was reluctantly accepted by USAID.

After the transition to the PMT, the project continued to directly fund most (except for ART and ZT) CCG members into 2000, and intermittently after that (WWF especially). In an effort to keep the CCG members engaged in the project/programme, USAID made it clear to all CCG members that "the door was always open" for additional CCG funding proposals (even up to 2003). This brought some new members on board (e.g., SAFIRE, FC, MLGPWNH). However, with few exceptions (WWF), most CCG members lost interest in CAMPFIRE when the core funding ceased, a response that was exacerbated (caused?) by CA's negative position on this grouping. In addition, USAID always offered resources to promote/facilitate continued CCG operations/collaboration. However, the CA never pursued this option (as programme lead agency, USAID states that it was their responsibility to initiate this, not USAID's, Loken comments), in a deliberate effort to further marginalize this group and seize tighter control of the programme (and project).

This created a leadership crisis in the CAMPFIRE movement. CA was empire-building without the capacity or vision to take on all the roles it envisaged for itself. The CCG, which had created the programme, was sidelined and in any case lost capacity. USAID, which controlled the money, was placed in the invidious position that its decisions were highly influential and was de facto in an uncomfortable leadership position. The net result was that the leadership, maturity and innovativeness of the CAMPFIRE programme was seriously weakened. Given what has transpired in Zimbabwe over the past several years, this transition may have been inevitable, and may have happened anyway with or without the project though perhaps just not as quickly. It was USAID money that allowed CA to become so dominant (a negative) but this money also spread the programme and maintained the CAMPFIRE movement in a time of serious difficulties (very positive).

Conceptually, both the PMT and the use of the IC (as opposed to developing long term programmatic capacity) were not the right way to go, but operationally in the light of political events they proved to be invaluable. The project needed a good diligent management entity willing to deal with all of the boring details. The PET/CCG was not doing this, did not want to do this, and (it could be argued) really shouldn't be doing this but attending more important programmatic matters. And, despite all of its problems (structure, potential for conflict of interest, political (equity) considerations, poor consultant pool, poor leadership, etc.), overall, the PMT did an adequate job from the project's perspective, especially for the CDF, which is what the PMT was always most interested in. (acknowledging a lot of extra help from the IC/DA).

To purchase political support and broaden its base, there was a strong temptation for CAMPFIRE Association to spread CCDF money and projects equally to as many districts as possible to increase its

power base, even where this did not make financial or conservation sense. Despite sacrificing technical efficiency, there is little doubt that the strategy taken by CAMPFIRE Association (led, dynamically, by the late T.N. Maveneke) was crucial for CAMPFIRE's political survival, both nationally and internationally⁷. However, it also began to divert the NRMP from the principles of CAMPFIRE, with increasing weight being given to more conventional donor 'products' and systems such as centrally funded projects, and rather less on self-production. As noted in the lessons, a better approach, at least retrospectively, would have been to structure grants in the manner of what are now called "social investment funds", where grants are linked to matching contributions and where effective implementation and performance graduates a community to the next level of support.

The dangers of this top down funding, and the likelihood of it centralising the programme, were recognised at the time of NRMP design (c.f. Murphree interview). Seeing that the core strength of CAMPFIRE was revenue distribution and control at producer community level, a proposal was made by DNPWLM to gear both the institutional capacity-building and NR investment grants directly to reward and reinforce fiscal devolution. For instance, if \$100,000 was devolved to a producer community, this would be matched by \$100,000 for investment, \$50,000 to purchase appropriate skills through a voucher system (thus also demand-driving service provision) and a similar amount to the respective councils to give them a vested interest in devolution. The donor showed no serious interest in this proposal. Contributing factors may have been the absence of administrative precedent, and the fact that the grant was bi-lateral and therefore inextricably linked with emerging GOZ reluctance to really support devolution. Whether the reason was USIAD inflexibility, or a judgement on government's reluctance to be innovative, the result is that an important opportunity for experimentation and innovation was lost. There are some suggestions that such an approach might not, in any case have worked, given that the liberalising conditions in which CAMPFIRE was borne, and the strong governmental support provided through DNPWLM, were reversing. At least one service provider was also adamantly opposed to the concept, which would demand-drive rather than supply-drive the programme thereby increasing consumer choice and the pressure for support agencies to respond and perform.

3. Phase III: Winding down of External Support

1998 was a further change point in the programme. Considerable pressure was placed on USAID by anti-hunting lobbies in the USA, with the result that the programme could no longer explicitly focus on hunting. This supported an internal demand for diversification and a spreading of the programme to non-wildlife districts, which the CDF supported. Diversification was tackled largely through micro-projects including the construction of eco-tourism projects and the sale of veldt products. Despite some efforts by USAID and the IC to encourage this, very little money was spent on market analysis and research, product development and marketing systems.

As noted above, after the Mid Term Review PET was replaced by the Project Management Team as the primary mechanism for administering project grants. At the same time, the oversight of the CCG collapsed, as skills were lost. This changed the nature of the support to CAMPFIRE. The PMT, which was technical, took over the lead of CAMPFIRE by default even though it was not designed for this role. Much of the earlier capacity for long-term vision and technical analysis was lost. Short-term project financing and constituency-building considerations became important. One result was that investments were based less on technical considerations such as economic returns and more on political considerations such as the spreading of CDF finances to broaden the programme's support base. While, generally, the principle of producer community survival, this was not always the case. In several districts, benefits were spread more widely and lost impact (as the case of Hwange, cited below, demonstrates), while the retention of income by RDCs increased. The balance also shifted significantly from civic to governmental control in the form of Ministries, RDCs and USAID.

At the start of NRMP II, significant funding was provided to CAMPFIRE Units through institutional capacity-building grants. CAMPFIRE units, which also go by other names, usually comprise an executive officer and assistant (and sometimes resource monitors), are attached to councils and are responsible for monitoring and supporting the CAMPFIRE programme and natural resource management activities in general. They

⁷ A major influence at this time was international pressure against the consumptive use of wildlife. With some two-thirds of its income being generated by Zimbabwe's rapidly expanding elephant herds (WWF, 2003), the move to place elephants on CITES appendix 1, and therefore to close commercial trade, was a major threat both to the programme and to the incentivisation of elephant conservation.

were provided with a standard set of equipment including a vehicle and computers. Remembering what had happened with Nyaminyami, the evaluation team was concerned that the phase out of grant funding would leave a large central overhead to producer communities, thereby under-mining the principles of CAMPFIRE. In the event, support of these Units has been successful as they continue to provide good support to communities. Moreover, it was not the cost of these units, but increased revenue extraction by RDCs, that was the primary culprit in communities' reduced share of wildlife revenues. At least half of the CDF projects have the potential to be viable, at least in ordinary economic circumstances.


Looking to the future, with the imminent phasing out of significant grant funding from USAID, an important question is whether CAMPFIRE Association managed these funds wisely to create economic sustainability both for itself and its constituency. Another important question is whether the diversification policy has worked, although measuring this will be difficult because of the time lags associated with diversification, and the effects of recent macro-economic implosion on both the country's national economy and its tourism sector. We also ask how well CAMPFIRE has stood up to the tests of time, including the difficult economic environment.

C. MACRO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS TO CAMPFIRE

One of the driving forces behind the CAMPFIRE programme was the realisation that rapid population growth was over-running wilderness areas in the Sebungwe and Mid-Zambezi Valleys, and that the option to use wildlife was being lost despite wildlife proving to have a comparative economic advantage in semi-arid rangelands. Zimbabwe's overall population was growing at well over 3% per annum and sufficient formal employment was not being created (Figure 1), forcing people to subsist off the land. CAMPFIRE had to contend with massive population and economic pressures.

FIGURE 1: ZIMBABWE POPULATION AND EMPLOYMENT

Source: WWF Database



Zimbabwe's general macro-economic circumstances are summarised by GDP data (Figure 2). The liberalising economy in which CAMPFIRE was born, was associated with a steady increase in GDP. However, a return to central planning and control as well as political uncertainty caused a rapid decline in economic performance after 1996, the time when NRMP II was initiated (signed 1994, initiated 1995). This affected all key macro-economic indicators (see Table 1, Figure 2). In the period 1989-1991, the exchange rate was over-valued by about 50%. It was allowed to achieve equilibrium by September 1991, and then floated freely with several crashes (e.g. November 1997; August 1998). The currency was then effectively recontrolled, remaining at ZD38:USD1 in 1999/2000 and ZD55:1 in 2000/2001. This created an informal market in foreign currency. The ZD is estimated to have been over-valued by 10% in 1999, 20% in 2000, 90% in 2001, reaching 600-1,000% by 2002 (Muir-Leresche, et al, 2003). The increasing gap between the official and parallel exchange rate (Table 1) is indicative of the increasing distortion and difficulties of operating in the Zimbabwean economy. It is of particular relevance to CAMPFIRE because trophy hunting is sold in USD, districts and other official bodies are required to exchange their earnings at the official rates, and this represents a huge loss of purchasing power.

FIGURE 2: ZIMBABWE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (USD BILLION)

Source: WWF Database




TABLE 1: ZIMBABWE: MACRO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Source: WWF Database; DA for parallel exchange rates

Zimbabwe: Macro Economic Indicators												
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
GDP (US\$ Billion)		\$7.90	\$6.73	\$6.56	\$6.84	\$7.08	\$8.42	\$8.20	\$5.57	\$4.39	\$4.61	\$3.30
GDP Real Growth Rate	2.2%	0.0%	-6.8%	4.2%	5.3%	-3.2%	8.1%	3.7%	1.6%	1.2%	-5.5%	-6.5%
GDP per capital		\$783	\$646	\$609	\$613	\$614	\$707	\$667	\$439	\$336	\$342	\$238
Z\$/US\$ exchange rate	\$2.47	\$3.75	\$5.11	\$6.53	\$8.21	\$8.72	\$10.07	\$12.44	24.374	\$38.34	\$44.62	\$55.07
Parallel Exchange rate					\$9.7	\$11.0	\$20.7	\$37	\$39	\$331	\$468	\$2,000
Inflation (CPI Index)		23%	42%	28%	22%	23%	22%	19%	32%	59%	56%	75%
Prime Lending Rate		17%	26%	29%	31%	31%	30%	32%	41%	61%	68%	32%

The growth in wildlife and wild land has been driven both by the denationalisation and devolution of these resources to landholders, and by the strong economics of this sector, as illustrated in rapid tourism growth trends (Figure 3). The logic of CAMPFIRE was to capture this value to provide direct incentives to rural people to maintain land under wildlife because this was their best land use option. Very early on, CAMPFIRE adopted the principle that the best land use should prevail, and if this happened to be agriculture rather than wildlife, then agriculture should be promoted. Note that these principles are also encapsulated, and almost replicated word for word, by the Government of Zimbabwe's 2002 policy on wildlife on resettled farms (which is printed as a GOZ document but not yet official adopted).

FIGURE 3: ZIMBABWE TOURISM: REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ARRIVALS





FIGURE 4: THE NUMBER OF ANIMALS HUNTED IN ZIMBABWE, 1984 TO 2000



CAMPFIRE also intended to build on the success of the wildlife sector on private land. Indeed, at the time of the Mid-Term NRMP II review, Zimbabwe's wildlife populations outside national parks had quadrupled in the past fifteen years as indicated by the value of trophy off-take (Booth, 2002). The growth in the number of animals hunted as trophies reflects a rapid conversion of land to wildlife. On the field trip to Save conservancy, for instance, it was immediately obvious that land that was heavily over-grazed by cattle in the 1980s had recovered, and that wildlife populations were much higher, with sable, wildebeest and other species were common replacing the dominance of a cattle - impala monoculture. This strongly vindicates Zimbabwe's conservation two-pronged conservation policy of:

- Devolving use-rights to landholders.
- Maximising the revenue potential of wildlife.

CAMPFIRE was the response to this policy success, replicating its intention in Communal Areas.

Economic research and the conversion of land from livestock to wildlife demonstrated that, where the economy was not distorted, wildlife was a highly competitive form of land use in semi-arid regions (Natural Regions IV and V⁸). The main concern was the heavy long-term subsidization of the agricultural sector and the implicit taxation of wildlife. Bond (2002) found the subsidization of livelihoods, and not only agriculture, to be the over-powering factor driving the rapid migration of people into unsuitable agro-environments in the 1990s. Bond concluded that people were not flooding into new areas to farm, but to gain access to the many free services provided by government and an open access natural resource property regime – schooling, clinics, fertilizer and agricultural inputs, food, and timber and grass for building. Note that where there may have been some control of access to resources by local people who had developed institutional systems over many years, new settlers often over-whelmed the original inhabitants and seldom respected their resource management systems. In-migration was characterised by an extractive, frontier economic mentality, and did a great deal of harm to the environment (Derman, 1990).

D. LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

CAMPFIRE rests on a number of policy and legal instruments that need to be read together to gain a full understanding of the allocation of rights and responsibilities for natural resource management. The CAMPFIRE approach is based on the sustainable use of natural resources. This principle is articulated in the 1989 Policy for Wildlife, which consolidated into official policy the thinking that had developed in the DNPWLM concerning wildlife use, proprietorship and incentives for sustainable management. Apart from commitments to protected areas and the preservation of endangered species, the policy also contained the following statement, which underlines the economic foundation of the DNPWLM's approach to conservation:

"Outside the Parks and Wild Life Estate, government views wildlife as a resource capable of complementing domestic livestock and will favour neither one above the other in the development of the country. It will rather allow economic processes to determine the outcome of competition."
(Government of Zimbabwe, 1989: 7)

CAMPFIRE is also based on the principle that landholders who live close to the resource and suffer the costs of living with wildlife should be those who benefit from sustainable management. Thus the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act gives freehold farmers "Appropriate Authority" (AA) or custodianship over wildlife, fish and plants". The Act effectively makes freehold farms and ranches into proprietary units for wildlife management. Farmers are able to make nearly all of the significant management decisions over the use of wildlife. These include the right to hunt, to allow someone else to hunt, the right to buy and sell game, and to carry out trophy hunting. The Act allows for the exemption of specially protected species and for Government to impose restriction orders in cases of flagrant abuse.

As described by Child G. (1995), the high standard of conservation on private land was based on the principles that peer-based control was cheaper and far more effective than the heavy hand of government. From as early as the Natural Resources Act of 1941, landholder communities (legislated as "Intensive Conservation Area Committees") had the legal recourse to control any unsustainable land use practices within their area (e.g. over-grazing, timber cutting, soil erosion) and were backed up by experienced government technicians. The Parks and Wild Life Act took advantage of this elegant and effective locally based institutional mechanism, rather than government policing, as the primary method of control, with remarkable results, as Child, G (1995, p87-88) describes in far greater detail. The reason we mention this here is that, should appropriate authority be devolved to producer community level, this should be complemented by a similar peer-based controlling mechanism.

The devolution of rights over wildlife to freehold farmers led to the development of a multi-million US dollar wildlife industry on freehold farmland and improved conservation of wildlife. Following this success, the DNPWLM aimed to establish the same incentive-based approach to conservation on communal land. In 1982 an amendment to the Parks and Wild Life Act gave the Minister power to designate Rural District

⁸ Vincent and Thomas (1960) in their classical agro-ecological survey of Zimbabwe, define five natural regions, of which natural regions 4 and 5 are unsuited to rainfed agriculture and are suited only to extensive or very extensive rangeland production systems.

Councils as Appropriate Authorities over wildlife on communal land. If an RDC is designated as an AA it gains the same rights over wildlife as the owners of freehold farms.

Martin (2003) suggests the Zimbabwean legislation is the *only* example in southern Africa of the *full* devolution of authority over wildlife to entities outside the state. However, devolution of authority over wildlife on communal land stops at the level of the RDCs, which are government bodies. The original intention of policy planners in DNPWLM had been to extend rights over wildlife producer communities i.e. those on whose land the wildlife was found and those who suffered the costs of living with wildlife. The early CAMPFIRE documents (Martin, 1984, 1986) mentioned the concept of the "village company". The planners had to compromise in this objective due to political constraints and were unable to legislate for devolution of authority over wildlife to levels below the district. Policy guidelines were issued stating that RDCs were expected to distribute a percentage of income derived from wildlife use to producer communities and to allow these communities to be responsible for a number of wildlife management activities (Annex P). Because of the existing administrative system of local government, producer communities had to be represented by Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) and Village Development Committees (VIDCOs), which had no legal personality but were advisory bodies to Councils. This is the root cause of the problem that this evaluation detected in the structure of the CAMPFIRE Association.

A number of other laws give the RDCs considerable control over natural resources. The Natural Rural Resources Act provides for Councils to establish conservation committees and these committees are able to make bylaws on the use of natural resources, including wildlife.

The Communal Land Act vests ownership of communal land in the State and the administration of communal land in the hands of the RDCs. The Rural District Council Act gives the councils power to take measures to conserve natural resources, permit grazing and cultivation, develop land use plans and make bylaws for the protection of natural resources. The councils may issue permits for catching fish, hunting, cutting firewood, cutting grass and collecting honey.

The Forest Act allocates large areas of former communal land to the Forestry Commission, which leases timber, hunting and photographic tourism concessions. The Commission has adopted the policy of encouraging RDCs to share 15% of their income from timber royalties with local communities. The Communal Land Forest Produce Act restricts the use of forest products to "own use" and excludes use of products from protected forest areas and areas where a license to cut trees has been granted to others. The use of certain trees is restricted. According to Chitsike (2000:11) under the Act, "without a permit or license, virtually any use of woodland is illegal".

The Environmental Management Act aims to establish a general legal foundation for all environmental laws based on sustainable development and addresses inconsistencies, overlaps and duplication in environmental and natural resource legislation. The Act contains limited references to devolution and decentralisation and does not provide for empowering sub-district levels.

The Traditional Leaders Act provides for Ward and Village Assemblies that would "consider and resolve" all issues relating to land, water and other natural resources. This statement is somewhat ambiguous with regard to actual decision-making powers of the Assemblies. Further, the Act does not provide land rights to the Assemblies and it does not give them any legal status beyond being sub-committees of council.

In contrast to other natural resource legislation, the Water Act makes provision for the establishment of Catchment Councils, which would be responsible for water management in the river systems for which they are established. The Act provides for Catchment Councils to be a body corporate with a legal personality. The Catchment Councils are able to delegate functions to Sub-Catchment Councils that are able to levy rates and fees and open an account in which the income can be held.

In summary, with the exception of the Water Act, natural resource legislation in Zimbabwe concentrates considerable power in the hands of Rural District Councils. Policy guidelines in the wildlife sector attempt to promote the "administrative devolution" of some functions and decision-making to sub-district levels. However, RDCs cannot legally be forced to apply the policy guidelines although DNPWLM has stated in the past that it would withdraw Appropriate Authority status if councils did not comply. The policy and legislative framework within which CAMPFIRE operates creates numerous local level institutions that operate in parallel, have overlapping functions and compete with each other for power and access to financial resources.

E. USAID SUPPORT (NRMP) TO CAMPFIRE

1. NRMP I (1989-1994)

USAID has been a partner with the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) in supporting CAMPFIRE since 1989 when the Agency proposed a grant as the Zimbabwe country-component of a regional program including Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana under the Initiative for Southern Africa (ISA) Natural Resources Management Project (690-0251), commonly referred to as NRMP I (1989-94). Project identification, preparation and planning was undertaken by USAID with substantial assistance from the DNPWLM, CASS and the Zimbabwe Trust (ZimTrust), the latter two agencies having been invited into the process at the request of the Department. NRMP I, with an effective implementation date of 15 September, 1989, was fully financed by USAID through an agreement with the GOZ which provided for sub-grants to ZimTrust and CASS. USAID (Loken, comments) states that this was "designed as a pilot initiative to test the innovative/revolutionary [CAMPFIRE] hypothesis on a limited scale, before committing more substantial USAID resources". There were four target districts, namely Tsholotsho, Hwange, Bulilima Mangwe and Binga in Matabeleland, and wildlife management by DNPWLM was also supported in the Hwange-Matetsi complex. Sub-activities undertaken have been in:

- Wildlife management,
- Institutional and community development,
- Community development involving women, and
- Education and training.

The total obligated project grant for the Zimbabwe component under NRMP I (690-0251.13) was USD 7,600,000 scheduled for a 5-year duration. The sub-grant obligated by USAID to the ZimTrust for implementation was USD1,541,000. The Trust was also responsible for receipt and control of USD1,400,000 allocated for district-level infrastructure and capital requirements.

Although the first USAID project was limited to the four sub-districts under NRMP I, the CAMPFIRE program was already very active in a dozen rural districts and had begun activities in another dozen. By that time the CAMPFIRE Programme had demonstrated notable accomplishments. Two of the most successful CAMPFIRE projects Mahenye and Beitbridge had received no external donor help. Under NRMP I, anticipated project results of increasing community involvement and rationalizing use of fragile lands had been partially achieved, and the potential for nationwide impact had also been convincingly demonstrated through project activities and efforts focused in the four pilot areas.

The mid-term evaluation of the Zimbabwe Natural Resources Management Project I, dated January 1995, generally supported the programme although it cited a number of problems and issues related to the financial and administrative aspects of the Project where there were obviously frustrations between USAID and implementing agencies over the complexities of complying with USAID's systems. They included:

- Concerns about unpaid vouchers and the fear that the experience of working with USAID might make some partners "fight shy" of further involvement;
- The belief, by some, that USAID rules and regulations are more complicated and burdensome than from other donors;
- Allegations that queries by USAID of implementing agency compliance with USAID rules "seriously damaged the morale of those agencies, encumbered them with incremental staff they were ill-equipped to afford, and delayed the completion of tasks." (p. 35)
- USAID complaints that participating agencies were tardy in submission of vouchers or submitted incomplete vouchers causing them to be "bounced back" to the submitting organization.

In spite of these administrative conflicts, NRMP I was seen as successful and USAID followed up on the successes of NRMP I by continuing and expanding its participation in CAMPFIRE. The successor program (NRMP II) did not restrict its interest to a limited number of districts but instead embraced CAMPFIRE in its totality, freeing up its contribution to be used wherever the programme was active. Moreover, USAID intended to work with CAMPFIRE to expand beyond the area of wildlife conservation and use, to the conservation and use of range lands, forest resources and even to mining. Where the Appropriate Authority had been given to RDCs, the NRMP II funding was to follow, with ICB grants to 23 RDCs. Accordingly, USAID considerably expanded the funds it was to contribute to CAMPFIRE over the next four years. At the same time, USAID

changed its operational approach to include an Institutional Contractor (IC), so that funds could move more quickly and be more responsive to the needs of CAMPFIRE and the RDCs. A US Company, Development Associates (DA) was engaged as the institutional contractor. USAID (Loken, comments) notes that the IC/DA was specifically engaged to address the problems with compliance with USAID procedures identified in the four evaluation bullets drawn from the NRMP I evaluation (Pangeti et al report). Others have suggested that the IC was expensive, did not contribute to the long-term capacity and sustainability of the programme, and may have contributed to the marginalisation of the NGOs.

In the second phase of NRMP, which was authorized on September 30, 1994, the envisaged USAID contribution was USD 20.5 million, which included USD 16 million in bilateral funds and USD 4.5 million in regional funds. This brought the total USAID contribution over the life of the project to USD 28,100,000 with a 25% GOZ contribution in kind, estimated at USD 9,400,000.

2. NRMP II Project Design: Goal, Purpose and Outputs

In September 1994, NRMP II had two goals:

- A multi-country **regional goal** of regional cooperation in promoting natural resources activities which will contribute to the sustainable development of communities on lands that are marginally sustainable for agriculture; and
- A **country-level goal** to use natural resources management to develop economically sustainable communities on lands marginally suitable for agriculture.

Under Phase II, the two country-level purposes were:

- To develop community-based programs to increase income while sustaining natural resources; and
- To improve local capabilities to protect the resource base.

The achievement of the project purpose was to be measured by achieving the following **end of project status**:

- Natural resource management programs underway in 23 districts;
- Revenue distributions made to all participating communities;
- Stable wildlife populations in targeted areas;
- Flexible and analytic responses to changing situations, formulated by CAMPFIRE program implementers.

The planned outputs of NRMP II in September 1994 were:

1. Community-level resource management capacity institutionalised;
2. Strengthened CAMPFIRE Association capable of supporting its members in community-based natural resources management programs;
3. Knowledge of NRM increased, especially socio-economic variables affecting sustainability of community programs;
4. Education and outreach expanded;
5. Policy analysis completed; and
6. Networking and communication systems in place.

These outputs were to be achieved through **four project components**:

- I. Community-based resource management and utilization
- II. Planning and applied research
- III. Wildlife and natural resources conservation; and
- IV. Regional communications and information exchange.

3. Direct and Indirect Project Beneficiaries

As far as beneficiaries are concerned, NRMP II saw congruence with the overall CAMPFIRE programme, which aimed to empower communal farmers to sustainably manage and conserve the wildlife and natural resources through the development of locality institutions. The primary beneficiaries under the CAMPFIRE program have always been households at community (village and ward) level. Under NRMP II, these communities were the intended ultimate beneficiaries. However, the RDCs, the CA and the CAMPFIRE Service Providers became the vehicles to reach the communities. As the latter became direct and immediate beneficiaries under NRMP II, a major share of project resources went towards building capacity and providing facilities in these institutions with the purpose of reaching the ultimate beneficiaries.

4. NRMP II Implementation Strategy prior to the 1998 Mid-Term Evaluation

Under NRMP Phase II the implementation approach was to channel the majority of funds through an institutional contractor selected through competitive means, which was to serve as a secretariat for implementing agencies, as a liaison/buffer between project agencies and with USAID, and to provide capacity-building and training. However, USAID was to maintain direct relationships with, and disbursements to, DNPWLM, the Ministry of Local Government Public Works and National Housing (MLGPWNH), Department of Natural Resources and the Forestry Commission. The strategy also called for:

- Expansion of services to many more districts,
- Financial, technical and training support to the CAMPFIRE Association, to strengthen its role as the lead CAMPFIRE agency,
- Introduction of an adaptive management and coordination system to better service the large number of CAMPFIRE stakeholders and implementing agencies,
- Establishment of the CAMPFIRE Development Fund (CDF) to fund projects designed to strengthen the capacity of RDCs to service CAMPFIRE and support community initiatives to improve natural resources management, and the
- Appointment of an Institutional Contractor (IC) to administer the USAID funds allocated to support CAMPFIRE.

Stakeholders organized themselves to implement these initiatives starting in 1995/6. Subsequently, as the Programme evolved, CAMPFIRE responded to other priorities such as the need to diversify the Programme from consumptive to non-consumptive natural resource utilization activities.

5. Revised Implementation Strategy after the 1998 Mid-Term Evaluation

In 1998, following the 1997 CITES Conference in Harare and the Project's Mid-Term Evaluation, and in agreement with USAID's (then) new re-engineering precepts, the Project was modified to its current and final form as the Mission's Strategic Objective One (SO1) is, "strengthened NRM for the sustainable development of CAMPFIRE areas."

Replacement of PET by PMT

An important change following the Mid-Term Review was the replacement of the PET by the PMT. Membership of these coordinating mechanisms were as follows (Table 2):

TABLE 2: MEMBERSHIP OF PET AND PMT

Membership	Project Execution Team	Project Management Team
GOZ	DNPWLM, MLGRUD	DNPWLM, MLGPWNH
CCG/ Civil Society	CASS, ZimTrust, WWF, others	
Donor/Management	USAID/DA	USAID, DA
Secretariat	CA	CA
Beneficiaries		RDCs

Up until 1994 the CCG functioned as a coordination mechanism. It was an important strength in the program ("coalition of support agencies"). PET was designed to build on the strengths of the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (e.g. a powerful dynamic of innovation, peer review, cooperation and constructive criticism), but to formalize this alliance in a balanced relationship between technical, political, civic and

government forces, to cope with large amounts of project money. This never worked. The Mid-Term Review recommended the replacement of PET by PMT. This reflected the political pressure of the time, including the CA desire to dominate NRMP II finances, GOZ's desire to marginalize NGOs, and the need to push through CDF projects. However, it also weakened and unbalanced programme leadership.

It appears that the initial intentions of the PET, and the solutions to its under-performance, were diagnosed as structural, when they were in fact related to personalities. Reasons we have been given are that:

- PET was badly led by CA, became bureaucratic and unproductive, and deliberately marginalized NGOs
- Partners therefore did not take it seriously (poor leadership led to reluctant support), and was attended (poorly) by junior CCG but seldom the bosses and
- Partners were in any case losing technical capacity.

In this period there was considerable competition over roles and the limelight, particularly between ZimTrust and the CA, which "mis-understood its role and wanted to be everywhere", leading the CA Director to state: "To hell with NGOs". The fight over NRMP II resources was often highly antagonistic.

Part of the leadership problem relates to the loss of key CCG staff at this time. However, much relates to a power struggle between CA and the NGOs. Thus, CA probably had little intention of building PET into a collaborating team, and did not have the capacity to lead PET effectively, and may have deliberately discouraged participation. Some CCG members openly flouted CA leadership, were perceived as frustrating efforts to facilitate CDF projects, and did not always provide technical services as required or demanded, to quote: "they are not in this year's work programme". The pressure to 'indigenise' may have also been used by CA and RDCs to gain dominance over resource allocation. This antagonism was a factor in the shift to using consultants rather than CCG members. However our analysis is that the problem lay not in PET's structure, but in the way it was led and managed (indeed, almost ceased to function), CA's desire to control the programme and its resources, avoid over-sight (e.g., get rid of the NGOs who were constantly pestering them, speaking on their behalf, interfering in their business, etc.) and the acrimony of the period. PMT was an improvement measured in terms of the delivery of CDF projects, and was not intended to replace the CCG. Nevertheless, it de facto lead the programme, but at the time of the evaluation lacked the capacity to do so, with key sustainability and other issues not being addressed.

6. Responsiveness of NRMP II to Recommendations of the Mid-Term Evaluation

1.1 Recommendation

USAID/Zimbabwe should continue to support the CAMPFIRE movement, with some modification to NRMP II and with additional funding through FY2002.

- *Continue direct contract support to the GOZ and IC partner, and continue grant support at a reduced level to the CA.*
- *Maintain initial direct support to NGO Partners (CAMPFIRE Service Providers – CSPs). Subsequently, phase down direct grants to NGO partners, and, instead, encourage them to continue to access support through joint proposals with the CA Secretariat and its membership (Rural District Councils) for funding under the Community Development Fund (CDF) or other sources.*

Evaluation Comments

Support was continued until September 2003, with no-cost extensions made possible by savings on expenditure and exchange rate gains. USAID continued its support to DA and CA through 2003, although the CA grant was outside the DA contract for the 2000-2003 period. USAID funded small programs with Forestry Commission (FC), Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and Local Government (MLGPWNH) soon after the Mid-Term Evaluation, and then discontinued them in late 2002 in response to the new United States Government (USG) policy not to support state agencies in Zimbabwe. Grants to CASS, ZimTrust and SAFIRE terminated in late 1999 / early 2000. Some joint (the CSP with CA general endorsement) proposals were developed and funded – WWF for specific M&E functions, aerial surveys and other agreed upon tasks; and SAFIRE for specific community trust development work. Communities requested many of the aforementioned services - for the development of community trusts and in some cases for WWF training.

1.2 Recommendation

Modify the CDF to enhance CAMPFIRE sustainability and diversify the sources of revenue from sustainable natural resource use.

- *Facilitate review and decisions regarding current proposals under active consideration;*
- *Open up access to CDF monies by eliminating the distinction between capacity-building and infrastructure grants;*
- *Revise CDF proposal criteria to encourage (1) actions at the sub-Rural District level and (2) economically viable natural resource enterprises through pre-investment feasibility studies and capital investments in the resource base;*
- *Have USAID and the MLGPWNH begin to involve neutral peer reviewers in decision-making about the allocation of CDF monies;*
- *Develop a decision strategy for extending the CDF beyond the current project completion date.*
- *Transform the CDF into a longer term financing mechanism, such as a sinking fund, that would extend NRMP II funds beyond the potential ending of USAID support in FY2000 or 2002. This would provide new, as well as ongoing initiatives [within] the necessary time to become technically sound and sustainable.*
- *Use the CDF/follow-on trust or endowment mechanism to facilitate and provide an enabling context especially at the village and ward levels, for the development of commercially viable NRM enterprises, identified through the participatory planning process.*

Evaluation Comments

According to DA (2003a), the thrust of these recommendations was to expedite CDF implementation, move into more infrastructural projects (as opposed to RDC training/capacity building activities that had been the main focus of earlier support), and broaden the range of recipients and the types of NRM activities being supported. It was also evident that the CDF would terminate in a couple of years, and that steps should quickly be taken to generate additional funding for NRM projects in the future. Most of the recommendations were implemented except two: CDF was not turned into a trust or endowment fund; and neutral peer reviewers were not involved to any significant extent in decision-making about the allocation of CDF monies. Comments on developments following these recommendations are as follows:

- Shortly after the stakeholders' workshop to discuss the results of the 1998 Mid-Term Evaluation, USAID amended the NRMP to reflect the new management framework agreed upon at the workshop. The framework sought to simplify the CDF and NRMP decision-making process, involve CA and key government stakeholders more significantly in management decisions pertaining to the NRMP (and, in particular, to the CDF). This new arrangement (details found in the NRMP Grant/Amendments file) did expedite the CDF review process by disbanding the PET, a relatively powerless CCG Committee chaired ineffectively by CA's Deputy Director, and replaced it with a smaller but higher-level group (the PMT) chaired by the CA Board. The PMT soon began to hold regular monthly meetings to approve or reject projects, and this practice continued for most of the period.
- The CDF proposal criteria for infrastructure projects were revised/finalized in late 1998 and RDCs were trained again in proposal development. The revised criteria gave more weight to sub-district participation in project development and to pre-investment analysis (particularly financial/economic).
- The CDF did achieve much more diversification in its portfolio, with particular emphasis on eco-tourism and other forms on non-consumptive NRM activities (see Annex 0).

Response to Mid Term Review

In direct response to the specific recommendations of the Mid-Term Review:

- Processing of proposals was considerably speeded up. CA played a stronger leadership role in the PMT. A more central role of the IC/USAID in decision making, and of the IC in CDF management, was accepted. The IC recruited technical capacity in tourism and engineering. However, it was still slow, with a lack of responsiveness by RDCs and complex procedures both being blamed. To quote from the field trip report, the large project in Gokwe North took 30 months, the small grant took 15 months, and the Nyanga Kairezi grant took two and a half years. Here DA suggests that RDC capacity was a major constraint, and indeed some RDCs took months to follow up on recommendations, whereas RDCs feel procedures were complex. Whatever the case, it appears that there was not enough communication between the PMT and RDCs to facilitate project implementation.
- DA (2003b) confirms that the distinction between capacity-building and infrastructure grants was removed, and agreement was formally reached to concentrate the remaining CDF funds on infrastructure projects (DA, comments).
- Latterly, most projects were implemented at the sub-district level (see DA, 2003b), and economic and technical criteria were improved. While there was nothing conceptually wrong with these criteria, requirements were excessive, were driven more by USAID requirements than the requirements of communities and they were not particularly user friendly, with some difficulties experienced in managing the balance between the use of rigorous criteria and implementation flexibility. Table 29 summaries the large CDF grants made, all of which were after 1998, showing that at least half were done at sub-district level. Table 3 summarises the technical viability of these projects.
- Neutral peer-review was not incorporated into the decision process, although it was used on specific issues. The process could have benefited from more private sector input/experience, especially for tourism projects, but there was resistance to this from CA.
- It would have been better to have more proposals as private sector – community joint ventures with integrated private sector input in design and implementation (but RDCs and CA discouraged this, although field visits suggested it is what communities wanted).
- No strategy for extending CDF beyond NRMP II was agreed.
- The CDF was not transformed into a longer-term financing mechanism. USAID rejected this recommendation of the Mid Term Review (Loken, comments). Our observation is that this should have been included in the original project design.

Comments on the Sustainability of Large CDF Projects

Only two eco-tourism projects stand out as "highly probable" in terms of sustainability. The requisite infrastructure for these projects has been completed and the projects are already operational. Both projects are situated in the Eastern Highlands and they attract local tourists as well as the few regional and international tourists who still visit Zimbabwe. Of the five projects that the team considers as being in the "probable" category, two are eco-tourism projects and three involve fisheries. Five ecotourism projects could possibly be sustainable, but these have not yet been completed, and their viability will depend largely on significant improvements in the political and economic environment in the country. The viability of four projects (mopane worm harvesting and processing, wildlife management, ecotourism and electric fencing) is doubtful. The overall summary is as follows:

<u>Probability of Success</u>	<u>Projects</u>
Highly probable	= 2 ecotourism
Probable	= 2 ecotourism 3 fisheries
Possible	= 5 ecotourism
Likely	= 2 conservation
Difficut	= 1 rehabilitation
Doubtful	= 1 mopane worm harvesting and processing 1 wildlife management (rehabilitate ranch) 1 ecotourism 1 electric fencing

The following notes pertain to the CDF (discussed in more detail in section IV.A):

- Large CDF projects were selected equitably, with one viable project in each district.
- Viability was defined in terms of sustainability, rather than return on investment.
- Over time, grants (Table 28) were increasingly developed at local level, and with more involvement of private partners. Performance improved.
- Monitoring of financial and economic impact was difficult to build into the process since impact extend well beyond the life of the Project.
- Expectations of viability were unrealistic. Diversification through eco-tourism (i.e. lower-middle market) was not yet well developed even by the private sector, but were popularly requested by communities (albeit, often with unrealistic expectations)
- With a focus on delivering projects at local level, the importance of the central functions of marketing and product development was recognised but not sufficiently pursued, with CA being unresponsive to this potential and important role. Thus, no marketing / booking system was developed in support of site-level ecotourism investments.
- Timing was unfortunate, as these developments were completed after tourism had collapsed.

In retrospect, it might well have been better to set up a (soft) loan fund, whereby communities and the private sector could submit joint proposals to fund diversification investments (see recommendations).

TABLE 3: ASSESSMENT OF VIABILITY AND LEVEL OF CDF PROJECTS

District	Type of project	Viability	IMPLEMENTER (RDC, Trust Private Partner)
Mudzi, Rushinga, UMP	Nyatana Wilderness	Doubtful.	3 District Trust (7 wards)
Chiredzi	Veld Fire Management	Conservation, likely	RDC
Chimanimani	Chalets, ornithology	Highly probable	Trust
Mazowe	Ecotourism camping	Marginal	Trust
Muzarabani	Upgrade campsite with chalets	Probable	RDC; Private partner
Chipinge	Veld Fire Management	Conservation, likely	Local, with RDC support
Nyanga	Fishing chalets	Highly probable	Trust, with Private sector and RDC support
Hurungwe	Small scale fencing/revolving fund	Doubtful.	RDC and Community
Binga	Electric fences	Conservation, likely	RDC and Communities
Gokwe North	Veld Fire Management	Conservation, likely	RDC
Hwange	Fishing camp	Probable	RDC
Beitbridge	Fisheries	Probable	Community groups
Bulilima and Mangwe	Amacimbi (mopane worms harvesting and processing)	Doubtful	2 RDCs and 2 Trusts
Umzingwane	Mtshabezi Valley Ecotourism	Doubtful	RDC and Community Trust
Guruve	Ecotourism project	Probable	RDC and 2 Trusts
Gwanda	Rehabilitation of Doddieburn Manyoli ranches	Difficult	RDC
Bindura	Ecotourism campsite at Paradise Pools	Possible	RDC and Community Trust
Matobo	Ntunjambili caves ecotourism	Possible	RDC and Community Trust
Mwenezi	Manyuchi fishery	Probable	RDC and Community Trust
Goromonzi	Ngomakurira Ecotourism day centre	Possible	RDC and Trust
Manyame	Mayambara lodges and conference centre	Possible but difficult	RDC, Trust and Private Partner

Peer Review

As noted by DA (2003a), the PMT only occasionally used neutral, peer reviews to help decisions on CDF funding allocations. More often than not, USAID or DA prompted such peer reviews after expressing strong reservations on the merits of some projects being reviewed by the PMT (e.g. Binga Fencing, Hwedza honey processing proposal, proposed private sector partnership agreements for Chimanimani and Manyame eco-tourism projects, Hurungwe and Nyaminyami fencing projects). The inclusion of peer review and experience from the private sector might have had a strong positive influence.

Sustainability

DA (2003a) confirms that neither CA nor other GOZ representatives on the PMT seemed very concerned about the longer-term sustainability of the CDF. While the other CCG members were interested in establishing a National Trust Fund, CA resisted this (section VII.A). USAID decided against this in the NRMP II design, and also when it was raised by the Mid term Review when the time horizon was too short (Loken comments))

1.3. Recommendation

Simplify NRMP II administration by phasing out PET and implementing a series of key project management changes.

- *In the short-term, eliminate PET and incorporate its subcommittees into the CCG.*
- *Refocus CDF financial management and other NRMP II management responsibilities more tightly within the IC and USAID SO1 team.*
- *Reduce the number and frequency of project planning and implementation meetings.*
- *For broader project issues, including the impending NRMP II and Mission graduation, the core management team should work closely with the NRMP II Bilateral Review Committee (BRC).*
- *Include new partners and develop a revised Plan of Operations for the second half of the project.*

Evaluation Comments

Eliminate PET

The PMT replaced the PET. The PET sub-committees were generally not effective, except the M&E Committee chaired by WWF at CA's request. This committee developed an Monitoring & Evaluation Plan and implemented most aspects of it. This exception was due in part to WWF's and USAID/DA's interest in, and need for, information on the impact of CAMPFIRE/NRMP for reporting purposes.

Refocus CDF within IC and USAID SO1

The recommendation to refocus CDF financial management more tightly within the IC and USAID SO1 team was followed. The PMT held regular meetings and approved more projects in the 1999 / 2000 period under the revised CDF criteria (e.g. more user friendly small projects window, same criteria but reduced requirement for documentation). Note that NRMP stopped reviewing proposals for large projects in 2001, but continued reviewing and approving small projects right up to the end of 2002.

Reduce Meeting Frequencies

The number of CSP joint planning meetings was reduced from four to three meetings per year starting in late 1998. By the year 2001, CA discontinued all annual and tri-annual planning/progress review meetings of the CSPs. The initial rationale for having fewer meetings was sound (less paperwork / more action), but the cessation of virtually all meetings seemed extreme. While some CSPs may have lost interest as their DA grants expired, CA made little effort to incorporate them in CAMPFIRE plans and seemed to feel that there was little need for their services. Interviews with several CSPs suggest that they were deliberately marginalized by the CA at this time.

This reflects badly on the capacity of CA to source and maintain productive partnerships, and is one consequence of excessive dependence on a single large donor, coupled with competition for a large amount of financial resources in the form of free money (i.e. grants). In this manner, unfortunately, the NRMP II Project inadvertently weakened the programmatic focus of CAMPFIRE. The following negative consequences can be attributed to this shift:

- (a) The creative tension between NGOs, the CA, and government was lost, with the balance shifting too far towards administrative and government agencies.
- (b) The diverse strengths of the CCG, an important contributing factor in the conceptual power of CAMPFIRE, was lost.
- (c) The opportunity for productive criticism and peer review was reduced (noting that CCG members also lost capacity).
- (d) The more mechanical process of project management replaced the ethos and mechanism of adaptive management.
- (e) The innovative capacity of the program was lost, with few major innovations during NRMP II, which had a far more mechanical focus on roll-out and grant management.
- (f) The intellectual and financial portfolio of the CAMPFIRE program was narrowed.

As noted, the negative points d-f were not a direct fault of NRMP, although the financial empowerment of CA may have contributed to the deliberate/continual CA obstruction of the CCG. Regarding point f, there was some broadening of the programme (e.g., inclusion of Forestry Commission, SAFIRE). However, the overall impact of the marginalisation of the CCG was (1) a loss of intellectual capacity and (2) a reduction in their desire/capacity to source additional donor funds to support CAMPFIRE, thus broadening the funding portfolio.

Bilateral Review Committee (BRC)

The BRC never met, as the PMT did not feel that there was ever a need for their intervention in the NRMP. The CA, however, has not yet dealt in any significant way with the broader strategic issues facing CAMPFIRE. So this function, envisioned for the BRC, was not undertaken. DA (2003) suggests that CA's development of its SGI (developed with NRMP funded external technical assistance) may be a step in the right direction, but this is not the opinion of the evaluation (see section VII B).

New Partners

The 1998 NRMP Grant Amendment opened the door for funding new NGO and GOZ partners over the remainder of the Project, and new partners such as SAFIRE, FC, DNR, and local government took up some

NRMP implementation functions. However, the extent of uptake was limited as the government agencies generally lacked the capacity to acquire USAID funds and effectively phased themselves out in 2000 (although funding was available up to May 2002), and SAFIRE was only directly funded for one year (for reasons of underperformance). NGOs (except WWF) did not make full use of the funding for reasons discussed above.

Support Mechanisms

The CAMPFIRE program appeared to lose its strategic and programmatic focus at the time of the Mid-Term Evaluation:

- The simultaneous concentration of responsibility and finances within the CA nexus, while tightening DA/USAID SO1 control, is internally inconsistent. The simultaneous empowerment and then hamstringing of the CA tends to neutralise the intention of this objective?
- The project de-emphasised long-term institutional support, and emphasised the use of contracted service providers. The role of several CCG members changed from long-term partners into short-term support provision. This also created a conflict of interest for CCG members: they were competing for funding, and also participating in the adjudication panel. For reasons of conflict of interest, WWF for instance, was happy to withdraw from PET/PMT. Diversity and technical capacity of the CCG/PET was reduced, with the PMT being dominated by government agencies (DNPWLM, MLG, USAID) and by the CA membership. At the very time that greater entrepreneurial and commercial capacity and judgment was required, it was lost from the decision-making process. While DA was able to provide some commercial advice, this placed DA in the difficult position of having to argue against non-viable projects, that the rest of the members were happy to approve.
- According to DA (comments) a conscious decision was not made in 1998 to convert CCG to Service Providers. Although the formal name change did occur at the time, it was intended that the CCG continue and concentrate on broader Programme issues. However, the notion that CCG agency were also to be Service Providers was built into the Project Design for NRMP II and was articulated by project implementers from the beginning. CA was to be the lead organization helping the RDCs to obtain better and more relevant CCG services. CCG inputs were to serve these interests and the CCG was not to use the NRMP to implement their own institutional agenda (a common perception of CA/RDCs and some key GOZ Ministries). Ideally, NRMP funds were to be apportioned to only those CSPs that responded to on-the-ground needs identified by RDCs/CA.

We agree with the IC that this was good in theory, at least concerning the delivery of specific services, especially as the performance of several of the NGOs was declining at the time. However, it was difficult to put into practice, and could have been more responsive to some worthwhile CCG initiatives (DA comments). In terms of long-term support, we concur with DA that a partnership approach was, in retrospect, more sensible. Indeed, one of the lessons and challenges presented by NRMP II is how to retain long-term programmatic support without losing quality. We see no option but to recruit and rely on people who are professionals in their field. In making these technical comments, we are aware of the many forces that were acting against such recommendations, set in motion well before 1998.

- Moreover, with PMT being dominated by CA membership, and with this membership comprising elected RDC representatives, it was inevitable that the PMT shared projects equally amongst the CA membership, rather than responding to commercial opportunities or implementation performance. Hence the situation where each district was 'entitled' to one large project each; where commercial criteria and innovation were secondary; and where a sustainable mechanism failed to develop.
- In large part, the increasing burden on DA resulted from the marginalisation of CCG membership and the loss of capacity by several of these NGOs. The net result was to replace a system that might have become sustainable, with a system that relied on built capacity in an Institutional Contractor that, by definition, was phased out with the Project. An opportunity to build local civic capacity was lost. This was not the Institutional Contractor's intention, although towards the end of the project it was forced to taking on a more assertive role in CDF to complete these projects when it was clear that CA did not have the capacity for this. One can also argue that the increasing burden on the Institutional Contract resulted from the demise of the CCG partners, with CASS and ZimTrust in particular losing capacity.

- Moreover, had CCG members been encouraged to use CAMPFIRE to diversify their financial portfolios and funding sources, capacity and support is likely to have extended beyond the withdrawal of USAID, which is not now the case. A more unified programme, and endorsement of CCG funding proposals by CA, might well have been important in this regard.
- Nevertheless, the most important outcome was that the spreading of investment did purchase the political survival of CAMPFIRE, albeit at some cost in terms of technical and economic performance.

As will be reinforced throughout this section, the evaluation is not in agreement with the conversion of CCG members into CSPs, as this removes the critical dynamic of long-term relationship-based facilitation and vision from the program. NRMP was correct in trying to infuse performance related grants into the programme, and to use consultants more, but this was based on an assumption that the NGOs that initiated CAMPFIRE would continue to perform and provide quality long-term services and leadership. Unfortunately, this was not the case, and NRMP suffered consequently. In retrospect, the assumption of continued NGO performance and leadership is central to the project design, and should therefore have been an explicit design assumption with a tracking mechanism to ensure that corrective action was taken. The increasing role of the IC was the implicit response to this problem, but for reasons of sustainability may not have been the best approach in the long-term interests of CAMPFIRE.

As we suggest in the lessons learned section, a three-component approach to supporting such programmes should be considered in project design. To incorporate critical long-term leadership and facilitation into CAMPFIRE-type programs:

- Provide small, long-term, core, support grants to key staff in key agencies.
- Subject this grant to continual performance appraisal, with a strong emphasis on impact at beneficiary level. (tracking performance assumptions would also trigger corrective action).
- To link funding to performance, over and above core long-term funding, allow support agencies to grow by competing for additional CSP-type funding on a competitive and performance basis (e.g., a voucher-type system).

1.4. Recommendation

Shift the NRMP's program focus from expanding coverage to graduating communities.

- *Emphasize "getting it right" in promising areas, or where promising initiatives show the most rapid progress;*
- *Refine the criteria for what constitutes a successful CAMPFIRE community that can be considered graduated;*
- *CCG implementing organizations should develop planning approaches that include a withdrawal phase, after which outside technical assistance would be intermittent and minimal;*
- *Develop a CAMPFIRE approach to CBNRM (and other indigenous resources). In concert with the District Environmental Action Plan (DEAP) and other initiatives, define and generalize a flexible model of participatory land-use planning/CBNRM that is linked to a set of "best practices" guidelines that can be adapted to differing contexts. The CA should sanction this approach and include provision for the "graduation of CAMPFIRE communities" and an "exit strategy" for CCG partners.*

Evaluation Comments

Most of these recommendations pertain to technical issues and the need to refine approaches as the NRMP nears its conclusion. These recommendations were not actively pursued, as stakeholders appeared to believe that the sun would never set under the NRMP. CA's predilection was to spread resources to more RDCs rather than concentrate on a smaller number of more promising initiatives. CA's RDC membership also increased dramatically over the last few years; there are now more hungry RDCs to feed, coupled with a need for CA to produce incentives/benefits to these new members. This trend (diminution of technical considerations in NRMP implementation) was probably exacerbated by the gradual withdrawal of CSPs (who tend to be more technically oriented) from the NRMP decision-making process.

"Getting it Right" and Community Graduation

As already discussed, the loss of technical capacity and adaptive management processes within the CAMPFIRE movement in the latter stages of NRMP II acted directly against the requirements and hopes of the Mid-Term recommendations.

The concept of "graduation" is erroneous if one believes in rewarding performance, in investing in success, or in utilizing capacity improvements: the better a community performs, the more likely that returns to investment will be high. Nevertheless, USAID responded to this recommendation and developed a criteria which were monitored with ZimTrust assistance and reported annually for several years in formal project reports to Washington, D.C. This stopped when ZT stopped monitoring, and USAID Washington reduced the size of annual reports as documented in USAID Annual Reports to D.C. While USAID-Zimbabwe did it as the Mid Term Evaluation recommended, they also did not agree the concept for the same reasons suggested by this evaluation (Loken, comments).

If we take "graduation" to mean sustainability, the early wildlife communities and hunting enterprises, are, in the majority, sustainable. Several of the ecotourism enterprises might also become sustainable, provided they are managed at a local level and benefits are not spread too thin. The most viable of these were being discussed or developed before NRMP II (e.g. Muzarabani, Kairezi, Chimanimani), but the CDF enhance implementation.

Sustainability

How much of the sustainability of the wildlife-based programmes is attributable to NRMP II requires discussion:

- NRMP II capacity-building obviously helped, especially NRM techniques and procedures.
- The counter suggestion is that the maintenance of this capacity at RDC level also entailed higher operating costs at RDC level, and thus reduced benefit flows to communities. However, our data suggests that this was not the case. While there are some inefficiencies at RDC CAMPFIRE Unit level, and some functions are over-centralized, CAMPFIRE units in the main are reasonably managed. The reduction in revenues devolved to communities is not linked to the size of CAMPFIRE Unit budgets, but to the extraction of revenues by RDCs for other purposes.
- That sustainability is closely related to the initial CAMPFIRE districts, attests to the initial design and focus of CAMPFIRE on high-value enterprises, when the program had little donor funding, and financial productivity and sustainability were central issues.

The early stages of CAMPFIRE were astute, taking advantage of the quickest, easiest and most lucrative opportunities to promote the concept of devolved NRM. NRMP II was implemented under difficult diversification objectives and country conditions. The difficult country conditions, loss of leadership and technical skills, and the acrimony within the CAMPFIRE movement at this time was the root cause of the design flaws in NRMP II, and therefore its sustainability problems. It also took on the far more difficult task of diversification, and while this was the correct decision and is likely to have favourable long-term results, at least if the Zimbabwean tourism economy recovers, too little was done in the way of product development, demand analysis and marketing. Product development is also a process with a much longer-term profile than relatively short-term donor projects, and this recognition needs to be built into project design.

Project versus Programme

The structure of the Project, with a heavy funding cycle followed by phase out characteristic of the typical project cycle, is not ideally suited to the programmatic approach of CAMPFIRE with its emphasis on institutional behavioural change and self-sufficiency. The question of the relationship between a long-term programme like CAMPFIRE and a short-term injection of project funding through NRMP deserved more critical analysis and thought in its design. Regional experience suggests that institutional and behavioural change is a process that requires, at a minimum, some 20 to 30 years, especially given the vicissitudes of economic and political stability in emerging democracies. The supplementation of a programmatic approach with a large project, changed the nature of a lightly funded, bottom up and demand-driven program, and increased the emphasis on accessing heavy, increasingly top-down funding:

- The relatively light, but high powered, CCG was replaced by a much larger contingent of middle managers and consultants, and a heavier project administrative super-structure. Given that USD3.5 million was disbursed as grants to RDCs and communities, this structure absorbed some USD15 million over seven years, of which at least 20% can be attributed to CDF support (Table 11).

- Even after cutting the initial plans for the CDF from USD6 million to USD3.5 million, a great deal of external effort was needed (in the form of DA and consultants) to spend this money within the time frame of the project.
- The efficacy of such a supply-driven approach for the spontaneous development of local capacity is questionable. Without being linked directly to the (often slow) process of building local capacity, the sustainability of individual projects is less likely (if people learn to build things themselves, they are more likely to maintain them). Also questionable, is the likelihood of replication and growth using other forms of funding.
- It did not help that the heavy funding phase and the scaling up and diversification coincided with the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy.

These approaches also changed the nature of the CAMPFIRE program. While NRMP II may not have been the direct cause of this change, it exacerbated the problem through a combination of more centralised project management structures and large amounts of 'free' money. (CAMPFIRE was envisaged as a process of institutional and behavioural change. It hoped to shift from command-and-control, central planned and open-access systems, to the internalisation of costs and benefits, and management at local level with resource allocatory decisions being made according to comparative advantage. Many of the implementers did not see CAMPFIRE primarily a wildlife programme, but as a process that used the high value of wildlife to catalyse institutional change. Hence, the promulgators were not too concerned about diversification in the belief that once sound institutional structures were developed for wildlife, it was inevitable that these would also manage all natural resources. There was the added insight that while NGOs and government agencies might think sectorally, communities did not: living with resources, and understanding the interactions and tradeoffs between them, their automatic response was to integrate resource planning and use).

NRMP II built the capacity to manage projects. However, being forced to work increasingly through government agencies and councils, it under-emphasized the importance of long-term institutional processes and self-motivated development. It was concerned more with implementing grant-funded projects, than the intricacies and elegance of institutional change. Nevertheless, in expanding the geographical base of CAMPFIRE, NRMP II was important in spreading the application of the original CAMPFIRE principles, especially after it recognised the problem of working mainly through RDCs and started working more directly with communities. That principles, such as benefits to the producer community have survived, is a testament to the rigour and resilience of the original CAMPFIRE principles.

Support Model

A small amount of high quality field-level technical assistance, spread over a longer time frame, is suited to CAMPFIRE-type institutional change programs. Encapsulated in a statement by Chiredzi RDC is an important lesson. The belief that "we [Chiredzi RDC] can do everything that ZimTrust can do," demonstrates that support agencies, including CA, DA and CSPs, should have placed less emphasis on expanding their middle-management capacity.

A better model would have been to build high-level technical capacity centrally (as was initially the case in the formative period of CAMPFIRE), for the purpose of supporting middle managers at RDC level where they are most effective. In this regard, NRMP II support to RDC CAMPFIRE Units, was an valuable contribution, especially in the wildlife districts that could maintain these (we are less sure of this conclusion in RDCs with insufficient funding to sustain the ICB-initiated capacity after donor withdrawal). Where NGOs were able to support these units with good technical capacity (e.g. WWF and NRM technology and training), the model was effective. However, where they effectively replicated RDC capacity (e.g. ZimTrust's "army" of Area and Regional Managers) or were unable to provide support (e.g. CASS) it was not.

The central assumptions of service provision (as opposed to long-term relationships) and of CSP withdrawal both need to be questioned, as does the efficacy of the traditional project cycle. What is evident on the ground is that 'graduating' communities, should not have their funding phased out, as they are exactly those communities that have developed the capacity to absorb funding productively. Chiredzi, for instance, has developed the capacity to manage finances and equipment well, the confidence to outsource and work eye-to-eye with the private sector, and now has the ability to plan strategically, and to facilitate communities to understand this vision and move towards it. Instead of 'graduation' and the phasing out

funding, Chiredzi is now ready to absorb tens of millions of dollars to convert the Lowveld into a major tourism-irrigation economy (see Chiredzi RDC, 2002; de la Harpe, 2002a, b).

CCG Phase Out

The approach of NRMP II Project affected the sustainability of support to institutional change. The short-term 'feast' of contracted (rather than partnership) technical support is likely to contribute to a long term 'famine' of relationship-based technical assistance. The blame for this should not be laid directly at the door of NRMP. However, NRMP II did give CA the financial capacity to work independently and reduced the need for CA to build long-term partnerships with NGOs. Moreover, the performance of NRMP II was weakened by the loss of leadership within the CCG, and one asks if more could not have been done to retain such leadership within the larger programme? Certainly, the IC was one means of doing this, albeit with a serious question over long-term sustainability. However, at bottom the NGOs within the CCG also bear much of the blame for this loss of leadership as they proved unable to attract and retain high-level skills, or to negotiate a continued role in CAMPFIRE (albeit in difficult circumstances).

The conversion of CCG members into CSPs was driven by the unspoken CA "policy" to cut them out of the project/programme. It was used to soften the blow of the loss of direct funding support and, to the extent possible, to keep the CCG members engaged in project activities. We have emphasised the importance of long-term quality support, and the detrimental effect to the CAMPFIRE programme of losing these skills. Core funding is important for maintaining such staff, and by reducing core funding the programme de facto lost high-level programmatic capacity. However, several of the NGOs were not in any case using core funding effectively in this manner, and were expanding the quantity of middle-managers rather than improving the quality of specialist staff. Yet, the programme really needed this capacity, to provide leadership and, in technical terms, to develop the institutional programmes (e.g. POMS). The challenge of NGO performance, and the associated problem of free money (i.e. core funding) and weak performance, is certainly not unique to CAMPFIRE, and can be especially problematic where the correction of past inequalities overshadows meritocracy.

II. Investment Inflows under NRMP I and II

On August 29, 1989, USAID authorized the regional NRMP (690-0251) at USD 19,539,000 to provide assistance to three member countries of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (then called SADCC and now known as SADC) – Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Funding was also provided to the Ministry of Forestry and Natural Resources of Malawi in its role as serving as the SADC sector coordinator for Forestry, Fisheries and Wildlife. Funds for the Zimbabwe component of this project (690-0251.13) were obligated on August 31, 1989, and January 11, 1990, for a total Phase I obligation of USD 7,600,000. As the NRMP was extended into Phase II, obligated investments in CAMPFIRE totalled USD 28,100,000 and was allocated as summarised in Table 4.

TABLE 4: OVERALL BUDGET FOR NRMP

NRMP INVESTMENTS INITIALLY PLANNED (in '000 USD)			
Activity Category	NRMP I	NRMP II	TOTAL LOP
Wildlife Conservation (WWF, DNPWLM)	1,277	3,070	4,347
Community Development (ZIMTRUST, CAMPFIRE Assoc.)	3,900	3,915	7,815
Community Funds (Community Projects and RDC develop.)	0	6,000	6,000
Regional Communication and Training (ART)	899	1,200	2,099
Planning and Applied Research (CASS, Action Magazine)	700	2,110	2,810
Administrative Contract (Institutional Contractor)	0	2,675	2,675
USAID Management	0	1,250	1,250
Audit	100	80	180
Evaluation	0	200	200
Contingency	344		344
Inflation	380		380
TOTALS	7,600	20,500	28,100

This budget was funded by USAID-Zimbabwe and by USAID's (then) Southern Africa Regional Programme (SARP). NRMP I was entirely funded from regional funds, and USD4.5 million of NRMP II was also provided by regional funds. The regional contribution to NRMP I & II budgets was as follows (Table 5):

TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF THE REGIONAL FUNDING COMPONENT OF NRMP

Summary of Regional Component of NRMP					
	FY 89-94	FY 94-99	LOP	Actual	Variance
Wildlife Conservation (WWF, DNPWLM)	1,481,500	1,500,000	2,981,500	3221205	-239,705
Community Development (ZimTrust, CAMPFIRE Assoc.)	4,180,500	1,950,000	6,130,500	6130500	0
Regional Communication and Training (ART)	899,295	0	899,295	965622	-66,327
Planning and Applied Research (CASS, Action Magazine)	699,000	1,050,000	1,749,000	1749000	0
Audit and Evaluation	100,000		100,000	29285	70,715
Contingency	239,705		239,705		239,705
	7,600,000	4,500,000	12,100,000	12,095,612	4,388

This budget was revised after the Mid-Term Evaluation in 1998 and the Project Grant Agreement Amendment Number 6 documents an illustrative financial plan as follows (Table 6):

TABLE 6: NRMP II BUDGET AS MODIFIED AFTER MID-TERM EVALUATION

NRMP II (in USD) Activity Category	REVISIONS 1998		TOTAL	CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS		
	USAID	GOZ		USAID	GOZ	TOTAL
Wildlife Conservation	0	800,000	800,000	4,421,205	4,000,000	8,421,205
Community Development	1,200,000	1,150,000	2,350,000	14,070,500	5,400,000	19,470,500
Regional Communication and Training	0	0	0	1,470,010	0	1,470,010
Planning and Applied Research	0	0	0	2,809,000	0	2,809,000
Administrative Contract (Institutional Contractor)	1,700,000	0	1,700,000	4,100,000	0	4,100,000
USAID Management	0	0	0	1,000,000	0	1,000,000
Audit/Evaluation	0	0	0	229,285	0	229,285
Contingency	0	0	0	0	0	0
Inflation	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTALS	2,900,000	1,950,000	4,850,000	28,100,000	9,400,000	37,500,000

The contract of the Institutional Contractor was extended in the post 1998 period. This did not increase the total project budget under Phase II as adjustments were made within existing budget lines. Initially under NRMP II, the use of project funds was anticipated to be as follows (Table 7):

TABLE 7: BREAKDOWN OF NRMP II BUDGET BY PROJECT COMPONENTS AND IMPLEMENTING AGENCY

Institutions	Inst. Strengthening	Natural Resource Management	Long term TA	Short Term TA	Training	Commodities	Operations/Overheads	Audit	Evaluation	TOTALS
IC	0	0	1,000	450	25	250	950	0	0	2,675
CDF	3,000	3,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,000
CA	0	0	0	625	350	435	340	0	0	1,750
ZimTrust	0	0	0	525	340	350	750	0	0	1,965
ART	0	0	0	500	250	150	300	0	0	1,200
Action	0	0	0	200	600	180	80	0	0	1,060
WWF	0	0	0	500	450	120	500	0	0	1,570
CASS	0	0	0	500	200	250	100	0	0	1,050
DNPWLM	0	0	0	500	100	400	500	0	0	1,500
MLGRUD	0	0	0	100	40	40	20	0	0	200
USAID	0	0	500	600	0	50	100	80	200	1,530
TOTALS	3,000	3,000	1,500	4,500	2,355	2,225	3,640	80	200	20,500

By the end of June, 2003, USAID-Zimbabwe had disbursed USD 13,958,175 million, with an amount of USD 1,641,556 remaining (Table 8).

TABLE 8: USAID-ZIMBABWE NRMP II VARIANCE ANALYSIS

Source: Analysis of raw data from USAID commitment records

USAID -Zimbabwe NRMP II Variance Analysis			
COMMITMENT DESCRIPTION	Committed	Disbursed	Variance
Administrative Contracts	4,100,000	4,034,451	65,549
USAID Management	1,048,707	852,255	196,452
Community Development	7,603,889	6,383,039	1,220,850
Wildlife Conservation	1,108,857	1,091,642	17,215
Regional Communication and Training	513,277	452,652	60,625
Studies and Evaluations	249,959	243,081	6,878
Direct Grants (to CSPs)	975,042	901,055	73,987
TOTAL	15,599,731	13,958,175	1,641,556

Table 9 (following) is an analysis of the same data extracted from USAID's commitment records for the USAID-Zimbabwe component of NRMP II, but provides a more detailed breakdown of expenditure according to activities. The data is further divided into USAID direct disbursements, and into disbursements through the Institutional Contractor. Almost USD14 million out of a budget of USD15.6 million has been spent.

TABLE 9: BREAKDOWN OF USAID-ZIMBABWE DISBURSEMENTS BY ACTIVITY FOR SUB-CONTRACTORS

Summary of USAID Disbursements for NRMP II (as at June 2003)									
COMMITMENT DESCRIPTION	Grantee	Administrative Contracts	Management	Community Development	Wildlife Conservation	Regional Comms and Training	Studies and Evaluations	Direct Grants	TOTAL
Project Budget		4,100,000	1,048,707	7,603,889	1,108,857	513,277	249,959	975,042	15,599,731
Disbursement (June 2003)		4,034,451	852,255	6,383,039	1,091,642	452,652	243,081	901,055	13,958,175
Variance		65,549	196,452	1,220,850	17,215	60,625	6,878	73,987	1,641,556
USAID	Costs	-	636,065	-	-	-	-	-	636,065
	Studies	-	-	-	-	10,018	243,081	-	253,099
Development	DA	4,034,451	-	1,913,279	-	-	-	-	5,947,730
Associates	CDF	-	-	2,986,962	-	-	-	-	2,986,962
	WWF	-	-	-	1,086,156	-	-	-	1,086,156
	CASS	-	-	-	-	-	-	401,055	401,055
Direct Grants	CA	-	216,190	-	230	16,522	-	-	232,942
from USAID	ZimTrust	-	-	1,452,591	-	425,451	-	500,000	2,378,042
	DNR	-	-	10,845	-	-	-	-	10,845
	FC	-	-	9,988	-	661	-	-	10,649
	MLG	-	-	9,374	5,256	-	-	-	14,630
Total Disbursement		4,034,451	852,255	6,383,039	1,091,642	452,652	243,081	901,055	13,958,175

By the end of March 2003, expenditures on obligated contract agreements administered through Development Associates were as follows (Table 10):

TABLE 10: SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURE ADMINISTERED BY DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES (15 JUNE 2003)

Source: Development Associate's Records

DA CONTRACT	Amount in USD				
	Funds allocated Per AID/IC Contract Agreement	Obligated to Contract	Expenditures for March 2003	Total Expenditures To date	Remaining Unexpended Obligated Amount
DA/PW operations	5,351,148.00	5,351,148.00	33,820.73	4,943,522.56	407,625.44
WWF Long-Term Grant	1,551,348.47	1,551,348.47	0.00	1,542,099.27	9,249.20
WWF Short-Term Grants	18,063.80	18,063.80	0.00	0.00	18,063.80
CASS	743,950.23	743,950.23	0.00	743,950.23	0.00
CA	1,567,852.41	1,567,852.41	0.00	1,567,852.41	0.00
ZimTrust	943,001.86	943,001.86	0.00	943,001.86	0.00
SAFIRE	153,028.09	153,028.09	0.00	153,028.09	0.00
RDCs	3,287,554.47	3,287,554.47	15,754.14	3,198,727.42	88,827.05
Sales tax refunds				(17,438.62)	17,438.62
RDC/CDF Grant Allocation	712,445.53	712,445.53	0.00	0.00	712,445.53
Support Grant Allocation	61,281.14	61,281.14	0.00	0.00	61,281.14
Total	14,389,674.00	14,389,674.00	49,574.87	13,074,743.22	1,314,930.78

Interviews with Development Associates suggest that the following money will not be spent:

- An amount of USD712,445 remains unexpended on CDF budget line.
- Over US 88,827 remains unutilised under the support grant budget line, intended for CSP small grants by applications.

Table 11 (following) summarises NRMP II expenditure as at June 2003⁹. In the absence of a summary of regional expenditure by budget line, these amounts are estimated. Expenditure of USAID-Zimbabwe funding is extracted from DA records as of June 2003. It is difficult to analyse CDF data in more detail because records are maintained in ZD where financial figures are rendered almost meaningless by inflation and devaluation. We have followed DA's conclusion that USD2 million was utilised on Institutional Capacity Building, with the remaining USD2 million allocated to the CDF of which approximately USD750,000 is not expected to be used. Notwithstanding these minor uncertainties in the financial data, Table 11 provides a valuable overview of the project.

⁹ Note that compilation of this data has been difficult. USAID keeps a full record of commitments, but does not as a matter of course keep management accounts that list the three critical criteria: budget line; agency; date. Furthermore, the inclusion of both USAID-Zimbabwe and regional funding has further complicated the collation and summary of data. This is indicative of the absence of a consolidated Management Information System for NRMP II.

TABLE 11: OVERALL SUMMARY OF NRMP II EXPENDITURE

Summary NRMP II Expenditure					
Agency	Budget		Expenditure		Percent Of Actual
	USAID/Zim	Regional	Actual	Variance	
WWF/DNPWLM		1,500,000	1,500,000	-	9%
ZimTrust/CA		1,950,000	1,950,000	-	11%
CASS/Action		1,050,000	1,050,000	-	6%
DA	5,351,148		4,943,523	407,625	28%
WWF LT Grants	1,551,348		1,542,099	9,249	9%
WWF ST Grants	18,064		-	18,064	0%
CASS Grant	743,950		743,950	-	4%
CA Grant	1,567,852		1,567,852	-	9%
ZimTrust Grant	943,002		943,002	-	5%
SAFIRE Grant	153,028		153,028	-	1%
Other Grants	61,281		-	61,281	0%
Sales Tax Refund			(17,439)	17,439	0%
RDC ICB (approx.)	2,000,000		2,000,000	-	11%
CDF	2,000,000		1,198,727	801,273	7%
	14,389,674	4,500,000	17,574,743	1,314,931	

Table 12 allocates the revenues presented above in the form of an input-output analysis. While percentages are unavoidably indicative, this nevertheless is useful for assessing the effectiveness of various project components. We have been criticised by both DA and USAID about these figures, and while we accept that they are indicative we believe that an input output analysis adds value to the evaluation and is helpful in showing where money worked best, and where it could have worked better. Both USAID and DA accept that the project should have monitored financial data against outputs in the first place to allow a more accurate appraisal.

We take at face value DA's statement that roughly half of the DA and ICB grant was targeted towards implementing CDF projects, and roughly half was for other capacity-building purposes¹⁰. However, as noted below, surely a significant amount of general capacity building must also have been aimed at the implementation of CDF, for why else invest in the non-wildlife districts (which comprise 16 out of 29 Large CDF Grants)?

¹⁰ DA (comments) suggests that the initial allocation of 40% to CDF support by the evaluation was incorrect. While no empirical data is available, DA suggests that a better approximation is 15-20%. This assumes that 35-45% of the amount spent on ICB and 35-45% of DA expenditure can be attributed to supporting the CDF. DA also notes that ICB grants were used not only to support the CDF but to support NRM and other activities including "World Bank Capacity Building Programme for RDCs, various UN sponsored poverty relief programs, special NGO funded projects, DEAP, etc. – most of these activities were never intended to result in a CDF infrastructure project". DA also notes "As per the DA contract a great deal of time/resources were spent on financial and commodity management training- much of which was not solely related to CDF infrastructure projects". However, DA does agree that in the last two or three years it might well have seemed that their activities were focused almost entirely on the CDF. We also accept DA's statement "Also, there were considerable training and TA efforts made for CA – various strategic planning exercises, personnel manuals, endowment fund TA, staff training systems, Board training, financial mgt training. Much time was spent on organizing (with CA quarterly Programme reviews, coordination meetings with CSPs, etc, etc."

Unfortunately, due to the absence of a comprehensive management information system, and as we have already noted in the preamble to this argument, it was not possible to draw out accurate data to compile the input:output analysis, which therefore remains indicative. Although we wonder what the objectives of the ICB were in (particularly) the non-wildlife districts if it was not to create awareness with a CDF project in mind, we also accept DA's argument that attributing the full 40% to CDF support is probably an exaggeration. However, this does not change the basic conclusion that CDF delivery had lower returns to investment than other components of the programme, largely because of design flaws and political and personality considerations that prevented these being corrected (see section IV.A).

TABLE 12: ROUGH INPUT-OUTPUT ASSESSMENT OF NRMP II

Output	Input
Improved natural resource management and revenues	18%
General institutional capacity building	25%
General capacity building (CA, RDCs)	20%
Capacity-building targeted specifically at CDF	20%
CDF Projects	7%
Regional communication	10%

Natural Resource Management: The main contributions to improved natural resource management were:

- The design of the CAMPFIRE programme, with wildlife revenues of approximately USD2 million annually.
- Approximately 18% of NRMP II revenues for wildlife management, which passed largely through WWF.
- Improvements in general institutional building, for instance the development of CAMPFIRE Units at RDC level by the ICB.

The output/input ratio of this component of the project has been high as illustrated by the impact of the programme (Section III A and B).

Institutional Development: The main strengths of institutional development were the sound principles embodied in the CAMPFIRE plus the wildlife revenues flowing through these producer communities and RDCs. This has led to generally sustainable and well-governed community institutions. Unfortunately, opportunities to build on this platform were not taken. For example, institutional capacity has not been well monitored by the NRMP II so this progress cannot be quantified. Opportunities to use the CAMPFIRE experience to develop improved systems and training materials for institutional management have not been used. The support of CAMPFIRE Units, as noted above, has been helpful, although a proportion of this was related directly to helping RDCs cope with financial and commodity matters related to USAID regulations and requirements.

We assume that the majority of ZimTrust and CA expenditure (25% of budget) and some of the DA/ICB costs (10-20% of budget) were allocated for this purpose. The effectiveness of this component of the project has been moderate, and there is certainly considerable scope for improvement in delivery. NRMP II lacked an institution that was highly skilled in institutional development. The 20% of the NRMP II budget spent variously on capacity building is too aggregated to be able to comment specifically on its impact, except to say that CA was not a good recipient of such help.

Community Development Fund: The CDF used considerable project time and resources, especially in the latter stages of project. This component used approximately 20% of the budget (i.e. half of the DA plus ICB grants) and delivered projects to the value of 7% of project budget. As noted elsewhere, the design of this component was unsophisticated, implementation was slow and cumbersome, and the original CCG was not committed, ready, nor tooled to administer or support grant funding. We have already commented on the dangers of 'free money'. The project's later emphasis on Trusts and community-level implementation recognised that the initial top-down RDC-level grant funding was problematic, and not in keeping with the objectives of the CAMPFIRE programme. For these reasons, and the coincidence of this phase with macro-economic decline, projects choice and implementation was sub-optimal from a business perspective (although, it must be said, a good effort was made by DA to complete these projects before closeout). This component of the project had the lowest economic return on investment, but was crucial politically. The project:

- Was initially designed to deliver USD6 million to communities in the form of CDF grants.
- Used USD2 million for Institutional Capacity Building largely at RDC level (23 grants).
- Delivered approximately USD1.3 million as CDF Large and Small Projects.
- Rather it aimed to implement one Large Project in each participating RDC, with the criteria that they could at least be maintained (it did not use return of investment or profitability as a criteria, and with grant funding there was no requirement to cover the cost of capital). Project resource allocations and design criteria were not rigorously applied throughout implementation due to such

extraneous considerations as equity, community desires/preferences and natural resource management needs (Loken, comments).

