C-SAFE Zimbabwe
End of Program Evaluation

July 20, 2010

Submitted by:
TANGO International

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Acronyms/Abbreviations

ART	Antiretroviral therapy
CK	Community Kitchens
COP	Chief-of-Party
CRS	Catholic Relieve Services
C-SAFE	Consortium for the Southern Africa Food Security Emergency
CSI	Coping Strategy Index
DME	Design, Monitoring and Evaluation
ESBF	Emergency School Based Feeding
FFA	Food for Assets
FDP	Food Distribution Point
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FPP	Focal Point Person
GOZ	Government of Zimbabwe
EUM	End-Use Monitoring
FFA	Food for Assets
FFP	Food for Peace
FSS	Food for School Services
HBC	Home-based care groups
HDDS	Household Diet Diversity Score
HFIAS	Household Food Insecurity Access Score
HH	Household
HLSA	Household Livelihood Security Assessment
HRF	Household Registration Forms
IF	Institutional Feeding
KII	Key Informant Interview
MAHFP	Months of Adequate Household Food Provisioning
MAP	Market Assistance Program
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
PRR	Productivity Requirement Ratio
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
SYAP	Single-Year Assistance Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VGF	Vulnerable Group Feeding
WFP	World Food Programme
WV	World Vision
ZimVAC	Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee

Executive Summary

This report presents the findings of the C-SAFE Zimbabwe End of Program Evaluation. From its inception, C-SAFE has been jointly implemented by a consortium of three PVOs (World Vision, CARE and CRS) and funded by USAID/FFP. Initially, C-SAFE PVOs worked cooperatively through a regionally dedicated commodity pipeline to deliver relief on a scale unprecedented for PVO agencies. The program was designed under an innovative development relief conceptual framework that sought to integrate immediate food assistance and sustainable development to protect and build resilient livelihoods. Though the regional C-SAFE consortium came to an end in 2006, the Zimbabwe consortium elected to continue its collaboration through subsequent Single Year Assistance Programs (SYAP).

Of all the country consortia initially participating in C-SAFE, Zimbabwe has implemented the largest country program in the most complex operating environment. Over the previous decade, Zimbabwe has experienced a protracted socio-economic crisis that has had a debilitating impact on the country's population, 70 percent of whom are either directly or indirectly involved in agriculture. During the period of evaluation (2007-2010), continual agricultural production shortages – resulting from a shortage of inputs, adverse weather conditions and policy constraints – have coincided with record high inflation (due to poor monetary policy), the global food price crisis, and further increases in the prevalence of HIV-positive individuals to heighten vulnerability to food insecurity throughout the country. Severe political and economic challenges in the country have presented numerous constraints for C-SAFE member institutions as they have sought to negotiate complex reporting relationships and clarify lines of responsibility and authority between diverse stakeholders.

Evaluation Objectives and Methods

The overall purpose of this evaluation is to provide an objective assessment of the C-SAFE Zimbabwe program in terms of its appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency and impact. The evaluation also identified best practices in each area of the program and lessons learned for the benefit of future programming in the country in response to emergencies or transitions situations. The evaluation methodology integrated statistically representative quantitative surveys and qualitative focus group discussions with beneficiaries and key informant interviews with members of the food distribution chain and program field staff. It has been designed to complement information previously gained through Household Livelihood Security Assessments (HLSA) conducted in Zimbabwe in 2007 and 2009.

Project Activities

Seeking consistency with the Food for Peace Strategy (2006-2010), C-SAFE Zimbabwe implemented interventions around two Strategic Objectives designed to direct SYAP food resources to have an immediate impact while also contributing to longer-term improvements in food security. Interventions aligned with Strategic Objective One are aimed at providing short-term, targeted food assistance to vulnerable households to protect them from acute food insecurity, including: direct transfer to vulnerable groups through institutions including primary schools and community kitchens; targeted food assistance through safety-net/vulnerable group distributions; and subsidized sales of sorghum to low-income groups through MAP. Interventions carried out under Strategic Objective 2 focus more on

improving productive assets, livelihood opportunities and human capabilities among households vulnerable to food insecurity, including: Food for Assets (community and vulnerable household projects), Vulnerable Group Feeding (chronically ill), and School Feeding. The targeting strategy for C-SAFE was intended to limit targeting error, identify graduation and referral mechanisms, and provide a framework to facilitate synergies through simultaneously coordinated interventions in a targeted area that could be scaled up or down in response to emergency food needs and contextual shifts.

Monitoring and Evaluation has played a very large role in C-SAFE. Initially, the lack of consistent and coordinated monitoring among individual members presented a major challenge for C-SAFE Zimbabwe. This was partly due to the lack of clear authority over management of M&E activities among C-SAFE and partner staff. By the end of the project, coordination of M&E activities among three agencies had improved significantly with the adoption of common methodologies and clearer understanding of roles and responsibilities regarding collection, analysis and dissemination of data. A comprehensive set of monitoring tools tracked critical processes throughout program intervention, including beneficiary selection, activity implementation, commodity distribution, and follow-up monitoring of beneficiaries. The Humanitarian Accountability system put in place by WVI (and eventually adopted by the other two partners) allowed beneficiaries the opportunity to give ideas and feedback for the betterment of the program and/or register complaints regarding perceived breaches of agreements made the communities. Another important areas of innovation in the M&E system of C-SAFE has been the introduction of PDAs for data entry in the field. However, the considerable and detailed amount of information generated by C-SAFE's M&E system was more than could be adequately processed for the benefit of program management and imposed a heavy burden on the M&E staff and respondents.

Summary of Findings and Recommendations

Over the past several years numerous factors – including severe drought, political turmoil, periodic bans on certain NGO activities and near collapse of the Zimbabwean economy have created enormous operational constraints to development programming. As a result, C-SAFE and other humanitarian actors in Zimbabwe have concentrated primarily on short-term responses to widespread food insecurity. Each of the institutional members of the C-SAFE Zimbabwe consortium deserves considerable credit for their response to a particularly complex emergency. Above all, the evaluators have determined that the consortium has maintained a very flexible, responsive and, at times, innovative approach to alleviating household food security in operational areas. Based on data contained in this and previous reports, it is clear that C-SAFE Zimbabwe has protected and/or improved access to food for millions of people throughout the country. It has also had limited success in creating productive assets aimed at increasing resilience to future shock among communities participating in the FFA component. The effectiveness of infrastructure created through the C-SAFE FFA component has been constrained in part by the fact that many the unfrastructures are very dispersed geographically and beneficiaries live considerable distance from rehabilitated water points and cannot afford the irrigation materials required to utilize water for improved agricultural production. Even for those households in close proximity to rehabilitated dams and boreholes, continuing drought limits the potential of these projects to contribute to sustainable improvements in food security.

Along with these critical successes, the C-SAFE Zimbabwe consortium also experienced substantial challenges and shortcomings throughout the period under evaluation. Communication and coordination between individual consortium members and donor representatives was often sporadic and ineffective, particularly during the early stages. Examples of this are seen in the extended delay in appointing a Chief-of-Party for the consortium and lack of clarity over which activities had the full support of FFP-Zimbabwe. Ultimately, these obstacles compromised the degree to which C-SAFE could provide an integrated package of assistance that was appropriately targeted to food insecure households.

Program Coordination

- Future consortium efforts should be founded on clear lines of authority with respect to program managers in each member institution. They should be supported by a distinct management unit capable of sustaining stakeholder dialogue for improved coordination.
- Future food security activities implemented through institutional partners (institutional feeding, school-based feeding, clinical food support for the chronically ill) should be supported by well-designed and feasible exit strategies that identify realistic alternatives to external food and non-food support. Despite a significant impact on the immediate food security of beneficiaries, the lack of viable exit strategies will limit the longer-term impact of C-SAFE activities. Particular attention should be paid to creating linkages with livelihood support services and income-generating activities.
- When designing and implementing future FFA projects, member institutions should enhance emphasis on integrating project plans with disaster relief assistance provided by District Administrations, ward development committee plans, and agricultural extension services.
- Consortium members should continue to proactively engage ZimVAC, WFP, and other institutional stakeholders in order to improve the methodology and accuracy of population-based food security assessments conducted at the national level.
- Qualitative data suggests that in some cases, miscommunication led to confusion regarding dates of distribution and ration sizes. In the future, consortium members should seek ways to improve both the frequency and consistency of information dissemination. Community "mobilization" should be consistently managed through the office of the ward councilor and should include regular input from traditional (non-government) community leaders.

Program Design

- Households participating in more than one type of intervention tend to achieve better food security outcomes. Accordingly, future programs should place a high priority on implementing packages of complementary interventions (e.g. FFA, conservation farming, ESBF) in particularly food insecure areas. Explicit linkages should be made between VGF, ESBF, and FFA components to enhance the resilience of the most vulnerable households.
- In order to meet the immediate need for assistance among rural households while supporting longer-term improvements in food and livelihood security, future initiatives should place greater

emphasis on implementation of FFA activities to increase the productive capacity of food insecure farming households dependent on C-SAFE assistance.

- In order to have a more sustainable impact on the food and livelihood security of populations in targeted wards, FFA activities should be clustered (to achieve synergy / complementarity) and implemented over a longer period of time.
- Qualitative data suggests a significant need for non-food support in C-SAFE operational areas. In Zimbabwe, this should include support for livestock generation (many vulnerable households have had to sell draft animals, making them more vulnerable to food insecurity over the long-term). Vulnerable households also lack access to productive infrastructure (water) and agricultural inputs. In implementing future Title II programs in Zimbabwe, member institutions should continue to place a high priority on securing complementary funding for non-food items (from OFDA, etc.)

Targeting and Distribution

- Qualitative data strongly suggested that the efficiency and safety of food distributions were compromised by the fact that many beneficiary households are quite distant from designated food distribution points (FDP). In the future, initiatives similar in scale to the C-SAFE should strongly consider establishment of a greater number of FDPs in order to decrease wait times, transportation costs, and the risk of violence among beneficiaries.
- In order to reduce targeting error and eliminate documented biases against households with assets and those engaged in non-agricultural activities, future food security programs should consider using proxy means testing method for targeting rather than the PRR-based method employed by C-SAFE. Information for developing an accurate proxy means model should be collected as part of a population-based baseline survey, prior to beneficiary selection.
- Given the extremely high prevalence of food insecurity in operational districts (50-60% of all households), future programs should carefully evaluate the relative costs and benefits of different targeting approaches to VGF/Safety Net. Depending on the severity of food insecurity at the national level, future emergency responses may consider reintroducing blanket feeding rather than investing in the data collection and analysis necessary for effective targeting. In addition to potentially decreasing administrative costs, such an approach may be more amenable to traditional community safety nets.
- In order to counter/prevent resentment over targeted VGF distribution in wards with high prevalence of food security, some beneficiaries recommended registration of beneficiaries on a rotating basis, or distribution over a shorter time period in order to ensure that all needy households had equal access to needed food assistance.

I. Introduction

The following report summarizes the findings of the C-SAFE Zimbabwe End of Program (EOP) Evaluation. This first section, describes the history of C-SAFE Zimbabwe, the structure of the program and the methodology employed for the evaluation. Section II describes in detail the activities implemented under each of the individual components of the program. It also describes some of the adjustments to program design and targeting made during the period of evaluation (2007-2010). Section III uses quantitative and qualitative data to assess the outcomes and impact of each of the individual interventions carried out under C-SAFE Zimbabwe. Section IV examines several factors that influenced the management of the program, pointing out both important successes and key challenges encountered by the consortium. Finally, Section V draws conclusions based on evaluation findings and presents recommendations for future food assistance programs in Zimbabwe.

A. C-SAFE History / Operating Environment

The C-SAFE program was initiated in 2003 as a large-scale response to the ongoing southern Africa food security crisis. From its inception, C-SAFE has been jointly implemented by a consortium of three PVOs (WV, CARE and CRS) and funded by USAID/FFP. The design of C-SAFE was innovative in several ways. First, the scale of the operation and cooperation was exceptional.[1] The program brought together three major PVOs, working regionally with a dedicated commodity pipeline, to deliver relief on a scale unprecedented for PVO agencies. Secondly, the program was designed under a development relief conceptual framework. Under this framework C-SAFE aimed to do more than a traditional relief program; it sought to integrate immediate food assistance and sustainable development to protect and build resilient livelihoods.[2] Though the regional C-SAFE consortium came to an end in 2006, the Zimbabwe consortium elected to continue its collaboration through subsequent Single Year Assistance Programs (SYAP).[3] In contrast to longer-term Multi-Year Assistance Programs (MYAPs), SYAPs are primarily aimed at funding effective, short-term responses to food security emergencies.

Of all the country consortia initially participating in C-SAFE, Zimbabwe has implemented the largest country program in the most complex operating environment. Over the previous decade, Zimbabwe has experienced a protracted socio-economic crisis that has had a debilitating impact on the country's population, 70 percent of whom are either directly or indirectly involved in agriculture. During the period of evaluation (2007-2010), continual agricultural production shortages – resulting from a shortage of inputs, adverse weather conditions and policy constraints – have coincided with record high inflation (due to poor monetary policy), the global food price crisis, and further increases in the prevalence of HIV-positive individuals to heighten vulnerability to food insecurity throughout the country.[4] Findings from a recent report by the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC)

[1] C-SAFE was originally designed and implemented as a regional consortium with national entities in four countries: Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
[2] Maunder, Nick. 2005. Consortium for Southern Africa Food Emergency (C-SAFE) – Program Review: Year Three. Final Report. October 2005.
[3] 2007-2009
[4] UNAIDS estimates that as of 2010, 15.3 percent of adults aged 14-49 years in Zimbabwe are HIV-positive. http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/zimbabwe.asp

suggest that 2.17 million individuals were in need of food assistance during the lean season from January to March 2010. [5,6]

In addition to the aforementioned challenges, the government has imposed deliberate obstacles to distribution of food assistance at different points during the course of C-SAFE Zimbabwe. The severe political and economic challenges in the country have presented numerous constraints for C-SAFE member institutions as they have sought to negotiate complex reporting relationships and clarify lines of responsibility and authority between diverse stakeholders.

One central issue regarding the operating environment for C-SAFE Zimbabwe has been raised by previous evaluations and continues to play a key role in the implementation of current activities. The issue concerns the effectiveness of short-term, emergency responses to in an environment characterized by widespread, chronic food insecurity. As observed in previous studies, food and livelihood insecurity in Zimbabwe is best understood as an outcome of various long-term causal factors. Undoubtedly, more recent political and economic shocks have exacerbated existing structural problems and have significantly increased the number of vulnerable households in Zimbabwe. Still, while C-SAFE Zimbabwe's large-scale, food-supported interventions have been an appropriate response to an overwhelming need, it is critical to note that underlying causal factors contributing to chronic food insecurity in Zimbabwe might not be effectively addressed through conventional short-term emergency responses.[7]

B. Program Objectives and Structure

Seeking consistency with the Food for Peace Strategy (2006-2010), C-SAFE Zimbabwe sought to direct SYAP food resources to have an immediate impact while also contributing to longer-term improvements in food security. Table 1 illustrates C-SAFE Zimbabwe's Strategic Objectives, Intermediate Results, and the specific interventions designed to achieve them. It demonstrates that together, the relatively limited number of individual interventions is intended to contribute to program results on various levels.

