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Evaluation of the USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Project

FINAL REPORT

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Executive Summary

The Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Project (PLSP) has been a 31-month initiative funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented under contract by Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland. Counterpart institutions are the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies of the country's four provinces. The PLSP project was begun in September 2005 and is scheduled to conclude operations on March 31, 2008. It contributes to USAID's Strategic Objective 4: "More participatory, representative, and accountable democracy in Pakistan" and its intermediate result 4.1: "Improved representation and responsiveness of national and provincial legislatures."

As the PLSP program approached its conclusion, USAID/Pakistan contracted with Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. of Washington, DC to provide a two-person team to conduct an independent evaluation of the project and offer recommendations, based on its findings, for a possible extension of the program and, assuming so, for priority activities that it might undertake. The team was assisted by a local expert who scheduled meetings and helped in the compilation of data and information. The evaluation team was on location in Pakistan from November 20-December 14, 2007. During this time, it spent fourteen days in Islamabad and ten days making visits to each of Pakistan's four provincial capitals. During the evaluation, the team spoke with more than two hundred legislators, Secretariat staff, civil servants, civil society representatives, journalists, and business and academic leaders. Despite obstacles caused by the country's State of Emergency and the dissolution of, and pending elections for, five of the six legislative bodies in the PLSP program, the evaluation team was able to observe and analyze PLSP program activities in great depth and meet with a broad cross section of stakeholders and other individuals that, it feels confident, has enabled it to conduct a thorough and accurate assessment of the PLSP program.

The evaluation team found the PLSP program to have been very well administered by its leadership and more thoroughly and more effectively organized than almost all of the other USAID projects previously examined by the team members. The Project Director (Chief of Party) has, in the opinion of the team and according to virtually everyone with whom the team met, done a superb job in running the program and in recruiting an outstanding group of local staff to fill its key positions. It was clear to the evaluation team that her leadership has been a major contributor to the program's success.

During its two and one-half years of operation, the PLSP program has provided an extremely impressive range of assistance activities that have addressed all areas covered in Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) that have been signed between USAID and the National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies. PLSP's leaders told the evaluation team that the intent and goal of all program activities is to provide training and assistance that will comply with USAID's requirement that legislative capacity-building programs be implemented that can be sustained beyond the life of the program. The team's findings

are that this requirement has been accorded paramount importance by the PLSP project leadership in all activities that were observed or examined.

The evaluation team found the PLSP program to have amassed a large and extremely impressive array of accomplishments during its 31 months of operation. It found the degree of PLSP assistance to have well exceeded—in some cases significantly so—that provided through USAID assistance programs of considerably longer duration that the evaluation team members have observed in other countries. By comparison with other USAID programs that the evaluation team has examined or participated in, the number and percentage of member and staff participation in PLSP project activities is impressive, especially given the program's relatively short duration. Almost half of the Senate membership (47%) has participated in at least one PLSP training activity. The figure for the 342-member National Assembly is somewhat lower (26%). Provincial Assembly participation ranges from a low of 20% in Punjab to a high of 40% in NWFP. PLSP places the percentage of Secretariat staff participation at 22%. Thirty five percent (35%) of parliamentarian and 6% of Secretariat participants have been women. Detailed analyses of PLSP program activities and of problem areas identified by the evaluation team are found in Section 3.

Given the success of the PLSP program, and with Pakistan sitting at a potentially historic crossroads that is expected to bring in a new civilian government, a new National Assembly, and a new Provincial Assembly in each of the country's four provinces, the evaluation team believes that it makes eminent sense for USAID/Pakistan to continue the program and build on the groundwork that it has provided toward parliamentary empowerment and parliamentary responsiveness to the Pakistani people. Representative of the overwhelming across-the-board support that the evaluation team found from legislators, Secretariat staff, government officials, and civil society and media representatives for additional capacity building activity in virtually every area are the results in the check list of options, shown to selected interviewees, in question 9 of the PLSP Program Questionnaire (Appendix D).

Particularly because of the anticipated election of a number of new leaders and the likely influx of a large number of inexperienced first term legislators who will want and need immediate and extensive orientation and training, the evaluation team believes it of critical importance that USAID make a strong effort to assure that the PLSP program will not just continue, but continue with no break from the end of the current program to the commencement of the extension. The new parliamentary bodies will be the first in Pakistan's history that will come into office with a successful on-going capacity building program in place, and a hiatus or gap of even short duration would be highly counterproductive to the momentum and interest that has been generated by the PLSP program during its 31 months of operation.

It would be important that an extended PLSP program repeat and continue some of the activities that have been found to be most successful and useful during the current program, both for newly elected legislators and for returning members who were unable to participate in them when they were initially offered. Detailed findings concerning

matters for consideration in an extended program, and suggestions for priority activities in such a program, are included in Section 4.

To fully appreciate the political environment within which the PLSP project has operated over the past 31 months, it is necessary to understand the historical role that national and provincial legislatures have played in the political development of Pakistan. From the time of the country's establishment as an independent nation at midnight on August 15, 1947, legislatures at the national and provincial levels have been minor players in the political development of Pakistan. At no period of time over Pakistan's sixty years of independence have its parliamentary bodies played major roles in public policy and governance. Throughout its relatively brief history, the country has spent considerable amounts of its resources on its military whose numbers currently exceed 600,000. In light of these conditions, it is not surprising that the National Parliament, the Provincial Assemblies, and their members and staffs, have regularly been shortchanged in terms of member and staff training and institutional support. A detailed analysis of the political and historical context in which the PLSP program should be viewed and evaluated is included in Section 2.

Reacting to realities, United States aid to Pakistan for parliamentary capacity building represents a relatively recent assistance area. It was not until 1991—a full 37 years after the United States began providing assistance to Pakistan—that USAID became involved in training and capacity-building assistance for the country's parliamentary bodies. Since 1995, USAID has conducted three parliamentary strengthening projects, with the PLSP program being the most recent and, according to an overwhelming consensus of those with whom the evaluation team spoke, clearly the most successful.

Within the scheme of United States aid projects to Pakistan, the PLSP program has been modest in terms of committed funding. The evaluation team believes that the program has proven to be a very good and a very wise investment for the United States and for Pakistan in terms of its potential for helping the country to build the performance capacity of its National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies. In the words of a prominent member of the National Parliament: "The PLSP program has been a good will ambassador for the United States and USAID to Pakistan, and it has bridged the divide between all political parties when it comes to strengthening our country's parliamentary bodies." At a critical and potentially pivotal point in Pakistan's history, an uninterrupted continuation of the PLSP program could be an important catalyst in helping the country to steer itself on a new course toward construction of a solid foundation that could provide for a sustainable democratic future.

1. Program Overview, Evaluation Team and Methodology

1.1 Overview of Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program (PLSP)

The Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Project (PLSP) has been a 31-month initiative funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented under contract by Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland. DAI has been assisted by several local and international partners. Counterpart institutions are the legislative bodies of Pakistan: the National Assembly and Senate of Pakistan and the Provincial Assemblies of the Northwest Frontier Province, Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab. Beginning in the second year of the project, the Assembly of the autonomous region of AJK became an informal participant in a number of project activities.

The PLSP project was begun in September 2005 and is scheduled to conclude operations at the end of March 2008. The project contributes to USAID's Strategic Objective 4: "More participatory, representative, and accountable democracy in Pakistan" and its intermediate result 4.1: "Improved representation and responsiveness of national and provincial legislatures."

In conducting the PLSP project, DAI has been partnered with Social Impact, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the International Roll Call Corporation, and the State University of New York, Albany, Center for Legislative Development. These partners have fielded legislative process and systems professionals on a number of short-term technical assistance assignments.

The PLSP team includes a Project Director (Chief of Party) who provides long-term technical assistance as a legislative processes advisor and provides legislative oversight support, a Deputy Project Director (Deputy Chief of Party) who provides direction for project implementation at the provincial level, five long-term technical staff, four provincial coordinators and an administrative staff to support the efforts outlined in this work plan. Pakistan-national professional personnel have also been engaged short-term for support in specific technical areas.

Program activities in the six legislative bodies have focused on four general technical areas. PLSP says that, in implementing its activities, it has tried to tailor them to the specific needs of each assembly, but that it has also encouraged joint activities when issues have been considered relevant to more than one legislative house. The main task components of the PLSP include the provision of assistance in four basic areas:

- Representation. Assisting the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies in providing information to the public and in the receipt of input from citizens.

- Lawmaking. Improving the structures and mechanisms by which legislation is analyzed, debated, and passed.
- Oversight/Accountability. Oversight of government operations, particularly in the area of budget formulation and implementation.
- Management Infrastructure. Improving day-to-day management and operation of legislative processes.

Each program area is subdivided into between one and four specific sub tasks.

The main PLSP program office is located in Islamabad with a provincial coordinator and support staff in residence in each of the four Provincial Assemblies. Project technical staff address the main project components working together with counterparts at the National Assembly and Senate as well as coordinate and support the work with counterparts at the provincial level. Provincial coordinators manage the respective provincial programs, providing liaison with provincial assembly leadership and staff and tailoring activities to meet the specific provincial assembly needs. International specialists are engaged to address specific technical areas, providing a comparative context.

At the outset of the PLSP project, USAID signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the National Parliament and with each Provincial Assembly. The MOUs specify that the PLSP program is intended to provide technical assistance and equipment to: “(1) strengthen the capacity of parliamentary [provincial assembly] partners (members and staff) to effectively undertake representative, law-making and oversight functions at the national [provincial] level; (2) enable effective use of research tools and the media by parliaments; (3) improve transparency and accountability in governance; and (4) improve avenues for civil society, including the media, to access and contribute to the parliamentary process.

1.2 USAID Evaluation Protocol

In the summer of 2007, USAID/Pakistan issued RFQ 391-07-026 proposing an independent evaluation of the PLSP project. In October 2007, the task order was awarded to Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. The Scope of Work can be found in Appendix E.

1.3 Checchi Evaluation Team

The Checchi evaluation team included Senior Legislative Specialist and Team Leader David B. Ogle, who has more than four decades of domestic and international experience in legislative management and development; Senior Political Scientist Dr. Robert

LaPorte, Professor Emeritus of Public Administration and Political Science, Pennsylvania State University, and an internationally recognized expert on Pakistan politics and government; and Zulfiqar Halepoto, a local specialist who served as a key member of the team that conducted a preceding USAID-sponsored legislative assistance program operated by World Vision. Team Leader David Ogle served as a short-term PLSP consultant on committee public hearing development in March 2007 and accompanied a delegation of parliamentarians and staff on a PLSP-sponsored study tour of the Canadian Parliament and the Ontario Legislative Assembly in May 2007.

1.4 Evaluation Methodology

Prior to their departure from the United States, the Senior Legislative Specialist and Senior Political Scientist reviewed a number of key documents provided by both Checchi and DAI. These included Checchi's Task Order Proposal, DAI's work plans and various quarterly reports, manuals, program descriptions and memoranda related to the PLSP project. The Senior Legislative Specialist and Senior Political Scientist also exchanged a number of reports and papers that they had previously written on Pakistan's parliamentary bodies, the PLSP project, and the country's government and politics.

Also prior to departure, the team members developed draft questionnaires to be used in semi-structured in-country interviews and received two extensive program briefings in conference calls with DAI's program coordinator in the firm's Bethesda, Maryland home office. The questionnaires were subsequently revised with input from the USAID/Pakistan mission and the team's local specialist and used for all legislator interviews and selectively in meetings with non-legislators. The questionnaires, including a compilation of responses to a checklist of possible activities for an extended PLSP program, are included as Appendix D.

The team members arrived in Islamabad from the United States on November 20 and immediately made contact with the local specialist. After meetings with the CTO and Deputy CTO of the USAID mission staff and with DAI's Chief of Party, a schedule for work in Islamabad and for visits to the four provincial capitals was agreed-upon. The schedule was as follows:

November 20-26 – Islamabad (National Parliament)
November 26-29 – Lahore (Punjab Provincial Assembly)
November 30-December 1 – Quetta (Balochistan Provincial Assembly)
December 1-4 – Karachi (Sindh Provincial Assembly)
December 4-5 – Peshawar (Northwest Frontier Province Provincial Assembly)
December 6-13 – Islamabad (Review of information compiled, draft of evaluation report, and USAID mission team debriefing)
December 14 – Departure from Islamabad

With assistance from USAID/Pakistan, PLSP staff, members and the local specialist, the team identified legislators, legislative staff, civil society representatives, and other donors

with whom it should meet. It then arranged meetings with them in Islamabad and the four provincial capitals. The Senior Political Scientist was able to identify and locate additional worthwhile interviewees from his extensive previous activities in Pakistan.

To get the fullest possible understanding of both the impact of the PLSP program and team members and activities that would be most productive if the program is continued beyond March 31, 2008, the team members felt it important to not limit meetings and discussions to members and Secretariat staff, but to tap a wider and more diverse audience by also talking with and receiving input from outside the parliamentary bodies. In this vein, substantial inputs were received from representatives of civil society, NGO and business leaders, government officials and international donors in other areas of Pakistan development. The restrictions placed on electronic journalists and reporters under the State of Emergency made contacts with its representatives somewhat sensitive and limited media input primarily, but not exclusively, to current and former print journalists.

The evaluation team was able to attend several important PLSP project participant meetings. An all-day session of the National and Provincial Assemblies' Secretaries in Lahore was particularly helpful in eliciting valuable information and feedback and in arranging meetings in the visits that were to follow to the other three provincial capitals. A guest visit to a joint meeting of five Rotary Clubs from Karachi also afforded the team with an opportunity to elicit extensive feedback from a broad cross section of the Sindh business and intellectual community

The presidential State of Emergency that was in effect in the country during the evaluation period provided some impediments for the evaluation team. The dissolution of five of the six parliamentary bodies prior to the evaluation team's arrival and the onset of the campaign period for the January 2008 election meant that sitting legislators were preoccupied with their re-election campaigns and, except in rare cases, not in their capital cities and/or their parliamentary facilities. The Senate—the one house that was not dissolved—did not sit during the evaluation period and almost all Senators had left Islamabad and returned to their provinces. In Balochistan and NWFP, the team was advised to remain in its hotel and limit outside travel to the Provincial Assembly facilities.