- CDF project investment comprises 7% of total project expenditure, with a significant portion of this investment including consulting fees for feasibility studies.
- More than USD \$700,000 remained unspent.
- A further USD 2m was used to capacitate RDCs to deliver these projects (11% of NRMP II) but RDC/ICB grants designed to accomplish much more than just CDF-related capacity such as district-level NRM, community awareness and capacity building.

Regional and International Communication: The investment in regional and international communication, largely through ART, CASS and ACTION, has had a powerful impact, through publications and at international conservation forums. Indeed, the funding provided by USAID in combination with the powerful philosophy of the CAMPFIRE movement, has had a significant impact on the direction of international conservation, and in particular the growth of interest in sustainable development and CBNRM. People as far away as US education institutions, Mongolian wildlife managers and Asian foresters and aquatic managers refer to CAMPFIRE. For reasons related to pressure from the US, funding to Africa Resources Trust (which was central to the impact of regional and international communication and Zimbabwe's success at CITES in 1997) was discontinued. Consequently, this component lost effectiveness, although USAID tried to provide some continuation by providing direct support for attendance at meetings. It must also be said that both Action Magazine and CASS lost the capacity to contribute effectively, and consequently did not have their NRMP II funding continued.

In summary:

- The returns on investment in wildlife management and regional and international communication have been high. This is because the institutions managing these components were technically strong, and they built on the strengths of CAMPFIRE to present a powerful message internationally and locally.
- The returns on investment in capacity building were mixed, good for some CAMPFIRE Units, poor in others and in CA, and a major opportunity to develop lower level institutional mechanisms was lost. Outside of NRM and advocacy, this is because community capacity building skills within the programme were lacking resulting in mediocre implementation.
- The returns on investment from the CDF were political sustainability and the spreading of the CAMPFIRE concept widely across the country, with a trade-off in terms of technical and economic criteria and sustainability where delivery was unexceptional. The value of political sustainability must not be under rated. Difficult political considerations, and the loss of technical skills, that meant that this component was compromised technically and lacked the institutional sophistication associated with the CAMPFIRE programme. The CDF concept was the right thing to do and was useful but in better circumstances could have yielded better results, using more experimentation and piloting, adaptive management and innovation to build on the learning opportunities that CAMPFIRE offers.

III. Impact Achieved and Challenges Faced

With the previous chapter having documented USAID-funded contributions to CAMPFIRE to date, this chapter assesses what USAID has "bought" with its support, and the results and impacts, particularly since the 1998 Mid-Term Evaluation

A. CONSERVATION

1. Awareness

The CAMPFIRE programme is widely known as the "African solution to the African problem" because a lot of awareness activities have been done to make the programme acceptable and justifiable socially, economically, environmentally and politically. Under NRMP II there has been significant investment in the awareness raising activities of RDCs, CAMPFIRE Service Providers and the CAMPFIRE Association itself. Conservation awareness has been promoted through the formation and establishment of Natural Resources Management Committees from village to district level; training workshops targeted at producer communities, conservation awareness among schools, and information dissemination through the print and electronic media.

Natural Resources Monitoring: In the post 1997 period, many CAMPFIRE districts recruited Natural Resources Monitors and CAMPFIRE promoters. Table 13 indicates the numbers of monitors and promoters who were recruited by selected RDCs and deployed to monitor and report the state of specific natural resources at village and ward levels. CAMPFIRE promoters function as extension personnel and provide back-up support to RDC training officers. Anecdotal information suggests that monitors and promoters have played an important role in reducing incidents involving unsanctioned harvesting of big and small game, fish, fruits and commercial timber. Natural resources monitors and promoters motivate local communities to take a leading role in the management and sustainable utilization of natural resources.

TABLE 13: NATURAL RESOURCES MONITORS AND CAMPFIRE PROMOTERS RECRUITED AFTER 1997

Rural District Council	Natural Resource Monitors	CAMPFIRE Promoters
Nkayi	6	-
Mudzi	6	3
Rushinga	10	7
Nyaminyami	11	-
Tsholotsho	8	-
Uzumba/Maramba/Pfungwe	10	4
Beitbridge	12	1
Guruve	14	-
Muzarabani	10	-
Bulilimamangwe	10	-
Gwanda	5	5
Chimanimani	4	-
Nyanga	4	4
Binga	7	-
Kusile (Lupane)	6	-
Gokwe North	6	-
	129	24

Information dissemination: Action Magazine has played a critical role in disseminating conservation awareness messages through schools and teachers training colleges countrywide. Action has produced 12 issues of its magazine, with an estimated circulation of 200,000 per issue covering six countries in Southern Africa. The CAMPFIRE Teachers' Pages has been distributed to 100,000 teachers and about 15,000 schools, 6,597 of which are in Zimbabwe. Action estimates that this environmental awareness drive has reached 1.5 million school children. In addition to magazines, Action's products include:

- An ecosystem poster set, which comprises a series of four posters featuring wetlands, grasslands, deserts and woodlands.
- Animal poster set – this comprises a series of 13 full colour posters of wildlife. These are often found in CAMPFIRE districts.
- Action's training, curriculum and research unit, in conjunction with the Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture, is spearheading a dynamic and participatory approach to the teaching of Environmental Education in Zimbabwe.

The CAMPFIRE Association on its part has contributed towards conservation awareness by:

- Participating at major exhibitions especially the Environmental Expo;
- Participating at the Zimbabwe Agricultural Show;
- Placing editorial supplements in Zimbabwe's major news daily newspapers

WWF has also contributed to conservation awareness. The CAMPFIRE Game has been incorporated into school curricula. Posters are widespread, especially one on managing and counting elephants.

Awareness and training:

Through training provided by WWF and RDC officials, producer communities are encouraged to undertake their own wildlife censuses. They later hold meetings with Parks Officers to compare their census results and determine sustainable off-take of wildlife.

The impact of all the activities associated with conservation awareness is reflected in the efforts being made in protecting landscapes and wildlife habitats, and in the interest shown by communities through the small and large projects (see section III.C on diversification). CAMPFIRE has developed income-generating enterprises based on natural resources and these projects are linked to natural resource management strategies. Community actions and attitudes towards these resources have significantly changed. Strategies that have been embarked on by communities include: formulation of by-laws that govern access to the resources, fencing the resource, monitoring and protecting resources, establishment of village natural resource management committees, conducting Environmental Impact Assessments and periodic resource audits.

Perhaps the primary awareness mechanism has been the participation of tens of thousands of households each year in deciding how to allocate wildlife revenues. Most people in CAMPFIRE producer communities (several hundred thousand) are well aware of the programme, and this is confirmed by the Process Orientated Monitoring System (POMS) (ZimTrust 2001, 2003). Most conservationists in the country know about it, and random questioning of ordinary people (e.g., border officials) suggests knowledge about CAMPFIRE is widespread. The report by Chikurro *et al* (2003) also confirms that local government officials at district and provincial offices are well aware of the programme.

A number of factors indicate that communities were increasingly aware of the value of wildlife and how to manage it¹¹. Indicators include:

- The number of Councils applying for and being awarded appropriate authority.
- The improvement in marketing of wildlife (c.f. Child, 1995a).
- The take-over of quota setting by communities and the maturity with which this was done.
- The monitoring of safari hunting.
- The high level of participation in revenue distribution.
- The uptake of problem animal reporting.
- The setting aside of dedicated wildlife areas, and the greater respect given to natural resource conservation in CAMPFIRE, as seen in fire control, reduced tree-cutting, reduced poaching, etc.

The growing demand by communities to develop ecotourism operations (Tables 23-25) indicates a general awareness of the value of tourism, although this has not yet translated into specific knowledge related to managing such operations.


¹¹ See table on page 19 of Child *et al* (1997)

2. Protecting Landscapes and Habitats

No accurate maps or lists of the area formally or informally set aside for wildlife by communities is available. The primary wildlife producing wards are illustrated in Figure 6.

FIGURE 6: MAP OF CAMPFIRE "PRODUCER WARDS" IN 1996

Source: WWF-SARPO database



Communal Areas, especially those in the Sebungwe and Middle-Zambezi Valley have been experiencing population growth rates in excess of 10% annually. This is due in large part to in-migration from overcrowded and degraded areas elsewhere in Zimbabwe (e.g. Save Valley). Within two decades, this 10% human population growth rate transformed much of the Sebungwe and Mid-Zambezi Valley from wilderness into subsistence agriculture of questionable sustainability¹², with survival being largely dependent on food relief and other government inputs (CASS, 2000). Bond (2002) demonstrated that what enabled people to live in these marginal areas was heavy subsidisation of many aspects of livelihoods (government food handouts, schooling, health, agricultural inputs, etc.), including the extraction of open access resources. This was especially prominent when new people moved into areas, usually already settled (Derman, 1990).

In the face of this, CAMPFIRE protects an area of land roughly equivalent in size to Zimbabwe's Parks and Wildlife Estate. This is a major indicator of the successful impact of the CAMPFIRE programme. The total area of CAMPFIRE Producer Wards is 56,135km² (see Table 14). Zimbabwe's protected areas, which comprise 12.7% of the country, total 49,700km²¹³. However, there are 152,255 households (605,691 people) living in CAMPFIRE Wards. Assuming each household requires an average of 5 hectares, the total area protected by CAMPFIRE is 48,522 km², still roughly equal in size to the Parks and Wildlife Estate.

¹² Research by Cumming and Lynam (pers. comms.) quantified these massive increases in human numbers, loss of habitat and unsustainability of land use practices.

¹³ List given on p35 of Child G (1995)

This area contains roughly 12,000 elephants and 14,000 buffalo, and is under stocked, although wildlife populations are increasing (see section III.A.3).

TABLE 14: CAMPFIRE BASELINE DATA

Source: WWF database (see Annex J for more information)

District	Natural Region	Total Area of districts (km2)	Year Granted AA	Year CAMPFIRE Started	Area of CF Wards (km2)	Total Number of Wards	Wards	District Population (persons)
Beitbridge	5	12,935	1991	1991	4,595	21	6	80,946
Binga	3,4&5	12,308	1991	1989	7,930	27	21	87,802
Bubi		5,547			88	12	2	36,614
Bulilimamangwe	4&5	12,574	1990		1,530	33	10	156,641
Chaminuka	2a,2b,3,4&5	2,752			380	26	2	94,047
Chimanimani	1,2a,3,4&5	3,419	1994	No activity		28		110,836
Chiplinge(Gazaland)	1,2a,3,4&5	5,223	1991		408	33	2	336,893
Chiredzi(Gaza Khomanani)	5	17,748	1991	1991/92	3,633	32	9	183,228
Chiweshe(Mazowe)	2a	4,482	1991		375	29	5	198,319
Gokwe North	3,4&5	7,359	1991	1991	2,523	25	4	164,558
Gokwe South	3&4	11,138	1991	1991	1,308	28	6	238,581
Goromonzi	2a	2,504				26		147,126
Guruve	2a,3&4	7,810	1988		4,215	28	14	135,637
Gwanda	4&5	10,792	1994	No activity	2,283	23	6	112,984
Hurungwe	2a,3,4&5	19,895	1992	1992	2,793	40	9	246,902
Hwange	4&5	29,934	1989	1991	4,021	27	15	71,707
Hwedza	2b&3	998						69,981
Kusile(Lupane)	3&4	7,780	1996	No activity	2,885	24	11	94,469
Marondera	2a&2b	3,554				24		104,601
Matobo	4&5	7,278			1,233	26	4	89,281
Mudzi	4	4,222	1992	1991	1,009	18	2	109,423
Mutoko	2b,3&4	4,052				29		122,941
Muzarabani	2a,3&4	4,322	1991		2,540	17	9	69,851
Mwenezi	4&5	12,933				31		101,354
Nkayi		5,333	993	No activity	2,628	23	6	113,302
Nyaminyami(Kariba)	4&5	6,327	1988	1989	3,532	16	11	27,717
Nyanga	1,2b,3&4	5,738	1992	1987 but no projects	253	37		128,439
Pfura(Mt. Darwin)	2a,2b,3&4	1,771						164,362
Rushinga	3&4	2,408	1992	1993		17		75,332
Tsholotsho	4	7,823	1990	1989	5,354	20	8	111,828
UMP Zvataida	2b,3&4	2,682	1993	9 3	619	15	2	86,302
Umzingwane	4	1,074	1988					62,954
Zlvagwe	4	2,363	1998					65,752
TOTAL/AVERAGE		247,078			56,135	735	165	4,000,710

Child (1988), Jansen, et al (1991), and the general conversion of private land in semi-arid areas to wildlife enterprises, demonstrated that wildlife could make more money from agriculturally marginal habitats than livestock. This, together with devolved proprietorship to private landholders, led to a quadrupling of wildlife populations in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2000 as illustrated by Booth's (2003) data on hunting offtakes (Figure 4). Initial impetus was given to the CAMPFIRE movement by the observation that although wildlife had an economic comparative advantage in agriculturally marginal areas, it provided no legal local benefit and was being replaced by unsustainable land use practices. CAMPFIRE was the mechanism developed by DNPWLM to replicate the success of devolved wildlife management on private land to communal lands. DNPWLM became extremely concerned at the rapid elimination of wildlife habitats, where the degradation of the Save catchment and other traditional agricultural areas was leading to mass migration into the Zambezi Valley and Sebungwe area and the associated destruction of wilderness areas as early as the 1970s.

Despite the rapid conversion of wild land to settlements and agriculture, most of the original twelve CAMPFIRE districts have been able to maintain substantial wildlife areas. In some districts this has been accomplished by designating and fencing settlement areas (e.g. Masoka, Binga); in others by fencing land to protect it from settlement (e.g. the Gokwe North wildlife corridor); and in others through tacit community support (e.g. Mahenye, Chiredzi, Bulilima mangwe, Tsholotsho, Hwange).

There is no available simple map that indicates the areas of communal areas that are zoned, formally or informally, for wildlife, a simple measure that would provide a graphic illustration of the impact of CAMPFIRE. In the early 1990s, encouraged by the income from wildlife, a number of districts set aside wildlife areas or corridors. From interviews with knowledgeable persons Table 15 was compiled to assess the impact of CAMPFIRE on the protection of wild land. More recently, the communities in more highly populated areas have also set aside protected areas to support diversification into ecotourism (Table 16). While much smaller, these areas protect remnant environments in eco-zones under-represented by the Parks and Wildlife Estate – they are effectively community conserved protected areas.

TABLE 15: ESTABLISHMENT OF WILDLIFE AND OTHER PROTECTED AREAS IN CAMPFIRE DISTRICTS

District	What has been done?	Has it worked?
Muzarabani	Mavuradonha Wilderness area set aside. Less able to protect land in valley floor from settlement.	Yes, in some areas
Guruve	Main producer wards have reduced spread of settlement. A game ranch has been established in Ward 4.	Yes
Hurungwe	Area along Mana Pools National Park and Charara Safari Area boundaries protected from settlement	Yes
Nyaminyami		
Binga	Enclosure fencing of people and wildlife areas has protected wild land	Yes
Gokwe North	In the face of massive settlement, only remaining wildlife area is the game corridor	Yes
Hwange	Area along Zambezi river, generally too harsh for settlement developed for wildlife	Yes
Tsholotsho	Settlement restricted in northern area adjacent to Hwange NP, also for livestock transhumance	Yes
Bulilima Mangwe	Wildlife area is restricted in north of Bulilima (Maitengwe) adjacent to Hwange NP, also for livestock transhumance	Yes
Beitbridge	Some areas too harsh for settlement, but some key wildlife habitats (e.g. Chikwarakwara) now cultivated	Not well
Chiredzi	Niavasha area, areas along Gonarezou, and Limpopo river zone protected from settlement	Yes
Chipinge	Mahenye community has centralized and released land for wildlife	Yes

TABLE 16: LAND AND/OR RESOURCES PROTECTED BY ECOTOURISM AND OTHER PROJECTS


District	What has been done?	Has it worked?
Chimanimani	Forest protected for ornithological eco-tourism and for cultural rites in Vhimba Ward	Yes
Nyanga	Area along the Gaerezi river and the surroundings has been protected for eco-tourism. Rwenya River Wilderness area in the north of the district.	Yes Not well
Mudzi	Nyatana Wilderness Area	Yes
Rushinga	Nyatana Wilderness Area	Yes
UMP	Nyatana Wilderness Area	Yes
Mazowe	Mwenje Fishery Project	Yes
	Banje Mountain protected for eco-tourism	Yes
Matobo	Ntunjambili Caves	Yes
Beitbridge	Fishery	Yes
Nkayi	Bee-keeping and ilala palm plantations	Yes
Bulilima and Mangwe	Mopane worm harvesting areas have been demarcated for protection	Yes
Pfura	Four villages are protecting a bamboo forest	Yes
Goromonzi	Ngomakurira hills and caves	Yes
Manyame	A woodland area in Mayambara Ward has been preserved next to Prince Edward dam for eco-tourism purposes	Yes
Mwenezi	The entire area surrounding Manyuchi Dam in four wards has been protected	Yes

3. Management of Large Mammals

Accurate records of communal area quotas have been kept since 1989 by DNPWLM and later by WWF (see Annex K3). Figure 7 shows that the value of big-game trophies has been maintained since the initial increases in the number of CAMPFIRE hunting concessions in 1993. This also suggests that the trophy hunting and monitoring systems are effective. The increased value of rising elephant populations (Figure 8) is not reflected because of the time lag and long maturation period of adult male elephants.

Plains-game are a much more sensitive indicator of short-term changes in management, because they are easily poached and mature more quickly with a shorter lag between increasing populations and the offtake of mature trophy males. Plains game quotas have increased by 50% since 1993. This suggests a similar increase in populations, and lends credence to the anecdotal evidence that poaching is decreasing and wildlife populations increasing in CAMPFIRE areas.

FIGURE 7: TRENDS IN QUOTAS SET FOR BIG-GAME AND PLAINS-GAME IN CAMPFIRE AREAS



a) *Elephant management*

Elephants contribute over 60% of CAMPFIRE revenues. The populations of elephants in CAMPFIRE areas have increased rapidly from about 4,000 to as much as 10-12,000. This reflects the natural population doubling time of 13 years (elephant populations can grow cumulatively at 5-7% annually), but may also reflect the overflow of elephant from the heavily overstocked Parks & Wildlife Estate, and increased protection in communal areas.

FIGURE 8: ELEPHANT POPULATION ESTIMATES IN CAMPFIRE AREAS

SOURCE: WWF SURVEYS AND DATABASES




FIGURE 9: TRENDS IN AVERAGE TROPHY SIZE OF ELEPHANTS ON STATE AND COMMUNAL AREAS




TABLE 17: TRENDS IN AVERAGE TROPHY SIZE OF ELEPHANTS ON STATE AND COMMUNAL LAND

Average Trophy Size in Communal Areas and the Parks and Wildlife Estate (1991-2002)			
	1991 to 1996	1996 to 2002	% Decline
P&WL	49	41	17.4%
CAMPFIRE	45	41	10.0%

The average size of elephant trophies reflects the management of a sub-population of adult males, rather than the entire herd. As illustrated in Figure 9, and calculated in Table 17, trophy size has declined by 10% in CAMPFIRE Areas in ten years, from 45 to 10 pounds a side. This is less than the decline that has occurred in the Safari Areas managed by DNPWLM. However, the fact that both have declined to the same level (forty pounds a side), and that this is a market-related size¹⁴ suggests a commercial decision that a higher offtake of 'average' elephant bulls earns more than a small offtake of 'exceptional' bulls, provided there is always the chance of a big trophy¹⁵. Other factors are also at play. Zimbabwe's elephant population has a youthful structure because of its high growth rate. Another is the trend towards shorter safaris and less selection time. Operators also report that hunters are increasingly interested in the experience as opposed to simply the size of the trophy. The heavy poaching of big tuskers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and high (in places) offtake of problem animals or, previously to protect veterinary fences, is also blamed. However, Zimbabwe needs to ensure that it manages elephant quotas carefully, and probably reduces them, in order to maintain trophy sizes at a level acceptable to the market (i.e. above 40 pounds a side).

b) Buffalo Management

Data on **buffalo** populations are notoriously variable because of the effects of clumping (i.e. large herds) on survey statistics. Despite a serious drought in 1992, which resulted in buffalo die-offs in some protected areas, buffalo populations have at least maintained themselves in CAMPFIRE areas (Figure 10).

FIGURE 10: TRENDS IN BUFFALO POPULATIONS IN COMMUNAL AREAS





FIGURE 11: TRENDS IN BUFFALO TROPHY QUALITY ON COMMUNAL AND STATE AREAS

Source: WWF database (data for 2000-2002 needs to be checked)



¹⁴ Taylor and Grobler (2003c) report that operators considered 35-45 pounds (average 40.7) pounds to be an acceptable "average quality elephant".

¹⁵ See detailed comments on the intricacies of marketing trophy quotas in Taylor and Grobler (2003a-c)


Data for buffalo trophy quality (Figure 11) suggests that quota-setting in CAMPFIRE Areas maintained trophy quality at a very acceptable 39", while the quality in the Parks and Wildlife Estate declined steadily from 39" to 36" (assuming that the 2000-2002 values are an aberration attributable to low sample size¹⁶). Operators also state that they have shifted from hunting 8-12 year old herd bulls (which have longer horns and score higher on SCI codes, despite often having a soft boss), to hunting older animals that have left the herd and have more worn (and hence lower scoring) horns (Taylor and Grobler, 2003c).

c) Lions and Leopards

Throughout the country the trophy quality of lions and leopards was maintained or increase (Figure 12). No analysis of the trophy quality of plains-game species is immediately available.

FIGURE 12: LION AND LEOPARD TROPHY QUALITY TRENDS IN ZIMBABWE (1989-2002)

Source: WWF Database



4. Habitat Management

WWF made attempts to measure and quantify the impacts of the programme on habitat quality using aerial photography and satellite imagery, but this was either too costly or the scale of resolution was insufficient for monitoring savanna ecosystems (Dunham, et al, 2003). Thus we have to fall back on anecdotal evidence and site visits to conclude that, to some extent, CAMPFIRE served to reduce the unsustainable management of trees and other resources. While much of this difference results from behavioural changes associated with CAMPFIRE revenues and natural resource management awareness and training (e.g. the control of indiscriminate cutting of trees; use of pollarding rather than burning to cut trees) there are several specific examples of deliberate programmes to improve habitat management:

- Fire control programmes (funded by CDF) were developed in Gokwe North, Chipinge, and Chiredzi.
- There is independent evidence from Mazowe that resource monitors are fining people for illegal fishing (Chikuruo, 2003), with the proceeds from fines being shared between salaries and costs of monitors, and community benefits as follows:

Fish dividends: 81% to community; 4% to CA; 15% to RDC	
Income for 2000:	\$69,000
Monitors allowance	\$31,200
RDC (15%)	\$ 5,670
Net income	\$32,130

- The transhumance system operating in Tsholotsho and Bulilima Mangwe, which protect the northern area along the boundary of Hwange National park for seasonal cattle grazing, has been reinforced by the value of wildlife.

¹⁶ Note that these data are averages of the averages of each concession area. A detailed analysis is required that includes number in sample and standard error, but is beyond the scope of this evaluation required.

B. ECONOMIC BENEFIT

Economically, CAMPFIRE can be assessed in three stages. It was initially based on the sale of high value safari hunting. In advantageous locations, high-end tourism lodges were then developed. Finally, and funded largely by NRMP II, investments in ecotourism (usually small tourism ventures within communal lands targeted at specialised – ornithology, culture – or middle to lower market segments – camping and chalets) were made. NRMP II also funded a variety of projects aimed at developing other natural resource (NR) products, too (e.g., ilala palm, fish, honey, etc.), largely through the small grants programme.

a) Direct Income to CAMPFIRE Areas

From 1989, the income from safari hunting increased rapidly to USD 2 million annually. In terms of Zimbabwe's economy, the multiplier on trophy fees is approximately 3, suggesting that CAMPFIRE areas generated direct income from hunting of USD6.0 million to Zimbabwe annually. During the period under review, CAMPFIRE areas earned USD 20.3 million, and Muir-Leresche (2003) estimates that this earned over USD 100 million for Zimbabwe. In addition to direct fees to communities, a proportion of safari operating expenses is paid locally as wages and salaries (some USD0.5 million annually), and for the purchase of materials, but this is not captured in CAMPFIRE monitoring records. Neither are economic multiplies like taxidermy, travel, extended tourism activities, food, etc.

FIGURE 13: DIRECT INCOME TO CAMPFIRE
Source: WWF database; see Annex L for further details





FIGURE 14: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO INCREASING INCOME: IMPROVING MARKETING AND INCREASING WILDLIFE POPULATIONS



The extremely rapid growth until 1994 can be attributed to two factors (Figure 14):

- A steady increase in quotas as, initially, more areas were designated for CAMPFIRE and, later, wildlife populations began to grow;
- A significant improvement in marketing¹⁷.

While the data indicates that CAMPFIRE continued to market its hunting well, in the last three years the parallel exchange rate played havoc with community incomes and is a serious threat to the programme. In 2001 and 2002, safari operators generally paid for hunting at the official exchange rate of 55, compared to the parallel rate of 500 and 1,500. Communities' income was therefore **less than 10%** of what it should have been. In many areas, this situation continued into 2003. Some RDCs have begun to adjust, but are still getting less than a third of the real value of their hunting. For example, Guruve now gets ZD473 and Chiredzi ZD800 to the USD, one sixth and one third of the real value of wildlife respectively. The Operators, too, are under pressure, as they are also forced to trade at the official exchange rate. However, the likelihood is that they are able to gain some relief by under-declaring revenues. There is nothing so destructive of economic growth, or regular management, as the need to manage finances in these circumstances. The Project and CA have generally been unable to provide advice to RDCs, or to lobby for more favourable circumstances in the appropriate government agencies. An important factor is that the programme has lost its personnel with economic skills, and has failed to use the private sector to access similar skills. For example, some private landholders are dealing with exactly the same problems (e.g. parallel exchange rates for hunting) and the programme could have learned from them

In the early to late 1990s, considerable effort was made by RDCs and CA to capture the benefits from sale of other natural resources such as sand, timber, and kapenta. However, as we explain below, this diversification is not captured by the data, and remains largely unrecognized even after it was pointed out by PWC (2002).

Therefore, the second phase of CAMPFIRE expansion is generally associated with a move into high-end tourism. The consultants listed know tourism lodges (Table 18). While generating less money to councils and communities through fees, tourism is important to the Zimbabwe economy and creates significant local jobs and wages. Much of this revenue, including direct fees to RDCs, is not recorded directly as CAMPFIRE income, at least in part because RDCs do not want to share it with communities. Moreover, some lease agreements are weak. For these reasons, the contribution of tourism is under-estimated in the data collected by WWF, as is the contribution of sand, fish, timber, etc. The gaps in Table 18 show that NRMP II has not monitored this aspect of diversification, a responsibility that should have been taken up by WWF.

TABLE 18: SUMMARY OF HIGH END TOURISM JOINT VENTURES IN COMMUNAL AREAS

Summary of High End Tourism Joint Ventures in Communal Areas					
District	Name of Lodge	Beds	Direct Income to Communities	Jobs	Income to Zimbabwe
Tsholotsho	Ngami				
Hwange	Gorges	16			
Binga	Chizarira	16			
	Masuma	24 (only just open)			
Nyaminyami	Bumi Hills	40+ (closed)			
	Kiplings	16-20 (closed)			
	Katete Lodge	30 (closed)			
	Msangu	12			
	Tiger Bay	40+			
	Gache Gache	(closed)			
Hurungwe	Chipembere	(closed)			
Chipinge	Chilo	36		30	
	Mahenye	16 (self catering)			
Guruve	Zambezi Lodge	??			

¹⁷ The DNPWLM data collated in the early stages of the CAMPFIRE programme differs significantly from the WWF CAMPFIRE data for this period. Given that the DNPWLM data was based on regular field audits, and on quotas set by DNPWLM, and that WWF was not directly involved in data collection at the time, some doubt must be cast on this early data in the WWF database. While there is minor variation in income data, trophy data and standard values differ significantly in the period 1989 to 1993.

b) Economic Beneficiaries

Table 19 shows that CAMPFIRE has been measured to deliver US\$20,3 million in direct income for RDCs and communities between 1989 and 2001. This derives from wildlife in some 90-110 Wards, and consistently benefits over 80,000 households (560,000 people).

While some districts have stuck well to the concept of producer communities (e.g. Guruve, Chipinge, Chiredzi), in others the dilution of benefits has been problematic. In Sidinda Ward in Hwange, for instance, the majority of benefits were initially returned to Sidinda ward. According to the safari operator, poaching ceased within six months and over the next few years the populations of buffalo and sable increased steadily. However, with one ward outvoted by the non-producing wards, Hwange RDC then began to spread these benefits over some twelve wards, with the ultimate effect that benefits in Sidinda fell, and poaching again increased. Wildlife populations are now at or below their initial levels. The same problems have occurred in other districts (e.g. Tsholotsho) and in other ways, with Nyaminyami, for instance, seriously diluting benefits by appropriating most hunting, tourism and kapenta revenues to the RDC rather than producer communities.

TABLE 19: SUMMARY OF CAMPFIRE REVENUES AND WARD AND HOUSEHOLD BENEFICIARIES

CAMPFIRE Revenues and Beneficiaries				
Year	Total Income USD	Number of Districts	Number of Wards	Number of Households
1989	348,811	3	15	7,861
1990	556,433	9	41	22,084
1991	776,021	11	57	52,456
1992	1,216,678	12	74	70,311
1993	1,483,873	12	98	90,475
1994	1,642,671	14	101	96,437
1995	1,591,567	14	111	98,964
1996	1,755,912	19	96	85,543
1997	1,837,438	17	98	93,605
1998	1,891,766	15	92	80,498
1999	2,753,958	16	112	95,726
2000	2,105,204	14	108	88,072
2001	2,328,452	14	94	76,683
20,288,784				

Source: WWF Database

Muir-Leresche *et al* (2003) calculates that the direct economic impact on Zimbabwe was USD100m. However, PWC (2001) suggests that these revenues under-estimate CAMPFIRE income by at least 30%, as RDCs tend not to account for natural resource income under the CAMPFIRE budget line. Moreover, tourism income is under-estimated as it is seldom recorded and the multiplier on direct revenues is normally at least 10. We can thus conclude that CAMPFIRE's impact on national income is at least USD 10m annually, and may well be higher. If we include the multiplier on tourism activities which, given the high proportion of locally manufactured inputs, has been significant and probably of the order of at least two¹⁸, CAMPFIRE is worth USD20-25m to Zimbabwe's economic income each year.

c) Economic Devolution

In CAMPFIRE's initial years, great prominence was given to the importance of devolution. DNPWLM 'audited' all RDC CAMPFIRE revenues regularly. The importance of producer communities and devolution to the sustainability of income generation was continually emphasized. Performance in terms of fiscal devolution was regularly presented at CCG and CA meetings, and peer review was an important factor in driving devolution, with many Council Secretaries appearing to support this process. The early results (Figure 15) were remarkable, reducing the amount of revenue retained by council from 42% to 13%, increasing the amount reaching communities directly from 54% to 69%, and increasing the amount of

¹⁸ It is quoted to exceed 6 in South Africa (Fearnhead, personal communications).

discretionary community income from 20% to 62%. This was not linked to funding with some well-funded districts performing badly (e.g. Nyaminyami (by E.U.) and Hwange (USAID)), and some non-funded districts doing especially well (e.g. Beitbridge, Chipinge, Guruve).

The amount and proportion of revenues devolved to communities is summarised in Figures 16 and 17 respectively. Until 1996, fiscal devolution increased steadily until it reached 60% and almost US\$1 million, after which no progress was made, the exception being 1999 which included the revenues from the sale of ivory. Indeed, after the millennium, RDCs were extracting around 40% of all CAMPFIRE revenues from communities, with communities getting less than 50% after 1996 and only 38% in 2001. Clearly, early progress was being reversed.

This reduced the level of benefits to project beneficiaries. Its also impinged directly on the sustainability of institutional capacity, with the POMS surveys confirming that only those communities that were benefiting directly from CAMPFIRE were willing or able to maintain their institutions. This may also have been a proprietorial issue, as institutions were maintained despite levels of income being relatively low when measured on a per household basis (Figure 18).

FIGURE 15: SUMMARY OF EARLY PROGRESS IN FISCAL DEVOLUTION¹⁹





FIGURE 16: SUMMARY OF ALLOCATION OF CAMPFIRE REVENUES TO RDCs AND PRODUCER COMMUNITIES (USD) (1989-2001)



¹⁹ Source: Child et al (1997), which notes exclusion of Chiredzi and Nyaminyami (because they refused to follow CAMPFIRE principles at this time), and small discrepancies in figures due to difficulties of incorporating carry-overs and different financial years in the accounts from ten districts.

FIGURE 17: SUMMARY OF ALLOCATION OF CAMPFIRE REVENUES TO RDCs AND PRODUCER COMMUNITIES (1989-2001)





FIGURE 18: SUMMARY OF AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD BENEFITS FROM CAMPFIRE

Source: WWF Database



C. DIVERSIFICATION

CAMPFIRE can be divided into four phases of natural resource diversification:

- Phase 1: The initiation and improvement of safari hunting with most activities in place by 1995
- Phase 2: The capture of other natural resources, like timber, sand, kapenta fishing, etc., usually by RDCs rather than communities. This occurred from the early 1990s.
- Phase 3: The development of high-end tourism in favourable sites, usually adjacent to parks. Zimbabwe Sun Hotels initiated this in Nyaminyami and Mahenye in the early 1990s, and there were 12 lodges in operation in communal areas by 1999 (Ebony Consulting, 2002).
- Phase 4: The use of CDF grants for eco-tourism, craft development and NRM development, generally after 1998. Outside tourism, the CDF was also used to invest in the production of other natural resource products (e.g. fish in Beitbridge, Mwenezi; mopane worms in Bulilima, Mangwe and Gwanda; honey in Nyanga, Binga, Mutoko) and many other products.

During the 1980s and early 1990s the focus in CAMPFIRE was on the "big" twelve wildlife districts, which include Binga, Guruve, Chiredzi, Nyaminyami, Tsholotsho, Hurungwe, Hwange, Muzarabani, Beitbridge, Chipinge, Gokwe North and South.

TABLE 20: CONTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT ENTERPRISES TO CAMPFIRE REVENUES (USD)

Year	Exchange	P.A.C.				Total
	Rate	Sport Hunting (1)	Tourism (2)	Hides & Ivory (3)	Other (4)	
1989	2.126	\$326,798	\$28	\$5,294	\$17,690	\$349,811
1990	2.472	\$453,424	\$2,865	\$42,847	\$57,297	\$556,433
1991	3.751	\$638,153	\$15,904	0,859	\$101,105	\$776,021
1992	5.112	\$1,154,082	\$18,951	\$9,429	\$34,216	\$1,216,678
1993	6.529	\$1,394,060	\$21,095	\$14,988	\$53,730	\$1,483,873
1994	8.212	\$1,553,543	\$39,985	\$2,770	\$46,373	\$1,642,671
1995	8.724	\$1,476,812	\$54,866	1,685	\$48,204	\$1,591,567
1996	10.07	\$1,656,338	\$23,275	\$39,869	\$36,429	\$1,755,912
1997	12.444	\$1,708,234	\$71,288	\$44,331	\$13,615	\$1,837,468
1998	24.374	\$1,787,977	\$40,871	\$25,205	\$37,713	\$1,891,766
1999	38.338	\$1,903,666	\$78,709	\$720,440	\$14,442	\$2,717,257
2000	44.616	\$1,919,980	\$55,668	\$116,075	\$13,482	\$2,105,204
2001	55.066	\$2,142,306	\$41,499	\$1,914	\$32,793	\$2,228,512
Total 1989 - 2001		\$18,152,074	\$464,915	\$1,165,706	\$507,090	\$20,289,784

From the mid-1990s the drive to diversify CAMPFIRE was manifest in a number of ways including a significant increase in the membership of the CAMPFIRE Association, active participation of communities in projects that are not linked to wildlife management, and funding for large and small income generating projects outside the "traditional" wildlife districts.

The first two Rural District Councils were granted Appropriate Authority status to manage wildlife in 1989. By 1998, 36 Councils operated as Appropriate Authorities, and by 2003 53 RDCs are members of the CAMPFIRE Association. One impetus for diversification from wildlife to include other natural resources was the need to accommodate the non-wildlife districts. Another was to broaden the income base of its members, thus promoting economic "sustainability". To this end, many of the traditional wildlife districts are implementing non-wildlife projects. Tables 21, 22 and 23 show the types of projects implemented under NRMP II. They also show that about half have not yet been completed.

TABLE 21: STATUS OF LARGE CDF PROJECTS AS AT 30 MAY 2003 (EXCLUDING ICBs)

Types of Project	Completed		Not Completed	Total
		(Operational)		
Fire management	2	(2)	-	2
Eco-tourism	6	(4)	6	12
Fencing	2	(2)	-	2
Wildlife management	1	(1)	1	2
Fisheries	1	(1)	1	2
Aquatic Resources Management	-		1	1
Mopane worms processing	-		1	1
NRM Rehabilitation	1		-	1
Crafts	-		-	1
Total	14	(10)	10	24

TABLE 22: STATUS OF CDF SMALL PROJECTS AS AT 30 MAY 2003

Types of Projects	Completed	Not Completed	Total
Eco-tourism	4	2	6
Crafts	2	-	2
Bee-keeping	5	10	15
Woodlots	1	-	1
Wildlife management	4	1	5
Fisheries	2	1	3
Canal	1	-	1
Total	19	14	33

TABLE 23: STATUS OF ECO-TOURISM PROJECTS

Category	Completed		Not Completed	Total
		(Operational)		
Large projects	6	(4)	6	12
Small projects	4	?	2	6
Total	10	(4)	8	18

Despite the large investments in "non-wildlife" CDF projects, trophy hunting and wildlife products continue to dominate CAMPFIRE revenues. According to the financial income data presented in Table 20, as late as 2000-2002, trophy hunting or wildlife products were still generating more than 95% of CAMPFIRE income. This conclusion, however, reflects gaps in data collection. The economic impact of high-end tourism (which were not a direct consequence of NRMP II support) on direct and indirect tourism revenues, and of the sale of other natural resources, is generally not captured in CAMPFIRE financial databases. This data gap also applies to the CDF-funded diversification projects, but the main factor here is the time lag between investment and return, and the fact that they coincided with the worst possible economic conditions. The impact of these projects needs to be measured in the future.

a) An assessment of investments in eco-tourism

CDF grants were provided for 12 large and 6 small tourism enterprises. These tended to be supply driven, with little assessment of demand (Ebony Consulting, 2002, p1). According to Ebony Consulting, the feasibility studies lacked rigour, lacked market analysis, tended to be unrealistic, and had weak operational plans, financial strategy and control. This reflects technical and capacity constraints in the PMT.

Most ecotourism projects were initiated (around 1999) during the period of rapid tourism growth (17.5%pa) and diversification/product explosion, especially tourism centred on wildlife, adventure, and Victoria Falls. This expansion focused on the upper and middle tourism sectors. CDF eco-tourism diversification, in

contrast, was targeted at the lower end of the market, in competition with accommodation in national parks and farm & ranch operations. According to Ebony Consulting, there was not much market for culture except as a secondary attraction to visitors in the area for other purposes. The common characteristics of these projects in many countries are donor funding and community involvement, and Ebony considered that most would have viability problems, especially following the collapse of Zimbabwe's tourism sector. The alternative argument is that, in happier economic circumstances, these are useful for empowerment, learning and sector diversification.

It is difficult to measure the impact of NRMP II diversification investments on CAMPFIRE revenues. There are several reasons for this. First, eco-tourism is small scale in relation to hunting and high-end tourism. Second, only four of the eighteen ventures are operational. Third, the development of eco-tourism has coincided with a collapse in the Zimbabwean economy and the tourism sector in particular. Lastly, no systems are in place to capture the economic impact of these investments. Contrast this with Namibia that tracks turnover, direct community income in concession fees, employment, wages, financial and economic rates of return, etc., to provide a more rounded picture of economic impact (Barnes et. al.; 2001).

The Ebony Consulting International Report (2002) made the following recommendations to CAMPFIRE Association, and the response to these recommendations (which fall into two categories: improving the enabling environment; linking product to market) has been as shown in table 24. CAMPFIRE Association has only recruited competent expertise in the tourism sector through DA, and has not created alliances with the private sector to fill this marketing void.

TABLE 24: RESPONSIVE OF CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION TO RECOMMENDATIONS ON ECO-TOURISM MARKET ASSESSMENT BY EBONY CONSULTANTS

Responsiveness of CAMPFIRE Association to Recommendations of Ebony Eco-Tourism Market Assessment		
Summary of Recommendations	Recommendation Number	Response
Group marketing by CA; reservations, booking, marketing, quality, and client-product linkages ²⁰	9,14, 15,16,17,18	No central marketing arrangements developed
Undertake Comprehensive audit of available products	1, 13	Done informally by DA
Review statutory environment; access to Parks; reduce bureaucracy and unrealistic requirements (e.g. unsuitable licensing);	2,3,4,5	Little done
Review agreements, profit sharing principles, and renegotiate as appropriate	6,7,8	Little done
Training and sharing experiences	10,11, 12	Some exchange visits
Demand driven product (make what you sell rather than sell what you make)	12	Not applied in CDF criteria

b) An assessment of investments in other natural products

PWC lists the following areas where CAMPFIRE has diversified:

- Trophy fees, concession fees
- Sales of meat, hides, ivory
- Logging concession fees
- Crocodile egg collection
- Fishing permits (commercial and angling)
- Sand extraction, grazing fees and grass sales
- Tourism (commercial joint ventures; high end concession/ bed fees; ecotourism; rafting / river use)
- Sale of natural products (amacimbi, mazhanje, marara, masau).

²⁰ This is the approach taken by the Namibian Community Based tourism Association (NACOBTA), which assesses and channels funding into community tourism investments, and also provides a booking service and marketing information, including packages and routes.

Royalties from activities such as sand abstraction and commercial exploitation of indigenous timber accrue directly to RDCs, and the proportion of royalties that is ploughed back to the communities is small. Most RDCs with concessions for the extraction of commercial timber only gave 15% of the timber royalties to producer communities. The Forestry Commission reports that the percentage has increased significantly in some districts such as Gokwe South, Nkayi and Tsholotsho.

In addition to these activities, NRMP II CDF investments have attempted to further broaden the range of natural resource enterprises (table 25).

TABLE 25: DISTRIBUTION OF CDF PROJECTS

Types of Projects	"Original Wildlife" Districts	Other Districts
1. ICB Grant	Gokwe North, Nyaminyami, Binga, Tsholotsho, Chiredzi, Chipinge, Hurungwe, Beitbridge, Guruve and Muzarabani	Kusile, Mudzi, Nkayi, Rushinga, UMP, Chimanimani, Nyanga, Mazowe, Bullimamangwe and Gwanda
2. Veldt fire management	Chiredzi, Chipinge, Gokwe North	
3. Eco-tourism	Muzarabani, Guruve, Gokwe North, Binga	Chimanimani, Mazowe, Nyanga, Umzingwane, Bindura, Matobo, Goromonzi, Manyame, Pfura, Buhera, Matobo
4. Electric fences	Hurungwe, Binga	
5. Game corridor/ wildlife management	Gokwe North, Gokwe South	UMP, Mudzi, Rushinga, Nkayi, Umguza
6. Fisheries	Hwange, Binga,	Mwenezi, Mazowe, Chimanimani,
7. Aquatic resources	Beitbridge	
8. NRM rehabilitation		Gwanda
9. Bamboo and Forest Products		Pfura
10 Crafts	Beitbridge	Umzingwane,
11. Beekeeping	Binga	UMP, Mutoko, Nyanga, Hwedza, Chirumanzu, Mutasa, Kusile, Matobo, Mudzi
12. Woodlots		Umguza,
13. Conservancy	Chiredzi	UMP
14 Canal construction		Mangwe,

Under NRMP II, most RDCs received grants to support community-based natural resources management and income generation projects. Approximately 40% of the projects focus on the establishment of eco-tourism ventures. Another 20% involve the production and sale of products derive from indigenous resources such as honey, crafts and edible mopane worms. Other major project categories include electric fencing to reduce human-animal conflict, veldt fire management, and commercial fishing (Table 24).

It is too early to reach any meaningful conclusions regarding the CAMPFIRE diversification efforts (currently via the CDF). The CAMPFIRE Revenue Study prompted RDCs to adopt a broader definition of CAMPFIRE revenue that is more compatible with Programme diversification. Some of the policy studies carried out earlier under the NRMP also addressed diversification (e.g. Mining Study). There are several aspects to an assessment of diversification:

1. Data Does not Capture Full value of Diversification

The CAMPFIRE revenue study (PWC, 2002) suggests that as much as 30% of the average district's natural resource revenue is captured by the CAMPFIRE data. The WWF data, which suggests that hunting and wildlife products still comprise over 95% of CAMPFIRE revenues, therefore under-estimates diversification (WWF was asked to collect this data, but felt that it was not economic to do so). This revenue is not captured in the "CAMPFIRE accounts" and, moreover, it is usually not returned to "producer communities" in the form of dividends as RDCs use them to cover administrative costs. Part of the reason is that while CAMPFIRE was build around the devolution of rights to wildlife, and the parent authorities for other resources have been less insistent that long-term resource sustainability depends on local participation and benefit.

2. Data Focuses only on Direct Payments

The CAMPFIRE data captures only direct payments for resource use. It does not capture secondary economic benefits such as wages, the sale of crafts or, indeed, other economic activities related to wildlife, tourism and natural resource management in general. Neither does it capture the impact of CAMPFIRE revenues as they flow through the local economy, for example in the development of grinding mills or the purchase of materials.

3. Some Diversification Activities Not Recognized

At RDC and community level, there is little doubt that CAMPFIRE initiated a drive towards product diversification, with charges being levied for timber, fish, crocodile eggs, tourism concessions and bed nights, commercial fishing, angling, sand abstraction, sale of natural resources, rafting, etc. Neither the monitoring system, nor the diversification encouraged by NRMP II, paid much attention to the initiatives that were developed by RDCs and communities independently of the CDF. Indeed, many of these were developed because they did not need funding.

4. Ecotourism seen as the primary indicator of diversification

Regarding diversification, and given the strong recent growth in the tourism sector, NRMP II and communities were absorbed largely with the ecotourism development and, to a less extent, with the sale of natural products. In both cases, significant investments and time are needed in product design, marketing and investment before returns are made. As noted by DA (2003a), there simply has not been time for the impact of these CDF investments to manifest themselves in increased revenue data.

The focus on small field products has neglected the necessity of linking a number of small producers to consumers. Despite encouragement from DA/USAID, little effort has been made, for instance, in setting up marketing systems for ecotourism products despite the fact that these are addressing an entirely new market segment – the lower to middle range tourism market (Ebony, 2002).

c) Product Development and Devolution

The initial focus on wildlife was neither accidental nor inevitable. In the 1960s and 1970s, wildlife was a relatively low value product, which is why it was replaced by livestock even in the commercial sector. Two initiatives reversed this trend, in what can be called the proprietorship-price-subsidiarity paradigm. This paradigm states that if a product is valuable, and if this benefit is both captured (i.e. internalised) and managed at local level, resource management is likely to be sustainable. Zimbabwe's wildlife sector is famous because it was the first to actively devolve authority. What is less known is how much effort went into product development. This included the development of infrastructure (e.g. Hwange Main Camp) and air-routes (the famous Flame Lily tours on the Harare, Kariba, Hwange, Victoria Falls route). It included pricing policies so that government as the dominant producer did not undercut the sector, and policies to encourage lodge development or hunting outside parks to deliberately stimulate the wildlife economy outside the Parks and Wildlife estate. It included research and product development, as with crocodiles, ostriches and kapenta, where the development of producer associations and production technology was also important. It included restocking. And it included the development of competitive pricing and marketing arrangements, such as tendering and auctioning. It took at least two decades.

This has simply not occurred with many other natural resource sectors, which remain state dominated. Thus, even today, little value is added to timber on location, and the authority (i.e. Forestry Commission) expects only 15% of revenues to be returned to producer communities. Moreover, land tenure systems are such that exclusion and marketing of grazing and other natural resources is not possible, so that these open-access resources remain under-priced and over-exploited. Indeed, a disappointment of the CAMPFIRE programme, which had hoped to address these problems, is how little progress has been made on extending the principles that have served a difficult resource like wildlife so well to other resources. Land tenure in particular, remains problematic, as does the absence of empowered sub-district structures, and the devolution of the management and benefit of non-wildlife commodities.

The evaluation team notes DA's (2003) suggestion that the diversification of CAMPFIRE will be much more technically and financially challenging than deriving CAMPFIRE benefits from wildlife, but questions why this complexity was not recognised in project design. As we noted above, the beneficiation of wildlife was a process that began in the early 1960s, was not accidental, and continues to the present with an accelerating pace of product diversification. CA should not be expected to develop the technical know-how to foster diversification. It makes sense to team up with other NGOs and/or private sector businesses that

do have the expertise and funding to help CAMPFIRE diversify. SAFIRE, the Chili Pepper Company, and the LEAD Project come to mind in this respect.

In this regard, the structure of CA represents a political constituency. It differs from, for instance, the Ostrich or Crocodile Producers Associations, which have more market-orientated and technical aims. CA is neither motivated nor equipped to drive diversification. Indeed, DA (2003) reports that CA has shown little interest in reaching out to other sources of assistance, which has inhibited CAMPFIRE diversification. There is also significant experience in the southern African Region in the production/marketing of indigenous products and this needs to be considered if CAMPFIRE is serious about diversification

DA (2003a) suggests that the biggest pay-off in terms of CAMPFIRE revenue growth probably still can be found in hunting and larger-scale eco-tourism (Mahenye type). For example, if the reforms adopted after the CAMPFIRE Revenue Study Workshop were to become a reality, the financial flow to communities would improve dramatically. Similarly, more recent discussions among CA, Safari operators, DA, etc could lead to more funds and benefits to CAMPFIRE communities in a relatively short time. The evaluation agrees that the adoption of the recommendations of the PWC (2001) report would immediately increase CAMPFIRE revenues by about 30%, and would also channel larger amounts to communities. However, returning only 55% of revenues to communities is economically inadvisable. The heavy dependence of RDCs on taxing wildlife will ultimately make wildlife uncompetitive. It will kill the golden goose. While there is the fundamental problem of small rural economies, RDCs should nevertheless expand their tax base beyond wildlife. Importantly, they need to avoid the economic distortions implicit in differential taxation, and should tax wildlife at the same rate as the sale of all other products – cotton, maize, livestock, beer, etc.

However, the real limiting factor to natural resource production and diversification is deeper-seated, and is institutional. Until communities have stronger rights to manage natural resources at lower levels, the real value of natural resources will never be realized. Grazing fees, sale of wood or ilala palm, etc., have the potential to generate large amounts of income or benefits to local people. Under the present tenurial system, these resources are often extracted by outsiders, and are heavily over-used and under-priced.

D. DEVOLUTION

a) *Devolution as a CAMPFIRE principle*

The concept of devolution has been a major principle of CAMPFIRE since its inception. The programme's foundation statement (Martin 1986) aimed at achieving institutional change that would give resident communities:

- Territorial rights over defined tracts of land;
- The custody and responsibility over natural resources (forestry, water, grazing and wildlife); and
- The right to benefit directly from the exploitation of natural resources on their land.

Martin envisaged that the rights over land and resources would be vested in local Natural Resource Co-operatives, and discussed the concept of the Village Company.

The CAMPFIRE approach was founded on the principles embodied in the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act that had devolved authority over wildlife to white freehold farmers. These principles were that wildlife needed to be given a focused value so that landholders could benefit from the use of wildlife, and that landholders were the best managers of wildlife as a resource. Through devolving appropriate authority over wildlife to freehold farmers, the Act provided the landholders with the necessary proprietorship for taking the most important decisions concerning management i.e. deciding how the resource should be used, how much should be used, who may or may not use the resource, and who should benefit from use.

CAMPFIRE was originally intended to be a rights-based approach that would give residents of communal areas a significant amount of *de jure* control over their land and natural resources. However, in the implementation of CAMPFIRE a number of compromises had to be made in terms of meeting the original objectives (Jones and Murphree 2001, Murphree and Mazambani 2002). Among these compromises was that formal control over wildlife would be devolved to RDCs by giving them, rather than local communities, Appropriate Authority. RDCs would be responsible for contracts with the hunting industry and would receive the income. Local level involvement would be through the local government structures of WADCOs and

VIDCOs. The idea of communities receiving some form of secure land tenure was dropped in order to move ahead with implementation. In order to promote the original idea of devolved rights to local communities, guidelines were issued by DNPWLM stating that local communities should receive a percentage of the income and that certain management decisions should be devolved further down to the Ward and Village levels. DNPWLM initially took the policy stance that it would remove Appropriate Authority status from councils that did not comply with the guidelines and used this, as well as the regular presentation of district-by-district fiscal devolution, as a tool to promote devolution (see Nduku letter, Annex P.). This was a critical role played by DNPWLM in the initial phase of CAMPFIRE, and was a major factor in increasing levels of fiscal devolution, but DNPWLM has recently lost wither the will or capacity to enforced this.

Data on economic benefits generated by CAMPFIRE (see section III.B) show that early in the programme RDCs appeared willing to reduce the amount of revenue they retained and increase the amount going directly to sub-district levels. By 1996 the proportion of income going to communities for use at their own discretion was 62%, with an additional 5% reaching communities but being managed by the RDC. By the year 2001, community benefits fell to only 38%, although there are exceptions such as Binga which is currently allowing communities to receive between 70% and 80% of the wildlife income.

In the early 1990s, several attempts were made by DNPWLM to legislate for appropriate authority to be vested in sub-district levels, but these were blocked at high levels. Consequently, CAMPFIRE has relied an ongoing persuasion for RDCs to devolve responsibilities and authority over natural resources and the income derived from their exploitation. Within the existing legal framework, considerable attention has been given to persuading RDCs to let communities retain more income, enabling sub-district institutions to receive income directly from the private sector, promoting quota setting at sub-district level, and promoting the development of local NRM by-laws. These attempts have been constrained by a general political trend in Zimbabwe towards re-centralisation of control in the 1990s as exemplified by the Environmental Management Bill, 2000 and attempts by DNPWLM to re-nationalise the wildlife resource. The position of the MLGPWNH appears to be that legislation gives appropriate authority to councils and these institutions should retain this authority and the income for general development projects (Chitsike 2000). The views of the CA as an institution are unclear although the CEO has suggested that RDCs could award a "sub-appropriate authority" status to wards (Chitsike 2000). An assessment of the impact of NRMP interventions and attempts by others to promote devolution within CAMPFIRE needs to be tempered by an understanding of the political constraints.

b) Devolution in the NRMP II Project Design

Neither the Project Paper, nor the August 1998 project grant agreement amendment (No. 6) contain specific components aimed at dealing with the major issue of devolution within CAMPFIRE. These documents do, however, contain the expectation that a better enabling environment for CAMPFIRE will emerge through policy dialogue between CAMPFIRE partners and government. While USAID continually harped on this issue throughout the project, CA and GOZ was not supportive and USAID did not force the issue, except more subtly with an example being the development and funding of projects or Trusts at community level in the latter stages of the CDF.

In particular, CASS was expected under its own grant to carry out policy research and disseminate findings regarding devolution to relevant stakeholders and to facilitate policy debate. It was also expected that policy issues identified by CASS and others would be taken up by the policy sub-committee of the CA which would then lobby government for appropriate policy and legislative reform.

c) Project Implementation

A number of project activities have been carried out that can be viewed as helping to promote further devolution below the RDCs. CASS produced several papers dealing with institutional issues within CAMPFIRE and produced a paper specifically aimed at exploring different legal mechanisms and institutional arrangements for promoting further devolution (Chitsike, 2000). A workshop for CAMPFIRE stakeholders was held to discuss the findings of the report on devolution. The issues raised in these papers have been debated by CSPs and within the CA. The CA has held a workshop for MPs in order to discuss changes to legislation. In his address contained in the CA 2000-2001 Annual Report, former Director Stephen Kasere stated that there was a need for new legislation "to protect the rights of communities so that they will have defined tenure and rights over natural resources". Unfortunately, one of the main fora for

taking these issues forward, the policy sub-committee of the CA, along with other CA sub-committees has become defunct.

The institution building and strengthening carried out by ZimTrust has focused largely on providing management skills to sub-district institutions, but has also paid some attention to persuading RDCs to devolve some of their authority over wildlife to Ward and Village levels. One argument regarding devolution is that strong and effective local level institutions that are demanding authority from above could be an important lever for persuading RDCs to let go of control. ZimTrust has also been exploring the potential of the Traditional Leaders Act of 2000 for promoting further devolution through village assemblies.

In the absence of other, more direct alternatives, some actors within the programme within the programme see the establishment of community trusts as a devolution initiative. A total of 16 trusts have been formed, mostly in order to provide community management control over projects funded through CDF grants (table 26).

TABLE 26: STATUS OF COMMUNITY TRUSTS AS AT MAY 2003

District	Name of Trust	Registered
1. Bulilima	Bulilimamangwe Amacimbi Trust	✓
2. Mangwe	Thuthukani Development Trust	✓
3. Matobo	Ntunjambili Development Trust	✓
4. Nyanga	Gairezi Development Trust	✓
5. Guruve	Karunga Community Trust	✓
6. Guruve	Masoka Community Trust	✓
7. Mwenezi	Manyuchi Fisheries Project Trust	✓
8. Manyame	Mayambara Community Trust	✓
9. Goromonzi	Ngomakurira Development Trust	✓
10. Mudzi/UMP/Rushinga	Nyatana Joint Management Trust	✓
11. Pfura	Mukurupahari Community Trust	✓
12. Bindura	Paradise Pools Community Development Trust	?
13. Mazowe	Banje Development Trust	✓
14. Umzingwane	Matojeni Development Trust	✓
15. Chimanimani	Vhimba Development Trust	✓
16. Muzarabani	Muzarabani Wildlife Community Trust	?

As Chitsike (2000) and others have suggested (e.g. Kundhlande, *pers. comm.*), trusts are a potential vehicle for communities to gain leases over their land and to strengthen their management authority over natural resources. The formation of Trusts can be viewed as a devolutionary approach because Trusts are created by a RDC, and through the Trust Deed management responsibilities of the Trust are legally defined. A Trust is a relatively autonomous body that has a legal *persona* and can enter into contracts with the private sector. Instead of councils managing development projects on behalf of communities and receiving the income for disbursement downwards Trusts, elected by communities, manage the projects and receive the income directly. They then pay, where appropriate, a service fee upwards to council.

The CA commissioned a revenue study carried out by a local accounting firm (and funded by NRMP) that examined all aspects of revenue accrual and distribution. A workshop was held for all CAMPFIRE stakeholder organisations to discuss the findings and agree on a set of guidelines for revenue distribution. A manual has been developed to disseminate the guidelines. The 2002 CAMPFIRE Revenue Guidelines have some important implications for devolution:

- The following distribution guidelines are established: Producer communities should receive not less than 55% of gross revenue; RDCs may receive a maximum of 26% of gross revenue to carry out CAMPFIRE/NRM-related management activities; RDCs may receive a maximum of 15% of gross revenue as a general administration levy; the CA may receive 4% of gross revenue as a levy from councils.
- The guidelines establish the sources of CAMPFIRE revenue i.e. gross revenue that accrues directly or indirectly out of a community managed resource (including wildlife, forestry, fisheries, grass, and

minerals such as sand). Revenue from these sources should be combined for distribution according to the 2002 guidelines. In the past, RDCs tended to distribute only wildlife income to communities.

- The guidelines are an agreed set of principles and procedures. Members of the CA are bound by their constitution to implement these principles and procedures. Individual RDCs can adopt them as by-laws.
- The guidelines define which communities should receive CAMPFIRE income i.e. "producer" communities who live closest to the resource and bear the social and economic costs and who invest time and money in management activities.
- The guidelines state that to balance income and costs, RDCs should transfer appropriate NRM activities to sub-district levels.

CA has also developed a Strategic Growth Initiative for the period 2002-2005. This document does not address the issue of devolution within CAMPFIRE and shifts the emphasis at community level towards the development of Sustainable Development Forums and Sustainable CBNRM Business Units. The tenor of the document is that RDCs will assist communities in sustainable NRM and the establishment of community managed or owned business ventures. The broader issue of providing rights over land and natural resources to localised collective institutions which would have authority for managing common pool resources is not addressed.

d) Impact

ZimTrust in its briefing notes for the evaluation team suggests the following: "Devolution of all management responsibilities from district to lower level institutions is one area where not only Zimbabwe Trust but the programme as a whole failed to deliver".

This is a strong and candid statement of failure. However, while it is true that not all management responsibilities have been devolved from district to lower level institutions, there has been some progress. Generally districts have devolved quota setting to Ward level and DNPWLM has accepted that there should be local participation in quota setting (see section III.E). Some Wards, such as Masoka Ward in Guruve District and Mahenye Ward in Chiredzi District, have been successful in demanding greater decision-making authority from the RDCs. In Mahenye, the contract with Zimbabwe Sun for ecotourism stipulates that 80% of revenue should be passed by the RDC to the ward. One RDC, Chiredzi, has agreed that the income from safari hunting can be paid directly to sub-district institutions by the safari operator.

If implemented and enforced by the CA, the 2002 CAMPFIRE Revenue Guidelines should help to ensure that a) producer communities receive a fair and significant share of revenue; b) that other revenue sources are captured for distribution to producer communities and c) that management activities are decentralised to producer communities where appropriate.

The community trusts represent an attempt to promote devolution, but only a few are functioning effectively and none have been established for very long. It remains to be seen to what extent they really can provide effective vehicles for communities to gain greater control over their land and natural resources. In order for these trusts to become effective institutions that can represent the interests of their members and negotiate land leases and contracts in the interests of their members, they need further capacity-building support. They also need further support in developing appropriate accountable and transparent relationships between the trustees and the community members. Ultimately, however, Trust formation still depends upon the willingness of councils to allow communities to take on increased management responsibility.

A number of structural constraints have limited the impact of the NRMP on the issue of devolution. Most of these derive from the fact that, through legislation, RDCs are the legal body to which government assigns rights to manage wildlife through the granting of appropriate authority under the Wildlife and National Parks Act of 1975. Through other legislation RDCs are also given the authority for controlling other resources such as the land itself, forests on communal land, and sand and rock extraction. Further, the exploitation of these resources brings much needed revenue to RDCs, which, particularly in the present economic situation, they are reluctant to give up. While there are strong arguments for the CA to be the lead co-ordinating body for CAMPFIRE as a programme, such a central role provides an inherent contradiction for the promotion of devolution within the programme. There are strong incentives for the CA, which represents RDCs, not to be a strong proponent of devolution to sub-district levels. Whether because of these disincentives or because of a lack of capacity, the CA has not taken a strong lead in engaging in policy dialogue with government over these issues. This has reduced project impact on devolution. For example

the CA Action Plan for 2000-2002 commits the Association to developing CAMPFIRE policy positions on key issues regarding devolution, but these have not been developed.

While the Project has been trying to promote devolution through the various means described above, the outcomes of some Project activities can be viewed as undermining these attempts. Capacity building and institutional strengthening have in some regards reinforced the status of the RDCs as the institutions that control management of natural resources. Thus communities had to gain approval from RDCs in order to obtain grants from the CDF and grant moneys are passed to communities by the RDCs. The Councils are the Settlers (founding party) of the community trusts. Game Guards and resource monitors are often, but not always, employed by RDCs. The evaluation team recognises that the project had no choice but to work through RDCs over many issues because a) they are the legally recognised authorities over natural resources and b) because USAID regulations would not allow funding to go to communities because of stringent accounting requirements. However, the unintended result is the reinforcing of the RDCs' role as gatekeeper for access by communities to management rights, benefits, donor resources and services from outsiders.

Ultimately project impact on devolution is constrained by the lack of policy and legislation that provides to communities the rights over land and natural resources envisaged in the original CAMPFIRE concept referred to above. Within the wildlife sector there has been no improvement in the enabling policy and legislative environment since the 1975 Parks and Wild Life Act and the 1989 Policy for Wildlife (Chitsike 2000). Although the Traditional Leaders Act of 2000 incorporates some of the recommendations of the Rukuni Commission on Land Tenure it fails to provide for the most important recommendation – that village assemblies should gain some form of secure land tenure. It also fails to provide for the assemblies to gain a legal *persona* so that they can enter into contracts. Chitsike (2000) argues strongly that what is required to achieve devolution is legislative change giving communities legal rights over land and natural resources. The evaluation team concurs fully with this view. Devolution in the CAMPFIRE context should mean more than simply giving communities more of the *responsibility* currently assigned to RDCs and allowing communities to retain more of the revenue. As Murphree (2000) argues, responsibility and authority need to be combined within the same institution if the necessary conditions for sustainable resource management are to be created. Devolution in CAMPFIRE should aim at providing local communities with the necessary *authority* to take decisions and the *proprietorship* to control access to resources that are currently vested in various government institutions.

e) Future Outlook

Any discussion of the future of devolution and policy change needs to take place within the context of the current political and economic situation in Zimbabwe. At the macro level, the political climate is not conducive to devolutionary approaches that place more power in the hands of local communities. The tendency of government is to centralise authority and control. Technical proposals to provide local communities with proprietorship over land and natural resources have been ignored or severely watered down. At the district level, the RDCs have been vested with numerous powers that they (with some exceptions) have been reluctant to give up. Further, the economic crisis in Zimbabwe means that the revenue derived from wildlife and other natural resources make an increasingly significant contribution to the budgets of RDCs. As a result RDC's are even less likely to want to increase the amount of revenue going to local communities or allow communities themselves to decide how much of a levy they would pay to council. This point was made by a district councillor at the workshop the evaluation team held to present its preliminary findings to stakeholders.

It is also clear from a review of available documents, the field visits carried out by the team and the stakeholders' workshop that there are different views among the councillors, council officials, office holders of the CAMPFIRE Association and CA board members. Some councils have taken steps to increase the revenue retained by producer communities, and to increase the amount of decision-making that can take place at sub-district levels. However, others hold on to revenue and decision-making, citing various reasons. For some, it is necessary first to build capacity of communities before responsibilities and authority can be devolved. For others, councils should remain the lowest level to which authority should be devolved. Some councils are willing to devolve some functions and responsibilities, but not others. Some officials and councillors are willing to debate the merits of legislating for Appropriate Authority to be devolved to sub-district levels. It is not clear however, how much support there would be among councils for such an approach. Some councils support the establishment of community trusts, while others appear ambivalent.

The factors mentioned above serve as major constraints to promoting further devolution. However, the prospects for further devolution to take place are not entirely negative. At the macro-level, government has been willing to devolve authority over water management to institutions other than RDCs and to local level institutions. At the local level, there is a strong demand for more rights and authority over natural resources (documented by Chitsike 2000) and communities are willing to pressure RDCs to establish concrete plans and time-tables for implementing devolution (Murphree and Mazambani 2002). The establishment of community trusts adds a new dimension to the debate on devolution within the CAMPFIRE community, as local level institutions have been established outside of the existing WADCO and VIDCO structures. Trusts can act relatively autonomously of council and could potentially lease land from council. The trusts have been established mainly to run local enterprises, but it is clear that the CAMPFIRE belief in devolved control has to some extent spread to these micro-projects and hence widened the seedbed from which the principles of CAMPFIRE can sprout if and when macro-political circumstances are suitable.

The provision for Village and Ward Assemblies in the Traditional Leaders Act also opens the possibilities of other institutional arrangements at the local level, although these hardly differ from VIDCOs and WADCOs in that they lack true proprietary rights over resources and resource management. In the past the DNPWLM itself has not been opposed to legislating for the devolution of Appropriate Authority to lower levels (although it was thwarted politically and legislatively in its attempts to achieve this).

The above situational analysis suggests that in the short term radical changes in access and entitlement to natural resources may have to await broader changes in Zimbabwean politics (Murphree and Mazambani 2002). It is possible, however, to identify the nature of some of these changes that need to be promoted when the time becomes right. Given the entrenched nature of authority and vested interest within RDCs, it would be unwise to ignore them in the process of reassigning rights of access and entitlement. From the outset CAMPFIRE has shown itself strategic and pragmatic in its policy development and its implementation (Jones and Murphree 2001). This same sense of strategic thinking and pragmatism is required under current circumstances. With regard to wildlife, the model used by the Water Act that gives authority to Catchment Councils and Sub-Catchment Councils should be pursued. The DNPWLM should legislate for Appropriate Authority over wildlife to be devolved to sub-district levels by councils. The current model of a community trust with council as the Settler should be used to establish sub-district institutions. The constitution of the Trust would provide details of the scope of management authority and functions of the trust and the relationship with council. The Trust should have a legally registered constitution, defined boundaries, a defined membership, and an elected representative board (there is no reason why a Village or Ward Assembly established under the Traditional Leaders Act should not constitute itself as a Trust). Within this framework:

- a) Councils should be responsible for district-wide planning, co-ordination between sub-district institutions, monitoring aggregate district quotas, supervision and monitoring of the financial accounts and wildlife records of sub-district institutions, liaison with central government, and either levying a tax no greater than for other land uses or receiving a "service fee" from community trusts (but not both).
- b) Community Trusts should be responsible for negotiating contracts with the private sector, directly receiving and accounting for income from contracts, deciding on the use of income, employing appropriate staff (including game guards/natural resource monitors), monitoring wildlife, and quota setting. The Trusts would pay a tax or service fee to council²¹.
- c) Outside assistance in terms of technical assistance or donor support could be negotiated separately by individual trusts or as a package in cooperation with other wards or council as appropriate.

The question arises as to why should councils under the framework suggested above be any more willing to devolve to lower levels than they are now. Given that there is already a strong demand from local communities for devolution, this impetus from below combined with the legal opportunity to acquire "Sub-Appropriate Authority" status and a strong lead from DNPWLM should go a long way to ensuring that devolution is achieved.

There are also activities that can continue to be carried out while the new policy is being developed and a change in political circumstances at the national level is awaited. These include:

²¹ Ideally the fee paid to council should be based on services rendered by council and performance related

- Continue with the promotion of “administrative devolution” to sub-district levels i.e. income paid directly to communities, maximising the share being retained by communities, management functions being carried out and staff employed at sub-district level, etc.
- Continue to encourage councils to allow all natural resource use revenue to accrue at community level, not just wildlife.
- Continue with the establishment of community trusts and the exploration of the potential of Village and Ward Assemblies, specifically advocating for the addition of use rights to these community organisations (and possibly combining the two).

Attention also needs to be given to the institutional complexity and expanding arena of overlapping authorities that is still being established in the rural landscape. ZimTrust (2001) makes note of the institutional confusion about roles, functions and authority being experienced by local communities. Policy and legislation need to be reviewed so that these roles can be clarified and the creation of institutions with overlapping authorities avoided. A concerted attempt needs to be made to enable local level community institutions to be able to obtain secure group tenure over their land and other natural resources than wildlife. The evaluation team was told by several persons interviewed that community trusts could apply to council for lease over their land. It would be a useful approach to try to pilot the application of one or two trusts for land leases. With regard to other resources, the approach taken by Botswana could be followed. If a community forms a trust, then it can apply for rights over different resources. Forestry and inland fishery rights and rights over veldt products could then be given by the relevant authorities to the trust. A start could be made with the authority that councils have over the various resources, and in the longer term there could be revision of the various pieces of sectoral legislation, particularly the Communal Land Forest Produce Act.

In terms of the existing community trusts that have been established, evidence from field visits and interviews suggests that several of these require further assistance in both institution building (issues of transparency, accountability, relationships between the board and members) and organisational capacity (running meetings, financial accounting, staff employment etc.).

Perhaps the most heartening aspect of CAMPFIRE is that, in the face of such adversity (e.g. political centralization; RDC financial pressures; DNPWLM/CA failure to institutionalise and monitor conformance with CAMPFIRE principles), so little slippage has occurred. In general, revenues are still being distributed, and even at RDC level CAMPFIRE Officers are still dedicated to devolutionary principles. This intention may not be as strong in the RDCs in general, but nevertheless the principle survives.

The theory of common property, and of organization development, suggests that transparency and participation, and therefore management, tends to improve as authority reaches lower levels. This is confirmed by data from the Luangwa Valley which, in a programme modelled on CAMPFIRE, shows that Village Action Groups (about 200 households, and equivalent to VIDCOs) outperform Area Development Committees (3-11 Village Action groups) by an order of magnitude whether this is measured in levels of participation (75,000 days versus 500 days), numbers of projects built (230 versus 10), or financial misappropriation (0.8% versus 40%). Interestingly, Chiredzi RDC, perhaps CAMPFIRE's best-performing RDC (it was the worst in 1993) has coevolved to a similar understanding. Each Village has a bank account, and the operator pays 60% of revenues to the Village upon taking a trophy in it (see trip report in Annex G). This demonstrated that in enlightened and well-managed RDCs, progress can still be made under the current legislative arrangements, although Chiredzi RDC did suggest that institutionalisation through legislated Village-level appropriate authority status would be a powerful tool.

Thus, the majority of devolution has occurred or been maintained through a conviction by many RDCs that these are powerful and productive principles. Contrary to common belief, many of these mid-level bureaucrats have fought hard to maintain devolutionary principles. However, as we have seen, in times of financial stress, there are temptations to reverse the process through desperation.

The primary vehicle of devolution, therefore, has been the perpetuation of the original administrative agreement between DNPWLM and RDCs, even in the absence of DNPWLM fulfilling its regulatory and monitoring mandates. The second measure that has been tried in an attempt to achieve the initial objectives of CAMPFIRE in the light of legislative constraints is the formation of Trusts at local level. Most of these are in their formative stages.

Looking to the future, achieving NRM devolution in Zimbabwe must be a multi-pronged approach:

- Policy change is obviously crucial, and should be supported by establishing and monitoring the performance of pilot sites, and using this information to argue for sub-district tenure and use rights.
- The probability of successful pilot sites can be improved by linking funding to levels of devolution.
- The development of sound sub-district management systems will lend much confidence to requests for policy change. A practical mechanism to achieve confidence in the devolved approach might be to further strengthen RDC CAMPFIRE Units (and perhaps MLGPWNH support staff) with on-the-ground management training, the development of sub-district management systems (in the manner that NRM technology was developed), and performance-related grant funding.
- Strengthening the new Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Authority to oversee the conformance to the original conditions of appropriate authority would certainly strengthen the programme. So would an extension of this support to agencies such as Forestry Commission.
- Helping MLGPWNH to perform regular procedural conformance and financial audits on adherence to the original CAMPFIRE guidelines would be highly beneficial to the monitoring and learning dynamic of the programme. New guidelines have been produced, and while they will hold RDCs to a greater level of fiscal devolution than is presently occurring (i.e. 55% of all NR revenues, not just wildlife), they nevertheless represent an implicit (and excessive) taxation of 45% on NR production.
- All support should be based tightly on performance, and contingent on the ability to deliver results.
- CA should be restructured as a producer association as described below.

The restructuring of CA as a true producer association would also be beneficial. In this regard, the following is recommended:

- Producer communities have voting power in accordance with their contributions,
- RDCs gradually transform their role to that of an associate member.
- There is advantage in providing membership to NGOs at an associate level, perhaps also expecting a financial contribution.
- Perhaps that most dynamic and innovative measure is to remove the artificial distinction between communal and private producers, and invite Conservancies to take up membership as legitimate producer communities. This would have the added advantage of infusing commercial and technical skills into the CA (Conservancies are dealing with exactly the same challenges as communities regarding matters like outsourcing hunting and tourism and collective decision-making), and would also boost its revenue base. In this manner, CA would combine the political power of the present CA, but add to it the technical and financial power of commercial wildlife conservancies.

E. CAPACITY BUILDING AT SUB-DISTRICT, DISTRICT AND NATIONAL LEVELS

1. Institutional Management Capacity

NMRP II has sought at all levels (sub-district, district and national) to enhance or build the capacities of various actors in CAMPFIRE in the following areas:

- The creation of an enabling legal and policy environment for CAMPFIRE.
- A CAMPFIRE Association Board and Secretariat that is effective and efficient in the management of various programme components.
- Enhanced capacities in RDCs and communities in:
 - Project proposal development, organizational development and project management.
 - The management of CAMPFIRE revenues to enhance income, democracy, transparency and accountability.
 - The management of wildlife, safari hunting, habitats and other natural resources.
- The monitoring of revenue collection and distribution practices at local and national levels.
- To engage with the private sector.