Interventions aligned with the first Strategic Objective are aimed at providing short-term, targeted food assistance to vulnerable households to protect them from acute food insecurity. Interventions carried out under Strategic Objective 2 focus more on improving productive assets, livelihood opportunities and human capabilities among households vulnerable to food insecurity.

[5] FAO. (2010). FAO Zimbabwe: FAO Initiative on Soaring Food Prices. http://www.fao.org/isfp/country-information/zimbabwe/en/

[6] The annual rate of inflation has since dropped to zero following the government's decision in March 2009 to adopt the South African rand and the US dollar over the local currency.

[7] TANGO. 2005. C-SAFE Final Survey Report, August 2005.

Table 1: C-SAFE Zimbabwe Strategic Objectives, Intermediate Results and Contributing Interventions

Strategic Objective	Intermediate Result	Interventions Contributing to Achieving Result
Strategic Objective 1: Protected and/or improved access to food for vulnerable individuals and households living in food insecure areas	1.1 Increased access to food for urban/peri-urban households vulnerable to food insecurity	Market Assistance Program (MAP)
		Food distribution to food insecure households with chronically ill members on DOTS, ART or receiving OI treatment through health institutions and HBC groups
		Food for Assets
		Institutional Feeding including community kitchens and day care centers
	1.2 Increased access to food for vulnerable individuals and households in rural wards with a high prevalence of food insecurity	Food distribution to very vulnerable households (safety net)
		School-based feeding
		Food distribution to food insecure households with chronically ill members through HBC groups
		Food for Assets (community and vulnerable household projects)
Strategic Objective 2: Productive assets and capabilities maintained and/or improved for vulnerable individuals and households living in food insecure areas	2.1 Vulnerable communities and households have maintained/improved productive assets, human capabilities and local livelihood opportunities	Food for Assets (community and vulnerable household projects)
		Food distribution to food insecure households with chronically ill members on DOTS, ART or receiving OI treatment through health institutions and HBC groups
		School-based feeding

Source: C-SAFE Zimbabwe. (2007). Single Year Assistance Program (SYAP) Proposal Document. FY07. January 19, 2007.

C. End-of-Program (EOP) Evaluation Methodology

Objectives of the Evaluation

The overall purpose of this evaluation is to provide an objective assessment of the C-SAFE Zimbabwe program in terms of its appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency and impact. The evaluation also examines each area of the program to identify lessons learned for the benefit of future programming in the country in response to emergencies or transitions situations. This represents the first quantitative, population-based evaluation since the current grant cycle began in early 2007. It has been designed to complement information previously gained through Household Livelihood Security Assessments (HLSA) conducted in Zimbabwe in 2007 and 2009.

It is important to note that the comparison of data collected during this evaluation to the EOP performed in October 2006 is a challenging exercise given the contextual changes that have occurred in Zimbabwe during the period under evaluation. Accordingly, it is critical that these changes be taken into consideration in determining the impacts of the program.

Sampling Strategy

The sample was designed to provide statistically representative summary information about beneficiaries and their households with respect to three core C-SAFE interventions: 1) Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF); 2) Food for Assets (FFA); and 3) Market Assistance Program (MAP). The objective was to obtain a minimum sample of beneficiaries of each of these types of intervention.

A two-stage selection process was used. First, samples were drawn from the complete lists of all wards in which VGF and FFA have been implemented. A total of 34 wards were selected from the list of wards were VGF has been implemented, and 34 wards were selected from the list of wards were FFA interventions have been implemented. The selection was made proportional to the number of beneficiaries for the specific intervention in each ward – probability proportional to size (PPS). In the selected ward, a random walk procedure was used to select a total of 30 households to be interviewed. In the case of MAP, a total of 34 retailers participating in MAP were selected from the master list of all MAP retailers. Using the selected retailers as starting points, a random walk procedure was again used to select a total of 30 households in proximity to the retailers to be interviewed. Table 2 provides information about the number of households actually interviewed.

Table 2: Quantitative Sample by Selection Group

Selection Group	Households Interviewed
VGF Wards	1,073
FFA Wards	993
MAP Neighborhoods	978
Total Sample	**3,044**

There are a number of wards that have had both VGF and FFA interventions in the period from 2007. Thus, some of the wards that were selected from the list of wards also benefited from FFA interventions, while some that were selected from the list of FFA wards also received VGF support. The MAP intervention has been implemented only in urban areas, so there is no geographic overlap between either VGF or FFA and MAP. There are in fact four distinct categories of intervention that individual wards may fall into: i)VGF only, ii) FFA only, iii) VGF and FFA, and iv) MAP. Table 3 shows the number of wards and surveyed households in each of these 4 intervention categories. The proportion of households selected from each of these four categories is not proportional to the total population in the categories, as can be seen by comparing the last two columns in the table.

Table 3: Weighting of Sample Households by Selection Group

Intervention	Number of Districts	Number of HH	
		Unweighted	Weighted
VGF	14	780	1,465
FFA	6	289	240
VGF & FFA	12	997	483
MAP	8	978	857
Total Sample	**40**	**3,044**	**3,044**

Population estimates for rural wards targeted for VGF and FFA are from project documents (Table 4). The population for MAP wards was estimated by assuming that each of the 271 MAP retail outlets has a potential market of 500 households, or 2,500 individuals. The population within VGF target wards is much larger than that for other interventions. Thus, each respondent selected from the VGF category represents almost 1,500 individuals, while an individual selected from the FFA category represents 655 individuals, as shown by the expansion factors in the table. The weight factors, shown in the final column of Table 4 are used to adjust the overall sample calculations so that they accurately reflect the population proportions in each intervention category, but maintain the overall sample size of 3,044. The weight factor is computed by multiplying the expansion factor by the sample size (3,044) and dividing by the total population of CSAFE beneficiaries (2,409,396). Applying the weight factor gives the weighted number of cases per intervention category shown in Table 3.

Table 4: Sample weighting Factors for Intervention Categories

Intervention Category	Sample (A)	Population (B)	Expansion Factor (B/A)	Weight Factor
VGF	780	1,159,686	1,486.78	1.878375
FFA	289	189,474	655.62	0.828303
VGF & FFA	997	382,736	383.89	0.484998
MAP	978	677,500	692.74	0.875199
Total Sample	3,044	2,409,396	791.52	

Selection of communities to be visited by the qualitative field team was conducted by the consultants, the C-SAFE evaluation coordinators, and representatives of C-SAFE member institutions. Selection was conducted in a manner that ensured equal coverage of operational areas for each of the three member institutions. The selection of communities for the qualitative field work also sought to capture information on each of the distinct interventions carried out under C-SAFE Zimbabwe.

Data collection process

The qualitative and quantitative assessment teams worked independently of each other. The quantitative team was divided into eight teams of five enumerators, each with an appointed supervisor.

After completing quantitative training, each enumerator was responsible for conducting individual household interviews using Personal Digital Assistants (PDA).[8]

The qualitative team split into two teams of five facilitators (each with a team leader). Partner staff (unaffiliated with C-SAFE) served as supervisors for both the quantitative and qualitative teams. Qualitative teams conducted male and female focus group discussions (FGD) in each community visited. The team also conducted key informant interviews (KII) with managers of cereal shops, representatives of institutions involved in food distribution, and program field staff.

II. Project Activities

The following section offers a brief description of each of the activities implemented under C-SAFE Zimbabwe. It also identifies important changes in implementation over the life of the program as well as targeting procedures for the various components. It should be noted that all activities are implemented directly by consortium partners rather than through external implementing organizations.

A. Safety Net / Vulnerable Group Feeding

In its original SYAP proposal for FY07, C-SAFE Zimbabwe explained its decision to forego Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) in favor of "complimentary packages of interventions which address immediate food needs through linkages to appropriate health, education and/or livelihood support through institutions including schools, food for assets projects, and home care or treatment for HIV/AIDS related illnesses and conditions". In fact, the suspension of VGF was in part a response to national government restrictions on this type of intervention dating back to 2005. Instead of VGF, C-SAFE intended to meet the short-term food needs of vulnerable populations through a 'safety net' approach to feeding that would allow the consortium to scale-up (and down) food distribution in response to emergency needs without disrupting the capacity to implement other, more sustainable interventions.[9]

Initially, safety net feeding was intended to benefit the estimated 25-30 percent of the population in wards deemed by C-SAFE Zimbabwe to be 'highly food insecure'. [10] Safety net feeding was designed to be implemented during the lean period (prior to harvest) when all food stocks are depleted and community-based support systems are incapable of supporting basic consumption needs of the most vulnerable. Through existing relationships with health institutions and home-based care groups, food insecure, chronically ill individuals were also referred to C-SAFE for registration in appropriate food assistance activities. Households targeted under the safety net component initially received a monthly ration of 10 kg of cereal (bulgur wheat), 1 kg of pulses (yellow peas), and .6 kg of vegetable oil from January through September.[11]

[8] PDAs are handheld computers that were used in the field to record responses to household survey questions instead of the more traditional paper-based survey.
[9] World Vision. 2007a. C-SAFE Zimbabwe FY07 Single-Year Assistance Program (SYAP) Proposal. January 1, 2007.
[10] For C-SAFE targeting purposes, 'highly insecure' was defined as having less than 3 months per year of adequate food provisioning from the households' own production. The methodology used by ZimVAC identifies varying degrees of food insecurity by designating several food economy zones.
[11] World Vision. 2007a.

Following national elections in 2008, the government removed restrictions on community food distribution programs, and C-SAFE initiated implementation of the Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) Program. From September to April, the VGF program was to provide monthly household rations to predominantly rural, vulnerable households in targeted food insecure wards. During the peak of the lean season (January-March) C-SAFE intended to expand safety-net feeding activities to address the acute food needs of the population in targeted areas. Following the May harvest, beneficiary numbers were to be dramatically scaled back to cover only 'social welfare cases' (elderly, chronically ill, orphans, etc.) While all wards in member institutions' operational areas were potential candidates for VGF, C-SAFE noted that in the event that partial exclusion of some wards became necessary due to resource shortages or other constraints, priority would be given to communities in the most food insecure districts and wards within C-SAFE's entire operational area. [12,13]

In targeted wards, C-SAFE facilitated community meetings to obtain detailed information relevant for planning VGF food distribution. Efforts were made to encourage wide participation of community leaders (chiefs, local government representatives) in order to avoid instances of partiality or political sensitivity. During these meetings, held at Food Distribution Points (FDP), C-SAFE staff would lead community members through the process of ranking individual households in the community according to their relative food security. Once the community ranking process was completed, Household Registration Forms (HRF) were administered only to selected household members (or their proxies) present at the meeting. All other community members (those not selected for VGF registration) were dismissed.[14] Following registration and initiation of food distributions, household verification surveys were conducted among a sub-sample (10 percent) of VGF beneficiaries on a monthly basis.

C-SAFE also coordinated the establishment of help desks at each FDP. Help desks were run by community members selected by their peers. These individuals were responsible for receiving feedback from the community and conveying responses to complaints regarding the efficiency of food distribution and/or the conduct of program staff. Complaints and feedback collected by the help desks were to be recorded in a book and shared with C-SAFE staff for follow-up. Community members selected to run the help desks were to be provided all training and materials necessary to perform these duties.

The preceding paragraphs describe the intended implementation of the VGF. However, the 2008 ZimVAC provided very high estimates of food insecure populations throughout Zimbabwe. Based on these findings, FFP instructed C-SAFE to implement blanket (safety net) distribution to populations in the VGF wards for the 2008-09 VGF cycle. In addition, again based on findings from the 2008 ZimVAC Food Security Assessment, the consortium piloted an urban VGF program in FY09 that was ultimately discontinued by Food for Peace over concerns regarding the accuracy of targeting.[15] In the 2009/10 cycle, the procedures for selecting targeted households within the wards identified as food-insecure based on ZimVAC results were implemented. As is mentioned throughout this report, this switch from

[12] World Vision. 2007a.
[13] C-SAFE Zimbabwe. 2009.
[14] The FY10 Annual Implementation Plan states that at least 80% of all households in the wider community must be present for VGF registration to begin and that sufficient numbers of C-SAFE staff must be present to ensure that registration processes for all participating villages can be accomplished within one day.
[15] World Vision. 2009. C-SAFE Zimbabwe: Annual Results Report (ARR), Fiscal Year 2009. November 2, 2009.

blanket distribution to targeted distribution created widespread discontent in the wards throughout C-SAFE's area of operation.

B. Emergency School-Based Feeding (ESBF)

The stated goal of the school-based feeding component carried out under C-SAFE was to stabilize school enrolment and attendance during the hungry season through the provision of daily school meals to children aged 4-14. In fact, ESBF was also formulated in response to government restrictions placed on VGF dating as far back as 2005/2006. The government permitted ESBF because it did not entail large assemblies of people in public places, which the implementation of VGF requires. (There was no restriction on children attending school.) In all operational rural areas, school feeding was targeted at the ward level based on food security data obtained by ZimVAC. All children that lived in the corresponding catchment area for targeted schools were provided with meals, regardless of enrolment status. Through the ESBF component, C-SAFE Zimbabwe also implemented what it referred to as Food for School Services (FSS). This initiative provided food assistance (equivalent to the monthly FFA ration) to individuals from vulnerable households who supplied labor in preparation and cooking of school meals but were unable to participate in other interventions due to low household labor capacity.

The school feeding component was implemented during the hungry season (January – March). Designed in response to the food emergency in Zimbabwe, ESBF was scaled up in vulnerable wards of targeted districts over the course of the hungry season, and then scaled back post-harvest to the most vulnerable wards.[16,17] At the outset of the program, C-SAFE Zimbabwe also planned to use school feeding as an entry point for other activities including construction of school fields, vegetable gardens and orchards. The purpose of these proposed activities was to complement food assistance with potential sources of nutrition and income generation for vulnerable students and staff. Ultimately, C-SAFE hoped that by linking school feeding more directly with FFA, it could support the long-term sustainability of school feeding in operational areas. However, ESBF was ultimately discontinued in spring of 2009. FFP urged the project to discontinue ESBF based on the reasoning that the global strategy for FFP does not include Food for Education (FFE) and that food support provided through this component was duplicative of that provided through VGF. Additional concerns about the ESBF were that: i) it was not a targeted intervention; ii) it provided relatively little support per beneficiary (one meal per school-age child per day); and iii) was expensive due to the cost of food preparation. Thus, because the government had removed restrictions on VGF, and because of the comparative disadvantages of ESBF compared with VGF, ESBF was replaced with VGF in the spring of 2009.