Despite the obstacles presented by the state of emergency and the dissolution of the parliamentary bodies, the evaluation team was able to observe and analyze PLSP program activities in great depth and meet with a broad cross section of well over two hundred legislators, Secretariat staff, government officials, civil society and media representatives, and other donors and implementers, and it feels confident this has enabled it to conduct a thorough and accurate assessment of the PLSP program.

A list of documents that were reviewed by the evaluation team is included as Appendix B, and a list of individuals with whom the team met or spoke with is included as Appendix C.

2. The PLSP Program in a Historical and Political Context

2.1 The Political Environment of Pakistan: The Beginning

To fully understand and appreciate the political environment within which the PLSP project has operated over the past 31 months, it is necessary to undertake a brief examination of the historical role that national and provincial legislatures have played in the political development of Pakistan. To do this, one must go back to the country's beginning that for all intents and purposes, took place on August 14, 1947, in the Sindh Assembly Hall. It was on that date and in that place that Great Britain transferred power from a partitioned part of the British Indian Empire to the new state of Pakistan. Lord Mountbatten as Governor-General and Viceroy, addressed the Assembly and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Quaid-I-Azam, gave a reply. Around the stroke of midnight on August 15, 1947, Jinnah was sworn in as Governor-General. Jinnah's decision to become Governor-General was critical since it set the tone of a strong central executive within a parliamentary framework. Shortly after, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali, Jinnah's principal lieutenant, was sworn in as Prime Minister.

The new nation of Pakistan consisted of two "wings" separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. The eastern wing was a partitioned part of Bengal known as East Bengal. The western wing included a partitioned part of Punjab (referred to as Punjab), the province of Sindh, the North West Frontier Province and the territory of what is now the Province of Balochistan. Within both wings was a series of princely states that were eventually merged into the provinces where they were located.

Jinnah's assumption of the office of Governor-General and the inclusion of the most populous part of the Pakistan union, East Bengal (later East Pakistan) was the start of major political struggles. The latter was resolved when East Pakistan succeeded from the Pakistan union immediately after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. The political struggle between a strong central executive (the Governor-General/President) and an executive elected by the National Assembly (the Prime Minister) has been a continuous part of Pakistan's political development.

2.2 The Role of Legislatures in Pakistan

From the beginning, legislatures at the national and provincial levels were minor players in the political development of Pakistan. At no period of time over Pakistan's sixty years of independence have legislatures performed major roles in public policy and governance.

2.2.1 The First Parliamentary Period, 1947-58. This period began slightly before August 14, 1947, and ended with the declaration of Martial Law by President Isakandar Mirza on October 7, 1958. (For an account of this politically turbulent period, see Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study*) On August 11, 1947 (three days before the transfer of power) Muhammad Ali Jinnah was elected President of the Constituent Assembly. In his first address to the Assembly, Jinnah gave Assembly members a mandate:

“ . . . The Constituent Assembly has got two main functions to perform. The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing the future constitution of Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete sovereign body as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan. . .” (Dawn, Independence Day Supplement, August 14, 1999.)

In the same speech, he uttered, perhaps, his most quoted lines that outlined his vision of a secular state of Pakistan:

“ . . . You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed; that has nothing to do with the business of the State. . . Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.” (Ibid.)

The First Constituent Assembly was unable to draft a constitution, function as a complete sovereign body, or establish a secular state. In fact, it spent most of its time debating East Bengal representation versus the four provinces in the west in the constitutionally based assembly it was trying to create.

Meanwhile, Jinnah functioned as a Governor-General. He regularly by-passed his ministers, including Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, and dealt directly with the civil service and the military. At this point in Pakistan’s history, its leadership felt besieged by a hostile India and Afghanistan and considered the Constituent Assembly and its members to be nuisances that at most interfered with the governance of the country or at least did nothing but talk.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah died on September 11, 1948, only thirteen months after his first speech to the Constituent Assembly. Liaquat Ali Khan remained as Prime Minister, with Khawaja Nazimuddin becoming Governor-General, but neither could fill the vacuum caused by the death of the Quaid. During the short period of Nazimuddin’s tenure as Governor-General, there was peace between him and Liaquat Ali Khan. But the struggle between the Governor-General and the Prime Minister was only in abeyance.

On October 16, 1951, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated. Nazimuddin stepped down as Governor-General and became Prime Minister and on October 19, 1951, Malik Ghulam Mohammed became Governor-General. Once again, the struggle for power between the governor-general and the prime minister began anew.

Before a final draft of the constitution could be placed before the Assembly, Ghulam Mohammed dismissed the Constituent Assembly on October 24, 1954. Five months later (March 28, 1955), by Governor-General's Order No. 12 of 1955, he "reconstituted" a Second Constituent Assembly by appointing the members. Although promoted by the executive, the Second Constituent Assembly passed a bill that merged the provinces in the west into one province (West Pakistan) and renamed East Bengal East Pakistan. The rationale was that the merger would promote administrative efficiency and save the costs of government. The not so hidden agenda was to achieve parity with East Bengal. The bill was passed on September 30, 1955. Ghulam Mohammed left office on October 5, 1955. His replacement as Governor-General was Major General Isakandar Mirza. On October 14, 1955, the "One Unit Scheme" went into effect. It was during his administration that Pakistan received its first constitution.

Although the Second Constituent Assembly met and debated, it did not draft the constitution. Instead, this task was assigned to the civil service. A draft was prepared, introduced into the Assembly on January 9, 1956, and passed by the Assembly on February 29, 1956. It was promulgated on March 23, 1956—sixteen years to the date to the Lahore Resolution that was adopted by the Muslim League, which called for a separate "Homeland for Muslims" in the subcontinent. This constitution (the 1956 Constitution) gave the state a new name—the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. It instituted a parliamentary form of government with the prime minister as the principal power holder. It also included the One Unit Scheme giving equal representation to West and East Pakistan. The new constitution replaced the Government of India Act of 1935—the document under which Pakistan was governed from 1947 to 1956. On March 23, 1956, Mirza became the first President of Pakistan under the new constitution. His term of office was to be five years.

Isakandar Mirza was known for his dislike of politicians and intolerance of Bengalis. He considered the civil service as the only institution capable of governance under his guidance. He also considered the people of Pakistan and its representative incapable of governing themselves.

2.2.2 The First Military Intervention, 1958-1971. Before the elections scheduled for 1959 under the new constitution were conducted, Mirza acted to prevent the first test of his leadership. On October 8, 1958, he abrogated the 1956 Constitution, dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies, and declared Martial Law. He appointed General Mohammed Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, as Chief Marshal Law Administrator (CMLA). Later in October (October 27, 1958), General Ayub ousted Mirza. Earlier, as a member of the Cabinet of All Talent (Ayub served as Minister of Defence), Ayub wrote a brief memorandum to himself that outlined his plan for a new political system for Pakistan. It was to be a presidential system with the assemblies as rubber stamps for the executive (See: Herbert Feldman, *Pakistan: Reform or Revolution?*). He established over twenty commissions to implement his vision for Pakistan. The topics to be investigated by the commissions included the development of a new constitution and land reform.

On March 1, 1962, Ayub promulgated his new constitution (the Constitution of 1962). This new document put in place a presidential form of government. It included the “One Unit Scheme”. The 1962 Constitution also included a new scheme called “Basic Democracy”, which altered the existing local government scheme and provided an electoral college for the election of both the President and the national and Provincial Assemblies. The continuation of the British-designed civil service was guaranteed by the constitution.

Ayub’s Basic Democracy scheme worked as follows. Each province had forty thousand Basic Democrats that were the chairmen of the district councils. The members of the district councils who, in turn, were elected by the teshil (West Pakistan) or thana (East Pakistan) councils elected the chairman. It was a complicated indirect election scheme guaranteed to protect the sitting president (Ayub) and the members of the National and Provincial Assemblies from the masses. Ayub was on record as advocating “guided democracy”, which continued Mirza’s bias against direct participation by the people. “The people of Pakistan are not ready for direct democracy” according to Ayub. They had to be “guided”.

The Government of Pakistan proclaimed the decade of the 1960s as the “Decade of Development”. As it was later revealed (by Mabubul Haq, Chief Economist, federal Planning Commission), the chief beneficiaries of Ayub’s economic development efforts were the famous (or infamous) “twenty families”—large-scale businessmen and industrialists who took advantage of the tax breaks, subsidies and protectionism (against foreign competition). Bengali leadership and economists charged that economic growth was facilitated by jute produced in East Pakistan and it was the Punjabis (who dominated business, the civil service and the military) who were the major beneficiaries of Ayub’s economic development policies.

The National Assembly, dominated by Ayub’s Muslim League, and the West Pakistan Assembly, dominated by Punjabis, remained either silent or supported the regime in power. The East Pakistan Assembly was also a controlled (by the regime) body.

Ayub’s style of governance was to use the civil service. Initially, the military played a role in administration of the country but Ayub returned them to the barracks.

After the disastrous 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, charges of corruption involving his family members, a heart attack, and the disaffection of key members of his administration (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in particular), Ayub had reached the end of his time in office. After a meeting of a group of his generals, Ayub stepped down and passed the baton to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Aga Muhammed Yahya Khan on March 29, 1969.

Assuming the office of the presidency, Yahya declared Martial Law, abrogated the 1962 Constitution, dismissed the National and Provincial Assemblies, scrapped the One Unit

scheme and scheduled national elections based on adult franchise and “one-man one vote”. This election would be the first in Pakistan’s history based on population.

The election took place with the Awami League, led by Sheik Mujibur Rahman, winning every seat in East Pakistan except one while the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who, among others, founded the PPP, securing a plurality of seats in the four western provinces. The election results meant that the Bengalis would hold the majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly that would draft a new constitution. However, before the Assembly met, General Yahya ordered a crack down in East Pakistan in March 1971 that resulted in civil war.

After the defeat and surrender of 90,000 Pakistani soldiers in December 1971, General Yahya transferred of power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on December 20, 1971. Bhutto became President and the first civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator.

2.2.3 The Second Parliamentary Period, 1971-1977. This period begins with seating of the Third Constituent Assembly on April 14, 1972, and ends with General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s ouster of Bhutto on July 5, 1977. The first order of business (after releasing Sheik Mujib who had been incarcerated in the west) was the drafting of still another constitution. Compromises between the Punjab and the other provinces led to the 1973 Constitution. This document reintroduced a parliamentary form of government with a strengthened role for the Prime Minister and a ceremonial role for the President. The constitution broke from the tradition of a unicameral to a bicameral or two-house National Parliament, with the creation of a Senate along side the National Assembly. The Senate was supposed to represent the provinces while the National Assembly represented the people. Unlike the National Assembly, the Senate could not be dismissed by the President. Bhutto ceased being President and became Prime Minister.

As Prime Minister, Bhutto attempted to rein in the power of the military by retiring several senior generals and changing the title of the head of the army from Commander-in-Chief to Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). Under the new constitution, the Prime Minister was the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. With regard to the civil service, Bhutto eliminated the constitutional guarantees that the civil service possessed under the two previous constitutions and eliminated civil service labels (the Civil Service of Pakistan, or CSP, was abolished). Bhutto also had enacted the Civil Service Reform Act of 1973 that opened up the services to lateral entrants. Over the next few years, Bhutto purged the civil service, resulting in over 4,000 dismissals. He also nationalized private companies and corporations, resulting in a vastly expanded role that government would play in virtually all sectors of the economy. Hundreds of public enterprises were created to absorb the nationalized private firms. He did not nationalize foreign-owned firms. All of the above was accomplished to ensure that neither the military, nor the civil service, nor the business/industrial class would challenge his rule.

During this time, parliamentary bodies at the national and provincial levels continued to rubber stamp executive initiatives. They were virtually powerless and unable to challenge the executive.

One major mistake that Bhutto made was to appoint, over the heads of twelve senior generals, General Muhammed Zia ul-Haq as COAS. Bhutto vetted Zia thoroughly before appointing him. Zia was considered to be politically neutral, if not apolitical. He was viewed as the perfect general for Bhutto—not interested in politics—and a willing “yes” man to Bhutto’s quest for dominance in the governance of Pakistan.

2.2.4 The Second Military Intervention, 1977-1988. After the 1977 elections in which a coalition of opposition parties charged wholesale fraud and took to the streets, General Zia led a military coup that ousted Bhutto. On July 5, 1977, he became the CMLA, suspended the 1973 Constitution and placed Bhutto under house arrest. He later released Bhutto only to re-arrest him and charge him with conspiracy to commit murder. Zia launched an accountability campaign that led to a series of white papers charging Bhutto with abusing and misusing his office and state institutions. With his takeover, Zia promised elections in 90 days. The 90 days turned into 90 months. Bhutto was tried in the Lahore High Court and convicted of ordering the murder of a political opponent. He was sentenced to death by hanging. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court’s decision, and on April 4, 1979, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was executed.

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 25, 1979, Pakistan became the frontline state in the proxy war on communism that the United States was conducting. Earlier in the year, U.S. President Jimmy Carter cut off military and economic assistance to Pakistan, citing evidence that Pakistan had violated the Symington Amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act. This amendment mandated the suspension of U.S. assistance to any country constructing a nuclear device. For several years prior to 1979, Pakistan worked to create a nuclear bomb. In fact, a book published in India in the 1970s was entitled *Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb*. Immediately after the Soviet invasion, the Carter administration offered a multi-billion dollar aid package to Pakistan that was refused by Pakistan. When Ronald Reagan took the office as President in 1981, one of his first foreign policy acts was to offer Pakistan a \$3.2 billion aid package—\$1.6 billion in military assistance and \$1.6 billion in economic and technical assistance. Pakistan once again became a partner of the U.S. in the Cold War and the supplier of military assistance to the Afghan mujahideen. The armaments were shipped to the rebels in National Logistic Cell (NLC) trucks—the NLC transports were managed by the Pakistani army.