Since the mid-term review the categorization of grants as capacity building or infrastructure grants has been scrapped and funding for capacity building has been through the overall grants approved for councils. The amounts actually spent on Capacity Building are therefore difficult to determine.

a) Capacities

At community level the programme has sought to develop the capacities of the community to:

- Increase awareness of the CAMPFIRE programme, wildlife and natural resource conservation.
- Understand their roles and responsibilities in the conservation and management of natural resources as well as in a local government system.
- Identify their development needs, and respond to these.
- Demand transparency and accountability from their elected committee members and councillor on the distribution and use of dividends.
- Participate in the identification, design, implementation, maintenance and operation of projects and programmes in their areas.
- Appreciate the importance of local revenue in financing infrastructure and social services in the ward.
- Engage with support agencies and hunting/safari operators in the area.

At RDC level, the programme, while focusing on CAMPFIRE units, has sought to help councils establish and operate systems to:

- Manage revenue from CAMPFIRE, including grants from CDF.
- Prepare, manage and review their annual budgets specific to the programme and those aspects of the RDC budget that impact on CAMPFIRE.
- Plan, implement, monitor and evaluate development projects and programmes.
- Promote participatory development and devolution.
- Promote increasing civic participation.
- Ensure efficient and effective service delivery.
- Improve corporate performance in effective management of resources.
- Manage capital assets.
- Promote sustainable management of natural resources.

At national level the capacity building activities have not been direct but the programme has sought to engage with CAMPFIRE Association and Government and other stakeholders to:

- Provide clear legislation or guidelines on the roles, functions and responsibilities of RDCs, CAMPFIRE committees and other stakeholders at district and sub-district level.
- Promote sustainable management of resources.
- Promote citizen participation and reaping of benefits from well managed natural resources.
- Negotiate with donors.
- Develop appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems.
- Create opportunities for self-regulating checks and balances.

b) Capacity Building Methodologies

The capacity building approach has comprised:

- Fiscal devolution, and the hands-on experiential learning that this entails as communities allocate, and manage their own finances, institutions and projects
- Direct training by CSPs, and also the training of RDC trainers, complemented by manuals, training manuals and workshops.
- The use of long term mentoring and facilitating relationships, particularly in the first years of CAMPFIRE.
- The use of short-term consultants.
- The provision of equipment, training and experiential learning through the ICB and CDF grant mechanisms.

The development of natural resource management capacity (mainly by WWF) has comprised a comprehensive long-term process of working with communities at site level to develop or translate management methodologies so that they are appropriate for community level operations. Once appropriate methods have been developed, they have been translated into a set of training tools including manuals, games and trainers' manuals. These have been used either to respond directly to community requests for specific training, or have been used to train trainers, most often officials in CAMPFIRE Units or in other government training agencies. Training evaluation and regular follow-up has been part of this process. As a consequence, natural resource capacity building has been effective.

For example, there has been responsive training organised for specific councils around the fire fighting and management. This has been in the form of experiential workshops designed around the problems faced by councils in attempts to implement these fire management projects. DA/WWF organised the workshops in clusters and the problems faced by each district were used as entry points for analysis and design of the workshop. The workshop then proceeded with participants discussing their individual experiences and the trainer guiding them towards solutions and giving them new tips in terms of techniques in the process. Judging by the smooth process through which the fire management projects have been implemented, the approach merits further development and trial.

Unfortunately, the same comprehensive materials development, and training approach used for NRM has not been applied to organisational development. ZimTrust was effective in the initial stages of CAMPFIRE when awareness creation and the development of institutions was important. There has also been short-term training on basic skills for accountancy and administration staff in the CAMPFIRE Units in RDCs, and sometimes at community level. RDCs have also continued to support the revenue distribution process, with checks ranging from sporadic to regular. This has been sufficient that reasonably accountable community management systems are in place. However, an important opportunity has been lost to use the devolutionary strength of the CAMPFIRE programme, and the generally good performance of sub-district structures, to design, test and record (e.g. in manual form) systems of local governance in the manner that was done for wildlife and natural resource management. One consequence of this is that clear parameters and systems of data collection were not set, and the monitoring of institutional capacity has been weak in the Project.

Nevertheless, there are signs at all levels that training in bookkeeping has occurred. This has focused on ensuring that records are auditable (i.e. on commitment registers, vouchers and receipts) but has tended to be weak in helping communities to understand, manage and report on finances. For instance, on field trips, communities and RDCs could generally explain and support the individual items of expenditure assessed, but were weaker at saying what their accounts meant. This good start needs to be strengthened. A sensible approach would be to emulate the development of natural resource technology. This would require a small team comprising experts in this field to lead the process. The goal would be to test, design, implement and document effective management systems at community level, and to develop at RDC level the skills to train communities and regularly assess performance.

Demonstration visits to other projects both within CAMPFIRE and the region were supported by NRMP II and appear to be valued by the council officers. Grants to RDCs have been moderately effective as training tools, providing activities around which capacity could be built.

Organisational development is a long-term approach, and the Project did not include organisational development skills to nearly the extent it incorporated natural resource management skills so that this aspect remained under-developed. Given that CAMPFIRE is one of the few real example of fiscal devolution, the failure to fully capitalise on grass-roots economic empowerment is a significant lost opportunity. Thus, NRM skills developed by CAMPFIRE are being adopted regionally, but this is not the case for organisational development methods not only in CAMPFIRE but in most regional CBNRM programmes.

Impacts:

c) Community level

Up to 2000 when its grant expired, ZimTrust worked actively with communities at village and ward levels. ZimTrust ran training courses on conflict resolution, confidence building, awareness raising, etc. and the courses helped the communities see the direct link between wildlife and their needs and to learn about accountability. ZimTrust was invaluable in the establishment of CAMPFIRE committees, and ensuring that these were democratically elected to represent all interests in the village or ward. While ZimTrust was effective in the early stages of awareness creation and establishing community institutions, they and the Project failed to move much beyond this stage.

Over 100 CAMPFIRE committees were established, and many are active. In some districts, communities have prepared plans and are selecting their projects from these plans. Through dividends received, communities have successfully implemented complex projects – e.g. fenced their fields, built schools and clinics, improved their water supply, provided relief food, etc. In most of the 13 wildlife districts, the councils

have identified and trained monitors and introduced conservation training in some schools. Capacity creation at community level and also in RDC CAMPFIRE Committees, mainly in the original districts but also elsewhere such as Nyanga RDC, should be considered a significant success of the project.

The work of ZimTrust has now been taken over by the CAMPFIRE Co-ordinators in council. These are doing a good job in continuing building community awareness and confidence, but the task is big. Field visits confirmed that, at least recently, WWF had been the most visible supporter, where it was also expanding into project planning activities. However, the programme has lacked the initial level of intensity targeted towards institutional development, especially after the ZimTrust grant was closed in 2000. Sub-district institutional development was not taken up through other means. An important casualty of this change is the weakening of the effort to further decentralise wildlife management and governance issues to communities. Moreover, while ZimTrust may have had performance weaknesses when it came to the technical aspects of institutional development, ZimTrust was always powerful at advocacy and had been working hard to push natural resource management and control to below RDC level. According to ZimTrust, communities needed to take control of the process if the CAMPFIRE principles were to be met and sustained, arguments with which we concur (see section on devolution).

While de facto, CAMPFIRE Committees have functioned well, and attempts were made to work within the existing local government legislation, their legal status in terms of the RDC Act has never been clear. In the communities visited there was a lot of enthusiasm about the activities of CAMPFIRE and there was intensive planning around CAMPFIRE activities. There is some concern about the development of parallel structures and co-ordination, but often CAMPFIRE committees were the most active community organisation.

d) District

CAMPFIRE efforts have combined with other efforts to develop the RDCs' management capacity in a number of areas, including the management of financial records, natural resources management, issues of devolved governance and capacity building, and interactions with the private sector.

At least 23 RDCs received grants of various sizes to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC. These RDCs generally received a standard equipment package, including a vehicle, motorbike, bicycles, computer and office and camping equipment. For those implementing veldt-fire management projects, there was an additional tractor, tow grader and trailer. In addition to this, there were grants of all kinds to assist with training. These grants and packages are in themselves a major capacity building instrument. They fuel a 'learning by doing' process. A skilled organisational development facilitator would have helped to optimise learning from this stimulus. Unfortunately human resource constraints from CAMPFIRE Association prevented this from happening but the CAMPFIRE Co-ordinators employed at District level made significant progress with intermittent short-term training support from the CA, DA and CSPs.

CAMPFIRE Units are generally functioning well, and are a strength of the programme. RDC office space, furniture, equipment and vehicles were found adequate for the responsibilities under CAMPFIRE. The programme has made a significant contribution towards this. It was also pleasing that some districts like Chiredzi and Chipinge kept this equipment well maintained. Chiredzi RDC had an impressive workshop and has even set aside 5% of income taxed from communities for the replacement of capital. Some Councils (e.g. Muzarabani) have failed to maintain their equipment, and the closure of the project will mean they have insufficient equipment for continuing to support the programme.

The governance structures appear to be working well. There is a clear separation of roles between the elected representatives and employees responsible for improving the management of natural resources – planning, animal counting, quota setting, budget management. Tensions were reported between well-equipped CAMPFIRE Units and the other branches of RDCs, but these tensions were no longer obvious. There is still, however, a tendency to prescribe CAMPFIRE departmental structures, size of establishment and office procedures from the top – that is, by CA and/or DA. The operational requirements of the present establishment are largely met from the wildlife funds. Such structures and establishments are likely to prove unsustainable in the long term in non-wildlife districts. With time it will be essential for RDCs to reflect on these structures and processes and adjust accordingly based on service delivery performance criteria.

The capacity of RDCs has been improved by CSP/IC training and training grants, although no effective evaluation of the impact of this training has been made except for NRM where WWF's programme has been evaluated twice. For the present, this situation is acceptable in that emphasis has to be placed on getting the concept of sustainable natural resource management accepted and shared in the community and getting the other systems to operate, e.g. financial management, budgeting, planning. A large amount of capacity has been built, and has so far been maintained at local and RDC level, but the precarious financial capacity of RDCs and Zimbabwe as a whole (where 60% of professionals are said to be working outside the country) is detrimental to maintenance of this capacity.

Few of the RDCs participating in the programme have strategic planning activities, and are generally contented with the project identification exercises taking place at ward and village levels. The consequences of lack of strategic thinking is that some of the CAMPFIRE projects are threatened by recent political events, especially the current resettlement phase. Important animal corridors have been shut or are in the process of being shut (e.g. by ex-farm workers in Guruve and Muzarabani). Strategic capacity also appears to have been lost from the once innovative and trend-setting CAMPFIRE programme.

It was refreshing, therefore, to see Chiredzi RDC engaged with Conservancies, the private sector and government in the preparation of a long-term plan for the development of wildlife and related development in the southeast Lowveld Trans Frontier Conservation Area. Strategic planning is often avoided by RDCs and projects for fear of it being too complex and beyond existing capacities. This need not be the case. A simple plan of just a few pages is more than adequate to gain a picture of how the area could develop in the future.

The programme has made significant mileage in project planning and management. The grants given to RDCs have provided discrete and tangible 'learning by doing' opportunities for project planning, design, management, procurement, negotiation, monitoring and evaluation and have thus been an excellent vehicle for capacity building. They have also promoted the development of technical skills in the district. On the negative side, they have demonstrated significant weaknesses in CA and RDC implementation capacity. Moreover, opportunities for building further capacity have not been followed up sufficiently as learning tools. For example, the difficulties faced by the hunters in finding trophies in the middle of the communal areas in some districts could have been used as an opportunity to discuss with the community the importance of allowing wildlife to increase within their areas. The cost over-runs faced by the Mahenye community in building a hall could have been an opportunity to develop skills in costing and making projections even in the current high inflationary environment. This again emphasises the importance of the loss of long-term facilitation support. These experiences needed a facilitator to use them as entry points for capacity building.

It has been difficult to assess the level of capacity development in financial management within councils visited given the absence of consolidated records. Field observations suggested that results are variable. The generally unconvincing status of CAMPFIRE books in Muzarabani RDC appear to be in the minority, and there are some cases where books are excellent, e.g. at community level in Chipinge, and at RDC level in Chiredzi. The data from DA tracking reports shows that many councils have struggled to produce financial statements on time, though most have been able to produce them. The data from MLGPWNH shows council behind in their financial statements and submission of audited accounts and statements. The latter includes Chiredzi whose CAMPFIRE books were found to be up to date. What this could mean is that there is always an incentive to keep the CAMPFIRE books up to date since failure to do so would delay future disbursements. The financial systems appeared to be working in the councils visited.

Without appearing to state an obvious point, it is essential to ensure RDCs are operating effective financial management systems at all times to maintain confidence of all concerned, particularly communities who have to be relied upon to sustain the resource. The absence of comprehensive audited accounts, including RDCs and communities is a serious programme weakness. A serious threat to CAMPFIRE is that it is closely links to RDCs that are increasingly under-funded by central government. We can already measure the extraction of wildlife revenues to keep RDCs functioning, and no agency is preventing this. Interviews suggested that RDCs "do not tax other resources such as cotton because they do not have the legal right to do so".

Similarly, CAMPFIRE cannot develop in isolation, and requires improvement in other services such as roads, water, health, etc. These will absorb huge amounts of resources that are at present not available in the communities and the RDCs. One of the challenges is to persuade RDCs not to see CAMPFIRE as the

primary source of this revenue, yet also to provide infrastructure support to CAMPFIRE, in circumstances where the rural economy is too small to be taxed to this extent.

The future of the programme depends on the conservation and protection of natural resources. There are numerous land-use conflicts that need to be sorted out. Some of these are beyond the RDCs to resolve and will need national level input in their resolution. The impact of resettlement is an important area for open discussion with councils and communities affected. There is presently no suitable forum for this discussion.

e) National

The national level was to provide an enabling legal and policy environment for CAMPFIRE. It was also to support the processes taking place at district and sub-district level. In generally, NGOs and government agencies lost capacity over the project period and performed below expectation.

The services provided to CAMPFIRE by NGOs and Government agencies decreased over the period. Two Government Ministries/Departments – MLGPWNH and DNPWLM – were far less active towards the end of NRMP than they were at the beginning. The activities of DNR decreased with the end of their funding in the year 2000. MLGPWNH did not fulfil several of its obligations, and the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management did even worse, and appeared not to have the capacity nor will to apply for funds from USAID. USAID (Loken comments) states that all government agencies had access to project funds until May 2002, when the USG was forced to cut off direct assistance to the GOZ due to serious bilateral legal and political concerns, but even then GOZ agencies were able to keep their outstanding advances so most still have access to some project funds to this day (e.g., MLGPWNH, DNR, FC), and government accounts are just now being closed out in preparation for the project termination in September. Thus the constraints were with government capacity to access funds or indifference, as funds were always available.

Direct funding to ZimTrust, SAFIRE and CASS ended in 2000, while funding to WWF continued but at a reduced level. As with GOZ agencies, while direct funding to ZT, CASS and SAFIRE ended in 2000-01 (when the project was planned to end), they were always still encouraged (at least by USAID) to try to access project funds for specific activities, as WWF and SAFIRE did. Sadly, most were not interested in this opportunity (without core support). Basically, CA (and to a lesser extent USAID) tired of supporting the costly overheads for these organizations in the face of steadily diminishing returns in results/impact (especially for ZT and CASS, not so much for SAFIRE, who were pretty frugal). It was also noted that after the end of funding, several NGOs still had a significant amount of capital equipment supplied by USAID, yet were not directing this towards CAMPFIRE activities.

This loss of capacity/support can be measured at community levels, where one of the primary requests from the communities interviewed was for a continuation of such support, even at low levels.

We have already noted that ZimTrust, CASS, DNPWLM and MLGPWNH have lost much of their capacity to support CAMPFIRE. While both CASS and WWF have diversified, and may be able to provide support to CAMPFIRE over the longer term, they have also lost key and/or experienced personnel, and contribute to the general picture that few support agencies have themselves been able to maintain capacity. Of particular concern, the CAMPFIRE programme as a whole now has very few recognised experts in their fields, a factor that was critical to early development. Of all the problems affecting sustainability, this is probably the most serious because (1) these skills take so long to develop and (2) without these skills, programmes are less able to 'find' resources.

CA construed its role as lead agency as a mandate to take over all or most of these functions, which was never realistic or sensible. CA received technical assistance, training and operational support, and large amounts of funding (see section VII.B). However, CA's role as a technical support agency was neither realistic nor seriously appraised or developed, and despite the best efforts of USAID/DA to take persuade CA to take on a marketing role CA never seriously addressed this. Much of the responsibility for this must be with CA, which never took sufficient advantage of the DA, various consultancies or of several CSPs to develop its technical capacity or sustainability, a situation exacerbated by role conflict. For instance, ZimTrust did much of the early work of developing CA, but was marginalized due to conflict and competition with government and the CA, which wanted this role. ZimTrust competed directly with CA (even establishing "ZimTrust Districts") and its advocacy role was unpopular. DA was often a gatekeeper on CA largesse, and this did not fit well with its other role of providing capacity building to CA. The major factor was that CA developed itself as an association representing its RDC membership and never took seriously

its other potential roles such as supporting producer communities with technical or marketing assistance. In its role as a representative organisation CA performed well, and has become an important association representing a growing RDC membership. Stakeholders now clearly recognize CA as the lead CAMPFIRE agency.

WWF turned in a strong performance, particularly with respect to its community training efforts, NRM, M&E work for CAMPFIRE (including aerial surveys and CAMPFIRE revenue reporting), and special reports on technical topics such as electric fencing, eco-tourism and fire management. WWF's assistance to RDCs for the preparation of CDF project proposals was variable. Even though WWF devoted considerable resources to this task, it was over stretched and was not always able to ensure the quality of consultant input, or to keep up to date with the need to expand its databases (e.g. inclusion of non wildlife revenues). Project development fell heavily on WWF, but this work was often dependent on input from others (CA and RDCs), which was not always forthcoming. DA, at the PMT's request, amended the WWF grant four times to extend implementation to March 2003 and to provide additional funding in response to emerging Programme needs.

CASS grant implementation performance was often slow. CASS lost its key personnel and experienced other organizational problems that delayed implementation. CASS did not carry out the institutional training expected of it by the Project. CASS eventually did produce relevant policy studies (devolution, eco-tourism, potential for CAMPFIRE in the mining sector, etc) and followed-up on the possible development of a CAMPFIRE Trust by producing a very good options paper. The CASS grant ended in June 2001 after one extension, and there was little interest from CA in renewing it or otherwise providing more NRMP support to CASS.

In the latter part of NRMP II (i.e. post 1998), and especially after the ZimTrust grant ended (post 2000) capacity building was increasingly linked to the CDF grants administered by DA, although the CDF was not specifically designed for capacity-building purposes.

The general conclusion is that NRMP has enabled a broad understanding and acceptance of the CAMPFIRE programme to be built in key government agencies and ministries, most RDCs and in the public in general. The development of RDC CAMPFIRE Units has been done well for natural resource management, but less well for institutional development, with the key risk factor here being the general sustainability of RDCs. At the level of service provision, roles were assigned to CA that it could neither take up nor sustain. The shift that evolved in NRMP II (and is attributable to many other factors) – from the CCG as partners to the CCG as service providers – had negative consequences. The loss of NGO capacity and high-level expertise is particularly worrisome. Moreover, the phasing out of NRMP is not timely, where the lessons to improve delivery and the capacity to absorb funds are just emerging. A general lesson is that support to institutional development and NRM diversification requires a far longer programme.

The real strength of the CAMPFIRE programme is fiscal devolution and the organisation development that this economic empowerment allows. However, far more could have been made of this in a more conducive political and economic environment, and the opportunity to use CAMPFIRE to develop cutting-edge institutional management, training and monitoring systems still exists. If donor funding and an environment conducive to devolution re-emerges in Zimbabwe, the use of CAMPFIRE to develop and test institutional systems should be a high priority that might provide an important means of experimenting with the merging concepts of fiscal devolution and discretionary funding (c.f. World Bank, undated).

2. Wildlife Management Capacity

a) Setting and managing quotas, safari hunting and natural resources

At national level, the methodology for setting quotas has been tested and developed. This was initiated by DNPWLM in the early 1990s but fully developed by WWF, which produced community-level techniques and training manuals for quota-setting and the sale and management of safari hunting. The quality of these is exceptional. Together with direct training, and training of trainers, these methods were rapidly taken up by wildlife districts, and field visits confirmed this capacity at both RDC and sub-district level. Given the

importance of trophy hunting to CAMPFIRE revenues, this is a well-targeted and professionally executed achievement of NRMP II.

A standard Quota Request Format was formally agreed by DNPWLM in 2000, and is now the basis for all RDC requests to the Department. This achievement reflects a significant policy shift within the DNPWLM in their acceptance of the need for a more participatory and co-management approach, not only to quota setting specifically, but also to resource management in general. It also clarifies district (RDC) and community level roles. The following results indicate that quota-setting capacity now exists within RDCs and wildlife committees:

- All districts are now submitting well-documented quota requests. Field visits confirmed that there is a good level of local involvement in the process, including Ward and District level workshops, and also that several officers in each district have a good understanding of quota-setting.
- There has been an increase in convergence between quotas requested by districts and communities and their approval by DNPWLM.
- Hunting is being adaptively managed with a strong indication of sustainability (see section III.A.3) largely because of the simplicity and rigour of the Quota Setting Methodology.
- There has been a growing number of Quota Setting workshops and proposals produced by RDCs and rural communities independent of the Quota Setting Project support (WWF, 2002).

Quota setting is now included in the Zimbabwe Secondary Schools Examination syllabus.

Field visits confirmed that comprehensive monitoring of safari hunting was occurring at the RDC level. This was reflected clearly in both Guruve and Chiredzi, where the CAMPFIRE officer could immediately produce a list of all animals shot and the value owed to each community. In Binga, results were displayed graphically on the walls. While community officials had a fair idea of offtakes, in Masoka there were complaints that monitoring had been centralised (along with the hunting contract) and people could no longer keep track of the animals shot in their area. Thus, while noting that the system is already good, there is still scope for increasing local participation.

In the same manner as quota setting, marketing and safari management, strong progress was also made in developing appropriate resource management techniques including fire management, problem animal management, counting animals and maintaining electric fencing.

The development of these capacity building processes entailed participatory and scientific research through long-term interaction with communities at several field sites in the first phases and, having developed techniques, rolling out this capacity. Important to institutional memory was the production of high quality manuals. In most cases, a second Trainers manual supports the manual. It is implemented through a comprehensive programme that included direct training (demand-driven) and the training of trainers to use these materials (targeting RDC trainers as well as those in government agencies e.g. FC, DNPWLM, DNR), thereby imparting significant capacity at the level of both the RDC and producer communities. In all communities visited, NRM training was cited in a highly complimentary and appreciative manner. However, NRM training was centred around wildlife management activities. The impressive results at a District and sub-district level were implemented largely by WWF, through the Support to CAMPFIRE Programme (March 1999-June 2001), which was funded by NORAD and SCI, as well as NRMP II.

Results from this period (1999-2000) indicate the level of effort and that they were supported by a methodical implementation and monitoring systems:

- Twelve training courses / workshops in quota setting were held at ward and village level for 283 participants from 92 wards in 1999 and 2000.
- Six District Level Quota Setting Workshops involving 188 participants were facilitated.
- Assistance was provided to develop annual offtake quotas and production of quota submission / proposal reports in ten RDCs.

Training of trainers included:

- Quota-setting training to 19 CAMPFIRE Training Officers/ Managers from 17 districts, and officials from DNPWLM, Zimbabwe Association of Tour and Safari Operators (ZATSO), Zimbabwe Professional Guides and Hunters Association (ZPG&HA) and Zimbabwe Hunters Association (ZHA) in May 1999.
- Counting Wildlife course to 13 CAMPFIRE Training Officers / Managers from 13 districts, and three from CIRAD.

- General wildlife management to fifteen DNPWLM staff from the Head Office, field stations and provincial offices.

As confirmed by field visits, the uptake of these methodologies at RDC and sub-district level has been strong. Most communities are now able to set their own quotas, and the combination of training, training of trainers, manuals and trainer manuals means that this capacity is largely being maintained.

Monitoring systems and databases for hunting, based on post-hunt forms, have been developed and are housed in WWF and also in DNPWLM. Aerial surveys have been conducted on a regular basis, as illustrated by figures 8 and 10.

A comprehensive wildlife and natural resource management system is now in place at national level for both training communities to manage wildlife, and for monitoring the wildlife sector. However, while several reports have just been compiled analysing trophy quality data (Taylor and Grobler, 2003 a,b,c), more attention could be paid to managing this database, checking data, producing regular reports and results, and defining new areas for monitoring and research (e.g. indirect income from tourism). Despite the potential for improvement, it remains the most comprehensive system in Africa.

The long term threat, however, is that WWF, which played an important role in developing these systems, has itself lost most of the people (75% attrition) who managed this highly competent and successful process.

b) Habitat management, monitoring and assessment

The simplest measure of preparing maps differentiating major wildlife areas from settlement has not been done. The value of doing so is illustrated, for instance, in the use that the Namibia CBNRM programme has found in using such maps, including for public relations purposes.

WWF has experimented with methodology to track the impact of CAMPFIRE on habitat conservation. On a broad scale, WWF Project ZW0025 used remote sensing (both aerial photography and satellite imagery analysis) to quantify and illustrate habitat extent and losses resulting from rapid population growth and immigration. The maps presented by Dunham et al (2003) illustrate the tremendous impact of humans on habitats in the Sebungwe and Mid-Zambezi between 1980 and 2000, but also show how CAMPFIRE has retained areas as consolidated wildlife land.

This project also sought to develop methodology to monitor habitat conservation. Dunham, et al (2003) concluded that:

- Aerial photographs are accurate although slow for mapping settlements and cultivation, but the future availability of coverage is uncertain and/or expensive.
- LANDSAT images are affordable, readily available and faster, but less accurate, especially in mosaic savannas e.g. they identified areas of Chizarira National Park as settled, which are not.

The proposal to use ever more sophisticated remote sensing (i.e. SPOT) should not be pursued until simple broad-scale mapping of wildlife areas is completed. A far better approach would be to use field visits to map the extent of wildlife areas in communal areas. For instance, working with Chiredzi RDC to define and map the wildlife zones around Gonarezhou, Niavasha and Limpopo would not only result in computerised maps at national level but might be important for delineating wildlife production areas (c.f. Conservancies in Namibia).

c) Problem animal control

At a national level there has been considerable experimentation with the age old and intractable issue of problem animals, and CAMPFIRE is the best source of experience in the region. Intensive monitoring of problem animals in several districts has led to a much better understanding of the problem, for instance that shooting animals generally has no impact. There is now a considerable literature and knowledge about problem animal control and, related to this, about the technical and institutional aspects of electric fencing. WWF has even developed model fences that can be transported to workshops for training purposes. There has also been experimentation with alternative means of control, such as the use of chilli pepper combined with local harassment of elephants (partly supported by NRMP). In most districts, PAC monitoring systems have been established, and professional hunters have to a large extent become involved in removing or

controlling problem animals. The use of clients for problem animals was initiated, and is now common, thus reducing the financial wastage of killing animals 'unproductively'. All in all, the number of problem animals killed has fallen. Before CAMPFIRE, several hundred animals were shot each year and, apart from the odd aberration, this can now be counted in the low tens (but specific data on PAC is not available and should be considered for inclusion in the national database).

Electric fencing was initiated to reduce problem animal incidents, and also the need to shoot valuable animals. Fences have been constructed in Guruve, Hurungwe, Nyaminyami, Gokwe and, using NRMP funding in Binga, Tsholotsho and Hurungwe. While expensive, they have been difficult projects to manage institutionally, as in Masoka where, despite its huge benefits, the fence was allowed to collapse. Long fences have generally failed (e.g. Tsholotsho, NRMP I), and in one case (Hurungwe) fencing projects supposedly to prevent elephants were in the majority used in non-elephant areas (presumably to protect crops from goats). The ring fences in Binga are an exciting development, and may offer the solution to maintaining people and elephants in close proximity to each other. Much of this experience, partly funded by NRMP, has been of value to the region, for example with help offered to Luangwa Valley, and the region in general.

On the whole, the systems and capacity to manage problem animals are in place throughout the country, with WWF again playing a central role.

3. Programmatic Monitoring and Adaptive Management

a) Conservation Management

The conservation monitoring system for CAMPFIRE is comprehensive, but can be improved. The WWF database contains:

- (a) Hunting quotas for all districts from 1991 to 2003
- (b) Aerial survey results 1988 to 2001
- (c) Trophy quota, offtake and trophy quality by district, and nationally, from 1989/1992 to present (there are minor gaps in the data, and some errors, e.g. more buffalo measured than were shot in Guruve). There is also data for all hunts on state land.
- (d) NP9 database, with detailed records (revenue, trophy prices, species used, origin of clients) of all hunts in Zimbabwe, 1998 to present.
- (e) Maps of CAMPFIRE districts and producer wards, together with data on populations, areas, etc.

The difficult task of mapping and monitoring habitat is a gap, but increasing wildlife populations and trophy offtake and quality, are both indicators of sustainability. The best monitoring instrument of all is trophy quality and offtake. This is cheap to collect, accurate, robust and directly related to the primary economic use. While triangulation with other data sets is useful, especially in this early stage of technology development, trophy quality data is such a powerful tool that it could, if necessary, stand on its own. It is well supported by the local knowledge of professional hunters, which is invaluable.

This data is collected at RDC and national level, and entered into a database. A slight weakness is the capacity to analyse and check this data regularly, and more could be made of it. At local level, annual quota-setting means the data is used effectively, although the use of publicly visible charts and posters (which WWF experiments proved to be extremely effective) would add strength.

Regular aerial surveys are under-taken. However, the CAMPFIRE dataset confirms that this is a crude measure of populations, is really only useful for a single species – elephants – and even here it at best provides a rough check that the situation is sustainable. By all measures, trophy quality data is a superior tool. Counting animals by air to set quotas is not as useful as assumed, even for elephants, but it does provide a checking mechanism. It is also expensive, depends on a high level of technical support, and has the major disadvantage that it cannot be internalised at community level. Walking or road counts may well be a better method, especially for lesser species, but this methodology requires further development.

With the main demand being for the monitoring of wildlife and hunting, and this demanding a large amount of capacity, more specific monitoring of other natural resources was not developed.

TABLE 27: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DATABASE FOR WILDLIFE AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Data	Responsible	Finding	Recommendation (keep for cutting into last chapter)
Wildlife Areas	None assigned	Not done	Collect data
Habitat Condition	WWF	Experimentation with remote sensing	Not a suitable technology. Rely on areas and trophy offtake/quality as indicators of conservation success.
Aerial Survey	WWF	Done well, with good long-term records	Continue as is. However, this is too crude a tool for short term management.
Quota management and trophy quality	WWF, RDCs	Well managed at RDC level. Generally well kept nationally, but some errors (from 1995) detected by evaluation suggesting analysis and checking not good enough	Analyse and report to improve management

b) Program Economics

The main source of economic data is from RDC CAMPFIRE quarterly and annual reports. For the period 1989 to 2001 the database includes:

- RDC income according to four sources (sport hunting, tourism, PAC hides and ivory, other) for each district and nationally.
- The allocation of revenue to five uses (communities, wildlife management, council levy, other and not-allocated) for each district and nationally.
- The amount of money allocated to each of some one hundred communities, and the average per household revenue for each community in each year.

While this data provides a good general picture of progress, and is an excellent and invaluable database, there are several important gaps or weaknesses:

- Financial data is not based on regularly audited reports, nor on standard records or recording periods, and may therefore contain errors. While these do not affect gross analyses of CAMPFIRE, there are variances with data presented by Child et al (1997) and differences were also noted by Muir-Leresche (2003).
- There is a significant proportion of income (up to 15% of total between 1989 and 2001) that is classified as unallocated.
- As demonstrated by PWC (2001), a number of revenue sources are not captured in the CAMPFIRE accounts, and must be extracted from RDC General Revenue Account. These may comprise as much as 30% of RDC natural resource revenue.
- PWC (2001) also noted that RDC financial records are inconsistent, and a line item may be found in the CAMPFIRE account in one year and the General Revenue Account the next. Hunting revenues are generally captured, but the inclusion of financial information on high-end tourism, ecotourism, forestry and other revenues is unreliable.
- Data only captures direct payment to communities. Indirect payments (e.g. wages) and related activities (e.g. curio sales) are not recorded, yet are significant.
- RDC data usually only captures the total disbursements to each community. The database therefore does not tell us how communities use revenue. A record of household dividends, investment in projects, etc. would be useful.
- There are no comprehensive or consistent records of which projects or activities are funded by communities, nor of the profitability of such projects (e.g. grinding mills).
- Linked to this, there is no data on how well individual communities are managing their finances, for instance variances compared to budgets (a good indicator of planning and implementation capacity) and the level of misappropriation or misuse (a good governance indicator).

Financial management systems, and the monitoring of them, are a weakness of the CAMPFIRE programme. This does not indicate a corruption problem. Rather, it reflects a lost opportunity because good financial management is critical for improving performance and understanding management, as well as for transparency and peer-based accountability and control systems. Financial monitoring at RDC and community level is also invaluable for identifying problems and opportunities, but is not used by the CAMPFIRE programme.

Economically we have already noted that there are no systems for monitoring the secondary and indirect impacts of the programme, for instance:

- The number of high-end lodges, beds, occupancy rates, community income and national turnover.
- The number of ecotourism activities, beds, occupancy rates, community income, and national turnover
- Employment and wages in safari camps, lodges, ecotourism ventures, etc.
- The sale of natural products to these camps (e.g. timber, grass, etc.)
- The financial and economic impact of ecotourism ventures including turnover, costs, local expenditure, wages, etc.

In terms of economic and social impact, these factors can be substantial. In tourism lodges, direct community earnings seldom exceed 10% of enterprise turnover, and wages often exceed formal concession fees. In hunting camps in Gurube, for instance, there are at least 60 full time employees and a similar number of part timers.

c) Monitoring of Institutional Capacity Building

An important objective of the CAMPFIRE/NRMPII programme was the development of institutional capacity. The target beneficiaries were communities managing natural resources. However, the delivery mechanism was to develop the capacity of RDCs, CA and also the CSPs to support communities, and the majority of NRMPII funding was targeted here.

Central to NRMPII, and an important Results Package, was "strengthening the institutional support systems for, and the local management of community-based wildlife and natural resources management and utilization". After the mid-term review, the Project Grant Agreement Amendment Number 6 (USAID, 1998) confirmed its centrality to the Project. For instance Results Package 1 emphasised the "monitoring and evaluation of requisite attitudes, incentives, skills and institutional and administrative capacities within participating communities". Results Package 2 also included substantial capacity building in support of the CAMPFIRE Development Fund. USD2m was allocated directly to RDC capacity building through the ICB package, and the majority of the support to CSPs, DA and CA was for capacity building.

It is therefore surprising that while the detailed summary of the results packages (USAID, 1998) emphasises the monitoring of the resource base, monitoring of institutional progress is not specifically mentioned. An inspection of Partner Roles and responsibilities reveals:

- That MLGPWNH was responsible for "monitor[ing] the use of CAMPFIRE funds, and conducting regular financial audits of RDC CAMPFIRE accounts". However, MLGPWNH did not access funding available to do this, and monitoring was never completed or consolidated.
- CA was to "ensure the reliable collection and analysis of nationwide data on all aspects of NRMP...including Programme revenues and monitoring the overall ecological and socio-economic impacts of NRMP and CAMPFIRE activities".
- ZimTrust was to "monitor the development of district and sub-district-level institutional and management capacities" but was phased out in 2000, and appeared to make little effort to remain engaged.

Apart from POMS, which remains weak, no comprehensive initiative to design, develop, test and undertake institutional monitoring was undertaken. While excellent long-term data is available to describe natural resource impact, and good data describes economic impact and trends, there is no such data measuring progress in organisational and institutional governance, capacity and development. This is reflected in the relative quality or absence of data in section III of this report, and in the feedback workshops by the consultants. In terms of the programmatic development and adaptive management of CAMPFIRE the absence of institutional monitoring systems is an important gap. Comprehensive management systems and training materials exist for natural resource management, but not for organisational and institutional

development. This is indicative of the loss of vision and innovation by the CAMPFIRE leadership, as well as a gap in institutional skills analysis and development – more effort should have gone in to developing effective institutional monitoring instruments.

The Process Orientated Monitoring System was developed by ZimTrust for monitoring the institutional performance of community organisations. Initiated in the early 1990s, the methodology has not evolved in the manner that WWF has developed appropriate natural resource technology. This is a pity given the large amount of fieldwork put into the collection of data (see, for example, ZimTrust, 2001, 2003). It nevertheless represents a first effort at measuring the impact of CAMPFIRE on four components of institutional performance illustrated by the ZimTrust (2001) results. Methodologically POMS could be improved significantly:

- It uses subjective rather than objective criteria. This means that trends described in the reports may be more a reflection of observer bias than of real trends. There is scope to improve on the subjective criteria in the POMS assessment forms (see ZimTrust 2001, 2003), for example:
 - While listing whether the community maintains cashbook, asset register and simple income and expenditure statement, why not also incorporate objective measures such as % money accounted for and % variance from budget?
 - While asking if communities attend meetings or not, more objective would be to count the number of meetings annually, and the percentage of the membership attending.
- It tends to score leniently. For example, procedural function of Ward and Village Wildlife committees is scored at 75%, followed by the statement that “whilst most institutions now maintain source documents like invoices, payment vouchers and receipts as well as cash books and combined ledgers, *very few institutions are producing income and expenditure statements for use in financial decision making*”. (ZimTrust, 2001).
- The process of data collection is also heavily subjected to observer bias and does not subject the observer's scoring to community scrutiny (for example, in the form of bar charts on flip chart paper). This would have many advantages:
 - The scoring would be self-correcting through comparison and scrutiny between communities;
 - The evaluators would be forced to clearly define and continually refine scoring criteria, thus adaptively improving the methodology (it has not changed since 1993);
 - The communities would learn about their strengths and weaknesses, with the mechanism quickly providing (1) a peer-based performance management assessment, (2) a goal and expectation clarification mechanism, and a mechanism for (3) assessing training needs and (4) identifying management problems (e.g. weak committees, corruption, etc.).
- A ZimTrust officer told the evaluation team that the users of POMS results were the RDCs, NGOs and donors. The results were not specifically fed back to the committees or the communities themselves. This is an important gap, especially in the light of the bullet point above.
- POMS should use fewer indicators, as much of the data collected remains unused or unreported.

In other words, CAMPFIRE has missed out on developing an extremely powerful tool for institutional development.

The POMS reports are difficult and frustrating to use, and the feedback report at the M&E Feedback workshop attended by the team indicated that we were not alone in our frustrations. Moreover, the over-aggregation of categories in the presentation of data suggests that too much was collected and does not do this data justice. Because of the high level of data aggregation it is not possible, for instance, to look at the general financial performance of all wards, or specifically at any indicator (e.g. budget variance). Moreover, the narrative conclusions do not always conform to the implications of the data, and the reports are difficult to read and often contradictory (an indication of weak capacity in the CSP?) – while scoring sub-districts high, for example, it also states that existing institutional arrangements at sub-district level are weak.

With these reservations, Table 28 summarises the results of the 2000 POMS survey conducted by ZimTrust. This confirms the observations gained on field trips that, by and large, community institutions are working reasonably well. It also confirms the statement we have repeatedly made that the programme

would have benefited from stronger capacity in designing community institutional and organisational management systems. The comment on weak financial summary and analysis confirms our impressions.

TABLE 28: SUMMARY OF POMS RESULTS FROM 2001 SURVEY

Summary of POMS Results from 2001 Survey		
Ward/Village Conservation Committees	"Model" Status	Comments
A. Procedural Functioning	75%	Have constitutions, keep financial source documents, but weak at financial summary and analysis
B. Composition and Management Capabilities	64%	Below expectations. Few income generating projects. Conflicts between parallel committees, and traditional and elected leadership.
C. Community participation	84%	Generally supportive where incentives are tangible
D. Natural Resource Management	54%	Selective enforcement of by-laws (infractions recorded in 80% of wards) and land use plans. Ineffectual PAC and resource monitoring systems

Also confirming our conclusions regarding the importance of long-term relationship-based technical support, ZimTrust (2001) recommends the need for **focused support requirements for an extended period** for various aspects of institutional development including by-law development and enforcement, land use planning, problem animal control, ameliorating role conflicts, financial management and business enterprise skills. This progress would also be enhanced by speeding up the devolution of power and responsibilities to sub-district levels, especially if the incentive base can be increased and/or diversified.

POMS also confirms the loss of support capacity, stating that in 2001, very few training workshops were provided to sub-district structures. This confirms the declining capacity of CSPs and suggests that RDCs are struggling to provide the wide array of services previously provided by the CSPs (ZimTrust, 2001).

An important gap in institutional monitoring is the compilation of audit reports for CAMPFIRE Units and producer communities. While this may be considered a MLGPWNH responsibility, it is too important area to neglect and alternative arrangements should have been considered.

d) Project MIS and Performance Tracking

While there are a large number of reports and documents summarizing various aspects of the programme, there is no regular system for reviewing progress of the programme nor a management information system for tracking the program as a whole. Data is often available, but is not systematically analyzed and reported.

For example, a database summarizing the status, performance and inputs to the CDF projects would have been an invaluable tool for evaluating the success of this component. As it stands, data is available but is in a number of different places, for example a spreadsheet summarizing the financial and grant status of projects (DA, 2003b), district tracking reports (DA, 2003b), and contracted evaluations of most districts receiving funding (e.g. CASS, 1998). Another example, is the absence of systematic tracking at a Project level of the inputs provided to various RDCs and communities in the form of training. Except for natural resource management, the program did not develop a comprehensive monitoring system. While the economic information is good, it would have benefited from auditing and, while indicative of general trends, it contains inaccuracies and significant omissions (e.g. tourism and NR income) Data on institutional performance is neither collated nor analyzed. For these reasons, the CAMPFIRE experience is feeding into management and policy decisions far less than it should. Moreover, systematic monitoring of programme assumptions (e.g. capacity of CSPs) may have encouraged the project to take corrective action earlier.

F. GOVERNANCE

Although not a stated objective of NRMP II, governance is an important aspect of CBNRM in general and CAMPFIRE, in particular. However, it has been difficult to obtain information that can shed true light on what has been happening with Governance issues:

- No consolidated audit reports were available to the evaluation team.

- No formal records of governance reviews that have taken place at community or district level, let alone at national level, were available to the team.
- There are no programme institutional indicators for measuring changes or progress in governance.

There are several issues that are of concern in the governance discussion, namely:

- What has been happening with participation? Has the role of citizens in choosing their local leaders, and in telling those leaders what to do, increased?
- Are local leaders and institutions becoming more accountable? Accountability is a useful test of whether attempts to increase participation have proved successful. Can local people hold their representatives accountable?
- Have systems and procedures become more transparent? Is there a free flow of information? Are people informed about what is happening around them?
- Have management practices of councils improved?

a) Participation

CAMPFIRE structures have provided a forum for high levels of community participation in decision-making on NRM and other issues. So far over 100 village and ward committees have been established and are functioning well, and over 90,000 households are participating in the programme. Members of these committees are elected by the general assembly of the village or the ward. These committees have learned basic organisational and skills and have used these skills to further mobilise and interest more people in the CAMPFIRE programme. Community leaders have also mobilised and trained members of the community to be monitors and game rangers and have involved the community in the drafting of by-laws for the control and utilisation of wildlife and other resources and introduced anti-poaching penalties. There are examples of poachers being fined and with fines paying guards and providing community benefit (e.g. Chikurao, 2003 reports this in Mazowe). People interviewed at the business centres visited were aware of the CAMPFIRE programme, knew members of their committee and were very much aware of the power and functions of these committees. The team is satisfied that the programme created opportunities for participation and deepening democracy at local level.

b) Accountability

The committees are elected at different intervals – some every year and others at three to four year interval. The fact that an electoral system exists and the members of the community can choose a member of their choice provides an opportunity to test accountability. The team heard of cases where members had been booted out for non-performance or failure to serve the interests of the village or ward. Financial records were well kept and open for inspection by members of the public. Any member of the community was free to inspect those books. Generally, funds were well accounted for at community levels. Feedback meetings and planning sessions were also mentioned as avenues through which the leaders accounted for their actions. Planning sessions to decide on quotas, to discuss the choice of concession and joint venture contractors, and to decide on the distribution or use of revenue accruing from the exploitation of resources were held regularly or appropriately.

c) Transparency

High levels of transparency and community participation in revenue distribution and use at village and ward levels have been reported. The process of deciding on revenue allocation at community level is reported to be very democratic with the community deciding on whether to pay itself dividends or invest the money in some project. Decisions are reached by consensus with dissenting voices persuaded to see the point of view of the majority. This has maintained community cohesion and given credibility to the process. The flow of information between communities and RDCs concerning CAMPFIRE issues, actions and projects including contracts issued to hunters, is reasonably transparent, although this observation is not universal – there are problems in some RDCs, e.g. Nyaminyami. In Chiredzi, the team was shown a record of correspondence between communities and the RDC and there was nothing to suggest that information was being held from the communities. Asset management and books of accounts have been kept well at RDC Campfire Units and the information has usually, but not always (e.g. Masoka, see Annex G) been made available to communities on request.

What remains a bone of contention is the ratio of money that goes to the community compared to that retained by councils as levy. RDCs have not been very transparent about how they use the money they

retain. It is an issue that councils need to openly discuss with communities and organisations that support communities. There is likely to be more support for these levies if it can be shown that communities benefit from advice or services provided by the RDCs.

Related to this is the whole debate on devolution. This discussion ought to be brought out into the open so that communities can also make their contributions especially on issues that relate to their capacity or lack of it. Another area where transparency could be enhanced is through regular internal performance reviews. This will bring a new dimension of peer scrutiny and provide an opportunity for those placed in leadership to improve their performance through constructive criticism. The reviews will also be a useful source of information for members of the community.

d) Corruption

There have been minor incidents of corruption associated with the CDF, for example the eco-tourism project in Mavuradonha where DA put corrective measures in place. There have also been attempts to corrupt the process of allocating hunting concession, but the limited evidence that we have on such a difficult issue indicates that, in general, the system of allocating concessions to the highest formal bidder has held up. There has also been corruption in some RDCs.

G. TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION

Murphree (1994) notes that there are three components to proprietorship: the right to benefit; the right to dispose; and the right to manage. CAMPFIRE has made the following innovations, which have important implications for these three aspects of proprietorship:

- The revenue distribution process (right to benefit) converts wildlife revenues from a public into a private, and therefore more highly valued, resource. This process has important implications for participation, transparency, governance and proprietorship. It is discussed at length in the literature (e.g. Child and Peterson, 1991; Child, et al 1997).
- The open, competitive and participatory marketing of wildlife concessions by communities is also a critical aspect of proprietorship (i.e. the right of disposal or sale). Developed by CAMPFIRE, these techniques have spread to Namibia and Botswana.
- Quota-setting has been the vehicle by which communities have gained increasing control (right to manage), and demonstrated increasing responsibility for wildlife management. Again, these methods were developed by CAMPFIRE and have spread to Namibia and Zambia.

As we have noted, WWF has played an important role in developing natural resource management technology in the following fields:

- Quota setting, animal counting and the management of safari hunting.
- The sale of hunting and photographic concessions.
- Natural resource management, including fires.
- Problem animal management, reporting and fencing.
- Project planning.

We have also noted that there has been little innovation and systems development in support of institutional development.

H. NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPACT

a) National

Crucial benefits of NRMP have been the spread and acceptance of the CAMPFIRE principles, and the acceptance of wildlife and tourism as legitimate land uses.

With the broadening of its base to include non-wildlife districts CAMPFIRE has enjoyed growing social and political acceptance at national level including among politicians and the central government. Mr P. C. Manyadza, Chief Natural Resources Officer, Department of Natural Resources told the evaluation team: "CAMPFIRE has received acceptance even at political level. The politicians are aware of it and so are people in rural areas. The number of districts in CAMPFIRE is an advantage. It has become a programme that government needs to support".

NRMP II has also helped to ensure the survival of the early CAMPFIRE principles including the focus on local communities as resource managers and beneficiaries and the principle of producer community. These principles are being applied in activities such as the use of mopane worms, masau, and local eco-tourism enterprises. The CAMPFIRE principles have shown themselves resilient and have spread to non-wildlife districts.

The Project has assisted CAMPFIRE to establish wildlife utilisation (consumptive and non-consumptive) as an acceptable form of land use on communal land. CAMPFIRE, with project assistance, has clearly established that wildlife can have a focused value and that this can be realised by RDCs and Producer Communities.

b) Regional and International

During the first phase of NRMP II, considerable regional and international impact was achieved. Largely through the NRMP-funded activities of ART, CAMPFIRE achieved a high regional and international profile. ART successfully disseminated information on CAMPFIRE and sustainable use principles, gained considerable positive media coverage for CAMPFIRE, arranged seminar/study tours in the region as well as the US and hosted visits to CAMPFIRE communities. ART was also instrumental in supporting the successful lobbying campaign by Zimbabwe and other southern African states that led to the down listing of elephants from Appendix 1 by CITES in 1997. However as a result of the controversy generated by ART's advocacy and lobbying activities and debate about US Government funding for these, USAID closed out the support to ART at the end of 1997. Following the closing of support to ART and the 1998 Mid-term Evaluation, NRMP II continued to support look and learn visits within the region.

Through bi-lateral or regional USAID funding, a considerable impact has been achieved in the region. Other countries in the SADC region (Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Mozambique) have adopted CAMPFIRE principles adapting methodology and approach to suit local circumstances and institutional and policy frameworks. In some cases neighbouring countries (e.g. Namibia) have specifically applied lessons learned from CAMPFIRE in the development of their own CBNRM policy and legislation. Some countries (e.g. Botswana and Namibia) accepted Zimbabwe's experience that devolution to RDC level is a half measure, and have gone much further than CAMPFIRE in devolving rights and authority over wildlife directly to local communities. Some CAMPFIRE RDCs visited Botswana and Namibia on look and learn visits funded by NRMP and have returned with positive views about devolution to lower levels. Technologies and approaches developed by CAMPFIRE for quota setting, marketing and monitoring and evaluation were widely adopted and adapted in the region.

CAMPFIRE has become a fertile ground for research and learning and has produced more than 300 publications on CBNRM and common property resource management. CAMPFIRE still has an international reputation as a pioneer of CBNRM in the wildlife sector and is cited regularly in the international academic literature. There is a growing recognition of its ecotourism successes, for instance in Mahenye.

IV. Assessment of Project Design, Delivery and Coordination

A. THE CAMPFIRE DEVELOPMENT FUND

NRMP II represented the first major funding of the CAMPFIRE programme (NRMP I targeted only four districts). It introduced a dynamic into the CCG partnership of competition for resources, which had previously been absent. At the time of its design, several CCG members (Murphree being prime amongst them) expressed real concern that this high level of funding would hinder rather than help CAMPFIRE. As he predicted, the CAMPFIRE superstructure has become heavily absorbed in accessing the various ICB and CDF grants, and there was also considerable inter-agency rivalry and conflict (e.g. between ZimTrust and CA).

While the CDF was slow to start, it dominated the latter stages of NRMP II. The idea of grant money excited RDCs and about 150 RDC "projects" awaited action/approval in early 1995. However, most did not match the goals of NRMP II, and it took several years to work out criteria for review/approval, and systems for approving/monitoring projects. It was 1.5 to 2 years before ICB projects were agreed, and 4 to 5 years for CDF projects (Table 29).

At the NRMP II design stage, there appeared to be little analysis of RDC capabilities to develop projects and the importance of such projects (relative to other actions) as a means of advancing CAMPFIRE, or of the capacity of CCG/CA/RDC in project planning/proposal development which was over-estimated. There was also little background analysis to guide diversification, such as the requirements and viability of ecotourism (where a consultancy was contracted in 2002, Ebony Consulting) and veldt product development. The difficulties of starting and then implementing the CDF are well documented in DA's annual/quarterly reporting, the minutes of the quarterly CCG Planning/Progress review workshops, and the PET and PMT minutes.

There was also some disagreement over roles. CA expected to coordinate the project development process, help decide which projects were to be approved, guide the CCG in helping RDCs develop projects and, as reflected in the SGI, eventually take over the IC grant-making and management responsibilities. However, USAID never accepted any direct grant-making, management or implementation role for the CA, which is why they contracted DA, and while it was always CA's desire to get rid of USAID's DA "watchdog" USAID never seriously entertained this idea (Loken, comments).

a) Speed of Proposal Development and Review

Tables 29 and 30 analyse the time lags between CDF project approval, sending of grant letters, signature by RDCs and project completion for a sample of projects. There were long delays in gaining final approval and implementation of concept proposals that were submitted to PET prior to 6 October 1998. For example, the concept proposal for the fire management project in Gokwe North was approved in August 1998. It was reconsidered again by the PMT in June 2000 and comments given to the RDC. The next submission by the RDC was also approved with comments in February 2001 and the grant letter sent in May 2001. Part of the delay was caused by the transition from PET to PMT, and part was caused by the time it took for the RDC to respond to advice and comments from the PMT. The project therefore took almost three years to approve.

In their comments, DA note that:

- "The delays which occurred between formal project concept approval by the PMT, full proposal review/approval by the PMT and grant preparation/signing by the IC/RDC were usually significant due to the need to fully justify the proposal, prove that it was viable, show/confirm detailed RDC/community inputs, etc. In most cases this required the RDC to contract outside TA. In other cases, the RDC felt it could do it alone. Either one of these approaches were very time consuming for the RDCs.
- The give and take between the PMT/IC/CA and the RDCs was significant in the process from concept approval to grant signing. RDCs frequently resisted the advice/guidance of the PMT and this further delayed the process. In Gokwe, they were principally interested in obtaining expensive

capital equipment for fire management and only after much negotiation, finally accepted a significantly scaled down version of the project that eventually included the use of more cost effective early burning techniques."

TABLE 29: SUMMARY OF APPROVAL DATES OF ICB AND CDF PROJECTS

Summary of Approval Dates of ICB and CDF Projects																												
NRMP II Started in 1995	1996				1997				1998				1999				2000				2001				2002			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Gokwe South														ICB														
Kusile								ICB																				
Mudzi						ICB																						
UMP/Mudzi/Rushinga																												CDF
Nkayi				ICB																								
Nyaminyami						ICB				ICB																		
Rushinga						ICB																						
Tsholotsho						ICB																						
UMP						ICB																						
Chiredzi							ICB								CDF													
Chimanimani								ICB									CDF											
Mazowe				ICB														CDF										
Muzarabani								ICB																				
Chipinge				ICB											ICB													CDF
Nyanga								ICB													CDF						X	
Hurungwe				ICB																		CDF						
Binga								ICB																				CDF
Gokwe North				ICB																								CDF
Hwange									ICB		ICB											CDF						
Beitbridge							ICB			ICB																		CDF
Bulalimamangwe										ICB																		CDF
Umzingwane																												CDF
Guruve							ICB																					CDF
Gwanda										ICB																		CDF
Bindura																												ICB
Matobo														ICB														CDF
Pfura																												CDF
Mwenezi													ICB															CDF
Goromonzi																												CDF
Manyame																												CDF
NB: Where two dates are given, this reflects information differences in the two spreadsheets supplied by DA																												

NB: Where two dates are given, this reflects information differences in the two spreadsheets supplied by DA

DA also notes "while this process was time consuming, it wasn't necessarily wasted time. Experiential learning occurred and sometimes better projects emerged – or at least there were less costly mistakes than otherwise would have been the case!" Our comment is that, with a good management information system and 'external' review of the type that CASS was able to provide to CAMPFIRE during NRMP I, learning would have been further enhanced.

Projects that required construction work and electric fencing generally took longer because of the need to carry out various appraisals. The quality of consultants hired to assist councils in developing proposals and for carrying out proposals was mixed in the early phase of the CDF (Nyanga RDC told the evaluation team they could have done a better job themselves than the consultant hired to assist them).

A window for small grants was opened in 2000, and these moved more quickly from proposal to implementation although some also took more than a year before signature by council and implementation.

TABLE 30: ASSESSMENTS OF THE TIME LAGS IN THE PROCESSING OF RANDOMLY SELECTED CDF LARGE GRANTS

Project	PMT Approval	Grant letter date	RDC signature date	Completed
Fire management, Gokwe North RDC	Concept approved with comments prior to 06.10.98. Approved with comments 01.02.01	06.05.01 (31 months from concept approval)	26.06.01	December 2002 (date of council's final report)
Gandavaroyi Falls Campsite, Gokwe North RDC (small grant)	Approved 07.06.00	18.07.01 (13 months from approval)	04.09.01	Site handed over to community in January 2003
Mwinji Cultural Village & tourist accommodation, Binga RDC (small grant)	Concept approved 29.03.00	05.11.01 (19 months from concept approval)	17.12.01	Officially opened October 2002. Final equipment items delivered to village by council in June 2003.
Siamuloba Fishing Camp, Binga RDC (small grant)	Concept approved with comments 29.03.00	05.11.01 (19 months from concept approval)	14.11.01	Construction uncompleted
Paradise Pools ecotourism project, Bindura RDC	Concept approved 29.03.00. Approved with comments 17.05.01	19.09.01 (14 months from concept approval)	01.10.01	
Beekeeping, Mutoko RDC	Approved with comments 17.05.01	15.08.01 (3 months from approval)	August 01	
Gairezi ecotourism project, Nyanga RDC	Concept approved prior to 06.10.98. Project approved with comments 27.09.00	06.02.01 (27 months from concept approval)	15.02.01	

b) Diversification and Decentralization of Grants

Table 31 summarises the large CDF grants made. Implementation was variable, but tended to be slow and expensive relative to private sector costs (DA, pers. comms). The operational criteria was for projects that would be self-sustaining upon completion, rather than profit or return on investment (Loken, pers. comms.). Private sector participation was always encouraged by the CDF manual, but CA and RDCs resisted this.

Some RDC CAMPFIRE Units were under pressure to "perform" and come up with CDF projects. As a result, a few projects were imposed on local communities or the dialogue process was short-circuited. This created project proposals without sufficient acceptance among the communities, and the impression that the CAMPFIRE programme is designed to benefit the RDC and not the communities themselves (for example, the serious conflicts between communities and RDCs over the Nyatana project).

From 2000, more attention was given to encouraging sub-RDC management of these projects. The opening of the small projects window had a lot to do with this positive development, too, as large projects were just too complex and ambitious for communities to deal with at the start. Communities liked private partnerships, and towards the end of the project, private sector participation became an important aspect of funding. An inspection of the CDF Large Project Grants (Tables 3, 31) confirms that recent projects have been developed almost exclusively at local level, with some RDC support. Even for completed projects, communities are increasingly searching for partners to manage them after they have been built, as interviews on field trips conformed (e.g. Muzarabani, Masoka). This shows some "learning" within the project,

where communities were gaining sufficient competence and confidence to begin to assume these responsibilities.

TABLE 31: SUMMARY OF LARGE CDF DIVERSIFICATION PROJECTS

(Source: DA (2003b) and Progress Reports CAMPFIRE from Regions)

District	Type of project	Progress	Viability	Implementer RDC/Sub-Dist Private Partner
Mudzi, Rushinga, UMP	Nyatana Wilderness – (Wildlife Management)	Beset by institutional problems. Resistance from Rushinga communities	Doubtful in short term	A Trust with 7 wards in three districts
Chiredzi	Veld Fire Management	Implemented well	Conservation project with no direct commercial value	RDC
Chimanimani	Ecotourism based on Chalets, ornithology	Completed and operational	Likely to cover operating costs and create local benefit – Viable	Local Trust working with RDC and an NGO - SAFIRE
Mazowe	Ecotourism camping	Completed, with problems	Marginal viability	Trust and RDC
Muzarabani	Upgrade campsite with chalets	Poorly implemented	Viable if well managed	RDC Private partner
Chipinge	Veld Fire Management	Implemented well	Conservation project with no direct commercial value	Local, with RDC support
Nyanga	Ecotourism based on fly-fishing, chalets and camping	Implemented well	Likely to cover operating costs and create local benefits – viable	Local, with RDC support. Private partner
Hurungwe	Small scale fencing	Most fences used for goats not elephants	Sustainability doubtful	RDC with individuals
Binga	Electric fences	Implemented well	Reasonable social and economic benefit, if money is available to maintain them (as it should be)	RDC with communities
Gokwe North	Veld Fire Management	Looks sustainable	Social benefits	RDC
Hwange	Fishing camp	Good progress	Likely to be viable	RDC
Beitbridge	Fisheries	Completed	Sustainable but was heavy investment needed?	Community groups
Bulilima and Mangwe	Mopane worms harvesting and processing	Poor implementation. Not completed	Of doubtful viability and value.	Two RDCs and two Trusts
Umzingwane	Mtshabezi Valley Ecotourism	Complete	May be viable in the medium to long term	RDC and community Trust
Guruve	Ecotourism project	Partly implemented: Gonono camp completed Masoka and Mkanga bridge camps not complete	Likely to cover costs in good economic conditions. Gonono is viable through hunting	RDC will pass on to two community Trusts. Private partner renting
Gwanda	Rehabilitation of Doddieburn-Manyoli ranches	Completed	If successful, likely to be viable after a 5-10 year period of wildlife rehabilitation	RDC
Bindura	Ecotourism campsite at Paradise Pools	Completed Phase I	May cover costs	RDC, Trust and private sector support
Matobo	Ntunjambili caves ecotourism	Slow progress, and unlikely to finish	Financially sustainable in right economic circumstances	RDC to hand over Community Trust
Mwenezi	Manyuchi fisheries	Completed, with infrastructure and equipment	Viable in the medium to long term	RDC and a Trust representing 4 wards
Goromonzi	Ngomakurira Ecotourism day centre	Good progress	Financially sustainable in right economic circumstances	RDC and Community Trust
Manyame	Mayambara lodges and Conference Centre	Slow progress	Could to be financially sustainable in the long term. Private sector partner experience difficulties	RDC, Community Trust and Private sector partner.

Monitoring focused on getting projects built and closed rather than on financial and economic impact which extends beyond the life of the project and term is difficult to build into the process. It is too early to accurately assess viability. Nevertheless, Table 3 represents an educated guess of the likelihood of viability in circumstances where the tourism sector is functioning, with viability defined as the likelihood of covering operational costs, or being maintained from wildlife revenues because of community benefit (e.g. social or environmental). The returns from these projects are an order of magnitude less than the investment in them, which included a high level of transaction costs (e.g. many meetings, training, consultants, etc.) and implementation inefficiencies associated with the learning process, capacity constraints and, sometimes, malpractice. Under the present harsh economic climate, most of these projects will struggle to survive, but with a good tourism market the majority are likely to be sustainable.

However, the difficulties of developing economically viable natural resource projects were under-estimated, as even the private sector was struggling to develop middle-market ecotourism and largely avoided veldt products. Whereas CAMPFIRE initially emulated the success of hunting and high-end tourism on private and state land, the economic viability of middle-lower market ecotourism and natural products was unproven, and lacked marketing arrangements. Given that this was as much a learning as an investment process, the absence of a more rigorous preparatory work and system for monitoring and assessing financial and economic performance is a weakness. So was the absence of crucial central support in the form of marketing and product development. These investments were naïve about the level of investment and time required to develop new products and markets. An important omission was that no marketing / booking system was developed in support of site-level ecotourism investments, a job that would have fitted in CA's remit.

A good example to learn from is NACOBTA in Namibia. NACOBTA supports similar investments, develops markets and does bookings, but also monitors jobs created, salaries, income and costs. Partly because these economic impacts are monitored, Namibia's CBNRM income portfolio is presented as being more diverse, whereas the CAMPFIRE data too often ignores indirect and secondary economic impacts, measuring only direct income from hunting and, sometimes, tourism (see below; and PWC 2001).

Moreover, for enterprise projects, it might well have been better to set up a (soft) loan fund, and to encourage communities and the private sector to submit joint proposals for diversification investments.

c) Peer Review

The PMT was not well structured. With a membership largely of officials rather than entrepreneurs, it lacked technical capacity in the areas being developed (i.e. ecotourism and natural products). It also faced the problem of vested interest as people representing districts that were also beneficiaries dominated it. The PMT seldom used neutral, peer reviews to assess CDF funding allocations (DA, 2003a), and these were prompted by USAID or DA after expressing strong reservations on the merits of some projects being reviewed by the PMT (e.g. Binga Fencing, Hwedza honey processing proposal, proposed private sector partnership agreements for Chimanamani and Manyame eco-tourism projects). The inclusion of peer review from the private sector might have had a strong positive influence.

d) Delivery and absorption

From the NRMP II project budget of USD20.5m, USD3.3m was disbursed directly to CAMPFIRE areas, of which approximately USD1.3m is in the form of community projects. The slow implementation of projects has led to the assumption that there is a problem of absorptive capacity at community level. This is not the case. The problem lies in the complexity and top-down nature of the Project, and the use of RDC rather than communities to implement projects, not in the absorptive capacity of communities. To make this point strongly, every year some USD1m of hunting revenues is used by communities for projects and activities at local level, that is roughly USD7million compared to USD1.3 million through the CDF. On the whole, this is well accounted for and carefully managed, resulting in a large number of projects – schools, clinics, grinding mills, shops, household projects, food relief, etc. This experience supports the emerging principles that discretionary funding is the key to rural development. Provided there is clarity about responsibility and that communities are organised, most rural communities are quite capable of constructing small infrastructure projects, ranging from classroom blocks, to grinding mills to clinics and even electric fences. By contrast, where councils interact with donors, conditions and responsibilities are often hazy and progress is consequently slow. What we are saying, is that NRMP may have been technically more productive had it

taken the former route, and indeed as was demonstrated by the latter stage of the project. For instance, categorising the projects reported by Chikuruo (2002) suggests that work was proceeding well on all the community level projects inspected, but there were problems with at least half of those implemented by RDCs.

Thus the issue becomes not the absorptive capacity of communities, which could easily use finances productively at several times this rate, but the design of the delivery mechanisms.

Verbal (USAID) and written (DA) comments strongly disagreed with this statement, although DA states "we would agree that CDF should have been designed differently, but that this would have had to occur up front at the PP stage with strong counterpart participation prior to signing the NRMP 11... and would have required radical surgery requiring a long gestation period that would have encountered strong resistance from CA and RDCs who had been "waiting for funds" for one to two years already". According to DA, most of the early proposals had little to do with NRM, being a wish list with little justification, part of the reason that start-up was so slow. Indeed, DA states: "Redesign of the CDF was briefly considered (principally by IC/USAID) after about 7 months of NRMP II implementation when it became evident that the CDF as then constituted could not absorb a large amount of funding." This begs the question of why re-design did not happen. We are cognizant of the difficult political considerations faced by IC/USAID, and sympathetic with the difficult decision that at least something was happening and some benefits were getting to communities and an attempt to change the system further in favour of communities might well have led to NRMP II being rejected by GOZ and perhaps even CA.

However, DA is correct in noting "this criticism does not take in to account the restrictions of NRMP II funding i.e. Only NATURAL RESOURCE BASED, NO CONNECTION TO SPORT HUNTING, etc. etc. It would have been easy to have disposed millions of US\$ to build clinics, schools, grinding mills as well as hand out individual dividends, however the project quite correctly prohibited this. The comparison made through out the document therefore would appear to compare apples with oranges and not reflect the true absorption capacity of the community within the laid down NRMP II restrictions."

This second argument against the Evaluator's view is that many CDF projects were involved in NRM and ecotourism and were therefore much more complicated than the schools, clinics, ventilated pit latrines, etc. constructed by communities. We agree that NRM and diversification is new and difficult, and have already asked why consideration of this complexity was not included in project design. However, most delays were related to the construction of buildings, fences and water supplies, or the difficulties of working through some RDCs. We therefore stand by our suggestion that structuring the CDF to work at community level, as happened in its latter stages, would have been more effective (experimentation in Luangwa suggested the lower levels implement projects an order of magnitude better than higher levels). Linked to this, an opportunity was not used to monitor and learn from the management of community projects financed by their own wildlife.

DA's comments further state that: "Larger, better designed infrastructure projects hypothetically were possible and could have absorbed far more funds, but these were not possible because of the need to spread project resources for equity reasons, CA's general reluctance to engage the private sector, collaborate with other NGOs, etc. So once NRMP II started, redesign of the CDF wasn't really an option".

These comments therefore support, rather than reject, the Evaluation conclusions that the purpose of the CDF was not clearly articulated nor from the start, and that its design was problematic and should have been modified. While accepting that investing in NRM and diversification is a new and difficult area, and that all-in-all a reasonable effort has been made, we still suggest that delivery mechanisms could have been improved considerably, and that much more could have been made of the CDF as a learning process.

DA states: "So, given the circumstances faced as NRMP II began, it would have been far preferable to have a small amount of funds, maybe two million, allocated to CDF more in line with CCG, RDC and CA tech capacities (it may be that communities could absorb more as noted by Evaluators but for better or worse external middlemen were required). A smaller allocation to CDF probably would have freed-up the CCG/CA to deal with more important CAMPFIRE sustainability issues, institutional capacity building, more programme collaboration and other areas that needed attention. A smaller allocation would have also made evident early on the desirability and political need (equity in access among RDCs) to have "small" projects, arguably one of the better features of the CDF, be the norm from the onset rather than a latecomer." This confirms our finding that the CDF dominated NRMP II, especially in the last few years. However, we still

believe that USAID was correct in following the principle of delivering direct support to communities and, if anything, that the amount should have been even higher. Our argument is not with the principle, but with the use of a standard grant-fund arrangement where greater clarity of objectives might have resulted in several delivery mechanisms depending on the specific objective (e.g. performance-related grants for conservation/social projects; soft loans for NRM businesses; matching funds to encourage fiscal devolution). Much more use could have been made earlier of the small grant process, and we agree that this was effective. We also suggest that opportunities for larger, strategic investments were not taken. Again we quote DA : "[the evaluation] refers to 'another opportunity not taken' to develop the community initiative to look into a bridge linking Chiredzi to Kruger National Park. Once again this is an example of good ideas that cannot be accommodated under NRNP II restrictions. The Guruve proposal originally identified looking in to a ferry link at Kanyemba, linking Lower Guruve to the Luangwa Valley across the Zambezi River. This had to be withdrawn after consultations with USAID and as such the idea remained undeveloped."

The impact of the CDF can be summarised as follows:

- In terms of ability to generate income from natural resources, the impact of the CDF is not measurable in CAMPFIRE income statistics (too early for results: data not collected).
- In the right economic circumstances, at least half of the projects are likely to be sustainable, providing moderate levels of jobs and income at local level.
- The CDF has doubled the number of RDCs involved in the programme and has increased the number of people involved by 10% (on the rough assumption that each of the ten Large CDF projects outside the original wildlife districts incorporates the equivalent of one additional ward).
- An important impact over the past eight years have been an increased awareness of the value and potential of natural resources and tourism, and an improved understanding and ability to manage natural resources.
- The impact on organizational and management capacity at community level is much more spotty. This aspect of the programme would have benefited from more careful experimentation, design, monitoring and institutionalisation. For example, evident in natural resource management, but missing from general management, is the careful design of management systems, training courses, manuals and performance monitoring systems.

At the level of the RDC, support of CAMPFIRE Units has been beneficial, or even highly beneficial, to the programme. Natural resource management and monitoring systems are well supported, but a missed opportunity was the systematic development of institutional monitoring and management systems, as CAMPFIRE managers were ideally placed for this.

Communities (and RDCs) are all keeping financial records, but systems were variable and difficult to use to compare and optimise management. Field trips showed communities and RDCs taking great care to fill in a complexity of financial statements. Within the time available, the evaluation team was not able to form a clear picture of RDC or community finances, although spot-checking did not ring warning bells in terms of misappropriation. However, the lesson is that if highly paid consultants familiar with rural financing (i.e. the Evaluation team) have to work hard to understand such financial records, how useful are they as a management or transparency tool at community level?

Simpler, robust, transparent financial systems should have been developed. For instance, building on the early financial systems developed in CAMPFIRE, and particularly in Gokwe, Zambia's Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project quickly built such systems, with transparent financial records in all 45 Village Action Groups. The failure to do the same was a key weakness of the NRMP II Project.

Another lesson that could be imported to CAMPFIRE is the effectiveness and cost efficiency of locally based para-professionals. By locating these facilitators in communities, RDC CAMPFIRE Units are likely to have significantly expanded their impact and reduced their costs.

An issue that deserved more attention in the design of the ICB component of NRMP was its financial sustainability, and the knock on impact of the costs of a central Unit on the flow of benefits to producer communities.

- Compared to 1995, the amount of money used for management at central level has increased from USD350,000 to over USD500,000.
- Given the generally good services provided by CAMPFIRE Units to communities, our general conclusion is that this is a positive investment. However, some services remain more centralized than necessary, and costs could be cut by a moderate amount (to less than 15% of CAMPFIRE revenues). For instance Gurube RDC employs 19 scouts, when it might be better to expect communities to hire and manage these personnel.
- By corollary, the reduction of income to communities is not a function of the CAMPFIRE units, but reflects increased extraction by the RDC for non-CAMPFIRE functions.

Perhaps the most negative impact of the CDF has been at the central level. The CAMPFIRE programme as a whole had become absorbed with managing CDF grants, rather than CAMPFIRE per se, with all district reports at the 2003 CAMPFIRE AGM focusing exclusively on CDF grants. Linked to this, the original CCG partners have become service providers rather than partners, and CA has not been able to replace their technical capacity and long-term vision.

This brings us to the question of whether the CDF has been important to the success of CAMPFIRE.

- At the start of NRMP II, CAMPFIRE was a politically marginalized programme largely associated with DNPWLM, wildlife and white technocrats. "Purchasing" the support of a far wider range of players and RDCs has been important, even critical, for its political survival, and has enabled the gains of the initial CAMPFIRE programme to be maintained.
- We have touched on the beneficial impact of the ICB programme on RDC's support to CAMPFIRE.
- The CDF has also added twelve communities with some probability of financial success (given improved macro-economic circumstances) to the hundred or so benefiting from wildlife, and may in the long term add 5-10% to direct CAMPFIRE revenues. The greatest benefit here is the increased geographic spread of the programme.
- Perhaps the most remarkable observation of the field trips is how well the CAMPFIRE programme has held together under extremely adverse economic and political conditions. Having a source of funding to enable meetings, learning and training to continue when normal sources of funding are adversely affected has been important.

e) Domination of CAMPFIRE by CDF

DA (2003a) states that the difficulties of initiating and implementing the CDF were compounded by the RDC's high expectations for the CDF, including the prospect of transferring a large amount of resources to RDCs via the CA who would control the process. With this large pot of money, and its ability to satisfy membership becoming the priority, other important matters received far less attention – such as developing national and local policy favourable to CAMPFIRE, reforming CAMPFIRE revenue generation/administration and distribution processes, taking proactive measures to ensure the sustainability of CAMPFIRE, and pursuing more Programme devolution and diversification. DA/USAID and some CSPs tried to keep these other matters (not directly related to the CDF) on the agenda, and record some achievements such as various policy studies completed, the PWC Revenue Study completed, numerous strategic planning exercises, etc. (DA, 2003a).

DA (2003a) confirms that as the CDF moved into its infrastructure phase, it gradually became the principal Project instrument to address diversification and devolution issues (via the establishment of community trusts and eco-tourism and other NRM community ventures). Thus, as it became evident that the CDF was CA's highest priority under the NRMP, USAID/DA tried to make the CDF, at least in part, be an instrument to achieve broader CAMPFIRE objectives.

f) CDF Structural concerns

The introduction, in 1999, of a funding window for small projects under the CDF proved to be compatible with RDC/community capabilities and CA's concern to spread resources quickly to its growing membership (DA, 2003a). The establishment of this window was consistent with some of the recommendations of the Mid-Term Evaluation. In retrospect, the Institutional Contractor considers that the CDF would probably have been more effective if (DA, 2003):

- The CDF was set up on a more apolitical, independent and technically driven basis (as recommended in the Mid-term Evaluation), making CDF management more independent from CA and other major stakeholders.
- The CDF was to fund only small projects more compatible with RDC/community capabilities and needs.
- The CDF had far less funding (say US\$1 or US\$2 million USD instead of US\$6 million).

While agreeing with the first two points (we do not agree with the third), the lesson is that while grant funding through RDCs worked well to expand CAMPFIRE politically, it was weaker if measured only with technical criteria. In the decade since NRMP was designed, we have learned a lot to improve on the standard donor grant fund arrangements. To reduce dependency, and improve performance, economic effectiveness and absorptive capacity we would suggest that, in addition to bullets one and two above, the improvements might be considered:

- Improved design of funding mechanism including a combination of linking funding directly to devolution at locality level; loan arrangements; use of formal banking sector; and encouraging loans to joint ventures with private sector; depending on specific objectives.
- Improved design of management, financial and monitoring systems at local level, using funding to build on and further develop their inherent capacity to absorb funding effectively, and
- Simpler financing arrangements, as worked well with the small grants mechanism.