C. Food-for-Assets (FFA)

The Food for Assets (FFA) component had two primary objectives:

1) protect and/or improve access to food for vulnerable individuals and households living in food insecure areas; and
2) maintain and/or improve productive assets and capabilities for vulnerable individuals and households living in food insecure areas.[18]

[16] Wards where on average, surveyed households reported 90% crop failure.
[17] World Vision. 2007b. C-SAFE Semi-Annual Narrative Report (January 1 – June 30, 2007).
[18] C-SAFE Zimbabwe. 2009.

During the period under review, C-SAFE Zimbabwe sought to broaden its previous implementation of FFA activities by contributing to the construction and rehabilitation of both communal and household productive assets. Food for Assets activities were implemented in select food insecure wards of rural and peri-urban operational areas under the following conditions:[19]

- The project must contribute to the creation/rehabilitation of productive assets that address food and livelihood security in the local context;
- The community/household must agree on the proposed project;
- The project must be technically, environmentally, and socially feasible;
- The project site should be accessible, and a large enough workforce interested in working on the FFA project for the duration of the project;
- The community/household must have a plan for the maintenance/sustainability of the asset created/rehabilitated; and
- There should be adequate required materials and tools to implement the project and the community should be responsible for the locally available materials.

While the FFA strategy called for implementation throughout the year, the most labor-intensive phases of FFA projects were conducted during the post-harvest period when labor was available and involvement in FFA would not divert beneficiaries from participating in other, labor-intensive household activities. While women were encouraged to participate, individual households were only allowed to have one person participating in FFA (between the ages of 18 and 65). Households receiving other forms of food assistance (excepting school feeding) were not allowed to participate. Workers participating in FFA projects implemented by C-SAFE Zimbabwe received monthly rations equivalent to daily remuneration of 2.5 kg cereal, 0.5 kg pulses and 0.185 kg oil.

According to the initial SYAP proposal, the selection of FFA projects was to be driven by the participatory identification of projects by the community, who would then be responsible for developing formal proposals. As described in the most recent Annual Implementation Plan (FY10), C-SAFE facilitated the establishment of "Project Implementation Teams" (PIT) in each targeted FFA community. The PITs were responsible for assessing local food security risks and developing proposals for community-led development projects. Proposed asset creation/rehabilitation projects requesting assistance from C-SAFE members then underwent technical evaluations by appropriate stakeholders. Individual proposals were assessed based on the following criteria:[20]

- Potential benefit of the output for improving food security and/or resiliency to shocks that degrade food security;
- Number of community members likely to benefit from the food exchanged for work *and* the output (project);
- Relative vulnerability of beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries;
- Accessibility of resources needed to complete the project;
- Viability of the proposed project (as determined by relevant stakeholders and technical experts);
- Sustainability of the project output;

[19] World Vision. 2007a. C-SAFE Zimbabwe FY07 Single-Year Assistance Program (SYAP) Proposal. January 1, 2007.
[20] C-SAFE Zimbabwe. 2009.

- Potential environmental / ecological impact of the project; and
- Estimated time required to complete the project (potential to complete the project within a single season)

The final step in the planning process was formulation of an agreement between C-SAFE member institutions and target communities that identified roles and responsibilities, specific work norms and food payment schedules, monitoring requirements, maintenance arrangements, and ownership of the asset. Activities supported under the FFA component included: improved water catchment management; small-scale irrigation; dam construction/rehabilitation; promotion of improved agriculture and livestock production (through conservation farming); key-hole gardens; and improved household water access and sanitation.

At the community level, FFA activities primarily focused on improving food security through conservation of water for productive use in drought-affected communities in C-SAFE operational levels. At the household level, the conservation farming strategy employed under FFA was intended to engage select vulnerable households in a combination of training and output based monthly modules incorporating improved farming techniques. Households participating in conservation farming activities under FFA were to receive their monthly rations upon completion of each module. While conservation farming activities were carried out, C-SAFE ultimately did not tie distribution of FFA rations to the completion of individual instructional modules. Throughout the life of the program, the consortium has attempted to maximize the effectiveness of FFA by applying complementary funding from the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and other sources for the purchase of tools, seeds, and other non-food inputs. In addition, the individual consortium partners sought to provide complementary support to FFA through other projects. For example, World Vision combined FFA with ADPs that were working to develop irrigation schemes. All of the partners integrated support for conservation farming with FFA.

D. Market Assistance Program (MAP)

The Market Assistance Program (MAP) has been widely touted by beneficiaries and stakeholders alike as one of the more innovative and efficient means of food assistance provided by C-SAFE Zimbabwe. The program was designed to address the food gap created by the difference in local demand for, and supply of, affordable cereals. MAP was specifically designed to meet the food needs of vulnerable urban households by providing an alternative to costly maize meal. It did this by supporting the milling, packaging and distribution of sorghum through selected retailers in low-income areas of targeted suburbs. It was also expected that the MAP component would have a positive influence on cereal markets by stimulating economic activity among both millers and retailers.

The MAP component was self-targeting in that all residents of targeted low-income suburbs had the ability to access milled sorghum meal by purchasing it at participating retail shops.[21] Individual consumers were allowed to purchase one 5 kg packet of MAP sorghum at one time. Geographic areas

[21] Zimbabweans generally prefer maize meal for sadza and bread for breakfast. Those who can afford the more expensive commodities will typically buy them in preference to sorghum meal, even when sorghum meal is less expensive.

targeted under the MAP component include: Bulawayo, Hwange, Gweru, Victoria Falls, Masvingo and Mutare. In order to effectively support food insecure households in urban areas, distribution of MAP sorghum was conducted only in high-density areas of urban centers through well-established rural networks.[22]

Although it was innovative and responsive to the food security needs of the urban poor, implementation of the MAP program has been challenged by the dynamic and generally deteriorating economic situation in Zimbabwe. Up until January 2009, the use of the Zimbabwe dollar made implementation of MAP difficult or impossible due as bulk transactions in the deflating currency exposed millers and retailers to considerable financial risk. Although pilot 'revivals' of the MAP program were attempted in 2008, the component was ultimately suspended until mid-2009 when the dollarization of the Zimbabwean economy made implementation of the program more feasible.

E. Institutional Feeding (IF) / Community Kitchens (CK)

C-SAFE Zimbabwe elected to distribute food through social welfare institutions in an effort to replace previous food and financial support to the institutions that had waned in response to continued economic deterioration throughout Zimbabwe.[23] It also sought to mitigate the increase in urban vulnerability to food security caused by the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic and government policies such as 'Operation Murambatsvina'.[24,25] Institutions targeted by the IF component were those in C-SAFE operational areas that were registered as public institutions with the Ministry of Social Welfare. These included orphanages, hospices, elderly homes, homes for the disabled, private hospitals, and homeless shelters. Religious institutions and community-based organizations in low-income urban areas were also eligible to participate provided they demonstrate the ability to appropriately target vulnerable individuals and manage commodities. All individuals residing in targeted institutions were eligible to receive 2 hot meals daily. For Community Kitchens, the only eligibility criteria were homelessness and/or sleeping in a location where food stocks cannot be stored. Similar to FSS, vulnerable individuals were selected by institutions staff to receive food rations in exchange for working in the institutional/community kitchen. The number of kitchen workers receiving rations was not allowed to exceed 10 percent of registered beneficiaries for any given institutional feeding site. Though meals were prepared daily, on a monthly basis individual beneficiaries of the IF component received the monthly equivalent of 10 kgs cereal, 2 kgs pulses, and 0.6 kg oil.

C-SAFE Zimbabwe established formal Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with institutions that addressed expectations regarding the duration of food support (contingent on the availability of commodities) and the compliance of institutions with regard to specified requirements (monitoring,

[22] World Vision. 2007a. C-SAFE Zimbabwe FY07 Single-Year Assistance Program (SYAP) Proposal. January 1, 2007.

[23] Institutions supported through the Institutional Feeding component include orphanages, hospices, elderly homes, homes for the disabled, private hospitals, and homeless shelters

[24] On 17 May, 2005 the Government of Zimbabwe began an operation labeled "Operation Murambatsvina". In subsequent weeks, the government-sanctioned destruction of homes and informal economic activities displaced over 500,000 individuals from urban centers throughout the country. Estimates also suggest that 100,000 individuals also lost their primary source of income in the informal sector as a result of the Operation, leading to an immediate, widespread, and severe impact on the food and livelihood security of vulnerable urban households.

[25] Tibaijuka, Anna Kajumulo. 2005. Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe. July 18, 2005.

reporting, etc.). Every 12 months, consortium staff reviewed the institution's capacity and performance prior to signing a new MOU. Through IF, C-SAFE Zimbabwe also sought to build the capacity of participating institutions to become self-sustaining by supporting creation of vegetable gardens for production of nutritious food for consumption and/or income generation. Where possible, the IF component endeavored to link participating institutions with other organization or individuals capable of providing long-term support for food assistance.

F. Food Support for the Chronically Ill (CI)

HIV and AIDS continue to have a severe impact on the food and livelihood security of poor households in both urban and rural areas of Zimbabwe.[26] Given the dependency of rural populations on agricultural livelihood strategies, the loss of productive labor resulting from HIV has a detrimental impact on income generation and cultivation of crops. Meanwhile, the lack of employment opportunities and medical expenses also threaten the food security of urban households caring for chronically ill members, many of whom depend on purchases as their main source of food.

C-SAFE sought to stem the downward spiral into chronic vulnerability that is often caused by HIV through the provision of safety-net food assistance to support treatment of HIV-related conditions (i.e. tuberculosis), antiretroviral therapy (ART), and the livelihood security of affected households. The primary goals of CI interventions of the CI component were to increase access to food among vulnerable HIV-positive individuals as well as support access to health services and compliance among individuals undergoing treatment (ART).

Interventions for the chronically ill were targeted in the same geographic areas as the safety-net program. Individual beneficiaries were referred by participating health facilities and home-based care groups (HBC). C-SAFE sought to establish an exit strategy for the CI component by identifying graduation criteria for individual beneficiaries and by strengthening linkages with a range of stakeholders including health care providers and HIV service organizations. Acknowledging that HIV/AIDS does not directly fall under the FFP mandate, C-SAFE sought to complement food assistance for CI beneficiaries with programming supported by the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). However, citing the components' medical alignment, improved food security situation in the spring of 2009, and concerns over the appropriateness of targeting, FFP recommended discontinuation of the CI component in July 2009.[27]

G. Targeting and Distribution

In its initial SYAP proposal, C-SAFE Zimbabwe acknowledged the need to coordinate targeting strategies for distinct interventions in order to facilitate synergies and respond to various operational challenges (e.g. government restrictions on VGF). The creation of a targeting framework (Figure 1) was intended to guide scale-up (and down) of interventions in response to the emergency food security context and support creative strategies for providing food assistance through limited channels at multiple levels (local government, national government, donor). The targeting strategy for C-SAFE was also intended to

[26] UNAIDS estimates that as of 2010, 15.3 percent of adults aged 14-49 years in Zimbabwe are HIV-positive. http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/zimbabwe.asp

[27] World Vision. 2009.

limit targeting error (both inclusion and exclusion error) as well as outline graduation and referral mechanisms. Importantly for the purposes of this evaluation, the initial SYAP proposal states that "wherever possible, all interventions will be implemented simultaneously within a targeted community". [28]

Figure 1: C-SAFE Targeting Framework, 2007



Source: World Vision. 2007a.

Under C-SAFE Zimbabwe, beneficiary selection began with identification of operational districts in accordance with food security information obtained from ZimVAC. In rural operational areas, C-SAFE then engaged in community-based screening of households to identify their relative vulnerability to food insecurity. Those identified as vulnerable to food insecurity by their fellow community members were then asked to complete a Household Registration/Verification Form. These forms collected household data used to calculate their particular Productivity Requirement Ratio (PRR). The PRR became a critical element of C-SAFE's targeting strategy and was aimed at quantifying vulnerability by assessing the extent to which households had adequate access to food. [29] Under the PRR, household access to food was assumed to be determined by five primary factors:

1) current cereal stocks;
2) labor capacity (function of age, health status);
3) ownership of productive assets (including draft power and implements);
4) yield potential of agricultural land; and
5) ownership of livestock that could potentially be converted to cereals through sale.

[28] World Vision. 2007a.

[29] The PRR cut-off value is reviewed and periodically fixed for at least 4 months depending on levels of food insecurity in all C-SAFE districts. (PRR cycles defined as May-August, September-December, and January-April).

Once verified as being eligible for assistance according to their PRR score, labor capacity and demographic considerations (i.e. presence of school-aged children, elderly, chronically ill) would then be taken into account to determine the most appropriate intervention for the particular household. Community rankings of household vulnerability and follow-up verification surveys were intended to complement the PRR and minimize inclusion and exclusion error in program targeting.

Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) / Safety Net

Based on analysis of previous studies, quantitative data, and qualitative input from beneficiaries and other stakeholders, evaluators have determined that the equity and effectiveness of VGF/Safety Net targeting continues to be one of more difficult and contentious issues regarding implementation of C-SAFE. The primary issue with VGF targeting was that communities felt too few people were selected and that the need for assistance was much greater than VGF provided for. This sentiment was strengthened because the initial VGF in 2008-09 was a blanket distribution to all households in the VGF wards, which raised expectations for the next year. Imposition of targeting in 2009-10 undermined these expectations. In defense of C-SAFE, it should be acknowledged that targeting of direct food assistance over the last three years has been severely challenged by the overwhelming scale of food insecurity in Zimbabwe, the rapidly changing economic environment, as well as the tense political situation.

Despite development of the framework and proposed methodology for selecting the most vulnerable households for registration in food assistance programs, a subsequent review of C-SAFE's targeting strategy revealed considerable inclusion and exclusion error as recently as February 2009.[30] The study found that targeting of rural households base on the PRR approach led to an undercoverage rate of 44 percent, and a leakage rate of 30 percent.[31] The report went on to note that food insecure households not selected for C-SAFE support (an example of undercoverage) tended to have larger land holdings, were more engaged in agricultural sales, and were more likely to own productive assets than food insecure households that *were* selected as C-SAFE beneficiaries. Similarly, food secure households that were selected to receive C-SAFE food assistance (an example of leakage) were less likely to own productive assets, including livestock.

As a result of these findings, C-SAFE adjusted the targeting procedure. In 2009 the PRR tool was replaced with community ranking procedure in which all community members were invited to attend beneficiary selection and registration meetings. During these meetings, the community established selection criteria and actually selected households within the community that should be eligible for participation in VGF.

This finding is consistent with primary qualitative data obtained during the EOP fieldwork which strongly suggests that in targeting the VGF program, the PRR overemphasized the importance and accuracy of asset ownership as a proxy indicator of food security in rural Zimbabwe. In fact, some respondents claimed dissatisfaction with the selection criteria for VGF based on their belief that it actually erodes the asset base within targeted communities. Rather than the intended outcome of protected assets, they argue that the desperation for food assistance, and the selection criteria used for VGF, actually

[30] TANGO. 2009. C-SAFE Targeting in Zimbabwe: Review of Current Methods and Comparison with Alternatives. February 2009.

[31] This means that within rural C-SAFE operational areas, 44 percent of food insecure households were not selected as beneficiaries. At the same time, 30 percent of beneficiaries receiving food assistance were food secure, and thus, did not warrant food assistance.

encourages food insecure household to divest of productive assets (cattle, tools, etc.) so that they may qualify for assistance.