One major project in the USAID portion of the Reagan assistance package was the Development Support Training Project that had a large participant training component. The Pakistani participants were mostly civil servants who were sent to the United States for graduate studies and short-term training. Other funds in the DSTP were used to improve civil service training at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College, the National Institutes of Public Administration (NIPAs) in Lahore, Karachi and, later, Peshawar and Quetta. Aid was also provided to other civil service (and police) training institutions. No assistance was given to the National or Provincial Assemblies, their members, or their staff. Earlier, in the 1960s, USAID provided funds to support the development of civil service training institutions and for sending civil servants to the U.S. for graduate studies and short-term training.

Zia created his own local government system, replacing Bhutto's integrated rural development scheme. His major attempt to appease the politicians who were not in exile or under arrest was to hold non-party elections in 1985 for the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies. His choice for Prime Minister was Muhammed Junejo, a Sindh wadera, who had previously been a minister in the West Pakistan provincial government. To neutralize the religious right, he introduced "Islamization" which involved the prohibition of consumption, transport and sale of alcoholic beverages (although Muree Brewery continued to operate through out the Zia period), promulgated through ordinance the Islamic penalties for thievery and adultery, banned interest on bank transactions and attempted to enact zakat, a tax whose funds go to aid the poor.

As a counter balance to rising political star of Benazir Bhutto who had assumed the reins of leadership of the PPP, Zia groomed a political unknown, Nawaz Sharif. During the 1985 to 1988 period, as a result of the 1985 elections, Nawaz became Chief Minister of the Punjab. Along with Junejo, he revived the Muslim League (N) as a challenge to the PPP. Later, Nawaz split with Junejo, and the Muslim League came into being.

Throughout this period, General Zia held the reins of power. He was President, chief of the army staff, and indirectly controlled the office of Prime Minister. Conflicts between Zia and Junejo caused Zia to dismiss the assemblies in 1988. The power sharing arrangement that emerged from this period can be likened to a three-legged stool. One leg was the President, the second the COAS and the third the Prime Minister. The National and Provincial Assemblies were not part of the power sharing arrangement.

After he dismissed the National and Provincial Assemblies, Zia, along with the American Ambassador and several of his army generals, were killed when a bomb planted on their aircraft exploded on August 17, 1988. This event brought to an end the second military intervention. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Chairman of the Senate, became Acting President and called for elections in November 1988.

2.2.5 The Third Parliamentary Period, 1988-1999. This period begins with the November 30, 1988 seating of the National Assembly and ends with the military coup on October 12, 1999, bringing General Pervez Mushsharraf to power.

The Benazir-led PPP achieved a plurality of seats in the new National Assembly. The PPP also achieved a majority in the Sindh Provincial Assembly and became the major opposition party in Punjab. The Nawaz-led Muslim League captured a majority of the seats in Punjab.

Ghulam Ishaq Khan became President and asked Benazir to form a government. Nawaz became Chief Minister of the Punjab. Except as the stage for government-opposition conflict, the National Assembly accomplished little. During Benazir's first administration, she narrowly defeated a "no confidence" vote but her record of achievements was meager.

Using Article 58 (2) of the 1973 Constitution (as amended) Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the National and Provincial Assemblies in 1990, charging both Benazir Bhutto and her husband with corruption and other crimes. Elections took place ninety days later, and Nawaz Sharif and the Muslim League secured a majority in the National Assembly.

During his first administration, Nanas initiated the privatization of the firms that had been nationalized during the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto period. But he also tried to amend the constitution to eliminate the 8th Amendment that had been passed during the Zia period. This amendment gave the President the power to dismiss the National and Provincial Assemblies. In turn, on May 26, 1992, using Article 58 (2) once again, Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the National and Provincial Assemblies, this time charging Nawaz with corruption and misuse of the Prime Minister's office. However, when Nawaz brought suit against the President in the Supreme Court, the court ruled against the President and ordered Nawaz's reinstatement. The army intervened and both Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif resigned. Elections were held ninety days after the resignations. This time, Benazir Bhutto and the PPP secured a majority of the seats in the National Assembly, and Benazir became Prime Minister for a second time on October 10, 1993.

The new President was Sadar Farooq Ahmed Leghari who took office on November 14, 1993. Leghari was a former Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) officer. He was also a PPP supporter. He seemed to be the ideal partner for Benazir. During her second administration, Benazir's record of achievement was once again below expectations and, on November 5, 1996, using Article 58 (2), Leghari dismissed the National and Provincial Assemblies, making Benazir once again an ex-Prime Minister. Elections were held ninety days later and, once again, Nawaz Sharif and his Muslim League party secured a majority of seats in the National Assembly.

Nawaz's second administration was filled with events. This time he was successful in neutralizing the power of the President. He selected what he believed would be a politically neutral chief of the army staff, General Pervez Mushsharraf. He tightly controlled the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies. During his administration, Pakistan exploded its first nuclear device, causing worldwide alarm, and the military fought a costly battle with the Indian army along the cease-fire line in Kashmir. In fact, by the end of Nawaz's term, Pakistan's Treasury was close to depleting its reserves of hard currency. By the summer of 1999, the question was not "if", but "when", the military would once again intervene.

2.2.6 The Third Military Intervention, 1999-2008. The "straw" that "broke" Nawaz's government occurred in early October 1999. A Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) flight from Sri Lanka carrying General Musharraf was informed not to land in Pakistan on orders of the Prime Minister. The order was disregarded, and the flight landed. General Musharraf immediately declared a State of Emergency, suspended the constitution, dismissed the National and provincial Assemblies, and sent Nawaz to a ten-year exile in Saudi Arabia. Musharraf became Prime Minister and, later, President.

Musharraf is the first muhajir (a Muslim who migrated from India and speaks Urdu) to be chief of the army staff. All others were Punjabis or Pushtuns. One of his first acts was to appoint General (retd.) Naqvi to head a local government reform unit. Naqvi 's new local government scheme was introduced in August 2001. It abolished divisions, reduced the powers of the deputy commissioners (they are now District Coordination Officers or DCOs), and established the Nazims (elected officials) as the major power in the districts. Nazims have limited police powers.

General Musharraf took the office of the President on June 21, 2001. After forming his own political party (the Muslim League (Q)—the “Q” standing for Quaid-I-Azam— Musharraf held elections in 2002. In the absence of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif , the Muslim League (Q) secured a majority of the seats in the National Assembly and the Punjab Assembly, and went into coalition with the MQM (the muhajir party) in Sindh. The religious parties coalition, led by the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) secured a majority of the seats in the NWFP and Balochistan Provincial Assemblies. These parliamentary assemblies became the first ones in Pakistan’s history to complete a full five-year term.

Before the most recent month of political crisis (November 2007), Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan on October 18. A bomb that killed and maimed several people marred her return. Several weeks earlier, on September 10, Nawaz Sharif had attempted to return to the country, only to be placed on a flight back to Saudi Arabia. He was later allowed to return on November 25.

The current crisis began on November 3, 2007, when Musharraf declared a State of Emergency (the second one that he had declared since the October 1999 coup). On the same day, he issued the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) suspending the constitution. The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, declared Musharraf’s actions to be “illegal and unconstitutional.” Both of Musharaff’s acts were in anticipation of an unfavorable ruling by the Supreme Court concerning his reelection to a new five-year term by the country’s sitting parliaments, all of which with the exception of the Senate, were nearing completion of their constitutional terms. Musharraf then removed Chief Justice Chaudhry from the bench. Judges and Justices who refused to take an oath under the PCO were also removed. Musharraf also closed several independent local news channels including Geo, ARY, and AajTV. In response to these actions, lawyers and journalists took to the streets. The police reacted strongly.

In mid-November, Musharraf announced that elections would be held on January 8, 2008. On November 27, he “took off his uniform” and passed the baton to General Ashfaq Kiyani who has become the new chief of the army staff. On November 28, Musharraf took the oath of office of President for a new five-year term.

In early December, both Benazir and Nawaz claimed to be debating whether or not to boycott the January 2008 election. Their conditions for participation have involved lifting the President’s lifting of the State of Emergency, his voiding of the PCO, his reinstatement of the justices and judges who refused to take the oath under the PCO, and his lifting of the suspension on the independent local news channels. Both Nawaz and his

brother Shabaz had their election tickets invalidated by the Election Commission (they were appealing as this evaluation was being completed). Bhutto announced that the PPP would participate conditionally but said that, if the elections appeared rigged, she would withdraw. In the meantime, candidates filed to run for seats in the National Assembly and the four Provincial Assemblies and campaign posters began to appear. As this evaluation was being completed in mid December, except for negative news reports on the performance of the Twelfth National Assembly, news about the National and Provincial Assemblies had pretty much disappeared from the mass media. All of that changed with the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27. After a week of unrest and questions and accusations about who was responsible for the assassination and how it was carried out, the government announced on January 2 that the election date would be pushed back from January 8 to February 18.

If the number of bills passed by the Twelfth National Assembly is used as the measure of its performance, it falls short of success. While it would appear difficult to present a strong argument to the contrary, as indicated in Section 3.3 (below), such quantitative measurements can sometimes be very misleading as a measure of performance by a legislative body.

2.3 Other Political Factors That Have Affected Parliamentary Development

2.3.1 The History of Executive Dominance. What would seem to be a legitimate quantitative measure of the dominance of the executive over the legislative branch throughout Pakistan's sixty-year history can be derived from two simple numbers. Since 1947, Pakistan has had twelve Governors-General/Presidents and two dozen Prime Ministers. The strong central executive has become ingrained in the political psyche of the people of Pakistan. The development of the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies through the current and an extended PLSP program could help to modify this condition.

2.3.2 Pakistan's External Environment. From its beginning as an independent nation in 1947, Pakistan has often been under a "state of siege." As a result, leadership in Pakistan has often tended to take on a siege mentality. This condition has led to three wars with India (1948, 1965, and 1971) and numerous minor clashes along its eastern border, especially along the cease line in Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK). In addition, since Afghanistan never accepted the Durand Line as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and given its occupation by the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and 1980s, Pakistan has viewed Afghanistan as a threat to its security. The terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 caused Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. in the war on terrorism and once again Pakistan has come a frontline state.

Given all of the above, Pakistan's desire for modern weaponry and its interest in seeking external assistance to pay for and provide such weaponry is understandable. The country spends a considerable amount of its resources on its military whose numbers exceed

600,000. In light of these conditions, it is not surprising that the National Parliament, the Provincial Assemblies, and their members and staff have regularly been shortchanged in terms of member and staff training and institutional support.

2.3.3 The Role of External Assistance. Over its sixty-year existence, Pakistan has been a major recipient of foreign aid in terms of military hardware and economic and technical assistance. Multilateral aid has come from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the United Nations Development Program and other UN organizations, foundations such as the Aga Khan Foundation (currently) and, earlier, through the Ford Foundation and other private donors. Bilateral assistance has, and continues, to come from the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Japan, the Kuwait Fund, Sweden, Norway, as well as countries. Pakistan's external assistance is often coordinated through the Aid to Pakistan Consortium. The largest donor has been the United States in terms of both economic and technical assistance and military assistance.

The United States has had an aid presence in Pakistan from 1954 to 1979, 1981 to 1995, and 2001 to the present. Billions of U.S. dollars in grants and loans have poured into Pakistan to help stabilize the country's economy, build its infrastructure, and develop its institutions.

In response to needs articulated by the Pakistan's government, USAID's clientele was limited almost exclusively the public sector in general, and to the civil service in particular, for the first several decades of its assistance. During this time, thousands of Pakistani civil servants received USAID-sponsored education in the finest universities and colleges in the United States. In addition, thousands of civil servants received short-term training to enhance their skills and knowledge in USAID-supported training courses and institutions, both in Pakistan and in the U.S. In one USAID project alone, over \$80 million was spent on educating and training Pakistani civil servants and supporting civil service training institutions in Pakistan. While USAID has been the largest provider of assistance, it has not been the only U.S. government organization involved in education and training of Pakistan's civil servants. At various times, the U.S. Information Agency, the U.S. Department of Education and, recently, the U.S. Department of State have also been involved in assistance programs.

During the first four decades that United States assistance and training was being provided to Pakistani civil servants, no program assistance was offered to the National Parliament or the Provincial Assemblies. It was not until 1991—a full 37 years after the United States began providing assistance to Pakistan—that USAID became involved in training and capacity building for Pakistan's parliamentary bodies. Since 1995, USAID has conducted three parliamentary strengthening projects, with the PLSP program being the most recent and, according to an overwhelming consensus of those with whom the evaluation team spoke, clearly the most successful.

Within the scheme of United States aid projects to Pakistan, the PLSP program has been modest in terms of committed funding. However, as Section 3 will show, the evaluation team believes that the program has been a very good and a very wise investment in terms

of its potential for helping Pakistan to build the performance capacity of its National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies and, in so doing, help the country steer itself on a new course toward construction of a solid foundation that could provide for a sustainable democratic future.

3. Evaluation of the PLSP Program, 2005-07

3.1 Project Administration and Organization

The evaluation team found the PLSP project to have been very well administered by its leadership and more thoroughly and more effectively organized than almost all of the other USAID projects previously examined by the evaluation team.

3.1.1 Project Staff. Even by USAID's high standards, PLSP has an exceptional staff. The Project Director, who oversees the entire program, and the Assistant Project Director, who focuses on coordination of Provincial Assembly activities, each have long successful records of international democracy and governance assistance experience. Unlike many other USAID Chiefs of Party who tend to focus primarily on project administration, the Project Director, who has headed the program from its outset, has always taken an active hands-on involvement in PLSP's assistance activities. In the opinion of the evaluation team and according to virtually everyone with whom it spoke, she has done a superb job in running the program and in recruiting an outstanding staff. It was clear to the team that her leadership has been a major contributor to the program's success.

The quality of the key local staff—four subject matter coordinators and the training specialist in Islamabad and four provincial coordinators in the provincial capitals—is at least the equal of any local USAID program staff that the evaluation team has previously encountered.

The program is further strengthened by knowledgeable and involved home office staff support.

A PLSP organization chart is included as Appendix A.