With such modifications, a funding arrangement could simultaneously promote devolution, small business and absorb substantial amounts of financing efficiently, perhaps even more than the original US\$6m allocated. We have already confirmed that emphasising the small grant window sooner would have been beneficial. Another opportunity not taken was the potential for much larger projects where RDCs demonstrated capacity, for instance significant investments in infrastructure to open up new markets. We have already noted the examples of a bridge linking Chiredzi to Kruger National Park, and the ferry proposed at Kanyemba (vetoed by USAID) is another.

USAID notes (Loken comments) that this approach was discussed, but the CA would not permit the concentration of all project resources in a few districts, which was a major criticism of NRMP I. While there is a lot to be said for equity in expanding projects of this nature (e.g. CAMPFIRE membership growth), is there not also a lot to be said if CDF funding developed the capacity of some communities to get to an advanced stage? To continue the above example, building on and rewarding the good performance of Chiredzi might ultimately have resulted with the "USAID Trans-boundary Project for Chiredzi" (which, incidentally, we would recommend as highly feasible). USAID comments indicated a reluctance to go this far. But shouldn't we in fact also (in addition to equity and poverty alleviation) aim high, reward success and invest where returns are highest?

Having been critical of the CDF's technical delivery, we accept that this was also prevented by the difficult institutional dynamics associated with the NRMP II period. In no way would we argue for a return to the former status of CAMPFIRE where NGOs dominated the programme (notwithstanding the necessity of some long-term quality facilitation) and distributed largesse themselves. We entirely agree with the concept of the CDF, but our frustration is that it was administratively cumbersome, failed to draw in more experience and technical capacity (e.g. to the PMT), contained an element of conflict of interest (e.g. in the PMT), could have made more of community-level capacity, and could have made use of performance criteria in grants or even soft loans. Our hypothesis is that the this cumbersome design is why relatively minor issues consumed so much of DA's and USAID's energy.

The following factors contributed to the slow start-up and relatively small amount of money delivered by the CDF. Almost no CDF funding was disbursed by mid-1998 (Mid term Evaluation),

- There were design flaws in the funding allocation and review process, including conflicts of interest and deficiencies in technical support and review (e.g. in the PMT),
- Cumbersome USAID requirements (e.g. pre-award surveys, advance limitations, large demand for impact assessments, etc.),
- Unsophisticated design of the CDF (hardly different from many other grant-funded donor projects) compared to the difficult objectives of diversifying natural resource management objectives, is why it absorbed relatively little money. Innovative and interesting in its objectives, this did not translate into its design, which emphasised rather than avoided the implementation weaknesses of CA and RDCs by working through them.
- It started with large, complicated, projects before systems had been developed. It was a mistake to do these first.
- It took a long time to develop financing criteria, and these were dominated by USAID requirements rather than how well they could be understood and implemented by the client beneficiaries.
- The fact that most of the 150 projects stacked up at the beginning of NRMP II did not match funding criteria indicates that RDCs saw NRMP II as another donor cow to be milked, and also shows that communications between the project and beneficiaries over objectives was unclear.
- The CA and RDCs lacked implementation capacity (and more could have been made of community implementation capacity and small grants)
- In the early phases of CDF, the technical quality of the supporting consultancies was weak and the consultant base was narrow, but this improved after 2000.
- With Project close out always imminent, and at most a two-year planning horizon, corrective measures were not taken.
- It takes several years for RDCs to develop the capacity to use financing of this nature effectively.
- In many cases, communities were being given businesses to run, but not the accompanying training in running the business. Marketing was also largely unresolved.
- Funding coincided with the collapse of the tourism sector.
- An important external factor was the serious security, logistical constraints and distractions throughout the country throughout this period.

Given these problems, one cannot be too critical of the uptake of CDF by communities. However, a fund set up to last twenty years, and to be truly demand-driven, would have yielded significantly greater results, particularly if accompanied by targeted training and partnership aimed at developing business skills. USAID cannot fund in such long term initiatives.

An observation is that the otherwise active CCG (at least at the time of project start up) did not pick up on the value of the CDF immediately in the middle 1990s. This suggests that it was not considered a priority at the time, and that the CAMFPIRE grouping did not have the capacity to plan and implement such a project. Indeed, several of them resisted it for different reasons, some believing too much free money would dominate the dynamic of the programme, and some for more selfish reasons. Nevertheless, the CDF was the correct approach. The problem lay more in the timing and capacity for implementation, which, in the event, had to be purchased through an institutional contractor. The pity is that the CDF had such a short-time horizon (initially planned as four years) and was not used more as a learning process, where it could have made a greater contribution to the difficult field of NRM management and diversification (although political conditions were far from ideal for this). It never really had time to be carefully tested and developed (by comparison, WWF's wildlife management techniques, now strongly adopted by communities, took six to ten years to develop). The expectation of the CDF were unrealistic:

Predictable from the structure of the CDF decision process, DA (2003a) confirms that CDF implementation modalities were also a source of tension/conflict between CA and DA. CA inevitably thought it should be managing the grant-making process rather than sharing only some aspects of this process with DA. DA, on the other hand, had its contracted responsibilities to make grants, disburse/account for funds and monitor implementation. This tension frequently made it difficult for DA to provide, and for CA to accept, the other DA services included in the DA/USAID contract. DA confirms this role conflict, and also notes that the idea of a lending programme was considered but never implemented because of the time needed to establish such a programme, the one/two year time frame always faced by the CDF, and CA aversion to requiring poor communities to take out loans when they could get grants.

The dual role designed for DA (i.e. controller, and capacity builder) contains internal conflicts and inevitable tensions, which were exacerbated by the difficult personality and political dynamics during NRMP II. Alternative delivery mechanisms could have encouraged CA and RDCs to demand services from DA (and even the NGOs). For instance, placing CDF funds in the hands of a commercial bank, accessible on technical and commercial merit (as soft loans or grants where they provided social/environmental benefits), would have provided a strong incentive for CA, RDCs and communities to access the skills of DA and other partners to work together to develop proposals of sufficient quality to access these funds. This might have maintained, rather than torn apart, what in the past had been a powerful coalition.

g) Recommendations for future funding

DA (2003a) suggests that the possible continuation of the CDF (or something like it) after the expiration of the NRMP is really a question for CAMPFIRE stakeholders to decide. The Trust possibility, discussed earlier in this report, considers the pros and cons of various options. DA and some of the CSPs believe it could work and attract funding if it were set up correctly, learning from the CDF experience. This evaluation strongly endorses this proposal, contingent upon major improvements in institutional and programmatic design (see above).

Having made such a significant investment in CAMPFIRE, the timing of NRMP II withdrawal is unfortunate. On the ground CAMPFIRE is working well, but is threatened by the current economic turmoil. Hunting revenues, for instance, have shrunk to 10-25% of former levels because of exchange rate problems. Thus to survive this difficult period, and to prepare for significant growth potential once the economy is released, a small, well articulated gap-project fund would be of significant value. This project might:

- Use a three-year period to correct the weaknesses of the NRMP II, especially designing and setting up more balanced and rigorous performance management, financial and accountability systems at RDC and locality level.
- Towards this objective, and given short-term income difficulties, it might provide small amounts of funding to RDC CAMPFIRE Units on a performance basis.

A key design element should be the provision of a small amount of quality technical advice. The demand for this as evidenced on the field trips was palpable.

Technically, too, the timing of CDF withdrawal is bad. It does not make sense to phase out the CDF component just as it is beginning to overcome constraints and work. Moreover, as noted, support to CAMPFIRE in a period of extreme economic hardship would be invaluable.

If further funding to CAMPFIRE were considered,

- The priority investment is to strengthen the programme's high-level technical capacity, which has been lost. The focus should be on developing institutional performance systems, and on backstopping natural resource management. Perhaps the most important investment would be to support one or two long-term programmatic facilitators to work with communities, but these persons must be recognised experts in their field.
- Building on the experience of the CDF, a funding facility to support further NRM activities would be valuable. This need not be large, but must be more carefully designed to avoid vested interests and encourage performance. In terms of targeting direct funding at producer communities, there are several mechanisms that should be considered.

To **promote the concept of devolution**, and to build on the absorptive capacity demonstrated by communities, funding might be linked directly to the amount of money devolved to Village level. Thus, if \$100 is devolved to a Village, this might be complemented by a matching amount (\$100) for project/NRM activities, \$50 to purchase training (perhaps in the form of vouchers from a list of certified agencies), and \$25 for RDC support capacity.

By setting tight performance criteria as conditionality for the dispersal of wildlife revenues the conformance of the community to procedural necessities (such as elections, transparency, accountability, etc.) can be encouraged. Performance assessment mechanisms can also be used to encourage communities to correct procedural problems, or to purchase technical support where it is weak in relation to these requirements. Regular performance review would identify capacity gaps, and holding communities to performance

requirements would create a demand for capacity to address weaknesses. Key criteria might be: sound financial accounts; constituency accountability, including participation in decisions and transparency; NRM targets such as patrol days, and animal counts.

To **promote commercial diversification**, loans should be provided to community-private business partnerships that satisfy criteria of commercial viability, payback, and equity/empowerment. While accepting the transaction costs of initiating new programmes in a communal context, especially when experimenting with diversification, criteria should increasingly approach normal commercial parameters, including introducing communities into the banking sector. As is done in South Africa, the best approach may be to underwrite normal commercial loans.

The **grant funding of social or conservation projects** with non-commercial objectives should follow the model currently being developed for Social Investment Funds. Thus community-level projects are approved (1) provided they meet participatory, social and technical criteria and (2) the key ingredient of this approach is that performance is rewarded. The successful completion of projects progressively opens up greater funding opportunities (e.g. once a certain number of community projects are complete, the RDC becomes eligible for its own project, providing a direct incentive to the RDC to facilitate such projects). As performance is demonstrated, the ability of the community/RDC to access funds increases.

In conclusion, the primary positive impact of the CDF has been to purchase widespread support for the CAMPFIRE movement and for the CAMPFIRE Association. Measured by technical criteria, however, its performance has been weaker. It has created the platform for diversification into ecotourism and other natural products, but better design and implementation could have achieved these goals more cheaply, with a higher likelihood of success, and with far greater emphasis on capacity building and devolution. There has not been enough quality monitoring of the CDF to use it as a learning experience to further develop this kind of approach.

B. ROLE OF THE CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION

Initially (1989-90), CAMPFIRE Association was operating as a program under ZimTrust and was headed by a Program Development Officer. In February 1990, a CAMPFIRE workshop was held at Park Lane Hotel to discuss, deliberate upon and formally constitute the CAMPFIRE Association of Zimbabwe. It was attended by the Chairman, Senior Executive Officers and District Administrators of Guruve, Nyaminyami, Gokwe, Binga, Tsholotsho, Hwange, Bulilamangwe, Gaza Khomenani, Gazaland, Beit Bridge, Nyanga, Mudzi, Muzarabani, and Hurungwe. From that day on, the CAMPFIRE Association has experienced a meteoric rise (a story of rags to riches and back to rags again). The CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group, which was already assisting the CAMPFIRE Steering Committee formed in August 1989, was called upon to support the CAMPFIRE Association and its members.

The preamble of the Constitution of the Association (Annex E) clearly notes in no uncertain terms that in

"the formation of the CAMPFIRE Association the inaugural members" are "aware of, and fully subscribe to, the principle of devolution of the custodianship of wildlife resources to producer communities in communal lands." (emphasis added)

The preamble continues to state that the "acceptance of this principle has been made a condition of the conferment of appropriate authority status for wildlife on Rural District Councils and member councils in the Association will seek both collectively and individually to implement this principle and ensure that producer communities are the principal beneficiaries of the benefits of their wildlife and the activities of the Association."

It has been a long and tedious road for the CAMPFIRE association to gain legitimacy and widespread acceptance as truly representing interests of communities from rural and communal areas. But within its own membership, the spirit of the preamble has been forgotten. The last line of the preamble underlines the initial agreement among the inaugural members of the Association that "provisions exist for amendments to the Constitution allowing for membership by producer communities at such times and in such manner as may be appropriate", but this appears to have lost its meaning and importance as, in the 14 years of its existence, no single producer community has become a member. Thus the CAMPFIRE Association and its membership have not fulfilled the spirit of its Constitution enshrined in the preamble.

The negative indicator is that between 1990 and 1998, the Association failed to strategize on how to secure medium-to-long term funding independent from donor sources, despite being so well positioned to do so. Moreover, no thought was given to financial projections of income and expenditure, or to identifying an optimal financial break-even point. Even after 1998, there is little evidence of effort on the part of the secretariat or the Board to seriously consider survival strategies and their implementation. In any other "normal" circumstance any "normal" NGO or private sector organisation would have folded up and declared bankruptcy.

The "belt-tightening" on the CA support started in 1999, as recommended by the Mid Term Evaluation (see figure 19). The 2000 funding "spike" was due to the unforeseen necessity for the NRMP to pick up some additional CA staff costs, temporarily, following the abrupt cancellation of the Netherlands grant. NRMP agreed to do this in 2000, then proceeded to tighten the funding screws again in 2001, where a significant tightening of the belt can be seen. The Association, towards the end of NRMP II, is back where it started: it has now secured a two year grant from the Ford Foundation on the basis of its Strategic Growth Initiative (CAMPFIRE Association, 2002a), which is elaborated upon in section VII.B below.

In coordinating and directing (in policy terms) the efforts of CSPs and ensuring the longer-term sustainability of CA, the Association practically sidelined the Collaborative Group after the 1998 mid-term evaluation and the CCG has fallen apart as an effective leadership coalition. However, we should not lay the blame entirely with CA, as several of these NGOs were experiencing performance constraints. However, CA would have been better served by encouraging NGO partnerships much more actively. The loss of NGO partners threatens the quality of long-term service provision to communities, and the financial survival of CA itself. As they had demonstrated in the past, had CCG agencies been strongly supported by CA, they would have been well positioned to obtain funding and provide services, and were demonstrably willing to provide resources directly to CA.

CA's desire to take over the multitude of service functions was over-ambitious and extremely risky given the survival trajectories of small NGOs. The assumption that the CCG would be able to provide continuous support using their own or other donor funds proved incorrect, and several reasons have been put forward: without tacit support from CA several NGOs were unable or unwilling to obtain further funding for CAMPFIRE especially once Zimbabwe was ostracised by donors, while others attach more cynical motives to NGOs and feel they moved on once the easy money was finished. Whatever the case, the loss of CCG was a big blow to the CAMPFIRE programme and to NRMP II. An implicit assumption for NRMP II program delivery and efficacy was the existence of a powerful CCG, and its dissipation was an external factor of some detriment to NRMP II.

a) Devolution

It is too early to judge the effectiveness of recent initiatives to form community trusts and to reform the management of CAMPFIRE revenues. What can be said is that greater devolution has been on CA's agenda over the last few years. However, DA (2003a) suggests that outside forces (Donors and some CSPs) have nudged CA in this direction, rather than CA taking the lead. For example:

- The Netherlands did not renew their funding for CA in 1999, largely because they felt RDCs were not the proper vehicle for the implementation of CAMPFIRE, and that efforts should be made to deal more directly with producer communities. This was a wake-up call for CA. Other factors were also relevant to the termination decision such as the poor results of the 1998 evaluation of CA and difficulties in the GOZ/Dutch bilateral relations.
- CASS, under its NRMP Grant, funded a large study assessing the extent to which devolution was occurring in CAMPFIRE and what might be done to further enhance the process. This generated interest among RDCs and the CSPs.
- CA did not initially promote the recommendations of the PWC revenue study and the subsequent workshop. However, CA gradually came to endorse it as some RDCs took up the cause (e.g. Chiredzi by piloting direct payments from safari operators to communities) and as CA began to grapple with its own financial viability, which in the future, would be highly dependent on the amount of revenue generated by RDCs. A change in CA leadership was also positive in this regard. Recently, this study was presented to the membership at the CA 2003 AGM in the form of published revenue guidelines.

At the policy level, CA has been largely unsuccessful in pursuing a devolutionary mandate which, it must be said, has been difficult given the political circumstances in Zimbabwe, associated as they are with increasing tendencies towards centralisation:

- The Rukuni Land Tenure Commission, which recognized and based many of its recommendations on the powerful dynamic of the CAMPFIRE programme, was never implemented and never resulted in any land reform (e.g. group tenure at village level).
- The Traditional Leaders Act (GoZ, 1998) provides for two components of a devolved approach (i.e. establishing locality boundaries and Assemblies) but stops short of the crucial third component – entitlement – in much the same way as the initiation of VIDCOs and WADCOs in the Presidential Directive (1984) failed to provide the basis for community proprietorship and development.
- The Environmental Management Act (GoZ, 2002), also fails to pursue the devolution issue, once again vesting authority in RDCs.
- At the level of state agencies, limited headway has been made with devolution of timber, forest products or minerals.

The timing of CAMPFIRE coincided with the liberalization of the economy (under the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme). It also used the argument that equity required that communities were entitled to the same rights as private landholders to great effect. NRMP II, by contrast, occurred in a more hostile policy environment. It coincided with a period of increased central control and economic decline. Moreover, DNPWLM, which had initially created and driven the CAMPFIRE programme, largely abrogated its conservation mandate and responsibility for overseeing conformance to the administrative conditions on which Appropriate Authority was initially founded. Simply maintaining the devolution of wildlife at its present level might, in the light of this, be seen as an achievement.

However, more could and should have been done, and until recently there is little evidence that CA has pursued a devolutionary mandate. In this regard, CA, as an association that effectively represents RDCs, is in a difficult position. As illustrated by revenue devolution data (figures 15, 16, 17), it has presided over some slippage in the past several years. RDCs with severe funding difficulties are extracting an increasing amount of CAMPFIRE revenues. CA has not whole-heartedly taken up this challenge, either with policy (until recently) or peer-enforcement of CAMPFIRE's devolutionary policies.

In conclusion, CA has done well in developing its RDC constituency, but has been unable to take on the responsibilities of an implementing agency, or to position itself to become financially or technically self-sustaining. To do so, it needs to broaden the membership of the Board with financial, legal and private sector representation. It also needs to broaden Association membership by recognising producer communities as full members, and also by categorising private conservancies as producer communities. The artificial distinction between community approaches on private and communal land is no longer appropriate.

C. ROLE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTOR (DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES)

a) Rational And Role Of Institutional Contractor

Under NRMP I most implementers experienced difficulties in managing and administering USAID grant funds. Subsequently, as a remedy to these difficulties, the Institutional Contractor was selected in NRMP II to act as a financial/managerial intermediary between USAID and those implementing partners that required grant management assistance. From the very outset, the implementers under NRMP II did not view the IC's role as one of "partner". Nor was the IC to assume or seek to assume decision-making roles related to the planning or implementation of the CAMPFIRE program except in cases where such roles were delegated to the IC by the CCG itself. The IC was to execute, manage and administer grants to the CA, its RDC members, and some CCG members. In addition, the IC was to build, through specific in-service training programs the general management and administrative capacities of the CA, its RDC members and those members of the CCG that required such assistance. This was intended to ensure program sustainability beyond the life of the contract.

Furthermore, the IC had to ensure in advance that the grantees had adequate management and accounting systems to safeguard US Government funds and was ultimately to be held responsible for financial accountability. In its relationship with the CA, this put the IC in a very awkward position of the IC having to administer the grant, and on the other to play the role of mentor, friend, adviser, hand-holder and guide which clashed with its watchdog role of guarding financial accountability and, at times, having to micromanage petty financial matters. While the IC played the role of policeman well, it was the mentoring and capacity building role that suffered most.

Under its contractual obligations, the IC was expected to assist with short term TA in areas of:

- Grant proposal development, and/or
- Supporting technical analyses (e.g. limited scope environmental assessments, economic/financial assessments, social soundness assessments, and institutional assessments).

b) PriceWaterhouseCoopers

DA contracted PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) to provide additional capacity building. PWC supplied interim Financial Managers (FM) for DA for contract initiation and a permanent Financial Manager from March 1997 through September 2002. PWC:

- Provided DA with secretarial and bookkeeping services from Contract inception to September 2000.
- Conducted pre-award surveys of WWF, CASS and CA and an overhead rate study of WWF in the first few months of the DA Contract, and a second pre-award survey of CA in 1997 followed by its certification as entity eligible to receive USAID funding. Provided extensive, financial management training and capacity building to the CA in preparation for it receiving USAID funds. CA financial certification was acquired in 1997.
- Provided advisory services to CA for the development of its long-term grant proposal in mid-1996 (CA only had a bridge-funding arrangement during its first year of operations).
- Conducted Strategic Planning and training exercises for CA starting with a CA Board workshop in February 1996 followed by Technical Assistance (TA) for development of a CA five-year strategic plan and a Board planning workshop held in Nyanga late 1997.
- Provided TA for the development of a CAMPFIRE-CA endowment/fund.
- Completed organizational development for CA (job descriptions, job grading, determination of pay levels, etc.) by October 1997 and followed up with related services in 1998.
- Determined the hardware/software and training requirements needed by RDCs to enhance communications with CA/other stakeholders via the introduction of email usage; completed 1999/2000.
- Provided TA and training services to improve CASS's financial management of its Grant, completed in 2000.
- Concluded its assessment of the CAMPFIRE revenue performance in 2001, and, in mid-2002, presented its findings and recommendations to RDCs in a workshop organized by CA.

c) Institutional Capacity Building and the CAMPFIRE Development Fund

Early in phase II, CA and the IC decided to concentrate on implementing institutional capacity building (ICB) projects before embarking on funding community projects. We question the soundness of separating ICBs and CDF projects, and why more use was not made of pilot projects, especially a small grant window, to adaptively develop funding criteria. We also note that there were communication difficulties within the project as many of the initial 150 projects submitted did not fit funding criteria and were rejected. Much of the first three years was spend developing ICB projects (table 29). The first CDF project was the Chiredzi Veldt Fire Management signed in October 1999, almost four years after NRMP started, and the second was the Vhimba Eco-Tourism Project signed in August 2000 (almost five years). As table 29 illustrates, the average gap between ICB and CDF was about three years. There were 30 ICBs and 21 Large CDFs. It took five years to come up with the idea of a small grants window that enabled the communities to actually access the CDF, and this then worked well. The first project approved was for Umzingwane on November 6, 2000.

Training programmes on the accessing of CDF funds, project proposal development and financial matters were provided by the IC (often through a sub-contract with PWC) to RDCs. This entailed large, complicated and not very user-friendly manuals. Part of the delay in implementation was caused by the slow development of the CDF manual, which was "too complex for communities". This manual is far more

complex than that of other donors (e.g. CIRAD), and the delays in its development is attributed to USAID imposing a number of complex requirements and becoming over-proprietary of the manual.

Following training, it still took RDCs the better part of a year or more after the initial concept approval to come up with detailed project designs that could comply with the stringent requirements of USAID grant funding under the CDF. The absence of a CDF manual in the early years of phase II made it all the more difficult for the intended recipients to access CDF funds. The CDF manual came out late in 1998 and orientation and familiarization of the RDCs and recipient communities with the CDF manual seems to have been insufficient. The situation was compounded by a high turnover of staff at RDC level. This meant that those who had been trained may have left their jobs or been transferred to other jurisdictions thus leaving the RDCs without trained personnel to access the CDF. Furthermore, within DA there was a high staff turnover, with four different people in the position of Project's Manager within six years. A reluctance to visit field sites in the early part of the project is also blamed for communication problems and slow project startup. These factors contributed to the fact that it took so long to get CDF projects off the ground.

The CDF comprised a two-phase approach:

- ICB - Capacitating RDCs initially by deploying CDF grant funding for RDC institutional capacity building (typically support to procure office equipment, transport, staff and community level training, etc),
- CDF - offering support for infrastructure projects.

This was not ideal, as capacity-building is best done in conjunction with hands on work. Consequently, it did not often reap the expected benefits.

There is some debate as to whether the IC employed the "right" kind of professionals for providing assistance to RDCs in the technical aspects of CDF project proposals, and whether the IC fully anticipated just how much of this role they would eventually have to take on, given CA's lack of capacity and the declining technical capacity of the NGOs. Consequently, the qualifications of IC project development officers were of a "grant making and administration" instead of a "hands on" practical and vocational nature, and may not have sufficiently matched the requirement for field implementation. To their credit, DA adapted to this situation, employing a seasoned industry insider as a project development officer, after which CDF community projects started to roll. In fact, the small grant window facility emanated also in this period (sadly towards the end of NRM II).

The project design did not anticipate this wide role for the IC and its staff did not ideally match the requirements of field-based projects. It also under-estimated the need for technical engineering-type capacity, the match between this requirement and CCG capacities, and the declining ability of CCG members to provide the anticipated technical expertise. This had some impact on slow start of community project funding (though not ICB projects). The weak capacity of engineers and technical staff at RDC level compounded the delays. The technical proposals on eco-tourism required sound engineering, architectural design, siting, and marketing input for such projects to comply with the requirements of USAID grant mechanisms.

In its comments DA notes that the first two Project Managers were "skilled in community-based project development, interagency collaboration and training – pretty much the combination of skills needed in the early stages of the CDF development and the need to deal with interagency collaboration and CA institutional development issues. About the time that engineering, tourism and strong management skills were most needed, [a person with tourism and engineering experience] was hired, initially under a short term TA arrangement and soon after as a full time employee. that It would be hard to argue that these were not the right kind of people for the CDF". Accepting the complexities of the start-up phase, we nevertheless cannot easily find the evidence that Project Managers got the CDF working except in its latter stages. Were the challenge of the task, and therefore staffing requirements, under-estimated? DA notes, "it was not originally envisaged that the IC would have to provide hands on practical service".

The wildlife utilisation and safari industry in Zimbabwe has some of the most adaptable, innovative and successful business practitioners and technical safari experts in tourism infrastructure in Southern Africa. And yet the IC (perhaps because of CA policies) addressed the issue of establishing direct contact with ZATSO (the leading association in the tourism industry) inadequately, to establish synergies between community infrastructure projects (particularly eco-tourism) and the tourism sector. The IC could have hired expertise directly from the industry to develop ecotourism enterprises. ZATSO and its membership should

also have been used as partners in development. This was suggested (e.g. by USAID) but never followed up by CA.

DA confirms "short-term TA specialists were admittedly a mixed bag, ranging from solid types... to other more university types and others with less hands on/relevant experience. It should also be noted that there was considerable pressure/oversight (by CA and GOZ) in the hiring process to spread the goodies around, give preference where reasonable to indigenous folks, etc. The IC was particularly careful of its role in this regard since there was the perception by CA and the GOZ that favouritism might be occurring in the TA hiring business. In fact, The CA Director at one time was actively promoting the notion that the IC was up to no good in this regard. So it is not surprising that finding the highest quality of TA was not always feasible given the above circumstances." DA also distances itself from the choice of consultants and explains: "The system used was for each RDC to source their consultant through competitive means. A database of consultants was kept by DA/CA for reference by the RDC's if they so wished. In all cases the RDC would propose their choice of consultant to be approved by DA/CA. If the choice of consultants was wrong, the RDC also had a significant part to play in this and should therefore accept part of the responsibility. Consultants were not 'forced on' nor 'allocated' from Harare."

d) Building the Capacity of CAMPFIRE Association

The Institutional Contractor was also responsible for training and capacity building of the CA. Most of the training of the financial section of CA was on-the-job-training, but with high staff turnover it is difficult to see much impact. In general, CA was not willing or able to capitalize on the capacity building efforts of the Institutional Contractor. Although TA was provided by the IC for personnel development, HRD and staff performance appraisal, the quality of staff currently employed by CA does not reflect much impact of any training or staff upgrading having been provided. The change in CA leadership between 1998-2002 was also a major factor.

All in all, IC has been a good gatekeeper, assessing technical and viability requirements and accountability where the USAID manuals called for this. However, its role as a controlling force and messenger was also frustrating, as few of other PMT members provided similarly rigorous technical scrutiny of projects and it was often the lone voice saying 'no'. In CA, it faced a major challenge in building a sustainable NGO. And, it must be said, it failed, largely due to various externalities and role conflicts. For example, and a design flaw in the project, was the role conflict between CA's capacity building and controlling roles. Its mandate of build CA's capacity was not always encouraged by the latter. Capacity building is a joint operation for the mentor and the grantee. For reasons of role conflict (i.e. DA was supposed to be a grant gatekeeper and to provide capacity-building) and of personalities, this relationship was not as productive as it could have been through much of the project period. The complicated relationship between CA and DA really compromised the effectiveness of DA operations especially, but not only, with the CA capacity building and sustainability work.

D. ROLE OF USAID, HARARE OFFICE

The role of USAID, through Strategic Objective Team 1, was the day-to-day monitoring of NRMP implementation and keeping USAID aware of the Program's general implementation status. Specifically, roles included:

- Preparation of project documentation, amendments, agreements and implementation letters.
- In coordination with PMT, manage and monitor all grants to GoZ agencies.
- With BRC and PMT, contract and manage final Program impact evaluation.
- Routine USAID programme correspondence.
- Provide material oversight for the Institutional Contractor.
- Monitor Program implementation, including adherence to USAID regulations and progress towards stated objectives.

USAID personnel were highly committed to the CAMPFIRE programme, and played an increasingly active role, especially in the PMT and concerning the approval of individual CDF projects. USAID was placed in a difficult position following the demise of the CCG, and the increasing unacceptability of devolution in the Ministries of Tourism and Local Government (MLGPWNH) in the mid to late 1990s. Even retrospectively, it is difficult to judge whether the decision to fund CAMPFIRE in the face of important programme difficulties

that compromised project design (i.e. the increasing hegemony of CA and alienation of CCG partners; the failure by CA to include producer communities as members) especially at the time of the Mid Term Evaluation was correct. However, the marginalisation of the CCG and civic society generally from the programme, left USAID in an important, and possibly unwelcome, leadership and vetoing position. Together with DA, USAID was often in the difficult position of having to argue the unpleasant fact that a project was not viable and should not be funded. USAID became very much part of the CAMPFIRE managerial team, largely by default. While this was an important factor in controlling the project and supporting DA following the decline of the CCG, the question of whether a donor should be such an active participant was raised several times. Should USAID have allowed itself to get into this position?

In the absence of the leadership that had initiated the CAMPFIRE programme, USAID can be criticised for not being more visionary and forceful in ensuring project sustainability (yet, it is also often criticised for being too "hands on"). While the sustainability issue was often drawn to the attention of CA, and USAID eventually dealt with it by cutting back funding, perhaps USAID should have been stronger and also more innovative in insisting on approaches that would lead to project sustainability. An important case was the failure to develop any form of endowment or sinking fund mechanism. We have already referred to this recommendation in the Mid Term Review. The clash between the four-year establishment frameworks for endowments in the USAID bureaucracy, and the two-year NRMP II closeout period, also played a role. In the event, although NRMP was periodically extended five years beyond the Mid Term Evaluation, there was never more than a two-year planning horizon.

Although considered briefly by USAID, USAID never accepted the Mid Term recommendation (at least for the use of USAID funds) for an endowment/sinking fund (Loken, comments). This reflected bad past regional experiences with similar endowments (e.g., Swaziland – 1998-99), time constraints and fears that such a mechanism would be misused by the CA. Instead, USAID tried to help the CA consider something appropriate for meeting this need with other source funds (e.g. Ellsworth report, Murphree proposals, and, later, the SGI consultancies). However, the CA never really appeared interested in follow-up on the early work (as, basically, per usual, they wanted their own endowment, excluding all others, as laid out in the SGI, and the early consultants were not recommending this).

Thus, not only was the design, and therefore sustainability, of the CDF constrained by the conflicts and political pressures mentioned, but USAID was not able or willing to consider innovative suggestions.

Seven years on, it is easy to be critical of project design, and we do so in the light of the political constraints mentioned throughout this document. Nevertheless, NRMP II was overly top down, overly constrained by bureaucratic procedure, and with more imagination in the design of the project (e.g. match a component of CDF grants to fiscal devolution), it could have supported devolution far more directly than attempting to pursue devolution in a rather cumbersome manner through RDCs. The use of an endowment or sinking fund could also have extended the life of the funding so it better matched the absorption profile of communities.

E. PROJECT MODEL AND PROJECT DESIGN

Two Government Ministries and several Zimbabwe-based NGOs worked together to initiate CAMPFIRE. These entities, known first as the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group and subsequently as CAMPFIRE Service Providers (CSPs), provided considerable assistance to the movement during its first decade of development. The CCG also facilitated the establishment of the CAMPFIRE Association as the lead agency to represent the CAMPFIRE constituency and coordinate/orchestrate the work of CSPs to support CAMPFIRE. USAID funds were to support the strengthening of CA's institutional capabilities and to fund most of the technical inputs of the CSPs.

For several reasons, most of which we have already touched upon, the delivery model could have worked better:

- CA was correctly posited at the lead coordinating agency, but has remained an RDC-linked organization and has not evolved into a true producer association.
- The conversion of CCG members into CSPs removed critical long-term relationship-based facilitation from the programme, as well as diversity and civic peer review.

- The loss of the CCG, and its replacement by a government and RDC dominated forum (PMT; BRC), represents a significant reduction in the capacity and civil leadership of CAMPFIRE.
- The centralization of the programme around one agency (CA) and one donor (USAID) threatens the long-term sustainability, diversity and resilience of the programme.
- The balance between political and technical/commercial consideration in the model is swayed too heavily in the direction of the former, with too few technical, commercial and intellectual checks and balances.
- Too much money was supply-driven, too fast through a top-down system, and consequently was often not invested well (at least in terms of commercial criteria), nor developed into a sustainable financing mechanism.
- The project only marginally used the opportunity provided by the early promise of producer communities and their ability to use money well and locally. Had procedures been adapted to fund sub-district levels, which already absorb at least USD1 million annually (RDCs and management absorbs another USD1 million) and use this money well, the Project could easily have utilized all its financial resources.
- Too little effort was put into the testing, development, monitoring and institutionalising of local management and financial systems.
- As noted in other sections, too little effort was put into developing a comprehensive management information system. While most information can be found (except monitoring of sub-district conformance and performance; and measures of capacity building), this takes considerable digging, and the absence of compilation and analysis within the Project points to weakness in terms of adaptive management capacity.

The strengths of the approach have been:

- The geographic spread of the program;
- The development or enhancement of capacity at RDC level;
- The development of technology, with WWF scoring particularly highly here (although sustainability is problematic).

However, the Project would have benefited from a clearer vision, and much tighter performance accountability and rigour on the institutional development component (initially ZimTrust, later CA, DA and RDCs).

Donors definitely have a role to play in CAMPFIRE's future. The primary objectives should be:

- To provide a small amount of high quality, relationship-based technical support to RDCs, producer communities and, perhaps, to key officials in MLGPWNH and DNPWLM. Mediocrity must be avoided, and recognised leaders in their field should be recruited. Within the programme, there are already too many good middle managers for it to benefit from more of the same.
- To support CASS-type research into, particularly, institutional development and performance control systems. External, analytical review was an important strength of the earlier program (albeit an irritation in the case of researchers who were too academic, or lacked real competence).
- To strengthen the managerial capacity of RDC CAMPFIRE Units by training staff to support well-designed sub-district management systems.
- To link all funding to performance, with key criteria being managerial and fiscal devolution, income/benefit generation, and implementation performance.

- If significant amounts of funding are intended to flow through the system, this should be (1) linked to devolution (2) based on performance and commercial criteria and (3) established as a long-term self-replenishing (to some extent) funding mechanism.

The current trend is clearly towards less interagency cooperation/ communication, with CA and other agencies independently running their CAMPFIRE activities. Unfortunately, the high level of inter-agency cooperation associated with the low level of financial support, a strong, well articulated common vision and careful delineation of roles that led to earlier successes under CAMPFIRE was not carried through into NRMP II, and may have been exacerbated rather than ameliorated by the large amounts of money involved (not forgetting critical importance of the spread of the CAMPFIRE programme). There has been a considerable loss of capacity in the leadership of the program.

V. Performance of Collaborative Partners and Support Agencies

A. MLGPWNH (PREVIOUSLY KNOWN AS MLGRUD)

The role of MLGPWNH is to promote, support and regulate local governance structures and processes. It is to ensure transparency and accountability in the management of local affairs. The ministry will thus insist on the openness in the conduct of public affairs by RDCs, WADCOs, VIDCOs, and Traditional Leadership. As part of playing its role the Ministry has to insist on the involvement of people in the planning process, the timely preparation of financial statements and production of audited statements and the holding of report back sessions by councillors back in their wards. The ministry provides the vision and an avenue for co-ordinating local development.

In the NRMP II and CAMPFIRE the Ministry was expected to:

- Assist in formulating policies and procedures and in addressing relevant policy issues affecting CAMPFIRE
- Provide technical assistance and training to village, ward and RDC CAMPFIRE Committees and Programme staff
- Monitor the use of CAMPFIRE Funds, and conduct regular financial audits of RDC CAMPFIRE Accounts
- Review and approve RDC projects funded under CAMPFIRE Development Fund
- Provide oversight and approval of local government capital and recurrent cost budgets and NRMP and CAMPFIRE activities
- Provide assistance in mediating resource conflicts within RDCs
- Monitor district and sub-district level activities of Programme-funded NGO service providers
- Assist in overall NRMP and CAMPFIRE management, coordination, and monitoring and evaluation

Specific to CAMPFIRE, the Ministry has been advising RDCs on the drafting and adoption of natural resource by-laws and has also processed, reviewed and gazetted NRM by-laws submitted to it. The Ministry has also evaluated all project proposals from RDCs and Service providers. The evaluation reports were all sent to Development Associates. The Ministry has presented and discussed the 1999/2000 RDC financial accounts to Development Associates. The ministry supplements this information by periodic visits to RDCs (e.g. Chikuruwo et al, 2000). The ministry sat on PET and PMT to review and approve RDC projects funded under CAMPFIRE Development Fund

However, despite the above progress, the Ministry has been unable and is still to attend to some pressing issues that would have helped with the smooth implementation of the project. Some of these are:

- MLGPWNH claims that USAID budget cuts and the poor performance of the Zimbabwean economy forced the ministry to cut some of its trips and prevented specific assignments like auditing CAMPFIRE accounts (The ministry has limited itself to including the CAMPFIRE accounts in the audit of the General Accounts). USAID notes that funding to MLGPWNH was reduced because they were not spending the funds allocated to them, and that this occurred even before the decline in the economy, suggesting a lack of performance on the part of MLGPWNH.
- The ministry has not carried out a thorough assessment of some of the programme components, like the CDF. While CDF has allowed RDCs and communities to access resources for project implementation, a significant resources has been spent on consultancies sometimes, especially in the early stages of the CDF, with little tangible result on the ground. The ministry has also not come up with an alternative Operational Manual for CDF, although it had been its intention. Most RDC staff find it difficult to comprehend and use the present operational manual. As a result most RDCs have found it difficult to submit acceptable proposals leading the ministry to suggest that RDCs should travel all the way to Harare to submit their proposals so that where there are difficulties the RDC staff can be assisted on the spot in re-writing the proposal.
- The PMT is dominated by politicians and this is frustrating the decision making process. The ministry would like to see the addition of more technocrats into the PMT.

- The devolution of CAMPFIRE beyond the RDC level was raised at the last review but the Ministry is not aware of further debate and discussion on this subject. The proposals on the devolution must include discussion on how the proposed community trusts will relate to the traditional leadership structures and processes. It should also define the new power and functional relationships between the RDC and the new community structures.

(Note that MLGPWNH has been totally opposed to any form of real devolution, and even fought with the CA against the proposed trusts - see PMT minutes).

- The Ministry welcomed the diversification of CAMPFIRE into other natural resources beyond wildlife. However, the ministry is still to assess the viability of these new ventures. From the Ministry's experience, such ventures have suffered in the past.

In terms of prospects for the future, the ministry is of the view that:

- CA needs to review its membership. It needs to bring a wide range of expertise that will encourage further development of the project
- The CA secretariat is weak and will need further strengthening
- Devolution is acceptable in principle but has to be looked at in relation to the RDC and Traditional Leadership Acts. The resource being dealt with is complex and will need a thorough national discussion before a decision to decentralise appropriate authority is reached.
- The trusts that are being created in some RDCs will need to be reviewed in the context of the whole devolution discussion

However, a comparison of performance against the responsibilities allocated to the ministry by the Project Grant Agreement (Number 6) indicate significant performance gaps:

- There has been some progress in working with CA to finalise the revenue distribution guidelines, but otherwise the impact of empowering sub-district communities with real authority has not been recognised.
- Except through RDCs, the ministry has generally had insufficient resources to provide technical assistance and training to village, ward and RDC CAMPFIRE Committees and Programme staff. For example, the vehicle supplied by USAID was parked for nearly 18 months because of insufficient resources to pay for its insurance.
- In two years, the ministry attempted to monitor the use of CAMPFIRE Funds, at least at RDC level, but no consolidated audit reports are available. Auditing, or spot auditing, of sub-district CAMPFIRE revenues was not done by the ministry, and nor were guidelines developed. Some checking was done by RDC CAMPFIRE Units.
- In the normal course of its duties, the ministry provided some oversight and approval of local government capital and recurrent cost budgets and NRMP, but there is not much evidence of specific attention being given to CAMPFIRE activities, except at the local level where food-for-work programmes assisted in the construction of CDF projects
- The ministry has provided some assistance in mediating resource conflicts within RDCs, although in the period under review a number of RDCs were dissolved for reasons of politics, pay disputes or under-performance.
- There is little evidence of any comprehensive monitoring of district level activities, let alone records of sub-district level activities.
- While the ministry has assisted in overall NRMP and CAMPFIRE management, coordination, and monitoring and evaluation, given its administrative power a greater level of commitment could have resulted in much higher project impact.

B. DNPWLM

The Department is the statutory authority for wildlife management on all land in Zimbabwe. While it was transformed into the Parks and Wildlife Management Authority in 2003, the original name is retained in this document. Recognizing the failure of punitive conservation, the Department granted appropriate authority to all private landholders in 1975. In 1982, the Parks and Wild Life Act was amended to allow the granting of the same rights to local communities. To replicate the success of private-land conservation, appropriate

authority was provided to twelve wildlife districts in 1989 and 1990, thus giving rise to the CAMPFIRE programme. The Department's role was several-fold:

- To monitor compliance with the administrative conditions it had linked to appropriate authority. In this regard, and in fulfillment of its statutory obligations to wildlife conservation, it was insistent that revenues were returned to "producer communities" and regularly inspected RDC accounts to ensure that this was the case.
- It approved quotas, but also sought to ensure that this responsibility, and the responsibility to choose wildlife operators and manage wildlife revenues were exercised by producer communities in collaboration with Councils.
- In recognition of the primacy of its regulatory and monitoring role, and its lack of resources and expertise to undertake the full range of developmental activities associated with CAMPFIRE, it co-opted several NGOs as implementing partners for CAMPFIRE. This gave rise to the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Groups. The Department also encouraged the development of the CAMPFIRE Association, and its own replacement as lead CAMPFIRE agency.

Note that this was achieved largely without donor funding, the exception being a USD50,000 grant from NORAD.

During NRMP I, USD1,981,425 was disbursed to DNPWLM, mainly for managing natural resources in Matabeleland as this affected the four NRMP districts. Disbursement in NRMP II was USD179, against a commitment of USD4,363. No advantage was taken of access to further funding offered by USAID.

Following the Mid Term Review, Amendment Number 6 (USAID, 1998) allocated the following roles to the Department.

1. Provide guidance to the CAMPFIRE partners on all wildlife matters, as well as technical training and training assistance to RDCs and local communities;
2. Monitor CAMPFIRE implementation to ensure continuing biological integrity;
3. Assist RDCs in setting wildlife offtake quotas, the control of problem animals (PAC), the enforcement of quotas, etc.
4. Conduct CAMPFIRE-related ecological and economic research and monitoring, and dissemination of the results of this work at the sub-district, district and national levels, and in the various international forums;
5. Represent CAMPFIRE interests internationally, and support the development of markets for Programme-generated products;
6. Provide strategic management inputs for CAMPFIRE operations, including ecological, economic and institutional data and operating guidelines; and
7. Coordinating national park planning and management activities with participating neighbouring communities.

Reported outputs (sourced from interviews and DNPWLM CAMPFIRE 1998 Annual Report) by the Department in the review period include:

- Some support provided to fisheries in the Midlands including restocking and institutional follow up.
- Game guard training at Mushandike in 2000.
- The approval of further applications for Appropriate Authority status.
- The approval of quotas, as recommended by RDCs.
- A workshop on revenue distribution guidelines (with no apparent follow-up).

The Department discontinued its primary and crucial role of monitoring RDC compliance with the intentions of appropriate authority status. Interviews suggested the assumption was that this monitoring is now the

responsibility of MLG. Statutorily this is incorrect. Furthermore, MLGPWNH also does not currently have the capacity to audit and report on CAMPFIRE monies. It is therefore recommended that, in liaison with MLGPWNH, the Department set a requirement that annual RDC audits included a specific audit and report of CAMPFIRE funds, by category – namely revenue devolved to communities, spent in direct support of the CAMPFIRE program by the RDC, and revenue retained by the RDC.

Despite considerable preparatory work during NRMP I, there was no work on furthering devolutionary legislation at government level. However, there is a Wildlife-Based Land Reform, published as a Government of Zimbabwe document, which recognizes many of the principles of the CAMPFIRE program, namely that:

- Wildlife production will be maintained where it is the most appropriate land use option
- Wildlife management responsibility and authority will be devolved to the most appropriate level.
- The policy recognizes the importance of authority, responsibility and incentive system in fostering viable wildlife production systems.

The Department lost much of its capacity to provide economic, ecological and other technical advice, and fulfilled its responsibilities for animal census and quota management and monitoring largely through partnerships with WWF and RDCs. While USAID claims that funds were available to the Department, the Department claims that no resources were given to the CAMPFIRE Coordinating Unit to cover activities at a national scale. The Department also notes that during NRMP 1 USAID advanced funds to it, but "in phase 3 (?) this was dropped in favour of reimbursement" which the Department was unable to handle administratively.

Our conclusion is that the Department either lost interest in CAMPFIRE or lacked the capacity to support it. It may even have considered CAMPFIRE a threat to its hegemony. We cite the Department's comments to reflect a major change in emphasis from its initial determination to facilitate the devolution of wildlife to landholders: "Historical reference to Dande, Malapati and Chirisa Safaris areas in respect to communicate is not of an consequence [see two paragraphs down for explanation]. What is important is the current status of these areas. They are part of the Parks and Wildlife Estate and they under the jurisdiction of the Parks & Wildlife Act. The NRMP II project was implemented concurrently with the transformation of then DNPWN to Parks & Wildlife Management Authority. This changed the focus of the DNPWN as services to the Rural District Council started operating on cost recovery basis. The DNPWM could not champion devolution of wildlife resources when other natural resources lagged behind."

At the local level, field visits indicated that Departmental staff were generally helpful and, while under-resourced, often assisted with matters such as PAC. However, there were also bureaucratic frustrations such as Muzarabani being required to register PAC ivory at the provincial office in Marondera.

The reversal of the precedent that former communal land game reserves (i.e. Malipati, Dande and Chirisa Safari Areas) should, by rights and as agreed at their formation, benefit people from these areas caused considerable resentment from local people. Regarding the policy of actively encouraging neighbouring landholders to use and benefit from access to parks, and thus expand the national wildlife industry, field visits suggested that the relationship between the Department was now ambiguous and depended more on individuals than on policy direction. Thus, Chiredzi communities had expended considerable effort and funds to rehabilitate Manjinji Pan (a small protected area – botanical reserve – immediately south of Gonarezhou) and were irate that the Department, having long-neglected this park, would not allow communities to reap any benefits. By contrast, Mahenye continued to benefit from tourism access into Gonarezhou, and also an annual (and traditional) fish drive in the Runde River within the park.

When appropriate authority was extended to private landholders through the Parks and Wild Life Act of 1975, this used the Intensive Conservation Area structure of the Natural Resources Act (1941) as the primary, and locally based, mechanism of control. To fulfill its statutory responsibilities, DNPWLM reserved for itself the right to intervene in the cases of abuses. The system of local control worked so well that this intervention was seldom necessary, with DNPWLM achieving its conservation aims on private land at extremely low costs. Following this excellent example, the recommended devolution of authority to producer communities on communal land should be accompanied by a similar mechanism of neighbour-based checks-and-balances.

The legal implications of the claim that the state 'owns' wildlife should also be noted. Legal, wildlife is owned *res nullius*, which means it is owned by no-one, but that ownership is achieved by exerting a use

right such as hunting wildlife on one's land. Indeed, one of the prime motivating factors for the promulgation of the Parks and Wildlife Act, was legal action taken and won by a landholder in Matetsi in 1973. On the basis that wildlife was owned by the state, this landholder sued government for the grazing utilized by 'their' wildlife and won, thus rendering the standing legislation unworkable.

C. DNR

The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) falls under the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. Its mandate is to enable the Natural Resources Board (NRB) to implement the Natural Resources Act which is a major piece of legislation that influences the management of natural resources in Zimbabwe. In view of this, DNR is a focal point for natural resources management at all levels in the country. DNR is involved in a number of natural resources management initiatives, the most important of these being the District Environmental Action Planning programme (DEAP), the Bio-diversity Programme and the National Action Programme.

Prior to 1998, DNR was involved in CAMPFIRE only through information sharing at meetings and workshops. The department did not make any direct technical input to the CAMPFIRE programme because CAMPFIRE was mainly concerned with wildlife management. It was the introduction of diversification in CAMPFIRE that necessitated DNR's participation in NRMP II. The department was formerly invited by the CA in 1998, was contracted by NRMP II during the same year and held its initiation workshop in January 1999.

a) Responsibilities

- Provide guidance to CAMPFIRE partners and beneficiaries on Natural Resources Management (NRM) policy and legislation, including salient environmental review requirements;
- Assist Rural District Councils (RDCs) and local communities to develop technical skills in NRM; and
- Provide technical services to CAMPFIRE partners in resource inventory and mapping, monitoring and environmental review.

b) Key Outputs

- Capacity of the Department's CAMPFIRE Unit established;
- Environmental reviews of proposed CAMPFIRE development activities conducted, reviewed and approved;
- Capacities of local communities and groups in natural resources management enhanced;
- Natural resources inventories and environmental monitoring carried out in CAMPFIRE areas; and
- An enabling environment for community-based natural resources management created.

c) Impacts

DNR's CAMPFIRE Unit was created in 1999. Its primary mandate was to create and instil awareness of the CAMPFIRE approach in the department. The Unit hosted an inception workshop, which included officers from district, province and head office levels (see Table 32 below) to create awareness of CAMPFIRE in the department. The CAMPFIRE approach has been integrated in DNR's work, and the department has a CAMPFIRE budget line among its activities that are funded directly by central government.

TABLE 32: PARTICIPATION AT DNR'S CAMPFIRE INITIATION WORKSHOP

Participants	Number
DNR	
District Officers	30
Provincial Officers	16
National level Officers & the Directorate	9
SAFIRE	1
WWF	1
ZimTrust	1
DNPWLM	1
CAMPFIRE Association	1
Total	60

Using NRMP II funding, DNR has undertaken:

- The preparation of the district environmental profile for Bubi District.
- Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) training for RDC Executive Officers (Projects) for six districts in Matabeleland province.
- The formation of District EIA Teams that conducted environmental assessments for CDF project proposals.
- CAMPFIRE awareness training for DNR officers in Mazowe, Hurungwe, Nkayi, Binga and Hwange.

d) Future outlook

DNR would like to see the CAMPFIRE approach being applied to all natural resources utilization at the community level. CAMPFIRE principles should be applied to the extraction of black granite and gold panning as a way of ensuring that communities benefit from these activities and that there is proper control of the management of these resources. An Environmental Management Agency will soon be created to succeed DNR. This will incorporate all environmental related activities in several government ministries.

D. FORESTRY COMMISSION

The Forestry Commission is a parastatal organization established under the Forestry Act (Chapter 19:05) of 1948, and falls under the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. The national mandate of the Forestry Commission is derived from the Forestry Act (Chapter 19:05 as amended in 1999) and the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act (Chapter 20 of 1987), which provide for regulatory, management, capacity enhancement and trading functions within the forestry sector. The Commission received funding for its active participation in NRMP II from July 1998 to July 2000. Its key responsibilities and outputs according to Project grant Agreement Amendment Number 6 were:

a) Responsibilities

- Enhance the productivity and environmental functions of the forests and surrounding communal areas;
- Involve communities in the management and utilization of forest resources in certain reserved areas and surrounding communal lands;
- Improve the socio-economic status of communities surrounding the forests through improved access to tree and forest resources;
- Develop and strengthen the capacity of local institutions, communities and other stakeholders in the management and utilization of forest resources; and
- Develop and recommend appropriate policies for local-level management of tree and forest resources.

b) Key outputs

- Appropriate community-based forest resource management institutions and mechanisms identified and established, and personnel trained in technical and managerial skills;
- Community woodland management action plans developed and implemented;
- Community-level natural resources management by-laws developed, adopted and adapted by local communities, ratified by RDCs, and implemented.

c) Impacts

Community-based woodland management was strengthened. The Commission worked with communities in seven pilot districts to enhance woodland management by diversifying as well as adding value to non-wildlife products. The seven districts were Binga, Lupane (Kusile), Bulilima mangwe, Gwanda, Guruve, Muzarabani and Nkayi. Training and extension work focused on:

- Demonstrating the commercial value of a wide range of forest products such as mopane caterpillars ("macimbi") in Bulilima and Mangwe, masau in Muzarabani and Gurube, and honey in Binga and Gwanda;
- Skills development for processing these forest products;
- Woodland management skills; and
- Institutionalising the commercial utilization of non-timber forest products.

In terms of policy on RDCs' distribution of timber royalties at the district level, the Commission influenced RDCs to adopt the CAMPFIRE approach in the distribution of revenue derived from timber. Some of the RDCs e.g. Nkayi, are now giving communities more than 15% of the revenue from timber royalties.

Diversification: As a result of its participation in the policy, training, coordination and diversification committees of the CAMPFIRE programme under NRMP II, the Forestry Commission helped to take CAMPFIRE beyond wildlife. Products such as mopane worms, honey, timber, and thatching grass are now regarded as important sources of revenue for producer communities.

Regarding the masau project in Gurube and Muzarabani, NRMP II enabled the Commission to consolidate research, extension and product development with respect to management and utilization of masau. The Commission conducted an inventory of processing technologies in the two districts in 1999, and contracted Ranche House College's Food Unit to run a course on masau processing for communities in the two districts. Awareness workshops on the market potential for masau were also conducted in both Gurube and Muzarabani. The workshops promoted information sharing among communities, RDC Officers and CSPs such as ZimTrust and SAFIRE. The impact of this intervention is:

- Direct cash income for households that collect and sell masau to the project. This was confirmed by field visits where communities now attach monetary value to the masau fruit, which they consider to be preferable to the former system of bartering for such things as salt and sugar.
- Value adding to the raw material (masau fruit) as products from masau (beverages and powder) earn more money than the raw fruits.
- Enhanced conservation of masau as evidenced by reduction in the cutting of masau trees. Masau have become the dominant shade trees at schools and homes in Lower Gurube.
- Move towards the domestication of masau – as evidenced by the introduction of masau in tree nurseries in the districts.

Regarding the "Development of Mopane Resource Management Programme", the Commission assisted communities in Bulilimangwe and Gwanda districts to commercialise mopane worm harvesting and processing. Some of the key results of the Commission's intervention were:

- Bulilimangwe formalized a permit system for harvesting and marketing mopane worms.
- The Commission produced technical notes on the ecology of mopane trees and the worms. These were published in Forestry Extension News Magazine and the CAMPFIRE Magazine.
- The Commission developed management guidelines that were adopted by Bulilimangwe district, which has produced by-laws on mopane worm management.
- Communities from Gwanda and Bulilimangwe participated in a look and learn tour to Botswana.

In terms of woodland management institutions and action plans developed:

- Woodland resources management committees were formed at ward level in Binga, Lupane and Nkayi districts.
- Communities in Nkayi established ilala palm plantations to augment the resource found in the ward. Many households are now growing ilala or protecting ilala from wanton destruction.
- Communities from Lupane visited Nkayi on a look and learn tour of ilala projects.

However, it is notable that these are all non-timber activities and that, unlike DNPWLM, Forestry Commission has itself maintained control over the major economic activities, that is the harvesting of indigenous hardwood timber.

d) Future outlook

Lessons from NRMP II are being integrated into the commission's extension work. For example, the Commission is using experiences from Nkayi as a basis for preparing technical information on the agronomy of the ilala palm. Such information will be useful for extension work in other parts of the country. Eco-labelling was proposed as an indicator for products produced by community management. The commission plans to host a national seminar on eco-labelling. No mention was made of the devolved control of indigenous hardwood timber.

E. CASS

a) Responsibilities

CASS has been receiving USAID funding to support the CAMPFIRE Programme since 1989 when it received a grant through to 1996. CASS then received a second grant in 1996. According to the Project Grant Agreement Amendment of August 1998, under NRMP II CASS's primary responsibilities were programme policy and socio-economic research and monitoring activities. Initially CASS had seven end of project results that it was working towards. These were reduced to five, following the Mid-term Evaluation of 1998 (CASS 2000). The following are the initial end of project results/outputs:

- 1) Training materials developed, training of Rural District Council (RDCs) and community representatives initiated, and support provided in execution and analysis of baseline socio-economic studies at local and district level;
- 2) The provision of critical analyses of existing policies, policy issues and the identification of policy options that have been researched, analysed, presented and published;
- 3) The provision of research findings on prioritised CAMPFIRE related issues that have been researched, analysed, presented and published;
- 4) Prioritised advisory services undertaken and provided to clients;
- 5) Assistance and support in establishing socio-economic monitoring and evaluation techniques for district natural resource programmes, enabling the local continuing assessment of the impact of the CAMPFIRE Programme.
- 6) The training of qualified graduates capable of servicing the future needs of the CAMPFIRE Programme
- 7) Enhanced capacity in project management and programme administrative support installed and operational within CASS.

The following are the revised expected end of project results:

- 1) Training needs assessment report for RDCs, CAMPFIRE staff and, if warranted, design course modules on CAMPFIRE and a course(s) on CAMPFIRE;
- 2) Provision of critical analyses of CAMPFIRE policies, activities and impacts;
- 3) Contribution towards the development of feasibility studies for the proposed infrastructure projects;
- 4) Discussion workshops on CAMPFIRE policies;
- 5) Disseminated CAMPFIRE information in the form of publications (research findings) and policy briefs

b) Results

The major changes in focus for CASS brought about by the revised results were to shift from socio-economic monitoring and evaluation and the training of graduates towards meeting the needs of changes in NRMP II brought about by the Mid-term Evaluation. CASS was thus expected to make a direct contribution towards the development of feasibility studies for the CDF projects. From 1998, Phase II of the NRMP marked a change in both the role of CASS and its research agenda. In NRMP II, CASS, as was recommended by the Mid-term Evaluation, withdrew from being a central planning partner in CAMPFIRE and became more of a service provider for specific outputs determined largely by USAID and the CA. In its research agenda, while retaining an interest and involvement in CAMPFIRE issues, CASS moved to a more regional focus encompassing other non-CAMPFIRE initiatives and resource interests. USAID notes (Loken comments) that the shift of CASS funding was prompted by its continued poor performance/results to where it was no longer worth it to invest in core costs.

CASS has managed to achieve most, but not all, of its expected results, although it lost key personnel and experienced other organisational problems that regularly and significantly delayed implementation. CASS did not carry out the training expected of it by the Project. It has been strongest in the production and

dissemination of specific policy studies and other research findings on key issues pertinent to CAMPFIRE. A total of 39 research papers and written contributions to feasibility studies were carried out under NRMP II through to 2000. CASS has also facilitated dialogue among policy makers and stakeholders through workshops. It has selected study topics in consultation with relevant stakeholders and as approved by the CA and DA. It is difficult within the scope and time frame of this evaluation to measure the impact of the CASS policy research and dissemination. Impact is largely dependent upon the uptake of findings by others and such uptake is outside the control of CASS itself, being dependent upon a number of variables including national political trends. It is also often difficult to show a direct causal link between policy research by academics and policy development by government. According to DA (2002) it was principally CA's responsibility to drive activities to promote the development of national policy to advance CAMPFIRE nationwide, and CA was not pro-active in this regard. It was slow to identify policy issues for CASS's attention and stakeholders were not very effective in using the information generated by CASS.

However, the various CASS papers on devolution and institutional issues have helped to keep alive debates on issues concerning the CAMPFIRE principles and how best these might be implemented. The CASS paper on decentralisation and devolution within CAMPFIRE (Chitsike 2000) provides an important reference on possible mechanisms for achieving further devolution to sub-district levels and on the possible institutional arrangements that could promote this. The issues raised and recommendations of the report were presented to stakeholders at a workshop, and have proved useful for underpinning the devolution debate within the CAMPFIRE community.

CASS also produced an options paper on the possible development of a CAMPFIRE Trust, but the CA did not follow this up.

Some initial work was carried out to train communities to undertake baseline surveys, but these activities were discontinued following the 1998 Mid-term Review as there was duplication with the activities of other service providers and the evaluation identified delivery weaknesses in CASS.

By the end of its grant period in 2000 CASS had not carried out its task of a training needs assessment for RDC staff.

By mid 1997 CASS had recruited eight research fellows to assist in carrying out NRMP II activities. Two received doctoral degrees and two obtained masters degrees. The Mid-term Evaluation identified a delivery weakness with the research fellows and recommended that CASS should rather contract short term TA to undertake specific project tasks. CASS (2000) suggests that while this recommendation was correct in some respects, as a result of its implementation, CASS's presence in the CAMPFIRE districts as well as its number of publication decreased dramatically. However, by its own admission, CASS's ability to contribute to CAMPFIRE was below expectations.

NRMP funding has made a significant contribution to management and capacity building within CASS. It assisted the organisation in setting up the necessary structures, staffing and procedures to administer its own research grants independently of the University under the CASS Trust. The USAID grant funded the costs of a book keeper, programme manager, librarian and technician. CASS has been successful in sourcing other grant funds as well as an endowment that enables it to cover its overheads. Annual turnover in USD had risen from nearly 400 000 in 1999 to 1,8 million in 2002.

NRMP funding has contributed the purchase/production of almost 40% of the reading materials in the CASS library.

The total budget received under NRMP II was ZD13 800 000. The main budget lines were as follows:

Training	ZD 168 839
Policy and programme issues analysis	ZD4 667 063
Project Management	ZD7 112 978

By July 2000 CASS had a balance of ZD2 205 745, which it estimated could fund some ongoing activities until March 2001.

c) Outlook

CASS is likely to continue on the current course where linkages between CASS and CAMPFIRE will be less tightly linked, more diffuse and indirect. At the same time, CASS will in its regional and international academic activities continue to focus on issues and present analyses that are broadly supportive of the devolutionist and sustainable use principles that underlie the CAMPFIRE approach.

CASS sees a number of areas of synergy between its current areas of interests and those of CAMPFIRE:

- CASS will continue to use CAMPFIRE data to provide constructively critical analyses on local institutional development.
- Through its regional academic links CASS can provide opportunities for CAMPFIRE to interact with similar initiatives elsewhere in the region in the analysis of institutional issues.
- Multidisciplinary research for land and resource planning in the South East Lowveld that includes CASS will have implications for CAMPFIRE in the areas concerned
- CASS is also interested in developments resulting from resettlement and potential CBNRM approaches that would also be of interest for CAMPFIRE.

CASS also sees three areas of activity in which it could interact with CAMPFIRE more closely:

- a) Institutional research on site-specific CAMPFIRE initiatives (e.g. Nyatana)
- b) The provision of short courses for CAMPFIRE leadership
- c) The development of approaches and techniques for institutional performance monitoring, tailored to local perspectives

F. WWF

WWF has incorporated its component of the NRMP Project within a single and comprehensive programme in support of CAMPFIRE, with NORAD also being a significant donor and additional assistance being provided by Safari Club International and others.

a) Responsibility

In support of NRMP II, the **Immediate Objective** of the NRM WWF MAPS project was:

"Improved technical knowledge available at all levels, including policy levels, to manage, use and benefit from wildlife and other natural resources in wards with the CAMPFIRE Areas".

The following important dates are of relevance to this evaluation:

- Grant agreement signed with Development Associates June 1996
- Project commenced July 1996
- After June 1998 mid-term review, added habitat monitoring (output 1.2) and resource management training (output 5).
- In July 2001, WWF-SARPO offered a no cost extension.
- In March 1999 – merged SUPCAMP (NORAD), Quota-Setting Project (SCI) and Output 5, with NRMP II to define a workplan for training materials development and training programme.
- As at 1 March, 2003, the expenditure to date is USD1,593,065 with USD353,602 remaining.

Agreed outputs are as follows:

1. Monitoring and evaluation
 - 1.1 Annual aerial census of all CAMPFIRE areas carrying large mammal populations in sufficient numbers to warrant an aerial census.
 - 1.2 Monitor the area and quality of wildlife habitat in CAMPFIRE areas (started early 1999)
 - 1.3 Monitoring of financial and economic indicators of performance, revenue generation and related marketing and management information conducted and an appropriate database established for the CAMPFIRE programme.

- 1.4 Organizational development and institutional performance of community based organizations assessed (started July 2001)
- 1.5 CAMPFIRE monitoring and evaluation coordinated (started July 2001)
- 2 Effective technical services provided to assist RDCs in implementation of their CDF projects
- 3 Resource surveys and feasibility studies completed as requested by RDCs.
- 4 Research and information dissemination to assist natural resource management and landuse planning in CAMPFIRE areas.
- 5 Natural resource management training program developed and implemented with CA, RDCs and communities (started early 1999).
- 6 WWF project management and implementation capacity established.

b) Results

The detailed assessment of WWF's performance (Annex H) is comprehensive.

Field visits suggested that WWF's natural resource training methods were highly effective and appreciated, and that this capacity was largely being maintained because of consistent follow-up, structured programmes to train trainers, and a high quality set of manuals. Many years of field-testing were put into the development of these manuals, the quality of which is reflected in their simultaneous properties of simplicity of presentation and sophistication of content. Not only is the technical quality of these manuals excellent, but the seven of the manuals are also accompanied by a trainer's manual. This explains to trainers how to use the manual and other materials, and testifies to WWF's combination of technical wildlife management and educational expertise. Indicative of WWF's capacity is the reporting of its training programme. For instance, under NRMP in 2000 in 2001:

- 31 general exposure training courses were provided to districts by the NRMP II (MAPS) project alone;
- Six training manuals and seven trainers manuals were produced
- The "CAMPFIRE Game" was developed for financial training. This highly innovative and appropriate tool has since been exported to Namibia and Zambia, and is also widely used in primary and secondary school education

Independent assessment suggests that more than 75% of respondents strongly agreed that WWF training and materials were excellent, but that it was difficult to establish causality between training and improved management.

The evaluation is also indebted to WWF's various databases, which provide important and long-term data series on ecological and economic impact. This includes (see the invaluable document, WWF, 2003):

- Income and allocation of CAMPFIRE revenues
- CAMPFIRE Hunt Return Form Database
- NP9 (National) Hunt Return Form Database
- GIS mapping

However, this data is neither sufficiently analysed and reported, nor consistently checked. Neither are the databases reviewed and improve in line with the requirements of the CAMPFIRE programme (e.g. add additional socio-economic data).

This is indicative of organizational over-stretch. So is the contracting out of POMS without assurance of quality (to fulfill output 1.4) and the variable quality of consultancy reports.

WWF simply did not develop sufficient skills to take on its additional roles. Moreover, WWF has lost 12 of approximately 20 staff in the past year, including 3 of the 4 people managing inputs to the CAMPFIRE programme. This is a serious threat not only to WWF's competitive ability to play a role in CBNRM regionally, but also to the sustainability of quality input to CAMPFIRE. With WWF reporting difficulties of recruiting appropriate trainers, it has been unable to hold them despite the quality of, and investment in, these persons.

While it generally has performed extremely well, especially regarding the development of NR technology and training and the development of ecological and ecological systems, some areas of WWF's portfolio were problematic:

- Financial systems are slow, affecting reporting and contracting.
- The attempt to develop techniques to assess habitat conservation was beset by technical and staffing problems (resignations), and simple approaches (e.g. mapping wildlife areas) were not tried.
- There was a heavy focus on wildlife monitoring to the exclusion of other natural resources, although this may reflect demand.
- Databases were not expanded to reflect the expansion of CAMPFIRE (e.g. ecotourism), and better analysis and presentation could have added considerable value to what is excellent data.
- The Research, Decision Support Systems (DSS) and Information Dissemination (output 4) which involved the development of land use models may have been of academic interest, but required but has not fed into CAMPFIRE field performance except through the development of community land use planning techniques (which are good). Moreover, completion of the project was prevented by staff losses.

c) Outlook

In terms of sustainability:

- WWF has a diverse portfolio, with NRMP being only 20% of operations making for sustainability. It also has three donors supporting its efforts in CAMPFIRE.
- WWF has begun to diversify regionally, especially in use of training materials, thus effecting a means of conserving institutional memory in Zimbabwe's difficult period.
- However, loss of technical capacity is a threat to delivery, and a serious loss to the long-term technical capacity of the CAMPFIRE programme. WWF has lost 75% of the personnel with significant experience in supporting the CAMPFIRE programme, and this will reduce its ability to provide long-term services to CAMPFIRE even should it be able to find funding.

G. ACTION MAGAZINE AND ART

Action Magazine is a sub-unit of ZimTrust, which specializes on environmental education. Action's responsibilities were to provide environmental education, training and materials to schools in CAMPFIRE areas. It offers training services and produces publications related to CAMPFIRE. Action's specific responsibilities were to:

- Produce and provide to schools educational materials relating to environment and health.
- Develop appropriate and relevant secondary school curricula subject options and materials which link with and reinforce the development of community-based natural resources management within CAMPFIRE districts.
- Enhance the quality of teaching and learning about the environment within schools and colleges serving CAMPFIRE RDCs.

The impact of Action was:

- It strengthened linkages between schools and communities, particularly in CAMPFIRE districts.
- At least 12 issues of Action newsletters/magazines and supplementary posters on wildlife management were produced and distributed. These issues include:
 - CAMPFIRE a Special Issue – It explains what CAMPFIRE is and how it works.
 - CAMPFIRE Teachers' Pages – This magazine gives information about natural resources and how CAMPFIRE helps in the management of these resources.
 - Lighting - It narrates the story of how CAMPFIRE started in south eastern Zimbabwe. This magazine was published in six languages, namely, Shona, Ndebele, Tonga, Venda, Shangaani and English.
- Action successfully promoted the integration of Environmental Education into Teachers' Training Colleges. In addition, it also conducted several science exhibitions in schools.
- Networking: An informal network involving 6597 schools has been created countrywide. Out of this total, 4499 are primary schools, while 3044 are rural primary and secondary schools. Communication is done via Education Officers at district level and/or directly by mail.
- Action's training, curriculum and research unit, in conjunction with the Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture, is spearheading a dynamic and participatory approach to the teaching and learning of Environmental Education (EE) in Zimbabwe.
- Action also conducts environmental exhibitions, which enable pupils to explore their social, economic and political environments.

Funding levels: Action received ZD 528 836.66 in 1999 and ZD 64 447.48 in 2000 for producing newsletters and holding science exhibitions.

Africa Resources Trust (ART) facilitated awareness of CAMPFIRE, advocacy and information exchange at regional and international levels. Its responsibilities also involved lobbying and product marketing, and raising awareness through various publications. Art was particularly effective in promoting sustainable development and in defending the rights of rural people to utilise and benefit from their wildlife at a time when animal welfare groups were seriously threatening wildlife markets. However, after 1997, NRMP II did not fund ART's activities because ART's lobbying activities were considered to be contradicting USA policies. NGOs like the Humane Society put considerable resources into discrediting sustainable use programmes, with CAMPFIRE coming under considerable pressure. The withdrawal of USAID funding from core CAMPFIRE business (i.e. safari hunting) was an important consequence of this. However, ART's activities had some impact on CAMPFIRE revenues as seen by the one-off sale of ivory (figure 13).

H. ZIMTRUST

Under NRMP I ZimTrust provided institutional and infrastructure support to four districts in the Matabeleland Region. ZimTrust provided implementation support as well as grant management. Under NRMP II, ZimTrust relinquished grant management services to DA and districts and focused on providing institutional support services. During the first two and a half years of NRMP II, ZimTrust assisted districts to develop capacity building plans that included proposed infrastructure development. These plans were used to give focus to the capacity building strategy implemented in the remaining period of NRMP II.

The 1998 Mid-term Evaluation led to ZimTrust redefining its support services and a new programme was developed with six key outputs (ZimTrust 2000):

- 1) CBNRM organisations from participating village to district level strengthened
- 2) Institutional arrangements for Integrated CBNRM implemented in selected areas
- 3) Organisational, financial, management and administrative planning skills strengthened through training inputs provided to districts and sub-district levels
- 4) Specialist services (technical, socio-economic, environmental education) accessed and facilitated
- 5) CAMPFIRE institutional development model monitored
- 6) ZimTrust management and implementation capacity enhanced

Under Output 1 CAMPFIRE information fact sheets and NRM by-law development guidelines were developed, although the translations of the fact sheets into Shona and Ndebele were not completed. Training was provided to 20 older districts in by-law development, the development and review of ward and project constitutions, pre-dividend distribution and dividend distribution meetings. These training activities were targeted at Ward CAMPFIRE Committees and local project committees. A total of 93 workshops and meetings were facilitated. ZimTrust (2000) reported that a substantial number of the ward and village structures in 13 of the 20 districts were generally functional and required little external assistance in running their affairs. Although by-laws were being adopted, their enforcement remained a problem.

A total of 21 training workshops were held in five newer districts focusing on the establishment of CBNRM structures at district and sub-district levels, CAMPFIRE awareness, constitution and work plan development.

It was difficult to mobilise communities to participate in CAMPFIRE activities in non-wildlife area because of the lack of financial incentives. This was a constraint to capacity building activities. The absence of institutional capacity building grants on the part of RDCs resulted in partial implementation of their training programmes.

Under Output 2 ZimTrust facilitated the preparation of four integrated NRM project proposals and responded to 12 requests for assistance in compiling concept papers for CDF funding.

Under Output 3 a draft evaluation report on income generating projects was circulated, and a small and medium enterprise (SME) service providers brochure was produced. Nine 3-day business training workshops were facilitated for community projects, a total of 10 workshops on organisational competence

were held in seven new CAMPFIRE districts and a total of 119 workshops to address skills gaps in "old" CAMPFIRE districts were held. ZimTrust facilitated 34 inter-district look and learn visits.

Under Output 4 ZimTrust developed a manual on tender procedures, contract development and management and held a total of 60 workshops for nine districts to assist RDCs and communities in accessing specialist technical services.

Under Output 5 a total of 20 RDCs attended POMS Training workshops focusing on data collection methods and data entry and produced POMS reports for target districts. Participation in the CA Monitoring and Evaluation sub-committee was constrained by the non-convening of meetings.

Under Output 6 a total of seven staff were recruited to carry out project activities, and staff attended three training courses aimed at developing skills for implementing project activities.

Although ZimTrust accomplished most of its planned activities during the grant period, a number of activities could not be completed by September 2000. The overall impact of ZimTrust activities on CAMPFIRE has been considerable. The NGO supported the development of CAMPFIRE in the first 2 pilot districts at the start of the CAMPFIRE Programme. It has sourced funds from USAID and other donors to develop CAMPFIRE in various parts of the country, assisting CAMPFIRE to become a national programme. It created ACTION magazine and Africa Resources Trust, thus raising awareness of CAMPFIRE and contributing to CITES and other international conventions and debates on sustainable use.

Under NRMP II the December 2001 POMS evaluation of selected CAMPFIRE districts suggests that ZimTrust made some headway in terms of institutional development. The report (ZimTrust 2001) notes that 75% (n=51) of sub-district CAMPFIRE institutions evaluated retained their model rating, although 55% of this group experienced marginal declines in overall performance, caused mainly by poor performance in the NRM and Ward CAMPFIRE Committee composition and management capabilities categories. The POMS report attributes this to the following:

- the steady decline of service provision from CSPs following termination of grant support;
- the inadequate capacity of RDCs to provide training, monitoring and support services to sub-district institutions;
- high staff turnover at sub-district level;
- a largely malfunctioning PAC and resource monitoring system and the slow rate of devolution resulting in problematic institutional relationships between Village and Ward levels and RDCs.