Furthermore, many individual respondents in FGDs reported that in light of widespread and severe food insecurity in Zimbabwe, and the cultural practice of sharing resources during times of need, C-SAFE's targeting of selected vulnerable for participation in VGF created considerable tension within the community. In one community, a local councilwoman told the qualitative team that divisiveness in the community due to preferential targeting of vulnerable households was so extreme, that they would rather have no assistance at all. Despite involvement in community screening, and general agreement with the fairness of selection criteria, some respondents felt the process of targeting and registration was manipulated by local leadership and unscrupulous wealthy households. Others felt that by creating feelings of jealousy and resentment among community members, VGF targeting also had a negative impact on traditional safety nets.

C-SAFE Zimbabwe made attempts to address this perceived bias in its most recent Annual Implementation Plan. In it C-SAFE Zimbabwe explained that when conducting community ranking for VGF targeting, facilitators *must not* emphasize livestock or asset ownership, or demographic vulnerability as these may not be directly relevant to household's immediate access to food for consumption.[32] According to the FY10 Annual Implementation Plan, information collected through the HRFs was also to be used for verification and to facilitate necessary improvements in the 'productivity requirement ratio' (PRR) calculation used for beneficiary screening. Initial verification (prior to first distribution) was to be conducted among 10 percent of households initially ranked by the community as being vulnerable to food insecurity (7% potential beneficiaries, 3% vulnerable but not selected by community for VGF registration). Following the initial verification/registration process, a minimum of six percent of randomly chosen households from each FDP (3% beneficiaries, 3% non-beneficiaries) were to be verified on a monthly basis. Household verifications included observation/confirmation of the following:[33]

- Household demographics;
- Presence/quantities of food stocks in the home;
- Presence/quantities of assets in the home or on the property;
- Agricultural land use (present and immediate past);
- Recent receipts of food assistance; and
- Evidence of wealth or steady income

Qualitative information collected during the evaluation also revealed a degree of confusion and frustration among respondents regarding the method through which beneficiary numbers were estimated. As stated in its initial semi-annual results report (January – June 2007), C-SAFE expected safety net beneficiary numbers to be roughly equivalent to 15-25% of the population within targeted districts. However, key informants and beneficiaries expressed some reservations about the means

[32] C-SAFE. 2009.
[33] C-SAFE. 2009.

through which individual households were targeted. They explained that while information on household food security showed distinct differences among individual communities, the estimates of number of food insecure households, and the subsequent beneficiary target numbers, were aggregated at the ward level. Some felt that this targeting method inevitably led exclusion of many food insecure households in targeted wards.

Food for Assets (FFA)

Wards targeted for participation in FFA were selected based on assessed degree of food security determined through Household Livelihood Security Assessment (HLSA) reports. C-SAFE partners then conducted 'social feasibility assessments' to determine which communities were most likely to maximize benefits through sustainable management of FFA-supported assets. Individual households were targeted for participation in FFA activities according to their PRR scores. Initially, households that fell below the PRR cut-off point but who lacked adequate household labor were eligible for registration in VGF and may also have qualified for FFA assistance through construction/rehabilitation of productive *household* assets.

Subsequently however, the FY10 Annual Implementation Plan determined that FFA would not be implemented in the same ward as rural VGF, but may be implemented in the same district".[34] According to the FY10 Implementation Plan 20 percent of FFA beneficiaries were also subject to verification visits upon initial selection, and another 5 percent on a monthly basis during project implementation.

Market Assistance Program (MAP)

One of the strongest contributing factors to the efficiency and the effectiveness of the MAP component has been the fact that it is self-targeted. Residents of low-income urban and peri-urban neighborhoods can access the subsidized milled sorghum through participating retailers. Criteria for targeting specific, high-density areas in selected urban centers include:

- Average monthly income and expenditures;
- Proportion of low-income earners; and
- Percentage of households living under the poverty line

As mentioned later in this report, the chaotic and deteriorating economic situation in Zimbabwe leading up to the dollarization of the national economy in August 2009, had a severe (and at times debilitating) impact on the ability of the consortium to implement the MAP program. Price controls, import bans and extreme inflation, particularly during 2008, meant that shelves of retailers were often bare, and that MAP sorghum could not be priced in a way that ensured participation of either retailers, or potential beneficiaries. Ultimately, implementation of the MAP was resumed in mid-2009.

Food distribution

The vast majority of respondents consulted during qualitative data collection confirmed their opinion that distribution of C-SAFE food assistance was fair, transparent, and efficient. Overall, there were very

[34] C-SAFE. 2009.

few complaints regarding either the quality, or the timeliness of food distributions. However, a number of valid concerns were raised.

By far the largest complaint regarding food distribution under the VGF component was the cutting of monthly cereal rations from 10 kg to 5 kg (in March of 2009). According to C-SAFE staff, this adjustment was forced upon the consortium by the delayed repayment of commodities loaned to WFP. Respondents claimed that due to the cultural practice of sharing food assistance among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, the reduced rations often did not last an entire month and did little to alleviate household food insecurity. Other FGDs revealed issues concerning "mobilization" for food distributions and/or the distance between beneficiary homesteads and Food Distribution Points (FDP). They reported that in some cases, distant households could either not reach FDPs or could not meet the costs of transporting rations from FDPs to their homes. Others complained that they had to spend an inordinate amount of time at FDPs waiting for distant beneficiaries to arrive before distribution could start and that returning home with rations after dark subjected them to exploitation and violence. Finally, several respondents expressed resentment over the fact that they were summoned to FDPs to participate in community screening only to later be told that they had not been selected as beneficiaries.

Qualitative input from individuals involved in ESBF, institutional feeding and community kitchens expressed overall satisfaction with quantity, quality and timeliness of food distributions. They also claimed that their responsibilities for food distributions (receiving and storing stocks, managing inventories, submitting reports) were clearly communicated to them by consortium staff and were easy to fulfill. However, institutional respondents consistently stated that they would appreciate more variety (bulgur alternated with maize) introduced into the rations in order to make them more palatable to beneficiaries.

III. Assessment of Program Impacts

The following section draws on analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data to highlight key outcomes of the activities implemented under C-SAFE Zimbabwe. Where possible, the quantitative analysis draws conclusions regarding program impacts based on the values for core indicators among beneficiary and non-beneficiary households. The indicators are:

- ***Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS):***

This indicator is computed by summing the number of different food categories reportedly eaten by the household in day prior to the interview. This indicator was measured as recommended by FANTA, with the exception that 18 different food items were used (as opposed to 12).[35] The HDDS provides a measure of a particular household's food security status. A higher HDDS represents a more diverse diet, better nutrition, and greater level of household food security.

[35] This adaptation to the survey was made to ensure consistency with previous rounds of the HLSA.

- ***Household Food Insecurity Access Indicator (HFIAS):***

This indicator has been developed by FANTA, and is based on household access to food and responses to shortages in access to food over a 30-day recall period.[36] This indicator is based on households i) perceptions of uncertainty over food access in the past 30 days, ii) perceptions of insufficiency in quantity and quality of food over the past 30 days, iii) reported reductions in food intake, and iv) reported consequences of reductions in food intake. A higher value of this index indicates a higher degree of food insecurity.

- ***The Coping Strategy Index (CSI):***

This indicator is based on the frequency with which households utilize different coping strategies, with each strategy having a specific weight based on its perceived severity and frequency of use. The severity weights are based on results from previous studies undertaken in both rural and urban contexts in various countries around the world.[37] This study uses the same method for calculating the CSI used in the in the 2009 HLSA. Using this method, more food secure households – those that rely less frequently on coping strategies that are considered to be the most severe – have higher CSI values.

- ***Asset Index:***

This index is computed by multiplying the number of each type of household asset by the index value for that particular asset type. Index values of household assets used for construction of the asset index are presented in Table 7. A higher value of the asset index indicates that households have been able to accumulate assets over time. Households are able to accumulate assets if income is greater than the necessary expenditures to meet household subsistence requirements. Assets also provide households with a cushion to adjust to shortfalls in incomes, or sudden increases in necessary expenditures. Thus, households with a higher asset index are less vulnerable than households with lower asset index values.

- ***Months of Adequate Household Food Provisioning (MAHFP):***

This indicator is a measure of a household's ability to obtain food from their own production, reserved food stocks, purchases, gathering, or through food transfers from friends, family or through external assistance (government, donors). Household access to food largely depends on the resources available to individual household members and the degree to which access to such resources enables provision of adequate food for consumption for all household members.[38]

The HDDS indicator is a measure of current food security status of households, while the asset index is a measure of vulnerability. The HFIAS and CSI are combined indicators of food security status and vulnerability – looking at how households adjust to times of stress through either changes in food consumption or other coping mechanisms. Previous HLSA have measured CSI, but the C-SAFE M&E unit has subsequently determined that the CSI has some shortcomings for measuring food insecurity,

[36] Coates, Jennifer, Anne Swindale, and Paula Balinsky. *Household food insecurity access scale (HFIAS) for measurement of food access: Indicator guide*. FANTA, August 2007.

[37] Maxwell, Dan, Richard Caldwell, and Mark Langworthy, "Measuring food insecurity: Can an indicator based on localized coping behaviors be used to compare across contexts", *Food Policy*, Vol. 33, Issue 6, December 2008.

[38] Bilinsky, Paula, Anne Swindale. 2007. *Months of Adequate Household Food Provisioning (MAHFP) for Measurement of Household Food Access: Indicator Guide*. FANTA. June 2007.

particularly the fact that it is primarily oriented toward rural contexts. For this reason, the C-SAFE Zimbabwe has adopted measuring the HFIAS as an alternative indicator.

Table 5 examines the correlations of these two indicators with HDDS and the asset index. Because the HFIAS is higher for households with less food security, this indicator is negatively correlated with HDDS, and the asset index. Conversely, the CSI is higher for households with greater food security, so the CSI is positively correlated with HDDS and the asset index. Table 5 shows that the absolute magnitude of the correlation of HFIAS the the household food security and vulnerability outcome indicators (HDDS and Asset index) is higher than the CSI. For this reason, the majority of analyses included in this report are based on the HFIAS, and not CSI.

Table 5: Correlations among Food Security and Vulnerability Indicators

	HDDS	Asset Index
HFIAS	-0.347	-0.159
CSI	0.219	0.152

Table 6 compares data on several core food security indicators from the Household Livelihood Security Assessment carried out in 2009 with data collected as part of the C-SAFE Zimbabwe EOP household survey. Given the short amount of time between the two studies, it is not surprising that data show limited change in the value of indicators reported by the different studies. Interestingly, reported relatively moderate increases in household consumer assets (radio/t.v. and bed) and much limited increase or decrease in ownership of productive assets (plough, oxcart, wheelbarrow). Data do suggest however, that the final year has seen relatively small, but important increases in average values for MAHFP and value of livestock. This is consistent with qualitative data suggesting that household food security has increased slightly since the food crisis experienced in Zimbabwe throughout 2008.

Table 6: Comparison of C-SAFE EOP and 2009 HLSA Data, by Indicator

	2009 HLSA				
	CARE	CRS	WV	AVG[a]	EOP
HDDS[b]	3.5	3.3	2.9	3.3	3.5
CSI[c]	95	102	106	99.3	96.7
MAHFP	2.8	5.1	3.5	3.5	5.5
% HH owning selected assets					
Radio/TV	21.2	27	22.7	22.8	36.6
Bicycle	11.2	16.2	25.6	15.9	13.6
Bed	48.9	53.2	67.9	54.6	64.5
Plough	41.9	43.7	59.1	46.6	49.1[d]
Oxcart	18.9	23.4	35.3	24.0	23.7[d]
Wheelbarrow	35.4	32.5	45.7	37.3	36.3[d]
Value of livestock	3,450.0	3,997.0	6,632.0	4,368.1	5,089.7[d]

[a] Average value across three agencies weighted by the proportion of cases in the total sample for each agency.

[b] HDDS computed as number of the following 7 food categories (cereals/roots/tubers; meat/fish/eggs; milk/dairy products; legumes/pulses; vegetables; fruits; oils/fats) consumed by the household in the previous 24 hours. This is consistent with the formula used in the 2009 HLSA.

[c] The CSI is calculated with the same formula used in the 2009 HLSA. This index is constructed such that higher values indicate greater food security.

[d] Computed only for households in rural wards. Uses same prices (prices in Rand) as used in the 2009 HLSA.

Table 7 provides data on each of the core food security indicators according to participation in various C-SAFE interventions. The table shows that among all interventions, HDDS is highest among MAP beneficiaries. This is not surprising given that the vast majority of MAP beneficiaries reside in urban or peri-urban areas. Often, such households have greater dietary diversity than rural households due to greater access to food markets and vendors. Similarly, MAP beneficiaries tend to have the lowest HFIAS values, highest CSI scores, and highest asset value scores; each of which suggest that MAP beneficiaries are relatively food secure compared to beneficiaries of VGF and/or FFA. HDDS scores indicate that dietary diversity is lowest among VGF beneficiaries. This findings supports the accuracy of C-SAFE's targeting framework that aimed to provide VGF support to households facing the greatest level of current food insecurity.

Average household values for the HFIAS, CSI and asset index each suggest that FFA beneficiaries are the most food insecure among all sampled C-SAFE beneficiaries. Likewise, according to HDDS, HFIA and the Asset Index, households participating in both VGF and FFA components did not demonstrate obvious improvements over households participating solely in the VGF component. Households participating in both VGF and FFA components did however report higher CSI values.

As is often the case in urban areas, MAP beneficiaries have much higher average asset values than predominantly rural beneficiaries of VGF and MAP. Interestingly, FFA beneficiaries reported the lowest average asset values. The fact that households participating in both VGF and FFA reported higher asset

values suggests that VGF was somewhat effective in preventing divestment in (sale of) assets among beneficiaries.

The final column in the table provides data on months of adequate household food provisioning (MAHFP). It shows that households participating in MAP reported the greatest length of time with adequate access to food (7 months) whereas those participating in both VGF and FFA, and those participating only in FFA had adequate access to food for the shortest period (4.5 months).

Together, these findings suggest that the FFA component has had little impact on the food security status of beneficiary households. This is likely due to the fact that limited coverage of the FFA component, and ongoing precipitation shortages have constrained the contribution of rehabilitated water infrastructure to agricultural production.

Table 7: Core Food Security and Vulnerability Indicators

Intervention	HDDS[a]	HFIAS	CSI[b]	Asset Index	MAHFP
VGF	3.2	13.7	91.6	386.7	5.0
FFA	3.5*	15.2*	89.4	284.1*	4.5*
VGF & FFA	3.3	13.8	98.1*	304.8*	4.5*
MAP	4.1*	9.2*	106.4*	792.9*	7.0*
Total Sample	3.5	12.6	96.7	480.0	5.5

[a] HDDS computed as number of the following 7 food categories (cereals/roots/tubers; meat/fish/eggs; milk/dairy products; legumes/pulses; vegetables; fruits; oils/fats) consumed by the household in the previous 24 hours. This is consistent with the formula used in the 2009 HLSA.