3.1.2 Legislative Development Steering Committees (LDSCs). The National Parliament and each of the Provincial Assemblies have a Legislative Development Steering Committee that is responsible for approving PLSP activities within their respective jurisdictions. The National Parliamentary LDSC is chaired by the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, with each provincial LDSC chaired by that Assembly's Speaker. Membership includes representation from both the treasury bench and the opposition. The goal of the LDSCs is to have participatory and consultative input into PLSP activities, with LDSC decisions concerning such activities being binding.

The evaluation team found strong satisfaction among both members and staff with the effectiveness of all five LDSCs, no expressions of dissatisfaction with this approach to project decision-making, and no suggestions of more preferable means of steering the PLSP program. All LDSC members that were interviewed expressed strong feelings that

the committees have been effective, and non-members offered no preferable alternatives to activity coordination.

3.1.3 Focal Persons. At the outset of the PLSP program, DAI and USAID concluded that program communication and decision-making—reportedly a rather serious problem during the preceding USAID parliamentary development program operated by World Vision—could be facilitated by having the leadership of each house designate a “mid-level bureaucrat” in its Secretariat (a Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary or Assistant Secretary) to serve as a focal person through whom the PLSP staff could channel program communications with each house’s top leadership, particularly with its Secretary and Speaker.

While the concept of a focal person would seem to make sense, the results have been decidedly mixed. The only bodies in which the evaluation team found the focal persons to have proven significantly beneficial to the PLSP program were the Sindh and NWFP Provincial Assemblies. In the National Assembly, four different individuals filled the position during the two years of the project and this frequent turnover likely contributed to some difficulties experienced by PLSP in establishing a strong working relationship with the Assembly’s leadership (see Section 3.4.1, below). With regard to the Senate and the Punjab and Balochistan Provincial Assemblies, it did not appear that the focal persons have proven damaging to the program, but there was no evidence that they have contributed in any significant way to providing an enhanced communication link between PLSP staff and the top leadership.

3.1.4 Working Groups. Beginning in its second year of operation, PLSP established eight working groups of Secretariat staff members from the National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies to focus on specific areas of legislative development, and to undertake in-depth examinations of possible interventions. The working groups have covered the areas of committee activities, research, parliamentary service, information technology, libraries, bill and amendment drafting, parliamentary public relations, and rules of procedure and codes of conduct. Each group’s membership is comprised of staff members who operate in the group’s area of focus. The groups meet three or four times each year in either Islamabad or one of the provincial capitals, with the members expected to spearhead interest in development of their focal areas among their colleagues in their respective bodies.

Every working group member or working group meeting attendee with whom the evaluation team spoke felt that their experience as a member of the group has served to both enlighten them on the potential for development and expansion of their individual disciplines and to motivate them to encourage their fellow staff members to think in terms of how to improve the quality of service. All expressed a hope that the use of working groups will be continued if the PLSP program is extended and each also expressed a strong interest in being able to serve as a member the working group that concerns his or her area of responsibility.

The evaluation team asked all working group members, non-member attendees, and legislators who were familiar with them whether they would be in favor of adding legislators as members of the groups. There was virtually no support for doing so. Negative responses indicated that legislators would probably be unable or unwilling to take time to spend on working group meetings, and that the subject matters of the groups focus on staff-support activities.

3.1.5 Donor/Implementer Coordination. The PLSP project leadership says that it has made a concerted effort to coordinate with other donors and implementers, and all indications are that it has made a considerable effort to do so.

The other major parliamentary assistance donor is the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which limits its activities to the National Parliament. There appear to be some areas of activity overlap in the Senate and National Assembly, specifically with regard to research and library services, committee outreach, and member training in rules of procedure. In each of these areas, PLSP appears to have been active in the area before UNDP, and the decision to undertake duplicate work appears to have been UNDP's. The PLSP Project Director has taken the initiative in trying to establish better communication links with her UNDP counterpart to improve resource coordination and minimize unnecessary and unproductive activity duplication.

Neither the National Democratic Institute (NDI) nor the International Republican Institute (IRI) is directly involved in parliamentary activities, but both their representatives and the PLSP Project Director indicate that they have established close communicative and cooperative working relationships with PLSP. DAI focuses on political party development and IRI's activities include public opinion polling. At PLSP's request, IRI included a question in its late summer 2007 quarterly survey concerning the public's interest in live broadcasts of plenary sessions of the National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies. The survey results (See Section 4.3.1a) provided valuable feedback that encourages focus on this as an important activity area if the PLSP program is extended.

In other areas, during the summer of 2007, PLSP brought in a short term international consultant to meet with representatives of the Asia Foundation, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and United Nations representatives concerning the possibility of collaboration on the development of the Geographic Information System (GIS) linked information database.

PLSP project leadership appears to have enjoyed a good working relationship with the United States Embassy, with the US Ambassador having traveled to each of the four provincial capitals to participate in the official openings of the provincial resource centers. PLSC's leaders do express some frustration at not being regularly notified by the Embassy when Americans with congressional background are in the country on sponsored visits.

3.2 PLSP Program Accomplishments

During its two and one-half years of operation, the PLSP project has covered an extremely impressive range of assistance activities that have addressed all of the areas covered in the MOUs signed between USAID and the National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (see Section 1.1). PLSP's program leaders say that the intent and goal of all of its activities is to provide training and assistance that will comply with USAID's requirement that legislative capacity-building programs be implemented that can be sustained beyond the life of the program. The evaluation team's findings are that this requirement has been accorded paramount importance by the PLSP project leadership in all activities that were observed or examined.

The degree of PLSP assistance has well exceeded—in some cases significantly so—that provided through USAID assistance programs of considerably longer duration that the evaluation team members have observed in other countries. By comparison with other USAID programs that the evaluation team has examined or participated in, the number and percentage of member and staff participation in PLSP program activities is impressive, especially given the program's relatively short duration. Almost half of the Senate membership (47%) has participated in at least one PLSP training activity. The figure for the 342-member National Assembly is somewhat lower (26%). Provincial Assembly participation ranges from a low of 20% in Punjab to a high of 40% in NWFP. PLSP places the percentage of Secretariat staff participation at 22%. Thirty five percent (35%) of parliamentarian and 6% of Secretariat participants have been women.

The following are what the evaluation team found to be PLSP's most important accomplishments in each of its four activity areas.

3.2.1 Representation. The evaluation team found the following to be PLSP's most impressive accomplishments in the representation area:

3.2.1a. Initiatives in the area of media relations and public outreach, including beginning exploration of the possibility and requirements required for live broadcasts of plenary sessions, with the effort being spearheaded by the Senate whose Finance Committee established a special subcommittee on telecasting, press gallery enhancements in all plenary chambers, budget process workshops for journalists in Punjab and NWFP, and a parliamentarian media relations manual (prepared by a member of the evaluation team).

3.2.1b. Website development, including upgrading of existing National Assembly and Senate websites, the establishment of websites for three Senate committees, the establishment of a website for each Provincial Assembly, and staff training on website management and updating.

3.2.2 Lawmaking. The lawmaking program area has involved the greatest amount of PLSP activity of the four program areas. The evaluation team found the following to be PLSP's most impressive accomplishments:

3.2.2a. The establishment of the Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services (PIPS). The evaluation team concurs with the array of feedback that it received from parliamentary leaders, PLSP program leaders, and external stakeholders that the establishment of PIPS is the single most important accomplishment of the PLSP project, and the activity that figures to have the greatest impact on the future operations of Pakistan's parliamentary bodies.

PIPS existed in name only at the outset of the PLSP project. During the project term, PLSP served as the catalyst in bringing the idea to fruition, serving as a surrogate secretariat for the institute and playing a major advisory role in working out the details of its organization and infrastructure, all of which have been agreed upon by all stakeholders as the PLSP project nears its conclusion.

When fully operational, PIPS will be the country's first permanent professional development training institute and research center devoted exclusively to providing support to the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies. It will operate from a building that will be constructed on a site not too distant from the National Parliament in Islamabad. USAID will fund the construction of the PIPS building, but the Parliament will be responsible for PIPS' permanent operational costs. The operational costs of the interim PIPS facility will be borne by USAID until the end of current PLSP project. PIPS will be a semi-autonomous body, not under direct parliamentary control, but with a sixteen-member board of governors comprised of eight National Assembly members, four senators, and one member from each Provincial Assembly. The decision to make PIPS a semi-autonomous operation under the direction of a parliamentary board is a wise one that will protect against parliamentary interference in its professionalism and personnel administration, but also assure a close working relationship with the parliamentary bodies.

At the time of this evaluation, two separate bills formally establishing PIPS await action in the Parliament—one introduced in the Senate by a member of the National Parliament's LDSC, and one in the National Assembly submitted by the government. While awaiting passage of one of these bills, PLSP has continued to work with PIPS to develop a roster of more than fifty Pakistani expert consultants from academia and civil society institutions who have declared their readiness to serve parliamentarians' information and research support needs and who can be tapped for assistance of a wide variety of policy issues. A short list of candidates to serve as PIPS' Executive Director has been approved and it is anticipated that an appointment will be made before the convening of the new parliaments in early 2008.

3.2.2b. The use of international consultants to provide Secretariat staff training in research and to train trainers in bill and amendment drafting. Research training was provided by experienced researchers from the United States Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the Canadian Parliamentary Library (see, also, Section 3.4.8). Primary drafting training was provided through a highly intensive two-week course conducted by the International Consortium for Law and Development (ICLAD), which is affiliated with the Boston University School of Law. The consortium has conducted

similar workshops in a number of Central and South Asian parliaments. Secondary training was provided through what appears to have been a less successful long-distance Internet program. The theory and methodology of the ICLAD course is to emphasize the importance of research and information-gathering before beginning to draft a piece of legislation, an approach that the evaluation team found to be seldom used in Pakistan where proposed laws are often quickly drafted with insufficient or no advance consideration or research. Forty-two Secretariat staff members from the national and provincial parliaments took the two-week ICLAD course and, from this number, twelve staff members (including at least one in each province) have emerged as trainers capable of training other parliamentary and government ministries in this critical skill. Training activity, conducted by these trainers, of Secretariat and governmental staff was underway during the period of this evaluation.

3.2.2c. Committee strengthening activities that have included the establishment of a Council of Committee Chairs to provide a platform for interaction among chairpersons and to establish a list of action items to improve and expand committee operations. Other activities included a series of workshops and roundtables for members of the National Parliament to address the role and activities of committees in an effective parliament, and how committee activities could become more transparent and participatory. In this regard, an international consultant (a member of the evaluation team) prepared a manual on how to prepare for, hold, and follow up on a committee public hearing and a citizens' guide to participation in a public hearing.

3.2.2d. A parliamentary internship program for recent university graduates and graduate students. Interns serve in both the national and provincial parliaments, with national interns serving mainly as committee staff and provincial interns in a variety of assignments including website and database development. As the PLSP program drew to a close, 98 interns had served in the program, 58 in the National Parliament and 40 in the four Provincial Assemblies. Awareness of the program and interest in it grew very rapidly during 2006 and 2007, resulting in huge increases in program applications. As a result, the program has become extremely competitive and selective, with only 21 of 412 applicants selected for the most recent internships in the National Parliament, five of 97 in NWFP, and similar percentages in the other three Provincial Assemblies.

Perhaps PLSP's single most impressive individual success story concerns an intern from rural Pakistan who, prior to his selection as an intern, had failed the country's civil service entry exam and, after being selected for and serving as a parliamentary intern retook the exam and received the highest score attained by anyone in more than twenty years. The intern attributed his success to the experience and training that he gained through his service in the PLSP internship program.

3.2.2e. Assistance to parliamentary libraries including facilitation of a merger of the Senate and National Assembly libraries, the purchase of new or upgraded equipment and software, a start on the digitization of old parliamentary records, and the beginning installation of a common library management (KOHA) system for use in both the national and provincial libraries.

3.2.2f. Facilitation of several Senate committee, and at least one provincial committee, Policy Dialogues in which academic and civil society experts were invited to address committee members on a specific matter within the committee's jurisdiction. In addition to providing the committee members with valuable expert input from outside the parliament, the Policy Dialogues served as a demonstration to committees of the value of public hearings which, if held, could increase both parliamentary transparency and linkage with the people. One internationally recognized Pakistani journalist and author whose books have been published worldwide and who was invited to address a committee at one of the dialogues remarked that it was the first time that the parliament or government had ever asked for his thoughts on a major policy issue. He said that he found the approach refreshing and offering promise for future openness of the parliamentary process.

3.2.2g. Sponsorship of a conference of area study centers that brought together private and academic research groups and individuals to meet and talk with parliamentarians and staff concerning possible future collaboration in public policy review and development.

3.2.3 Oversight/Accountability. The evaluation team found the following to be PLSP's most impressive accomplishment in the oversight/accountability area:

3.2.3a. Budget process and budget analysis training for members and staff, with workshops conducted in Islamabad for the Senate and National Assembly and in each of the provincial capitals for the Provincial Assemblies.

3.2.4 Management/Infrastructure. The evaluation team found the following to be the most impressive PLSP accomplishments in the management/infrastructure area:

3.2.4a. The establishment of a Parliamentary Information Technology Resource Center (PITRC) in each Provincial Assembly and the upgrading of the existing Parliament Resource Center (PRC) in Islamabad. After the establishment of PIPS, the creation and upgrade of these centers is arguably the most significant accomplishment of the PLSP program in terms of long-term sustainability. The purpose of the centers is to provide information resource assistance to parliamentary members and staff. PLSP's excellent provincial coordinators operate out of their respective resource centers, with two PLSP-supported staff persons providing coordination in the Islamabad center. Each center includes several computer terminals provided by PLSP with free Internet access. PLSP reports that member use of the centers is reportedly heavy and continually increasing, PLSP figures indicate that use of all five centers has steadily increased. Because of the dissolution of five of the six bodies and the ongoing preparations for the January election, it was impossible for the evaluation team to make an independent assessment of the extent of member use of these impressive facilities.

3.2.4b. English language enhancement and information technology training courses for members and staff. The evaluation team was extremely impressed with an English language class for Balochistan Secretariat staff that it attended and observed in Quetta.