ZimTrust in its briefing notes for the evaluation team concluded that the organisation as well as the rest of the CAMPFIRE programme had failed to achieve the devolution of all management responsibilities from district to lower levels institutions.

The POMS evaluation system, while useful, is cumbersome and needs revising. It should be simplified using fewer indicators, and should take less time to carry out. The evaluators were told by a ZimTrust staff member that the data is used by RDCs, CSPs and the NRMP but the data is not fed back to the ward and village committees themselves. Such feed back needs to be built in to the approach.

DA (2002) believe competition between CA and ZimTrust reduced the effectiveness of the ZimTrust grant and this explains why training/educational materials developed for communities were not fully utilised or promoted by CA. DA recorded that there was reasonable collaboration between CA and ZimTrust on some programme matters, particularly with respect to the work of ACTION Magazine, whose role was well defined and had no overlap with CA. ACTION was able to accomplish its objectives under NRMP and was successful in obtaining post-NRMP support from other donors. ZimTrust, on the other hand, was less successful in securing other donor support.

The total budget received under NRMP II was ZD35 million. The main budget lines were as follows, leaving a balance of ZD6.7 million at the end of project (table 33):

TABLE 33: SUMMARY OF ZIMTRUST BUDGET UNDER NRMP II

Activity	Expenditure
Management costs	ZD11 507 043
Operating Costs:	
1. Motor vehicle operating	ZD 7 435 166
2. Office operating costs	ZD 2 905 531
Service Inputs	ZD 1 082 291
Audit	ZD 900 000
Indirect costs	ZD 1 429 969

ZimTrust has defined its future role in CAMPFIRE as focusing on the devolution of all natural resource management responsibilities to lower levels through the framework of the Traditional Leaders Act, which came into force in 2001. ZimTrust views the Act as providing potential for promoting issues of local governance, democracy and natural resource management. It has given a concept paper to the MLGPWNH, held a joint workshop with the ministry and developed a project proposal to work on implementation of the Act. ZimTrust is currently seeking funds for this proposal.

In general, ZimTrust's performance in terms of advocacy and awareness raising was excellent, but it failed to evolve the capacity to develop, test, design and impart rigorous institutional and managements systems to communities.

I. SAFIRE

SAFIRE is an NGO which is affiliated to the CAMPFIRE Programme as a service provider. It was formed in 1994, and its mission is to facilitate the development and application of innovative approaches to diversify and improve rural livelihoods, based on the utilization, commercialisation and sustainable management of natural resources. SAFIRE was involved in NRMP II for two years from 1st October 1998 to September 30, 2000. During this period, its specific responsibilities and key outputs were as follows.

a) Responsibilities

- Increase the participatory planning skills of RDCs, CAMPFIRE partners, and relevant district-level officers; and
- Increase the ability of communities and local-level organizations to participate in natural resources management planning.

b) Key Outputs

- CAMPFIRE NGOs, RDC executives, and District Administrators exposed to Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) philosophy and application.
- District CAMPFIRE Officers, RDC Project Officers, officers of relevant GoZ departments, NGOs, parastatals, and the private sector from seven districts trained in the use of PRA for activity planning, implementation and monitoring.
- Local-level groups trained to use PRA in activity planning, monitoring and evaluation.
- Natural resource endowment of districts established and proposed uses determined using PRA.
- CBNRM-based income-generating activities developed using PRA.

c) Impact

Output 1: Members of CAMPFIRE NGOs (CCG), RDC executives, and District Administrators from 36 districts exposed to PRA philosophy and applications.

This level of training was intended for people who were involved in the coordination of NRMP II, and in the assessment and review of CDF project proposals. The participants needed to be familiar with the methodologies used in the preparation of the proposals. Four training workshops were conducted between November and December 1998. Table 34 shows the workshop venues, dates, and the total number of participating districts.

TABLE 34: TRAINING ON PRA PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGIES

Workshop Group and venue	Dates	Number of participants	Participating Districts
1. Maphisa	1-6 Nov. 98	15	Bulilimamangwe, Bubi, Gwanda, Hwange, Kusile, Matobo, Nkayi, Tsholotsho, Umguza, and Umzingwane
2. Karoi	8-13 Nov. 98	12	Binga, Chaminuka, Gokwe North, Gokwe South, Guruve, Hurungwe, Muzarabani, Pfura and Nyaminyami
3. Mazowe	23-27 Nov. 98	15	Goromonzi, Hwedza, Marondera, Mudzi, Manyame, Mazowe, Mutoko, Rushinga and UMP
4. Chimanimani	29 Nov.– 4 Dec. 98	16	Beitbridge, Buhera, Chiredzi, Chikomba, Chimanimani, Mwenezi, and Nyanga
Total		58	

The training enhanced participants' understanding of PRA, and some of the participants made some undertakings to ensure that staff in their districts were trained in the application of PRA.

Output 2: District CAMPFIRE Officers, RDC Project Officers, officers of relevant GoZ departments, NGOs, parastatals, and the private sector from seven districts trained in the use of PRA for activity planning, implementation and monitoring.

This second level of training was designed for field personnel who facilitated programme implementation "on the ground". Training focused more on the tools and techniques of participation. Trainees included district level staff of the RDCs, parastatals, government departments, NGOs, and community-based organizations (CBOs). A total of seven workshops were conducted, involving 80 participants from 13 districts. Districts that participated were Mudzi, Rushinga, Hurungwe, Guruve, Mwenezi, Beitbridge, Gokwe North and South, Goromonzi, Mazowe, Matobo, Umzingwane and Bulilimamangwe. These participating districts later submitted concept papers and project proposals that were approved for funding by the PMT.

Output 3: Local-level institutions in six districts trained to use PRA in activity planning, monitoring and evaluation of their activities.

Ten district strategy teams worked with local communities and produced concept papers for their projects. These concept papers became the basis of large CDF projects.

d) Other impacts

- SAFIRE was involved in the formation of the Vhimba Community Trust.
- SAFIRE commissioned a study conducted by the Biodiversity Foundation for Africa on the culture of the people, and the biological species found within and around forests in the Vhimba area.
- After 2000 SAFIRE was contracted to facilitate the formation of ten other Community Trusts using its experience gained with the Vhimba Community Trust.

e) Funding levels and expenditure

The total funding received by SAFIRE was Z\$4 100 000.00. This was used for training (\$3 400 000.00), non-expendable equipment (\$87 000.00) and other direct costs (\$600 000.00).

f) Future outlook

SAFIRE continues to support the CAMPFIRE programme despite the ending of NRMP II support to the institution.

- SAFIRE is using its own resources to facilitate the development of a conservancy involving commercial farmers and resettled farmers in Kadoma district.
- There is need for continued support to Community Trusts. This should not be done on an ad-hoc basis. SAFIRE can play an important role in nurturing Community Trusts and their projects in the same manner it did in Vhimba. The main challenge is the uncertainty of donor support in view of the prevailing donor perception of the political environment in Zimbabwe.

VI. Impact of External Factors on Project (NRMP) Performance

In 1994, the Project Document of NRMP II stated that the long-term sustainability of CAMPFIRE is in part dependent on conditions external to the NRMP. The key assumptions were (Table 35):

TABLE 35: KEY PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS FOR NRMP II (1994)

KEY PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS: NRMP II (1994)	
1.	That wildlife resources are or will become adequate to sustain commercial exploitation
2.	That wildlife utilization can compete economically and financially with other extensive forms of land use
3.	That communities deriving wealth from wildlife resources will both wish to, and be able to protect these resources
4.	That communities will not only be willing to manage these resources but also can become capable of doing so; and will invest in the management of wildlife resources
5.	That the demand for wildlife products will support widespread development of this form of land use
6.	With control over resources, farmers' behaviour will lead to the improved conservation of the resource base
7.	The member organizations involved with CAMPFIRE will continue to work cooperatively towards a common objective
8.	Rural District Councils can be persuaded to pay out profits to the ultimate resource managers in villages, and villages and RDCs will use these revenues and grants to promote long-term resource sustainability
9.	Economically viable technologies and intervention strategies can be developed and adopted for the full range of ecosystems included in the Program

Assumptions 1-6 from Table 34 above have basically remained favourable to NRMP II implementation. Today, data shows that key indicator species of wildlife population have stabilized; wildlife utilization (consumptive and non-consumptive) has had a robust demand up until the time of regional and national political stability. Most communities receiving income from this utilization have shown a high degree of responsibility towards managing their wildlife resource by re-investing in operations and maintenance (game guards, fencing, watering sources, small dams). In many villages and wards that have received training on quota setting and animal counting, communities are capable of carrying out these activities on their own. Simple record keeping and financial books are in place in most of the of the producer communities dealing with wildlife. In fact, backstopping and support services to be provided by RDCs to communities are functioning to a large extent in wildlife districts.

It is evident that with the control and empowerment over resources and economic benefits flowing directly to households and other community projects, the behaviour of producer communities has led to improved conservation of the resource base. The best indicator for this is that in spite of a burgeoning population pressure in rural areas, wildlife districts have managed to contain otherwise negative effects on the resource base.

However, Assumption 7 was a major problem. Throughout most of NRMP II, the partners worked anything but cooperatively (the notable exception being the '97 CITES campaign). Constant bickering, in-fighting, rivalries, etc., were highly detrimental to the project and, more importantly, the CCG and CAMPFIRE itself. The same argument applies to Assumption 6 in the Logical Framework presented on the next page.

As far as the principle of paying out profits to ultimate resource managers is concerned, RDCs have accepted it and most members of the CAMPFIRE Association are paying out income to the producer communities. However, the struggle has been in efforts to maximize the share going to producer communities. Hence, it can be said that in principle assumption 8 has remained favourable in the case of a large number of RDCs. Progress has been much less favourable in the districts that have failed to return much to communities (e.g. Nyaminyami) or have spread these benefits too thinly by also supporting non-producing communities (e.g. Hwange). These resources are being used for long-term resource

sustainability, both by providing community benefit and by contributing to the direct costs of natural resource management.

As far as assumption 9 is concerned, efforts have been made by NRMP II to look for viable technologies for the full range of ecosystems. Diversification, however, requires a longer gestation period and hence, assumption 9 cannot be said to have been fulfilled as envisaged as it is far too early to say that strategies put in place for the whole range of ecosystems has proven to be economically viable.

Beyond these assumptions, the Project Document also mentioned external risks, such as:

- The evolution of international conventions on elephant and ivory trade
- Severe drought
- Regional political or economic unrest, and
- International trends in tourism.

Some of these factors can be deemed to have become high risk factors. Due to political developments in Zimbabwe, tourism has dropped down to a trickle of what the levels were in 1995-1996. The exponential growth trends in tourism did continued until 1999 and this enabled the wildlife and natural resources sectors to expand. This was the basis for embarking on eco-tourism investments in the communities under NRMP II. But the current economic hardships have severely affected NRMP II. At this point in time, nothing much can be said about the sustainability of most of the eco-tourism projects set up through NRMP II support except that they are at best marginally viable under present circumstances, but might well have been viable had positive tourism trends continued. It is hoped, however, that stabilization and economic recovery may lead to some of the eco-tourism projects gathering momentum and becoming viable.

The 1994 Project Document also contained a logical framework that had the following assumptions or external factors (Table 36):

TABLE 36: NRMP II ASSUMPTIONS AND EXTERNAL FACTORS

Narrative	Assumptions
GOAL: The development of economically sustainable communities on lands marginally suitable for agriculture	• Food is available and affordable • Incomes growth exceeds inflation • National disasters do not eliminate wildlife resources in target areas
PURPOSE: To expand community-based natural resource management and utilization throughout marginal lands nationwide; and to halt declines within the wildlife resource base, especially in Regions IV and V	• Continuing market for wildlife and veld products • Communities are willing and able to learn and practise wildlife management • Continued granting of Appropriate Authority status • National will to protect endangered species
OUTPUTS: 1. Community-level resource management capacity institutionalised 2. Strengthened CA 3. Knowledge of NRM increased 4. Education and outreach expanded 5. Policy Analyses completed 6. Networking and communications systems in place	• Community consensus maintained • CA accepted by communities as legitimate representative • Popular receptivity to the concept of sustainable utilization • ACTION, CASS & WWF continue to produce high quality materials • CSPs can be modified • Inter-organizational conflict does not undermine the networking process

Except for two assumptions (food is available and affordable; incomes growth exceeds inflation) all other external factors or assumptions remained favourable to project implementation under NRMP II. At this point in time, macro economic conditions have deteriorated and this affected project achievements.

VII. Sustainability of NRMP Interventions

A. SUSTAINABILITY OF CAMPFIRE DEVELOPMENT FUND

It seems that neither CA nor other GOZ Government representatives on the PMT were very concerned about the longer-term sustainability of the CDF (or any other funding mechanism similar to it) after the termination of USAID assistance. Counterpart efforts focused more on maximizing the number and amounts of grants made to RDCs.

Although CA requested technical assistance to assess the feasibility of developing Trust/Sinking Funds options, it showed little interest or determination to follow up on the 1999 Ellsworth Report. However, other CCG members (WWF, SAFIRE, ZIMTRUST and CASS) were interested in establishing a National Trust Fund, and they actively participated in Trust Fund discussions when CA asked for their input. DA tried to keep the Trust Fund idea alive, but CA resisted this consistently (over a three-year period) until just recently when CA included Trust Fund development as a component of CA's new SGI. It can only be speculated as to why CA resisted the formation of a Trust Fund, but some of the following factors probably came into play: fear of losing control of its "leadership" of CAMPFIRE and CBNRM on a national level; competition with other CSPs who stood to gain more influence over CBNRM under a Trust arrangement than currently was the case; and lack of CA will and planning/management skills to take on a complex task of forming a viable trust which was not likely to yield significant benefits in the short-term. The Trust Fund idea is now on the back burner and will probably stay there until some CSP takes the initiative. More detail is provided in the Ellsworth Report, the follow up concept papers by Murphree, CA Board deliberations on this subject and DA's annual/tri-annual reports, which track Trust developments.

This problem was compounded by the long (four-year?) time horizon needed by USAID to establish an endowment, and the fact that NRMP II was planned as a 4-5 year project, although it was periodically extended until it became a seven-year project. It was also compounded by the fact that the CDF used grants (not loans) as a tool to build broad acceptability of CAMPFIRE, rather than primarily as a long-term investment mechanism.

We have also noted USAID's reluctance to develop a sustainable mechanism for continuing with the CDF component into the project design. While this is a serious disadvantage to the future of CAMPFIRE, we must also question how well, given the conflicts and problems associated with the programme at the time, such a fund would have been managed. Most of the efforts towards establishing an endowment fund were embarked upon quite late in the project and were not considered by USAID to be a priority from the very start of the project. When finally plans for an endowment were put on the table in 1999-2000, USAID found the process of setting up such an endowment going beyond the life of the project. This seems to have been a grave oversight in the very design stage of NRMP II, and another example of where conflicts compromised progress.

B. SUSTAINABLE FUNDING OF THE CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION

The data on which this analysis is presented is extracted from CAMPFIRE Association's audit reports. Income and expenditure is summarized in Table 37, with details in Annex I. categorized as follows. It is then converted into USD using the prevailing parallel exchange rates. Because of the increasing divergence between the official and parallel rates after 2000, and the time lag between the exchange rates and cost increases is ZD, any interpretation of data after 2000 must be cautious. Thus the large reduction in USD costs, does not represent as sharp a decline in purchasing power as it seems.


TABLE 37: SUMMARY OF THE FINANCES OF CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION (1996-2002)

SUMMARY OF CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION REVENUES							
Z\$	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Parallel exchange rate	9.73	10.97	20.71	37.02	39.00	331.67	467.76
Grant	5629401	5321992	7822670	8038808	12664192	15926789	14133200
Own Income	160496	154685	121467	663894	369207	1560119	6408949
Other income	2919	226791	225669	442153	270232	2986825	4793997
INCOME	5792816	5703468	8169806	9144855	13303631	20473733	25336146
Office Overhead	215231	484058	748597	1994142	2175315	4558310	7620184
Meetings, training, publ	300553	736882	676867	1051478	2101824	3205551	6349034
Staff costs	1254019	2372640	2758655	3658449	6847078	6811427	6109669
Travel & Accommodation	404973	578145	932523	1218606	1540097	1311339	1366152
Vehicles costs	128092	366018	603273	802712	1570166	2485412	2768407
Consultancy	311865	709834	416734	366118	0	2811768	1589263
COSTS	2614733	5247577	6136649	9091505	14234480	21183807	25802709
Depreciation etc.	357698	618803	448302	690201	956126	676029	589461
US\$	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Parallel exchange rate	9.73	10.97	20.71	37.02	39.00	331.67	467.76
Grant	578,332	485,177	377,755	217,167	324,723	48,020	30,214
Own Income	16,488	14,102	5,866	17,935	9,467	4,704	13,701
Other income	300	20,675	10,897	11,945	6,929	9,006	10,249
INCOME	595,121	519,955	394,518	247,047	341,119	61,730	54,165
Office Overhead	22,112	44,129	36,150	53,871	55,777	13,744	16,291
Meetings, training, publ	30,877	67,178	32,686	28,406	53,893	9,665	13,573
Staff costs	128,831	216,301	133,215	98,832	175,566	20,537	13,061
Travel & Accommodation	41,605	52,706	45,031	32,920	39,490	3,954	2,921
Vehicles costs	13,159	33,368	29,132	21,685	40,261	7,494	5,918
Consultancy	32,039	64,712	20,124	9,891	-	8,478	3,398
COSTS	268,623	478,393	296,337	245,606	364,987	63,871	55,162
Depreciation etc.	36,748	56,413	21,648	18,646	24,516	2,038	1,260
ANALYSIS							
Surplus/deficit	326,498	41,561	98,181	1,441	-23,868	-2,141	-997
% met by own income	6%	3%	2%	7%	3%	7%	25%

Source: CAMPFIRE Association Audit reports. Data is provided in more detail in Annex I.

Figure 19 summarizes the trends in CA financing. It shows the massive growth of the CA resulting from donor funding (which enabled CA to become a nationally recognized institution), with staff costs contributing over half the total costs. Costs were cut drastically in 2001 and 2002. While this exaggerates the loss in purchasing power (for reasons explained above), it nevertheless represents a substantial decline in CA's financial position

FIGURE 19: ILLUSTRATION OF TRENDS IN CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION EXPENDITURE (USD)



The costs, income and degree of financial self-sufficiency for CA is summarized in ZD and USD in Figures 20 and 21 respectively. The contrasting appearance of these figures is indicative of the difficulties faced in dealing with exchange rates and inflation in Zimbabwe's difficult macro-economic circumstances.

Both figures emphasize the high level of donor dependency of CA from 1996 to 2002, which remained above 90%. Nevertheless, the actual donor contribution has fallen steadily (at least in USD), leading to belt-tightening especially since 2002. The degree of donor dependency has fallen from over 90% to 75% in the last two years. The cost of managing CAMPFIRE Association's direct costs is approximately USD60,000, although there are hidden savings related to the presence of DA and USAID (e.g. the 2003 AGM, which costs over USD10,000 was paid for by USAID).

At this level of operational costs, a 4% levy on CAMPFIRE incomes would provide an income of USDUS\$80,000 which can theoretically cover the costs of the CA. However, correcting for the fact that wildlife revenues are being changed at between ZD55 -800 for USD1, suggests that:

- The CAMPFIRE hunting revenues of USD2m from all the producer districts, are actually devalued to a purchasing power of approximately US\$400,000.
- Similarly, the CA levy, is devalued to a purchasing power of USD 16,000. This, if it can all be collected which has not been the case in the past, will cover about a third of minimum requirements.

CA is about to face severe financial difficulties. However, in the long term, it is possible that a 4% levy (US\$80,000) can maintain CA core staff. If this can be supplemented by new membership (e.g. some NGOs, Conservancies and other partners), it is possible for CA to become self-financing.

The 4% levy represents a significant investment in CA by producer communities, and with this investment will come an expectation of services. CA will need to justify itself, and may need to seriously re-consider the cross subsidization of services it provides to non-contributing RDCs. Undoubtedly, CA can continue to

function as a forum for all CAMFPIRE RDCs. However, to survive financially, it must do this as cheaply as possible (especially as it is no longer a conduit for donor funds), but must instead concentrate on activities that add real value to paying membership.

FIGURE 20: ILLUSTRATION OF COSTS, INCOME AND FINANCIAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF CAMFPIRE ASSOCIATION (ZD)





FIGURE 21: ILLUSTRATION OF COSTS, INCOME AND FINANCIAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF CAMFPIRE ASSOCIATION (USD)



Soon after the initiation of Phase II, it became apparent that CA was not ready or willing to engage in long-term planning and tackle its self-sufficiency issues. CA found it very difficult to develop a funding proposal for itself, even with a serious attempt by PWC to engage them in this process (first, via a participatory strategic planning workshop with staff and Board in early 1996, and later via TA to help CA develop its first proposal for long term DA grant funding). CA felt that the 1996 PWC facilitated workshop was not useful and that it was unfair for PWC to expect CA follow up by developing its own strategic plan based upon the results of the workshop. It took the CA Director about one year to finally deliver his plan, by which time it was outdated and dealt only with generalities.

In November 1997 (about one year after CA received its first long-term grant), CA agreed to host another strategic planning workshop. PWC did considerable pre-planning with CA to avoid problems associated with CA's first attempt at strategic planning. PWC contracted a person chosen by CA to facilitate the workshop. The Nyanga Workshop was hailed as a "success". It set out a clear mission statement, programme objectives/quantifiable indicators and established targets and means to achieve CA's financial self-sufficiency, progressively reducing its dependence on donor funding. Neither CA staff nor the Board took a serious look at the Plan after that despite USAID/DA attempts to keep it on CA's agenda.

When the Netherlands funding was not renewed ("unexpectedly", according to CA) in June 1998, there were no funds available to continue the salaries of the CA Director, the Training Officer and the M&E Officer. USAID agreed to fund the additional CA staff costs over a three-month period (later to be extended). However this was conditional upon CA presenting USAID with a credible Action Plan showing performance targets and how it intended to achieve greater financial self-sufficiency. Garcia (DA) then helped CA develop the Plan via a CA Board/staff Committee set up for that purpose. This was done (CA Director declined to participate) and the report was eventually discussed in a facilitated (by Dr. Mazamabani) workshop with stakeholders.

The Plan was finally endorsed by the CA Board in August 2000 and was used as the basis of a direct USAID/CA two-year grant starting in late 2000. By late 2001, it was evident that CA largely ignored the plan, so it was replaced by another shorter plan, CA Management Objectives, developed with DA assistance. This provided a framework for the second year of the USAID/CA grant, which established more stringent funding conditions such as making CA fund all staff costs. At the end of 2001, CA released its Director and subsequently in 2002 generally complied with most of the Management Objectives. Based on that performance, the fact the CA Board finally induced the CA Director to resign, and the existence of CA's newly developed Strategic Growth Initiative (SGI), USAID agreed to a one-year grant extension to Sept. 2003.

Thus, there is an impressive history of failed CA attempts to develop long-term strategic plans and deal seriously with CAMPFIRE sustainability and CA financial self-sufficiency issues. This was not a case of the donor ignoring sustainability issues. DA and USAID provided CA with the tools to address these long-term issues several times but they were not used. Clearly poor management, politics and interagency conflicts and, more recently, national economic decline have contributed to this poor showing.

However, with the project being extended periodically, managers were continually operating with a short time horizon. Consequently, important changes to project policy were not made. For example, an endowment was never established, and funding principles were never switched from a grant (free-money) to a soft loan mechanism. Funding support for CA operational costs was progressively reduced in line with the belief that CA would not deal with its self-sufficiency issues until it felt the bite of less AID support for CA staff and other operational costs. This forced CA to reduce its staff complement. CA made little effort to fill the funding gap by increasing its income, with almost no additional donor funding apart from USAID being obtained

a) Strategic Growth Initiative

The CAMPFIRE Association's Strategic Growth Initiative (SGI) has been developed to cover the period 2002-2005. It aims at providing sustainability for the CAMPFIRE Association and the CAMPFIRE Programme. The SGI emerged as a result of a series of planning meetings held in mid 2002 by representatives of RDCs. It has five core technical programmes and an institutional development component. The six programmes are summarised as follows (CAMPFIRE Association 2002):

1) Sustainable Rural Development

Under this component, the CA will assist member RDCs to integrate CAMPFIRE programming into their mainstream natural resource activities. The CA will assist RDCs in supporting local communities to define, develop and implement sustainable, market linked, community-owned and operated business units. CAMPFIRE Committees will be transformed into Sustainable Development Forums, which will provide communities with new forums through which they can discuss business options and perspectives on sustainable development. The RDCs will use the forums as vehicles for key CA programmes. The CA will provide technical support and training to RDCs and the Sustainable Development Forums.

2) Systems Development and Capacity Building

Under this component the CA will set up, operate and build the capacity of the entire CAMPFIRE system. The main vehicle for this will be the establishment of a CAMPFIRE Institute which will provide the training, establish an Endowment Fund and make grants to communities.

3) Marketing and Market Development

Under this component the CA will provide market linkage support to business programmes and projects and work proactively with the private sector to develop and implement new product marketing opportunities. The CA will also develop a national CAMPFIRE Branding programme so that CAMPFIRE becomes a community-defined brand name that can be licensed and used for income generation. As part of this approach the CA will develop a commercialisation programme for CAMPFIRE products including establishing CAMPFIRE shops in critical tourists areas.

4) Advocacy for Sustainable Development

Under this component the CA will work with RDCs to launch a programme where communities and RDCs use the Sustainable Development Forums to review their experience, identify the policy and regulatory factors affecting their activities and carry out advocacy around these issues. The CA will hold a regional/international conference to look at issues related to the state of sustainable development activities in Zimbabwe, develop a sustainable development action agenda and participate in international forums such as CITES and WSSD.

5) Monitoring, Information and Publications

The CA will develop and implement an Information and Communications Technology capability that will form the foundation for a Management Information System. This will be used for monitoring progress in achieving the goals of the SGI as well as enabling the CA to assume the monitoring activities that have been carried out so far by WWF. The CA will also develop a web site and produce a range of information materials and publications.

6) Institutional Development

Under this component the CA will focus on developing internal capacity to implement the SGI and focus on revenue generation and financial sustainability.

The evaluation team finds the SGI to be an over ambitious initiative. It rests on the assumption that the CA should be not only the lead co-ordinating agency for CAMPFIRE, but also the lead *implementing* agency. Question marks remain over the realistic prospects of the CA generating sufficient income, either through endowments or commercial programmes, to sustain a major implementing capability. There appears to be no documentation available to show financial projections or analyses.

The SGI focus is almost entirely on building up the capacity and control of the CA and RDCs with little focus on any direct support to local communities. There is a strong focus on developing business units and business projects and commercialisation of a CAMPFIRE "brand". The tenor of the document is that RDCs will assist communities with general sustainable development activities, under the control of RDCs. The broader issue of providing rights over land and natural resources to localised collective institutions which would have authority for managing common pool resources is not addressed. There are (a few) very

general references to community empowerment and to community managed or owned business ventures. The SGI assumes that membership of CA will still be composed of RDCs and does not address the need to expand membership, particularly to Producer Communities. There is little attention given to ensuring good natural resource management while developing natural resource-based businesses. At the local level there is a shift towards the development of Sustainable Development Forums and Sustainable CBNRM Business Units. There is a danger that a move towards a more broad sustainable development agenda could result in a diffusion of focus that takes attention and resources away from the core CAMPFIRE activities.

The results of this evaluation suggest that CAMPFIRE is still in need of consolidation in key aspects of the programme. Before a shift is made into broader sustainable development and refocusing existing institutions as Sustainable Development Forums, more attention needs to be given to the existing institutional framework. There is a need to focus on further devolution from RDCs to lower levels and on the strengthening of local institutions. There is a need to ensure that the capacity built at local level to set quotas and carry out other NRM activities is built upon and not lost. There is a need to facilitate a shift within RDCs from an implementing role to a monitoring and supervisory role. Producer Communities need to be brought in as full members of the CA. The NRMP II has to some extent strengthened the control of the RDCs and their status as gatekeepers for local communities. The SGI would further entrench the control of the RDCs and make it more difficult for CAMPFIRE to really address the needs of its primary beneficiaries – the households that make up the producer communities. Given that reaching these beneficiaries is also the objective of most donors, the SGI may well not match donor funding priorities.

C. SUSTAINABILITY OF COMMUNITY PROJECTS FUNDED UNDER CDF

The majority of community projects that were funded under CDF are located in rural areas in CAMPFIRE districts throughout the country. Generally speaking, the macro-economic environment in Zimbabwe, coupled by prevailing climatic conditions (the drought that has ravaged Southern Africa over the past two years) has adverse effects on the sustainability of some of the community CDF projects. A lot of resources were devoted towards immediate food relief and food for work-related activities at the expense of long-term sustainable development projects. Macro-economic and political factors continue to reduce capacity of many RDCs, CSPs, and government agencies to facilitate community efforts. Other factors that affect the sustainability of the projects are briefly mentioned below.

High staff turnover among RDC staff tends to retard continuity in the implementation of CDF Projects in some districts. This is caused by resignations or deaths due to the AIDS pandemic affecting RDC CAMPFIRE units (for example, in Nyanga and Gokwe North). In some districts CAMPFIRE managers are overloaded with other council duties to the extent that CAMPFIRE activities became secondary. On the one hand this tends to negate the investment that NRMP II had made in the CAMPFIRE units, but on the other the concept of CAMPFIRE is spread more broadly through the RDC.

For purposes of this analysis, the CDF projects are classified and discussed under the categories listed in Table 38 below. This table also shows the percentages of projects that have been completed, and those that still require financial support before they can be operational.

TABLE 38: CATEGORIES OF COMMUNITY-BASED CDF PROJECTS

Category of Projects	Large Projects	Small projects	Total	% Complete	% Not Complete
1. Eco-tourism	12	6	18	56	44
2. Natural resources utilization	4	20	24	42	58
3. Natural resource rehabilitation	4	2	6	83	17
4. Wildlife management	4	5	9	78	22
Total	24	33	57	56	44

a) Eco-tourism Projects

Eco-tourism products offered by CDF projects include campsites for nature appreciation or bird viewing, various traditional cultural and educational activities, fly-fishing, simple lodges and chalets with self-catering facilities. All the eco-tourism projects operate under the CAMPFIRE principles to ensure that community involvement in project management or in deciding how revenues are utilized. These projects typically involve inputs from the RDCs, the communities under the leadership of trusts or CAMPFIRE Committees, and in some cases private sector partners for management and specialized functions (especially marketing). As indicated in Table 37 above, only 55% of the eco-tourism projects have been completed, and only four of the completed large projects were operational as at the end of May 2003. Various factors have a bearing on the sustainability of eco-tourism projects:

- Lack of effective marketing strategies for most of the projects, coupled with the difficulty of marketing a single product in an isolated rural area.
- Investor scepticism over the viability of community-based tourism and tourism as a whole under the prevailing economic and political environment in Zimbabwe.
- Many eco-tourism projects are in communal areas remote and difficult to access.
- Access to completed facilities is reduced by the prohibitive costs of upgrading roads and establishing tele-communications systems (e.g. the Mwinji Cultural Village in Binga, Ntunjambili Eco-tourism Project in Matobo, and Masoka Eco-tourism Project in Guruve). This has been compounded by the fuel crisis that has gripped the country.
- Due to internal factors (especially political instability) and external factors (e.g. bad publicity about the country), the tourism industry in Zimbabwe has experienced a serious decline in overseas and foreign visitor numbers and tourism receipts over the past two years.

b) Natural Resources/wildlife Utilization and rehabilitation

Natural resources projects include beekeeping, fishing, harvesting and processing mopane worms, and harvesting ilala palm leaves and other weaving materials. Rehabilitation projects include the rehabilitation of degraded land, veldt fire management. Community groups have conserved and rehabilitated their environs but have also developed strategies for sustainably utilizing their resources to improve their livelihoods. A good number of the CAMPFIRE projects are self-sustaining where:

- The projects have established local level institutions with binding by-laws or constitutions (in the case of community trusts).
- The traditional leaders are key in the development and management of local level projects (for example the Manyuchi fisheries project in Mwenezi; and the Nyatana Wilderness project in Mudzi, Rushinga and UMP).
- Community resource management plans have been developed (fire management projects in Chiredzi and Chipinge).
- Training in various aspects of business development and management has been offered (this was the case for all community trusts).
- Linkages between the local project groups and the important partners such as the private marketing agencies, private partners and the RDC have been established (e.g. Mukurupahari project in Pfura, beekeeping projects in Mutoko, Nyanga, UMP and Hwedza)

c) Comment:

Based on observations given above, and the fact that a large number of CDF projects are not yet completed, it seems obvious that the sustainability of most projects is questionable. Technical assistance is needed to help the communities to successfully manage the projects and to promote the marketing of products.

VIII. Summary of Findings: Positive Impact and Weaknesses

A. POSITIVE IMPACT

1. Conservation impact

In the face of 10% population growth in some areas, and doubling of rural populations between 1980 and 2000:

1. Wildlife areas were demarcated (often informally, sometimes with fences) and were largely maintained (but area/size data not available)
2. Elephant populations increased steadily, and buffalo populations were maintained (despite crash in 1992 drought)
3. Trophy quality was largely maintained
4. With diversification, small "community conserved areas" were established or protected in non-wildlife ecoregions – Gairezi, Vhimba, Mavuradonna, Mazowe Mountain, caves in Matobo, etc.
5. Reduced or contained veld fires in Chiredzi, Chipinge and Gokwe North
6. Poaching contained or reduced levels of illegal off-take (wildlife populations, but data on fish not available)
7. Anecdotal narrations suggest reduction in tree-felling (Nyanga, Ntanjambili, Maitengwe)

2. Economic benefit Impact

1. Revenues from hunting were increased rapidly and then maintained at USD1.5-2.0 million annually although NRMP II moved away from promoting hunting due to policy reasons;
2. At least 12 high-end ecotourism projects are operational in communal areas – Ngami, Gorges, Bumi, Mahenye, Binga (but no income data)
3. Increased number of households (from 7,861 in 1989 to over 80,000 in 1993) benefited directly (in cash) from wildlife and many of these communities made social investments and built small businesses (no full records available) prior to NRMP and continued throughout the NRMP period.
4. Secondary benefits in terms of services, goods and supplies, employment creation at local levels around successful tourism projects can be assumed (no data available)

3. Diversification

1. At least 18 middle range eco-tourism ventures were started (of which 4 have been completed – Nyanga, Vhimba, Banje, Gonono)
2. New areas of revenue were promoted (e.g. fisheries in Beitbridge, Mazowe; honey collection in Nyanga, Gokwe South, and Masau (fruit) in Muzarabani and Guruve)

4. Devolution

1. CAMPFIRE movement and its supported structures have led to increased awareness of entitlements and rights and demand for these at local level (Chitsike Report mentions demand and the team's impression from site visits confirms this)
2. At least 17 trusts established at sub-district level and 7 are functioning (bank accounts, regular minuted meetings, paid employees)
3. In 1 hunting District (Chiredzi) and 2 Eco-tourism projects (Gairezi and Karunga Trusts) payments are being made directly to sub-district level
4. In 5 out of 7 sites visited by evaluation team, Council and CAMPFIRE unit officials strongly supported devolution and were taking measures to implement it (but reportedly there is less commitment by Councillors with some notable exceptions)
5. 2002 CAMPFIRE Revenue Guidelines reinforce principles of administrative devolution
6. In 6 out of 7 RDCs visited, there was full acceptance of the right of communities to utilize income as they saw fit

5. Institution and Capacity Building at Sub-District, District and National Levels

1. Over 100 village and ward CAMPFIRE committees in 23 Districts learned basic organizational skills – book-keeping, minutes, meetings, etc.
2. In at least 13 districts, natural resource monitors and community leaders in particular learned wildlife management skills – setting quotas, selling wildlife, monitoring hunting, managing electric fences, problem animal monitoring, counting wildlife, ecological management

3. Systems of controlling off-take of natural resources were put in place – e.g. fish poachers were fined, with fines paying guards and providing community benefit
 4. Fire management implemented in 4 areas (Chipinge, Chiredzi, Gokwe North and Guruve)
 5. CAMPFIRE Support Units established at RDC level in 23 districts and are still providing training to sub-district levels in Wildlife districts
 6. Over 100 village and ward wildlife committees established and functioning
 7. NRM by-laws and constitutions developed for use in the village and ward wildlife committees
 8. Training of members of Board of Trustees
 9. Asset management and books of accounts kept in order at RDC units
 10. In most producer wards basic record keeping is in place
 11. Communities undertaking project identification and implementation in wildlife districts (but weak monitoring and no centralized database)
 12. CAMPFIRE Units in wildlife districts generally operate well, maintaining expenses at 20% (but could devolve more functions to communities and reduce this percentage to between 10-15%).
- 6. Governance**
1. High level of transparency and community participation in revenue distribution and use at village and ward levels
 2. CAMPFIRE structures have provided a forum for high levels of community participation in decision-making on NRM and other issues
 3. Generally, funds were well accounted for at sub-district level and in RDC CAMPFIRE Units
 4. CAMPFIRE committees at village and ward levels are elected
 5. Transparent flow of information at ward and village and between some wards and villages concerning issues, action plans and projects
- 7. Technologies and Innovation**
1. Development of cutting edge knowledge about the process of empowerment (e.g. quota setting, contract negotiation with private sector etc.)
- 8. National, Regional and International Impact**
1. With broadening of base, CAMPFIRE enjoyed a growing social and political acceptance at national level (by Parliamentarians and within Central Government)
 2. NRMP II ensured survival of the earlier CAMPFIRE principle (see Constitution of CAMPFIRE Association and the CAMPFIRE Principles) to a large extent by funding its expansion to non-wildlife districts in the country
 3. Consumptive forms of wildlife utilization and non-consumptive use of wildlife (eco-tourism) on communal lands became acceptable forms of land use
 4. CAMPFIRE principles have proved resilient and have spread to non-wildlife areas
 5. Other countries in the SADC Region (Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, Mozambique) have adopted CAMPFIRE principles adapting methodology and approach by devolving authority to sub-district community organizations rather than district level administrative units
 6. Technologies developed by CAMPFIRE were widely adopted in the region
 7. CAMPFIRE contributed significantly to promote acceptance of sustainable use principles at the international level
 8. CAMPFIRE put Zimbabwe squarely on the international scene by its activities in CITES (particularly 1997), becoming a fertile ground for research and learning and producing a vast amount of literature (over 300 publications) on CBNRM and common property resource management
- 9. Sustainability**
1. Systems, infrastructure and capacity are being maintained in wards and villages receiving revenue from wildlife utilization, and in some community eco-tourism initiatives
 2. CAMPFIRE units are probably sustainable in wildlife districts
 3. Most CSPs have diversified funding base and several have made a shift towards regional activities
 4. At this point in time the team has concerns over the long-term sustainability of some of the CDF-funded activities, particularly those ecotourism projects with weak market links and those projects that have not yet been completed.

B. WEAKNESSES OF NRMP II

The following weaknesses have been noted by the evaluation team:

1. RDC Performance

1. NRMP has strengthened RDC control and role as gatekeepers in relation to producer communities
2. Poor management by RDCs of approved community projects
3. Misuse of project vehicles in some RDCs (Muzarabani) without monitoring and corrective mechanisms
4. In the face of the current economic crisis, RDCs retaining an increasing amount of revenue, thereby disadvantaging the intended primary beneficiaries of the NRMP Project and the CAMPFIRE Programme

2. CAMPFIRE Association Performance

1. Current membership of CA does not include producer communities and conservancies
2. Current membership of CA has made no room for associate membership for supporters, promoters and well-wishers of CAMPFIRE
3. Marginalization of collaborative partners by CA from core decision-making forum – the exact opposite to the recommendations of the Mid-Term Review
4. Policy of marginalization of CCG-NGO members and conversion into service providers has removed the opportunities for long term facilitation and partnership with producer communities
5. At times weak leadership of CA Board and Secretariat (strategic plans remained unimplemented, sustainability issues neglected, poor coordination)
6. No synergies created with private sector
7. The SGI continues in the same flawed vein in proposing the establishment of a CAMPFIRE Institute providing services as an implementer without seriously looking at its income projections, costs and role change implications (no documentation of financial analyses)
8. Discontinuation of team review processes (annual reviews) diluted the powerful dynamic and unity of the CAMPFIRE movement and inhibited NRMP implementation
9. Heavy funding by USAID inhibited diversification of donor base
10. Board membership lacks diversity, specialisation and external input (particularly private sector)
11. CA has failed to take up policy issues in a formalised manner with Government (devolution of AA to sub-District level, weak follow up on required legislative harmonization)
12. CA should have remained a membership and advocacy agency

3. Devolution

1. No enabling Legislation has been passed to provide proprietorship at producer community level (Traditional Leaders Act provides assembly and boundaries but no entitlement and legal personality)

4. Diversification

1. Compared with total investment inflow, the output (increase in revenue generation from non-wildlife sources) has been minimal
2. In spite of diversification efforts under NRMP, consumptive wildlife revenue provides more than 70% of the benefits
3. Insufficient investment in product development and marketing
4. Eco-tourism projects were embarked upon with minimal marketing and product feasibility except in cases where collaboration with private sector was already in existence (e.g. Nyanga Downs Fly Fishing Club where the project builds on existing demand and use of the Gairezi River for fly fishing)

5. Project Design

1. Technical criteria and requirements of USAID in CDF implementation far too complicated for producer community projects
2. Insufficient attention and resources were devoted to diversification
3. The thrust to turn a fledgling association like CA to take on implementation responsibilities was questionable given the CA's primary role as an organisation representing the interests of its members and carrying out advocacy on their behalf
4. It was a design flaw of NRMP to expect an RDC membership organization like CA to push for devolution below the district level
5. Ratio of direct deliverables to community versus other components was skewed (1:10)

6. Phasing out of CCG input after 1998 mid-term evaluation threatens long term collaborative partnerships and capacity within CAMPFIRE
7. PMT after 1998 represented only CA, Government and the donor without civic society and private sector
8. CDF did not succeed in rewarding devolutionary process and good performance, although the CDF guidelines had adopted such an approach. Funding was awarded based on each district receiving some support.

6. Project Delivery and Coordination

1. Absence of technical peer review of proposal approval processes (while some CCG members did not want to be part of the process due to potential conflicts of interest, the PMT did not succeed in co-opting external reviewers with appropriate expertise)
2. Training in the Institutional Capacity Building phase 1995-1997 of RDCs/Communities on USAID requirements of accessing CDF funds was insufficient; CDF manual came out late (early 1998) and insufficient orientation and follow up training was done on applying the CDF manual
3. Distribution of projects across districts was not based on sound economic and business criteria but was most often based on equity
4. Role conflict, lack of team spirit and commonality of purpose between key actors in NRMP implementation (CA and DA)
5. DA and USAID were pushed more and more into an unintended implementational role on CA institution building and overall guidance of the CDF by default (CA's own leadership weakness after 1998)
6. CA/DA took 7 years to innovate a small grant window enabling speedier processing of projects
7. No piloting of CDF and accompanying development of sound methodology based on piloting results

7. Project MIS and Monitoring of Socio-Economic Impact

1. No centralized MIS on NRMP implementation and key monitoring aspects of the program are missing or weak (e.g. income data at HH level, socio-economic data, capacity and institution-building data etc.)
2. No collated and analysed information to substantiate capacity building effort and income generation at RDC and sub-district levels
3. Despite overall aims of promoting diversification, devolution, ICB and accountable decision-making, impact and performance indicators were not developed and monitored either by the Project or the CAMPFIRE Programme

8. Project Sustainability

1. No sustainable mechanism put in place to maintain the database already set up by service providers (e.g. WWF, ZIMTRUST)
2. Unsustainable installation of units at RDC level in non-wildlife districts thereby increasing overheads of the districts
3. Early efforts from 1997 at establishing financial sustainability were not followed up by CA and many opportunities thereafter missed (creation of endowment fund/trust for CA or NRM at large).

9. Project Collaborating Partners/Service Providers

1. DNPWLM took a back seat or remained passive in program implementation (involvement mainly confined to the PMT), particularly when it came to policy issues, monitoring of wildlife and compliance with conditions of AA.
2. Some of the CSPs did not perform up to expectations (SAFIRE on providing training on trusts, ZIMTRUST on institution building, accessing CDF, application of POMS and financial management, WWF on Decision Support System models, CASS on institutional training, time lags in submitting reports and weak dissemination at RDC level)

10. Role of USAID

1. USAID remained too optimistic about the capabilities of CA in spite of early warnings by DA
2. USAID misread signals of absorption and institutional efficiency at RDC levels

IX. Lessons Learned

The following lessons can be drawn from the implementation of NRMP in CAMPFIRE Program:

1. Devolution has been proven as an essential condition for sustainable management of natural resources. Where devolution of revenue accrual and decision-making has gone to the lowest possible levels, (ward and village) in CAMPFIRE, the best results have been achieved. Communities are managing resources sustainably and devolution brings high levels of participation, transparency and accountability.
2. The importance of devolution of authority over wildlife was demonstrated first on freehold land in Zimbabwe. CAMPFIRE, with NRMP support, has demonstrated that the same holds true for communal land. In order to promote sustainable natural resource management on communal land, the DNPWLM should vigorously promote and enforce devolution to sub-district levels.
3. Communities are capable of managing funds, building projects and managing wildlife, especially with light, but consistent, technical support. This demonstrates that support in the form of long-term relationships with communities and persistent light touch facilitation by quality staff is important for the development of sustainable community institutions and the building of community capacity. The use of short-term consultancy support and training does not enable the formation of long-term relationships and can lead to a lack of follow-up at crucial stages.
4. Large and time-bound projects are an expensive way of delivering capacity to communities and are not well suited to the behavioural changes that programs like CAMPFIRE envisage. Too much emphasis is placed on the delivery of products, and too little on behavioural and institutional change, which have long time horizons and require process-oriented support rather than product-oriented support.
5. NRMP II was a large project with national scope that aimed to support an existing indigenous program. The project to a large extent became the program. This is not desirable in terms of sustainability. Donors and host-country implementers need to ensure that the donor assistance does not overwhelm and begin to drive the program it is aimed at supporting. (For example, at the CA AGM, most regional reports focused on the progress of CDF-supported projects rather than on broader program issues such as health of natural resources, income to communities, progress of devolution to lower levels, achievements by CAMPFIRE Units in building capacity to communities, etc.).
6. Collaborative support groups play important roles in increasing the chances of success of community-focused projects. Multi-dimensional projects that combine natural resource management with rural development and governance issues function best when synergies and partnerships are developed between implementers. The CAMPFIRE Program was at its most dynamic and vigorous when it was guided by the collective thinking and experience of the multi-disciplined Collaborative Group. The cohesion and sense of working towards a common goal and vision was a major strength of the program. At the same time, collaborative support groups require good coordination and strong visionary leadership. The advantages of the Collaborative Group were lost under the implementation arrangements for the CDF (PMT) and the control over the program established by the CA.
7. NRMP II provides an important lesson regarding the roles of long-term support and short-term service provision. The reason for the initial emergence of CAMPFIRE was the presence of a small group of long-term facilitators that were experts in their field yet had personal and long-term relationships with communities and RDCs. It emerged that the greatest threat to the CAMPFIRE programme may well be the loss of such leadership. While contracted support and consultancies are useful, they are no replacement for such long-term commitment. Thus, the conversion of CCG members into CSPs, and the failure of the programme and project to retain high-level skills, removed the critical dynamic of long-term relationship-based facilitation and vision from the program. A three-component approach might well have been better, and we hope this advice will be useful in the design of such programmes in the future. (1) Recognising the importance of long-term leadership and facilitation to programmes like CAMPFIRE, projects should be designed to

support the provision of a small, long-term, core, support grants to key staff in key agencies. To fill these positions with mediocre personnel is a disservice to the beneficiary communities positions, and perhaps the most costly mistake a project can make. (2) Nevertheless, recognising that NGOs can lose effectiveness in times of plenty, this grant should be subjected to continual performance appraisal, with a strong emphasis on facilitation and service at beneficiary level. Tight and carefully designed performance criteria are needed to avoid the rather common situation where an NGO is able to raise money by spinning a good story to a relatively inexperienced desk officer in a development agency.

(3) In addition to this core performance-related institutional funding, further funding should be closely linked to performance. Over and above core long-term funding, allow the support agency to grow by competing for additional CSP-type funding on a competitive and performance basis.

8. Diversification projects have a better chance of success if accompanied by private resources/partnerships. CAMPFIRE enterprises are most sustainable where business partnerships have been developed between communities and the private sector. At a large scale, the relationship between CAMPFIRE and Conservancies in the lowveld is an example. At a small scale, the long-term relationship between the Mahenye community and the private sectors lodge operator is another example.
9. Product diversification within NRMP was expensive. For products based on natural resources such as wild fruits (e.g. masau and marula) diversification needs a long gestation period. The cost-benefit of diversification into such products is unproven in arid and semi-arid zones in Zimbabwe. More research is needed into levels of household income and profits of processing organisations versus the costs of product development, processing and retailing. While high-end tourism has proven itself as a viable form of income generation for communities and households, eco-tourism still needs to be tested in this regard. Experience elsewhere (e.g. Namibia and Botswana) shows that while community control might be high in small ecotourism enterprises, income generated is low. There is usually enough income to pay staff and maintain infrastructure, but little profit for a significant contribution to the "community".
10. Projects are an inefficient way of driving product diversification, unless they complement the efforts of private entrepreneurs (e.g. venture capital funds). A project approach does not always make the necessary links between costs and profits (e.g. the community at Mwinji have been given a project (cultural village and tourist accommodation), but they have not been taught how to run a business.)
11. Grant funding of diversification investment results in inefficient use of funds (by some estimates twice as much could have been built at half the cost). Moreover, the process whereby communities inexperienced in ecotourism build facilities and then lease them to private sector is sub-optimal. Providing a venture capital loan fund to which community-private partnerships could apply, is likely to have resulted in more viable investments.
12. Membership associations like CA should identify and prioritise core activities and commensurate staffing and equipment levels and fund these from their own income sources. They should adopt the principle that "if you can't pay, don't play". Additional activities should be funded by donor funding, but only for specific projects that have a limited time frame and do not require additional permanent staff.

X. Recommendations and Future Outlook

A. RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSED TO CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION

1. Include producer communities, including private sector conservancies, in the membership of CA
2. Include supporters, promoters and friends of CAMPFIRE as associate members in CA
3. The Board of CA should be broad based (including legal, financial and private sector expertise)
4. The formula approach to allocating percentages of revenue between communities and council should be abandoned. Communities should receive all revenue from natural resource utilisation directly. They should then pay a levy or service fee to RDCs *based on services rendered to the communities by the RDCs*. RDCs should pay any membership fees of the CA or levies from its general account, not exact this additionally from communities.
5. CA should formally propose policy changes and legislative amendments dealing with devolution of AA to producer communities
6. CA should embark on long term partnerships with Service Providers (NGOs) for consistent support to producer communities
7. CA, CSPs and external support agencies should establish an endowment fund for producer community projects within CAMPFIRE servicing loans and grants
8. CA should reconsider whether its "core business" is as a representative body and the lead coordinating agency for CAMPFIRE or as an implementing agency. The evaluation team recommends that implementation should be limited to value added activities funded through donor support or own-generated income and for a specific period of time. Short-term staff should be employed to carry out these activities.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSED TO RDCs

1. NRM income should go directly to producer communities, which should then transfer levies to the RDCs
2. Producer communities should be given authority to negotiate agreements with the private sector
3. RDCs should formulate financial/procedural guidelines and supervise compliance

C. RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSED TO SERVICE PROVIDERS

1. CA, CSPs and external support agencies should establish an endowment fund for producer community projects within CAMPFIRE servicing loans and grants.
2. Use the opportunity offered by fiscal devolution and devolved community institutions to develop institutional monitoring and training tools in the manner that WWF did for NRM.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSED TO DNPWLM

1. DNPWLM should re-assume responsibility for monitoring compliance with AA
2. DNPWLM should work with MLGPWNH to revise legislation to provide for devolution of "sub-Appropriate Authority" to local communities
3. DNPWLM in liaison with MLGPWNH should audit CAMPFIRE revenues at RDC and community level annually according to clearly defined categories (e.g. revenues devolved to communities, income used by RDCs for management and income used by RDCs for general purposes)

E. RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSED TO MLGPWNH

1. MLGPWNH should assist DNPWLM in reviewing AA and empowering producer communities by legislating for devolution of "sub-Appropriate Authority" to lower levels
2. Local Government should review Traditional Leaders Act and RDC Act to provide proprietorship for land and natural resources at producer community level. In this regard, replication of the mechanisms of devolution to unitary level, with the primary control mechanism being neighbours (not central government), as proved so successful in the Intensive Conservation Movement, is highly recommended (see last two paragraphs in section V.B.)

F. RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSED TO USAID AND OTHER DONORS

1. The highest proportion of any future assistance to CAMPFIRE should be aimed at meeting the needs of producer communities. This should be done through the provision of consistent and persistent light touch facilitation in institution building and the provision of high quality training.
2. Project implementation mechanisms must be simplified and made user friendly for producer communities but should include performance criteria and simple reporting and accounting requirements
3. Institution building is a long term process and needs to be nurtured and monitored over longer time horizons
4. CAMPFIRE's fiscal devolution and devolved community institutions provide a rare and important opportunity to test and develop institutional monitoring and training tools in the manner that WWF did for NRM. A project to specifically develop these opportunities is likely to be invaluable for improving devolved management, and should also be designed to monitor the evidence to support (or refute) the power of devolution.
5. On-going and planned bilateral and regional projects/programs in the pipeline should be used to funnel resources directly to producer communities and support strategic initiatives (e.g. Chiredzi)
6. Any future project design needs to support mechanisms ensuring the development of accountability, transparency and checks and balances in decision-making at all levels, particularly between committees and those who elected them.
7. Future projects should promote public-private-partnerships for enterprise development (e.g. joint-venture partnerships, using private sector marketing links and expertise, and using private sector advice when developing tourism enterprises). Care needs to be taken that partnership agreements provide for
8. In order to assist CAMPFIRE survive the current economic crisis and prepare for growth once there is an upturn, donors should consider providing a small bridging fund which could assist in establishing more rigorous performance management, financial and accountability systems at RDC and local level. This fund could also provide support to the continued functioning of CAMPFIRE Units, local CAMPFIRE committees and community trusts through small amounts of quality technical advice and facilitation. The fund should also back-stop natural resource management (particularly ongoing monitoring of key indicators of resource health).

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Annex A: Statement of Work

STATEMENT OF WORK

Final Evaluation of the Zimbabwe Natural Resources Management Program (USAID/Zimbabwe Strategic Objective No.1)

I. Title

Final Evaluation Report: Zimbabwe Natural Resources Management Program -
USAID/Zimbabwe Strategic Objective No. 1.

II. Purpose Statement

Short-term technical assistance services by a multi-disciplinary team of experts are required to conduct a Final Evaluation of the Natural Resources Management Program, NRMP), more recently redesigned as USAID/Zimbabwe's Strategic Objective No.1 (SO1 - "Strengthened Natural Resources Management for the Sustainable Development of CAMPFIRE Areas"). The evaluation should begin o/a May 2003 and end no later than July 31, 2003.

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to assess the extent to which the NRMP's original goal, purpose and outputs, and any subsequent revisions of these, were achieved over the life of the Program (1995-2003). and to recommend actions that should be considered by stakeholders responsible for the future development of CAMPFIRE. The specific objectives of the evaluation are to:

- Assess the responsiveness of the Program to the findings and recommendation of the Mid-term Project Evaluation conducted in 1998;
- Document USAID-funded contributions to CAMPFIRE to date, i.e., what has USAID "bought" with its support, and what are the results and impacts achieved to date from this assistance, particularly since the Mid-Term Evaluation;
- Assess the performance of each of the implementing partners in fulfilling their respective responsibilities under NRMP, including their role in the Program after their specific NRMP grants expired;
- Address certain key policy, planning, management and implementation issues (discussed in Section IV-2 of this work statement); and
- Recommend future implementation approaches or arrangements, including the roles/responsibilities of key stakeholders, that would enhance the further development and sustainability of CAMPFIRE.

The product of these services will be a Final Evaluation Report to be distributed to USAID and key CAMPFIRE stakeholders. The evaluation should focus on the 1998 to present period in terms of data collection and analysis. However, the evaluators should use the information

and analysis found in the 1998 Mid-term Evaluation in developing their overall findings and recommendations.

III. Background Information

BACKGROUND

1. The CAMPFIRE Movement

In the late 1980s, various Zimbabwean Government and NGO agencies established the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). Its purpose was to help rural communities to sustainably manage their natural and cultural resources, derive income from these resources and determine how this income would be utilized.

A diverse group of Government and non-governmental partner organizations were key to the early success of CAMPFIRE. These organizations, initially called the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG), included the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing (MLGPW&NH); the Zimbabwe Trust (ZIMTRUST); the University of Zimbabwe's Center for Applied Social Sciences (CASS); and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).

Stakeholders subsequently facilitated the establishment of the CAMPFIRE Association (CA), which was to become the lead organization in CAMPFIRE, representing Rural District Councils (RDCs) who are legally responsible for implementing the Programme at the local level. CA's mission was to promote and facilitate CAMPFIRE by engaging RDCs, their constituent communities and other relevant public and private agencies to implement and support activities conducive to the development of CAMPFIRE.

The basic premise of CAMPFIRE is that financial incentives are critical to the conservation and sustainable use of Zimbabwe's wildlife and other natural resources. Significant financial benefits earned from wildlife (mostly from hunting and tourism) are transferred to RDCs, who then devolve a proportion of this revenue to communities, as an incentive for them to manage their natural resources. From its inception, CAMPFIRE revenue grew steadily, reaching approximately \$2 million by 2000. By the late 1990s, an estimated 320,000 households were benefiting from CAMPFIRE revenue.

2. USAID Involvement

USAID began assistance to CAMPFIRE in 1989 with funds from USAID's Southern Africa Regional Program. This pilot effort focused on four districts in Matebeleland. The second phase of USAID assistance began in 1994/5, building upon the Matebeleland experience and expanding program coverage nationwide. USAID contributed approximately \$20.5 million to this phase, including \$16 million in bilateral funds under USAID/Zimbabwe's Natural

Resources Management Project (NRMP). Phase II Project assistance featured program initiatives such as the:

- Expansion of services to many more districts,
- Financial, technical and training support to the CAMPFIRE Association (CA), to strengthen its role as the lead CAMPFIRE agency,
- Introduction of an adaptive management and coordination system to better service the large number of CAMPFIRE stakeholders and implementing agencies,
- Establishment of the CAMPFIRE Development Fund (CDF) to fund projects designed to strengthen the capacity of RDCs to service CAMPFIRE and support community initiatives to improve natural resources management, and the
- Appointment of an institutional contractor (IC) to administer the USAID funds allocated to support CAMPFIRE.

Stakeholders organized themselves to implement these initiatives starting in 1995/6. Subsequently, as the Programme evolved, CAMPFIRE responded to other priorities such as the need to devolve more management responsibilities from Councils to communities and to diversify the Programme from consumptive to non-consumptive natural resource utilization activities.

In 1998, following the 1997 CITES Conference in Harare and the Project's Mid-Term Evaluation, and in agreement with USAID's (then) new reengineering precepts, the Project was modified to its current and final form as the Mission's Strategic Objective No. 1, "strengthened NRM for the sustainable development of CAMPFIRE areas." The shortened version of this new program title is the Zimbabwe Natural Resources Management Program, or simply the "Program."

IV. Scope of Work for the Evaluation

The evaluation team will review key reference documents, such as the 1998 Mid-term Evaluation and the 1998 Amendment to the NRMP that provided a new framework for Program management, particularly with respect to interagency coordination and the implementation of the CDF. The team will conduct interviews and site visits and will perform any other tasks that are required to collect sufficient information to assess the NRMP design, implementation progress and success in achieving the Program's conservation-based, community development objectives. While interviews will be required of a variety of different stakeholders, the team will rely, to the maximum extent possible, on existing written information on the NRMP and CAMPFIRE. Formal surveys or other primary data collection activities will not be required.

The evaluation team will organize a one-day workshop at a suitable venue in Harare, Zimbabwe to share their initial findings and results with key Program stakeholders, and receive appropriate preliminary feedback, prior to finalization of their final draft report.

The final draft evaluation report will be reviewed and used by USAID and other key stakeholders who are critical to the continued development of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe.

The firms or individuals selected to undertake this work will propose the final methodological details of this Scope of Work (e.g., including team composition; timing, staffing and levels of effort of individual team members; and specific assessment techniques).

Some specific questions and issues to be addressed are described later in this Scope of Work (SOW). These questions and issues are organized around the following major evaluation topics: (a) follow-up questions and actions pursuant to the major findings and recommendations of the Mid-term Project Evaluation; (b) current salient questions and issues regarding CAMPFIRE and the NRMP's role in the Programme; and (c) recommendations regarding future strategic directions for CAMPFIRE, including possible future support to CAMPFIRE via other bilateral, regional or centrally-funded donor programs.

In completing this SOW, the contractor shall address the following specific questions, issues and tasks:

1. 1998 NRMP Project Mid-term Evaluation Questions/Issues

The contractor should review all the findings and recommendations arising from the NRMP Mid-Term Evaluation conducted by the Mitchell Group and the South-East Consortium for International Development. The contractor should describe subsequent developments relevant to these recommendations. The major recommendations of the Mid-Term Evaluation are summarized below:

Recommendation

USAID/Zimbabwe should continue to support the CAMPFIRE movement, with some modification to NRMP II and with additional funding through FY2002.

- Continue direct contract support to the GOZ and IC partner, and continue grant support at a reduced level to the CA.
- Maintain initial direct support to NGO Partners (CAMPFIRE Service Providers–CSPs). Subsequently, phase down direct grants to NGO partners, and, instead, encourage them to continue to access support through joint proposals with the CA Secretariat and its membership (Rural District Councils) for funding under the CDF or other sources.

Recommendation

Modify the CDF to enhance CAMPFIRE sustainability and efforts to diversify the sources of revenue from sustainable natural resource use.

- Facilitate review and decisions regarding current proposals under active consideration.
- Open up access to CDF monies by eliminating the distinction between capacity-building and infrastructure grants.

- Revise CDF proposal criteria to encourage (1) actions at the sub-Rural District level, and (2) economically viable natural resource enterprises through pre-investment feasibility studies and capital investments in the resource base.
- Have USAID and the MLGPWNH begin to involve neutral peer reviewers in decision-making about the allocation of CDF monies.
- Develop a decision strategy for extending the CDF beyond the current project completion date.
- Transform the CDF into a longer term financing mechanism, such as a sinking fund, that would extend NRMP II funds beyond the potential ending of USAID support in FY2000 or 2002. This would provide new, as well as ongoing initiatives the necessary time to become technically sound and sustainable.
- Use the CDF/follow-on trust or endowment mechanism to facilitate and provide an enabling context, especially at the village and ward levels, for the development of commercially viable NRM enterprises identified through the participatory planning process.

Recommendation

Simplify NRMP II administration by phasing out PET and implementing a series of key project management changes.

- In the short term, eliminate PET and incorporate its subcommittees into the CCG.
- Refocus CDF financial management and other NRMP II management responsibilities more tightly within the IC and USAID SO1 team.
- Reduce the number and frequency of project planning and implementation meetings.
- For broader project issues, including the impending NRMP II and Mission graduation, the core management team should work closely with the NRMP II Bilateral Review Committee (BRC).
- Include new partners and develop a revised Plan of Operations for the second half of the Project.

Recommendation

Shift the NRMP's program focus from expanding coverage to graduating communities.

- Emphasize "getting it right" in promising areas or where promising initiatives show the most rapid progress.
- Refine the criteria for what constitutes a successful CAMPFIRE community that can be considered graduated.

- CCG implementing organizations should develop planning approaches that include a withdrawal phase, after which outside technical assistance would be intermittent and minimal.
- Develop a CAMPFIRE approach to CBNRM (and other indigenous resources). In concert with the District Environmental Action Plan (DEAP) and other initiatives, define and generalize a flexible model of participatory land-use planning/CBNRM that is linked to a set of “best practices” guidelines that can be adapted to differing contexts. The CA should sanction this approach and include provision for the “graduation of CAMPFIRE communities” and an “exit strategy” for CCG partners.

2. Other Questions/Issues to be Addressed by Evaluators

A. Implementation of the CDF absorbed a significant proportion of NRMP funding and staff time (IC, CA and CSPs) over the last several years. What has been the impact of this allocation of resources on CAMPFIRE stakeholders (producer communities, RDCs, CA, and CSPs) in terms of the achievement of the stated purpose and objectives of NRMP? Has the CDF been important to the success of CAMPFIRE? Has it diverted attention from other programme priorities? Do the views of donors, CSPs, RDCs, CA and communities regarding the utility of the CDF differ? Should a project funding facility be set up in the future to support/promote the NRM initiatives of producer communities and/or relevant assistance agencies? If so, in what form and under what conditions would it most likely to succeed?

B. Previous evaluators, some donors and CSPs felt that Program diversification was necessary for the continued expansion and sustainability of CAMPFIRE. The past (and to a degree, current) emphasis on safari hunting as a source of revenue limits community participation to those districts that have robust wildlife populations. It was also evident that the revenue derived from hunting was nearing its full potential. What have been the results thus far of CAMPFIRE’s efforts to diversify? What has worked and what has not and why? What are the likely technical constraints and market opportunities for further diversification? What should be the CAMPFIRE approach to diversification in terms of policy development, project formulation/implementation, advocacy, institutional roles/responsibilities, etc?

C. Similarly, most stakeholders believe the greater devolution of NRM responsibilities, from RDCs to sub-district, community-based groups/organizations, ought to be vigorously pursued. How has CAMPFIRE attempted to achieve more devolution and what are the results? What has been the role of CA and RDCs in trying to facilitate devolution? What are the prospects for recent devolution initiatives such as the establishment of community trusts? Some stakeholders consider that RDCs may be an impediment to Programme devolution; others feel that RDCs constitute the appropriate institutional level for managing natural resources; others believe RDCs can/should facilitate NRM to lower levels (e.g. villages, wards). What appears to be the best approach for achieving NRM devolution in Zimbabwe, considering legal, policy, technical, institutional and other pertinent factors?

D. Two Government Ministries and several Zimbabwe-based NGOs worked together to initiate CAMPFIRE. These entities, known first as the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group and

subsequently as CAMPFIRE Service Providers (CSPs), provided considerable assistance to the movement during its first decade of development. The CCG also facilitated the establishment of the CAMPFIRE Association as the lead agency to represent the CAMPFIRE constituency and coordinate/orchestrate the work of CSPs to support CAMPFIRE. USAID funds were to support the strengthening of CA's institutional capabilities and to fund most of the technical inputs of the CSPs. Has this model worked as anticipated? What have been its strengths and weaknesses? Is the model an appropriate approach to CAMPFIRE's current and future needs, particularly with respect to the ability of CAMPFIRE to sustain itself and act as a positive force in promoting CBNRM in Zimbabwe? What role should donors play in CAMPFIRE's future?

E. The CA developed numerous strategic plans over the 1996 to 2002 period. These generally covered two to five year periods and set out CA organizational objectives and program work plans. The plans focused on CA's functions of representing the interests of RDCs and CAMPFIRE producer communities, coordinating and directing (in policy terms) the efforts of CSPs and ensuring the longer-term sustainability of CAMPFIRE (and CA itself). Has this planning process achieved the desired results? What have been the strengths and weaknesses of the process? Were the roles carved-out for CSPs and CA realistic given the institutional priorities and capabilities of the CA and CSPs and the inherent complexity of the CAMPFIRE movement? What are the prospects for the successful implementation of CA's most recent plan, the Strategic Growth Initiative 2002 – 2005? What, if any, future role should donors play in support of CAMPFIRE? Is there any further USAID collaboration that might be appropriate and possible, taking into consideration CAMPFIRE's priorities and USAID's bilateral/regional assistance objectives, programs and resources?

V. Work Products

The contractor evaluation team shall schedule and conduct entry and mid-term briefings during the evaluation with concerned USAID, GoZ and CCG staff. The team will organize and conduct a one-day workshop with key Program stakeholders to present and receive feedback on their initial findings and results. The team will produce draft and final reports, which will include detailed findings, recommendations, lessons learned and other salient results of the analysis specified in the above SOW. The draft report will be submitted to the CTO, USAID/Zimbabwe, concerned GoZ agencies (i.e. MMET, MoF, MLGPW& NH) and other CSP organizations no later than June 30, 2003 for review and discussion prior to finalizing the report.

The contractor shall submit the final evaluation report no later than July 15, 2003. Thirty-five (35) bound copies of the final report should be submitted to the CTO, USAID/Zimbabwe, who will assume responsibility for subsequent transmittal to other concerned agencies, together with an electronic copy of the final report in Word format for subsequent printing, dissemination and use.

VI. Team Composition and Qualifications

The evaluation will require a multi-disciplinary team of experts over an eight to ten week period. Suggested key team disciplines include natural resources management policy and program development, community-level capacity building and institutional/organizational development, resources economics, wildlife management and ecology. Additional possible areas of desirable expertise include eco-tourism development, natural resources marketing, business management, and sustainable CBNRM project financing mechanisms.

To the maximum extent possible, team members shall be experienced senior-level professionals within their respective areas of expertise. Team members should possess an advanced degree and a minimum of ten years of work experience within their respective areas of expertise, at least half of which should have focused on LDC situations. Demonstrated experience in Africa is mandatory for all positions; prior southern Africa experience, in general, and Zimbabwe experience, in particular, is also required. A good familiarity with CBNRM in southern Africa, in general, and Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE, in particular, is highly desirable; however, at least one of the team members should have demonstrated experience in planning, managing and implementing national and community-level NRM development initiatives in southern African LDC contexts. Prior experience evaluating USAID programs and projects is highly desirable. All team members shall also possess well-developed written and oral communications skills, including a good working knowledge of standard computer word processing and spreadsheet applications.

VII. Team Reporting Relationships and Responsibilities

The contractor will receive technical direction from the USAID/Zimbabwe Mission Director or his/her designee (i.e., the SO1 Team Leader/CTO).

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Annex B

TEAM COMPOSITION

Dr Brian Child

Team Leader responsible for conservation impact assessment, commercial and financial analysis, and overall coordination. Dr Child is a former CAMPFIRE Co-ordinator within the Department of National Parks and Wildlife. He has managed a community-based natural resource management project for several years in Zambia and has published widely on CBNRM in the southern African region. Brian Child is an institutional economist, familiar with the restructuring of projects and wildlife agencies.

Dr Hasan Moinuddin

Responsible for program model and implementation, institutional development and performance, and sustainability issues. Dr Moinuddin has considerable experience as a consultant in management and organizational development, working with a range of donors in Africa and Asia. He has assisted the Zimbabwe Department of National Parks and Wildlife in restructuring and has facilitated key workshops that have guided the direction of the CAMPFIRE Program.

Dr David Mazambani

Responsible for community development fund, non-wildlife products, and diversification. Dr Mazambani has considerable knowledge of the CAMPFIRE Program and has experience of managing and implementing rural development projects in Zimbabwe. He is an expert on community trust formation and institutional arrangements for common property resource management in Zimbabwe.

Mr Andrew Mlalazi

Responsible for local government issues, institutional coordination and cooperation at national, district and local levels, and capacity building and governance. Mr Mlalazi has extensive experience within local government in Zimbabwe, particularly the legal framework and functioning of Rural District Councils.

Mr Brian Jones

Responsible for CBNRM policy issues, devolution, and beneficiary focus and graduation of producer communities. Mr Jones is a former co-ordinator of Namibia's CBNRM program in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. He has considerable knowledge and experience within southern Africa of CBNRM policy and implementation and has managed local-level CBNRM projects in Namibia.

Annex C

PERSONS MET

Name	Agency	Position
F. Spain	Development Associates	
A. Francis	Development Associates	
C. Jonga	CAMPFIRE Association	Director
E. Loken	USAID	Acting Mission Director
R. Taylor	WWF	Program Director
S. Mutsauri	WWF	Head of Finances and Administration
A. Khumalo	WWF	M&E Data base manager
Lilian Goredema	WWF	Assistant Coordinator, training
J. Chikuruwo	MLGPWNH	Under Secretary
A. Ndlovu	MLGPWNH	Deputy Secretary
T. Chikoma	ART	
C. Muchena	ART	Director
C. Chinhoyi	ZimTrust	Director
E. Kawadza	NPWLA	Principal Ecologist
O. Mufute	NPWLA	Senior Ecologist
M. Chasi	Department of Natural Resources	Director
P. Manyaza	Department of Natural Resources	Chief Natural Resources officer
S. Baker	Forestry Commission	Deputy General Manager
K. Ramachela	Forestry Commission	Woodland Management Advisor
G. Kudhlande	SAFIRE	Director
M. Murphree	CASS	Professor emeritus
N. Shumba	CASS	Administrator
L. Mutseyekwa	ACTION Magazine	Networking Officer
S. Lunga	Binga RDC	CAMPFIRE Co-ordinator
S. Mudimba	Binga RDC	CEO
J. Mujaka	Mwinji traditional village committee, Binga District	Chair
Mr. Akajodo	Muzarabani RDC	Council Chair
M. Magaya	Muzarabani RDC	Chief Executive Officer
M. Moyo	Muzarabani RDC	E.O. Social Services
A. Mufunga	Muzarabani RDC	AEO Wildlife
T. Marongwe	Gokwe North District	District Administrator
O. Mashamba	Gokwe North RDC	CAMPFIRE Co-ordinator
O. Mbano	Gokwe North RDC	Council Chairman
L. Chizombe	Gonono Ward	Wildlife Chair
T. Mutsokonyore	Gonono Ward	Assistant Ward Clerk
J. Siamatata	Gonono Ward	Ward Clerk
B. Coaton	Ingwe Safaris	Professional Hunter
Z. Dawa	Masoka Ward	Anti Poaching Unit
I. Chaukura	Masoka Ward	Community Mobilizer
B. Chisunga	Masoka Ward	Headman
T. Magunde	Masoka Ward	Treasurer
P. Kajengo	Masoka Ward	Vice Secretary
D. Kambizi	Masoka Ward	Clerk
G. Zarota	Masoka Development Trust	Chair
A. Zengeredzi	Masoka Development Trust	Treasurer
Mr Chikuni	Guruve RDC	CAMPFIRE Manager
C. Stockil	River Lodges	Owner/manager
A. Ndebele	Chiredzi RDC	Council Chair
A. Sithole	Chiredzi RDC	Finance Committee Chair
F. Ngwarati	Chiredzi RDC	CAMPFIRE Secretary
L. Moyo	Chiredzi RDC	Acting Accountant
Mr Choga	Chiredzi RDC	CAMPFIRE Manager

Mr Sambo	Chiredzi RDC	EO
E. Madhuku	Chipinge RDC	Chair, NR Committee
R. Dembaremba	Chipinge RDC	Natural Resources Officer
D. Chauke	Mahenye Ward	Wildlife Committee
C. Chauke	Mahenye Ward	Wildlife Chair
L. Chauke	Mahenye Ward	Treasurer
P. Simbini	Mahenye Ward	Member
J. Ndlovu	Mahenye Ward	Member
S. Mukuchwa	Mahenye Ward	Resource Monitor
E. Chauke	Mahenye Ward	Resource Monitor
S. Sithole	Mahenye Ward	Resource monitor
Jojo Chauke Mahenye	Mahenye Ward	Chief
M. Manyewu	Mahenye Ward	Health Officer
A. Chauke	Mahenye Ward	Kraal Head
E. Chauke	Mahenye Ward	Kraal Head
P. Chauke	Mahenye Ward	Vice Chair
J. Muhlana	Mahenye Ward	Village Head
W. Chauke	Mahenye Ward	Village Head
Mr. Chitondo	Mahenye Ward	Village Head
D. de la Harpe	Malilangwe Trust	Director

In addition, members of the evaluation team attended the following meetings:

1. Meeting with approx. 40 adult community members (including project committee members) of the Mwinji Cultural Village Project on 17 June 2003.
2. A WWF feedback meeting to CAMPFIRE stakeholders on game numbers, hunting data and tourism data on 24 June 2003.
3. Evaluation Team feedback workshop to CAMPFIRE stakeholders on 25 June 2003.
3. CAMPFIRE Association AGM on 30 June 2003. The evaluation team provided a short presentation on findings and recommendations.

Annex D:

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References and Documents Consulted

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ANNEX E:

CONSTITUTION OF THE CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION

CONSTITUTION OF THE CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION

1. THE NAME AND STATUS OF THE ASSOCIATION

- (a) The Association shall be known as the CAMPFIRE Association, a private, non-profit organisation, subject to the laws of Zimbabwe.
- (b) It shall be a corporate body capable of entering into any legal transaction, contractual and other, in furtherance of its objectives and of suing and being sued under the laws of Zimbabwe. It will also be capable of accepting donations, contributions, and grant funds from individuals or organisations, private and public, domestic or international.