[b] The CSI is calculated with the same formula used in the 2009 HLSA. This index is constructed such that higher values indicate greater food security.

* different from VGF Intervention group at 0.1 significance level

Table 8: Estimated Average Values used in Calculating Household Asset Indices

Asset	Index value
Plough	200
Oxcart	200
Wheelbarrow	50
Bicycle	100
TV/radio	100
Bed	50
Solar panel	50
Refrigerator	100
Stove	100
Car	5,000
Generator	500
Sofa	100

Evaluators also sought to determine the extent to which household asset ownership corresponded to other indicators of food insecurity utilized in the evaluation. Gauging the accuracy of asset ownership as a proxy indicator of vulnerability is also important given that C-SAFE used it as one of several important indicators during household registration/verification and regular post-distribution monitoring (PDM) processes. To do this, evaluators identified separate quartiles of asset ownership among the entire sample population. Table 9 and Figure 2 provided a breakdown of the food security indicators by quartiles of the asset index. Results show that there is a strong positive correlation between household wealth (the asset index quartiles) and current food security (HDDS) and the HFIAS score. As one might expect, households with the fewest assets also tend to have the lowest dietary diversity and the highest HFIAS scores. Alternatively, households in the highest asset category tend to have the greatest dietary diversity and the lowest average HFIAS. These finding suggest that household asset ownership is a reasonably valid proxy indicator of food insecurity in C-SAFE operational areas. Data in the table also shows the range in variation in the asset index over the sample, with the average asset index of the highest quartile almost 80 times that of the lowest value. The final column in the table provides information on MAHFP among households in different asset categories. It shows, as expected, that access to adequate food increases in accordance with increased asset ownership.

Table 9: Household Outcome Indicator Scores by Asset Category

Asset Category	HDDS	HFIAS	Asset Index	MAHFP
Lowest	4.3	14.6	16.7	4.6
2	5.1*	13.5*	189.1*	5.2*
3	5.5*	12.7*	404.0*	5.6*
Highest	6.8*	9.5*	1,318.7*	6.5*
Total Sample	**5.4**	**12.6**	**480.0**	**5.5**

* different from value of lowest asset category at 0.10 significance level

Figure 2: Household Dietary Diversity, Household Food Insecurity Access Score, and Asset Ownership



Table 10 compares findings on assets from individual HLSAs carried out in 2009 with those from the C-SAFE EOP survey. Data show a significant reduction in the percent of households owning all types of assets and livestock (with the exception of radio/TV, bed and poultry). This is a reflection of the generally worsening conditions for vulnerable households since the time of the HLSA survey.

Table 10: Percentage of Households Owning Selected Assets and Livestock, 2009 HLSA and EOP

	HLSA 2009			
Asset / Livestock	**CARE**	**CRS**	**WV**	**EOP**
Plough	41.9	43.7	59.1	37.6
Oxcart	18.9	23.4	35.3	17.2
Wheelbarrow	35.4	32.5	45.7	27.5
Bicycle	11.2	16.2	22.7	13.6
Radio/TV	21.2	27.0	25.6	36.6
Bed	48.9	53.2	67.8	64.5
Cattle	40.6	45.2	45.2	32.8
Donkey	11.3	1.4	32.2	11.6
Sheep/Goat	42.3	43.4	55.1	39.8
Pig	2.1	5.1	2.5	2.0
Poultry	62.2	4.0	66.5	64.5

In order to complement these quantitative measures of vulnerability, the qualitative field team also queried key informants and focus group participants about the primary contributors to food insecurity in C-SAFE operational areas. They consistently reported that labor shortages – particularly among households caring for the elderly, orphans, and/or chronically ill – are perhaps the most common contributor to household food insecurity. They also noted that given the dependence on subsistence agriculture, households without adequate draught power are also face a distinct disadvantage in accessing adequate food. However, despite the existence of particularly vulnerable households, respondents consistently confirmed that nearly all households in rural areas were made more vulnerable to food insecurity as a combined result of poor harvests, lack of employment opportunities, economic deterioration and political tension.

The unpredictability and/or lack of rains was by far the most severe and commonly cited challenge among FGD respondents in all operational areas. As explained, the lack of adequate precipitation compromises the ability of many households to produce agricultural crops and household gardens, meet human consumption and domestic water needs, and provide sufficient water for livestock. In especially dry years, significant numbers of cattle also die from starvation due to lack of grazing pasture. Although there is existing water infrastructure in many operational areas, the majority tends too distant from beneficiary households for use in agricultural production and is often in disrepair (cracks, siltation, run dry). Severely limited access to employment opportunities and necessary agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, tools) also compromise the food and livelihood security of the majority of households in operational areas. In order to cope with these challenges, many vulnerable households rely on cross-border labor migration but this places them at risk of arrest and or victimization by thieves along migration corridors. Reliance on petty trade (brick fabrication, brewing/selling beer, collecting/selling firewood, roadside sale of vegetables) and collection of less preferred foods (wild

tubers, wild fruits, cassava, unripe bananas, tree roots, baobab fruit and caterpillars) is also reportedly common among the most vulnerable households.

A. Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) / Safety Net

The following tables and figures provide information on food security outcomes among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the VGF/Safety Net component of C-SAFE Zimbabwe. Analysis revealed that of the 1,948 households sampled in VGF operational wards, 837 (43 percent) participated in VGF at some point within the previous three years. Table 11 and Figure 3 show the proportion of households within VGF wards that participated in this particular component, broken down by wealth (as measured by the quartiles of the asset index).

The highest proportion of households in VGF is in the lowest asset index category, and the proportion of VGF households decreases steadily in the higher asset categories. This pattern shows that wealthier households are less likely to have participated in VGF, suggesting that the targeting of households for VGF is directed toward less wealthy households, as measured in terms of household assets.

Table 11: VGF Beneficiaries by Asset Category

Asset Category	% HH in VGF
Lowest	49.5
2	48.4
3	36.8*
Highest	31.6*
Total Sample	43.0

[a] All HH in wards with VGF
* Different from value of lowest category at 0.10 significance level

However, it is also important to note that a relatively large proportion of VGF households are in the highest asset index category. Two explanations are possible. Either the VGF targeting mechanism is ineffective in excluding wealthier households, or a significant proportion of households with many assets are also food insecure. Qualitative findings conform to the latter interpretation. In particular, respondents noted that within the Zimbabwean context of rapid economic deterioration, price instability, employment disruptions and political turmoil, many households with relatively strong asset bases (livestock , permanent housing) also faced severe difficulties in accessing adequate food due to unforeseen and sudden losses of income and pensions, as well as the unavailability of food in local markets.

Figure 3: Percentage of Households Reportedly Registered as VGF Beneficiaries, by Asset Category



Table 12 compares the values for core food security indicators among VGF beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Data show that VGF participants have significantly fewer assets than non-participants (almost 40 percent less). This is consistent with the results of the previous table. However, differences in both the HDDS and HFIAS between the two groups are much smaller. The HDDS of VGF households is only 8 percent lower, and the HFIAS is not statistically different between the two groups. Data show that differences among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in terms of duration of adequate food access were minimal and not statistically significant.

Table 12: Outcome Indicator Scores among VGF Beneficiaries and Non-Beneficiaries

Sample	# HH	Asset Index	HDDS	HFIAS	MAHFP
Non-beneficiaries	1,111	441.7	4.8	13.8	5.0
Beneficiaries	837	266.4*	4.4*	13.6	4.8
Total Sample [a]	1,948	366.4	4.6	13.7	4.9

[a] All HH in wards with VGF

* Value different from non-beneficiaries at 0.10 significance level

Table 13 presents the HDDS broken down by participation in VGF and by asset index categories. The HDDS for VGF beneficiaries in the lowest asset index category is actually higher than for non-beneficiaries. Overall, these results suggest that the VGF program has protected vulnerable households in the sense that food security status of participants have remained on par with non-participants. In all likelihood, the dietary diversity of vulnerable beneficiary households was also positively influenced by an improved 2009/2010 harvest, the loosening of restriction on grain markets, increases in food aid, and a generally improving economic climate since 2008.

Table 13: HDDS by Participation in VGF and Asset Index

Asset Index Category	VGF Beneficiaries	
	Non-beneficiaries	Beneficiaries
Lowest	4.1	4.3*
2	4.9	4.2*
3	4.6	4.6
Highest	5.7	5.1
Total Sample	4.8	4.4*

One of the objectives of the VGF intervention was to protect households from the need to borrow or sell assets to purchase food. Table 14 shows few differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in terms of borrowing, selling household assets, and selling animals. Note that among the entire sample, borrowing is reportedly quite common and that nearly one-fifth (19 percent) of all households have reportedly borrowed for food. However, there is no statistical difference in borrowing between participants and non-participants. The proportion of households that reported selling household assets is extremely low overall (slightly over 1 percent of all households in the VGF wards). Of households with livestock, almost 20 percent sold animals, with 12 percent reporting the reason for sale was to obtain food. There is no statistical difference in livestock sales between participants and non-participants in VGF. These results indicate that VGF was fairly successful in helping vulnerable households avoid accumulating excessive debt and/or divesting of productive assets during the period of evaluation.

Table 14: Borrowing and Asset Sales by Participation in VGF

VGF Beneficiaries	% HH borrowed	% HH borrowed for food	% HH sold assets	% HH sold livestock	% HH sold livestock for food
Non-beneficiaries	29.1	19.5	1.7	20.2	11.8
Beneficiaries	28.7	17.3	0.6*	19.1	13.4
Total Sample	29.0	18.5	1.3	19.8	12.3

Qualitative information from beneficiaries and program staff revealed that many viewed the VGF / Safety Net component as the most critical and most effective of all C-SAFE Zimbabwe interventions. This perception is clearly supported by the overwhelming need for food assistance in Zimbabwe, particularly during 2007 and 2008, a period which witnessed the combination of crop failures, runaway inflation, near collapse of markets, and extreme political tension throughout the country.

According to qualitative information, beneficiaries and other stakeholders are convinced that many vulnerable individuals would have starved during this time had it not been for the safety-net food assistance provided through C-SAFE Zimbabwe. Despite the stated desire on the part of member institutions to “go beyond VGF as the bottom line of C-SAFE interventions”, the Steering Committee agreed that the VGF component implemented by C-SAFE between 2007 and 2010 played a vital role in

emergency response at the national level by providing food support to millions of food insecure individuals.[39]

Qualitative data gained through FGDs and KIIs also suggest that VGF also resulted in a number of indirect benefits in target communities. Respondents explained that VGF helped targeted households avoid selling assets or drawing on limited cash reserves to fund food purchases. By doing so, VGF reportedly enabled beneficiary households to direct more of their income toward non-food expenses including health care and school fees. Finally, some acknowledged that food distribution through VGF had a positive influence on family relations by decreasing the incentive for male members to engage in labor migration.

> *"Since C-SAFE began providing food assistance our lives have totally changed. We have managed to live long because even those who did not receive rations would be given food by those that were registered. They made a garden for us which is fenced and we grow vegetables that we eat with our families and sell (surplus) so that we can buy other things we need. We can now engage in other developmental projects in our community."*
>
> - Focus Group Participant

In order to gauge the efficiency, equity, and effectiveness of implementation processes, the household survey also queried respondents about perceived problems with implementation of the VGF component. Table 15 demonstrates that relatively few (approximately 1 in 7) respondents reported having any problems with VGF distributions. Among those that did report problems, 'shortages in quantities received' and 'delay in receiving food' were most commonly cited (5% and 3%, respectively).

During the qualitative phase of field work, communities explained that community food security improved substantially during blanket (safety net) feeding because everyone one who needed assistance received food. Some were particularly adamant that safety net feeding provided by consortium members was critical in ensuring the survival of especially vulnerable populations (elderly, children, chronically ill) who would have otherwise starved. However, when programming was adapted toward targeted VGF, food security at the community level was compromised due to the narrowing of targeting criteria and the practice of sharing rations within the wider community. Frustration with the quantity of VGF distributions was heightened in March 2009 following the change in distribution from a typical monthly ration of 10 kg of cereal (plus 1kg pulses and 0.6 kg of oil) to a reduced ration of 5 kg of cereal (plus 1kg pulses and 0.6 kg of oil). Especially following the decrease in ration size, the practice of sharing rations among all community members meant that targeted VGF food support had relatively little impact on the food security of beneficiary households.

[39] Estimates for FY 08 suggest that 1.7 million individuals benefitted from VGF/SN feeding carried out by C-SAFE in that year alone

Table 15: Reported problems with VGF

Type of problem	% reporting [a]
None	89.2
Distance to distribution center	1.8
Delay in receiving food	3.2
Shortages in quantities received	4.9
Food spoiled	0.1
Inappropriate type of food	1.8
Other	2.3

[a] Percentage of all HHs receiving VGF

B. Emergency School-Based Feeding (ESBF)

Among communities visited by the qualitative field team, each that participated in ESBF was especially complementary about the coordination and effectiveness of the activity. Respondents consistently stated their opinion that the provision of school meals to both in-school and out-of-school youth directly contributed to increase in enrollment and boosted both the attentiveness and intellectual capacity (ability to concentrate) among students. Others claimed that ESBF has prompted children to take a more active interest in their education and that the provision school meals has reduced injuries/accidents caused by children gathering wild foods. Among some communities that received VGF, FFA and/or ESBF at some point over the last three years, several claimed that ESBF was likely the most valuable intervention based their opinion that education is an important contributor to longer-term improvements in household livelihood security.

Others noted more immediate benefits of school rations, including the freeing up of income to spend on expenses other than food (health care, school fees, agricultural inputs) and more efficient food distribution in the home (since children were fed at school). The selection of kitchen staff / cooks for ESBF, under the sub-component entitled Food for School Service (FSS) was also apparently targeted without significant complaints and was effective in supporting some of the more vulnerable members of participating communities. In several cases, respondents noted that selection of FSS beneficiaries was managed on a rotational basis to ensure that all eligible individuals had an equal opportunity to participate.

Some communities that participated in ESBF prior to its discontinuation in 2009 claimed a preference for more distribution points (schools) under the component to enable children living in remote households, and those not yet in school (3-4 years old) to access benefits.

While the ESBF component was consistently praised as both appropriate and effective in meeting the food assistance needs among school-aged children, parents and children were consistently critical of the way in which the component was discontinued. Even though many had been given some notice of the end of ESBF activities, most felt the end of ESBF was abrupt and that the end of school meals would inevitably lead to a decline in enrolment. They explained that without the meals, children lacked an immediate incentive to attend school. Without the additional food support provided by ESBF,

respondents claimed that school-aged children from the most vulnerable households would be forced to drop out of school and possibly migrate in search of food or income.

C. Food-for-Assets (FFA)

Table 16 presents survey results on the numbers (and percentages) of sample households that reportedly participated in FFA activities. Of the 724 households surveyed in FFA wards (FFA plus FFA&VGF wards), 183 reported receiving water from C-SAFE systems, and 175 reported having a plot in a C-SAFE garden. Overall, 40 percent of all households surveyed in the FFA wards reported receiving irrigation water or having a garden plot supported by the project.