3.2.4c. The provision of a vast array of equipment and software, including computer terminals, transcription, recording and printing equipment that can be used in creating and editing transcripts of plenary session debates and other important documentation, and the upgrading of some print shops and press galleries. PLSP has also assisted all four Provincial Assemblies in establishing permanent connections to high speed Internet.

3.2.4d. Upgrading the recording and editing capacities of the reporting and audio sections of the Senate and National Assembly.

3.2.4e. The design of information technology software for the NWFP Provincial Assembly, and the redesign of existing software in the Sindh and Balochistan Provincial Assemblies.

3.2.5. Training Modules. In conjunction with its activities in the four assistance areas, PLSP has developed seven comprehensive permanent training modules that will be available for use by local trainers that have been and are being trained through the PLSP program. The modules cover the areas of effective committees, public hearings, budget process and review, question hour, media relations, legislative management, and parliamentary privileges. The evaluation team conducted cursory examinations of some of the modules and found them comprehensive and capable of utilization as effective training tools if administered by a qualified trainer.

3.3 Performance Measurement

Any meaningful measurement of PLSP program success must be undertaken within the context of the historical mindset, addressed in detail in Section 2, of strong executives and comparatively weak, and at times powerless, parliamentary bodies that has existed throughout Pakistan's sixty years as an independent nation.

A review of PLSP's Performance Management Plan (PMP) and of its 2007 PMP Reporting Matrix indicates that the project achieved or exceeded most performance indicator levels, some by substantial margins. The few levels that were not achieved mostly related to the National Assembly and were missed by narrow margins, with most based on data from a unstructured legislator survey, the response to which was so small as to make the results somewhat suspect. (See, also, Section 3.4.1 concerning National Assembly response to the PLSP program.)

In evaluating the success of a legislative capacity-building program, it is important to be mindful that quantitative measurements (such as how big an increase there has been in the number of bills passed) can often be misleading. Qualitative measurements, while inevitably subjective, can often prove more meaningful and accurate. For example if the National Parliament were in its next session to enact only two bills—a parliamentary service law and a budget process law (see Sections 4.3.3c and 4.3.4b)—the PLSP

program could be deemed a huge success in terms of the parliament's institutional empowerment and its establishment of independence from the government.

3.4 Problem Areas

The evaluation team found virtual universal praise from legislators, Secretariat staff and other stakeholders for all aspects of the PLSP program. By every standard, its activities appear outstanding in effectively addressing their intended purposes, a tribute to PLSP's outstanding staff, thorough project organization, and careful preparation. Problem areas identified by the team fall primarily in the administrative area, with a few minor and easily correctable program matters.

3.4.1 Access to National Parliament. PLSP has encountered some difficulty in gaining authorization for the automatic access to the National Parliament that it has been granted by all four Provincial Assemblies. The program staff has been required to go through a sometimes time-consuming process of calling the offices of the Senate or National Assembly Secretaries to request approval for building access every time that they have reason to come to the Parliament. The PLSP program leadership says that it has never been denied access, only that the procedure it has to go through is slow and cumbersome compared to the automatic access that their provincial coordinators have to Provincial Assembly facilities.

PLSP's inability to receive automatic access to the National Assembly may be symptomatic of a few other fairly minor problems that it has encountered with regard to the body. It is likely that these problems relate to the National Assembly's being the legislative body closest to the federal government, which is not likely to be very enthusiastic about the thought of parliamentary empowerment (see, also, Section 2, above, and Section 3.4.6). Nevertheless, this situation appears to have been significantly alleviated by the recent retirement of a National Assembly Secretary who was not particularly cooperative with program officials and the appointment of a new Secretary who has demonstrated much stronger support for the program.

The process required to gain access to Senate offices does not appear to have had any adverse impact on the PLSP program as the percentage of senators who have participated in at least one of its program activities is the highest of any of the six legislative bodies.

3.4.2 Focal Persons. As indicated in Section 3.1.3, the designation of a focal person in each parliamentary house through whom PLSP project staff can channel program communications with the house's top leadership has produced mixed results. The concept would seem to make good sense, particularly if the focal person has a good working relationship with PLSP staff and enjoys easy access to the Secretary of the house, something that clearly appears to be the case in the Sindh and NWFP Provincial Assemblies.

3.4.3 Selection of Activity Participants. All of the parliamentary houses insist on making final determinations concerning the selection of individual members and Secretariat staff who attend individual PLSP activities. This insistence appears to have on occasion prevented PLSP from including a particularly promising legislators or staff in an activity because the parliamentary leaders or the Secretary will not grant their approval. There are some indications that focal persons have used their positions to secure approval for personal friends on the Secretariat staff to attend an activity while preventing attendance by some staff that PLSP feel would benefit more from the activity and better use the training to contribute to building the performance capacity of their Secretariat.

3.4.4 Lack of Institutional Identity among Secretariat Staff. Secretariat staff are treated as part of the Pakistan civil service and, as such, are subject to transfer or rotation from government ministries to the parliament and then back to a ministry. The evaluation team found that the civil service utilizes this rotation process with some frequency with regard to the Secretariat staff of the National Parliament. Such rotations appear to take place with considerably less frequency in the Provincial Assembly Secretariats. Particularly at the federal level, this situation serves to focus the institutional identity of Secretariat staff on the civil service system rather on the parliament, thereby hindering the development of a full parliamentary identity and an institutional loyalty among staff. Such rotations also hinder establishment of a vital institutional continuity that a parliamentary staff can provide as parliaments and their members come and go. This is a matter that could be addressed during an extended PLSP program (see Section 4.3.4b).

3.4.5 Balochistan Provincial Assembly TA/DA Support. The Balochistan Ministry of Finance has declined to cover TA/DA (transportation allowance/daily allowance) support for its Provincial Assembly members and staff to attend PLSP program activities in Islamabad and other provincial capitals. At the beginning of calendar year 2007, PLSP informed the leaders and Secretaries of all six parliamentary houses that, beginning on July 1, 2007, they would be expected to assume responsibility for TA/DA for their members and staff. All of the provinces except for Balochistan have done so. Secretariat staff in Balochistan, including the PLSP focal person, say that their province is poor, cannot get their finance ministry to agree to take responsibility for these expenses, and that PLSP should therefore continue to cover them. But these staff members also admit that their government covers out-of-country TA/DA for members and staff to attend meetings and programs of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) that, unlike USAID, provides no capacity-building financial or technical support to the Provincial Assembly. While Balochistan is a poor province compared to Punjab and Sindh, the Assembly and government of NWFP—the province most similar to Balochistan—have accepted responsibility for the coverage of TA/DA for its members and staff after July 1, 2007.

3.4.6 Lack of Full National Assembly Support of The PLSP Internship Program. Some Secretariat staff of the National Assembly have failed to fully embrace the PLSP internship program which, as indicated in Section 3.2.2 has become highly competitive

and selective. Some of this attitude may be a legacy of the recently retired Secretary who was not as supportive of PLSP as is his successor. From meetings and discussions with the National Parliament interns and Secretariat staff and a review of intern work assignments and activities, the evaluation team believes that an underlying cause of this situation is probably Secretariat staff discomfort with the high quality and quantity of work done by the interns and a concern of how this may reflect on their own work products.

3.4.7 Donor Coordination. Some communication problems that PLSP has encountered with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) program to assist the National Parliament were addressed in Section 3.1.5. As indicated in that section, the evaluation team did not find PLSP to be the responsible party for any of these problems. Rather, the PLSP Project Director is taking the lead in trying to establish better communication links with her UNDP counterpart (this was confirmed by the UNDP Project Director) to improve resource coordination and minimize unnecessary and unproductive activity duplication.

3.4.8 Tailoring Workshop Training To Local Conditions. The evaluation team's discussions with members and staff indicated that the PLSP budget training workshops were deemed among the program's most helpful and valuable workshop programs. Those who attended them indicated that the workshops have generated an understanding of the constitutional power and authority of the national and provincial parliaments in the budget area and of the role that the parliament can play in budget formulation and review.

There were a few expressions from the Provincial Assemblies of Balochistan and NWFP that the budget training they received may have been a bit too complex for their members and staff. Those expressing this view suggested it would have been helpful if the training in these two assemblies might have been presented with some minor variations on a slightly less sophisticated level than in the National Assembly and the Punjab and Sindh Assemblies.

In a similar vein, there were also some expressions from a few participants in the research training workshops provided by a highly experienced two-person international team from the United States and Canada (see Section 3.2.2) that the training might have been more tailored to the particular conditions and circumstances of Pakistan's parliamentary bodies. This could be addressed in the future by bringing the international consultants to the country for a week of orientation and meetings, and discussion before the commencement of training activity.

3.4.9 Secretariat Staff and Parliamentary Intern Access to Parliamentary Libraries. The evaluation team was surprised to learn that only legislators and Secretariat research staff are allowed to use the parliamentary libraries. While none of the libraries that were visited have large collections, the collections are nevertheless relevant to the work and activity engaged in by parliamentary interns and many other Secretariat staff. Limiting access to these collections to the very small number of researchers in each Secretariat is counterproductive to the goal of building each parliament's internal capacity.

3.4.10 Cultural Communication Issues. A couple of instances were brought to the attention of the evaluation team in which a lack of full appreciation of cultural differences created misunderstanding or confusion in sensitive communications between PLSP leadership and parliamentary officials. Such situations could be avoided through use of a respected senior local person such as PLSP's Senior Technical Adviser, a former National Assembly Secretary, to assist in facilitating sensitive communications that have the potential for resulting in misunderstandings (see, also, Section 4.2.10).

4. The PLSP Program beyond March 31, 2008

4.1 Extension of PLSP Program

As indicated in Section 3.2, the evaluation team believes that the PLSP program has amassed a large and extremely impressive array of accomplishments during its two and one-half years of operation. Given this record of success, and with Pakistan sitting at a potentially historic crossroads that is expected to bring in a new civilian government, a new National Assembly, and a new Provincial Assembly in each of the country's four provinces, it makes eminent sense to continue the PLSP program and build on the groundwork that it has provided toward parliamentary empowerment and parliamentary responsiveness to the Pakistani people. Representative of the overwhelming across-the-board support that the evaluation team found from legislators, Secretariat staff, government officials, and civil society and media representatives for additional capacity building activity in virtually every area are the results in the check list of options, shown to selected interviewees, in question 9 of the PLSP Program Questionnaire (Appendix D).

Particularly because of the anticipated election of a number of new leaders and the likely influx of a large number of inexperienced first term legislators who will want and need immediate and extensive orientation and training, it is of critical importance that USAID make a strong effort to assure that the PLSP program will not just continue, but continue with no break from the end of the current program to the commencement of the extension. The new parliamentary bodies will be the first in Pakistan's history that will come into office with a successful on-going capacity building program in place, and a hiatus or gap of even short duration would be highly counterproductive to the momentum and interest that has been generated by the PLSP program during its 31 months of operation.

The evaluation team believes that it would be important for an extended PLSP program to repeat and continue some of the activities that have been found to be most successful and useful during the current program, both for newly elected legislators and for returning members who were unable to participate in them when they were initially offered.

4.2 Matters for Consideration in an Extended PLSP Program

The following are matters that the evaluation team believes important for consideration in an extended PLSP program.

4.2.1 New Member Orientation. While some of the PLSP New Member Orientation Program will be conducted before project closedown if the parliamentary election is held, as currently re-scheduled, in mid February, at least some portions of it are certain to be uncompleted and would carry into an extended program. For reasons addressed in Section 4.3.2a, the evaluation team suggests that the tentative intention, based on member

and staff requests, that separate orientation sessions be held for parliamentarians and Secretariats be reexamined. (See, also, Section 4.3.6)

4.2.2 Parliamentary Commitment to Ownership of Capacity-Building. During an extended PLSP program, it would be important that parliamentary leaders demonstrate a commitment to assume ownership of capacity-building institutions and activities. This would include a willingness to provide adequate funding from parliamentary budgets to support the permanent operation of the Pakistan Institute or Parliamentary Studies (PIPS). USAID will provide interim support for PIPS until the conclusion of the current PLSP project, but a parliamentary commitment to permanent support is critical if PIPS is to become the sustainable parliamentary training and research institution that it is intended to be (see, also, Sections 3.2.2a and 4.3.2b).

In the same vein, the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies must be demonstrate a willingness to gradually assume responsibility for payment of parliamentary intern stipends if this highly successful and valuable program is to become a permanent fixture.

The unwillingness of the Balochistan Ministry of Finance to cover TA/DA for Provincial Assembly members and staff to attend PLSP programs in Islamabad and the other provincial capitals was addressed in Section 3.4.5. The evaluation team found it difficult to be sympathetic to the situation once it became clear that the Balochistan government liberally covers TA/DA for member and staff to attend Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) meetings and other international activities. PLSP's July 1-September 30, 2007 quarterly report indicated that the Program Director has provided the Balochistan Assembly Secretariat with a wording formula that could be used to resubmit its request to the Ministry of Finance for approval for TA/DA reimbursement. It is hoped that this strategy would result in a commitment by the ministry in an extended PLSP program.

4.2.3 Full Program Participation for The AJK Assembly. Beginning in the second year of the PLSP program, the Assembly of the autonomous region of AJK was accepted as an unofficial program participant. Since that time, it has covered TA/DA for its members and staff to attend and participate in PLSP training workshops. The Speaker and Secretary of the AJK Assembly have expressed a strong desire to be accepted as a full program participant in an extended PLSP program. They indicated to the evaluation team that they are prepared to cover TA/DA for member and staff program participation.

4.2.4 Focal Persons. The mixed record of the use of focal persons in the six parliamentary bodies has been addressed in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.4.2. As previously indicated, the concept makes sense, with the alternative of PLSP project leaders having no means of access to the Secretary and top leaders other than through direct contact being highly risky. The evaluation team cannot offer a preferable alternative. In an extended program, PLSP's project leaders should seek to have some input into the selection of focal persons, and should also seek commitments from the Secretaries and

Speakers to relieve focal persons of some of their regular responsibilities to assure them adequate time to work with PLSP staff on program planning and administration.