2. INTERPRETATION OF TERMS

In this constitution —

"Association" means the CAMPFIRE Association of Rural District Councils established under this constitution;

"Council" means a rural district council established in terms of the Rural District Councils Act, or any other Act that establishes rural local authorities.

"Appropriate Authority" means the status accorded to a rural district council in relation to the wildlife resource under the Parks and Wildlife Act. ("The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, appoint a rural district council to be the appropriate authority for such area of communal land as may be specified in such notice and may in like manner amend or revoke such notice");

"General Assembly" means the composite grouping of all members that make up the Association;

"Board" means the Board of Management established under clause 9;

"Executive" means the secretariat established in terms of clause 9;

"CAMPFIRE Revenue" means gross income from any activity as defined by AGM from time to time.

"CAMPFIRE" means Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources *Association* which aims at giving full control of natural resources.

"Delegate" means a representative elected by a member council to represent that Council at the Annual General Meeting.

“Producer communities” are a group of people who live with, manage natural resources, bear the costs and enjoy the benefits communally.

3. PREAMBLE

Aware of the economic, social and cultural values of the indigenous plant and animal resources of the communal lands of Zimbabwe, supporting the National Conservation Strategy of Zimbabwe, recognising the economic opportunities afforded by Section 95 (i) of the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act:

- a) extending the responsibilities and privileges conferred by the Act on landholder/occupier to rural district councils, and
- b) promoting the propagation and use of wild flora and fauna for the benefit of the inhabitants of communal lands,

And considering that there is currently a void in the representation of the collective interests of communal land inhabitants and district councils in terms of the opportunities provided by the Act:

Therefore, following on from the deliberations of a steering committee formed in August 1989, representatives of the following district councils; Nyaminyami, Guruve, Gokwe, Binga, Tsholotsho, Hwange, Bulilimamangwe, Gaza Khomanani, Gazaland, Beitbridge, Nyanga, Mudzi, Muzarabani and Hurungwe, resolved at a meeting held in Harare 27-28 February 1990 to form the CAMPFIRE Association, the constitution for which follows.

In the formation of the Campfire Association the inaugural members having been aware of, and fully subscribe to, the principle of the devolution of the custodianship and management of wildlife and other natural resources to producer communities in the communal lands. Acceptance of this principle has been made a condition of the conferment of appropriate authority status for wildlife and other natural resources on Rural District Councils and member councils in the Association will seek both collectively and individually to implement this principle and ensure that producer communities are the principal beneficiaries of the benefits of their wildlife and other natural resources and the activities of the Association. Provisions exist for amendments to the Constitution allowing for membership by producer communities at such times and in such manner as may be appropriate.

4. DOMICILE

- a) The Association will be based and have its headquarters and principal offices in Harare.
- b) The Association may establish subsidiaries or regional offices in other localities within Zimbabwe or in other countries.

- c) The Association began its activities 1989 and will continue ad infinitum.

5. OBJECTIVES OF THE ASSOCIATION

The objectives of the Association shall be to advance and safeguard the rights enjoyed, powers held and duties performed by Rural District Councils who are members) individually and collectively, and especially:

- a) To promote and protect the rights and interests of Appropriate Authorities and to make such representations and take such steps as may be deemed necessary or desirable in connection therewith for the common interests of the members.
- b) To cooperate with the Government, in particular appropriate Ministries, and generally with all agencies sharing common interests.
- c) To promote and assist in the conservation of indigenous flora and fauna in Zimbabwe's communal, resettlement lands *and other such lands as is appropriate.*
- d) To promote, advance and develop sustainable utilisation of all natural resources in Zimbabwe's communal and resettlement lands *and other such lands as is appropriate.*
- e) To promote the fundamental principles enshrined in the CAMPFIRE concept of proprietorship of natural resources by producer communities.
- f) To promote the collation and distribution of information on natural resources utilisation and management within the association's membership and between it and other agencies.
- g) To encourage the introduction of legislation and policies which promote CAMPFIRE activities.
- h) To provide advisory and other services to the members.
- i) To provide an arbitration and mediation service to the members and between them and other agencies and parties.
- j) To do all other lawful things as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objects.
- k) To contract and co-ordinate Service Providers for their services for the benefit of members.

6. MEMBERSHIP AND ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION

The Association will be made up of the following types of members: full members, associate members, honorary, and ex-officio members. Except for honorary and ex-officio members, membership is based on Rural District Council areas and producer communities.

- a) Full membership is open to all Rural District Councils with Appropriate Authority.
- b) Associate membership is open to all Rural District Councils that are not Appropriate Authority holders but which support the Campfire Programme.
- c) Any agency or person invited by the General Assembly at the Annual General Meeting may be granted ex-officio status in the Association.
- d) A Council aspiring to, and approved for membership shall be subject to a "joining fee" set by the General Assembly. Additionally, each member shall be liable for payment of *an* annual subscription fee which shall be fixed in such a manner as determined at the Annual General Meeting from time to time. To remain in good standing the annual subscription fee must be paid by 31 December of each year and is a pre-requisite *for* attendance at the Annual General Meeting.
- e) A Council may cease to be a member of the Association by giving notice to the Board of Management on or before the 31st December in any Calendar year, provided that any Council that finds itself at variance on certain matters shall endeavour to get such matters resolved prior to 31st March.
- f) Full Members shall have the following rights:
 - Participation in the activities of the Association;
 - Participation by voice and vote at all general meetings of the Association;
 - Be a party to the decisions of the Association through the various committees in which they participate;
 - Nominate or *be elected*, to positions on the various components of the Association Board of Management, committees and working groups.
- g) Members shall have the following responsibilities:
 - Participate and collaborate actively on those activities of the Association associated with its objectives;
 - Comply with the requirements contained in the Constitution of the Association and the rules and regulations promulgated by the various organisational elements

of the Association;

- Attend all general meetings of the Association;
- Comply with tasks or duties assigned by the Association;
- Comply with the majority decisions of the Association and decisions of the Board save for such cases which a member intends to challenge the validity of such decision(s) in terms of the Constitution;
- Pay annual subscriptions and other dues on time; and
- Conduct all personal and organisational matters in a manner that is above reproach.

7. FINANCE AND AUDIT

- a) The Association shall seek to be financed primarily by contributions from its members as stipulated in this Constitution.
- b) The Association shall engage in fundraising activities and may accept all manner of charitable/grant contributions from individuals or bodies supporting its objectives and programmes.
- c) The Association's financial year shall commence on 1st January and end on 31st December.
- d) All monies received must be deposited into proper accounts opened in the name of the Association with one or more banks, building societies, post office, or other registered reputable financial institutions.
- e) The Board shall cause proper books of accounts to be kept with respect to all matters pertaining to the affairs of the Association.
- f) The books of accounts shall be kept at the office of the Association or such other place as the Board shall deem fit and during normal office hours be open for inspection by the members of the Association.
- g) At least once in every year the accounts of the Association shall be examined and the correctness of the income and expenditure account and balance sheet ascertained by registered *and* reputable auditors.
- h) The auditors shall be appointed by the BOARD at the behest of the General Assembly at such remuneration and upon such conditions as the BOARD may prescribe.

- i) The Board shall cause the accounts of the Association duly certified by the auditors to be tabled before each Annual General Meeting of the Association for approval.

8. FEES FOR SERVICE AND LEVIES

The Association may charge a commission in respect of any purchase or sale made on behalf of any Council through the Association's services, provided that such commission shall not exceed 2.5% of the value of the transaction.

The Association shall receive contributions as approved by the General Assembly, on those members that have CAMPFIRE projects. These levies shall be a percentage of the member's revenue generated from CAMPFIRE activities. The Association shall treat this revenue for the sole purpose of calculating the Annual levy.

9. THE ASSOCIATION

The Association shall have the following organisational elements for administration and control: General Assembly; BOARD; and the Secretariat.

10. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The General Assembly is the ultimate authority and governing entity of the Association. It is comprised of an *Authorised elected Council representative* and another elected representative delegated from the district. The General Assembly is responsible for all matters pertaining to the Association, *which shall* include the following:

- a) Approve, revise, and/or disapprove policies of the Association proposed by the Board of Management;
- b) Approve rules, regulations, and procedures related to the various activities of the Association. The General Assembly may delegate this function to the Board of Management as it deems appropriate;
- c) Elect and remove members of the BOARD.
- d) Approve or disapprove the Annual Report and Financial Report submitted by the Board of Management;
- e) Modify as necessary, the annual subscription required of the members;
- f) Act on and resolve those matters that may be presented by the Board of Management for the decision of the General Assembly;
- g) Approve or disapprove proposed modifications to the Constitution of the

Association:

- h) Approve or disapprove the general focus of the annual budget for the Association;
- i) Act on the dissolution of the Association; and
- j) Act on any other matters deemed necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the Association.

Amendments to the Constitution and dissolution of the Association requires the approval of two-thirds of the membership.

11. ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

The Association shall in each year hold an annual general meeting of members, in addition to any other meetings that may take place. Not more than fifteen months shall elapse between the date of one general meeting of the Association and the next. The annual general meeting shall be held at such time and place as the Board shall appoint, but no later than 90 days after the end of the financial year.

- a) A general meeting of the Association may be convened by:
 - i) a written request of not less than one third of the members of the Association; or
 - ii) by the Board at any time it considers it expedient to do so.
- b) In the case of the Annual General Meeting, twenty-one days notice at least and in the case of a general meeting thirty days notice at least certifying the place, day and hour of the meeting and in the case of business not being routine business, the general nature of such business shall be given to each member.
- c) No business shall be transacted in any General Meeting unless a quorum is present when the meeting proceeds to business. For all purposes a quorum shall be half plus one of the membership, whether personally present or represented by proxy.
- d) If within two hours after the time fixed for a general meeting the members present do not constitute a quorum, the meeting shall be adjourned, and a new meeting called for seven days later at the same time and place. If a quorum is not constituted within two hours after the time fixed for this subsequent general meeting, the members present shall be considered to constitute a quorum, provided that the members present shall not have power to amend the Constitution of the Association.
- e) The General Assembly shall elect, from among the delegates of the Association, a Board of Management, a Chairman and two Vice Chairmen. One of the vice

chairmen will be responsible for planning and secretariat, and the other for finance.

- f) At a General Meeting, resolutions put to the vote of the Assembly shall be decided on a show of hands, unless a poll is demanded by the Chairman, or by not less than half the members voting either in person or by proxy.
- g) Members of the Board of Management will not have a right to vote on the deliberations relative to the Annual Audited Financial Statement nor on any matters in which the member has been involved.
- h) Each voting member shall *be entitled to* two votes.
- i) In the case of an equality of votes the Chairman of the meeting shall be entitled to a second or casting vote.
- j) Except for amendments to the Constitution matters before the General Meeting shall be decided by simple majority of the members present and voting.
- k) The Minutes of the meeting of the General Assembly will be signed by the Chairman, the Vice Chairman responsible for planning and secretariat and the Director.
- l) Items of the agenda should be submitted to the Secretariat at least 30 days before the Annual General Meeting.

12. BOARD OF MANAGEMENT

The responsibility for formulating policy to guide the day-to-day management of the Association's affairs shall be in the hands of the BOARD which shall consist of eleven members.

- a) The Board shall meet at least four times a year.
- b) *Members of the BOARD shall be elected for four years.* All members are eligible for re-election if they so desire.
- c) The BOARD shall co-opt any individual or agency for any period of time on a non-voting basis.
- d) The Chairman shall have a second or casting vote.
- e) No business shall be transacted unless a quorum of members is present. For all purposes the quorum shall be half plus one of the elected members of the Board.
- f) All acts, matters or things authorised or required to be done by the Board shall be decided by a majority vote at a meeting at which there is a quorum.

- g) An elected Board member ceases to be a representative of his/her own Council because he/she has assumed a national duty/responsibility.
- h) The Board shall be responsible for the engagement and dismissal of the Director and shall have oversight of the hiring and dismissal of all other staff employed of the Association.
- i) Disqualification of a Member Representative from the Board of Management.
 - Member Councils are responsible for the eligibility of Board representatives.
 - An individual representative member who misses three consecutive meetings without an acceptable apology may be disqualified and the Board co-opts a replacement.

13. **POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE BOARD OF MANAGEMENT**

- a) To direct the affairs of the Association and all funds and assets of the Association, and shall be vested in it and administered by it, subject to such directions as may be given by the General Assembly from time to time.
- b) To appoint one or more special committees or sub-committees for specific purposes with a membership not necessarily restricted to members of the Association.
- c) To transmit all resolutions passed by the General Assembly to the appropriate quarter for consideration and to endeavour by all constitutional means to carry into effect any recommendations of the General Assembly and generally to take such action as may seem expedient in furthering the interests of the Association or any member thereof.
- d) To frame and recommend standing orders relating to the conduct of meetings of the General Assembly and itself, provided that such standing orders shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or militate against the spirit and objectives of the Association.
- e) The BOARD shall have power to take on lease or purchase immovable property or other fixed property and for that purpose to borrow money on the security of Mortgage Bonds over such property or otherwise and to enter into agreements Hire Purchase or Lease Hire as may be required on behalf of the Association.
- f) The BOARD shall have power to appoint a Director and other senior employees on such terms and conditions as it shall determine.

- g) The BOARD shall have such power to do such other things as may be deemed necessary for the furtherance or the objects set out in clause 5 hereof and for the carrying out of the duties imposed upon it by this clause and in particular may out of the funds at its disposal, refund to every member attending any of its meetings, travelling and subsistence and other allowances as may from time to time be determined by the BOARD).
- h) The BOARD shall keep the minutes of its meetings, which minutes shall be circularised to all members and shall also keep minutes of the proceedings of General Meetings and circulate the minutes to all members.
- i) The BOARD shall have the power to delegate to officials or employees engaged by it any of the duties imposed on it by this clause.
- j) The BOARD shall recommend auditors at the Annual General Meeting of the Association.
- k) The BOARD shall present at each General Meeting a report on its activities and a financial statement.

14. ADMINISTRATION

The Secretariat headed by a Director shall be hired by the Board. The Secretariat shall be responsible for carrying out those functions of its position in accordance with the clauses contained in the Constitution of the Association and the specific delegations of authority conferred by the Board through detailed employment contracts.

15. AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

Amendment of this constitution may only be made if two thirds of the total membership of the Association vote in favour thereof and provided that due notice of any proposed amendment has been given one calendar month prior to the General Meeting. The Commissioner of Taxes is to approve the amendments.

16. DISSOLUTION OF THE ASSOCIATION

The Association may be dissolved in accordance with procedures established by the Laws of Zimbabwe with the approval of two thirds of the total membership, at a meeting duly convened for that purpose.

In the event of the dissolution of the Association its assets shall be disposed of to best advantage and after payment of all just and lawful debts, the proceeds shall be distributed amongst member Councils in proportion to the annual subscription payable and paid by them at the date of dissolution, provided that such member's subscription is fully paid as at

that date. The Commissioner of Taxes is to approve of such distribution.

17. AFFILIATION

The Association may be affiliated to any other body or association on the decision of the Annual General Meeting.

Annex F

Feedback to preliminary presentation of findings and recommendations by team

**Mandel Training Centre,
Harare,**

1) Welcome

Mr Charles Jonga, Executive Director of the CAMPFIRE Association officially opened the meeting and welcomed the participants. He explained the purpose of the meeting and introduced the evaluation team.

2) Presentation

The format of the presentation was as follows (presenter's names in brackets):

I Purpose of the Evaluation (Dr Brian Child, team leader)

Dr Child emphasised that it had been difficult to differentiate between CAMPFIRE as a programme and the NRMP II. The task of the team was to evaluate NRMP II and not the whole programme. The team aimed to provide an honest, unbiased and critical assessment. He emphasised that the findings to be presented represented preliminary findings and the team looked forward to the inputs of participants.

II. Methodology Used (Dr Brian Child)

III. Summary of Findings: Positive Impact and Weaknesses

A. Positive Impact

1. Conservation Impact (Dr Brian Child)
2. Economic Benefit Impact (Dr Brian Child)
3. Diversification (Dr David Mazambani)
4. Devolution (Mr Brian Jones)
5. Institution and Capacity Building at Sub-District, District and National Levels (Mr Andrew Mlalazi)
6. Governance (Mr Andrew Mlalazi)
7. Technologies and Innovation (not presented)
8. National, Regional and International Impact (Mr Brian Jones)
9. Sustainability (Dr Hasan Moinuddin)

B. Weaknesses of NRMP II (Dr Hasan Moinuddin)

1. RDC Performance
2. CAMPFIRE Association Performance
3. Devolution
4. Diversification
5. Project Design
6. Project Delivery and Coordination
7. Project MIS and Monitoring of Socio-Economic Impact
8. Project Sustainability
9. Project Collaborating Partners/Service Providers
10. Role of USAID

IV Lessons Learned (Dr David Mazambani)

V. Recommendations and Future Outlook (Dr Brian Child)

- A. Recommendations Addressed to CAMPFIRE Association
- B. Recommendations Addressed to RDCs
- C. Recommendations Addressed to Service Providers
- D. Recommendations Addressed to DNPWLM
- E. Recommendations Addressed to USAID and other Donors

3) Discussion of presentation

The following is a record of *substantive* comments and discussion on the team's presentation.

E. Loken (USAID): I am confused about the distinction the team is using concerning NRMP II and NRMP I time frames and data sets. E.g. in the ZimTrust grant pre. 1998 money went to community projects. If

the team didn't include this then the 1-10 ratio of spending is wrong. Goes right through the findings. I agree with the fundamental finding and recommendation that higher proportion of funds should go to producer communities.

J. Gotoro (CA): The team contradicts itself by saying most money should go to the community, and then saying that CSPs should use donor funding to build sustainability. The money given to ZimTrust was well spent because it went on training and WWF didn't spend their money on themselves. The money was well invested because it was in capacity, which you might not translate in to dollars. You went to seven districts out of 53 so missed out on some that were doing well.

Team Response: Team will work with DA to get a better breakdown of spending where possible and try to include expenditure on training to communities.

Team Response: We are concentrating on NRMP II, 1994-2003 but detail will be on the performance from 1998 to present, we don't want to repeat the Mid-Term Evaluation.

E. Loken (USAID): It would be useful for me to have a full summary of the use of the 16.5 million dollars and a final accounting of all 28,1 million would be good.

E. Loken (USAID): I assume today's presentation will form the basis of the executive summary of the final report. The strengths and weaknesses presented don't seem to have been prioritised, they are all presented as if they have equal weight. It would be useful to rearrange them in terms of priorities. Also some are findings and some conclusions.

Team response: Will attend to this.

J. Gotoro (CA) and C Jonga (CA) were concerned about the way the involvement in the Gairezi project of the Nyanga Downs Fly Fishing Club was described by the team. The team had said the club had provided money and been involved in project implementation. The team was ascribing success to something that only came last (involvement of the club).

Team response: The club has actually made some investment, raised funds and are doing marketing and bookings. There is also a formal agreement on roles and responsibilities. The point is the community has benefited from private sector assistance. By contrast we are concerned about how marketing will be done for the Mwinji cultural village project

M. Chasi (DNR): You are saying the Govt. depts. have done very little but you need to recognise the role of DNPWLM. Also DNR have fulfilled their role e.g tree conservation has improved through DNR work with communities. Building capacity of communities to monitor wildlife is because of the capacity training by DNPWL.

Team response: the final report will carry detailed sections on the performance of service providers and government agencies that were part of NRMP II. Their positive contributions and weaknesses will be addressed fully. We have been surprised though that DNPWLM has taken a back seat.

C. Jonga (CA): DNPWLM has done everything else expected of it but not in terms of supervising the monitoring and data collection

E. Kawadza (DNPWLM): Please use a different word to DNPWLM taking a "back seat".

J. Gotoro (CA): The team said we hadn't done much on devolution. On the issue of Appropriate Authority being at council level, we have been talking to government on this and have presented papers to government. Councils need to be commended for having devolved a lot of functions to sub-district level. We will make use of the Traditional Leaders Act and Trusts are coming in to deal with the problem of the mismatch between traditional leaders' and administrative boundaries and ecological boundaries.

Team response: We couldn't find any papers that had been submitted to government. Please give us advice and data. We recognise that CA has had a tough battle since 1994/95 to deal with devolution because of the changed political climate and there are diverse opinions in CA on this issue.

J. Gotor (CA): Three points: 1. DA, USAID and CSPS have done a good job in very difficult political circumstances. We said previously that CSPs should be phased out by now, and communities should have been capacitated, but now you are saying the CSPs still need to be there. We commend USAID and Americans in general for staying with us an extra 5 years. 2. It is totally wrong to say that CAMPFIRE has not looked for other donor money. We got money from the Dutch, WISDOM, Japanese and another US source, though it is true that the Americans have big muscle and others get frightened to provide support. Work has been done on an endowment fund but people think we have too much money because of USAID. Also USAID aren't amenable to putting money into an endowment fund. 3. It is a good report and some of the recommendations are already on our AGM agenda for discussion. Some stories you gave were not totally true but I respect this report. It is better than the Patel report. I encourage my colleagues to look at this report very carefully. You are not fault finding. It is a very objective report that needs some cleaning up. It is positive.

Team response on sourcing donor funds: We have not seen a good paper that says CA will be able to break even in a given year – is a weakness of the secretariat.

Jerry Gotor (CA): The walk out of the Dutch was not to do with CAMPFIRE it was political.

E. Loken (USAID): But the point is CA has had no significant funding since 1998 from another source. It is a valid point that partly because we are seen as big brother others were reluctant to give funds, but it is also partly because you sat back and said you were ok.

Team: On the issue of an endowment. It wasn't developed at the start so that when USAID phased out, activities would be able to continue. It was in documents but they ended on the shelf.

E. Loken (USAID): We funded a report on the potential for establishing an endowment or sinking fund. At that stage we were going to phase out in a year. We said from the start we would not use our money for an endowment fund, but would help CA design something to attract other funds while we phase out.

C. Jonga (CA): The team referred to the marginalisation of CSPS as a CA issue, but we need to look at this in terms of project design rather than as a policy of CA.

E. Loken (USAID): The project policy was very much a CCG approach. The former executive director of CA took a hard line at the ODA workshop and with government pressure said the CCG should end. It was a CA policy, we didn't necessarily support one way or another. It was counter to the findings of the Mid-Term Evaluation, we didn't take up this issue because we were phasing out. The executive director, supported by the Board wanted full control of the programme for CA.

Team response: During our interviews with service providers, we were told that since 1998 the sub-committees of CA had fallen apart and the triennial meetings stopped. Some CSPs said there is no longer a platform to share with CA and work to the same vision. Meetings were not called for.

J. Gotor: No-one can challenge that because the time frame given to the CCG had expired.

F. Spain (DA): Triennial meetings were in place when CCG members were getting funding but it was not DA's intention for their input to stop. The onus was on CA to liaise. We provided funds to hold CCG meetings and we reported that CA needed to engage CCG members and that didn't happen.

C. Chinoyi (ZimTrust): From the outset it was recognised that NRMP was a project and CCG and CAMPFIRE were a programme. The CCG should continue to meet to discuss the strategic vision of the programme. A lot of meetings and structures fell apart.

A. Sithole (CA): On expenditure on staff employment by CA: There was a condition with USAID funding to employ additional staff in order to access funds and then we had a big budget for staff expenditure. From 2001-2003 we have been focusing seriously on sustainability and started to reduce our staff. So we need to look into detail and look at minutes of meetings so there is a correct interpretation of what caused expenditure to go up.

E. Loken (USAID): We urged CA to build up staff in 1991 and in 1996-7 we had the first strategic planning workshop and we urged CA to reduce staff. From 1991-96 we did encourage the taking on of

staff, but after that we urged CA to think within their means and DA has focused on that since 1996-7. Since 2000 CA has made an effort to reduce staff, but for 4-5 years nothing happened despite our urging.

Team response: From the evidence we have, the staff reduction only came when you had to and wasn't planned for. Also on the issue of CA capacity – if we ask for a document, people say wait for Charles Jonga – key documents should be filed properly and available – this is a capacity indicator

A. Sithole (CA): We as a team had a problem in accessing USAID funding. That's why PMT came in place. It wasn't a thumbsuck from CA. On the issue of the SGI, we need funding and support and workshops were organised on our behalf and new ideas came from these like SGI. The aim of SGI is to capacitate RDCs so they can capacitate communities because we are talking about devolution. SGI might need to be improved, but it is ok. Things are always criticised by others, there are so many workshops - what we are discussing here will be criticised by facilitators at other workshops.

Team response: We feel the SGI is over ambitious – should you be doing what it proposes or concentrating on core services?

C. Jonga (CA): We need to be a bit more cautious in our criticism of SGI – a lot of things in this evaluation are addressed in SGI – but it's another story if you are saying other things in it are over ambitious. We are looking at a 3-year programme. We are looking at a trust fund, marketing, and systems at a community level.

M. Murphree (CASS Trust): Section 6, Lessons Learned does not flow clearly and necessarily from the proceeding section. Three of the nine points deal with product diversification and nothing is said about CA and nothing is derived from some of the other weaknesses identified.

Team response: We will give more attention to lessons learned including on institutional capacity building

M. Murphree (CASS Trust): The recommendation to USAID and other donors for funding only to go to producer communities is ambiguous and seems to contradict others. I assume you don't mean that no other organisation should receive funds at all. A substantive issue here is that it is questionable whether it is appropriate for donor funds to go direct to producer communities when the essence of the programme is to promote the development of self reliance through locally available resources. It might be appropriate to give donor funding to communities for activities such as electric fences where there is no locally available start up capital. But a very substantial part of a programme like this, which is aimed at self reliance is to create an enabling political policy and social environment that will develop local social capital and develop the right kind of legislation and provide light touch facilitation. We need to look carefully at any recommendation that would imply that donor assistance should be used in only one way.

E. Loken (USAID): I agree on the principle that the focus of future activities should be on producer communities rather than on intermediaries, so in such a case we would work out a concept and sign an agreement with producer communities

C. Chinoyi (ZimTrust): If you get a CAMPFIRE Ward and a non- CAMPFIRE Ward side by side, in terms of enforcing bylaws one village will do it, but people in the next village are not aware and the police can't enforce the bylaws, so this is why I question the isolating of communities in the context of vertical and horizontal integration.

J. Gatora (CA): The team seem to be saying RDCs are being bribed so they can accept the CAMPFIRE concept. It would be good if you can give counter ideas about how to get people to buy in. CA is said to be an exclusive club of RDCs and made mistakes. The team said capacity building takes over 30 years. I agree the ultimate aim is the lower level, but how do you capacitate the RDCs to help the communities – which comes first? Tell us the answers – you said Chiredzi was an example of how it should be done and they have their own SGI and they were assisted. We need to help to identify the roles of RDCs and we need to use the Environmental Management Act to define roles. Giving assistance to communities only will create a capacity gap between communities and their government structures.

M. Murphree (CASS Trust): With the recommendation A.4, you are sticking to the old formulaic approach for revenue distribution guidelines - but in retrospect I think this is the wrong way and there is inconsistency between A.4 and B.1, which suggests the income should go directly to the producer communities.

Team response: We will address the apparent inconsistency – what we are saying in A.4 is that in principle the major share should go to the producer communities and in B.1 we say give income direct to communities and they should pay a levy to council.

Mr Marisa: I'm not against the principle, of giving more income to communities, but Government devolved functions to the RDCs and they need monitoring capacity and to be able to provide effective services to communities. The 20% in the revenue distribution guidelines is a contribution to the CAMPFIRE Unit to sustain wildlife activities – it is not a contribution to council. Council won't survive on 5%.

C. Jonga (CA): The team have mentioned that we should not destroy the goose that lays the golden eggs. We must look at it not in terms of the economic difficulties councils are going through. Let communities do things at that level and let communities pay for the costs and then RDCs are losing nothing. There needs to be sufficient incentive for communities.

J. Gatora (CA): The team said RDCs put a double tax on wildlife and other resources should also be taxed – but cattle are taxed at 7,5%, cotton is taxed at 13% (the buyer pays). And general council revenue goes back to communities in the form of services.

Team response: But realistically, councils are unable to provide services 100km away. The tax on wildlife is much higher than other resources. You are effectively taking 45% off from a revenue source compared to 7,5% or 13% for other resources.

C. Jonga (CA): I think we should move away from subject – we don't need to discuss the exact percentages now but should look at the large amount of unallocated money. We have the figures on this.

Team response: the figures on unallocated income by councils were shown in a graph (about 20% on average). If council income from other natural resource use was included, then councils were retaining even higher percentages of overall income.

J. Gatora (CA): I appreciate that point, but we cannot act on this in the absence of concrete examples. The team should give us examples in confidence. Everyone should toe the line. We would want to take corrective measures because these actions are unfair to the communities.

C. Jonga (CA): The information is there and we as CA will deal with this.

Team response: CA should ask WWF to give you this data and disaggregate it according to each council. Some are doing well and others worse than the table shows and comparisons will exert peer pressure to improve. The team would consider a suggestion to provide some information on this in the annexes to the main report.

J. Gatora (CA): Yes we want to tell the Minister of Local Government at our AGM that his ministry should help enforce this.

A. Sithole (CA): The team has been harsh in its recommendations on revenue distribution. You need to consider the time frame and budget planning. The previous guideline was 50% to communities and now we have resolved on 55%. From 55% to 70% is a big gap – we need a bridging period.

E. Kawadza (DNPWLM): It maybe true that National Parks is not doing monitoring. The CAMPFIRE principles are supposed to be enforced by NP, but they are not legislated, so the idea was to allow flexibility. We should sit with the Ministry of Local Government on this. We can deal with things that have legs (animal issues) but when it comes to money it is difficult for us.

Team response: But in the past, DNPWLM has in fact taken responsibility for enforcing the guidelines on revenue distribution. A letter was sent for example by former Director Nduku in 1993 stating that councils should comply with returning 80% of to communities.

E. Loken (USAID): Sustainability section III.A.9.4: The team says only 5 of 18 CDF projects have a higher probability of sustainability. You are entitled to your opinion, but what is the basis? There are

some bee keeping projects that are doing very well. What is your sample? At this point in time things might not be sustainable, but with an economic upturn some eco-tourism projects could become sustainable.

Team response: These were our judgements because there is no Management Information System in place and no records on income generation or long-term business and marketing strategies. The sustainability comments should actually refer to the eco-tourism projects and not all projects.

E. Loken (USAID): I appreciate that data isn't there, but rather say "At this point in time the team has concerns about the long-term sustainability of some CDF activities" – 5 out of 18 makes it look as if most are not sustainable.

E. Loken: Section III.B.3.4: the team says there was no marketing or product feasibility done except where there was private sector collaboration already in existence. We didn't ignore these issues and we did ask the key questions, and tried to get information. I would say it was minimal, but you cannot say it was not done.

Section III.B.5.2: the team says there was insufficient funding to support CSPs who were expected to drive diversification. We told all CSPs that if they wanted to work with communities they could get funds. WWF and SAFIRE were the only ones who applied, but everyone else backed off. It wasn't a case of insufficient funding – we have money left over.

Team response: we are talking about the need for product development, not small grants. There are long time lags to get products on to the market. Project developed enterprises, but not markets.

E. Loken (USAID): Why not say "Insufficient attention and resources were devoted to diversification"?

Section III.B.5.8: The team is talking about performance-based funding to reward certain things with more money. The CDF manual guideline says innovative projects should be given extra special attention – we did provide for this, but won't defend our record on implementation.

Section III.B.6.1: I agree there was an absence of technical peer review in the CDF approval process, but many CCG people said they didn't want to be on the PMT because there would have been a conflict of interest in reviewing projects they were involved in designing.

Section III.B.6.2: I accept that there was inadequate orientation and training on the requirements for accessing CDF grants, but it is not that nothing was done.

Section III.B.6.3: Distribution of projects on equity and political correctness. It wasn't politics, though it was on equity.

(Objections from the floor on the use of "political correctness")

Team response: We will remove reference to political correctness. You are referring to equal distribution. However, some districts could have received more funding if the criteria had been more based on economic viability and performance.

F. Spain (DA): DA put a lot of effort into reviewing proposals before PMT meetings and we did look at business plans.

E. Loken (USAID): Sections III.B. 5.3 and 6.5 contradict each other. We are damned if we do and damned if we don't.

Team response: Let's add "on CA institutional building" at the end of 6.5. USAID continued to extend the project, but CA wasn't coming up with the capability to implement then CDF.

E. Loken (USAID): There was never any provision for CA to administer or implement anything on CDF – they were decision-makers to run the process to manage projects – but not to do grant management. DA was going to continue to do that for duration. CA was never going to assume that responsibility. That was never a design principle.

Team response: There is correspondence between DA and a USAID official discussing the transfer of CDF to a local institution and discussing the possibility of CA.

E. Loken (USAID): Such a letter means nothing – look at the project agreement.

Team response: However, CA itself wanted to take on CDF management and said this at an AGM. There was a perception DA was supposed to build capacity so CA could take on the responsibility.

E. Loken (USAID): Once we were gone!! . I want to be blunt: there was never anything in the design that aimed at relinquishing implementation control over the CDF to the CA. I won't do it. We wanted to strengthen CA to do it once we were gone. My personal feeling is to agree with the recommendation that CA should not do implementation. It should be an advocacy organisation. CA was supposed to set policy and chair the PMT.

J. Gatora (CA): III.B.6.4: What is the role conflict the team refers to? Was that a design issue?

Team response: The role conflict was always there. It is not design issue – DA were supposed to be the policeman and the advisor and provide assistance – the two roles do not go well together.

E. Loken (USAID): That is fairly stated.

Section III B.8.3: I suggest this reads "Early efforts from 1997 to establish the sustainability of CA were not followed up" as we did not aim to give this attention "at the very start" as the team suggests we should have done

Section IV 5. I agree product diversification is expensive and has a long gestation, but I will challenge the statement that the cost/benefit is unproven in semi-arid areas. Eco-tourism is highly economic in these regions. Perhaps in NRMP it has been unproven. If we are talking about things like bee keeping, I would agree.

Team response: It depends upon what you are diversifying from. Hunting and high end tourism provide good returns. All activities people struggle to get going e.g. low end tourism in Namibia.

Eric Loken (USAID): Section IV. 6. Rather say: "Diversification projects have a better chance of success if accompanied by private resources/partnerships"

Section V.A: You should include a recommendation to CA that its role should be in terms of advocacy rather than implementation.

Section V.F: I agree with the need to support mechanisms to promote good governance and institutional checks and balances. Earlier you suggested that support should be performance based. You should add some examples of this. You want to reward good performance, but the way it is written here is a bit awkward.

(Objections from the floor to use of "good governance" as it perhaps implied that there wasn't any at present and had other connotations – team agreed to use other terminology)

E. Kwadza (DNPWLM): Section III.B 9.1: National Parks did take part e.g. in the PMT.

C. Jonga (CA): Section III.B.2.10: Can the team not qualify this statement that the CA constitution was amended to maintain status quo. You should rather look at the motivations which were to realign the term of the Board to that of elected councillors. Also the whole membership agreed to the changes.

4) Closing

Eric Loken of USAID thanked the team for the presentation. There had been a good discussion. He said that despite all the comments made the general consensus was positive. Most people thought it was definitely a good start and approach to the evaluation.

5) List of participants

Name	Position	Organisation
T Gotosa	Ecologist	Parks and Wildlife Management Authority
T Marisa	Chief Executive Officer	Guruve RDC
E Kundhlande	Director	SAFIRE
E Kawadza	Chief Ecologist	Parks and Wildlife Management Authority
O Mbano	Chairman	Gokwe North
J Nyaguse	CDF Field Programme Officer	CAMPFIRE Association
C Mabharanga	Council Chairman	Guruve RDC
L Mutseyekwa	Project Co-ordinator	Action Magazine
K Manyani	Chief Executive Officer	UMP Zvatanda RDC
O Mashamba	Executive Officer Agriculture	Gokwe North
S Chamboko	Wildlife Officer	Nyaminyami RDC
A Sithole	2 nd Vice Chairman	CAMPFIRE Association
J Nare	Chairman	CAMPFIRE Association
J Gotori	1 st Vice Chairman	CAMPFIRE Association
E Loken	Program Manager	USAID
F Spain	Chief of Party	Development Associates
A Francis	Associate Chief of Party (Programme)	Development Associates
M Murphree	Professor	CASS
G Pangeti	Vice Chair	Parks Authority Board
M Chasi	Director	Department of Natural Resources
C Chinhoyi	Director	ZimTrust
S Mudimba	CEO	Binga RDC
David Mazambani	Consultant	
Brian Child	Consultant	
Brian Jones	Consultant	
Andrew Mlalazi	Consultant	
Hasan Moinuddin	Facilitator	

Annex G1

FIELD TRIP REPORT FOR VISITS TO MUZARABANI, GURUVE, CHIREDDZI AND CHIPINGE DISTRICTS

**16-20 JUNE, 2003
BY BRIAN CHILD AND ANDREW MLALAZI**

Field Visit Notes Outline
Questions to be addressed to RDCs

1. How well is the CAMPFIRE unit operating at RDC level in terms of:
 - a. Management of CAMPFIRE revenues
 - b. Record keeping
 - c. PAC
 - d. Devolution
 - e. No. of Employees in the unit and staff turnover
 - f. Equipment in operation; equipment broken down

2. Impact of Training
 - a. Who trained the Unit and when?
 - b. What was covered during training?
 - c. Has there been training at sub-district level?
 - d. If yes, who was trained? What was covered?
 - e. Where are the trained people now (today)...still in office?

3. How many infrastructure projects have been funded under CDF (large or small) ?
 - a. What natural resources are being utilised/managed?
 - b. When was/were the projects approved?
 - c. What is the status now?

4. What indicators of success have been achieved in the infrastructure projects?
 - a. In terms of Infrastructure completed
 - b. In terms of institutions actually managing on the ground
 - c. Revenue or other benefit generated through the project
 - d. Distribution of revenues, if any
 - e. Maintaining books of accounts and record keeping
 - f. Financial transparency (reporting on revenues) and Governance
 - g. Cooperation with RDC

5. Community Trusts
 - a. Year of formation
 - b. Were Trustees trained
 - c. Is it in operation?
 - d. Cooperation of trustees
 - e. Level of acceptance and participation by community

6. General Assessment of Information/Community Project

Itinerary:

Monday 16 June:
Mavuradonha Wilderness Campsite and Ecotourism Project
Muzarabani RDC
Gonono Ward Wildlife Committee
Ingwe Safaris
Tuesday 17 June
Masoka CAMPFIRE Committee
Masoka Development Trust
Guruve CAMPFIRE Unit
Wednesday 18 June
Chiredzi RDC and CAMPFIRE Unit
Clive Stockil, Senuka and River Lodges
Thursday 19 June
Mahenye Ward, with RDC attendance
Friday 20 June
Malilangwe Trust
Chiredzi RDC

Andrew Mlalazi joined Brian Child for the Lowveld leg of this trip

Muzarabani Rural District Council

People Seen	16 June 2003
Akajodo	Council Chair
Munyaradzi Magaya	Chief Executive Officer
Michael Moyo	EO Social Services
Alfred Mufunga	AEO Wildlife

General Appearance of RDC

Council offices are scruffy, with no water. Have 15 staff. CAMPFIRE Office is slightly better, but not well organized. CEO is new (two weeks) and there has been a big staff turnover. AEO wildlife is relatively new, but was a resource monitor before with a long history in programme. Appear to have serious financial constraints.

This RDC appears to have less capacity than in 1994. High staff turnover. Project is relatively simple and staff keen (if inexperienced) but it will be difficult to sustain unless moderate level of "light touch" facilitation is provided over at least five years. Revenue distribution system remains intact. Help is needed with commercial deals, with wildlife record keeping, and with auditing and analyzing financial records.

NRMP Project

Good training provided by WWF, and manuals are extremely useful. DA money was valuable for the RDC, project, and training was also useful. CA is no help.

Staffing

All new staff and want training.

Hunting Contract

Had re-marketed in 2000. Used WWF manual. Choice was by 14 Councilors. Allocated Mopani Safaris a five-year contract (second choice).

Offtake in 2002: 4 elephant, 2 impala, 6 sable, 3 klipspringer, 2 kudu, 2 zebra, 2 crocodiles, serval, 1 leopard (from memory rather than records, which were not to hand).

Wildlife Finances

Cash books were kept in a fair manner but it was not possible to check accuracy. Financial summary (i.e. trial balance) was provided, and staff had a moderate idea of what these

meant. Also get minor income from fishing, ilala palm, Masau (local fruit), poachers fines and fire fines

Revenue Distribution

Allocated 50% to communities, with all wards getting something but majority going to where wildlife was shot.

2001 Summary

Income	\$2,778,617
Wards (x2)	\$ 347,327
Wards (x 12)	\$ 53,435
Total Distributed	\$1,389,307 (50%)
CA (2%)	\$ 55,572
Admin (15%)	\$ 416,792
Operations (33%)	\$ 916,943 (1 manager, 1 clerk, 6 game guards)

Cheque is sent to communities. All communities do projects and use money reasonably well. This improves attitudes to wildlife. Communities have bank accounts and financial records, which are checked by Finance Officer. According to RDC, no monies go missing. RDC gives communities a financial statement of RDC expenses (but could not provide me with an updated one). The latest available (Trial Balance as at 31/12/01) is attached as an illustration, as are the Estimates of Income and Expenditure for 2003 (using RDC photocopies!).

Wildlife Records

Generally weak. Hunt return forms not to hand. A graph of PAC offtake and poaching had been started and posted on the office wall. Interview said few elephants had been shot on PAC (by NP and RDC scouts), but records showed 1-2 (i.e. half the quota). Requested latest CAMPFIRE Annual Report (compiled Feb, 2003) but this was not available as "clerk was out".

Mavuradonna Wilderness

Muzarabani set aside a wilderness area in early 1990s. Wildlife populations have increased: 40 buffalo; 4,000 warthog; 700 sable; 150 elephant; plenty impala; 300 elephant; kudu increasing. Poaching is increasing, largely because of new settlers. In rest of district, there has been much settlement, and so land specifically set aside for wildlife on valley floor. Have now stopped settlers, which took a lot of discussion.

Southern (WWF-funded) game fences have collapsed. Fence and panels stolen. Still employ two fence-minders.

Carew Safaris offered horse safaris, fee Z\$10,000. Had been replaced by James Vaden Safaris – flat fee of Z\$500,000.

Ecotourism Project

Established in early 1990s, and facilitated by partnership with local branch Wildlife Society (who have now withdrawn due to loss of membership – commercial farmers).

Site in generally good condition. Highly attractive, and still attracts a few visitors, often being used for workshops

CDF used to add chalets. Impression is that while these will be used, they could have been designed better (too small and closed). Administration, and even corruption problems, hindered the construction of these, which were not quite finished. RDC noted that they terminated the contractor, and completed project with their own staff (DA records note that over half the materials supplied were initially misappropriated, leading to early closure of project funding). Have asked CA for electrification, and are still expecting this despite NRMP closeout.

Have contracted site to a partner, Mr. Simba Mudarikwa (Yukan Enterprises?) for Z\$ 350,000 annually plus US\$12,000 annually.

Trust

Contract is with Council, but Trust will take over and report to Council ("Council is the Mother"). Trust papers have been sent for registration. Unclear answers on membership of Trust, and how it works. It is not trained. Communities are said to like the Trust.

Guruve District

Visit to Gonono Ward (16 June 2003)

Gonono Ward is said by many to be a model Ward. Only the Wildlife Committee Chair (Luckmore Chizombe), Ward Clerk (Johane Siamatare) and Assistant Ward Clerk (Tinariwo Mutsokonyore) were available to interview.

Training had been provided by WWF (anti-poaching unit; quota-setting "manuals are good"), by Council (leadership 1997; record keeping 2003), ZimTrust (leadership; quotas 1997/98). Capacity to set quotas remains. Council Officers take all Wards to Mushumbi Pools for 7 days for this exercise. Problem now is that finances are short as donors are gone.

Ward records include (none were provided, but other sources indicate that these are well kept):

- Hunting daily rate
- Trophy fees
- Cash analysis
- Financial records – claim these are good (substantiated by RDC) but Secretary was away and office was locked.

Have bank account. Last year got \$3,395,000. Projects supported:

- Gonono Secondary School
- Dip tanks (x3)
- Primary schools (x4)
- Gonono clinic
- Chasa Football Association
- No HH cash, although people have the right to this if they choose

In 2003.

Ward Management Costs	\$2,030,200 (8 scouts)
Expect to earn	\$3,500,000

Council provides ideas, training, are said to be honest in financial transactions, audit wards (last done 2002), and keep 17% of revenues (actually keep 17% + 15% + 4%).

Anti-poaching scouts report every Monday, animal counts show animals are increasing (lots of sign of elephant on the road), especially elephant and buffalo (confirmed by safari operator, but dumping of former farm works from commercial farms in key areas is highly problematic).

General meetings are held every 4 months, 300-400 people attend, talk about financial statement and problem animals. Major problem is devaluation of Z\$.

The 'masau' project is improving prices as now sell for money rather than barter

Gonono EcoTourism Project

Bedford (Ingwe Safaris) said to own these chalets, which don't belong to the community. Managed by Karunga Trust (6 community, Councilor, 1 Council official). Is under Council. Bedford pays trust, and no profits to people (not much transparency or understanding of how the Trust works apparent at this level).

Masoka Community (17 June 2003)

Initial Impressions

Large increase in number of people, both at Masoka and at the Masoka road junctions. Lots of cutting of trees near Masoka, something that used to be controlled. The fence, formerly seen as very important by community and well maintained (1996) has collapsed, and community is waiting for a donor to help them re-build the fence which they say "should only last five years anyway". There are obviously internal problems in this community, which used to be unified under the late headman Kanyurira and buoyed up by regular visits from CCG members (especially WWF) and look-and-learn visits, which have all but ceased.

Hunter has developed and maintained roads well. Wildlife populations appear to have improved, and poaching from the community is minimal, although there are now signs of commercial meat poaching from Mushumbi Pools.

Wildlife Revenues

Revenue came in March, with delays (inflation). In 2003, got \$10m. CA gets 2%, RDC 30%. Major problem is coordination between RDC and community. WWF Hunt return forms were extremely useful to check up on RDC and hunting revenues. The RDC (Council Chair) stopped community from getting these, and have written several times to request them with no response. PAC is centralized at RDC which is too expensive. "CAMPFIRE revenues remain precious to the people". Choice of people since 2000 has been to do projects (no cash) because of inflation. General meetings held quarterly and the majority of people attend.

Project undertaken include:

- Primary school
- Secondary school
- Clinic
- Tractor (which is still working)
- Grinding mill (well managed, with books of accounts)
- Football clubs (have three)
- Boreholes (3)
- Fence
- Offices
- Staff block
- "Bridges" drifts on road
- Food in time of drought
- Cash for households
- Construction of ecotourism camp
- Meat bay built, and meat provided regularly

Financial management

Records are kept, they are audited occasionally (I found them hard to follow, i.e. good, simple systems not in place. Summaries seem ok (copy for 2000 attached), but community needs help with analysis).

People re-elected every two years "give opportunity to everyone" which creates a need for regular re-training. The old committee now appears to be the new Trust.

Fence Issues

Fence collapsed in 1999. Had been extended to include new people. Solar saw stolen. Asked for help as did not have enough money to fix fence.

Wildlife Management

Have increased game guards from 7-14 to control poaching. Caught 3 last year and 12 this year. Have also controlled gold panners, who were poaching.

Masoka Community Development Trust

Nine members registered, including Headman, Councilor, 6 elected

Ecotourism project. Money came through Council, with a contract to Bedford, with "lots of stories" (Community obviously wary of something going on that they do not know about). Implementation is poor and over-centralized. Indeed, power has generally been centralized to RDC

A visit to the camp showed that buildings were in fair condition (renovated by Bedford) and thatching was underway on central area. Community said little progress had been made on Mkanga Bridge camp. Borehole was dry (why spend money on a borehole when camp had operated for many years on sand abstraction?).

Training

WWF provided training in patrolling, early burning, PAC and game counting "only thing to be remembered.

Council provided good training in book keeping in 2002.

No training provided by ZimTrust, CA, CNPWLM, CASS.

Some visits by Andy Francis of DA about camp and Chigusa (CA) came several times.

Lack of facilitation is a major problem to us "really a loss to us, we are now working alone"

Visitors (rough summary from visitors book). Includes CCG, and look and learn tours:

1998 – 20

1999 – 24

2000 – 11

2001 – 12

2002 – 1

2003 - 2

Wildlife Management

Quota-Setting. Done every year, and are happy with this. Developed by community and sent to Council for finalization. Facilitated by Council and helped by Operator (who knows trophy quality) and by game counts (4 transects conducted every month March to October.

Early burning, now done by operator (fine)

Lots of tree cutting "because new people are not educated".

The best thing in the past three years have been the secondary school, building of bridges (by the community) and the grinding mill. The worst things have been the drought (the budget was changed to feed the community), the delay of financial disbursements, the lack of training (game counting, etc.) and PAC deaths (linked to collapse of fence).

General impressions

The performance of Masoka has deteriorated. Major reason seems to be the loss of regular facilitation, and also reduced revenues (because of parallel exchange rate problem). With a little help in the form of technical advice, project would get back on its feet quickly. There is a strong demand for this from the community.

The ecotourism investment looks average, not finished and no clients anyway. Might have been far better done as a joint venture.

Guruve RDC

RDC has been affected by strikes for three years.

In 2003, CAMPFIRE Manager trained wards in record keeping (with Ben Zizane, former CMAPFIRE officer).

Council records of wildlife offtake and revenue share (attached) are good. Some 64% of revenues is allocated to communities.

However, hunter pays at a rate of 473, which is low, though has increase % of daily rate to 45%. Parallel exchange rate issues are a major problem. Revenue from Dande Safari Area has been lost of DNPWLM. Rolled over leases – fear of political interference.

CAMPFIRE Unit

1 EO Natural Resources and Agriculture

ALASKA WILDLIFE PROJECT

FINANCIAL STATEMENT AS AT

EX21-12-2000

VOTE	ALLOCATION	EXPENDITURE	BALANCE
WILDLIFE COMMITTEE MEETING	9400-00	11200-00	2800-00
EMERGENCY	4200-00	3390-00	1190-00
TRUVE TRIPS	12000-00	1700-00	5000-00
RARE TRIPS	29800-00	19100-00	9700-00
OFFICE WORK	3600-00	2050-00	1550-00
WORKSHOP	7700-00	7700-00	-
REFRESHMENTS	7700-00	8384-20	664-20
SLEEPING BAGS	3000-00	3590-92	590-32
A. P. O. SALARIES	119640-00	119065-00	595-00
TRUVE	17200-00	17199-98	0-02
IND-ORMS	17200-00	17200-00	-
AND S MASHUWI	2400-00	2000-00	400-00
. A . C	3780-00	4230-00	- 450-00
. M SALARIES	98000-00	89075-00	925-00
UNIFORMS	30000-00	34743-03	- 4743-03
CASUALS	32400-00	24250-00	11050-00
ANCE REPAIR	3000-00	3000-00	-
STATIONERY	6817-10	5225-65	1391-35
B . EF .	14400-00	14643-95	243-95
NEW FENCE LINE	25000-00	15955-00	9050-00
FOR COLLS	5000-00	5000-00	-
REDITORS	59860	59860	-
TRACTOR	98000-00	95530-31	2469-69
FENCE EQUIPMENTS	10000-00	10000-00	-
. V SET	5000-00	6385-50	1385-50
BALANCE TOTALS	1 315 317-10	1 322 115-90	6298-20

1 Clerk

19 scouts paid by Council – do PAC and safari monitoring (several communities also have scouts)

Sustainability – support is being phased out too early, as capacity-building is still needed at all levels including the RDC. A number of people have been trained, but continual (light) support would help a great deal.

CDF – Gonono Project has improved Ward income through greater offtake of elephants. Still need assistance with marketing and advice on rates. (this emphasizes the negative impact of losing capacity in economics and database analysis in the program as a whole).

Chiredzi RDC

General Impressions

RDC and staff is impressive. Equipment is managed well. Staff are highly motivated, and are innovating. The determination to devolve to village-level, and to facilitate this process through training, is extremely positive. All staff are motivated and know what they are doing. There is obviously an ethos of saving money and controlling expenditure. Thus, where vehicles can be saved, other methods are used. There is also use of allowances for work done rather than salaries, and payments for periods of work (e.g. three month fire season) rather than incurring overhead costs all year. The only real problem in this area is that elephant quotas may not be sustainable. It is a pity that the CDF did not provide far more support to RDCs working this well, as money would have been well used.

Project looks sustainable, financially and in terms of human resource capacity. USAID has helped, but major factors are strong personalities and good relations with private sector, especially Malilangwe and Save Conservancies. The area has good strategic district plans, and is poised to take off if TFCA projects materialize. Indeed, the impetus in this district, and the close cooperation between stakeholders, is inspirational. Little doubt that if heavy investment is provided through carefully structured local institutions (RDC is mature enough to suggest avoiding using them because of unavoidable bureaucratic issues) the entire lowveld can boom in terms of tourism. Chiredzi is also setting aside large areas for wildlife (e.g. Sengwe corridor):

- 3-6km corridor along Limpopo river
- 3km corridor along Gonarezou National Park boundary in Chibwediwa Ward
- Niavasha Area (10,000 hectares?)

Highly impressive on all fronts.

Fire Control Project

All equipment in good condition and well managed.

Project initiated by communities who were worried about fires. Started project without funding, copying Malilangwe, which led to a project. Leaders of fire teams paid \$15,000/m for three months; rest of teams are volunteers who get food (initially provided by safari operators, now by RDC). Four teams, one of which is weak. Use radios to call for equipment.

Training

RDC trains communities every year in keeping books, leadership, etc. (Planning looks good; and is also responsive to requests). Training needs are identified locally, and community must buy food, pay meeting costs, etc. (i.e. to develop commitment and responsibility). RDC provides only training. RDC has strong internal training capacity but also used Safire, DNR, etc.

ZimTrust – we now know what they know, last here is Oct 2002

WWF – training of trainers was very effective.

RDC can now manage quota-setting. Starts with community meetings and is consolidated at district level.

Financial and Offtake Records

Finances were computerized using an accounting package. Random checks suggested that they were accurate and honest. However, while the system is good for accounting, managers had some difficulties in understanding and presenting finances to us. Examples of these records are provided, and so are example of wildlife offtake. (how much better would the programme be with a simple and standardized system of records, comparable over districts?)

Devolution

Each Village has a CAMPFIRE committee with a bank account. RDC insists on a budget, and monitors expenditure against this. Insist on AGM every year.

Lots of community activities – cattle/goat projects, grinding mills, kiosks, schools, roads, electricity supply, also cash if wanted.

Big improvement in performance with devolution, but of course results are variable.

Recently, responded to CA request to decentralized. On shooting an animal, operator immediately pays a cheque of 60% to the village in which the animal was shot. Council retains 40%

- 10% RDC levy
- 4% CA levy
- 26% for CAMPFIRE Department, of which 5% is kept for capital replacement. Activity-based budgeting is used.

Communities not yet fully independent. Appropriate Authority status is still at RDC level, hence RDC still accountable for funds.

CDF

Got \$7m from USAID. Purchased capital equipment and used \$600,000 for training communities (supplemented normal training budgets)

Funding was difficult to access because of complex procedures (hence US\$800,000) not used. Programme help a lot.

Issues

- Quota approvals by DNPWLM too slow
- Major problems with income due to exchange rates
- Malipati Safari Area – traditionally a community game reserve, DNPWLM now charges commercial rates for hunting.
- DNP looking internally, and not supporting tourism in communal areas

Diversification

Plans to improve tourism and identify sites, but problems with DNP and access.

Will only do joint ventures, even for cultural tourism, as RDCs not as suited to business as private sector

Have set aside Niavasha area for wildlife. Also 3-6km x 24 km along Limpopo River. Also +- 3km along park boundary

Have protected Manjinji, and invested in this, but DNP will not allow it to be used by community

Trusts

Malipati Trust, mainly Ward 15, for ilala production and includes everyone. Trusts are good for business operations. Two council members as a control, but the rest are from the community. Have had a difficult time with MLG who oppose trusts, although they are business oriented. Safire has helped with training and registering Trusts.

Mahenye and Chipinge RDC

General impressions

Mahenye has developed significantly, largely as a result of CAMPFIRE. There are now two lodges in Mahenye: the eight room Mahenye camp on an island in the Save, and Chilo Gorge Lodge with sixteen rooms overlooking the Save river. Despite the marked slow down in tourism, these lodges still employed over thirty full time persons. Lodge development had rough both electricity and telephones to the areas, which significantly reduced the isolation of this community. Ten years ago, all one found in Mahenye was a half finished school, and this was in fact the very first development from wildlife revenues provided by two elephants shot by Stockil with the permission of DNPWLM in 1982. The primary school is now well developed, and work has started on a secondary school. The clinic is completed (not wildlife revenues) and electrified. The grinding mill is also electrified, and is the first community business. It appears to be making money, or at least covering costs, and provides a valuable service to the community. Operating profit in the last year was ZD1m. There are also several shops, apparently also a community project, where there previously was no access to these amenities in Mahenye. In terms of rural development, Mahenye is undoubtedly much better off as a result of CAMPFIRE.

Wildlife is obviously still poached and scarce, although probably more abundant than it was. The community has maintained control over settlement, and the wild areas set aside (some 10,000 hectares in the north, plus Machumeni Island and some riverine areas) are being maintained.

USAID Equipment

USAID supplied a VHF radio system for communications between Chipinge RDC and Mahenye, but the solar panels at the repeater mast (many kilometers from Mahenye) have been stolen. The tractor and trailer for the veld fire project appeared to be in good working order, and are managed out of the profits of the grinding mill accounts. The building was completed, with the community providing some ZD580,000 of their own money due to inflation and a six month delay in the purchase of materials. Construction was not to a good standard, as cracks were already appearing. The old motorbike appeared in reasonable order, and the bicycles were still being used.

Training

Members of the community had traveled to three courses in fire management provided by WWF, in Gokwe Harare and unspecified. A consultant had also spent 14 days providing the community with fire management training in 2001. They were still following the management advice, but were not sure if they were doing this correctly (there is obviously a need to follow-up support).

The community liked this project, though wanted more equipment like Chiredzi had got. They built firebreaks and roads, and did back burning and early burning to prevent hot fires. They wanted animals to move into their area.

WWF had also trained seven people in animal management at Chilo in 1998, a further 17 in project planning also in 1998, and had helped with quota setting and animal counting for at least five years to 2002.

ZimTrust had not been seen since 2000, before which they provided some training. CA had never provided training but had come for the tractor handover.

Chipinge RDC visited the area every month for a meeting, and also helped regularly with auditing and financial management.

The community is confident that it can set its own quotas, which the RDC then submits to DNPWLM. They involve a number of ordinary villagers in the exercise, and find the WWF manuals very useful.

Revenues

Mahenye now has two sources of revenues. They hunt 3-4 elephants a year, but the USD charge is not increasing and the purchasing power of this income is falling, as they are exchanging the USD10,000 per elephant at the official exchange rate of 55 and, this year, 800. They have no real source of marketing information except informal communications with other CAMPFIRE RDCs. The RDC keeps 25% of revenues, 4% goes to CA, and the community gets 71%. These same proportions apply to the lodges, except that the money comes straight to the community, which then pays the RDC. The tourism operations are levied at 12% of gross turnover.

Project proposals are discussed at six-monthly general meetings, and also at monthly Village Head meetings. The community has built shops, a grinding mill and schools, and still gets and values its household dividends. The community has its own bank account.

There are now 892 households in Mahenye. Each village has a CAMPFIRE sub-committee, and there is a high level of participation because of the benefits CAMPFIRE has brought. There are also a number of other committees – WARDCO, VIDCOs, PTA, AIDS, etc.

Employment

The Wildlife Project employs 18 people who are paid allowances rather than salaries. This includes six resource monitors, 3 guards, 2 grinding mills attendants, 4 shop keepers, 1 general hand, 1 tractor driver and 1 assistant.

Devolution

Both the RDC and Mahenye agreed that Mahenye did everything for itself and was ready for appropriate authority status. They were considering a community company. The community had set a number of by-laws to control natural resource abuses, including poaching, tree-cutting, etc. But people were obviously still also using natural resources, although the control of tree-cutting in and around the village was impressive.

RDC

The Natural Resource Officer from Chipinge RDC, was enlightened in terms of community capacity, and was also obviously of some help to the community. The battle over the sharing of revenues continues in this area, but in a respectful and sensible manner.

Summary of Responses to Questions on Training

	WWF	ZimTrust	CA	DA	Other	Remaining Capacity
Muzarabani	Wildlife management Much training at village, and also all 14 wards 1997-2001 Did quota-setting 2002 Also did financial training	Awareness All 14 Wards, also villages, last seen 2000	Hardly seen	Trained C.I.O (gone), Treasurers (gone) clerks (remaining) book keepers (gone) in 1998 No follow up Think this capacity remains		Can do quota-setting, game counts but retaining only 4 of 8 RDC trained in this. High staff turnover because of poor pay. Don't know if can cover costs – exchange rate loss
Guruve	Manuals and training good Phasing out, but need more help		Helps quite a lot to broker assistance	Good, but RDC too slow to implement	David Mazambani helped with Trusts IUCN helping ZIMOSA AWF helping with animal corridors CIRAD – impala project	Can do quota-setting and financial training. Can keep program running, though minor facilitation would help enormously
Mahenye	Fire management, quotas, animal counting	Not recently	Rarely	Yes		RDC regularly audits and advises
Chiredzi	Training of trainers very effective. Also quota-setting Three people in RDC are capable	"We know what they know"		Yes		RDC CAMPFIRE Unit provides much training and support to communities Villages have bank accounts

Status of Vehicles and Equipment Seen

Equipment Provided	Muzarabani	Guruve	Chiredzi	Chipinge
Vehicle	Running, poor condition	Running, fair condition	Both running, excellent condition Same with tractor, trailers, etc. Well maintained and strong discipline in use	Still using old vehicle, which is in good condition. Tractor etc provided to Mahenye in good condition
Motorbike	Running, poor condition			Old, but not mistreated
Radios	Broken			Solar stolen
Camera	Broken			
Computer	Broken			
Fax	Broken			
Tent	Unusable			

Annex G2

FIELD TRIP REPORT FOR VISITS TO GOKWE NORTH, BINGA AND NYANGA DISTRICTS

**16-20 JUNE, 2003
BY BRIAN JONES AND DAVID MAZAMBANI**

Gokwe North District Council 16.06.03

1. Persons met

Council Chairman, Mr Onward Mbanu
CAMPFIRE Co-ordinator, Mr Mashamba
District Administrator, Mr T. Marongwe

2. CAMPFIRE Unit

The CAMPFIRE Unit consists of the following staff members

- 1 x Co-ordinator
- 1 x Admin. Clerk
- 1 X Financial Clerk
- 6 x Game Guards (operating in the Nenyunga Game Corridor)

The district has 30 Wards of which 14 are CAMPFIRE Wards. Some wards are generating timber revenues only, but these do not fall under CAMPFIRE (these wards receive 15% of the royalty on timber extraction that is paid to council under an arrangement with the Forestry Commission). Only wards with wildlife are incorporated under CAMPFIRE.

3. Income and operating costs

Income is derived from one safari operator, timber logging, sand and gravel extraction and fines. Overall income in 2003 is expected to be ZD43 million. The costs of running the unit, including revenue distribution to communities, is expected to be about ZD41 million.

The Unit operates according to the wildlife revenue distribution formula of 55% going to the community, 4% as a levy to the CA, 15% for Council administration and 26% for the running of the Unit.

4. Support from NRMP

NRMP provided support to Gokwe North RDC from November 1996 – June 2002 first through an ICB grant to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC (data from DA). The grant was extended to include CDF funding for a veld fire management project in six wards. The total amount obligated was Z\$ 13,036,650 (data from DA).

Officials interviewed said the aim of the veld fire management project was to reduce random veld fires in the Nenyunga Game Corridor in order to ensure there was sufficient wildlife there for hunting to be sustained over time. The officials reported that the project had reduced the number of uncontrolled fires in the corridor and the game guards reported seeing an increased number of species entering the corridor from the neighbouring Binga District and an increase in game numbers. The officials interviewed said the idea for the project had come from the previous CAMPFIRE Co-ordinator and members of the Unit.

The officials said equipment received through the CDF Grant for Veld Fire Management is as follows¹.

- 2 x tractors

¹ DA data shows that in December 2002 Council submitted a list of the items purchased. The assets recorded were: a 4x4 truck; computer and printer; radios; mountain bikes; camping equipment; office equipment; two tractors; tow grader, two trailers; bowser; disc plough and a portable water pump.

2 x trailers
1 x tow grader
1 x disc plough
2 x plastic tanks
6 x rifles
2 x computers
1 x fax machine
2 x vehicles

The evaluation team was told that the all equipment was being used and was functional except the fax machine. The tractors, trailers, grader, disc plough and plastic tanks were seen by the evaluation team and appeared to be in good working order except the pipe fitting on one plastic tank was missing. The hole had been plugged with rags but was leaking water.

Data from DA show that a concept project was approved by PET prior to 06/10/98. On 07/06/00 the RDC was advised to split the project and the Fire Management component was approved with comments on 01/02/01. The revised proposal was submitted for review on 06/03/01 and the grant was finalised (with RDC signature) on 26/06/01.

CDF also provided a small project grant to Gokwe North. This was for the development of a campsite at Gandavaroyi Falls. The officials said the sites have been completed and were handed over to the community in January 2003. The officials said the site lacks marketing and is not yet functional. A guard is on site to safeguard the infrastructure. The PMT approved this project on 07/06/00, the grant letter was signed on 18.07.01 and Council signed on 04.09.01.

5. Training and Capacity

The RDC has lost a well-trained CAMPFIRE Co-ordinator who emigrated to the UK two years ago. The current Co-ordinator was transferred within Council from an administrative post. The Financial Clerk has qualifications up to O-Level and has been trained by the Council Financial Officer and WWF. The Administrative Clerk has a Certificate in Rural and urban Planning.

During 2002, WWF provided training to the Unit and six wards on Veld Fire Management (123 participants) and provided training to the Unit on financial management. The Unit trained Wards in financial management and quota setting. Game guards had been trained in PAC and anti-poaching by a safari operator. PAC. During 2003 up to June, the Unit had provided training on awareness of natural resource conservation, financial management, and awareness of the need to prevent veld fires at village level. The Unit Co-ordinator and community representatives attended a WWF workshop on veld fire management. Later during 2003, the Unit planned to provide communities with support in developing action plans for veld fire management.

The CAMPFIRE Coordinator said his unit was not yet fully-fledged and required further assistance from CAMPFIRE CSPs, particularly on quota setting and financial management for himself because he was new.

Other planned activities for the rest of the year at community level include:

- Further veld fire management awareness at village level
- Early burning in the Nenyunga Game Corridor
- Quota setting
- A concept proposal on salt extraction
- A concept proposal for building chalets along the road to Binga/Sanyati Gorge

The Council also intends establishing a Safari Lodge (following a visit to a community/private sector joint venture lodge in Namibia)

6. NRM By-laws

The Council has enacted the following By-laws:

- A fee has to be paid (part to Ward and part to Council) for sand extraction
- A Council resolution has been passed that Chiefs should fine people caught setting illegal fires and hand over serious cases to Council
- Provisions are made for compensation to be paid to traditional chiefs and to Council for wildlife killed illegally (in addition to any fine imposed by a magistrate's court).

The officials said the communities were aware of the By-laws, but enforcement was difficult.

7. Attitudes towards further devolution from Council to sub-district levels.

Councillors and officials had been to Namibia on a look-and-learn visit (funded by NRMP) and had concluded that the Namibian system of communities forming their own "conservancies" was better than the CAMPFIRE model. This was because the wildlife belonged to the conservancies and income from hunting and tourism went directly to the community. When asked why they did not promote such an approach within their own district the officials said it was because attitudes to wildlife were more positive in Namibia. In Gokwe North, if people saw an elephant they wanted to shoot it and if they were given ownership of the game people would poach. The officials did not appear to see the links between the incentives given to communities in Namibia through proprietorship and direct income and the positive attitudes towards wildlife.

The Council had not considered Trusts as a mechanism for further devolution to sub-district level and the officials interviewed did not believe the community had the capacity to run a Trust.

The DA indicated that government would not allow communities to use their income on household dividends. They should rather spend it on community projects. However, in practice, it appears as if communities are able to make their own choices.

8. Observations

The plans for the development of chalets along the road to Binga/Sanyati Gorge have not been backed up by any feasibility studies and when questioned about the need for such a study, the officials interviewed were vague in their responses. The Council intends asking the CA for funding assistance as CA had said there was a likelihood of getting funding through the CA's SGI. The officials did not seem to be aware that USAID funding was no longer available. Having visited the site, the evaluation team does not consider the site to be suitable for chalets. However, the Council should get some advice from experts within the tourism industry in order to determine if the site does have any potential for development. The Council should also carry out a sound feasibility study and get advice from tourism experts with regard to its plans to establish a Safari Lodge.

There are discrepancies between the CDF activities that officials said were funded by CDF and the CDF records. The list of equipment given to the evaluation team by council officials does not match that provided to DA by Council in its final report. Generally, the Campfire Co-ordinator was vague about NRMP activities, probably reflecting his newness in the position. However, the team gained the impression that capacity within the Unit was weak and that important records were not readily available (e.g. the minutes of the Annual End of Year Meeting were in long-hand, had not yet been typed and the official was happy to hand these minutes to the Evaluation to take away with them).

Binga Rural District Council 17.06.03

1. Persons met

RDC:

Mr S. Lunga, CAMPFIRE Co-ordinator

Mr S. Mudimba, CEO

Mwinji Cultural Village project:

Mr J. Mujaka, Chair, traditional village committee

Approx 40 other adult community members including traditional village committee members

2. CAMPFIRE Unit

The CAMPFIRE Unit consists of the following.

1 x Coordinator

1 x Assistant co-ordinator (vacant)

1 x Accounts clerk

1x Typing/admin. Clerk

1 x Senior Game Guard (vacant)

6 x Game Guards

3 x seasonal Game Guards to assist with PAC

3. Income and operating costs

CAMPFIRE income to Council in 2002 was ZD18 378 336 and as of May 2002, ZD20 191 246 had been distributed to Wards. In 2003 Council expected to make Income generation sources include safari hunting and three photographic tourism lodges that pay to council 15% of their accommodation fees. Calculations of income to Wards are made based on the combined income from safari hunting and photographic tourism. Council intends to sub-divide some existing hunting concession areas and add new ones in order to generate more revenue. In 2003 income from hunting was expected to be ZD136 million².

4. Support from NRMP

Binga RDC received an ICB grant that started in November 1996, one infrastructure grant for electric fencing and two small project grants – one for the establishment of the Mwinji Cultural Village and one for the establishment of the Siamuloba fishing camp.

Total NRMP funding for the ICB and infrastructure grants was ZD37,759,300 NRMP funding for the Mwinji Cultural Village was ZD1 103 000. The NRMP funding for the Siamuloba fishing Camp was ZD1 372 500 000. All aspects of the electric fencing and Mwinji projects have been completed. Council is busy with completion of the fishing camp, which officials said was delayed due to a shortage of cement.

The CEO said Binga RDC distributes on average 70-80% of its CAMPFIRE revenue to sub-district level. He said the council usually kept around 15% and paid its 4% levy to the CA. It did not strictly follow the recommended formula as income was generally low. The council approach was to give more to communities than the formula suggested.

The CEO said the NRMP support had been significant, but had been a lengthy and complicated process to gain approval. It seemed as if people had been sent from Harare to see if there

² Based on signed contracts. Tourism income cannot be predicted in the same and in any case is likely to be low because of the current severe downturn in the tourism industry

actually were elephants and whether the villages really did require the electric fences. It seemed as if Council's word was being doubted.

The CEO said the electric fence project consists of 153 km of fencing in seven blocks covering two wards adjacent to Chizarira National Park and Chitsa Hunting area. He reported that in general fences worked well and the damage to crops had been reduced during the last growing season. No persons had been killed by elephants (as had happened in the past before the fences were erected) and incidents of killing and wounding of elephants by villagers had been reduced. The number of elephants killed on PAC had also declined. Each block had a maintenance unit and a fence project supervisor (one of the game guards) had been trained by an electric fencing company. Each village has an electric fence committee with overall responsibility to see that maintenance is carried out. The evaluation team visited once block and saw the fence. There was insufficient time to interview villagers.

The Mwinji Cultural Village project has been completed and was officially opened during October 2002. The evaluation team visited the village and all solar energy equipment, beds, and bedding were in place. The project committee will retain 79% of income, pay Council 17% and the CA 4%. A similar arrangement is in place for the Siamuloba Fishing Camp. Council is busy finalising the construction of the camp.

Equipment received from NRMP consisted of a 4X4 Truck, 11 Motor bikes/Mountain bikes, Camping Equipment, Radio equipment, Computer and Printer. The Co-ordinator said these were all in working order apart from needing normal maintenance and repairs.

5. Training and Capacity

The Co-ordinator was originally trained by DWLNP and has a diploma in Wildlife Management. He has received training from ZimTrust in logical framework analysis, project identification and monitoring. He has been head of the unit for the past nine years. The Accounts Clerk has been trained in book keeping, the Typing/Admin Clerk has O-Levels and computer literacy. All six permanent game guards have been trained by DWLNP (three are ex-DWLNP Scouts).

In 2001 WWF trained Unit staff in financial management so they could train ward committees. Following training from the Unit on financial management ward financial returns had improved. The Co-ordinator said ZimTrust had provided training in the past on project identification and monitoring and assisted communities to come up with viable projects.

The CEO reported that communities were now mature in handling their own accounts after there had been poor accounting by some in the past.

6. Attitudes towards further devolution from Council to sub-district levels.

Communities are able to make their own choice as to how they spend their income, although Council insists on seeing a budget and a record that such a decision has been taken by a majority of community members. The CEO said he would like to see council change the system so that the safari operators would pay the income directly to the community, which would then pay a lease fee to Council for the land. Staff such as game guards could then be employed by the community. The CEO said Trusts were a problem as a vehicle for devolution because if a community forms a Trust, then it is independent of Council, but Appropriate Authority over wildlife is vested in Council. Also if a Ward Committee misappropriated funds, then Council could dissolve it, but it could not do so with a Trust Committee.

7. Observations

The length of time that Co-ordinator has been in the position (nine years) provides much needed continuity, institutional memory, and experience within the Council. It also means that capacity built through training has remained within Council. Generally the Unit appeared to be

well-run, the necessary records were being kept and data on income and revenue distribution were publicly displayed

Projects based on tourism in Zimbabwe can expect to struggle to generate income in the short term because of the severe decline in overseas tourism in Zimbabwe and the shortage of fuel that limits internal tourism. The Siamuloba fishing camp can expect to generate income in future as it was already a popular fishing site for Zimbabwean and regional (southern African) tourists. However, the evaluation team has concerns over the long-term viability of the Mwinji project. It is relatively far from tarred roads and access is by poor-to-very poor gravel roads and small tracks. Apart from the village itself and a historical link to the Ndebele King Lobengula (stories say he died there or stayed temporarily in a cave there), the area has no other attractions discernible from either observation or project reports. The game guard who acted as our guide said there was little or no wildlife in the area. It is not particularly scenic, and it is far (in time, if not necessarily in distance) from existing tourism lodges and attractions. It is not at all clear where the market is for such a product (no proper business/marketing feasibility study has been carried out). There is also much that needs to be done to improve the product (e.g. refine the quality of the singing and dancing, provide more demonstrations of local culture such as traditional blacksmithing, grain pounding by women, a sangoma, and sell good quality local crafts). The chair of the project committee told us that there was interest in the village from tour operators in Victoria Falls. The project needs some expert advice and support in product development and links to established operators who can guarantee visitors if it is to be successful. The 40 or more villagers who met us and the project committee were full of enthusiasm and expectation that the project would bring them income and help maintain their Tonga culture. There is a strong likelihood that their enthusiasm will be dashed and their expectations unmet.

Nyanga Rural District Council 19.06.03

1. Persons met

Mr A. Nyakatsapa, District Projects Officer and CAMPFIRE Manager

2. CAMPFIRE Unit

The District Projects Officer is also the CAMPFIRE Co-ordinator as the District aims to integrate all its NRM activities and not have separate departments. There are also four natural resource monitors (one per CAMPFIRE Ward) and a clerk.

3. Support from NRMP

NRMP provided ICB funding starting in 1998 to strengthen the capacity of the Unit to provide effective support to producer communities. Additional funding was added to support the development of Kairezi Eco Tourism Project. Total funding was ZD11 664 308.