Table 16: Percent of HH Benefiting from FFA Irrigation Activities

	Number	%
Receive irrigation water	183	25.3
Have community garden	175	24.2
Irrigation water and community garden	69	9.5
Irrigation water or community garden	289	39.9
Non-beneficiaries	434	59.9
Total Sample [a]	724	100.0

[a] Total of sampled HHs in FFA communities

Average household values for core food insecurity indicators among FFA beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are presented below in Table 17. Both the HDDS and HFIAS suggest that non-beneficiaries tend to be more food insecure than beneficiary households, despite the fact that they own more assets. Based on average HDDS, quantitative data suggest that sampled beneficiaries tend to be more food secure than non-beneficiaries (differences among the two groups in other indicators were not statistically significant). This finding might be interpreted in different ways. First, it can be viewed as evidence of the impact of food assistance on the food security of vulnerable FFA target households. Alternatively, this data also lends credence to qualitative information obtained from both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries regarding the targeting of C-SAFE support. Time and again, they pointed out that asset ownership is not the best indicator of transitory vulnerability to food insecurity, particularly in rural Zimbabwe. Despite clearly higher asset index scores, non-beneficiaries in FFA target communities had a lower degree of dietary diversity and scored lower on the HFIAS than did FFA beneficiaries.

Table 17:Outcome Indicator Values for FFA Beneficiaries and Non-Beneficiaries

FFA Irrigation	# HH	HDDS	HFIAS	Asset Index
Non-beneficiaries	434	4.6	14.5	308.2
Beneficiaries	289	5.0*	13.9	282.6
Total Sample [a]	724	4.8	14.2	297.9

[a] Total sampled HH's in FFA communities

* Value different from non-beneficiaries at 0.10 significance level

In order to assess the impact of the C-SAFE FFA component, sampled households were asked about changes in agricultural production over the previous three years. Data in Table 18 and Figure 4, shows that among the entire sample, nearly one half (43 percent) of all respondents said that their agricultural production had *decreased* during the previous three years, while over a third (37 percent) reported that production levels had remained the same. Only one-fifth (20 percent) of all respondents reported that agricultural production had increased over the same period. Interestingly, while FFA beneficiaries were more likely to report production increases than non-beneficiaries (22 versus 16 percent, respectively), FFA beneficiaries were also more likely to report production decreases in the past three years than were non-beneficiaries.

Table 18: Reported Change in Vegetable Production among FFA Beneficiaries and Non-Beneficiaries, 2007-2010

	FFA Irrigation		Total Sample
	Non-Beneficiaries	Beneficiaries	
	% HH reporting		
Increased	16.4	21.9	19.5
Same	47.9	29.0	37.4
Decreased	35.6	49.2	43.2

* Distribution of Non-beneficiaries different from Beneficiaries at 0.10 significance level

Figure 4: Reported Change in Vegetable Production among FFA Beneficiaries and Non-Beneficiaries, 2007-2010



One explanation for this anomalous finding may be found in Table 19, which presents data on reasons provided by respondents for decreases in vegetable production. Of all the cited reasons for production decreases, weather problems (drought) was by far the most common response among both FFA-Irrigation beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Interestingly, while 'pest problems' was the second most commonly-cited reason for production decreases, this issue was reportedly much more common among beneficiaries than among non-beneficiaries (45 percent versus 29 percent, respectively). This may be due to the fact that pest problems are often more pronounced in irrigated plots, where plant density is higher, and higher moisture associated with more intensive irrigation increases the risks of certain kinds of plant diseases.

Table 19: Reasons for decrease in vegetable production

	FFA Irrigation	
	Non-beneficiaries	Beneficiaries
	% HH Reporting	
Illness of HH member	2.8	0.5
Problems access to inputs	14.8	7.2
Shortage of labor	10.8	5.5
Shortage of land	4.1	1.5
Pest problems	29.2	45.1
Weather problems	65.6	69.1
Other	8.3	7.8

Table 20 presents information on the cereal crop production among households that received training from C-SAFE on conservation farming as well as among those who did not. Of the 724 households in FFA communities (weighted sample), 139 (18 percent) reportedly received training in conservation farming from C-SAFE member institutions. Data shows that beneficiaries of C-SAFE training in conservation farming were more likely to report increases and less likely to report decreases in cereal production than were non-beneficiaries. While the vast majority of the entire sample (77 percent) reported a decrease in cereal production during the period of evaluation, evidence suggests that training in conservation farming helped participating households mitigate risks to agricultural production.

Table 20: Reported Change in Cereal Production among Beneficiaries and Non-Beneficiaries of C-SAFE Training in Conservation Farming

	Conservation Farming		
	Did not receive	Received	Total Sample
	% HH reporting		
Increased	11.2	16.1	12.1
Same	10.6	10.5	10.6
Decreased	78.0	73.4	77.2

Differences in distribution between groups not different at 0.10 significance level.

Qualitative information gained through FGDs and KII in target communities revealed that among those that had received FFA and/or VGF at one time, most expressed a preference for FFA. Some stated their opinion that rations provided through VGF had little impact on food security, while other felt it was unjustly targeted. By contrast, FFA is self-targeting and is more likely to lead to sustainable improvements in food security (rehabilitation of gullies and water sources for agriculture and/or livestock, training in conservation farming). Some also pointed out that "FFA discourages laziness and fosters a feeling where the community feels they own the project".

Among the tangible benefits of the FFA component, beneficiaries reported that rehabilitated dams had helped communities create vegetable gardens, boost production (and in some cases generate marketable surplus) in established vegetable gardens, and provided an important source of water for livestock. In some areas, FFA activities have focused on application of conservation farming techniques on semi-communal agricultural plots. Participating households are responsible for maintaining their individual portions of plots in with improved conservation farming techniques are employed. At harvest, part of each individual's production is contributed to a "chief's granary" which is traditionally used as a safety net mechanism for supporting the most vulnerable households (orphans, elderly, chronically ill, disabled, etc.). In this way, they feel that FFA has not only improved the immediate food security of households participating in FFA activities, but also contributed to the longer-term food and livelihood security of many non-beneficiary community members.

Alternatively, others felt that FFA activities had little or no impact on household food security given that rehabilitated water infrastructure was too far away from their homes (several kilometers) to be of use for irrigating crops or homestead gardens, and that FFA was implemented over a short period. Others claimed that while increased access to water had boosted vegetable production, the lack of access to transportation and continuing economic stagnation has limited their ability to market their surplus. The provision of technical assistance by consortium members in support of FFA projects was also reportedly minimal, though many of the individual projects (silt removal, gulley restoration, etc.) required little technical input.

Finally, most communities who have benefitted from creation of infrastructure through the C-SAFE FFA component confirmed that they have established local committees responsible for the maintenance of these productive assets.

D. Market Assistance Program (MAP)

In order to gauge the impact of C-SAFE provision of sorghum through the MAP component, evaluators sought information on the availability of milled sorghum in local retail shops. Table 21 shows that for the clear majority of sample households (64 percent), sorghum meal is 'usually' or 'always' available in local shops. Alternatively, approximately ten percent of sampled households reported that milled sorghum was never available.

Table 21: Reported Availability of Sorghum Meal in Nearby Shops

	Number	%
Never	81	9.5
Sometimes	230	26.9
Usually	264	30.8
Always	281	32.8
Total Sample [a]	857	100.0

[a] HH sampled in MAP neighborhoods

Table 22 shows that among sampled urban populations, more than half (55 percent) acknowledged purchasing C-SAFE sorghum during the six months prior to the survey. When asked the reasons for purchase of MAP sorghum within the previous six months, most (64 percent) cited its low cost. Interestingly, 17 percent explained their purchase of sorghum meal based on its nutritive value, whereas 15 percent acknowledged doing so because sorghum is a 'preferred food'. Very few respondents (2 percent) reported that they purchased sorghum meal because there was not alternatively available. Data also show that among households that *did not* purchase MAP sorghum, 'don't like' (not preferred food) was by far the most common reason (48 percent). However, 15 percent also reported that they were unaware of the availability. These findings suggest that while the MAP component has achieved its primary objective of providing a nutritious, low-cost alternative to maize meal for vulnerable urban households, it has yet to have a significant impact on the secondary objective of increased consumer preference for sorghum.

Table 22: Reasons for Purchase or Non-Purchase of C-SAFE Sorghum Meal

	# HH	%
Purchased sorghum meal	**468**	**54.6**
Reasons purchased		
Low cost	297	63.5
High nutritional value	79	16.8
Preferred food	69	14.8
No alternatives available	11	2.4
Other	11	2.4
Did not purchase meal	**389**	**45.4**
Reasons not purchased		
Don't like	187	48.0
Other	87	22.3
Not aware	59	15.1
Poor quality	32	8.3
Not available	18	4.7
Too expensive	4	0.9
Only for sick people	3	0.7
Total Sample	857	100.0

Evaluators also sought to assess differences in the quantity of MAP sorghum purchased among households in various food security categories, based on HFIAS values. Data in Table 23 show that 'severely food insecure' households purchased nearly twice the quantity of sorghum as did 'moderately food insecure' households. Interestingly, 'food secure' households purchased greater quantities of MAP sorghum than 'moderately food insecure' households, suggesting that some non-vulnerable urban households have in fact developed a preference for sorghum as an alternative to maize.

Table 23: Packets of C-SAFE Sorghum Purchased Monthly, by HFIAS Category

HFIAS Category	# Packets purchased per month
Food Secure	0.9
Mildly Food Insecure	0.4
Moderately Food Insecure	1.3
Severely Food Insecure	2.3
Total Sample [a]	1.6

[a] Percentage of sampled HH in MAP neighborhoods

Regarding outcome indicator values, Table 24 shows that households that *did not* purchase MAP sorghum within the previous six months had more assets, more diverse diets, and lower HFIAS values. This information supports the validity of self-targeting mechanisms aimed at improving access to cereals among food insecure urban households.

Table 24: Outcome Indicator Values according to Purchase of C-SAFE Sorghum

Sorghum Meal Purchase	HDDS	HFIAS	Asset Index
Yes	6.9	11.0	732.8
No	7.9*	7.1*	865.3
Total Sample [a]	7.3	9.2	792.9

[a] Percentage of sampled HH in MAP neighborhoods

Previous evaluations and current institutional stakeholders credit MAP with being the most innovative and efficient components implemented under C-SAFE. The MAP component is also credited as being one of the few food assistance programs in all of Southern Africa that has proven effective in addressing the need among vulnerable urban households for affordable sources of cereal. [40,41] C-SAFE and consortium member staff have been particularly pleased with the efficiency of MAP implementation given that it is self-targeting and therefore avoids the time- and resource-intensive processes of beneficiary selection, registration and verification that constrained some other components.

[40] Maunder, Nick. 2005. Consortium for Southern Africa Food Emergency (C-SAFE) – Program Review: Year Three. Final Report. October 2005.
[41] TANGO. 2006. Southern Africa Vulnerability and Program Response: A Way Forward. April 2006.

Participating MAP retailers and beneficiaries universally praised the program, claiming that it was the only program directly supporting urban households during the height of food insecurity caused by price controls instituted in 2007. Although the stigma associated with purchasing sorghum (considered inferior to maize), poor milling/packaging, and lack appropriate knowledge regarding preparation of sorghum initially slowed its implementation, a growing preference for the alternative grain has helped overcome earlier challenges. Preference for milled sorghum has also reportedly increased as a result of instructional pamphlets provided to MAP retailers. The pamphlets were distributed to purchasers of MAP sorghum and presented different methods of preparing sorghum (e.g. Mahewu drink, bread, dumplings, sadza and porridge). MAP sorghum was also noted by respondents as being a particularly nutritious and affordable staple for individuals infected with HIV and AIDS. Given the relative vulnerability of households caring for chronically ill members, the affordability of the packages ($1 dollar for a 5 kg package) was seen as a significant boost to food access in targeted urban neighborhoods.

> *"This was a God-sent program. Because of MAP, all people regardless of income got food or an affordable meal. If one sold vegetables for as low as a dollar one could still manage to get meal for a dollar."*
>
> - MAP retailer

Though not necessarily food insecure, MAP retailers also benefitted directly from implementation of the MAP program. Most claimed that the commissions gained through the sale of the subsidized sorghum helped them meet other expenses including staff salaries and utility fees. The added customer traffic in participating shops also led to an overall increase in sales of other products. Finally, when MAP sorghum was introduced at the height of food shortages, participating retailers claim it encouraged other cereal retailers to lower prices on more preferred, but expensive grains such as maize.

Despite the many reported success of the MAP component, consortium staff, retailers and beneficiaries did acknowledge some challenges in its implementation. There were initial problems in the quality of milled sorghum supplied by local millers (the grain was reportedly too coarse) as well as the packaging (frequent breaks). Given the affordability of the grain, and the fact that it was self-targeting, other beneficiaries did not appreciate the policy that limited purchase to one package per person per day. They claimed this was an insufficient quantity to feed households with more than five members.

Despite their satisfaction with the successes, C-SAFE staff and Steering Committee members also had certain regrets concerning the MAP component. To them the most significant challenge for MAP was the result of the donor's evolving position on distribution of the alternative grain. These policies made clear that C-SAFE could not be seen as actively promoting sorghum. This is because it is not considered a viable crop throughout the country, particularly in the drier, livestock dominant areas of the south. There is also the cultural (and likely political) emphasis on maize production. Although they felt it "was a shame that we couldn't have taken MAP further" by linking with efforts to increase the marketing and production of sorghum, members noted that MAP has had a positive impact on consumer preferences for milled sorghum. In retrospect, they sited this issue as a prime example in which the Steering Committee could have been more effective in advocating more strongly with FFP.

E. Institutional Feeding (IF) / Community Kitchens (CK)

As mentioned previously, the IF and CK components of C-SAFE were designed and implemented to address the needs of a rapidly growing number of vulnerable and food insecure individuals in urban areas of Zimbabwe. By providing a reliable source of food for orphans, the disabled and mentally ill, elderly and/or homeless people, the IF and CK components provided critical food assistance at a time when beneficiaries had nowhere else to turn for support.

Supervisory staff in participating clinics and hospitals confirmed that food provided through the IF component has greatly contributed to their limited food stocks (for patient feeding) and has had a direct and positive impact on the dietary diversity and nutritional status of patients, particularly those with HIV-related illnesses. Several health facilities reported that the pulses provided through C-SAFE greatly complemented the food they produced in their own garden, most of which consists of green vegetables. Others noted that CK activities have significantly introduced the health status of malnourished and destitute adults, and given them some peace of mind since they know where there next meal is coming from. The provision of two cooked meals a day in participating health facilities has also had a positive impact on food insecure patients and their households since they no longer have to prepare meals to bring to the hospital. Analysis of qualitative data also suggest that the IF and CK components have had an indirect impact on surrounding communities in that C-SAFE and institutional staff have actively engaged in raising awareness regarding the importance of care for destitute and/or chronically ill individuals.