4.2.5 PLSP Access to National Parliament Building. The process that PLSP program leaders have to go through to gain access to the National Parliament Building in Islamabad was addressed in Section 3.4.1. At the outset of an extended program, the program leaders should try to address this problem by seeking authorization from the Senate Chairman, National Assembly Speaker and the two Secretaries for passes to the Parliament Building.

4.2.6 A National Parliament Coordinator. In an extended program, PLSP project leaders might consider appointment of a National Parliament coordinator similar to those that PLSP now has in each Provincial Assembly. The Project Director has effectively filled this role for the past two and one-half years, with the Deputy Project Director coordinating the work of the provincial coordinators. A National Parliament coordinator could alleviate some of the enormous burden placed on the Project Director in overseeing and coordinating an extremely comprehensive and wide-ranging program.

4.2.7 Procurement Officer. In an extended PLSP program, consideration might also be given to the appointment of a procurement officer to handle equipment needs and purchases. If an extended PLSP program were to proceed as indications are that it would, two major activities will be the provision of advice and assistance in the development of the new PIPS facility, and the likely installation in at least some, if not all, of the parliamentary plenary chambers of equipment to provide for live broadcasts of proceedings. These activities alone would figure to require special expertise and major commitments of time. When added to other project needs such as the assessment future parliamentary technology requirements and the importance of familiarity with licensing agreements and customs issues, a convincing case can be made for full time program officer with expertise in the procurement area.

4.2.8 Parliamentarians Understanding Of Their Role and Authority. A recurring theme in the evaluation team's discussions with members, staff, journalists, and civil society representatives was that members of both the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies need assistance in developing a clearer understanding the "role of a parliamentarian" and of their constitutional and legal authority. These matters have been touched upon in many PLSP program activities. In an extended program that is likely to include large numbers of inexperienced first-term members, this focus will be more important than ever. Sessions specifically addressing this issue should be included in the New Member Orientation agenda, and each member activity in an extended program should include this as a component.

4.2.9 Donor/Implementer Coordination. The matter of donor coordination and some problems that PLSP's project leaders have experienced with communication from the director of the UNDP assistance program to the National Parliament have been addressed in Sections 3.1.5 and 3.4.7 (see, also, Section 4.1.3e, below). In an extended PLSP, the program leaders should continue to take the lead and initiative currently being taken by

PLSP's Program Director in promoting full exchange and communication with UNDP's program director to improve resource coordination and minimize unnecessary and unproductive activity duplication.

4.2.10 Cultural Communication Issues. The potential for encountering difficulty in sensitive communications with parliamentary leaders due to cultural differences was addressed in Section 3.4.10. As suggested there, the leaders of an extended PLSP might consider drawing upon a respected senior local person such as PLSP's current Senior Technical Adviser to assist in the facilitation of communications that it might consider particularly sensitive and subject to misunderstanding.

4.2.11 Public Disconnect From The Parliament. Discussions with approximately fifty of Karachi's leading business and intellectual leaders during the evaluation team's attendance at a joint meeting of five of the city's Rotary Clubs indicated a strong disconnect between these individuals and their national and provincial parliament. In 2005, a decision was made by USAID to shift the focus of the PLSP program away from some apparently less than fully successful outreach activities that were a major component of the predecessor World Vision assistance program to internal activities that would enhance information resources and access for members and staff. The evaluation team agrees that this decision was probably an appropriate one in 2005, but believes that, if the program is extended to support newly elected parliaments in Islamabad and the provinces, public outreach activities should now become a priority program component.

Because, in many countries, political parties often provide public outreach support for their members, an extended PLSP program should explore the possibility (suggested in Section 4.3.1c, below), of collaboration on some activities in this area with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) whose Pakistan program focuses on political party development

4.3 Suggested Activities for an Extended PLSP Program

While USAID and program leadership would be best able to determine specific activities of an extended PLSP program, the evaluation team, on the basis of its four-week examination of the program and discussions with well over two hundred individuals in Islamabad and the four provincial capitals, suggests consideration of the following as priority activities in PLSP's four program areas.

4.3.1 Representation. It is suggested that activity in the representation program area be significantly expanded if the PLSP program is extended, with the following to be targeted as priority activities.

4.3.1a. Support for the establishment of live broadcasts of plenary sessions and possibly other official activities of the Senate, National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies. This is an area in which a recent public opinion poll indicates the Pakistani people have great interest. In response to a question that the International Republican Institute (IRI)

placed on its most recent quarterly public survey of Pakistani public opinion at the request of PLSP, 81% of respondents said that they would be likely to watch live broadcasts of National Parliament sessions were they to be offered (by province, the figures were 69% in Balochistan, 63% in NWFP, 73% in Sindh, and 89% in Punjab). With such interest, it would be hoped that all six parliamentary bodies would be responsive to this strongly expressed public desire.

At the time of this evaluation, the Senate Finance Committee special subcommittee on broadcasting has been established and has given indication of its readiness to begin serious examination of the matter of live broadcasts of Senate plenary sessions. Among areas in which PLSP assistance might be provided to the subcommittee and to the other legislative bodies if they indicate interest would be provision of international consultants to help in a decision of whether to have a dedicated C-Span type channel that would allow virtually unlimited coverage or to operate through existing commercial stations that would figure to mean more limited coverage, and additional consultant assistance in the development of telecast guidelines and in the identification of appropriate equipment and hardware.

4.3.1b. Assistance in the expanded utilization of committee public hearings, building on the work begun during the current program. Additional PLSP-facilitated Policy Dialogues similar to those conducted on several occasions during 2007 would offer an ideal venue for jump-starting the expanded use of public hearings by continuing to demonstrate their value as a means of acquiring valuable expertise from outside the parliament and, just as importantly, establishing an all-important dialogue linkage between the parliament and those it represents and serves. As indicated in Section 4.2.11, public disconnect from its parliamentary bodies is a matter that needs to be addressed by all of Pakistan's parliamentary houses.

4.3.1c. Further addressing the matter of citizen disconnect from their parliaments through the provision of public outreach and communication training for members and staff, with the training to focus on such matters as how parliamentarians can develop positive working relationships with journalists and reporters, effective constituent relations including district constituent meetings, preparation and dissemination of newsletters, and the establishment of individual member websites. As suggested in Section 4.2.11, such training might be conducted cooperatively with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in conjunction with its political party development program.

4.3.1d. Continued parliamentary reporting and budget process training for journalists, with the addition of sessions on understanding the intricacies and nuances of the democratic parliamentary process. Discussions with virtually every journalist who had attended PLSP training in these areas included strong requests for their being repeated for colleagues who were previously unable to attend them

A number of journalists with whom the evaluation team spoke indicated that they and their colleagues would benefit greatly from parliamentary process training. In a nation that, like Pakistan, has not experienced a long uninterrupted history of parliamentary

democracy, reporters and journalists assigned to cover parliamentary activities will almost always lack an in-depth understanding of the complexities and intricacies of the parliamentary process. They may, for example, mistakenly see a lack of neatness in the process and the slow pace at which it often operates as evidence of an ineffective system. As journalists and reporters develop a more in-depth understanding and appreciation of the workings of the parliamentary process, it can be expected that the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies can expect to see a noticeable improvement in the quality and accuracy of their reports.

4.3.1e. In Islamabad and in each of the provincial capitals, the evaluation team was asked by almost all women legislators with whom it met to suggest that an extended PLSP program include gender-focused programs for women legislators, addressing such topics as how to effectively advocate for gender issues, effective constituent service, and contacts with fellow women legislators from around the country and with women legislators from other countries. This has been an area in which the UNDP legislative assistance program has done some work in the National Parliament. But the UNDP program does not include assistance to Provincial Assemblies, meaning that any UNDP activity has not extended to women members of these bodies. The widespread interest that the evaluation team found among women legislators for PLSP inclusion of this area of assistance in an extended program would suggest that Provincial Assembly women legislator programs be included as a component of an extended program, and that PLSP leaders at least explore the possibility of some cooperative assistance programs in the National Parliament.

4.3.2 Lawmaking. The following activities that fall under the lawmaking heading are suggested for an extended PLSP program.

4.3.2a. Sponsorship and facilitation of New Member Orientation programs for the new parliaments scheduled that will take office in early 2008. If the election is held as scheduled in January 2008, PLSP plans to begin orientation activities during the final weeks of its program. It plans to hold sessions in Islamabad and in each provincial capital, with provincial sessions tailored to the specific circumstances and situation of the individual Provincial Assembly. PLSP has utilized a series of focus groups provide guidance in its determination of tentative agendas. Given the magnitude of this undertaking, it seems unlikely that the orientations could be completed before the project's scheduled March 31 closedown.

PLSP has received feedback that separate orientation sessions should be held for members and staff. The evaluation team believes that this would be a mistake. Parliamentarians, particularly newly elected ones, and staff need to see each other as a team that works together—with staff assisting members—in addressing problems on behalf of the people. Separating members and staff in an orientation session at the very outset of a new parliament sends the wrong message to both and can serve to discourage rather than encourage the development of cooperative working relationships. (See, also, Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.6 concerning the orientation of new members.)

4.3.2b. Assistance in the development of PIPS as a permanent institution. PLSP activities might cover assistance to the PIPS board of governors in the development of guidelines on PIPS/Secretariat coordination and on how PIPS services will be provided to the Provincial Assemblies from its Islamabad headquarters, training of the PIPS staff that will become the permanent training unit for parliamentarians and staff, the identification of equipment for PIPS new headquarters building (the construction of which is to be funded by USAID), and at least a partial continuation of the Secretariat-type services that have been provided to PIPS by PLSP during 2006 and 2007 as the institute gradually builds and trains its staff. (See, also, Sections 3.2.2a and 4.2.2.)

4.3.2c. Continuation of the parliamentary internship program, the interest in which has skyrocketed as Pakistani graduates become aware of it. Special consideration should be given to increasing the number of interns in the Provincial Assemblies, all of which indicate a strong interest in additional internship assistance.

4.3.2d. While the reluctance of all six parliamentary bodies to commit sufficient of their Secretariat resources to committee staff support is a hindrance to expanded committee activity, committee development should, nevertheless, continue to be a major component of an extended PLSP program. Suggested priorities in this area should be support for expanded public hearings (Section 4.3.1b, above), chairperson training particularly for new committee chairs, and member awareness training on effective parliamentary committees. The PLSP program leadership has suggested the utilization of effective committee operations workshops for rank-and-file committee members as a possible means of pushing reluctant or passive chairpersons to action.

4.3.2e. Continued Secretariat training in drafting and research, both of which are essential qualities for an effective independent parliament.

The number of current researchers in each parliamentary body is inadequate, with the evaluation team told that there are a total of only seven in the Senate, five in the National Assembly, and comparable or fewer numbers in the Provincial Assemblies. As PIPS develops its staff, it can be expected to provide additional supplementary support. But in the meantime, training of existing research staff should be a priority.

The importance for each of Pakistan's parliamentary bodies to have an in-house capability to draft legislation and proposed amendments cannot be overemphasized. The internal capacity to draft legislation and amendments is an essential element for any parliamentary or legislative body that wants to have the capability to initiate public policy and programs and not be limited simply to ratification or rejection of government proposals. The twelve trainers that emerged from PLSP's training program (see Section 3.2.2) mark a promising start in this direction, a start that it would be important to build upon during an extended program.

4.3.2f. With the inauguration of a new National Assembly in Islamabad and new assemblies in the four provinces, some and perhaps all of the bodies parliamentary bodies will have new leaders, and all will be required to adopt new rules of procedure soon after

its members take their oaths of office. This would be an ideal time to offer assistance from international experts experienced in parliamentary and legislative rules of procedure in the writing new rules for the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies (because the Senate is a continuing body, it would not be adopting new rules, but consultant assistance could certainly be also offered to its leaders if they express an interest in revision of their house rules).

4.3.3 Oversight/Accountability. With one exception, suggested priority activities in the oversight/accountability area involve basic continuation of successful activities undertaken during the program’s current phase.

4.3.3a. Budget training for members and staff was frequently cited as the most worthwhile, important, and well-conducted PLSP training activity by those who attended the sessions. It was also frequently suggested as a priority activity for an extended program.

As indicated in Section 3.4.8, the evaluation team suggests that budget workshops conducted during an extended PLSP program should be structured and presented on a slightly less sophisticated level for the Balochistan and NWFP Assemblies than for the National Parliament and the Punjab and Sindh Assemblies.

4.3.3b. Closely related to budget training and equally important to it, but also distinct from it, would be member and staff training on parliamentary oversight of the government.

The evaluation team feels it important that oversight training in an extended PLSP program emphasize to members and staff that effective parliamentary oversight involves more than just budget review—that a parliament’s approval of the government’s budget is only what might be termed its “before” role in the oversight process, its establishment of government spending priorities and its authorization of the means and methods of collecting revenue to cover these expenses. Oversight training must emphasize that the process also involves the “after” role—a look back by the parliament, often through its committees—at the activities, spending, and performance of government ministries to determine whether budget funds a) have been spent as the parliament intended, b) have been administered effectively, c) whether there has been waste, inefficiency, or corruption, and d) to generally determine what value and benefits the people have gotten from the funds and programs authorized by the parliament.

4.3.3c. Compared to many other countries, the Pakistan Constitution rather severely limits the authority of the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies in the area of budget review. PLSP program staff have pointed out, however, that parliamentary enactment of national and provincial budget laws defining parliamentary authority within these constitutional parameters could serve to provide significant latitude that neither the national nor the provincial bodies do not now have. Should the leaders of the national and/or provincial assemblies express interest in the exploring the possible adoption of

parliamentary budget laws, an extended PLSP program should be prepared to offer assistance in their design.

To cite just one significant example of how a parliamentary budget law could allow for more extensive parliamentary budget review, Articles 80 and 120 of the Constitution provide that the federal and provincial governments must submit their annual budget statements to their parliaments for their consideration. But the Constitution does not specify dates by which the statements must be submitted. Government budget statements are, therefore, usually sent to the parliaments at such late dates as to allow only a very short timeframe (usually no more than a couple of weeks) for parliamentary examination before the onset of the new fiscal year. A parliamentary budget law could require that the budget statements be submitted to the parliament by specific dates that would allow for more meaningful examination than is currently possible.