The evaluation team visited the Gairezi Tourism Project and was shown the infrastructure funded by NRMP. This comprises a three chalets, a reception area, an ablution block, campsites, kitchen and braai stands. The site and chalets are well-tended by the project staff (a guard, a resource monitor, and a general hand). A Trust has been established to manage the project and management assistance is being provided by the Nyanga Downs Fly-Fishing Club. Records are being kept of income and occupancy. The evaluation team was told that the income will first be used for maintenance of the site and chalets and then any profit will be used for community benefits. The Trust represents 90 households consisting of about 500 people. The chalets are being used on a fairly regular basis despite the economic downturn and fuel crisis. A feasibility study was carried out that looked at the trend in income to the fishing club which had been operating at the site previously and had an informal arrangement to pay some of its income to the community. The study also looked at where fishermen were coming from and potential occupancy rates.

The projects officer estimated that it took about two and a half years to move from the submission of the project concept paper to having the grant approved and signing the grant agreement. He also commented that a consultant had been employed to develop the full proposal, but when the document had been finalised Council realised that it could have been done by its own officials.

He also said council had learned that it was better to start developing project institutions while the construction was taking place. When the infrastructure had been completed, it took a while for the project to run smoothly because roles and responsibilities had not been fully discussed and agreed upon. It was also difficult to maintain the interest of communities when expectations were raised by awareness workshops, but the gap between submitting proposals and the project starting was too long.

Equipment received by the Unit from NRMP consisted of a 4x4 truck, computer and printer, flip chart stand, camping equipment, radios and office furniture. The NRMP-funded computer is being used in the Council's finance Department while the Unit is using a computer provided by the NGO SAFIRE.

NRMP has also provided small grant funds (ZD640 000) for a bee keeping project in the district. 20 people from three wards were trained and assisted in making and buying hives. This project ran from December 2001 to June 2002. The projects officer said the production of honey was low in some of the wards because there were not enough trees in the area. Council should have followed up with support to the farmers for tree planting activities.

4. Training and Capacity

When the Unit started in 1996, it had little capacity to manage CAMPFIRE activities, particularly because staff lacked training. New staff with more appropriate skills were recruited in 1998 and the Unit was better able to implement activities. Initial training for staff through an NRMP ICB grant centred on the CAMPFIRE philosophy, NRM and establishing sub-district institutions. Since 1998 training has been provided on financial management, resource monitoring, computer literacy and monitoring and evaluation.

5. Attitudes towards further devolution from Council to sub-district levels.

Although the Projects Officer views the Trust approach as a way of empowering the community and enabling them to assume ownership of projects, this view is not necessarily shared by all councillors. He said more awareness raising needs to take place among councillors, the chairman, and the CEO concerning devolution and the mechanisms for achieving it. The idea for forming a Trust had come from CA, DA and SAFIRE who argued that if it was to be a community-owned project then the community should have its own representatives managing the project.

6. Observations

The RDC and CAMPFIRE Unit appear to have the capacity to support sub-district levels, and manage their own records and accounts. NRMP-funded equipment is still in place and being used.

The Gairezi Eco-tourism Project appears to have a good chance of being sustained over the long-term. The project is based on a prior arrangement with a Fishing Club. This arrangement has been formalised, based on an existing demand for the 'product' and good indications that this demand will continue. The project is also located close to existing lodges and other tourism infrastructure. The Fishing Club is willing to provide technical support if and when necessary. The project has provided limited employment (three people), but has the potential to generate income for the 90 households represented by the Trust. The Council Projects Officer believes that the project will also have an impact on natural resources because the income will provide an incentive for people to conserve the riverine habitat.

It is less clear what impact the bee-keeping project is likely to have. The council projects officer believes production to be low, although there are no figures on incomes to those supported by the NRMP. He says that because bee-keeping is an individual activity, carried out by a few people, it is difficult to promote tree conservation because the forests are a communal resource. The bee-keepers cannot do much to prevent other people cutting the trees. The evaluation team feels that tree planting could be promoted on individual plots owned by households.

Annex H:

CAMPFIRE Programme Zimbabwe Programme Strategy Workshop 1992

CAMPFIRE PROGRAMME

Zimbabwe

PROGRAMME STRATEGY WORKSHOP 1992

HELD BETWEEN 29 SEPTEMBER - 2 OCTOBER,
1992 AT HUNYANI HILLS HOTEL, LAKE CHIVERO

WORKSHOP REPORT

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1.0 Introductory Remarks

The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) programme seeks to promote the sustainable use of natural resources for socio-economic development through decentralising the management and utilisation of natural resources to rural communities. It proceeds from the premise that the alienation of natural resources, particularly wildlife, from resident rural communities deprived those communities of the use of such resources to support their livelihoods and so removed any vested interest they may had in conserving the resources.

CAMPFIRE, using recent policy changes and enabling legislation, seeks to return "custodianship" or "proprietorship" over natural resources and wildlife to the rural communities in which those resources exist.

1.1 Origins of CAMPFIRE

The concept of CAMPFIRE has its origins in the work of three National Parks Ecologists (Cumming, Martin, Taylor) working in the Sebungwe during the 1970s and early 1980s and a Chief Economist in Finance (Reynolds) who had returned from India at Independence. The retreat of tsetse fly in the Sebungwe (Binga, Gokwe, Kariba Districts) and influx of settlers resulted in major changes in land use and it became clear that the existing protected areas would become isolated ecological islands unless people living in the Sebungwe were able to develop and benefit from the rich wildlife resources of the region. Much of the region was in any event unsuited to arable agriculture.

The Parks Ecologists commenced a series of meetings with other Departments and Ministries to develop a land use plan for the Sebungwe. These began in 1976 with the three District Commissioners involved and culminated in a major land use planning workshop held at the Hwange Safari Lodge in 1982 under the auspices of the Department of Physical Planning.

Meanwhile, National parks had developed and implemented Operation Windfall which passed wildlife benefits from elephant culling in Chirisa Safari Area back to the people living in the surroundings. It had always been the intention that benefits from Chirisa created in 1968, should go to the surrounding communities.

The experiences from Windfall, the Sebungwe Regional Planning exercise and Reynolds experiences in India led to the birth of the CAMPFIRE concept. Initial project proposals were written up by Rowen Martin and accepted in principle by January 1982. At this time Department of National Parks and Ministry of Finance realised that the programme needed inputs from social sciences and approached CASS in 1983/84 to carry out the research. Zimbabwe Trust was requested in 1987/88 to assist in implementation and the Multispecies Animal Production Systems project started in January 1988.

MAJOR ACTORS INVOLVED IN CAMPFIRE

IMPORTANT "KEY" PERSONS	FACILITATORS	LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES	PRODUCERS	BENEFICIARIES
-District Administrator -Senior Executive Officers (Council) -Councillors -Provincial Administrator -MPs -School Teacher -Chief -Village Headmen -Spirit Mediums -Provincial Wardens and staff (DNPWLM)	-Area Coordinator -Area Managers -District Wildlife Facilitator (VSO) -Extension Worker -Collaborative group -CAMPFIRE Coordinator -DNPWLM	-Law enforcers -Police -DNPWLM	- Producer communities - Cattle barons - Men - Households - Women - District Wildlife Committees - Ward/ Village wildlife committees	-Rural School Pupils -School children -Heads -Household -Women -Households -Men
			USERS/ CONSUMERS -Wildlife clients (consumers) -Poachers -Cattle Barons -Women -Households -Men	OTHERS -"Gatekeepers" -Evaluators -Thinkers (Innovators)

ROLE CLARIFICATION : DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL PARKS AND WILD LIFE MANAGEMENT/CAMPFIRE

PRESENT ROLE	PROBLEMS CONSTRAINTS	FUTURE ROLE	RESOURCES AVAILABLE	WE EXPECT	WE OFFER
- Ultimate authority for Wildlife - Legislation - Policy - Anti-poaching - Liaison-Government - International Public - Public relations - Direct/Initiate CAMPFIRE - Administration - Quotas - Permits - General - Strategic Management Inputs - Ecological - Economic - Institutional - Monitoring - Sustainable use - Socio-economic sustainability - Compliance with guidelines - Planning - Estate - Outside - Training - Community game guards - Research - Wildlife management - Problem Animal Control (PAC)	- Lack Resources - Inefficient allocation of resources	- Ultimate authority, Policy, legislation - Coordinating revision of legislation - Assisting communities with law enforcement (by request) - <u>Interantional Liaison</u> - Project markets - Promote image - Liaison with DNR, MLGRUD, MLAWD to extend CAMPFIRE to other resources - Increased role in land-use planning policy (vis a vis MLAWD) - <u>Stragic Management Inputs</u> - Ecological - Economic - Institutional - <u>Monitoring</u> - Sustainable use - Socio-economic sustainability - Compliance with guidelines - Integrated planning of estate and surrounding Districts - In-service training of staff with regard to CAMPFIRE - <u>Research</u> - Appropriate wildlife management techniques		- <u>CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION</u> - Capture support of Producer communities - Secure funding base - Provide services: - Representation - Coordination - Information - Source training - <u>ZIMTRUST</u> - Development of: - Institutions - Management systems - Appropriate skills - Strategic small scale funding - operational costs - Public relations - <u>CASS</u> - Base line surveys - Follow-up monitoring of socio-economic progress - Advice on implementation - Socio-economic research - Analysis of implementation options and socio-economic implications - <u>WWF</u> - Development of ecological, Appropriate economic management techniques - Provision of technical advice to producer communities - Resource surveys - Monitoring	- <u>GENERAL</u> - Policy forum - Official support - <u>CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION</u> - <u>ZIMTRUST</u> - Mandate - <u>CASS</u> - Mandata - <u>WWF</u> - Mandate

ROLE CLARIFICATION : DEPARIMENT OF NATIONAL PARKS AND WILD LIFE MANAGEMENT/CAMPFIRE continued

PRESENT ROLE	PROBLEMS CONSTRAINTS	FUTURE ROLE	RESOURCES AVAILABLE	WE EXPECT	WE OFFER
				- <u>DISTRICT COUNCILS</u> -Appropriate Authority conditional on compliance -Training Auditing/feedback -Technical advice -Compliance with principles/guidelines with regard to Appropriate Authority -Monitoring systems -Wildlife -Financial -Law eforcement - PAC	

ROLE CLARIFICATION : ZIMBABWE TRUST

PRESENT ROLE	PROBLEMS/ CONSTRAINTS	FUTURE ROLE	RESOURCES AVAILABLE	WE EXPECT	WE OFFER
- Community/Institutional Development - District/National Institutional support - Capital support - Personnel support - Administrative/ Financial support to District Councils - Information dissemination - Training/Training Materials Development - National/Provincial/ District promotion - International advocacy - Facilitating Intra-Governmental Coordination	- Excess demand - District vs ZIMTRUST perceptions of CAMPFIRE - Internal resource constraints - Bureaucratic obstacles - Policy and legal constraints - Perception of ZIMTRUST as CAMPFIRE implementing agency	- Community/Institutional development - Training of Trainers - Promote involvement of Government Extension Services - Information dissemination - Facilitate enabling Policy and Legislation - Facilitating Intra-Governmental coordination - Retain flexibility	RESOURCES AVAILABLE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES REQUIRED	- <u>DNPWLM</u> - Greater support from Provincial level down - Formal explanation of Appropriate Authority to Districts and others - Enhanced coordination with other Government Agencies - <u>CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION</u> - Expand services - Financial self-reliance - Appropriate representation - <u>WWF</u> - Technical support and advice on resource management issues - All relevant research findings/papers - Coordination of field activities - <u>CASS</u> - All relevant research findings and papers - Coordination of field activities	- Institutional development resources - Limited financial support/ facilities

ROLE CLARIFICATION : CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION

PRESENT ROLE	PROBLEMS CONSTRAINTS	FUTURE ROLE	RESOURCES AVAILABLE	WE EXPERT	WE OFFER
- Information dissemination - Lobbying nationally and internationally - <u>Training</u> - Informal - Promotion of formal training - Co-ordination between Appropriate Authorities - Participatory, action-oriented, problem-oriented research and documentation - Advisory role to Councils	- Staff shortage - Lack of equipment and logistics - Members not all united - Unresolved mandate - Finances - Bureaucracy (Time consuming)	- Information dissemination - Lobbying nationally and internationally - <u>Training</u> - Informal - Promotion of formal training - Co-ordination between Appropriate Authorities - Participatory, action-oriented, problem-oriented research and documentation - Advisory role to Councils and Producer communities - <u>Marketing</u> - Promotion - Linkage - Market information	ADDITIONAL RESOURCES REQUIRED	CURRENT - <u>ZIMTRUST</u> - Technical advice - Funding - Logistics - Training - <u>CASS</u> - Articles, analysis - Evaluation - International networking - <u>WWF</u> - Resource surveys - Infrastructure (eg fencing) - <u>DNPWLM</u> - Clear, legalized guidelines - Extension and training - Technical services	- <u>ZIMTRUST</u> - Joint approach to community mobilization and training - <u>CASS</u> - Research and training sites - Collaboration in evaluation - <u>WWF</u> - Research sites - Coordination with local authorities - <u>DNPWLM</u> - Political support - Administrative support through decentralized management
				LONG TERM - No change to above except eliminate funding - Participation of other agencies in defining role of collaborative group	- As above for all agencies

ROLE CLARIFICATION : MULTISPECIES ANIMAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS PROJECT (WWF)

PRESENT ROLE	PROBLEMS/ CONSTRAINTS	FUTURE ROLE	RESOURCES AVAILABLE	WE EXPECT	WE OFFER
- Ecological and Wildlife Management monitoring - Economic monitoring - Wildlife Management advice and Technical input - Financial and Economic advice - Baseline resource surveys - Wildlife Management advice and Technical input - Financial and Economic advice - Baseline resource surveys - Training wildlife Management Financial - Research/Evaluation on Ecology/Economics of CAMPFIRE - Tertiary training (Economic/Ecological) - Small scale Donor support for District Projects - Information dissemination - Local - International	- Mandate (limited to 6 Districts) - Demand/Supply of Information/Services not clear - Limited project time frame (extension?) - Manpower - Manpower - Inadequate training skills - Funds to WWF - Institutional constraints - Limited funds	- Research to develop Ecological and Wildlife Management Policy and Techniques for Local use - (Census and monitoring - Fire, water management - Marketing, Financial analysis and monitoring - Leases - Technology transfer to District, Ward, village - Field Facilitators/ Trainers in Wildlife Management - Resource surveys and wildlife land use plans - Assist in raising Donor funds for small scale strategic District Projects - Analysis/Evaluation and dissemination of research results - Development of training materials		- <u>DNPWLM</u> - Clear policy/legal framework - Forum - Links to other Ministries Government Departments - <u>ZIMTRUST</u> - Institution Development and Training - Legal development - <u>CASS</u> - Define social dimensions of Natural Resource Management - <u>CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION</u> - Guidance on demands and priorities of Producers - <u>AGRITEX</u> - (through DNPWLM) - Assistance in Extension (Support for Wildlife) - <u>COLLABORATIVE GROUP MEMBERS</u> - Liason and information dissemination	- Ecological/Economic Monitoring/Research/ Evaluation services - Develop wildlife Management Techniques and transfer to Districts

ROLE CLARIFICATION : CASS, UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE

PRESENT ROLE	PROBLEMS CONSTRAINTS	• FUTURE ROLE	RESOURCES AVAILABLE	WE EXPECT	WE OFFER
- Research (including participatory) - Training - Advocacy - Consultancy - Monitoring and evaluation - Contribute to development of Policy Options	- Staffing - Information dissemination (accessibility) - "Pure" vs Applied Research - Bureaucratic constraints in which CASS operates	- Research (including participatory) - High level (Post-Graduate) training, locally regional - Short term train training on environment and resource management - Accessible information - Social impact assessment - Consultancy - Monitoring - Contribute to development of Policy options	- 5 Support/ Admini- stration staff - 11 academic staff - (Out of 16, 11 funded through the projects)	- PARKS Short Term - Recognition of monitoring and evaluation information - Long Term - Adoption of monitoring and information ZIMTRUST - Access to monitoring and evaluation information WWF - Interdiscipli- nary approaches CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION - Accountability to producer communities - Self- sufficiency - Effective lobbying - USAID - Flexibility	- Reliable, timely and relevant monitoring and evaluation infor- mation - Trained personnel participatory appraisal - Participatory appraisal train- for implementors at all levels - User readable information
			ADDITIONAL RESOURCES REQUIRED		

FORUM OF DISCUSSION : Presentation (28.2.92)

TOPIC	ISSUES RAISED	RESPONSE BY DISTRICT COUNCIL	RESPONSE BY GOVERNMENT	ACTION REQUIRED
-Legislation	-Rural and District Councils Act -Weak Natural Resources Legisla-tion -Legislation out-dated and in need of reform -Government dictates Policy: Public not involved			
-Communication and information	-Action Magazine in local Dialects -Exchanges between Councils -Coordination between Ministries			
-Scope of CAMPFIRE	-Should include all resources -Holistic research management -Objectives not clear to District Councils -Extend to Small Scale Commercial farms	-Agreed	-Agreed	

FORUM OF DISCUSSION : Presentation (28.2.92)

TOPIC	ISSUES RAISED	RESPONSE BY DISTRICT COUNCIL	RESPONSE BY GOVERNMENT	FURTHER CLARIFICATION REQUIRED
-Landuse	-Government control -Wildlife use not recognised -Resource access -Land degradation -Land use planning too slow -Resettlement		-Challenged by DNPWIM	-Do not forget development of CAMPFIRE Research areas
-Devolution of power	-Inadequate legislation (for VIDCOs and WADCOs) -Compatibility of ICAs/NRCs	-Fathers are responsible for children	-DNPWIM favour devolution to lowest level.	-Examine Part XI of P&WL Act to extend provisions to communal lands
-Revenue generation and control -Distribution of benefits	-Councils as business entities? -Equal distribution of benefits? -Redistribution of benefits? -Who are the Producers?		-DNPWIM support producer communities	-Discuss issue with MIGRUD -Discuss issue with Councils -Agitate for formal guidelines for Councils through MIGRUD

FORUM OF DISCUSSION : 28.9.92
NEEDS EXPRESSED BY DISTRICT COUNCILS

TOPIC	NEEDS/ISSUES RAISED	RESPONSE
- Training	- Lack of training at District/Sub-District level - Inappropriate training of Community Game Scouts - Training of Trainers - Local facilitators needed - Village level courses - More visits by technical people - District/Ward and village workshop needed - More information from CAMPFIRE - Transport - Water supplies - Coordination between Government and District Councils - CAMPFIRE support from Leaders/Bureaucrats - Donor support	- Videos available at Province level (D.N.R)

CAMPFIRE PROGRAMME STRATEGY

LONG TERM OBJECTIVE	- Successful rural economic systems based on sustainable use of natural resources
MEDIUM TERM OBJECTIVE	- Sustainable community based resource management
PROGRAMME OUTPUTS (SHORT TERM OBJECTIVES)	1. CAMPFIRE Association established as Lead Agency 2. Legal mechanism for local empowerment established 3. Mechanisms for collective decision-making and enforcement established 4. Policies of government ministries affecting CAMPFIRE are made consistent 5. Local resource management programme established 6. Upgrading of implementation skills and increasing awareness of CAMPFIRE 7. Effective public relations 8. Effective monitoring Research and Evaluation systems established


PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES

1. CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION

- Co-ordinate inputs to Producers from NGO's
- Coordinate
 - inputs to Appropriate Authority Districts
- Government Departments
 - interested parties
- Specific service requests
- Co-ordinate information flow among Appropriate Authorities
- Co-ordinate and source training at District, Sub-District
- Take administrative load off Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management
- Develop broad support for CAMPFIRE
- Monitor compliance of District Councils with conditions of Appropriate Authority
- Act as contact point with Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management for quotas, permits and all Council matters
- Make itself accountable to producer communities
- Secure adequate funding base
- Invite membership from new Districts awarded Appropriate Authority
- Lobby appropriate Ministries for their supportive participation
- Lobbying on behalf of producer communities
- Service producer communities on demand basis
- House selected persons engaged in research and implementation
- Disseminate information to constituency, public
- Facilitate access of approved workers to Districts, Wards, villages
- Chair CAMPFIRE collaborative group
- Host, coordinate and chair the CAMPFIRE collaborative group
- Sub-contract/hire technical services on behalf of constituents
- Facilitate the monitoring of resource base, institution progress
- Assist producers with marketing and activities relevant to marketing
- Assist with legislative and policy reform
- Recommend research priorities
- Act as forum for conflict resolution within constituency
- Institute institution financial control/audits
- Lobby for more devolution of power from District Councils to producer community
- Broaden full membership to include Producer Wards of Appropriate Authority Districts
- Extend Associate Membership to non-Appropriate Authority District Wards
- District Councils pay a membership fee (\$100)
- All wards pay a membership fee(s) and levy on wildlife earnings
- Revise and update constitution
- Improve funding base of CAMPFIRE Association

PROGRAMME RESPONSIBILITIES

OUTPUT	MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY	COLLABORATION WITH	REPORTING FREQUENCY	REPORTING TO
1. CAMPFIRE Association established as lead agency	- CAMPFIRE Association	- Collaborative Group	- Annually - Quarterly - Quarterly	- Members - Board of management - Collaborative Group
2. Legal mechanism for local empowerment established	- DNPWLM	- MET, MLGRUD - Attorney General's Office - CAMPFIRE Association	- Preliminary response by 30/12/92	- Gazetted by 31/3/93
3. Mechanisms for collective decision making and enforcement established	- CAMPFIRE Association	- ZIMTRUST/CASS	- Quarterly	- Collaborative Group
4. Policies of Government Ministry affecting CAMPFIRE are made consistent	- DNPWLM	- Government Ministries DNR, MET, MLGRUD, MLRD - CAMPFIRE Association - Collaborative Group	- Annually	- Collaborative Group
5. Local resource management programme established	- DNPWLM	- WWF - MLAWD - MLGRUD - CAMPFIRE Association - Other technical agencies	- Quarterly	- Collaborative Group
6. Upgrading of implementation skills and increased awareness of CAMPFIRE	- CAMPFIRE Association	- ZIMTRUST - WWF	- Quarterly	- Collaborative Group
7. Effective public relations	- CAMPFIRE Association	- DNPWLM - ZIMTRUST	- Quarterly	- Collaborative Group
8. Effective monitoring research and evaluation systems established	- CASS	- Producer communities - WWF - ZIMTRUST - DNPWLM	- Reporting annually on progress	- Collaborative Group



ANNEX TO THE REPORT

**WORKSHOP
DOCUMENTATION**

MAJOR ACTORS INVOLVED IN CAMPFIRE

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS (CENTRAL LEVEL)	GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS (PROVINCE)	GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS (DISTRICT)	DONORS	INTEREST GROUPS
- Ministry of Environment and Tourism - Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development - Ministry of Agriculture - Ministry of Education - AGRITEX - Forestry Commission - Natural Resources Board - Department of Natural Resources - Veterinary Department - Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management - *DNFWLM CAMPFIRE Unit	- P.D.C.	- D.D.C - District Council - District Natural Resources Committee - District Development Fund	- U.S.A.I.D - O.D.A. - E.E.C - I.D.R.C	- *CAMPFIRE Association - CAMPFIRE Committees - Village Committees - Branch Committees - Hunting/Photo-graphic Safari Operators - Crocodile Farmers Association
	SUPPORT AGENCIES		INFORMAL INTEREST GROUPS	
	- *ZIMTRUST - *CASS - *WWF	GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS WARD + VILLAGE	- Poachers	INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE GROUPS
		- WADCO - VIDCO - Ward Natural Resources Committee - VIDCO Natural Resources Committee		- CITES (etc) - Greenpeace

*Identified for detailed role clarification

1.2 CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group

The CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group is the collective name for governmental agencies and non-government organisations (NGOs) which formally coordinate their efforts to assist District Councils and local communities in planning and undertaking CAMPFIRE. The Collaborative Group, which represents a multidisciplinary effort in the implementation of CAMPFIRE, consists of:

- Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management
- Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
- CAMPFIRE Association
- Zimbabwe Trust
- Centre for Applied Social Sciences
- World Wide Fund.

DNPWLM

The Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism is the statutory authority for wildlife management and conservation. The policy of DNPWLM recognises that landholders are better placed to manage wildlife on their land than the Department provided certain conditions are met. The Department has therefore granted "appropriate authority status" to certain District Councils provided these Councils have stated their intent to follow the principles embodied in the CAMPFIRE concept. DNPWLM provides direction and coordination to the Collaborative Group on all wildlife matters as well as offering technical assistance and guidance to interested District Councils and local communities.

MLGRUD

The MLGRUD advises and assists the Collaborative Group and Provincial and District authorities on the Ministry's policies and practices as they apply to CAMPFIRE. While "appropriate authority" to manage wildlife is given to District Councils by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, District Councils are the official responsibility of MLGRUD.

CAMPFIRE Association

The CAMPFIRE Association is the organisation elected by the rural communities through their District Councils to promote their interests at the national level and to provide them with technical advice and services. The Association ensures that the activities of the Collaborative Group correspond with the needs of its members.

Zimbabwe Trust

The Zimbabwe Trust is responsible for assisting local communities and District Councils in developing or strengthening their management skills and institutions needed to manage their wildlife and other resources. ZIMTRUST is directly involved in six districts but provides technical support and training materials to others through its Institutional Development Unit.

CASS

The Centre for Applied Social Sciences in the University of Zimbabwe is responsible for socio-economic research on CAMPFIRE in a few selected districts and for monitoring CAMPFIRE. The work of CASS serves to advise and guide the Collaborative Group as well as the District Councils and communities.

WWF

The World Wide Fund for Nature's Multispecies Research Project presently being undertaken in a number of Communal and Commercial farming areas, provides advice and assistance on ecological and wildlife management issues as well as related economic and financial services.

1.3 Background to the CAMPFIRE Workshop 1992

The review of the CASS programme in 1991 and the WWF programme in January 1992 recommended that the activities of the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group should be reviewed.

Given the growth of the CAMPFIRE Programme over the last two years and the demands now being made by producer communities on the Collaborative Group, the Group itself, which is chaired and coordinated by DNPWLM, recognises that a review would be extremely useful and appropriate.

Thus a workshop was conducted between 29 September - 2 October 1992 to review activities and services of members of the Collaborative Group in support of the CAMPFIRE programme and to re-define the roles and services each member can or should provide and how best these activities and services can be coordinated. On 28 September 1992 a one day open meeting was conducted in Harare with presentations from a range of government ministries and departments which are involved in CAMPFIRE. The forum was used to air government perspectives on CAMPFIRE and to set the policy framework for the workshop.

The workshop objectives, programme and the list of participants are given in sections 2, 3, and 4 below. The outcome of this workshop is documented in the annex of this report.

2.0 Workshop Objectives

The objectives of the workshop were:

- * discuss issues raised in the Forum with Government representatives and District Councils involved in CAMPFIRE (28.9.92)
- * identify major actors involved in CAMPFIRE
- * clarify roles and functions of major actors, in particular of members of the Collaborative Group
- * discuss, elaborate upon and recommend (or agree upon) coordination mechanisms (of the Collaborative Group)
- * review briefly past experience in CAMPFIRE, discuss present demands and future challenges
- * outline clearly objectives to be pursued by major actors with clear delineation of roles

3.0 Workshop Programme

Tuesday, 29.9.92

- Welcoming address/opening
- Brief introduction of participants
- Introduction to methodology to be used (visualization techniques)
- Presentation of objectives (discussion and agreement on agenda)
- identification of major actors involved in CAMPFIRE
- Presentation of issues raised during discussions in the FORUM (28.9.92)
- Clarification of Roles/Functions

Wednesday, 30.9.92

- Clarification of Roles and Functions of Major Actors (continued)
- Implications drawn from the Review of Roles and Functions of Collaborative Group Members
- Discussion of present coordination and setting-up of future co-ordination mechanisms

Thursday, 1.10.92

- Discussion of past experience, present demands, and future challenges of CAMPFIRE
- Definition of clear objectives to be pursued by Major Actors

Friday, 2.10.92

- Clarification of Issues Raised
- Finalization of Agreements Reached
- Closing 12.30 Hrs

Daily Programme Schedule

29.9.92	14.00 - 15.30	Opening Session
	15.30 - 15.45	Tea/Coffee
	15.45 - 17.00	2nd Session

All other days	08.30 - 10.00	First Session
	10.00 - 10.30	Tea/Coffee Break
	10.30 - 12.30	Second Session
	12.30 - 13.30	Lunch
	13.30 - 15.00	Third Session
	15.00 - 15.30	Tea/Coffee Break
	15.30 - 17.00	Forth Session

4.0 List of Workshop Participants

CENTRE FOR APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCES

1. Mr M.W. Murphree, Director
2. Mr J.C Jackson, Lecturer
3. Mr J. Murombedzi, Staff Development Fellow
4. Mr C. Nhira, Research Fellow
5. Mr S. Metcalfe, Research Associate

WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE (WWF)

6. Mr R.D. Taylor, Ecologist
7. Mr I. Bond, Research Fellow,
8. Mr D.H.M. Cumming, Project Leader (Multispecies Animal Systems Project)

ZIMBABWE TRUST

9. Mr R. Monro, General Secretary
10. Mr L. Manala, Project Manager
11. Mr J.P. Sturgeon, CAMPFIRE Project Manager

CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION

12. Mr T.N. Maveneke, Chief Executive Officer, CAMPFIRE Association
13. Mr J.P. Muleya, CAMPFIRE Member, Binga District Council
14. Mr G. Mupfudza, CAMPFIRE Member, Guruve District Council

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL PARKS AND WILD LIFE MANAGEMENT

15. Mr R.B. Martin, Assistant Director (Research)
16. Mr E. Shumba, Ecologist
17. Mr B.A. Child, Ecologist

DOCUMENTATION

Ms F.T. Gapara

FACILITATOR

Mr Hasan Moinuddin, Consultant to CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group

5.0 Role Clarification

The analysis of present roles of the Collaborative Group members and the future roles they envisaged to play in CAMPFIRE were discussed in the backdrop of problems and constraints faced by each. This led to some discussion as to what is the future role of the collaborative group as a whole and what can each individual organisation contribute towards the CAMPFIRE programme.

In the inception or initiation phase of the CAMPFIRE programme, the collaborative group members made pioneering effort in transferring concepts of participatorial natural resource management and empowerment to the communities and District Councils under the programme. Now after several years of experiential learning and adaptive management a phase of consolidation has begun for those 10 districts which have been able to implement the programme successfully to a large extent. Consolidation has also to be accompanied by extension or expansion of the programme as 12 new districts are awaiting the award of "appropriate authority status". This will lead to new challenges and perspectives.

It was agreed that in this phase of consolidation and expansion, the role of the lead agency in the CAMPFIRE programme must now be taken up by the CAMPFIRE Association, which needs to broaden its membership base by including wards as well as District Councils. The Association will also convene and chair the meetings of the collaborative group, thus becoming the official representative of the CAMPFIRE programme internally and externally.

The other members of the collaborative group are providers of technical services reacting on request from the CAMPFIRE Association or any of its active members. Demand driven service-orientation of the collaborative group must be based on a prioritized programme to be defined by the Association in conjunction with the collaborative group.

Except for the CAMPFIRE Association, all other members of the collaborative group have cut down on their future role as compared to the present role. This, however, does not mean that each member will require less resources. It is only a shift to meaningful concentration on areas that these members are specialized in. In fact, in some cases additional resources will be necessary to intensify efforts in the areas of specialization due to expansion into additional districts.

The CAMPFIRE Association has a big task ahead and a sound financial base with trained personnel will have to be secured. In this task, the collaborative group should assist the Association intensively.

6.0 Programme Strategy

The role clarification also led to the definition of the CAMPFIRE programme strategy on the basis of consensus.

The long term development objective of the programme has been defined as the establishment of:

"Successful rural economic systems based on sustainable use of natural resources."

In order to achieve this, it is necessary to establish:

"Sustainable community based resource management"

in the medium term.

In order to achieve the medium term objective the following programme outputs have been identified:

1. CAMPFIRE Association established as Lead Agency
2. Legal mechanism for local empowerment established
3. Mechanisms for collective decision-making and enforcement established
4. Policies of government ministries affecting CAMPFIRE are made consistent
5. Local resource management programme established
6. Upgrading of implementation skills and increased awareness of CAMPFIRE
7. Effective public relations
8. Effective monitoring Research and Evaluation systems

Major (primary) responsibilities for each of these outputs were clearly defined as follows:

Output 1: CAMPFIRE Association
 Output 2: DNPWLM
 Output 3: CAMPFIRE Association
 Output 4: DNPWLM
 Output 5: DNPWLM
 Output 6: CAMPFIRE Association
 Output 7: CAMPFIRE Association
 Output 8: CASS

The responsible agencies will have to collaborate with a range of technical agencies for securing specialized services and implementation.

7.0 Follow-Up Action Required

The workshop deliberations led to the clarification of roles and the programme strategy. It was also concluded that the following actions were required to be carried out after the workshop:

- * CAMPFIRE Association presents workshop results to its membership for endorsement and necessary changes in its constitution;
- * DNPWIM presents results of the workshop to the Director for endorsement and informs the Ministry of Environment and Tourism;
- * DNPWIM and the CAMPFIRE Association issue Letters of Authority to members of the collaborative group and other technical agencies involved in (or to be involved in the future) in the CAMPFIRE programme;
- * The collaborative group updates CAMPFIRE programme presentation materials and information with regard to collaborative group.

Annex I:

Financial Summary of CAMPFIRE Association


Annex I: Financial Summary of CAMPFIRE Association

Summary of CAMPFIRE Association Income and Expenditure							
Source: Audit Reports							
Actual Z\$							
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Income							
USAID	4,932,900	4,158,768	6,567,606	6,684,222	12,460,191	15,846,789	14,133,200
Netherlands	695,500	1,149,425	1,240,000	1,060,824			
RDC subscriptions	160,496	154,685	121,467	663,894	369,207	1,560,119	6,408,949
Donations	1,001	13,799	15,064	293,762	204,001	80,000	
Other revenue	2,540	48,739	14,306	119,026	270,232	2,028,135	2,787,115
Interest received	379	38,053	207,365	323,127			
Sale of fixed assets		139,999	3,998			958,690	2,006,882
Total Income	5,792,816	5,703,468	8,169,806	9,144,855	13,303,631	20,473,733	25,336,146
Expenditure							
Advertising	149	4,533	8,142	79,984	7,789	13,423	95,116
Annual reports						185,500	198,900
Advances written off and refunds				1,788		154,982	
Audit fees	28,000	63,803	72,650	305,543	414,000	1,046,000	1,800,000
Awareness materials				377,963	343,896	381,000	2,167,471
Bank charges	2,083	9,264	12,814	23,390	26,516	57,861	117,892
Board and Workshops		105,101	78,103	172,373	203,741	1,109,966	2,343,080
Board sitting allowances	15,288	9,600	25,980	7,800	90,850	186,600	209,300
CA AGM				215,404	483,822	658,420	1,105,550
CCG and review meetings				135,565	548,203		188,292
Communication costs				208,527	484,587	626,114	740,127
Community meetings				27,680			
Consultancy	311,865	709,834	416,734	366,118		2,811,768	1,589,263
Depreciation	303,104	422,381	448,302	580,162	637,263	676,029	589,461
Direct labour	1,254,019	2,372,640	2,758,655	3,658,449	6,847,078	6,811,427	6,109,669
Fixed assets	54,594	27,581		300			
Committee meetings				186,419	427,669	712,566	483,338
Funeral expenses			37,653			10,500	
Import duty	4,128						
Institutional strengthening	51,702	220,080	197,333				
insurance and licences	33,259	4,526	65,976	136,179	193,482	539,508	259,506
Journals and periodicals	4,207	280					
Loss on disposal of vehicle		168,841		109,739	318,863		
Office expenses	54,870	54,972	89,585	167,400		298,804	134,830
Organisation awareness	103,479	32,944	287,686				
Parking	187	270					
Postage and telephones	12,030	67,414	147,010				41,435
Public relations			6,825	6,500			
Repairs and maintenance			88,646	119,483	46,441	114,913	286,991
Reproduction and supplies	59,240	109,827	105,267	222,479	240,026	351,780	813,580
Seminars	325	5,048		4,097	17,777	334,468	36,520
Rent and service levy	17,078	60,574	77,040	147,265	267,563	586,973	756,494
Other allowances					32,123	22,000	24,000
Subscriptions		6,764	36,867	71,239	78,012	160,302	176,592
Staff training				126,402	40,880	8,650	7,250
Training and newsletters	129,759	364,109	87,765	302,140	329,762	203,531	1,982,954
Travel and accommodation	404,973	578,145	932,523	1,218,606	1,540,097	1,311,339	1,366,152
Vehicle costs	128,092	366,018	603,273	802,712	1,570,166	2,485,412	2,768,407
Other direct costs		101,831	122				
Total Expenditure	2,972,431	5,866,380	6,584,951	9,781,706	15,190,606	21,859,836	26,392,170


Annex I: Financial Summary of CAMPFIRE Association

SUMMARY OF CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION REVENUES							
Source: Audit reports							
Z\$	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Parallel exchange rate	9.73	10.97	20.71	37.02	39.00	331.67	467.76
Grant	5,629,401	5,321,992	7,822,670	8,038,808	12,664,192	15,926,789	14,133,200
Own Income	160,496	154,685	121,467	663,894	369,207	1,560,119	6,408,949
Other income	2,919	226,791	225,669	442,153	270,232	2,986,825	4,793,997
INCOME	5,792,816	5,703,468	8,169,806	9,144,855	13,303,631	20,473,733	25,336,146
Office Overhead	215,231	484,058	748,597	1,994,142	2,175,315	4,558,310	7,620,184
Meetings, training, publicatio	300,553	736,882	676,867	1,051,478	2,101,824	3,205,551	6,349,034
Staff costs	1,254,019	2,372,640	2,758,655	3,658,449	6,847,078	6,811,427	6,109,669
Travel & Accommodation	404,973	578,145	932,523	1,218,606	1,540,097	1,311,339	1,366,152
Vehicles costs	128,092	366,018	603,273	802,712	1,570,166	2,485,412	2,768,407
Consultancy	311,865	709,834	416,734	366,118	-	2,811,768	1,589,263
COSTS	2,614,733	5,247,577	6,136,649	9,091,505	14,234,480	21,183,807	25,802,709
Depreciation etc.	357,698	618,803	448,302	690,201	956,126	676,029	589,461
US\$	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Parallel exchange rate	9.73	10.97	20.71	37.02	39.00	331.67	467.76
Grant	578,332	485,177	377,755	217,167	324,723	48,020	30,214
Own Income	16,488	14,102	5,866	17,935	9,467	4,704	13,701
Other income	300	20,675	10,897	11,945	6,929	9,006	10,249
INCOME	595,121	519,955	394,518	247,047	341,119	61,730	54,165
Office Overhead	22,112	44,129	36,150	53,871	55,777	13,744	16,291
Meetings, training, publicatio	30,877	67,178	32,686	28,406	53,893	9,665	13,573
Staff costs	128,831	216,301	133,215	98,832	175,566	20,537	13,061
Travel & Accommodation	41,605	52,706	45,031	32,920	39,490	3,954	2,921
Vehicles costs	13,159	33,368	29,132	21,685	40,261	7,494	5,918
Consultancy	32,039	64,712	20,124	9,891	-	8,478	3,398
COSTS	268,623	478,393	296,337	245,606	364,987	63,871	55,162
Depreciation etc.	36,748	56,413	21,648	18,646	24,516	2,038	1,260
ANALYSIS							
Surplus/deficit	326,498	41,561	98,181	1,441	-23,868	-2,141	-997
% met be own income	6%	3%	2%	7%	3%	7%	25%


CAMPFIRE Association Finances



CAMPFIRE Association Expenditure



CAMPFIRE Association Finances



Annex J:

CAMPFIRE Baseline Data: Summary of Wards, Populations and Areas Benefiting from CAMPFIRE

Annex J1: Summary of Wards, Populations and Areas Benfiting from CAMPFIRE

BASELINE CHARACTERISTICS OF CAMPFIRE DISTRICTS																
District	Natural Region	Total Area of districts (km ²)	Year Granted AA	Year CAMPFIRE Implemented	Area of FIRE Ward (km ²)	C-FIRE Wards Area as % of district	Total Number of Wards	with CAM	C-FIRE Wards as % of total wards	District Population (persons)	District Pop density (persons/km ²)	C-FIRE Wards Population (persons)	C-FIRE Wards Ave Pop density (Persons/km ²)	District Population (households)	C-FIRE Wards Population (households)	Percentage of C-FIRE households
Beitbridge	5	12,935	1991	1991	4,595	35.52%	21	6	28.57%	80,946	6.25	30,716	6.68	16,261	5,674	34.89%
Binga	3,4&5	12,308	1991	1989	7,930	64.43%	27	21	77.78%	87,802	7.13	76,427	9.64	19,669	15,809	80.38%
Bubi	4	5,547			88	1.59%	12	2	16.67%	36,614	6.60			6,833		
Bulilimangwe	4&5	12,574	1990		1,530	12.17%	33	10	30.30%	156,641	12.46	35,829	23.42	26,449	7857	29.71%
Chaminuka	2a,2b,3,4&5	2,752			380	13.80%	26	2	7.69%	94,047				20,625		
Chimanimani	1,2a,3,4&5	3,419	1994	No activity			28			110,836	32.42			22,864		
Chipinge(Gazaland)	1,2a,3,4&5	5,223	1991		408	7.81%	33	2	6.06%	336,893	64.50	11,491	28.18	68,516	2430	3.55%
Chiredzi(Gaza Kho)	5	17,748	1991	1991/92	3,633	20.47%	32	9	28.13%	183,228	10.32	46,703	12.86	38,294	9,176	23.96%
Chiweshe(Mazowe)	2a	4,482	1991		375	8.38%	29	5	17.24%	198,319				27,995	13515	
Gokwe North	3,4&5	7,359	1991	1991	2,523	34.28%	25	4	16.00%	164,558				40,017	10,211	
Gokwe South	3&4	11,138	1991	1991	1,308	11.74%	28	6	21.43%	238,581				32,047		
Goromonzi	2a	2,504					26			147,126	58.76			26,904	12,475	46.37%
Guruve	2a,3&4	7,810	1988		4,215	53.97%	28	14	50.00%	135,637	17.37	51,149	12.13	21,663	6178	28.52%
Gwanda	4&5	10,792	1994	No activity	2,283	21.15%	23	6	26.09%	112,984	10.47	35,466	15.54	48,841	12,815	
Hurungwe	2a,2,4&5	19,895	1992	1992	2,793	14.04%	40	9	22.50%	248,902	12.41			13,659	10838	79.35%
Hwange	4&5	29,934	1989	1991	4,021	13.43%	27	15	55.56%	71,707	2.40	54,976	13.67	14,579		
Kwedza	2b&3	998								69,981				14,769	7,371	49.91%
Kusile(Lupane)	3&4	7,780	1996	No activity	2,885	37.08%	24	11	45.83%	94,469	12.14	47,610	16.50	23,150		
Marondera	2a&2b	3,554					24			104,601	29.43			15,625	3,159	20.22%
Matobo	4&5	7,278			1,233		26	4	15.38%	89,281	12.27	19,189	15.56	23,995	3009	12.54%
Mudzi	4	4,222	1992	1991	1,009	23.90%	18	2	11.11%	109,423	25.92	28,478	28.22	24,925		
Mutoko	2b,3&4	4,052					29			122,941	30.34			14,535	8554	58.85%
Muzarabani	2a,3&4	4,322	1991		2,540	58.77%	17	9	52.94%	69,851	16.16	39,048	15.37	16,879		
Mwenezi	4&5	12,933					31			101,354	7.84			18,085	6567	36.26%
Nkayi	4	5,333	1993	No activity	2,628	49.28%	23	8	34.78%	113,302	21.25	42,113	18.02	5,996	5720	95.40%
Nyaminyami(Kariba)	4&5	6,327	1988	1989	3,532	55.82%	16	11	68.75%	27,717	4.38	24,160	6.84	28,862	1364	4.73%
Nyanga	1,2b,3&4	5,738	1992	97, but no proje	253		37	1	2.70%	128,439	22.38	5,261		32,211		
Pfura(Mt. Darwin)	2a,2b,3&4	1,771								164,362				14,998		
Rushinga	3&4	2,408	1992	1993			17			75,332	31.28			18,420	7550	40.99%
Tsholotsho	4	7,823	1990	1989	5,354	68.44%	20	8	40.00%	111,828	14.29	46,630	8.71	17,057	1993	11.68%
UMP Zvatale	2b,3&4	2,662	1993	1993	619	23.08%	15	2	13.33%	86,302	32.18	9,447	15.26	12,128		
Umzingwane	4	1,074	1988							62,954				12,820		
Zivagwe	4	2,363	1998							65,752						
TOTAL/AVERAGE		247,078			56,135	22.72%	735	165	22.45%	4,000,710	16.19	605,681	10.79	781,351	152,255	38.66%

Sources:

Census 1992: Zimbabwe Preliminary Report(CSO)

FEWS Digital Geographic maps

Total Population (1999 estimate)	13,079,127
Male Population (1999 estimate)	6,382,092
Female Population (1999 estimate)	6,697,035
Population Density(persons/km ²)	33.83
Intercensal Growth(82-92)	3.13


Annex K:

CAMPFIRE Offtake Quotas ad Values


Summary Hunting Quotas for all Communal Areas: 1991 - 2001

Species	Year											Total
	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
Elephant (male)	58	81	115	137	153	151	132	154	145	134	154	1,414
Elephant (female)	0	0	22	146	185	85	81	90	33	31	47	720
Elephant (PAC)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	8
Buffalo (male)	328	318	435	404	415	395	306	315	295	263	290	3,764
Buffalo (female)	138	83	392	137	116	107	75	81	76	63	76	1,344
Lion (male)	37	46	69	59	58	46	41	52	50	51	53	562
Lion (female)	23	25	39	31	29	19	9	5	8	9	11	208
Leopard	81	89	114	112	130	125	113	131	126	115	118	1,254
Hyena	0	0	95	142	124	133	144	170	196	180	27	1,211
Hippopotamus	14	24	30	40	47	45	37	39	40	64	54	434
Crocodile	19	35	45	56	52	12	58	53	49	53	50	482
Giraffe	4	2	6	13	12	61	12	12	14	12	12	160
Roan	0	0	0	20	10	0	0	10	11	0	0	51
Sable	30	30	43	46	81	52	49	55	43	41	45	515
Eland	22	22	33	35	40	38	34	44	50	58	64	440
Kudu (male)	86	90	104	125	135	134	129	145	150	137	164	1,399
Kudu (female)	4	9	19	27	33	39	33	27	31	21	28	271
Nyala	11	11	11	17	18	14	13	14	8	8	6	131
Bushbuck	66	86	95	118	132	147	112	126	109	106	115	1,212
Waterbuck (male)	45	44	51	64	73	71	63	71	76	69	65	692
Reedbuck	9	4	10	13	15	10	11	8	13	16	17	126
Wildebeeste	10	10	11	14	16	16	16	16	27	28	30	194
Tsessebe	0	37	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	5	11	63
Zebra	45	72	58	79	91	87	79	104	136	153	152	1,056
Bushpig	53	121	93	95	99	120	197	192	200	170	192	1,532
Warthog	107	445	147	138	145	141	111	138	149	136	216	1,873
Impala (male)	1,556	215	1,861	1,554	1,534	768	1,705	1,740	1,775	1,426	1,523	15,657
Impala (female)	283	147	1,457	1,241	1,190	461	836	830	894	790	849	8,978
Duiker	141	59	164	146	189	181	180	183	198	170	178	1,789
Steenbok	35	53	44	37	45	41	40	40	55	43	56	489
Klipspringer	48	90	80	79	83	88	78	86	83	76	75	866
Grysbok	68	16	80	112	102	101	73	76	77	75	69	849
Honey badger	0	14	11	29	30	31	29	41	53	46	49	333
Civet	16	5	24	34	46	41	44	63	60	61	64	458
Serval	2	34	17	28	29	30	27	7	16	20	27	237
Jackal	32	19	58	95	108	141	129	137	147	147	201	1,214
Wild cat	2	24	21	37	36	39	39	52	63	58	68	439
Genet	18	23	34	38	48	46	45	49	65	61	73	500
Porcupine	17	58	54	63	69	66	61	81	91	79	97	736
Spring hare	0	295	290	327	317	360	365	409	466	442	483	3,754
Baboon	327	180	713	593	653	758	696	966	895	824	899	7,504
Vervet monkey	0	920	266	1,233	307	296	317	327	671	521	514	5,372
Guinea fowl	1,145	1,405	1,480	1,565	1,505	1,735	1,665	2,640	2,043	2,257	2,732	20,172
Francolin	1,340	1,095	1,680	1,790	1,655	1,945	1,900	2,405	2,055	2,040	2,315	20,220
Sandgrouse	850	2,170	1,480	1,805	1,660	1,971	1,745	3,740	3,365	2,810	3,335	24,931
Pigeons/doves	2,700	1,760	4,550	6,770	7,720	7,300	7,550	16,500	13,220	12,550	14,100	94,720
Ducks/geese	100	60	520	880	935	797	892	3,312	4,765	3,520	3,415	19,196
Suni	0	41	0	0	0	2	1	1	1,021	2	2	1,070
Spotted hyena	46	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	0	206	301
Cheetah	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caracal	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	16	2	21

Big Game Trophy Quotas



Value of CAMPFIRE Quotas



Annex L:

CAMPFIRE Economic Data

Annex L1: CAMPFIRE Income by Source

CAMPFIRE PROGRAMME: INCOME, 1989 - 2001

Income by Year (ZWS\$)

Year	Sport Hunting(1)	Tourism(2)	P.A.C. Hides & Ivory(3)	Other(4)	Total	% annual change
1989	\$694,773	\$60	\$11,256	\$37,610	\$743,699	85%
1990	\$1,120,864	\$7,082	\$105,917	\$141,639	\$1,375,502	112%
1991	\$2,393,713	\$59,657	\$78,242	\$379,243	\$2,910,855	114%
1992	\$5,899,669	\$96,878	\$48,199	\$174,913	\$6,219,659	56%
1993	\$9,101,816	\$137,730	\$97,858	\$350,804	\$9,688,208	39%
1994	\$12,757,694	\$328,360	\$22,747	\$380,811	\$13,489,612	3%
1995	\$12,883,712	\$478,653	\$101,939	\$420,528	\$13,884,832	27%
1996	\$16,679,327	\$234,381	\$401,479	\$366,842	\$17,682,030	29%
1997	\$21,257,264	\$886,729	\$551,649	\$169,430	\$22,865,072	102%
1998	\$43,580,153	\$996,194	\$614,345	\$919,212	\$46,109,904	129%
1999	\$74,389,769	\$3,017,543	\$27,620,248	\$553,686	\$105,581,246	-11%
2000	\$85,661,806	\$2,483,664	\$5,178,802	\$601,514	\$93,925,786	36.51%
2001	\$117,968,205	\$2,281,889	\$6,162,683	\$1,805,785	\$128,218,562	
Total 1989 - 2001	\$404,388,765	\$11,008,820	\$40,995,364	\$6,302,018	\$462,694,966	

Income by Year (US\$)

Year	Exchange Rate	Sport Hunting(1)	Tourism(2)	P.A.C. Hides & Ivory(3)	Other(4)	Total	% annual change
1989	2.126	\$326,798	\$28	\$5,294	\$17,690	\$349,811	59%
1990	2.472	\$453,424	\$2,865	\$42,847	\$57,297	\$556,433	39%
1991	3.751	\$638,153	\$15,904	\$20,859	\$101,105	\$776,021	57%
1992	5.112	\$1,154,082	\$18,951	\$9,429	\$34,216	\$1,216,678	22%
1993	6.529	\$1,394,060	\$21,095	\$14,988	\$53,730	\$1,483,873	11%
1994	8.212	\$1,553,543	\$39,985	\$2,770	\$46,373	\$1,642,671	-3%
1995	8.724	\$1,476,812	\$54,866	\$11,685	\$48,204	\$1,591,567	10%
1996	10.07	\$1,656,338	\$23,275	\$39,869	\$36,429	\$1,755,912	5%
1997	12.444	\$1,708,234	\$71,258	\$44,331	\$13,615	\$1,837,438	3%
1998	24.374	\$1,787,977	\$40,871	\$25,205	\$37,713	\$1,891,766	46%
1999	38.338	\$1,940,366	\$78,709	\$720,440	\$14,442	\$2,753,958	-24%
2000	44.616	\$1,919,980	\$55,668	\$116,075	\$13,482	\$2,105,204	10.60%
2001	55.066	\$2,142,306	\$41,439	\$111,914	\$32,793	\$2,328,452	
Total 1989 - 2001		\$18,152,074	\$464,915	\$1,165,706	\$507,090	\$20,289,784	

Percentage Income by Year by Activity


Year	Sport Hunting(1)	Tourism(2)	P.A.C. Hides & Ivory(3)	Other(4)	Total
1989	93%	0%	2%	5%	100%
1990	81%	1%	8%	10%	100%
1991	82%	2%	3%	13%	100%
1992	95%	2%	1%	3%	100%
1993	94%	1%	1%	4%	100%
1994	95%	2%	0%	3%	100%
1995	93%	3%	1%	3%	100%
1996	94%	1%	2%	2%	100%
1997	93%	4%	2%	1%	100%
1998	95%	2%	1%	2%	100%
1999	70%	3%	26%	1%	100%
2000	91%	3%	6%	1%	100%
2001	92%	2%	5%	1%	100%
Total 1989 - 2001	87%	2%	9%	1%	100%

- (1) Sport Hunting - income earned from lease and trophy fees paid by safari operators
 (2) Tourism - income earned from the lease of wild life areas for non-consumptive tourism
 (3) PAC hides & ivory - income from sale of animal products from PAC. Includes proceeds from ivory auction.
 (4) Other - income from the sale of live animals, collection of ostrich and crocodile eggs, etc
 (5) Mean annual exchange rate based on RBZ end of month exchange rates


Compiled by WWF SARPO, Harare

Annex L1: CAMPFIRE Income by Source


CAMPFIRE: Sources of Direct Revenue (US\$)



CAMPFIRE Marketing Efficiency



Index of Value of Hunting Quotas



Annex L2: Allocation of CAMPFIRE Revenues

CAMPFIRE PROGRAMME: ALLOCATION OF REVENUE, 1989 - 2001

Allocation by Year (Zw\$)

Year	Disbursed to Communities (1)	Wildlife Management (2)	Council Levy (3)	Other (4)	Amount Not Allocated(5)	Total	% annual change
1989	\$396,005	\$173,180	\$60,386	\$25,579	\$88,549	\$743,699	
1990	\$509,994	\$300,310	\$129,854	\$55,623	\$379,721	\$1,375,502	85%
1991	\$1,203,673	\$823,441	\$451,786	\$213,544	\$213,372	\$2,905,816	111%
1992	\$3,074,278	\$1,059,673	\$589,914	\$91,185	\$1,404,609	\$6,219,659	114%
1993	\$5,560,958	\$2,331,210	\$1,639,316	\$210,050	(\$53,326)	\$9,688,208	56%
1994	\$7,794,511	\$2,583,326	\$1,219,653	\$349,137	\$1,542,985	\$13,489,612	39%
1995	\$8,259,680	\$3,086,311	\$1,684,426	\$228,688	\$625,709	\$13,884,814	3%
1996	\$8,388,566	\$4,085,950	\$3,031,985	\$78,504	\$1,931,342	\$17,516,347	26%
1997	\$10,681,392	\$369,096	\$332,829	\$154,491	\$11,397,266	\$22,935,072	31%
1998	\$22,185,225	\$12,707,938	\$1,722,402	\$2,021,547	\$7,472,791	\$46,109,904	101%
1999	\$51,443,942	\$23,335,512	\$9,709,178	\$1,130,108	\$19,962,506	\$105,581,246	129%
2000	\$45,757,567	\$14,320,530	\$21,924,782	\$5,678,560	\$6,244,347	\$93,925,786	-11%
2001	\$47,294,474	\$29,658,311	\$25,014,536	\$11,585,227	\$15,316,957	\$128,869,506	37.20%
Total(1989-2001)	\$212,550,265	\$94,834,788	\$67,511,046	\$21,822,244	\$66,526,827	\$463,245,170	

Allocation by Year (US\$)

Year	Exchange Rate	Disbursed to Communities (1)	Wildlife Management (2)	Council Levy (3)	Other (4)	Amount Not Allocated(5)	Total	% annual change
1989	2.126	\$186,268	\$81,458	\$28,404	\$12,032	\$41,651	\$349,811	
1990	2.472	\$206,308	\$121,485	\$52,530	\$22,501	\$153,609	\$556,433	59%
1991	3.751	\$320,894	\$219,526	\$120,444	\$56,930	\$56,884	\$774,678	39%
1992	5.112	\$601,385	\$207,291	\$115,398	\$17,837	\$274,767	\$1,216,678	57%
1993	6.529	\$851,732	\$357,055	\$251,082	\$32,172	(\$14,216)	\$1,477,824	21%
1994	8.2122	\$949,138	\$314,572	\$148,517	\$42,514	\$187,889	\$1,642,631	11%
1995	8.724	\$946,777	\$353,772	\$193,080	\$26,214	\$71,723	\$1,591,565	-3%
1996	10.07	\$833,025	\$405,755	\$301,091	\$7,796	\$191,792	\$1,739,458	9%
1997	12.444	\$858,357	\$29,661	\$26,746	\$12,415	\$915,884	\$1,843,063	6%
1998	24.374	\$910,200	\$521,373	\$70,666	\$82,939	\$306,589	\$1,891,766	3%
1999	38.338	\$1,341,853	\$608,678	\$253,252	\$29,477	\$520,698	\$2,753,958	46%
2000	44.616	\$1,025,586	\$320,973	\$491,411	\$127,276	\$139,958	\$2,105,204	-24%
2001	55.066	\$858,869	\$538,596	\$454,265	\$210,388	\$278,156	\$2,340,274	11.17%
Total(1989-2001)		\$9,890,392	\$4,080,194	\$2,506,885	\$680,491	\$3,125,382	\$20,283,343	


Percentage Allocation by Year (Zw\$)

Year	Disbursed to Communities (1)	Wildlife Management (2)	Council Levy (3)	Other (4)	Amount Not Allocated(5)	Total
1989	53.25%	23.29%	8.12%	3.44%	11.91%	100%
1990	37.08%	21.83%	9.44%	4.04%	27.61%	100%
1991	41.42%	28.34%	15.55%	7.35%	7.34%	100%
1992	49.43%	17.04%	9.48%	1.47%	22.58%	100%
1993	57.40%	24.06%	16.92%	2.17%	-0.55%	100%
1994	57.78%	19.15%	9.04%	2.59%	11.44%	100%
1995	59.49%	22.23%	12.13%	1.65%	4.51%	100%
1996	47.89%	23.33%	17.31%	0.45%	11.03%	100%
1997	46.57%	1.61%	1.45%	0.67%	49.69%	100%
1998	48.11%	27.56%	3.74%	4.38%	16.21%	100%
1999	48.72%	22.10%	9.20%	1.07%	18.91%	100%
2000	48.72%	15.25%	23.34%	6.05%	6.65%	100%
2001	36.70%	23.01%	19.41%	8.99%	11.89%	100%
Total(1989-2001)	45.88%	20.47%	14.57%	4.71%	14.36%	100%



- (1) Disbursed to communities - revenue allocated to sub-district CAMPFIRE institutions
- (2) Wildlife Management - revenue allocated for wildlife and programme management
- (3) Council Levy - revenue allocated to district council general account
- (4) Other - revenue invested in capital development projects and RDC levy to CAMPFIRE Association
- (5) Not Allocated - revenue not allocated but retained by RDC for general account
- (6) Mean annual exchange rate based on RBZ end of month exchange rates

Annex L2: Allocation of CAMPFIRE Revenues



Allocation of CAMPFIRE Revenues (%)



Annex L2: Allocation of CAMPFIRE Revenues to Communities, Management and RDCs



Annex L2: Source of CAMPFIRE Revenues



Annex L3: Allocation of CAMPFIRE Revenues Cumulated by District (1989-2001)

CAMPFIRE PROGRAMME: ALLOCATION OF REVENUE

GROSS ALLOCATION (ZW\$): 1989 - 2001

	TOTAL Income	Brought Forward	Total Resources	Disbursed	Management	Council	Other	Total Expenditure	Unallocated	Cumulative Unallocated
Beitbridge	7,595,194	4,340	7,599,534	3,906,364	2,104,286	1,129,963	46,000	R 7,186,613	408,580	412,920
Binga	41,186,777	502,458	41,689,235	19,348,505	9,020,239	2,376,215	5,786,562	R 36,531,522	4,655,255	5,157,713
Bulilimangwe	9,249,738	88,135	9,337,873	4,209,369	2,394,782	845,381	43,700	R 6,842,288	2,407,450	2,495,585
Gaza Khomanani	40,526,160	806,675	41,332,835	24,169,515	4,622,170	7,512,262	521,264	R 36,825,211	3,700,949	4,507,624
Gazaland	9,799,993	0	9,799,993	4,506,872	2,158,470	1,625,203	1,404,621	R 9,695,165	104,828	104,828
Gokwe N	30,904,347	135,570	31,039,917	5,790,680	2,397,099	2,308,723	221,295	R 10,717,797	20,186,550	20,322,120
Guruve	92,553,774	915,834	93,469,608	48,162,808	15,328,313	24,565,272	1,425,400	R 89,481,793	3,071,981	3,987,815
Hurungwe	35,390,316	119,958	35,510,274	18,770,012	7,440,070	4,120,549	1,275,290	R 31,605,921	3,784,394	3,904,352
Hwange	20,410,266	191,073	20,601,339	11,001,432	4,780,492	1,276,354	634,022	R 17,692,300	2,717,966	2,909,039
Muzarabani	8,284,904	-8554	8,276,350	3,215,739	2,047,682	779,142	266,726	R 6,309,289	1,975,615	1,967,061
Nyaminyami	134,290,627	10,045	134,300,672	53,503,661	39,853,477	14,753,992	9,148,189	R 117,259,318	17,031,309	17,041,354
Tsholotsho	24,988,924	504,184	25,493,108	13,309,679	1,697,299	5,887,568	49,809	R 20,944,355	4,044,569	4,548,753
Totals	R 455,181,021	R 3,269,718	R 458,450,739	R 209,894,637	R 93,844,378	R 67,180,624	R 20,822,878	R 391,091,573	64,089,448	67,359,166

Annex L4: Detailed Summary of Ward Revenues

SUMMARY OF WARD REVENUES (1989-2001)																
District	Ward	H/holds	Ward Dividend (US\$)													TOTAL
			1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
Exchange rate			2.126	2.472	3.752	5.112	6.529	8.212	8.724	10.027	12.444	24.775	38.338	44.616	55.066	55.066
Beitbridge	Chipise	775		29,935	5,156	5,657	3,214	11,293	7,004	6,630	9,703	3,480	10,016	8,517	4,520	105,125
	Diti II	1134			5,330	5,769			413	4,025	235		3,756			19,528
	Mtetengwe II	1658			3,998	4,617	5,881	14,902	5,955	1,652	5,547	8,199	9,587	5,621		65,960
	Maramani	721		405	7,230	10,368	4,725	3,854	6,247	4,063	1,279	3,109	1,422	639		43,340
	Masera	387		2,023		1,780				75				128		4,006
	Machuchuta	713				2,700	4,215	3,472	1,696	6,828	2,826		762	1,350		23,849
	Dendele								745			590				1,335
Binga wildlife area	Lubu	772			959	4,888	8,990	9,742	8,705	2,850	2,619	1,589	3,082	3,592	1,965	48,982
	Machesu	664		4,169	2,294	7,148	9,259	7,306	12,265	5,948	2,619	1,904	4,789	3,592	1,965	63,258
	Kariangwe	857		3,475	2,294	7,480	9,268	7,320	12,265		2,619	1,904	4,789	3,592	1,965	56,972
	Chinonge	1002		3,475	2,294	7,480	9,259	6,698	12,265	5,948	2,619	1,904	4,789	3,592	1,965	62,287
	Kabuba	995		3,474	2,294	8,663	6,196	8,196	12,265	5,948	2,619	1,904	4,787	3,477	1,965	61,787
	Sinansengwe	547		3,236	2,294	7,391	6,196	8,973	33,540	15,731	4,808	5,543	11,182	6,170	4,495	109,559
	Sinakoma	717		3,475	2,294	7,480	9,572	7,306	11,635	9,183	2,237	2,217	6,022	6,170	2,259	69,849
	Sikalenge	1054		3,475	2,294	4,066	11,933	6,430	11,635	9,183	2,237	2,217	30,826	3,477	2,259	90,031
	Tyunga	902		3,475	2,294	11,482	6,127	4,262	33,425	15,731	4,808	5,543	14,392	7,290	4,495	113,323
	Nabusenga	1577		3,475	2,294	7,978	7,338	7,306	12,265	15,731	4,808	5,543	11,182	6,170	4,495	88,584
	Nagangala	1044		3,475	2,294	7,978	8,800	7,306	33,425	15,731	4,808	5,543	11,171	6,170	4,495	111,196
	Sianzyundu	1236				2,719	4,779	2,070	2,426	928	402	995	26,992	2,144	1,411	44,866
	Simatelele	552				2,719	4,855	609	9,963	928	402	995	3,082	2,144	1,411	27,109
Binga non-wildlife area	Siachilaba	899				2,719	4,779	2,070	2,426	928	402	995	3,082	2,144	1,411	20,956
	Sinamagonde	1380				2,719	4,779	2,070	6,876	2,129	1,309	1,299	4,268	3,309	983	29,742
	Lubimbi	806				2,719	4,779	2,070	6,876	2,129	1,309	1,299	4,268	3,309	983	29,742
	Dobola	1234				2,719	4,999	2,070	12,252	5,948	2,619	1,589	4,789	3,592	1,965	42,542
	Pashu	816				2,719	3,798	2,241	6,876	2,129	1,309	1,614	4,268	3,309	983	29,247
	Tinde	811				1,252	3,798	2,070	2,426	928	402	995	3,082	2,144	1,411	18,508
	Saba-Lubanda	931				2,719	4,779	2,070	2,426	928	402	995	6,561	2,928	1,411	25,218
	Manjolo	873				2,719	4,779	2,070	2,426	928	402	995	30,809	2,144	1,411	48,683
	Gala	800			5,492	2,731	2,133	1,898	3,259	3,590		1,336	3,186	3,527		27,152
	Huwana	967			5,492	2,731	2,133	1,898	3,259	3,590		1,336	3,186	3,527		27,152
	Ndolwane	918			5,492	2,731	2,133	1,898	3,259	3,590		1,336	3,186	3,527		27,152
	Mukulela	1022			5,492	2,731	2,133	1,898	3,259	3,590		1,336	3,186	3,527		27,152
	Madlambudzi	808			5,492	2,731	2,133	1,898	3,259	3,590		1,336	3,186	3,527		27,152
Bulilimamangwe	Hingwe	823			5,492	2,731	2,133	1,898	3,259	3,590		222	3,186	3,527		26,039
	Bambadzi	840			5,492	2,731	2,133	1,898	3,259	3,590		1,336	3,186	3,527		27,152
	Sangulube	714										222				222
	Makorokoro	965										222				222
	Mahenye	849		6,007	15,618	27,220	24,200	17,727	16,110	17,677	36,890	21,609	49,818	33,229		266,104
	Mutandahwe	1581		5,833		9,781					274	2,480	7,133	4,131		29,632
	Xibhavahlengwe	1059							27,865	10,386	41,030	30,736	26,066	27,053	21,717	184,853
	Sengwe	784							12,743	10,730	13,165	30,281	28,338	12,053	8,147	115,459
	Maose-Xini	1591							11,607	12,634	20,515	21,653	8,689	12,232	19,362	106,691
	Batanai	1312							8,818	10,556	10,406	7,684	19,318	12,384	10,411	79,577
Chiredzi (Gaza Khomanani)	Twamanani	714							8,818	10,556	10,406	7,684	19,318	12,384	10,411	79,577
	Chibwedziva	1103							37,197	46,878	28,921	15,988	20,844	29,034	22,841	201,704
	Dzinzela	961											1,097	880	897	2,874
	Chitsa	762							1,789	6,062		24,819	7,225	6,462	10,652	57,009
	Mupinga	890							1,160			495	967	4,049	1,168	7,838
	Chichingwe												445	440	448	1,334

Annex L4: Detailed Summary of Ward Revenues

	Chikomedzi												1,078	1,075	1,090	3,243
Gokwe North	Simchembo 1	1491			14,490	8,922	13,694	12,892	8,686	5,126	4,130	4,780	2,184		3,321	78,224
	Simchembo 2											4,762	2,458		3,659	10,879
	Nenyunka A	1551			8,360	8,908	13,064	9,602	23,557	4,457	3,591	7,129	7,768		10,361	96,796
	Nenyunka B											1,544	1,297		2,587	5,428
	Madzivazvido 1	1945			9,959	10,471	12,862	21,593	9,823	5,370	4,327	4,711	14,844		10,607	104,567
	Madzivazvido 2											5,818	5,388		6,180	17,387
	Chireya I	3709			5,161	8,885	3,410	3,606	2,741	1,043	840	1,416	3,399		4,538	35,038
	Chireya 5	704					5,291	4,634	4,858	4,963	3,999	1,023	1,242		2,339	28,349
	Chireya 6											2,780	5,231		636	8,647
	Gumunyu 2	979					767	1,218	1,662	708	571	945	1,242		1,090	8,201
	Gumunyu 3	763					767	1,218	1,916	708	571	945	1,242		1,090	8,455
	Gumunyu 4	979					767	1,218	1,662	708	571	945	1,242		1,090	8,201
	Nechinyika	704					3,410	1,279	1,662	708	571	924	1,242		1,090	10,884
	Nyaurungwe	690					767	1,218	2,339	1,258	1,014	906	1,242		1,090	9,833
Gokwe South	Masuka	1064			4,797		1,898		1,377							8,072
	Jahana	916				1,745	1,820		2,274							5,838
	Nemangwe V	1650			1,599		393		170							2,161
	Sai/Mangidi	1946			6,397	704	589									7,690
	Sai 2								729							729
	Sai 3								191							191
	Sai 4								137							137
	Sai/Sengwa	1784			4,264	2,940	196									7,401
	Jiri	2324			533		131									664
	Huchu	527			4,797				379							5,176
	Chapoto	309	24,935	13,784	11,832	17,887	34,154	40,000	39,105	34,212	32,144		20,891	49,995	39,935	358,875
Guruve	Chisunga	529	35,384	31,897	20,358	27,853	63,551	65,442	76,507	89,071	69,930		50,594	57,722	63,050	651,360
	Neshangwe	1702		3,275	1,316	6,017	5,961	7,538		6,997	7,873		4,019		5,698	48,693
	Chiriwo	441		3,275	364	10,932	15,463	41,688	15,617	12,770	16,462		8,541	9,934	12,809	147,855
	Matsiwo A	983		3,275				1,218	836							5,329
	Chitsungu	1972	4,704	3,275	361	1,230	6,507	7,789	22,445		7,390		553	12,857	1,845	68,956
	Matsiwo B	1257		3,275				1,218								4,493
	Neshangwe 9	851					108	1,408	2,509	8,885	4,825				4,070	21,806
	Kanyurira	350	28,112	31,622	23,799	54,084	70,439	77,848	60,361	65,904	59,378	88,304	56,160	108,787	76,243	801,042
	Mutota	1457					383	609	828					71		1,891
	Mukwena	2624					383	609								992
	Chundu	1731				42,393	28,796	16,712			15,103	13,616	13,129	21,769	23,314	174,831
	Karuru	886				4,890	6,561	11,303						1,022	605	24,382
	Kazangarare	3000				13,347	15,996	16,767			10,629	9,441	6,063	10,558		82,801
Hurungwe	Chidamoyo	1923				1,708	4,331		287			348	714	2,555	18,644	28,585
	Rengwe	1542				637	919	11,593	5,928	6,458	3,621	5,210	5,749	8,157	14,238	62,510
	Dandahwa	2422				7,621	1,960		5,177	2,296						17,054
	Nyaodza							5,320			3,069	10,294	8,168	13,116	18,216	58,183
	Nyamakate	644				20,262	15,031		24,878	18,654	16,105	28,859	18,661	26,778	28,089	197,316
	Ward 8								27,487	22,736						9,450
	Ward 9								10,804	10,820						7,195
	Chidobe	667					1,915	1,679	2,598	2,444	3,827	4,826	6,678	4,436	6,077	34,480
	Sidinda	646					6,151	5,778	9,577	8,458	3,405	4,048	9,096	5,264	6,894	58,671
	Jambezi	427					140	1,131	2,497	1,331	1,449	1,095	4,143	5,154	2,450	19,390
Hwange	Kachecheti	623					182	1,131	3,644	4,351	1,940	1,072	4,285	2,021	2,481	21,107
	Nemananga	594					182	1,131	2,497	2,114	3,839	1,203	4,260	1,970	2,481	19,677
	Simangani	913					3,868	3,722	5,990	3,536	3,246	3,209	8,114	4,507	3,440	39,634
	Mabale	1235						1,290	9,171	1,267	2,414	2,260	8,505	1,857	2,450	29,215

Annex L4: Detailed Summary of Ward Revenues

	Nekatombe	916						1,608	7,320	1,267	3,348	1,072	6,677	1,857	2,450	25,599
	Mbizha	633						1,131	2,391	1,267	1,411	1,072	4,118	1,857	2,450	15,696
	Silewu	920						4,426	2,391	1,267	5,731	3,364	4,118	1,857	2,450	35,326
	Nekabandama I	713						1,131	2,391	2,385	1,411	1,072	4,118	1,857	2,450	16,815
	Nekabandama II	746						3,201	2,391	1,267	1,411	1,072	4,483	1,857	2,450	18,132
	Lupote	131						3,241	2,391	2,944	3,347	2,260	4,118	1,857	2,450	22,608
	Makwandara	690						1,131	2,391	1,267	1,411	1,072	4,118	1,857	2,450	15,696
	Chikandakubi	600				268		1,290	2,391	1,267	1,411	1,072	4,118	1,857	2,450	16,123
	Dete	384											6,633	3,436	8,470	18,540
Muzarabani	Kapembere	913				766	895				4,757		1,688	71		8,177
	Chadereka	851				766	1,382				341		254	71		2,814
	Hoya	1075				766	895				341		254	71		2,327
	Machaya	1382				766	895	2,619			341		257	71	322	5,271
	Muzarabani	1078				766	5,459	115			3,755			71	645	24,542
	Gutsa	302				766	5,894	15,114			1,442		612	71		10,661
	Hwatsa	1024				766	895	1,923			4,938		1,746	71	322	3,015
	Chawarura	1024				766	895				341		942	71		3,515
	Chiweshe	905				766	898				341		144	1,367		5,753
	Maringazuva												4,064	1,367	322	1,890
	Utete												200	1,367	322	273
	Dambakurima												202	71		215
	Mutemakungu												144	71		215
	Sone												144	71		215
Nyaminyami	Gatshe Gatshe	316	7,761	3,270	4,531	6,814	14,013	10,232	3,353	1,174	265	14,987	19,224	21,854	21,670	129,148
	Kanyati B	545	7,761	3,270	4,531	6,814				4,052	2,354	2,383	2,521	2,653	1,019	37,357
	Kanyati A	340	7,761	3,270	4,531	6,814	16,630	99,633	65,821	4,052	2,354	2,383	3,190	5,463	5,009	226,911
	Musambakaruma A	469	7,761	3,270	4,531	5,789	4,527	31,671	1,074	8,278	14,646	29,137	20,955	21,103	8,268	161,010
	Musambakaruma B	217	7,761	3,270	4,531	1,929	6,626	6,838	3,912	2,839	1,125	2,383	14,115	684	1,124	57,137
	Nebiri A	245	7,761	3,270	4,531	5,789	8,531	8,273	3,512	4,861	5,107	28,230	48,395	61,758	18,756	208,774
	Nebiri B	737	7,761	3,270	4,531	5,789	8,840	26,074	9,841	9,035	12,081	23,393	46,433	51,208	21,492	229,749
	Negande A	267	7,761	3,270	4,531	3,216	2,505	9,756	3,880	5,702	2,682	18,602	24,504	19,695	4,021	110,124
	Negande B	724	7,761	3,270	4,531	1,929	4,680	8,819	3,975	4,854	3,429	25,600	11,654	14,459	8,779	103,741
	Mola A	684	7,761	3,270	4,531	28,300	38,159	14,382	57,341	26,135	37,398	53,416	55,393	54,736	45,978	426,799
	Mola B	757	7,761	3,270	4,531	11,577	51,293	7,749	1,911	10,252	25,727	57,477	55,918	66,155	21,238	324,857
	Chalala	419	7,291	3,270	4,531	6,814	8,832	2,973	1,911	4,052						39,672
	Ward01	658		11,742	12,220	17,850	27,487	10,809	15,078	18,382	16,901			7,154		137,623
	Ward02	950		6,826	5,664	9,536	6,637	1,598	4,025	3,927	2,411			6,966		47,591
	Ward03	895		23,210	23,787	16,751	19,768	10,122	23,689	18,487	10,416			6,966		153,197
Tsholotsho	Ward04	593		6,826	5,664	6,358	6,890	1,598	4,298	3,927	2,411			6,966		44,938
	Ward06													6,966		6,966
	Ward07	978		15,837	16,839	11,085	26,688	13,188	3,762	18,444	14,089			7,154		127,086
	Ward08	1527		4,915	3,776	3,260	10,163	4,261	5,178	6,582	5,093			7,154		50,383
	Ward09							1,598	2,064	3,927	2,411			7,154		17,154
	Ward10													7,154		7,154
	Total count		16	41	57	74	98	101	111	96	98	92	112	108	94	146
	Average ward dividend		11,612	6,870	5,972	8,143	8,250	8,426	9,649	8,261	7,253	7,808	9,650	9,563	7,995	63,207
	Total devolved to wards		185,797	281,678	340,382	602,611	808,468	851,032	1,070,998	793,012	710,766	718,291	1,080,776	1,032,801	751,568	9,228,181
	Number of benefiting h/holds		7,861	22,084	52,465	70,311	90,475	96,437	98,964	85,543	93,605	80,498	95,726	88,072	76,863	
	Summary disbursed		186,268	206,308	320,808	691,342	851,732	949,161	933,844	836,636	858,357	895,468	1,287,893	1,025,586	260,061	
	Difference		-470	75,370	19,574	-88,731	-43,264	-98,129	137,155	-43,623	-147,591	-177,177	-207,116	7,214	491,507	
	% error		-0.25%	26.76%	5.75%	-14.72%	-5.35%	-11.53%	12.81%	-5.50%	-20.77%	-24.67%	-19.16%	0.70%	65.40%	
	Median		7,761	3,474	4,531	5,789	4,779	3,472	3,880	4,057	2,947	2,217	4,268	3,592	2,481	