> *"People can now afford to have a decent meal without having to walk around the rubbish bins in search of food. Malnourished children within the squatter camp have since decreased. But when C-SAFE ends, most will go back to the streets since they will no longer have an incentive to come here."*
>
> - *Community Kitchen staff member*

Through implementation of the IF and CK components, C-SAFE helped maintain the food and non-food assistance provided by many important community-based institutions (orphanages, hospitals, clinics, shelters) whose funding support had rapidly declined in the wake of the economic collapse. During qualitative fieldwork, evaluators visited one participating institution that houses (and feeds) 100 children ranging from ages three months to twenty three years. They claimed that with C-SAFE support, the limited funding they get from other donors could be directed toward other purchases and expenses including milk for infants, school fees, electricity bills and staff salaries.

Despite the substantial impact the IF and CK components have both had on the immediate food security of vulnerable beneficiaries, the lack of adequate attention and resourced dedicated to the development of viable exit strategies severely compromising the sustainability and longer-term impact of activities (for more detail on exit strategies see Section IV. C – Coordination with Stakeholders).

F. Food Support for Chronically Ill (CI)

Initial program documents acknowledge that FFP is typically not directly involved in providing food support specifically targeted toward the chronically ill. Nonetheless, C-SAFE took the stance that given the prevalence of HIV and associated illnesses (tuberculosis), food security programs would not be effective unless they attempted to respond to the "elephant in the room". And while the CI component

was ultimately discontinued in July 2009, consortium members deserve credit for designing and implementing food-supported activities for this particularly vulnerable population. [42]

In FGDs and KIIs, respondents noted that introduction came at a critical time, when a growing number of HIV-affected individuals were gaining access to TB treatment and antiretroviral therapy and rapidly losing access to sufficient food. By providing reliable access to meals for food insecure patients at participating clinics, C-SAFE extended the lives of thousands and contributed to greater adherence to treatment regimes. The fact that beneficiary targeting was based on positive HIV test results not only limited inclusion and exclusion error, it also apparently encouraged increased uptake of testing services. Some also reported that the distribution of rations through home-based care groups had a positive influence on the profiles of these organizations within the community. Nonetheless, qualitative information did reveal a degree of dissatisfaction among those with other chronic diseases (diabetes, high blood pressure, mental illness) who felt discriminated against because they were not selected to receive food assistance under the CI component.

G. Achievement of Program Targets

For the evaluators, a quantifiable assessment of C-SAFE performance with respect to achievement of beneficiary targets is difficult for numerous reasons. First and foremost, performance measurement of the three subsequent SYAPS (2007-2009) is constrained by the frequent change in targets in response to emerging food security crises, availability of resources, and government interference in implementation (especially during 2008). Secondly, evaluators are hard-pressed to make conclusive statements regarding the achievement of program targets due to the unavailability of monitoring documentation.[43] Although comprehensive information on achievement of program targets was not provided to the evaluators, available results reports reveal common trends regarding C-SAFE performance with respect to expectations.

The initial semi-annual Results Report (January – June 2007) stated that actual distributions met 63 percent of the targeted projection for the period of January to March due to pipeline constraints, the time-consuming process of applying a new targeting tool and ongoing negotiations with between WFP and CRS regarding programming in proposed C-SAFE operational areas (see Figure 5). Likewise, the planned scale up of Food-For-Assets (FFA) between January and April did not occur partly as a result of an inability to identify and implement appropriate projects (as per the Detailed Implementation Plan, the approval of which was delayed by months of back-and-forth communication with the FFP Officer). Scale up of FFA during the first year was also apparently hampered by the fact that agencies prioritized the scale-up of safety net and school feeding interventions over FFA. Certain planned FFA activities including conservation farming were also constrained during the initial year due to the lack of required agricultural inputs. During the first year, the slow scale up of FFA projects was made up for in part by the scale-up of emergency school-based feeding (ESBF) in the period after March. While the original

[42] Due to its perceived medical alignment and improved urban food access situation in Spring 2009, Food for Peace recommended discontinuation of food support for the chronically ill under C-SAFE in July 2009.

[43] Despite numerous requests, evaluators did not receive a comprehensive set of Detailed Implementation Plans and Annual Results Reports for the period under evaluation.

implementation plan did provide for school feeding during these post-harvest months, C-SAFE and FFP ultimately agreed that sustaining ESBF in particularly food insecure districts was warranted in response to severe drought. Finally in 2007, projections for MAP also exceeded actual distribution in the early half of 2007, due in part to the delayed expansion plans for smaller rural towns (Gwanda, Plumtree etc), the closure of MAP in Gweru in March, and the slow start-up in Mutare. The continuing deterioration of the Zimbabwean economy also constrained initial MAP operations.

Figure 5: Projected Verses Actual Commodity Distributions (MT), FY08



Source: World Vision. 2007b.

The next period for which results were made available was January to June 2008 (Table25). While the Semi-Annual Results Report for that period claimed that Safety Net feeding was implemented as planned between January and March, final distributions had to be completed earlier than planned due to disruptions created by the national election cycle and concerns over political interference. While C-SAFE hoped to resume safety net registration in June, that was ultimately made impossible by the government ban on NGO activities issued on June 4. Examination of data below reveal interesting discrepancies between level of achievement as measured by beneficiaries and distribution of commodities. Differences in achievement levels between beneficiaries and commodities was most pronounced for IF, FFA, FFSS and ESBF. These differences are not explained in the report but suggest some difficulty in making accurate projections and/or in establishing appropriate ration sizes.

Table 25: Planned versus Actual Beneficiaries and Commodity Distributions (MT), FY09

	Beneficiaries			Tonnage		
Program	Planned	Actual	% Beneficiary Achievement	Planned	Actual	% Tonnage Achievement
Safety Net	695,409	423,905	61%	19,881.59	20,704.26	104%
ESFP	422,064	435,313	103%	6,535.59	3,930.799	60%
FFSS	10,393	1,680	16%	2,182.25	2,043.88	94%
CI	33,604	36,624	109%	1,212.01	1,917.16	158%
MAP	140,000	142,333	102%	5,600	4,812.65	86%
IF	7,698	18,026	234%	292.99	305.48	104%
FFA	8,343	17,936	215%	1,882.73	1,575.50	84%
Total	**1,317,511**	**1,075,817**	82%	**37,587**	**35,290**	94%

The Annual Results Report (ARR) for FY09 states that the projections for the safety-net intervention were based upon a scale-up plan that corresponded to food security categorization of districts enabled by the 2008 ZimVAC report. According to the report, distributions peaked in January 2009 when C-SAFE was providing safety net rations to over 1.1 million beneficiaries per month. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, achievement of Safety Net / VGF targets was severely compromised when C-SAFE was forced to reduce ration sizes following late repayment of commodities borrowed by WFP. While the ARR claims that 84 FFA projects planned to benefit 30,245 beneficiaries during peak season (May to August) it includes no information on what percentage of targets were actually achieved. Similarly, no conclusive information was made available on achievement of program targets for the CI component. The ARR states that the consortium planned to target 49,037 chronically ill beneficiaries per month, but later explains that the program was discontinued by FFP in July 2009. The ARR does not explain why the planned scale-up of the MAP program into new areas of Harare and Hwang was also not achieved. Finally, while the ARR identifies performance targets for both the IF and ESBF components during FY09, it provides no information on the extent to which these targets were met.

IV. Management Issues

A. Adjustments to Changing Context

The uncertainty of the Zimbabwean context regarding social and economic vulnerabilities, resource availability an operational constraints required that C-SAFE Zimbabwe retained an overall strategy that was flexible enough to enable rapid response to changing conditions. Contextual constraints (e.g. ban on NGO activities, hyper-inflation, crop failure) led to the emergence of innovative approaches to supporting food security through available channels. Throughout the life of the program, the highly dynamic political environment and evolving policies of the donor regarding the provision of food assistance required C-SAFE to rapidly scale-up, scale-down, redesign and in some cases completely discontinue project activities.

For instance, in 2008, distributions originally scheduled to take place in March (35,000 MT for 1 million beneficiaries) had to be completed earlier than planned due to national elections held at the end of the

month. It proved impossible for C-SAFE distributions to take place after the last two weeks of March due to the chaotic social conditions and concern about safety incidents and/or political interference. While C-SAFE had hope to resume safety net registration and verification in June, that was in turn made impossible by the ban on NGO activities adopted by the government on June 4th.[44] Alternatively, while original projections did not include school feeding during post-harvest months, C-SAFE effectively advocated with FFP Officer to continue ESBF programming during these months in wards particularly affected by severe drought.[45,46] It is also worth noting that C-SAFE submitted Supplementary AER requests in March and June of 2007 in which the consortium asked for additional food and funding to meet the growing needs in light of drought and the deteriorating economic situation. These were quickly and fully approved, in effect giving C-SAFE a cost extension through March 31, 2008.[47]

Regarding adjustment to changing conditions and external factors, C-SAFE staff explained that Food for Assets (FFA) and Emergency School-based Feeding (ESBF) were developed and promoted partly in response to government restrictions on VGF.[48] C-SAFE effectively 'made up' for the slow scale-up in FFA projects by the rapid scale-up of ESBF in April 2007. Despite the effectiveness of both the ESBF and CI components in meeting the food needs of vulnerable populations, they were ultimately discontinued by the donor, primarily due to concerns over duplication with other food security, health and education initiatives. At the time of the evaluation, consortium member representatives also stated that overreliance on FFA had, in some cases, led to problems such as a focus on distributing food to needy households rather than selection of appropriate and sustainable projects.

Continual deterioration of the economic situation throughout most of the program also constrained operations as the MAP component was forced to seek suppliers of packaging material outside of the country due to the exorbitant pricing and limited capacity of local suppliers. Despite this, the MAP picked up significantly following June of first year (2007) due to the combined effects of near crop failure in the Southern region, and the devastating effects of the price control policy upon the urban food market. As such, MAP 'actual distributions' increased significantly in the last quarter of FY07 (and into FY08).[49]

Overall, the evaluators believe that C-SAFE Zimbabwe deserves significant credit for adapting programming modalities and targets in response to extremely challenging and unpredictable changes in the operating environment. Likewise, despite its shortcomings, C-SAFE Steering Committee members confirmed their opinion that the consortium was very responsive to changing conditions and overwhelming need for assistance among a rapidly expanding target situation. They cited, for example, the boosting of VGF rations in March 2008 in anticipation of the pending restrictions on VGF which were ultimately put in place later that year (June-August).

[44] World Vision. 2008. C-SAFE Semi-Annual Narrative Report (January 1 – June 30, 2008).
[45] Ultimately, the Food for Peace Officer and C-SAFE agreed that sustaining ESBF in wards with at least 90% crop failure was the best way to improve access to food for households vulnerable to food insecurity.
[46] World Vision. 2007b. C-SAFE Semi-Annual Narrative Report (January 1 – June 30, 2007).
[47] World Vision. 2007b. C-SAFE Semi-Annual Narrative Report (January 1 – June 30, 2007).
[48] The Government of Zimbabwe banned VGF from June to August 2008. This reportedly was a political attempt on the part of the government to demonstrate the sufficiency of grain production at the national level and counter warnings of an emerging food security crisis.
[49] World Vision. 2008. C-SAFE Semi-Annual Narrative Report (January 1 – June 30, 2008).

However, despite establishment of a 'Targeting Framework' describing the interrelation of interventions, referral mechanisms, and criteria for beneficiary graduation, qualitative data do suggest certain issues related to targeting. By far the biggest complaint on the part of beneficiaries in all C-SAFE operational areas concerns the transition from blanket, safety net feeding toward more targeted VGF assistance. As is stated throughout this report, the lack of clarity and/or accuracy of targeting criteria created considerable tension in target communities, particularly given the overwhelming need for food assistance over the last three years. The administrative burden associated with targeting, registering, and verifying VGF beneficiaries also put a considerable strain on the capacity of member institutions, particularly given the scale of the intervention. Most importantly, evaluation findings suggest that while modifications in targeting under the VGF component may have limited instance of leakage, it led to widespread accusations of undercoverage, a shortcoming that is inherent in the situation of widespread food insecurity and limited available resources.

Ultimately, the evaluation team believes that the changes in the targeting mechanisms for VGF did lead to real improvements. This is despite the fact that the PRR approach was based on quite simplistic assumptions regarding determinants of household access to food, and on the assumption that assets are highly correlated with food security status. In the particular context of Zimbabwe these assumptions are not applicable. The economic crisis over the past three years has had a debilitating effect on many households that would otherwise be considered relatively resilient (i.e. with many assets) in normal circumstances. In the Zimbabwean context, the loss of employment (and pensions), exposure to hyper-inflation and the global increase in food prices, meant that for many previously food secure households, food was simple inaccessible. The switch to a community-based ranking approach allowed for a more responsive and community-driven assessment of the conditions of particular households. Nonetheless, the C-SAFE experience has shown that this approach to targeting is very resource-intensive, and can be more divisive within communities – pitting neighbor against neighbor. However, no targeting mechanism is perfect, and the adjustments that were made over the course of the program appear to have led to more effective targeting.

B. Coordination within the Consortium

With the close of the regional consortium and the inception of the SYAP, C-SAFE Zimbabwe assumed coordination responsibilities formerly carried out under the C-SAFE Regional Management Unit (RMU). As the lead agency for the consortium, World Vision assumed ultimately responsibility for establishing a management structure for the collaborative S-SAFE program (Table 26). The most significant change in the management structure of C-SAFE Zimbabwe was establishment of a Chief of Party (COP) directorate, responsible for overall program management. According to the original SYAP proposal, the COP was to be supported in these duties by a: Deputy COP; C-SAFE Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator; C-SAFE Program Officer; C-SAFE Grant Accountant; a Regional Commodities Manager (based in Durban); and a Country Commodities Manager (based in Bulawayo). [50] According to the initial SYAP proposal, much of the direct oversight responsibility for C-SAFE was to be held by a 'Country Consortium Unit' made up of a Deputy Chief-of-Party and relevant Program Managers within member agencies. The Country Consortium Unit was to be supported by a distinct Finance Unit, Commodities Unit, and Design,

[50] World Vision. 2007a.

Monitoring and Evaluation (DME) Unit. The DME Unit itself was staffed by a Program Officer, a Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator and relevant sector Focal Point Persons.[51]

Table 26: Proposed Organizational Structure for C-SAFE Zimbabwe	
Steering Committee	- Responsible for meeting quarterly (or as necessary) to coordinate interventions among individual agencies and ensure communication among relevant stakeholders at the national level.
Chief-of-Party	- Chairperson of C-SAFE Steering Committee - Senior staff member overseeing implementation of consortium activities: responsible for ensuring program quality in the field, maintaining functional relationships among member institutions, and providing timely and accurate reporting of activities to FFP.
Country Consortium Unit	- Manage country consortium implementation through coordinated activity of individual sub-units: • Management Unit • Finance Unit • Commodities Unit
Design, Monitoring and Evaluation (DME) Unit	- Responsible for program design, M&E, documentation and reporting. Supported by: • Program Officer • M&E Coordinator • Focal Point Persons

Source: World Vision 2007

During primary data collection, institutional stakeholders revealed a number of important successes and challenges in terms of internal coordination of consortium. First and foremost, coordination of the consortium was constrained at times by delayed recruitment of key staff positions. World Vision was without a permanent Country Director for an extended period which in turn prevented appointment of a Chief-of-Party for C-SAFE until August 2009. The delay in filling this key position was apparently also due to the diverse group of interests that needed to be consulted during recruitment of the COP. During recruitment of the current COP, C-SAFE offices were supported by senior staff from member institutions on temporary duty from headquarter offices in Washington D.C.