4.3.3d. If the members of the National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies are serious in their often-expressed desire to play a more significant role in budget formulation, and oversight, they will require professional staff in assistance in this area within their respective Secretariats. An extended PLSP program could provide assistance in development of this concept and in follow-up establishment of parliamentary budget offices.

4.3.3e. PLSP's question time training has been deemed almost as important and valuable as its budget training by those members who have attended its sessions. Question time has traditionally been the only area in which Pakistani parliamentarians have exercised any significant oversight of the government. As such, continued training in this area would be of paramount importance.

4.3.4 Management/Infrastructure. The following are suggested priority activities in the management/infrastructure program area.

4.3.4a. PLSP program leaders and Secretariat information technology staff feel strongly that an important focus of an extended program should be completion of the establishment of an interconnect of all six parliamentary information systems. A complete interconnect would enable such capacity-building activities as video conferencing and shared exchanges of information, and would facilitate live Internet coverage of plenary sessions and non-closed committee meetings.


4.3.4b. The lack of a strong institutional identity and loyalty among Secretariat staff was addressed in Section 3.4.4. PLSP's Parliamentary Service Working Group has examined the matter of adoption of a parliamentary service law, and the evaluation team believes that this examination should be continued in an extended PLSP program.

The evaluation team did not find it widely understood by national parliamentarians or their Secretariat staff that Article 87 of the Pakistan Constitution provides that both the Senate and National Assembly "shall have a separate Secretariat" and that the Parliament "may by law regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to

the secretarial staff of either house.” The establishment of Senate and National Assembly Secretariats that will be independent of the civil service, that will be institutionally loyal to the Parliament, and that will assure institutional continuity and memory could therefore be addressed through the National Parliament’s enactment of a parliamentary service law that would clarify the full independence of the Parliament’s Secretariats. If the leaders of the Senate and National Assembly can be persuaded of the importance of such a law, an extended PLSP program should be prepared to offer assistance in its design.

4.3.4c. The evaluation team received many requests, from Secretariat staff in particular, that an extended PLSP program provide them and their respective houses with additional equipment and hardware—computers, printers, photocopiers, fax machines, transcribers, and recorders. As indicated in Section 3.2.4c, the current program has provided large amounts of such items to all six parliamentary bodies. The provision of additional such items should certainly be a component of an extended program. But this is also an area in which Pakistan’s parliaments could begin to demonstrate acceptance of ownership of their own capacity-building efforts. At least until such time as PIPS has been able to grow and develop, they will not possess the technical expertise and assistance that only a USAID-sponsored program like an extended PLSP could provide. Hardware and equipment could, however, be supplied as easily by the parliaments as by USAID. This is not to suggest that hardware and equipment should be excluded from an extended PLSP program, only that this is a financial commitment area in which parliamentary leaders and Secretaries can, and should, begin to accept near-term responsibility.

Appendix A – PLSP Project Organization Chart



Appendix B – Documents Reviewed

PLSP Task Order and DAI Contract

Memorandum of Understanding Between USAID and Secretariats Of Parliaments Of Pakistan For A Program Of Technical Assistance To Strengthen The Parliament Of Pakistan (October 25, 2005)

Constitution of Pakistan

Rules of Procedure of Senate, National Assembly, and Provincial Assemblies

DAI PLSP Year One Work Plan

DAI PLSP Year Two Work Plan

DAI PLSP No Cost Extension Work Plan

DAI PLSP Quarterly Reports

PLSP Performance Management Plan (PMP) and 2007 PMP Reporting Matrix

PLSP program documents

- detailed terms of reference and descriptions of PLSP activities and results
- PowerPoint presentations of PLSP program activities
- selected consultant reports, white papers, and memoranda
- handbooks and manuals prepared by PLSP consultants and staff
- selected meeting minutes of Legislative Development Steering Committees (LDSC) and Working Groups

Comparative Statement of Activities of the PLSP-USAID SPDP-UNDP

International Republican Institute (IRI) Fifth Annual Survey of Pakistan Public Opinion

Citizens Report: Performance of the 12th National Assembly of Pakistan, prepared by Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILAT), November 17, 2007

USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening

USAID/Pakistan Strategic Plan, May 2003-September 2006

Daily newspaper reports and commentaries during in-country period

Appendix C – Individuals Interviewed

USAID/Pakistan

- Saad Paracha, USAID Chief Technical Officer for the PLSP program
- Humaira Ashraf, USAID Deputy Chief Technical Officer for the PLSP program

PLSP Staff

- Eleanor Valentine; PLSP Project Director (Chief of Party)
- Christopher Shields, PLSP Deputy Project Director (Deputy Chief of Party)
- Jeremy Kanthor, PLSP United States Coordinator
- Aizaz Arif, PLSP Oversight Adviser
- Daud Malik, PLSP Representation Adviser
- Mudassar Alam, PLSP Intern Program Coordinator
- Sher Shah Farooq, PLSP IT Specialist
- Nadia Batool, PLSP Training Specialist
- Junaid Alam, PLSP PLSP Finance and Office Manager
- Arif Tabassum, PLSP Balochistan Coordinator
- Asifa Khan, PLSP Punjab Provincial Coordinator
- Huma Ikramullah, PLSP Sindh Coordinator
- Ashfaq Khan, PLSP NWFP Coordinator
- Khan Ahmed Goraya, former Secretary General of National Assembly, currently PLSP Chief Technical Adviser

Islamabad

- Raja Muhammad Ameen, Secretary, Senate
- Karamat Hussein Niazi, Secretary, National Assembly
- Syed Moshaid Hussain, member, Senate
- Jamil A Qureshi, Joint Secretary, Senate
- Muhammad Tahir Hanafi, Joint Secretary, National Assembly
- Bushra Nazli, Coordinator, PLSP Resource National Parliament Resource Center
- Nazeer Mahar, Research Officer, Senate
- Hamad Kazi, Legislation Branch, National Assembly
- Shaukat Aziz, former Prime Minister
- Salmon Shah, caretaker Minister of Finance
- Nasir Khosa, Secretary to caretaker Prime Minister
- M. Ismail Khan, development specialist, journalist, and columnist
- Fazalullah Qureshi, former Federal Secretary of Economic Affairs Division, Government of Pakistan
- PLSP interns, Senate and National Assembly
- Rehman Malik, political adviser to former prime Minister Benazir Bhutto,
- Shahzad Sharjeel, Sr. External Affairs Officer, The World Bank, Islamabad,
- Farhatullah Babar, former Senator
- Ammara Durrani, former editor of political economy page of the NEWS, currently Development Outreach Communication Specialist, USAID

- Pervaiz Ahmed , Program Manager Rural Development, Aga Khan Foundation, Islamabad
- Ejaz Qureshi, Secretary, Environment Ministry, former Chief Secretary, Sindh, former Chief Secretary, NWFP
- Marvi Sarmad, Country Director of UNDP Pakistan Parliament Project
- Ejaz Rahim, Caretaker Federal Minister for Health, member, Pakistan Planning Commission, and former Federal Cabinet Secretary
- Sheila Fruman, County Director, National Democratic Institute/Pakistan (NDI)
- Malis Orban, Executive Coordinator, National Democratic Institute/Pakistan (NDI)
- Tariq Junaid, Program Manager International Republican Institute/Pakistan (IRI)
- Glenn Cowan, Democracy International, USAID National Democratic Institute/Pakistan (NDI) Evaluation Team
- Bill Gallery, Democracy International, USAID National Democratic Institute/Pakistan (NDI) Evaluation Team
- Brian Katulis, Center for American Progress, USAID National Democratic Institute/Pakistan (NDI) Evaluation Team
- Zia Rehman Action Against Hunger, USAID National Democratic Institute/Pakistan (NDI) Evaluation Team

Punjab

- Anwar Bhinder, member, Senate
- Samia Amjad, member, Punjab PA
- Saeed Ahmed, Secretary, Punjab Assembly
- Malik Aftab Maqbool Joya, Assistant Secretary, Punjab PA
- Tariq Mehmood, Deputy Secretary, Library and IT Sections, Punjab PA
- Raja Riaz, press gallery Punjab PA, Chief Reporter, The Post
- Suleman Ghani, Chairman Planning and Development Board, Government of Punjab
- Bashir A Khan, Professor of Finance at Foreman Christian College, Lahore,

Balochistan

- Amanullah Karnani, Deputy Advocate General, Government of Balochistan, former Senator
- Abdul Karim Gorazai, Deputy Secretary, Balochistan PA
- Shamsuddin, Deputy Secretary, Balochistan PA
- Rehmatullah Jatak DS Committees
- Nazeer Panazai, Public Relations Officer, Balochistan PA
- Mir Baz Kakar, Research Officer, Balochistan PA
- Malik Muhammad Din, System Analyst, IT Wing, Balochistan PA
- Illahi Bux Jatak, Chief of Debates, Recording and Documentation, Balochistan PA
- Abid Mehmood, Facilitator, PLSP Drafting Course
- Suhail Ansari, facilitator, PLSP Legislative Drafting Course, Balochistan PA
- Instructor and participants, PLSP English Class, Balochistan PA
- PLSP Balochistan PA Interns
- Ayub Tareen, BBC Urdu and Pashto service, press gallery, Balochistan PA

- Syed Ali Shah, DAWN TV, press gallery, Balochistan PA
- Zulfiqar Guramani, KTV and Kawish newspaper, press gallery, Balochistan PA
- Javed Langha, Sindh TV, press gallery, Balochistan Assembly
- Syed M Hasan, free lance documentary expert, press gallery, Balochistan PA
- Abdul Raheem Ziaratwala, member Balochistan PA
- Shafiq Ahmed Khan, member, Balochistan PA
- Rahila Durrani, member Balochistan PA

Sindh

- Javaid R Laghari, Senator, Chairman Szabist Institute (Karachi)
- PLSP Legislative Drafting Course participants
- Abdullah Channa, Additional District and Sessions Judge, posted as Deputy Secretary Regulation, Sindh PA
- Kabir Leghari, Additional District and Sessions Judge, posted as Assistant Draftsmen Secretary, Law Department, Sindh PA
- Professor Akmal Wasim, Associate Professor, Hamdard Law College (Karachi)
- Hadi Bux Buriro, Secretary, Sindh PA
- Syed Talib Imam, member, Sindh PA
- Syeda Bano Siddiqui, member, Sindh PA
- Humera Alwani, member, Sindh PA
- Raheela Tiwana, Deputy Speaker, Sindh PA
- Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah, Speaker, Sindh PA
- Mian Haji Muhammed Hasan Shah, Committee Branch, Sindh PA
- Naila Inam, member, Sindh PA
- Rehana Nasreen, member, Sindh PA
- Kishwer Sultana, member, National Assembly
- Nisar Ahmed Khuhro, Opposition Leader, Sindh PA
- Anwar Ahmed Khan Mahar, member, Sindh PA,
- Abdul Qadir Qureshi, Associated Press of Pakistan (Karachi)
- Nadia Khalique, Muhammed Ali, PLSP interns, Sindh PA
- Syed Mohammed Abbas, Assistant Secretary Budget, Sindh PA
- Munazza Shakoor, Librarian, Sindh PA
- Syed Sajid Ahmed, IT and Website Director, Sindh PA
- Muhammed Atique, Chief Reporter, Sindh PA
- Ghulam Anwar Memon, Publication Officer, Sindh PA

Joint Meeting and Reception of Five Karachi (Sindh) Rotary Clubs

- Badruddin Fakhri, President, Rotary Club of Karachi South
- Arsalan Mahmood, President, Rotary Club of Karachi Bay
- Jawed Siddique, President, Rotary Club of Karachi Gateway
- Rana Zahid Habib, President, Rotary Club of Karachi Marina Gold
- Mustansar Bandukwala, President, Rotary Club of Karachi Defense

The joint clubs meeting was conducted by Khalid Ikramullah Khan, Co-Chairman of the Karachi Area Rotary Clubs District Committee. Approximately fifty members were in attendance and participated in a dialogue and discussion with the evaluation team.

NWFP

- Muhammad Mushtaq, Secretary, NWFP PA
- Amanullah Khan, Senior Additional Secretary, NWFP PA
- Attaullah Khan, Director Automation, NWFP PA
- Moulana Asmatullah Khan, Former Minister for Revenue and Religious Affairs, Government of NWFP
- Amanullah Khan, Deputy Secretary Administration, facilitator, PLSP drafting course, NWFP PA
- Participants of PLSP drafting course, NWFP PA
- PLSP NWFP PA interns
- Javed Iqbal, Additional Chief Secretary FATA, Government of NWFP
- Robert Traister, Senior Adviser, NASPAK, USA Embassy, NWFP,
- David Levinson, USAID/Pakistan, NWFP
- Siguard Hanson, former Chief of Party, USAID Pakistan parliamentary assistance program conducted by World Vision
- Shahid Khan, Daily Express, President Press Gallery, NWFP PA
- Abdul Rehman, Journalist, Secretary General Press Gallery, NWFP PA
- Kashifuddin, Coordinator, Press Gallery, NWFP PA
- Kifayatullah, Additional Secretary, NWFP PA
- Shagufta, PLSP Senior Legal Drafting Expert, Law Ministry, Government of NWFP

AJK Officials

- Shah Ghulam Qadir, Speaker of AJK Legislative Assembly and Caretaker President of AJK
- Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan, Secretary, AJK Legislative Assembly
- Amjad Abbasi, Deputy Secretary, AJK Legislative Assembly

Appendix D – Questionnaires Used In Interviews and Meetings

PLSP Program Questionnaire

Name (optional): _____

Position: _____

National Parliament: ___Senate ___National Assembly

Provincial Assembly (province)_____

1. There has been a great deal of criticism of Pakistan’s parliamentary bodies in recent days. What is your opinion of the effectiveness with which they have performed their constitutional responsibilities over the past several years?