Annex L5: Household Dividend by Ward by Year (USD)

Household Benefits (US\$)

District	Ward	H/holds	per household(US\$)													TOTAL
			1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
Beitbridge	Chipise	775		38.63	6.65	7.30	4.15	14.57	9.04	8.55	12.52	4.49	12.92	10.99	5.83	135.64
	Diti II	1134			4.70	5.09			0.36	3.55	0.21		3.31			17.22
	Mtetengwe II	1658			2.41	2.78	3.55	8.99	3.59	1.00	3.35	4.95	5.78	3.39		39.78
	Maramani	721		0.56	10.03	14.38	6.55	5.35	8.66	5.64	1.77	4.31	1.97	0.89		60.11
	Masera	387		5.23		4.60				0.20				0.33		10.35
	Machuchuta	713				3.79	5.91	4.87	2.38	9.58	3.96	1.07	1.89			33.45
	Dendele															0.00
Binga wildlife area	Lubu	772			1.23	6.26	11.51	12.47	11.15	3.65	3.35	2.06	3.99	4.65	2.55	62.87
	Machesu	664		6.22	3.42	10.67	13.82	10.91	18.31	8.88	3.91	2.87	7.21	5.41	2.96	94.58
	Kariangwe	857		4.03	2.66	8.67	10.74	8.48	14.21		3.03	2.22	5.59	4.19	2.29	66.12
	Chinonge	1002		3.44	2.27	7.41	9.17	6.63	12.14	5.89	2.59	1.90	4.78	3.59	1.96	61.77
	Kabuba	995		3.47	2.29	8.65	6.18	8.18	12.24	5.94	2.61	1.91	4.81	3.49	1.97	61.75
	Sinansengwe	547		5.84	4.14	13.34	11.18	16.20	60.54	28.40	8.68	10.13	20.44	11.28	8.22	198.39
	Sinakoma	717		4.79	3.16	10.30	13.18	10.06	16.03	12.65	3.08	3.09	8.40	8.60	3.15	96.50
	Sikalenge	1054		3.27	2.16	3.82	11.23	6.05	10.95	8.64	2.10	2.10	29.25	3.30	2.14	85.01
	Tyunga	902		2.53	1.67	8.36	4.46	3.10	24.34	11.46	3.50	6.14	15.96	8.08	4.98	94.60
	Nabusenga	1577		2.26	1.49	5.19	4.78	4.76	7.99	10.24	3.13	3.51	7.09	3.91	2.85	57.21
	Nagangala	1044		3.30	2.18	7.57	8.35	6.93	31.71	14.93	4.56	5.31	10.70	5.91	4.31	105.75
Binga non-wildlife area	Sianzyundu	1236				2.17	3.81	1.65	1.94	0.74	0.32	0.81	21.84	1.73	1.14	36.15
	Simatelele	552				2.81	5.02	0.63	10.29	0.96	0.42	1.80	5.58	3.88	2.56	33.95
	Siachilaba	899				3.00	5.27	2.28	2.67	1.02	0.44	1.11	3.43	2.38	1.57	23.18
	Sinamagonde	1380				1.98	3.49	1.51	5.02	1.55	0.96	0.94	3.09	2.40	0.71	21.66
	Lubimbi	806				3.35	5.89	2.55	8.47	2.62	1.61	1.61	5.30	4.11	1.22	36.72
	Dobola	1234				2.18	4.01	1.66	9.82	4.77	2.10	1.29	3.88	2.91	1.59	34.22
	Pashu	816				3.30	4.62	2.72	8.36	2.59	1.59	1.98	5.23	4.06	1.20	35.64
	Tinde	811				1.53	4.65	2.53	2.97	1.14	0.49	1.23	3.80	2.64	1.74	22.72
	Saba-Lubanda	931				2.90	5.09	2.20	2.58	0.99	0.43	1.07	7.05	3.15	1.52	26.97
	Manjolo	873				3.09	5.43	2.35	2.76	1.05	0.46	1.14	35.29	2.46	1.62	55.64
Bulilimamangwe	Gala	800			6.87	3.41	2.67	2.37	4.07	4.49		1.67	3.98	4.41		33.94
	Huwana	967			5.37	2.67	2.09	1.86	3.19	3.51		1.38	3.30	3.65		27.02
	Ndolwane	918			5.68	2.82	2.21	1.96	3.37	3.71		1.46	3.47	3.84		28.52
	Mukulela	1022			6.54	3.25	2.54	2.26	3.88	4.27		1.31	3.12	3.45		30.62
	Madlambudzi	808			6.80	3.38	2.64	2.35	4.03	4.44		1.65	3.94	4.37		33.60
	Hingwe	823			5.98	2.97	2.32	2.07	3.55	3.91		0.27	3.87	4.29		29.24
	Bambadzi	840			7.70	3.83	2.99	2.66	4.57	5.04		1.59	3.79	4.20		36.37
	Sangulube	714										0.31				0.31
	Makorokoro	965										0.23				0.23
Chipinge (Gazaland)	Mahenye	849		7.08	18.40	32.06	28.50	20.88	18.98	20.82	43.45	25.45	58.68	39.14		313.43
	Mutandahwe	1581		3.69		6.19					0.17	1.57	4.51	2.61		18.74

Annex L5: Household Dividend by Ward by Year (USD)

Chiredzi (Gaza Khomanani)	Xibhavahlengwe	1059						26.31	9.81	38.74	29.02	24.61	25.55	20.51	174.55
	Sengwe	784						16.25	13.69	16.79	38.62	36.15	15.37	10.39	147.27
	Maose-Xini	1591						7.30	7.94	12.89	13.61	5.46	7.69	12.17	67.06
	Batanai	1312						6.72	8.05	7.93	5.86	14.72	9.44	7.94	60.65
	Twamanani	714						12.35	14.78	14.57	10.76	27.06	17.34	14.58	111.45
	Chibwedziva	1103						33.72	42.50	26.22	14.50	18.90	26.32	20.71	182.87
	Dzinzela	961										1.14	0.92	0.93	2.99
	Chitsa	762						2.35	7.95		32.57	9.48	8.48	13.98	74.82
	Mupinga	890						1.30			0.56	1.09	4.55	1.31	8.81
	Chichingwe														0.00
	Chikombedzi														0.00
	Simchembo 1	1491		9.72	5.98	9.18	8.65	5.83	3.44	2.77	3.21	1.46		2.23	52.46
	Simchembo 2														0.00
Gokwe North	Nenyunka A	1551		5.39	5.74	8.42	6.19	15.19	2.87	2.32	4.60	5.01		6.68	62.41
	Nenyunka B														0.00
	Madzivazvido 1	1945		5.12	5.38	6.61	11.10	5.05	2.76	2.22	2.42	7.63		5.45	53.76
	Madzivazvido 2														0.00
	Chireya 1	3709		1.39	2.40	0.92	0.97	0.74	0.28	0.23	0.38	0.92		1.22	9.45
	Chireya 5	704				7.52	6.58	6.90	7.05	5.68	1.45	1.76		3.32	40.27
	Chireya 6														0.00
	Gumunyu 2	979				0.78	1.24	1.70	0.72	0.58	0.96	1.27		1.11	8.38
	Gumunyu 3	763				1.01	1.60	2.51	0.93	0.75	1.24	1.63		1.43	11.08
	Gumunyu 4	979				0.78	1.24	1.70	0.72	0.58	0.96	1.27		1.11	8.38
	Nechinyika	704				4.84	1.82	2.36	1.01	0.81	1.31	1.76		1.55	15.46
	Nyaurungwe	690				1.11	1.76	3.39	1.82	1.47	1.31	1.80		1.58	14.25
	Masuka	1064		4.51		1.78		1.29							7.59
	Jahana	916			1.90	1.99		2.48							6.37
Gokwe South	Nemangwe V	1650		0.97		0.24		0.10							1.31
	Sai/Mangidi	1946		3.29	0.36	0.30									3.95
	Sai 2														0.00
	Sai 3														0.00
	Sai 4														4.15
	Sai/Sengwa	1784		2.39	1.65	0.11									0.29
	Jiri	2324		0.23		0.06									9.82
	Huchu	527		9.10				0.72							

Annex L5: Household Dividend by Ward by Year (USD)

Guruvu	Chapoto	309	80.70	44.61	38.29	57.89	110.53	129.45	126.55	110.72	104.03		67.61	161.80	129.24	1,161.41
	Chisunga	529	66.89	60.30	38.48	52.65	120.13	123.71	144.63	168.38	132.19		95.64	109.11	119.19	1,231.30
	Neshangwe	1702		1.92	0.77	3.54	3.50	4.43		4.11	4.63		2.36		3.35	28.61
	Chiriwo	441		7.43	0.83	24.79	35.06	94.53	35.41	28.96	37.33		19.37	22.53	29.05	335.27
	Matsiwo A	983		3.33				1.24	0.85				0.28	6.52	0.94	34.97
	Chitsungo	1972	2.39	1.66	0.18	0.62	3.30	3.95	11.38			3.75				3.57
	Matsiwo B	1257		2.61				0.97								4.78
	Neshangwe 9	851					0.13	1.65	2.95	10.44	5.67					25.62
	Kanyurira	350	234.27	263.52	198.32	450.70	586.99	648.74	503.01	549.20	494.82	252.30	160.46	310.82	217.84	4,870.97
	Mutota	1457					0.26	0.42	0.57							1.30
	Mukwena	2624					0.15	0.23								0.38
	Chundu	1731				24.49	16.64	9.65			8.72	7.87	7.58	12.58	13.47	101.00
	Karuru	886				5.52	7.41	12.76						1.15	0.68	27.52
	Kazangarare	3000				4.45	5.33	5.59			3.54	3.15	2.02	3.52		27.60
	Hurungwe	Chidamoyo	1923				0.89	2.25		0.15			0.18	0.37	1.33	9.70
Rengwe		1542				0.41	0.60	7.52	3.84	4.19	2.35	3.38	3.73	5.29	9.23	40.54
Dandahwa		2422				3.15	0.81		2.14	0.95						7.04
Nyaodza																0.00
Nyamakate																306.39
Ward 8																0.00
Ward 9																0.00
Chidobe		667					1.32	1.16	1.79	1.69	2.64	7.24	10.01	6.65	9.11	41.60
Sidinda		646					17.57	16.51	27.36	24.17	9.73	6.27	14.08	8.15	10.67	134.51
Jambezi		427					0.16	1.32	2.90	1.55	1.68	2.56	9.70	12.07	5.74	37.69
Kachecheti		623					0.21	1.33	4.29	5.12	2.28	1.72	6.88	3.24	3.98	29.06
Nemananga		594					0.23	1.41	3.12	2.64	4.80	2.02	7.17	3.32	4.18	28.89
Simangani		913					5.83	5.61	9.02	5.33	4.89	3.51	8.89	4.94	3.77	51.77
Mabale		1235						1.91	13.59	1.88	3.58	1.83	6.89	1.50	1.98	33.16
Hwange		Nekatambe	916						2.40	10.93	1.89	5.00	1.17	7.29	2.03	2.67
	Mbizha	633						0.87	1.84	0.97	1.09	1.69	6.51	2.93	3.87	19.77
	Silewu	920						1.97	1.06	0.56	2.55	3.66	4.48	4.44	10.81	29.52
	Nekabandama I	713						3.14	6.64	6.62	3.92	1.50	5.78	2.60	3.44	33.65
	Nekabandama II	746						8.38	6.26	3.32	3.69	1.44	6.01	2.49	3.28	34.87
	Lupote	131						2.16	1.59	1.96	2.23	17.25	31.43	14.17	18.70	89.51
	Makwandara	690						1.64	3.47	1.84	2.04	1.55	5.97	2.69	3.55	22.75
	Chikandakubi	600					0.37	1.79	3.32	1.76	1.96	1.79	6.86	3.09	4.08	25.03
	Dete	384											17.27	8.95	22.06	48.28

Annex L5: Household Dividend by Ward by Year (USD)

Muzarabani	Kapembere	913					0.84	0.98			5.21		1.85	0.08		8.96
	Chadereka	851					0.90	1.62			0.40		0.30	0.08		3.31
	Hoya	1075					0.71	0.83			0.32		0.24	0.07		2.16
	Machaya	1382					0.55	0.65	1.90		0.25		0.19	0.05	0.23	3.81
	Muzarabani	1078					0.71	5.06	0.11		3.48			0.07		9.43
	Gutsa	302					2.54	19.52	50.05		4.77		2.02	0.24	2.13	81.27
	Hwatsa	1024					0.75	0.87	1.88		4.82		1.71	0.07	0.31	10.41
	Chawarura	1024					0.75	0.87			0.33		0.92	0.07		2.94
	Chiweshe	905					0.85	0.99			0.38		0.16	1.51		3.88
	Maringazuva															0.00
	Utete															0.00
	Dambakurima															0.00
	Mutemakungu															0.00
	Sone															0.00
Nyaminyami	Gatshe Gatshe	316	19.60	8.26	11.44	17.21	35.39	25.84	8.47	2.96	0.67	47.43	60.83	69.16	68.58	375.83
	Kanyati B	545	14.90	6.28	8.70	13.08				7.78	4.52	4.37	4.63	4.87	1.87	70.98
	Kanyati A	340	19.21	8.09	11.22	16.87	41.16	246.62	162.92	10.03	5.83	7.01	9.38	16.07	14.73	569.14
	Musambakaruma A	469	27.62	11.64	16.12	20.60	16.11	112.71	3.82	29.46	52.12	62.13	44.68	45.00	17.63	459.63
	Musambakaruma B	217	31.29	13.18	18.27	7.78	26.72	27.57	15.77	11.45	4.54	10.98	65.04	3.15	5.18	240.94
	Nebiri A	245	40.85	17.21	23.85	30.47	44.90	43.54	18.48	25.58	26.88	115.23	197.53	252.08	76.56	913.14
	Nebiri B	737	16.55	6.97	9.66	12.34	18.85	55.60	20.98	19.26	25.76	31.74	63.00	69.48	29.16	379.36
	Negande A	267	14.21	5.99	8.30	5.89	4.59	17.87	7.11	10.44	4.91	69.67	91.77	73.76	15.06	329.58
	Negande B	724	32.34	13.62	18.88	8.04	19.50	36.75	16.56	20.23	14.29	35.36	16.10	19.97	12.13	263.76
	Mola A	684	8.60	3.63	5.02	31.37	42.30	15.94	63.57	28.97	41.46	78.09	80.98	80.02	67.22	547.20
	Mola B	757	10.57	4.45	6.17	15.77	69.88	10.56	2.60	13.97	35.05	75.93	73.87	87.39	28.05	434.27
	Chalala	419														0.00
	Ward01	658		17.84	18.57	27.13	41.77	16.43	22.91	27.94	25.69			10.87		209.15
	Ward02	950		7.19	5.96	10.04	6.99	1.68	4.24	4.13	2.54			7.33		50.10
Tsholotsho	Ward03	895		25.93	26.58	18.72	22.09	11.31	26.47	20.66	11.64			7.78		171.17
	Ward04	593		11.51	9.55	10.72	11.62	2.70	7.25	6.62	4.07			11.75		75.78
	Ward06															0.00
	Ward07	978		16.19	17.22	11.33	27.29	13.48	3.85	18.86	14.41			7.32		129.95
	Ward08	1527		3.22	2.47	2.14	6.66	2.79	3.39	4.31	3.34			4.69		32.99
	Ward09															
	Ward10															
	Total Count		15	40	56	73	97	98	103	92	96	86	100	97	83	145
	Average Household Benefit		41.33	16.52	11.62	15.87	17.01	20.35	18.54	16.99	14.80	13.65	17.49	18.82	14.68	
	Median		19.60	6.11	5.82	5.74	4.65	2.95	5.05	4.90	3.49	2.16	5.78	4.37	3.87	
	Standard Deviation		55.58	41.38	26.53	52.43	61.33	71.94	54.42	59.77	52.86	33.00	31.16	45.82	31.91	
	Minimum Value		2.39	0.56	0.18	0.36	0.06	0.23	0.10	0.20	0.17	0.18	0.16	0.05	0.23	
	Maximum Value		234.27	263.52	198.32	450.70	586.99	648.74	503.01	549.20	494.82	252.30	197.53	310.82	217.84	

Annex L6: CAMPFIRE Revenues and Beneficiaries

CAMPFIRE Revenues and Beneficiaries				
Year	Total Income USD	Number of Districts	Number of Wards	Number of Households
1989	348,811	3	15	7,861
1990	556,433	9	41	22,084
1991	776,021	11	57	52,456
1992	1,216,678	12	74	70,311
1993	1,483,873	12	98	90,475
1994	1,642,671	14	101	96,437
1995	1,591,567	14	111	98,964
1996	1,755,912	19	96	85,543
1997	1,837,438	17	98	93,605
1998	1,891,766	15	92	80,498
1999	2,753,958	16	112	95,726
2000	2,105,204	14	108	88,072
2001	2,328,452	14	94	76,683
	20,288,784			

Source: WWF Database

Annex M:

NRMP Project Financial Data

Summary NRMP II Expenditure					
Agency	Budget		Expenditure		Percent
	USAID/Zim	Regional	Actual	Variance	
WWF/DNPWLM		1,500,000	1,500,000	-	9%
ZimTrust/CA		1,950,000	1,950,000	-	11%
CASS/Action		1,050,000	1,050,000	-	6%
DA	5,351,148		4,943,523	407,625	28%
WWF LT Grants	1,551,348		1,542,099	9,249	9%
WWF ST Grants	18,064		-	18,064	0%
CASS Grant	743,950		743,950	-	4%
CA Grant	1,567,852		1,567,852	-	9%
ZimTrust Grant	943,002		943,002	-	5%
SAFIRE Grant	153,028		153,028	-	1%
Other Grants	61,281		-	61,281	0%
Sales tax refund			(17,439)	17,439	0%
RDC ICB (approx)	2,000,000		2,000,000	-	11%
CDF	2,000,000		1,198,727	801,273	7%
	14,389,674	4,500,000	17,574,743	1,314,931	

Summary of Grants Administered through Development Associates in NRMP II						
DA CONTRACT	Amounts in US\$					
	Funds allocated Per AID/IC Contract Agreement	Obligated to Contract	Funds not Obligated to Contract	Expenditures for 03-Mar	Total Expenditures to date	Remaining Unexpended Obligated Amount
- for DA/PW operations	5,351,148.00	5,351,148.00	0	33,820.73	4,943,522.56	407,625.44
- for WWF Long Term Grant	1,551,348.47	1,551,348.47	0	0	1,542,099.27	9,249.20
- for WWF Short term Grants	18,063.80	18,063.80	0	0	0	18,063.80
- for CASS	743,950.23	743,950.23	0	0	743,950.23	0
- for CA	1,567,852.41	1,567,852.41	0	0	1,567,852.41	0
- for ZIMTRUST	943,001.86	943,001.86	0	0	943,001.86	0
- for SAFIRE	153,028.09	153,028.09	0	0	153,028.09	0
- for RDCs	3,287,554.47	3,287,554.47	0	15,754.14	3,198,727.42	88,827.05
- for s/tax refunds					-17,438.62	17,438.62
- for RDC/CDF Grant Allocation	712,445.53	712,445.53	0	0	0	712,445.53
- for Support Grant Allocation	61,281.14	61,281.14	0	0	0	61,281.14
Total	14,389,674.00	14,389,674.00	0	49,574.87	13,074,743.22	1,314,930.78

Summary of Regional Component of NRMP					
	FY 89-94	FY 94-99	LOP	Actual	Variance
Wildlife Conservation (WWF, DNPWLM)	1,481,500	1,500,000	2,981,500	3221205	-239,705
Community Development (ZIMTRUST, CAMPFIRE Assoc.)	4,180,500	1,950,000	6,130,500	6130500	0
Regional Communication and Training (ART)	899,295	0	899,295	965622	-66,327
Planning and Applied Research (CASS, Action Magazine)	699,000	1,050,000	1,749,000	1749000	0
Audit and Evaluation	100,000		100,000	29285	70,715
Contingency	239,705		239,705		239,705
	7,600,000	4,500,000	12,100,000	12,095,612	4,388

Annex M: Data Summarising NRMP Finances

Summary of USAID Disbursements for NRMP II (as at June 2003)									
COMMITMENT DESCRIPTION	Grantee	Administrative Contracts	Management	Community Development	Wildlife Conservation	Regional Communication and Training	Studies and evaluations	Direct Grants	TOTAL
Committed in Project Document		4,100,000	1,048,707	7,603,889	1,108,857	513,277	249,959	975,042	15,599,731
Actual Disbursement (June 2003)		4,034,451	852,255	6,383,039	1,091,642	452,652	243,081	901,055	13,958,175
Variance		65,549	196,452	1,220,850	17,215	60,625	6,878	73,987	1,641,556
USAID	Costs	-	636,065	-	-	-	-	-	636,065
	Studies	-	-	-	-	10,018	243,081	-	253,099
Development Associates	DA	4,034,451	-	1,913,279	-	-	-	-	5,947,730
	CDF	-	-	2,986,962	-	-	-	-	2,986,962
	WWF	-	-	-	1,086,156	-	-	-	1,086,156
	CASS	-	-	-	-	-	-	401,055	401,055
Direct Grants from USAID	CA	-	216,190	-	230	16,522	-	-	232,942
	ZimTrust	-	-	1,452,591	-	425,451	-	500,000	2,378,042
	DNR	-	-	10,845	-	-	-	-	10,845
	FC	-	-	9,988	-	661	-	-	10,649
	MLG	-	-	9,374	5,256	-	-	-	14,630
Total Disbursement		4,034,451	852,255	6,383,039	1,091,642	452,652	243,081	901,055	13,958,175

Summary of USAID / Zimbabwe Disbursements to NRMP II														
COMMITMENT DESCRIPTION	COMMITTED	DISBURSED	USAID		Development Associates				Direct Grants from USAID					Total Grant
			Costs	Studies	DA	CDF	WWF	CASS	CA	ZimTrust	DNR	FC	MLG	
Administrative Contracts	4,100,000	4,034,451	0	0	4,034,451	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,034,451
USAID Management	1,048,707	852,255	636,065	0	0	0	0	0	216,190	0	0	0	0	852,255
Community Development	7,603,889	6,383,039	0	0	1,913,279	2,986,962	0	0	0	1,452,591	10,845	9,988	9,374	6,383,039
Wildlife Conservation	1,108,857	1,091,642	0	0	0	0	1,086,156	0	230	0	0	0	5,256	1,091,642
Regiounal Communication and Training	513,277	452,652	0	10,018	0	0	0	0	16,522	425,451	0	661	0	452,652
Studies and evaluations	249,959	243,081		243081	0	0	0		0		0	0	0	243,081
Direct Grants	975,042	901,055						401,055		500,000				901,055
TOTAL	15,599,731	13,958,175	636,065	253,099	5,947,730	2,986,962	1,086,156	401,055	232,942	2,378,042	10,845	10,649	14,630	13,958,175

Summary of USAID Disbursements for NRMP II (as at June 2003)									
COMMITMENT DESCRIPTION	Grantee	Administrative Contracts	Management	Community Development	Wildlife Conservation	Regional Comms and Training	Studies and evaluations	Direct Grants	TOTAL
ProjectBudget		4,100,000	1,048,707	7,603,889	1,108,857	513,277	249,959	975,042	15,599,731
Disbursement (June 2003)		4,034,451	852,255	6,383,039	1,091,642	452,652	243,081	901,055	13,958,175
Variance		65,549	196,452	1,220,850	17,215	60,625	6,878	73,987	1,641,556
USAID	Costs	-	636,065	-	-	-	-	-	636,065
	Studies	-	-	-	-	10,018	243,081	-	253,099
Development	DA	4,034,451	-	1,913,279	-	-	-	-	5,947,730
Associates	CDF	-	-	2,986,962	-	-	-	-	2,986,962
	WWF	-	-	-	1,086,156	-	-	-	1,086,156
	CASS	-	-	-	-	-	-	401,055	401,055
Direct Grants	CA	-	216,190	-	230	16,522	-	-	232,942
from USAID	ZimTrust	-	-	1,452,591	-	425,451	-	500,000	2,378,042
	DNR	-	-	10,845	-	-	-	-	10,845
	FC	-	-	9,988	-	661	-	-	10,649
	MLG	-	-	9,374	5,256	-	-	-	14,630
Total Disbursement		4,034,451	852,255	6,383,039	1,091,642	452,652	243,081	901,055	13,958,175

NRMP INVESTMENTS INITIALLY PLANNED (in '000 USD)			
Activity Category	NRMP I	NRMP II	TOTAL LOP
Wildlife Conservation (WWF, DNPWLM)	1,277	3,070	4,347
Community Development (ZIMTRUST, CAMPFIRE Assoc.)	3,900	3,915	7,815
Community Funds (Community Projects and RDC develop.)	0	6,000	6,000
Regional Communication and Training (ART)	899	1,200	2,099
Planning and Applied Research (CASS, Action Magazine)	700	2,110	2,810
Administrative Contract (Institutional Contractor)	0	2,675	2,675
USAID Management	0	1,250	1,250
Audit	100	80	180
Evaluation	0	200	200
Contingency	344		344
Inflation	380		380
TOTALS	7,600	20,500	28,100

Summary of Regional Component of NRMP					
	FY 89-94	FY 94-99	LOP	Actual	Variance
Wildlife Conservation (WWF, DNPWLM)	1,481,500	1,500,000	2,981,500	3221205	-239,705
Community Development (ZIMTRUST, CAMPFIRE Assoc.)	4,180,500	1,950,000	6,130,500	6130500	0
Regional Communication and Training (ART)	899,295	0	899,295	965622	-66,327
Planning and Applied Research (CASS, Action Magazine)	699,000	1,050,000	1,749,000	1749000	0
Audit and Evaluation	100,000		100,000	29285	70,715
Contingency	239,705		239,705		239,705
	7,600,000	4,500,000	12,100,000	12,095,612	4,388

Summary of NRMP II Budget Source: NRMP Amendment Number Two										
Institutions	Inst. Strengtheni ng	Natural Resource Manageme	Long term TA	Short Term TA	Training	Commoditi es	Operations/ Overheads	Audit	Evaluation	TOTALS
IC	0	0	1,000	450	25	250	950	0	0	2,675
CDF	3,000	3,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,000
CA	0	0	0	625	350	435	340	0	0	1,750
ZimTrust	0	0	0	525	340	350	750	0	0	1,965
ART	0	0	0	500	250	150	300	0	0	1,200
Action	0	0	0	200	600	180	80	0	0	1,060
WWF	0	0	0	500	450	120	500	0	0	1,570
CASS	0	0	0	500	200	250	100	0	0	1,050
DNPWLM	0	0	0	500	100	400	500	0	0	1,500
MLGRUD	0	0	0	100	40	40	20	0	0	200
USAID	0	0	500	600	0	50	100	80	200	1,530
TOTALS	3,000	3,000	1,500	4,500	2,355	2,225	3,640	80	200	20,500

NRMP II Budget Revisions 1998						
NRMP II INVESTMENTS: CUMULATIVE 1998 (in USD)	REVISIONS 1998			CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS		
Activity Category	USAID	GOZ	TOTAL	USAID	GOZ	TOTAL
Wildlife Conservation	0	800,000	800,000	4,421,205	4,000,000	8,421,205
Community Development	1,200,000	1,150,000	2,350,000	14,070,500	5,400,000	19,470,500
Regional Communication and Training	0	0	0	1,470,010	0	1,470,010
Planning and Applied Research	0	0	0	2,809,000	0	2,809,000
Administrative Contract (Institutional Contractor)	1,700,000	0	1,700,000	4,100,000	0	4,100,000
USAID Management	0	0	0	1,000,000	0	1,000,000
Audit/Evaluation	0	0	0	229,285	0	229,285
Contingency	0	0	0	0	0	0
Inflation	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTALS	2,900,000	1,950,000	4,850,000	28,100,000	9,400,000	37,500,000

Annex N:


Macro Economic Data for Zimbabwe

Annex N1: Population and Employment

Zimbabwean Population Growth and Employment

Year	Estimated Population	Estimated Total Employed	% of total Employed	TLF [63% of TP]	% of TLF Employed
1977	6,462,710	1,008,183	15.6%	4,071,508	24.8%
1978	6,675,664	987,998	14.8%	4,205,668	23.5%
1979	6,895,635	986,076	14.3%	4,344,250	22.7%
1980	7,122,854	1,011,445	14.2%	4,487,398	22.5%
1981	7,357,560	1,037,416	14.1%	4,635,263	22.4%
1982	7,600,000	1,048,800	13.8%	4,788,000	21.9%
1983	7,842,440	1,035,202	13.2%	4,940,737	21.0%
1984	8,092,614	1,035,855	12.8%	5,098,347	20.3%
1985	8,350,768	1,052,500	12.6%	5,260,984	20.0%
1986	8,617,158	1,081,100	12.5%	5,428,809	19.9%
1987	8,892,045	1,085,100	12.2%	5,601,988	19.4%
1988	9,175,701	1,131,200	12.3%	5,780,692	19.6%
1989	9,468,406	1,166,700	12.3%	5,965,096	19.6%
1990	9,770,448	1,192,200	12.2%	6,155,382	19.4%
1991	10,082,126	1,244,000	12.3%	6,351,739	19.6%
1992	10,403,745	1,236,200	11.9%	6,554,360	18.9%
1993	10,735,625	1,240,300	11.6%	6,763,444	18.3%
1994	11,150,006	1,263,300	11.3%	7,024,504	18.0%
1995	11,526,258	1,239,600	10.8%	7,261,543	17.1%
1996	11,907,557	1,273,700	10.7%	7,501,761	17.0%
1997	12,293,953	1,323,200	10.8%	7,745,190	17.1%
1998	12,684,679	1,348,300	10.6%	7,991,348	16.9%
1999	13,079,127	1,316,100	10.1%	8,239,850	16.0%
2000	13,476,418	1,231,800	9.1%	8,490,143	14.5%
2001	13,875,574	1,230,200	8.9%	8,741,612	14.1%

Source: CSO



Annex N2: Official Exchange Rates

Exchange Rates: ZW\$/US\$ (1987 - 2001)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
January	1.6367	1.7077	1.9865	2.2994	2.6631	5.0903	6.0354	8.4943
February	1.6327	1.74	1.9739	2.3186	2.7503	5.0575	6.4294	8.1403
March	1.6332	1.7161	2.0101	2.4021	2.9455	5.0452	6.4619	8.0640
April	1.6361	1.7413	2.0272	2.4402	2.9994	5.0639	6.3037	8.0894
May	1.6581	1.7828	2.0725	2.4558	3.0731	5.0766	6.3039	8.0266
June	1.8136	1.8136	2.1413	2.4802	3.2175	4.9583	6.5405	8.1302
July	1.6918	1.8474	2.1209	2.4631	3.4435	4.9313	6.6738	8.0821
August	1.6838	1.8598	2.2065	2.4820	3.8941	4.8521	6.5745	8.1373
September	1.7053	1.9037	2.2114	2.5465	4.9736	5.0790	6.5048	8.3208
October	1.6728	1.919	2.2212	2.5615	4.9501	5.2674	6.7161	8.3250
November	1.6526	1.8954	2.2691	2.5800	5.0512	5.4419	6.8675	8.3493
December	1.6631	1.9429	2.2701	2.6364	5.0511	5.4815	6.9350	8.3871
Mean Annual Rate	1.6733	1.8225	2.126	2.472	3.751	5.112	6.529	8.212

Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe

NB: The exchange rate for the Zimbdollar was fixed at 55:1 to the US dollar throughout 2001


Annex N2: Official Exchange Rates

1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
8.3829	9.4509	10.9637	18.2848	39.2465	38.1388	55.066
8.4366	9.4589	11.1731	16.2258	38.5059	38.1097	55.066
8.4430	9.6515	11.2739	16.1394	38.1533	38.1679	55.066
8.4631	9.8183	11.3250	17.0561	38.1533	38.1533	55.066
8.4918	9.8318	11.2956	18.0147	38.1679	38.1242	55.066
8.5462	9.8745	11.3908	18.0115	38.965	38.197	55.066
8.6258	9.9611	11.6090	19.135	38.1825	38.197	55.066
8.6572	10.2532	11.8891	25.7864	38.197	50.2008	55.066
8.8004	10.3401	12.6823	33.4784	38.1097	53.0222	55.066
9.2687	10.5954	12.6406	35.727	38.1388	54.9752	55.066
9.2644	10.7642	14.4717	37.3134	38.0952	55.0357	55.066
9.3109	10.8389	18.6081	37.3692	38.1388	55.066	55.066
8.724	10.070	12.444	24.374	38.338	44.616	55.066

Annex N3: Tourism Data for Zimbabwe

VISITORS TO ZIMBABWE BY COUNTRY OR REGION OF ORIGIN, 1990-2001												
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
S.A/Botswana	238,909	282,076	367,111	461,246	505,035	540,758	572,125	405,846	718,832	598,051	848,963	675,500
Zambia	178,061	216,262	204,411	261,226	361,703	591,432	448,507	376,085	567,754	676,696	409,532	786,839
Rest of Africa	87,378	92,518	92,145	91,854	110,681	206,494	237,562	201,984	296,757	377,858	238,307	274,847
Africa	504,348	590,856	663,667	814,326	977,419	1,338,684	1,258,194	983,915	1,583,343	1,652,605	1,496,802	1,737,186
Britain & Ireland	46,359	35,711	33,487	50,393	46,930	70,180	84,966	109,179	130,155	190,642	136,808	156,159
Germany	11,989	11,081	12,725	20,688	21,663	33,362	54,512	45,208	65,733	66,084	33,379	32,694
Rest of Europe	31,909	22,993	24,538	34,744	38,570	58,466	91,814	75,864	109,602	123,387	101,382	76,023
Europe	90,257	69,785	70,750	105,825	107,163	162,008	231,292	230,251	305,490	380,113	271,569	264,876
USA & Canada	19,012	15,332	13,292	22,827	21,042	38,161	38,689	56,840	97,325	101,445	79,941	91,714
North America	19,012	15,332	13,292	22,827	21,042	38,161	38,689	56,840	97,325	101,445	79,941	91,714
South America	811	1,074	1,311	4,362	3,912	4,485	10,248	6,262	23,779	14,664	37,591	20,013
Asia	3,754	4,484	3,952	7,312	7,123	12,789	21,425	14,243	36,990	35,507	24,047	26,761
Oceania	17,610	15,128	13,006	16,878	24,399	25,519	36,097	44,069	43,480	62,281	65,281	76,519
Other	22,175	20,686	18,269	28,552	35,434	42,793	67,770	64,574	104,249	112,452	126,919	123,293
TOTAL	635,792	696,659	765,978	971,530	1,141,058	1,581,646	1,595,945	1,335,580	2,090,407	2,246,615	1,975,231	2,217,069
Regional Tourism	504,348	590,856	663,667	814,326	977,419	1,338,684	1,258,194	983,915	1,583,343	1,652,605	1,496,802	1,737,186
International Tourism	131,444	105,803	102,311	157,204	163,639	242,962	337,751	351,665	507,064	594,010	478,429	479,883
AVERAGE DURATION OF VISIT (days)	6.3	5.8	5.3	5.3	5.5	4.6	5	4.2	3.4	3.1	3.1	
BED-NIGHTS AVAILA	2,580,918	2,645,552	2,795,434	2,923,575	2,981,370	2,990,938	3,344,573	5,495,626	2,352,042	1,057,289	3,433,869	2,826,882
BED-NIGHTS SOLD	1,220,620	1,324,910	1,275,295	1,200,280	1,421,451	1,520,903	1,683,874	2,849,744	1,116,668	649,510	1,020,037	895,901
% OCCUPANCY	47.3	50.1	45.6	41.1	47.7	50.9	50.3	51.9	47.5	61.4	29.7	31.7
TOTAL VISITOR NITE	4,005,490	4,040,622	4,059,683	5,149,109	6,275,819	7,275,572	7,979,725	5,609,436	7,107,384	6,964,507	6,123,216	0

Source: Central Statistical Office & Zimbabwe Tourism Authority



Annex O

SUMMARY OF CDF PROJECTS

O1: Large Projects

O2: Small Projects

Annex O1: CDF Large Projects Approvals/Signing

Code	RDC	Project Title and Brief Description	PMT Approval/Comments	Grant letter date	RDC Signature Date
L9	Gokwe South	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC		March 29, 1999	April 7, 1999
L15	Kusile	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC		February 4, 1998	February 4, 1998
L19	Mudzi	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC		June 1, 1997	June 6, 19997
L22	Nkayi	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC		November 15, 1996	November 26, 1996
L23	Nyaminyami	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC		May 12, 1997	May 12, 1997
L26	Rushinga	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC		June 1, 1997	June 6, 1997
L27	Tsholotsho	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC		June 1, 1997	June 1, 1997
L28	UMP 1-97	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC		June 1, 1997	June 6, 1997
L7	Chiredzi	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC Chiredzi Veldt fire Management Project – to help prevent, detect and fight veldt fires.	Concept approved April 1999. Project approved 20/09/99.	July 28, 1997 October 21, 1999	July 28, 1997 October 21, 1999
L5	Chimanimani	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC Vimba Eco-Tourism Project – to help develop a community-based eco-tourism project at Haroni/Rusitu.	Concept approved by PET prior to 06/10/98. Project approved 20/09/99. RDC in search of private partner before grant could be drawn up. No partner found.	February 4, 1998 August 28, 2000	February 4, 1998 August 29, 2000

Annex O1: CDF Large Projects Approvals/Signing

Code	RDC	Project Title and Brief Description	PMT Approval	Grant letter date	RDC Signature Date
L18	Mazowe	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC Banje Eco-Tourism Project – to establish a viable camping tourist facility that generates employment and income for the community.	Concept paper discussed 28/01/99 and approved 24/02/99 for development into proposal. 29/03/00 project proposal approved with comments for campsite development (1st phase). 11/05/00 RDC still to address PMT comments and resubmit revisions before grant document could be drawn up.	November 15, 1996 December 8, 2000	November 15, 1996 December 11, 2000
L20	Muzarabani	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC Mid Zambezi Eco-Tourism Project – to upgrade the Mavuradonha Wildlife Headquarters to provide an eco-tourism facility that is to be marketed with corresponding facilities in Guruve District.	07/12/00 concept paper approved subject to scaling down costs for proposal development and EIA. 06/03/01 proposal approved with comments. 01/04/01 revised proposal received for review. 17/05/01 RDC to submit further revisions before grant document can be drawn up.	October 24, 1997 July 12, 2001	October 24, 1997 August 8, 2001 Grant Amendment No. 8, Incorporating the Mid-Zambezi Eco-tourism Project
L6	Chipinge	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC Fire Management Project - to help prevent, detect and fight veldt fires in wildlife areas.	Concept approved by PET prior to 06/10/98 10/04/01 Project approved with comments. 17/05/01 RDC had not yet addressed PMT comments and resubmitted revisions so that grant could be drawn up.	November 15, 1996 July 20, 2001	November 15, 1996 July 2001 Grant

Annex O1: CDF Large Projects Approvals/Signing

Code	RDC	Project Title and Brief Description	PMT Approval	Grant letter date	RDC Signature Date
L24	Nyanga	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC		February 4, 1998	February 4, 1998
		Kairezi Eco-Tourism Project - to establish a viable eco-tourism facility on the Gairezi River that generates employment and income for the community.	Concept approved by PET prior to 06/10/98. 31/08/00 Project approved with comments. 27/09/00 PMT resolved that flaws in project proposal be addressed before drawing up grant. 14/10/00 Report on meeting between DA/USAID/RDC, RDC to resubmit revisions so that grant document could be drawn up.	February 6, 2001	February 15, 2001
L13	Hurungwe	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC		November 7, 1996	November 8, 1996
		Small Scale Fencing – to help reduce threat to human life and crops caused by elephants through the provision of individually owned low cost electric fences.	Concept paper approved 24/02/99. Project approved with comments on 07/12/00. RDC to submit revisions before grant document could be drawn up.	April 10, 2001	April 10, 2001
L3	Binga	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC		February 2, 1998	February 2, 1998
		Electric Fence Project – to help reduce the incidence of human-animal conflicts by constructing 7 encircling electric fences .	Concept approved by PET prior to 06/10/98. 07/12/00 PMT to undertake assessment with technical experts. 01/02/01 PMT to organise field visit with WWF consultant. 06/03/01 Project approved with PMT comments. 10/04/01 consultant working on realignment of fences. 17/05/01 consultant to submit report to DA/CA. 17/07/01 project approved with RDC/community contribution condition. RDC to submit revisions before grant document could be drawn up.	September 14, 2001	October 4, 2001

Annex O1: CDF Large Projects Approvals/Signing

Code	RDC	Project Title and Brief Description	PMT Approval	Grant letter date	RDC Signature Date
L8	Gokwe North	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC Game Corridor Fire Management Project - to help prevent, detect and fight veldt fires in the game corridor.	Concept approved by PET prior to 06/10/98. 07/06/00 RDC advised to split project and approved Fire Management Project concept. 01/02/01 proposal approved with comments. 06/03/01 revised proposal submitted for review.	November 15, 1996 May 6, 2001	December 6, 1996 June 26, 2001
14	Hwange	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC Hwange Fishing Camps - to help the Mhakwe community establish an economically viable sport fishing campsite.	Concept approved by PET prior to 06/10/98. 07/12/00 project approved with comments. RDC to submit revisions before grant document could be drawn up.	December 7, 1998 February 26, 2001	December 12, 1998 February 27, 2001
L1	Beitbridge	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC Utilisation Of Aquatic Resources - to help the local community establish economically viable fishing camps at Zhove Dam, which generate employment and income.	Concept approved by PET prior to 06/10/98. 31/08/00 RDC asked to respond to PMT comments. 27/09/00 RDC had not responded to all issues raised. 14/11/00 project approved with comments. RDC to submit revisions before grant document could be drawn up.	July 28, 1997 May 24, 2001	July 28, 1997 June 2001
L4	Bulilima-mangwe	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC Amacimbi Project – to help increase and coordinate the participation of rural communities in the sustainable harvesting and marketing of the Mopane worms.	Concept paper approved 22/11/99. Grant approved with comments 01/02/01. RDC to submit revisions before grant document could be drawn up.	February 4, 1998 June 28, 2001	February 23, 1998 July 13, 2001

Annex O1: CDF Large Projects Approvals/Signing

Code	RDC	Project Title and Brief Description	PMT Approval	Grant letter date	RDC Signature Date
L30	Umzingwane	Mtshabezi Valley Eco-Tourism Project – to help implement an eco-tourism venture and cultural centre, which will generate employment and income for the community.	Concept approved by PET prior to 06/10/98. 31/08/00 Project approved with comments. 27/09/00 RDC had not provided CA/DA with revisions so that the grant document could be drawn up.	June 26, 2001	July 10, 2001
L11	Gurube	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC Mid Zambezi Eco-Tourism Project - to develop/upgrade camping facilities at three locations in the district so as to provide an eco-tourism facility that is to be marketed with corresponding facilities in Muzarabani District.	07/12/00 concept paper approved subject to scaling down costs for proposal development and EIA. 06/03/01 proposal approved with comments. 01/04/01 revised proposal received for review. 17/05/01 RDC to submit further revisions before grant can be drawn up.	October 24, 1997 July 17, 2001	October 24, 1997 August 6, 2001
L12	Gwanda	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC Doddieburn-Manyole Rehabilitation – to help the local community generate income and employment through the rehabilitation of the ranch.	Concept approved by PET prior to 06/10/98. 10/04/01 project approved with comments. 17/05/01 consultant working on amendments. RDC to resubmit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	February 4, 1998 September 18, 2001	February 4, 1998 October 5, 2001
L2	Bindura	Paradise Pools - to help implement an eco-tourism venture, which will generate employment and income for the community.	Concept approved 29/03/00. 17/05/01 Project approved with comments. RDC to resubmit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	September 19, 2001	October 1, 2001

Annex O1: CDF Large Projects Approvals/Signing

Code	RDC	Project Title and Brief Description	PMT Approval	Grant letter date	RDC Signature Date
L17	Matobo	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC Ntunjambili Ecotourism – to economically empower the communities through the establishment of an eco-tourism project.	22/11/99 RDC asked to re-write concept paper. 29/03/00 Concept paper approved for development into project proposal. 11/05/00 RDC advised to seek WWF' assistance with TORs for project proposal development. 10/04/01 RDC to revise proposal with comments. 17/07/01 Project approved with comments. RDC to resubmit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	March 2, 1999 September 19, 2001	March 2, 1999 October 3, 2001
L25	Pfura	Mukurupahari Natural Resources Conservation Project – to improve the management of the bamboo forest and establish a craft centre for the sale of bamboo products.	22/11/99 Concept approved for development into project proposal. 17/07/01 Project approved with comments. RDC to resubmit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	December 19, 2001	January 8, 2002
L21	Mwenezi	ICB Grant – to help build capacity to strengthen CAMPFIRE within the RDC Community Based Fisheries At Manyuchi Dam – to enable the communities to generate income and employment from the fish resources in the Manyuchi Dam.	Concept approved 22/11/99. Project approved with comments 17/07/01. RDC to resubmit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	March 29, 1999 December 14, 2001	April 8, 1999 January 21, 2002

Annex O1: CDF Large Projects Approvals/Signing

Code	RDC	Project Title and Brief Description	PMT Approval	Grant letter date	RDC Signature Date
L10	Goromonzi	Ngomakurira Eco-Tourism Project – to economically empower the communities through the development of a day centre and generate employment.	11/05/00 concept paper approved for development of proposal. 17/05/01 RDC to revise proposal & resubmit. 17/07/01 RDC represented by a member of staff not fully conversant with project.- issue deferred, 25/09/01 Project approved with comments. RDC to resubmit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	December 19, 2001	January 15, 2002
L29	UMP/Mudzi/ Rushinga	Nyatana Joint Management Project – to help the communities participate in the sustainable management of the Nyatana Wilderness Area.	Concept approved 25/01/00. Project approved with comments 25/09/2001. RDC to resubmit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	February 1, 2002	February 19, 2002
L16	Manyame	Mayambara Lodges – to economically empower the communities through generation of income and employment through the provision of service infrastructure for an eco-tourism site.	06/03/01 DA/CA to assist RDC develop a revised concept paper. 10/04/01 concept paper approved for development into project proposal. 17/05/01 TA for development of proposal and EIA being facilitated. 25/09/01 project approved with comments. RDC to resubmit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	February 12, 2002	February 12, 2002

Annex O2: CDF Small Projects Approvals/Signing

Code	Rural District Council	Project Title	PMT Approval/Comments	Grant Letter Date	RDC Signature Date
F67	Umzingwane	Lumene Falls Road	11/05/00 RDC to revise concept paper. 31/08/00 project approved.	November 6, 2000	November 10, 2000
F36	Beitbridge	Maramani Craft Centre	29/03/00 Approved.	July 5, 2001	August 17, 2001
F65	UMP	Beekeeping	11/05/00 Approved with comments. RDC to submit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	July 18, 2001	August 27, 2001
F43	Gokwe North	Gandavaroyi Falls Campsite	07/06/00 Approved as separate project.	July 18, 2001	September 4, 2001
F63	Umguza	Mahawana and Ngxingweni Block Woodlots	01/02/01 Approved with comments. RDC to submit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	July 18, 2001	August 8, 2001
F57	Mutoko	Beekeeping	17/05/01 Approved with comments. RDC to submit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	August 15, 2001	August 2001
F44	Gokwe South	Jahana Wildlife Water Reticulation	07/06/00 Concept approved with comments. 31/08/00 RDC still to submit revisions so that grant can be developed.	September 13, 2001	September 29, 2001
F60	Nyanga	Beekeeping	31/08/00 concept approved with comments. RDC to submit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	September 13, 2001	October 1, 2001
F55	Mazowe	Mwenje Dam Fishing	24/02/99 Concept paper approved but RDC had to choose between large or small grant. 11/05/00 project approved but, RDC to seek CSP assistance. 07/06/00 DNPWLM to look into viability of project.	September 13, 2001	October 10, 2001
F59	Nkayi	Borehole Game Watering Points	31/08/00 Concept approved with comments. RDC to submit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	November 5, 2001	December 4, 2001
F37	Binga	Cultural Village Lodges	29/03/00 Concept approved and RDC authorised to implement project using ICB funds and to request for more funds, if need arises, from IC. RDC did not implement under ICB and a grant had to be drawn up.	November 5, 2001	December 17, 2001
F38	Binga	Siamuloba Fishing Camps	29/03/00 Concept approved with comments. RDC to submit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	November 5, 2001	November 14, 2001
F68	Umzingwane	Craft Centre	11/05/00 RDC to revise concept paper. 6/03/01 revised concept paper received late for meeting. 17/05/01 Concept paper approved with comments. RDC to resubmit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	November 5, 2001	November 23, 2001
F66	UMP	Muda Conservancy	17/05/01 approved with comments. RDC to submit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	November 5, 2001	November 20, 2001

Annex O2: CDF Small Projects Approvals/Signing

Code	Rural District Council	Project Title	PMT Approval/Comments	Grant Date	RDC Signature Date
F41	Chimanimani	Mhakwe Fisheries	17/05/01 RDC to revise concept paper. 25/10/01 Approved subject to RDC resubmitting concept paper incorporating PMT comments by 08/11/01. 19/12/01 grant document being developed.	January 25, 2002	March 1, 2002
F64	Umguzo	Igusi Wildlife Management & Institutional Support	25/01/00 Concept paper to be revised. 11/05/00 Project approved, but RDC not yet granted AA status	January 25, 2002	March 1, 2002
F61	Pfura	Pfura Mountain Camp Sites	19/12/01 Project approved subject to RDC withdrawing other small project concept papers tabled before PMT (the cost of this project is double the agreed limit for FOGs).	January 25, 2002	March 1, 2002
F62	Tongogara	Beekeeping	25/10/01 Approved on condition revisions submitted by 08/11/01. 19/12/01 grant document being developed.	January 25, 2002	March 19, 2002
F45	Gwanda	Tuli – Shashe	25/09/01 Could not be discussed due to time constraint. 25/10/01 Approved subject to RDC submitting revisions incorporating PMT comments by 08/11/01.	January 25, 2002	March 1, 2002
F42	Chirumanzu	Beekeeping	25/10/01 RDC to submit revisions incorporating PMT comments by 08/11/01. 19/12/01 Project approved subject to RDC adapting other beekeeping project grants to own needs.	January 25, 2002	March 1, 2003
F39	Bulilimangwe	Canal Construction	19/12/01 Concept approved with comments. RDC to submit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	March 6, 2002	April 16, 2002
F46	Hwedza	Beekeeping	20/09/99 Concept approved. 11/06/02 Project approved with comments. 25/10/02 Project to be implemented in partnership with LEAD and drawn up as a FOG as opposed to a large grant due to time constraints..	November 21, 2002	November 27, 2002
F56	Mutasa	Beekeeping	23/10/02 Concept approved subject to RDC submitting revisions within two weeks, after which grant can be drawn up.	November 21, 2002	November 27, 2002
F40	Buhera	Matendera Ruins Eco-tourism project	23/10/02 Concept approved with comments. RDC to submit revisions before grant can be drawn up.	December 20, 2002	December 20, 2002

Annex O2: CDF Small Projects Approvals/Signing

Code	Rural District Council	Project Title	PMT Approval/Comments	Grant Date	
F47	Kusile	Silethokuhle Beekeeping	23/10/02 Concept approved with comments. RDC to submit revisions after standardizing within two weeks, after which the grant can be drawn up.	December 20, 2002	December 20, 2002
F48	Kusile	Bambanani Beekeeping	23/10/02 Concept approved with comments. RDC to resubmit revisions after standardizing within two weeks, after which the grant can be drawn up.	December 20, 2002	December 20, 2002
F49	Kusile	Gomoza Beekeeping	23/10/02 Concept approved with comments. RDC to resubmit revisions after standardizing within two weeks, after which the grant can be drawn up.	December 20, 2002	December 20, 2002
F50	Kusile	Guga II Beekeeping	23/10/02 Concept approved with comments. RDC to resubmit revisions after standardizing within two weeks, after which the grant can be drawn up.	December 20, 2002	December 20, 2002
F51	Kusile	Gunyanga Beekeeping	23/10/02 Concept approved with comments. RDC to resubmit revisions after standardizing within two weeks, after which the grant can be drawn up.	December 20, 2002	December 20, 2002
F52	Kusile	Mabhunu Beekeeping	23/10/02 Concept approved with comments. RDC to resubmit revisions after standardizing within two weeks, after which the grant can be drawn up.		
F53	Kusile	Vukani Beekeeping	23/10/02 Concept approved with comments. RDC to resubmit revisions after standardizing within two weeks, after which the grant can be drawn up.	December 20, 2002	December 20, 2002
F58	Mutoko	Beekeeping Capacity Building	23/10/02 approved subject to RDC addressing comments and submitting revisions within two weeks. 16/01/03 approved for development into grant.	February 18, 2003	February 28, 2003
F54	Matobo	Cecil John Rhodes Cultural Village	01/02/01 RDC to resubmit concept paper. 17/05/01 Approved with comments. RDC to submit revisions before grant can be drawn up. This grant was closed out due to no progress having been made on the ground during the grant period. RDC was advised to resubmit concept paper with new costings for reconsideration by PMT. 23/10/02 RDC did not attend meeting to reconsider project as new grant. 16/01/03 CA's CDF Field Programme Officer to visit project and report to PMT. 11/03/03 RDC to be compensated for milestone 1 under grant development. No new grant to be developed.	December 12, 2001	January 11, 2002

Annex P:

Original CAMPFIRE Guidelines and
Enforcement Letter from Director,
DNPWLM (Dr. W. Nduku)

Guidelines for CAMPFIRE

Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management
June 1991

Appropriate authority

The Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) is the agency responsible for wildlife conservation and management in Zimbabwe. DNPWLM policy recognises that landholders are better placed to manage wildlife on their land than the Department provided certain conditions are met. The DNPWLM has therefore granted 'appropriate authority status' to certain District Councils provided these Councils have stated their intent to follow the principles embodied in the CAMPFIRE concept.

Appropriate authority status effectively gives District Councils the same rights to manage their wildlife as enjoyed by commercial farmers except that quotas must be approved by DNPWLM.

This document sets out the key objectives of CAMPFIRE and the guidelines that District Councils should follow as a condition of appropriate authority. It also outlines the brief reporting procedures required by DNPWLM to monitor the programme.

Objectives of CAMPFIRE

CAMPFIRE is a rural development programme that harnesses wildlife enterprises to improve the livelihoods of people in rural communities. The fundamental aim is to provide people with more money, better health, and a greater and more educated role in acquiring these for themselves. This requires improved:

1. human managerial capacity:

The programme aims to improve the managerial capacity of rural communities through hands-on management experience at all levels of the District -- Council, Wards, Villages, Households and Individuals;

2. human well-being:

The programme aims to improve the well-being of people by providing direct benefits, through improved social services (schools, clinics), infrastructural projects (e.g. water, grinding mills) or by paying out cash;

3. sustainable use of environment:

The programme aims to conserve and cultivate wildlife by providing landholders with direct incentives to do so. DNPWLM is ultimately responsible for conserving the nation's wildlife, and believes that only direct incentives allow this. Consequently, appropriate authority status will be reviewed if producer communities do not benefit directly.

To achieve these three objectives, several principles must be followed.

Principle 1: Return benefits to producer communities

Benefits from wildlife must be returned directly to 'producer communities'. If benefits are not returned, communities gain little from conserving wildlife, especially as they bear the costs of doing so. Consequently, wildlife will continue to disappear. If wildlife disappears, so does one of the few opportunities for sustainable economic development in remote areas. DNPWLM wishes to avoid this.

To create the incentives to cultivate wildlife, Councils are required to return at least 50% of the gross revenue from wildlife to the community (Ward, Vidco or Village) which produced it (e.g. where the animal was shot). Communities must be fully involved in the process of choosing how to spend this money (projects, cash or both).

Council should retain no more than 15% of total income from wildlife as a levy to cover overheads. Likewise, Council should spend no more than 35% of total revenue on wildlife management costs (e.g. law-enforcement, monitoring, capital development for wildlife). Moreover, this expenditure should be in the producer community that earned it.

DNPWLM will look with favour on Councils that:

- o return more money to producer communities than these minimum figures; and
- o involve communities intimately in making decisions.

Principle 2: 'Producer communities' should be small and homogeneous

DNPWLM encourages Councils to define producer communities as Villages, Vidcos or (preferably small) Wards because the smaller the producer community, the more successful are CAMPFIRE programmes. The ideal size of a producer community is 100 to 200 households because this is large enough for a wildlife programme, and small enough that all households can be involved in the programme and accountable for it.

Principle 3: Full choice of expenditure

Producer communities must be given the full choice of how to spend their money, including both projects and cash payments. Councils must take the necessary steps to ensure producer communities participate fully in these decisions.

Where communities value cash above projects, they should be allowed cash. Council should not insist on projects because some projects are not worth implementing, or demand a great deal of extra management expense.

Projects should be chosen and implemented promptly in order to strengthen the link between wildlife and benefits, and to avoid money lying idle in banks. Therefore Council should:

- o present producer communities with their wildlife revenues;
- o ensure the development of project plans that include budgets, the means of implementing projects, and the people or committees responsible for doing so. Without this detail, project plans are dreams and will benefit no-one;
- o ensure that revenues are presented to communities, and that plans for spending their wildlife revenues debated and decided upon by them, within six months of the end of the hunting season (i.e. by June).

Principle 4: Accountability

Councils should keep producer communities (i.e. Council's constituency) fully informed of, and involved in, CAMPFIRE.

Councils are also accountable to government. When granted 'appropriate authority', day to day management of wildlife becomes the responsibility of the local authority. However, by law, DNPWLM remains ultimately responsible for all wildlife in Zimbabwe (Parks and Wild Life Act, 1975) and is therefore required to monitor the progress of CAMPFIRE, especially since it is a new initiative. Therefore, a condition of appropriate authority status is that each District Council submit an annual report to DNPWLM no later than June the following year.

Principle 5: Open, competitive marketing

Hunting and photographic concessions must be marketed competitively using such means as auctions or tenders advertised in newspapers. Criteria for selecting tenders should be discussed, and the best offer chosen (not necessarily the highest offer), at open meetings. Offers should be submitted in dollars rather than in kind, except where the latter is appropriate. Community members should be kept informed of events.

Principle 6: Avoid unfair taxation of wildlife

Wildlife should be taxed in the same manner as other resources. Like cattle or crops, benefits from wildlife should be given to producers (households) in full. Producers (not wildlife) should then be taxed to provide community services or infrastructure. Direct taxation of wildlife before benefits reach landholders reduces its value to them, and will result in wildlife disappearing even in areas where it is the best land use.

Annual report

In their annual report, Councils granted appropriate authority status will be expected to demonstrate that the guidelines given in this document are followed. DNPWLM will review these reports in determining the continuation of appropriate authority status. Should Council have difficulty in implementing these guidelines they are invited to approach DNPWLM for assistance at any stage. DNPWLM intends to sponsor a manual to further assist Districts.

An annual report should include:

1. Summary of land use and settlement.
2. Wildlife management including details on:
 - administration of hunting and tourism;
 - problem animal control;
 - crop protection, fencing, compensation;
 - monitoring of wildlife;
 - any other issues.
3. Financial review. This is crucial and must fully describe:
 - total income, including its source according to:
 - * area (e.g Ward or Village where animal was shot);
 - * activity (e.g. safaris, tourism, other);
 - * carryover from previous years.
 - Council recurrent and capital expenditure (broken down);
 - allocation of income to producer communities;
 - allocation of revenues by each producer community to projects, wages, household cash dividends, etc.
4. Institutional report including:
 - efforts to raise community awareness;
 - Village and Ward participatory and management structures;
 - training, etc.
5. Plan of action for following year including budgets, requirements for support, problems, ideas, etc.

Conclusion

The CAMPFIRE programme can bring significant development to rural areas provided it is properly implemented. It is also an evolving programme so continual communication between all groups involved in the programme is vital. The guidelines set out here will be subject to on-going review by DNPWLM, which encourages feedback from Councils.

The Department wishes District Councils every success with their CAMPFIRE programmes and will assist wherever we can or locate other agencies to do so.

To all:

- ✦ Rural District Councils with 'appropriate authority'.
- ✦ District Administrators in these Districts
- ✦ Provincial Administrators
- ✦ Provincial Wardens
- ✦ Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
- ✦ Ministry of Environment and Tourism

REMINDER TO RETURN WILDLIFE MONIES TO PRODUCER COMMUNITIES

This letter serves to remind Rural District Councils to adhere to the CAMPFIRE Guidelines. This means that Rural District Councils should retain no more than 15% of wildlife revenues and, as emphasised by the Minister of Environment and Tourism at the 1992 CAMPFIRE Annual General Meeting, at least 80% of revenues should be returned to producer communities or occupiers of land where these revenues were generated.

We are informed that the recent Rural District Council Amalgamation is causing severe financial difficulties for many Councils. The Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management is extremely concerned that Councils may expropriate wildlife monies from communities that produce wildlife to fund themselves because Councils have not developed alternative sources of funding. Failure to pay this money to producer communities will destroy wildlife in communal areas, will destroy the successful CAMPFIRE programme, and will destroy one of the few hopes for sustainable economic development in these remote areas. If the communities fail to benefit from their wildlife the Department and the Minister will be forced to review the conditions of appropriate authority.

We congratulate many Rural District Councils on making considerable progress in devolving monies to producer communities. However, we also warn those that have failed that they have already had a *four* year grace period and that further failure will force a review of their appropriate authority status.

We look forward to the day when wildlife is taxed at the same rate as other communal and commercial produce, and when Rural District Council devise equitable and progressive taxation systems. If revenue from communal land wildlife enterprises remains taxable, then commercial wildlife enterprises should be treated in a similar manner. Similarly, if revenue from wildlife enterprises is taxable, then revenues from other crop and livestock enterprises should also be taxed.



Dr W. Nduku
DIRECTOR

NOTES TO EXPLAIN THE NECESSITY OF BENEFITTING PRODUCER COMMUNITIES

These notes are attached in support of the Departments' insistence that wildlife monies must be returned to producer communities. Monies must be returned for the following reasons:

1. wildlife provides considerable potential for some of Zimbabwe's poorest communities to overcome poverty and under-development. However, unless wildlife monies are returned *directly* to these producers there will be no incentive to conserve wildlife, and this way out of poverty will be lost.
2. producer communities bear the costs of living with wildlife, and must be compensated for these costs.
3. Appropriate Authority was devolved to Rural District Councils on the basis that the benefits go to producer communities.
4. producer communities are remote and CAMPFIRE funds are essential for development in these *specific* areas.
5. deprivation and taxation of wildlife producing communities, generally the poorest of the poor, is unfair, inequitable and prone to failure given the fact that:
 - a/. the richer livestock owners and crop producers pay no tax on their production, yet are more likely to benefit from Councils' activities.
 - b/. differential taxation of a single resource like wildlife will distort the rural economy, and will severely retard development. It is far better *to tax the individual from the sum of his production* (crops, cattle, wildlife). This happens in the commercial sector where farmers pay rates based on their land. It is sensible that the communal sector follow the same principles and not tax any *single* resource to fund the Rural District Council. It must develop a system of rates paid by individuals or households out of the proceeds of *all* their enterprises.
 - c/. in the spirit of Parks and Wildlife policy, legislation and the CAMPFIRE programme, communal wildlife producers enjoy the same rights as commercial farmers. Commercial wildlife enterprises are not expected to fund RDCs alone. It is *not right that this burden is placed on communal wildlife producers*, or on wildlife in general.
 - d/. this deprivation of remote communities is only being entertained because these communities are vulnerable and defenseless, especially when utilising common resources such as wildlife.

ANNEX Q:

**SUMMARY OF WWF NRMP II
PERFORMANCE**

TABLE 1: WWF ACHIEVEMENTS COMPARED TO EXPECTED OUTPUTS

Output	Status	Finding
1.1	Arial census in CAMPFIRE Areas 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, including protected areas in Sebugwe, Dande, Gonarezhou, Hwange, Matetsi. 1998, 1999 include Zambezi Valley, 2001 included Save Conservancy. Full, quality reports available. (18 reports available)	Done exceptionally well
1.2	Experimented with aerial survey mapping of wildlife habitat, settlements and arable – rejected as too resource intensive. Experimented with use of Landsat 7 imagery, but is unsuitable to savannas. Reviewed methods by consultant.	Learned that remote sensing does not work. No map of basic areas protected or systematic summary of these.
1.3	Developed databases on: • District/ward income 1989-present • Sport hunting in CAMPFIRE 1994 – present. Records 11,142 hunts. Not all RDCs use system properly. • Sport hunting in Zimbabwe 1995- largest source of hunting data in sub-continent. Transferred to DNPWLM but high turnover of staff is problematic. • GIS spatial database on wards • Policy (showed policies highly negative to CAMPFIRE) Have responded to 240 requests for data and maps. Ten publications/reports on financial and economic monitoring	Data is good-excellent, and monitoring systems are in place. Results not used sufficiently by partners to manage programme. No data on indirect income. Some improvements in analysis, presentation and dissemination possible. Question of sustainability after NRMP II
2	Provided technical support to RDCs for project development (with outsourcing to consultants) completing 15 technical reports: • Mazowe – ecotourism feasibility and design Banje Mountain • Mazowe – management options for Mwenje dam fishery • Guruve – wildlife/tourism land use and business plan • Guruve – assessed (approved) viability of small, revolving funded electric fencing • Muzarabani – wildlife/tourism land use and business plan, including Mavuradonha Wilderness, • Muzarabani – plans for Chaderaka Game Park and Uchachacha Rest camp • Nkayi – ecological, social, economic impact of Mbazhe Bird Sanctuary ecotourism project • Binga – land use planning to reduce human-wildlife conflicts • Binga – planned/assessed tow major electric fences • Gwanda – land use options for southern Gwanda including Doddieburn-Manyoli ranch rehabilitation • Nyaminyami – wildlife business plan • Hwange – economic/environmental review of fishing camp • Rushinga – assessed (and rejected) proposal for crocodile farming • Gwanda – planned (PRAs) water for people and wildlife • Chikomba – assessed (rejected) proposals for fishery, quarry, campsite • Mazowe – Mwenje Dam management options • Guruve – advice regarding Masoka electric fence • Gwanda – feasibility of rehabilitation of Doddieburn-Manyoli ranch 15 technical reports aimed at supporting NR activities in RDCs	Largely achieved by outsourcing and sub-contracted. Reports of variable quality. WWF may have been too over-stretched to manage the volume of work that it gathered to itself as a consequence of its general competence.
3	Conducted 24 surveys/feasibility studies for RDCs: • Strategic plan for conservancy in Bulilimamangwe (no action by RDC) • Gamebird resource inventory for Bulilima-mangwe and Tsholosho (no action by RDC) • Assessed three early ecotourism projects (Sunungukayi; Sanyati Bridge, Mavuradonha). Lessons helped later developments • Assessed/planned Vhimba ecotourism project (implemented successfully) • Assessed (non viable) viability of ostrich farming in Chipinge • Assessed (non-viable) ecotourism project in Sengwe	Total of 42 reports produced. Developed sound information to support project development and decision-making. The real question is about the cost effectiveness of these reports for small

Output	Status	Finding
	• Separate aerial survey requested by Chiredzi RDC • Paper on gamebird potential (<i>no results</i>) • Tourism potential analysis for Nyanga (<i>Kairezi ecotourism successfully implemented</i>) • Technical report on animal conflicts in Gokwe South requested by RDC • Assessed feasibility of Vhumba Lodge in Gokwe South (<i>not completed because of conflicts in community</i>) • Crocodile survey for Gwanda RDC • Aerial survey of Doddieburn Manyoli for RDC, showing depleted wildlife • General study of electric fencing (<i>led to requests for support</i>) • Assess potential to use Kigelia dn Trichelia suggests uncertain viability • Resource survey in Pfura suggests bamboo (<i>project funded</i>) • Viable ecotourism sites identified in Matobo (<i>Ntunjambili funded</i>) • Resource potential of Nyatana assessed (<i>proposal submitted</i>). • Kairezi ecotourism business plan (<i>Project implemented</i>) • Resource inventory of Umguza shows viability questionable • Potential for village home stays assessed (<i>good potential, but not in current economic environment</i>) • Assessed bamboo in Mukurupahiri • Assessed potential for Ilala craft in Maramani, BBridge	projects
4	Developed agro-ecosystem computer simulation models Research on land use changes in communal areas Investigation of urban fuel wood demand	Models and research appear to have had little real application
5	Natural Resource Management Training 1993-98 SUPCAMP (funding from NORAD) worked with selected communities to develop NRM technologies • 20 manuals and trainers guides, 14 supported by NRMP II) • 31 modules presented to nine districts in 2001-2002	Very significant positive impact at all levels
6	Project management and implementation capacity • Internal financial systems slow • Use of outsourcing excellent • Well organized work planning, monitoring and reporting • Good relations with DA and CA • Staff technical development good, especially in training section • Major problem is conditions of service and difficulty of retaining quality staff. This will kill any organization's capacity.	

WWF-NRM PROJECT II Summary of Expenditure, Grant No WWF 1-96, 1 March 1996 to 30 June 2002										
OUTPUT/ACTIVITY	Item	BUDGET	Year 1 1997	Year 2 1998	Year 3 1999	Year 4 2000	Year 5 2001	Year 6 2002	TOTAL EXPEN DITURE	BALANCE
1. MONITORING										
1.1 Aerial Census	Staff and Consultants	288,491	24,384	40,073	31,247	33,236		161,579	290,518	-2,027
	Operational Costs	316,822	23,764	2,181	15,240	3,193		128,015	172,393	144,430
	Other	27,632	15	0	0	0	136	3,806	3,957	23,674
									0	0
	Sub Total	632,945	48,162	42,254	46,487	36,429	136	293,399	466,868	166,077
1.2 Habitat Monitoring	Staff & consultants	55,203	0	0	467	11,898	7,549	5,208	25,122	30,081
	Capital Items	12,511	0	0	7,217	0	0	0	7,217	5,293
	Operational costs	19,163	0	0	0	209	11,522	314	12,046	7,117
	Other	9,039	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9,039
	Sub Total	95,916	0	0	7,684	12,107	19,071	5,523	44,385	51,531
1.3 Financial & Economic Monitoring	Staff & consultants	121,216	5,138	11,907	17,971	21,645	17,697	17,263	91,621	29,596
	Capital Items	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Operational costs	55,471	921	8,345	2,374	13,786	7,181	1,224	33,831	21,640
	Other	9,932	963	0	0	0	99	12	1,074	8,858
	Sub Total	186,620	7,022	20,252	20,345	35,431	24,978	18,499	126,526	60,084
1.4 Institutional & Organisational Workshops	Staff & consultants	38,497	0	0	0	0	1,309	22,070	23,379	15,118
	Capital Items	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Operational costs	44,086	0	0	0	0	-4	20,865	20,861	23,225
	Other	7,700	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,700
	Sub Total	90,283	0	0	0	0	1,306	42,935	44,241	46,042
1.5 Coordination & Feedback Workshops	Staff & consultants	0	0	0	0	0	0	685	685	-685
	Capital Items	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Operational costs	21,656	0	0	0	0	23	0	23	21,634
	Other	1,925	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,925
	Sub Total	23,581	0	0	0	0	23	685	708	22,873
2. SERVICING RDC PROJECTS	Staff & consultants	197,649	27,013	27,665	39,070	85,318	28,362	0	207,428	-9,779
	Capital Items	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Operational costs	23,730	2,172	3,687	5,146	14,461	5,352	0	30,818	-7,088
	Other	3,518	57	0	0	0	0	0	57	3,461
	Sub Total	224,897	29,242	31,353	44,216	99,779	33,714	0	238,303	-13,406
3. Natural Resource Surveys & Feasibility Studies for CAMPFIRE	Staff & consultants	41,597	0	10,257	3,318	0	11,664	6,349	31,588	10,009
	Capital Items	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Operational costs	5,451	0	158	2,146	318	5,551	0	8,173	-2,723
	Other	443	0	384	0	0	0	0	384	59
	Sub Total	47,491	0	10,799	5,464	318	17,216	6,349	40,145	7,346
4. Research, DST f for land use planning and NRM Information dissemination	Staff & consultants	109,537	67,848	49,651	16,082	34,479	13,038	0	181,098	-71,561
	Capital Items	15,344	14,499	14,152	3,885	0	0	0	32,536	-17,192
	Operational costs	3,764	6,304	945	6,984	1,866	1,061	0	17,161	-13,396
	Other	9,753	403	0	0	0	0	0	403	9,351
	Sub Total	138,398	89,054	64,749	26,951	36,345	14,099	0	231,197	-92,799
5. Resource Management Training	Staff & consultants	3,947	0	0	0	3,929	25	750		3,947
5.1 Training Needs Assessment	Capital Items	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Operational costs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Other	0	0	0	0	664	480	0	1,144	-1,144
	Sub Total	3,947	0	0	0	4,593	505	750	1,144	2,803
5.2 Training Modules Courses & Workshops	Staff & consultants	60,640	0	0	0	29,526	23,593	22,492	75,611	-14,971
	Capital Items	17,026	0	0	0	0	0	5,152	5,152	11,875
	Operational costs	89,502	0	0	1,126	1,847	17,646	42,761	63,380	26,122
	Other	23,497	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	23,497
	Sub Total	190,665	0	0	1,126	31,374	41,239	70,404	144,142	46,523
5.3 Training Impact Assessment	Staff & consultants	6,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,000
	Capital Items	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Operational costs	5,375	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5,375
	Other	0	0	0	0	464	0	0	464	-464
	Sub Total	11,375	0	0	0	464	0	0	464	10,911
5.4 Financial Training Toolkits	Staff & consultants	13,827	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13,827
	Capital Items	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Operational costs	15,189	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,189
	Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	20,179	20,179	-20,179
	Sub Total	29,016	0	0	0	0	0	20,179	20,179	8,838
OVERALL TOTAL	Sub - Total - 1 - 5	1,675,135	173,480	169,407	152,271	256,840	152,287	458,722	1,358,302	316,833
	Overheads	271,531	40,785	39,651	40,981	61,642	26,947	24,756	234,763	36,769
		1,946,667	214,265	209,058	193,253	318,481	179,234	483,478	1,593,065	353,602

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1USD: Z\$ 38.00 11.565 18.92 38 38.3 55 55