2. From what you know of the PLSP program, what do you feel have been its greatest contribution(s) to strengthening the performance capacity of your parliamentary body (*or of Pakistan’s parliamentary bodies, if not a member or staff member of one of them*)?

3. Are you aware of the PLSP’s Legislative Development Steering Committee (LDSC) in your parliament? ___Yes ___No

If “yes”, do you think your parliament’s LDSC has had sufficient authority to approve PLSP activities? ___Yes ___No

USAID’s goal in utilizing LDSCs has been to have participatory and consultative inputs into PLSP activities, with LDSC decisions concerning such activities to be binding. Do you feel that the approach has worked in your parliament? ___Yes ___No

If “no”, do you have suggestions for how the approach could be restructured to achieve this goal?

4. The infrastructure of the Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Service (PIPS) that will provide institutional support for the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies has been agreed-upon. As PIPS begins to provide services to Senators, MNAs, and MPAs and their staffs over the next few years, what do you feel should be its top priorities in terms of the assistance that it provides? Capacity training for members and

staff? Research for committees and members? Bill and amendment drafting? Scholarly white papers on important issues? Administrative support? Other?

5. Are you familiar with the work of any of the PLSP Working Groups?

Yes, I serve on a Working Group (*Note: There is a separate questionnaire and set of questions for those who serve/served as members of Working Groups.*)

Yes, I am familiar with the Working Groups [If “Yes”, which one(s)?]

No, I am unfamiliar with the Working Groups

6. Are you aware of any specific changes or improvements made in the National Parliament or any of the Provincial Assemblies as a result of activity by any of the Working Groups? Please explain.

7. If you attended one of the PLSP-facilitated Policy Dialogues, do you feel that your attendance significantly helped you to better understand the issue that it addressed?

Yes No

8. If you attended a Policy Dialogue, which do you feel was its most important and beneficial aspect(s)?

It provided an ideal way for members to learn more about important issues

It provided an opportunity for dialogue and discussion between MPs and non-parliamentary experts and the news media

They were equally beneficial and important

9. If the PLSP project is extended, what degree of importance do you feel the program should accord to each of the following possible areas of focus:

Respondent Breakdown: Legislators (44%); Secretariat Staff (31%); Civil Society Representatives (11%); Media Representatives (8%); Government Officials (6%)

Activity	<i>Extremely Important</i>	<i>Somewhat Important</i>	<i>Not Important</i>
Workshops and training for members on how to utilize their constitutional power and authority to make their body more independent and more Effective	97%	3%	—
Workshops and training for members and staff on how to conduct effective parliamentary oversight of the government	83%	13%	4%
Support and assistance in the review and possible revision of house rules of procedure	57%	37%	6%
Workshops for top parliamentary leaders On the techniques of effective leadership	57%	13%	30%
Workshops and training for members and staff on how committees can most effectively perform their responsibilities	94%	3%	3%
Assistance in establishing parliamentary independence from the government over the size of its internal operating budget	62%	31%	7%
Sponsorship and coordination of new member orientation programs following parliamentary elections	83%	17%	—
Assistance in the day-to-day operation and Management of the parliamentary process	59%	38%	3%
Assistance in development of committee rules of procedure	67%	27%	6%
Support and guidance in the development of strategies to provide <i>sue motto</i> powers for all committees	44%	33%	23%

Activity	<i>Extremely Important</i>	<i>Somewhat Important</i>	<i>Not Important</i>
Support and assistance to committees in their expanded use of Policy Dialogues and/or public hearings	70%	27%	3%
Assistance in the design of a parliamentary Service law that would assure that staff appointments/promotions are based on merit	67%	27%	6%
Assistance in the development of parliamentary Services commissions to oversee staff hiring, Promotions, and other human resource activities	84%	13%	3%
Assistance in the development of a staff salary Schedule based on job importance, difficulty, And responsibility	40%	53%	7%
Support and assistance in eliminating existing requirements that there be a separate committee for each government ministry	47%	20%	33%
Assistance and training for members and staff in the techniques of bill and amendment drafting	84%	13%	3%
Assistance and training for members and staff in the budget process and techniques for effective review of government-proposed budgets	91%	9%	—
Workshops and one-on-one job training for Parliamentary staff	71%	23%	6%
Assistance and training for members and staff in the techniques of effective oversight of the government to make it more accountable to the parliament	84%	13%	3%
Workshops and training on how question time can be used to hold the government accountable to the parliament	87%	13%	—

Activity	<i>Extremely Important</i>	<i>Somewhat Important</i>	<i>Not Important</i>
Workshops and training for committee chairs on effective committee leadership	81%	13%	6%
Workshops and training for members and staff on how to develop good working relationships With the news media	78%	16%	6%
Workshops for journalists and reporters who cover parliamentary activities to help them develop a better understanding of how a democratic parliamentary process works	80%	20%	—
Assistance in improving legislative records Management, including software and hardware	87%	10%	3%
Assistance in the upgrading or expansion of parliamentary websites	87%	10%	3%
Roundtable discussions between members and Journalists and reporters to help each better Understand and appreciate the other's role and responsibilities	67%	30%	3%
Assistance in the development of procedures and processes that will provide for live television coverage of parliamentary plenary sessions and other parliamentary activities	66%	31%	7%
Assistance in expansion of parliamentary Libraries and in improvement of their services	80%	13%	7%
Assistance in achieving more transparency in Plenary sessions, committee meetings, public Hearings, etc.	87%	10%	3%
Computer skills training for members/staff	80%	17%	3%
Constituent relations training for members/staff	68%	29%	3%

Activity	<i>Extremely Important</i>	<i>Somewhat Important</i>	<i>Not Important</i>
English language enhancement courses for members and staff	70%	30%	—
Support for more direct exposure for members and staff with members and staff of other democratic parliaments	77%	23%	—

10. Do you have any other thoughts or suggestions concerning the PLSP program (concerning either its first two years or its possible extension)?

11. Do you have any suggestions for other knowledgeable individuals with whom we should meet concerning the PLSP program?

PLSP Working Group Questionnaire
(For Members of PLSP Working Groups)

Name (optional): _____

Position: _____

National Parliament: ___Senate ___National Assembly

Provincial Assembly (province): _____

1. On which Working Group do you serve (or did you serve)?

2. Has your service on your Working Group helped you to better perform your responsibilities? Please explain.

3. Has the work of your Working Group contributed to any changes in your parliament? Please explain.

4. If the PLSP program were extended, would you like to see your Working Group continued?

5. If “Yes” to #4, what specific areas would you suggest that the Working Group address during the extended program?

6. If your Working Group continues to operate, would you suggest any changes in its organization structure or operational format?

7. If the PLSP program is extended, would you suggest the establishment of additional Working Groups? If so, what should be their areas of focus?

Appendix E – Scope of Work

C.1. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION:

In 2005, USAID/Pakistan awarded a contract to Development Alternatives, Inc. to implement its current phase of assistance to strengthen the country's parliamentary governance. The Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Project, which is expected to end o/a March 2008, aims at improving the function of Pakistan's National Assembly, Senate and four Provincial Assemblies. As USAID looks toward the future and the possibility of its continued support for the development of parliamentary governance in Pakistan, it would like to aggregate lessons learned from the current phase of assistance and receive recommendations for future programming. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Pakistan requests a team to carry out an evaluation that will: a) identify areas of program strengths and weaknesses, b) determine accomplishments and the impact or progress towards achieving stated deliverables and objectives, c) assess the interface of the USAID project with parliamentary programs funded by other donors; and d) inform future direction of USAID/Pakistan's support to the legislature.

The product of this evaluation will be a final report that evaluates the successes (or otherwise) and lessons learned of recent programming and makes concrete recommendations for future assistance. Note: The use of the Contractor's report(s) and/or assessments in separate solicitations or follow-on programs such that they are directly predictable and lead without delay to the design of the separate solicitations or follow-ons may render the Contractor ineligible for such follow-on(s).

C.2. BACKGROUND:

USAID/Pakistan's Democracy and Governance (D/G) Program contributes to the U.S. Government's strategic goal of strengthening Pakistan's democratic institutions and practices. USAID's overall D/G program objectives are to help build a more participatory, representative and accountable democracy by strengthening key areas: legislatures at the national and provincial levels, political parties, election systems, and local governance.

In 2003, USAID/Pakistan conducted a democracy/governance assessment that would inform its upcoming phase of DG programming after nearly a decade-long hiatus in USAID presence in Pakistan. The assessment, and the strategy derived from that assessment, recognized that while parliament in Pakistan was historically weak, the potential for the institution to play a more meaningful role existed. This was based on several factors. First, the 2002 elections introduced a great deal of "new blood" into the parliament along with a sizable opposition, which increased the probability of the parliamentary houses becoming the deliberative bodies they should be. Second, a new quota system for women provided a toehold for their inclusion in parliamentary business more so than anytime in the past. Third, the newly elected members and staff stated a need for tools and technical assistance – especially in view of the fact that the parliament was being revived after three years of suspension.

USAID initiated its first post-9/11 parliamentary strengthening project in 2003. Led by World Vision and IFES along with a consortium of several local organizations, after one year of slow implementation, the Mission decided to shift to a new design and contract that held more promise for the project to attain its objectives.

The project that is currently being implemented has been in place since August 2005. Implemented by DAI, the project was designed to strengthen parliamentary processes related to and within Pakistan's legislative bodies: the National Assembly, Senate and four Provincial Assemblies. For the purposes of this activity, "strengthening legislatures in Pakistan" involved supporting incumbent as well as future members of national and provincial assemblies by insuring the development of leave-behind processes and capacities for their benefit. One of the results of this project was anticipated to be mechanisms and/or institution(s) that are able to provide training, orientations and briefings to members and staff of the respective houses. In addition, the activities delivered were to strengthen parliament's oversight capacity, lawmaking ability, and ability; to understand and represent the issues most important to lawmakers' constituents. The specific objectives of the program are: (1) Strengthen the capacity of parliamentary partners (members and staff) to effectively undertake representative, law-making and oversight functions at the national and provincial levels; (2) Enable effective use of research tools and the media by parliaments (3) Improve transparency and accountability in governance; and (4) Improve avenues for civil society, including the media, to access and contribute to the parliamentary processes.

To achieve these results, technical assistance and capacity building has been provided principally to benefit legislators in the National Assembly, Senate, and all four provincial legislative assemblies (Baluchistan, NWFP, Punjab and Sindh) and their staff. Priorities for assistance to each legislative body through the project were discussed with the leadership (including opposition leadership) of each beneficiary institution. Continuous guidance is provided by Legislative Development Steering Committees (LDSCs) both at the national and provincial levels. LDSC membership includes representatives of parliamentary parties and parliamentary secretariats.

The first phase of assistance to the parliamentary houses was viewed as an opportunity to a) assess firsthand the challenges and constraints faced by Pakistan's legislative bodies; b) gauge the commitment of the members and staff to strengthening their institution; and c) to lay the groundwork for future, more reform-oriented assistance. The evaluation will provide insight into these issues as well.

C.3. EVALUATION QUESTIONS:

In performing the evaluation, the Contractor will interview members of the USAID democracy/governance team, project implementation staff, members/staff of the various houses assisted through the project, and other donors/implementers, as appropriate. The Contractor will also review relevant documentation, in particular, the USAID/Pakistan Democracy/Governance Strategic Objective Agreement; the DAI contract, the project PMP, and documents/correspondence related to and produced by the project.

The following are the evaluation issues to be investigated and addressed by the Contractor:

1. Determine the accomplishments and the effectiveness of the subject programs in making progress towards achieving USAID Pakistan's DG Strategic Objective: ***More participatory, representative, and accountable democracy in Pakistan*** and the stated intermediate results. For example,
 - Examine the original assumptions used to justify USAID assistance to the Parliaments for relevance to the current political environment and make recommendations for

adjustments based on the current and future political dispensation; Review available data, related to legislative accomplishments in terms of a) staff training, b) strengthening the capacity of MPs and key committees, and how its capacity building has affected the Parliament's legislative and representative functions. Legislative accomplishments should be assessed in terms of Parliament's progress in general, and in terms of the progress that could be attributed to PLSP's assistance; impact of the budget workshops, Parliamentary Working Groups, the Parliamentary Interns program, expert database and research support for Committees by PLSP, the assistance in the province versus the national parliament; providing assistance for press galleries and training for journalists; Parliamentary Resource Centers and other equipment provided; and assess the quality of training materials and their utility for use in future by PIPS.

2. Assess the effectiveness of the various working relationships established with and among the stakeholders (USAID, project team, steering committees, secretariat, members, etc.) and make recommendations for improving working relationships in the future. For example:
 - Examine the project's ability to coordinate activities with the Parliaments, specifically the role of the national and provincial Legislative Development Steering Committees, provincial coordinators and project focal points.
3. Assess the sustainability of program interventions and possibilities for future interventions in policy work and suggest a design of legislative programs that would address the needs of USAID DG office in promoting parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. In this context, specifically look at the following:
 - Factors to be considered for making Pakistan Institute of Parliamentary Services (PIPS) a working reality and factors to be considered in realizing the broadcast of parliamentary proceedings

C.4. REFERENCES:

The preparatory work which the evaluators are expected to perform will at a minimum include the following:

- Document review: USAID Mission Strategy 2003-2007, relevant assessments (e.g. UNDP, PILDAT), Quarterly Reports, Annual Report, approved Performance Monitoring Plans, USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening (Feb. 2000), original contracts/cooperative agreements/grant agreements and relevant amendments, contractor/grantee reports (e.g. periodic, progress, etc.).
- Interviews : USAID mission staff with emphasis on DG SO team leader/members, other key members of the U.S. country team (e.g. Political Section/Consulate in Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar), Chief of Party and staff of current DAI contract, key donors including those supporting parliamentary development (DFID, UNDP), parliamentary staff members of National Assembly, Senate and provincial assemblies, members of LDSC, parliamentary

interns, representatives who have been participating in the budget workshops, participants of other training and capacity building activities,

- Site visits: PLSP office in Islamabad, National Assembly, Senate, provincial assemblies to the extent possible given the security situation (substituting with video-conference or telephone interviews where necessary and appropriate).
-