Likewise, turnover of senior management staff within C-SAFE member organizations and the government ban on NGO activities by the Government of Zimbabwe in 2008 both presented severe challenges to the continuity and efficiency of Steering Committee activities. In personal interviews conducted in April 2010, current Steering Committee members (Country Directors of C-SAFE member

[51] Focal Point Persons (and their institutional affiliation) included those for Food Security (CARE), Urban (World Vision), School Feeding / Institutional Feeding (Catholic Relief Services), Orphans and Vulnerable Children/HIV/AIDS (Catholic Relief Services).

institutions) acknowledged that their brief tenure in their current positions and relatively infrequent communication have constrained the effectiveness of the C-SAFE Steering Committee as a whole. [52]

In addition to high staff turnover, coordination of the consortium has at points been hampered by a lack of alignment with the FFP annual funding cycle and the absence of a National Steering Committee.[53] Previous evaluations noted that a high degree of involvement in implementation details by FFP Zimbabwe further complicated the work of the consortium and that, in the earliest stages of implementation, the consortium was affected by a degree of competition among members, though this eased as individual organizations gained confidence working together. [54]

Over the past two years, Steering Committee members explained that meetings were often attended by technical staff and program managers. Their role was to provide background and field-level information necessary for individual Country Directors to reach consensus on important logistical decisions in a very dynamic operating environment. In effect, members felt this kept the Steering Committee from addressing more of the "big picture" issues affecting the longer-term impact of the consortium. Recently, the Steering Committee has reportedly met three times in the previous 6-8 months, admittedly leading to meetings and decisions that were "a bit ad hoc".

For its part, WV stated that, as lead agency, they were often put in a difficult position. In making efforts to advocate for the collective interests of the entire C-SAFE consortium, government officials often required World Vision to confirm their official "registration" as an NGO. In this sense, it was difficult to gain widespread support for C-SAFE interventions among key government stakeholders given that it was not a legally recognized entity.

These concerns over efficiency and equity led to establishment of the C-SAFE office – which combined the offices of the COP, grant management, and M&E) in 2009. While all Stakeholder Committee members viewed the establishment of the C-SAFE office as a positive development, they acknowledged that the move was "too late" given that by the time it was set up, the donor (FFP) had already begun to move beyond emergency programming toward a longer-term focus on recovery.

- ***Technical Capacity of C-SAFE Staff***

Respondents from member institutions also mentioned that initially, coordinated implementation of C-SAFE activities was hampered by the fact that sectoral 'Focal Point Persons' (FPP) and key operational staff (finance, M&E, COP) were housed not within a central C-SAFE unit, but in their respective organizations' offices.[55] Some felt that this arrangement initially prevented the group from functioning as a consortium and that member agencies placed higher priority on those interventions for which they had an FPP. Some respondents also felt that as the lead agency, WV was disproportionately over-

[52] Each of the current Steering Committee members (with the exception of the World Vision representative) have been in their current positions for one year.

[53] The mismatch between the US government fiscal year and the southern Africa hunger period continued to plague C-SAFE Zimbabwe's ability to deliver food in terms to meet the needs of beneficiaries, as was the case in other countries.

[54] TANGO. 2007. C-SAFE Zimbabwe End of Program Evaluation Final Report. January 2007.

[55] The FPP for MAP was stationed at World Vision offices; the FPP for ESBF/CK was at CRS; and the FPP for FFA and VGF worked out of the CARE offices.

represented in terms of dedicated technical staff and that C-SAFE technical staff could have been more representative of other member institutions (CARE, CRS).

Qualitative input from project staff suggests that individual consortium members did not consistently draw on their particular technical strengths to contribute to technical improvements among other partners. While Stakeholder Committee members explained that operational budgets included funding for maintenance of a C-SAFE "Knowledge and Learning Center", emphasis on its role within C-SAFE seemed to diminish over time. However, respondents did agree that despite challenges related to coordination, communication and exchange between agencies, most C-SAFE field staff (estimated 600-700 individuals overall) improved their technical capacity simply by being forced to respond on a large scale to a pressing emergency within a particularly challenging operating environment. Some felt that C-SAFE's greatest gains in terms of innovation and improvement of technical capacity occurred with respect to program monitoring and evaluation.

C. Coordination with Stakeholders

Given the dynamic operating environment and the considerable number of stakeholders involved in implementation of C-SAFE activities, a significant amount of time and effort was spent by management staff on inter-agency communication and coordination, particularly during initial phases and crisis periods involving rapid scale-up or scaling down of activities. The following highlights both success and challenges in coordination between the consortium and the other primary stakeholders of C-SAFE.

- ***Donors***

Acknowledging the rapidly changing context in Zimbabwe and the charged political environment throughout all phases of implementation, C-SAFE Steering Committee members stated their opinion that donor views on a range of issues affecting C-SAFE have not been consistent. Like C-SAFE, there has been considerable turnover among FFP staff in Zimbabwe over the previous three years. As a result, respondents sometimes felt the consortium was pressured to adapt programming strategies in response to divergent priorities. At the same time, they felt that FFP guidelines and or policy statements were somewhat ad hoc and often shared informally (not in writing). Finally, they also cited significant differences in policy and/or strategies promoted by FFP-Zimbabwe and FFP-Washington. One noteworthy example of this was FFP-Zimbabwe's support for ESBF, a component that was ultimately discontinued by FFP-Washington). They felt this particular instance reflected a lack of understanding on the part of the donor regarding the operating environment and the seasonality of other components (VGF/Safety Net) and attributed to a lack of consistent communication between the Steering Committee and FFP.

Steering Committee members also noted that donor approval processes for C-SAFE operating budgets and changes in program implementation have been a "major constraint". They noted that the process of developing proposals for continued programming became "very bogged down" in 2009. They explained that even though C-SAFE had commodities on hand, and a letter of approval for the project from the donor, they were unable to conduct food distribution until they received approval on the budget. Respondents felt that the lack of clarity from the donor regarding very aspects of the budget (duration of the budget, cost versus no-cost extension, etc.) severely delayed the approval process and ultimately

food distribution. As an example, they stated the budget for final year of C-SAFE was submitted to the donor in July 2009, but did not formally approved until February 2010.

- ***World Food Programme (WFP)***

During primary data collection, evaluators met directly with representatives of the World Food Programme (WFP) in Harare to obtain their input on the effectiveness of coordination between WFP and C-SAFE. They emphasized that throughout the three-year period, the combination of food assistance provided by the two agencies was vital to helping vulnerable households cope with severe food security and economic crises.[56] WFP noted that the Food Aid working group served as the official channel for coordination among multiple stakeholders including WFP, C-SAFE, FFP, Government ministries (social welfare, agriculture, international cooperation, regional integration) and other NGOs implementing food security initiatives. WFP noted that VGF components carried out by both institutions were particularly well-harmonized, largely due to the fact that in many cases, C-SAFE member institutions were also the implementing partners for WFP's VGF component.

Through discussions with C-SAFE staff, evaluators learned that commodity management was one critical aspect of coordination with WFP that had a negative influence on program implementation. Namely, due to WFP's inability to adhere to repayment schedules for commodities borrowed from C-SAFE, the consortium was forced to cut ration sizes to VGF beneficiaries in March-April 2009. As mentioned throughout this report, the decrease in ration size had a severe and direct impact on the food security of beneficiary households, particularly in light of the food and economic crisis prevailing at the time.

- ***Local Government***

C-SAFE member institutions made attempts to involve local government authorities (District Administration representatives, Ward Council members) in the planning, implementation and monitoring of activities. As such, evaluators met with government representatives in operational districts to get their input on the effectiveness of collaboration with C-SAFE. Several noted that coordination between C-SAFE and government authorities was appropriate and effective, as evidenced by their participation in community and beneficiary selection exercises. In particular, they noted their approval of the transparency of C-SAFE administrative processes, including beneficiary registration and help desks at FDPs.

In terms of individual components of C-SAFE government representatives revealed a preference for longer-term, community development projects, such as FFA, over other direct food transfers (VGF/Safety Net) which they felt had created community tensions. In particular, they feel that irrigation projects supported through C-SAFE's FFA component have had a very high return on investment, and would like to support greater integration of FFA project planning with District Administration disaster relief efforts and Agritex (agricultural extension) activities. District government representatives were also complementary of ESBF due to the fact that it contributed to improved school attendance,

[56] WFP estimates that peak numbers of beneficiaries for both agencies were reached during 2009 when WFP assisted 5.1 million individuals and C-SAFE assisted 2.1 million.

augmented the limited income and food stocks of vulnerable households, and provided blanket (as opposed to targeted) coverage of children.

- ***Institutions/Millers/Retailers***

The primary roles of institutions participating in the distribution of commodities through IF, CK and MAP are to: receive and properly store commodities; prepare and/or distribute food to beneficiaries; manage inventories and complaints; participate in regular (monthly) monitoring activities; and submit required documentation on food distributed in a timely manner. Qualitative information gained through key informant interviews with managers of feeding institutions, sorghum millers and MAP retailers revealed their opinion that overall coordination with C-SAFE has been efficient and effective.

The vast majority of MAP retailers and institutional feeding supervisory staff reported that consortium staff were attentive to their needs and responded in a timely and appropriate manner in response to complaints or recommendations made by beneficiaries (e.g. C-SAFE's response to reported problems with packaging and quality of milled sorghum). While some reported confusion and development of tensions with consortium staff over reporting requirements, most felt such mechanisms were transparent and not overly burdensome. Some MAP retailers reported coordination problems in terms of the continuity of program staff. They noted that different individuals would come on behalf of consortium members to discuss reporting requirements and or payment arrangements, causing some confusion among retailers. Others noted that while consortium members maintained positive relationships with participating institutions, little effort was made to directly engage the wider community in urban programming areas. Finally, representatives of churches, orphanages, hospitals and clinics acknowledge participation in a range of capacity building activities facilitated by C-SAFE. They reportedly received training on proper food preparation, health and hygiene, commodity storage, and systems for inventory management (e.g stack cards).

- ***Beneficiaries***

Among each of the components implemented under C-SAFE, beneficiaries were perhaps most directly involved in VGF/Safety Net feeding. Community members were not only directly involved in selecting the most vulnerable households during the registration and verification processes, they also took part in the distribution of rations and collection of feedback through FDP Help Desks.

The vast majority of respondents expressed deep appreciation for the assistance provided through Safety Net (blanket) feeding, especially given that the support came at a particularly desperate time. However, there was widespread disagreement in all operational areas about the way in which, and the basis upon which, C-SAFE transitioned from safety net feeding toward more targeted VGF distributions. In terms of coordination, some stakeholder felt that the dissatisfaction with VGF was partly the result of C-SAFE's failure to adequately involve community leaders and consider traditional practices in the design of the intervention. Others explained that many non-beneficiaries were resentful over being asked to participate in community-level screening exercises only to be sent away empty handed when they were not selected as beneficiaries. On a related note, several committees reported that while most

of concerns they submitted to the Help Desks were promptly responded to, there was little follow-up from C-SAFE staff in response to their concerns over VGF selection criteria.

Overall, participants in all C-SAFE components related good relations with consortium member staff throughout the life of the program, with a few notable exceptions. Certain individuals involved in MAP and IF/CK claimed they were treated somewhat rudely by C-SAFE staff when they initially failed to accurately record information in regular inventory reports. Other complained that mobilization for VGF food distributions in their communities were somewhat haphazard given that consortium staff lacked principal contacts among local authorities. Apparently, this often led to distorted information regarding scheduled food distributions and created instances in which some waited hours and/or days to receive their rations. By far the most drastic case of inadequate coordination was reported in Mutare district. Reportedly, consortium member staff came to introduce the community to the FFA component, helped them identify an appropriate project, and led the community through the beneficiary selection process. After leaving the community to work on its own with no technical or material support, staff never came back to monitor activities, inform the community on any changes, or distribute rations. While such instances were presumably rare, they reflect a serious failure of coordination between C-SAFE and its primary stakeholders – the beneficiaries.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the failure to develop and implement viable exit strategies suggest that coordination with stakeholders was lacking. Despite the dire food security and economic situation in Zimbabwe, the inability of C-SAFE to create stronger linkages between beneficiaries and other available services or activities will likely limit the medium- to long-term impact of the program (see more on exit strategies below).

- ***Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC)***

Since 2002, the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) has conducted annual food security assessments in rural areas of Zimbabwe (during the months of May, June) with the key objective of understanding the various levels of household food security throughout the country. These assessments largely draw on Crop and Livestock Assessments conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and were likewise informed by Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions (CFSAM) carried out jointly by WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).[57]

In Zimbabwe, ZimVAC assessments play a critical role in defining the magnitude of food insecurity in all districts and is intended to guide the policies and strategies of Government and its development partners implementing food security programs. Annual ZimVAC reports must be officially approved by parliament. Given the politically charged environment regarding the distribution of food assistance in all parts of Zimbabwe, ZimVAC has a direct influence on the targeting of all food assistance programs in the country. Donors, implementing agencies, and food assistance policy makers have long questioned the methods employed by ZimVAC in conducting vulnerability assessments, as well as the accuracy of the findings.[58] When asked about the validity of ZimVAC vulnerability as the basis for C-SAFE targeting,

[57] Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC). 2008. Interim Rural Food Security Assessment. National Report. 30 August 2008.
[58] The primary complaint heard by the evaluators was that ZimVAC assessments do not accurately reflect distinct and important differences in levels of household food insecurity at the sub-district level.

current Steering Committees offered no comment other than acknowledging that dealings with ZimVAC are 'very political'. However, despite past difficulties, Steering Committee members reported that increasingly, non-government stakeholders have acknowledged that ZIMVAC is "the only game in town" and have started to take a more proactive approach with ZimVAC in an effort to influence both the process and outcomes.

- ***Exit Strategies***

Given the tenuousness of food security strategies among beneficiary households, and the relative lack of reliable service providers, the development (or lack thereof) of viable exit strategies will be a major factor in determining the long-term impact of C-SAFE interventions. Unfortunately, evaluators found that across the board, for every individual component of C-SAFE component, insufficient attention has been paid to implementing exit strategies in conjunction with community and institutional stakeholders.

While the initial C-SAFE SYAP proposal referred to 'sustainability strategies' no description was include on what such strategies would entail, nor was there any explicit references as to how consortium members intended to scale-down and/or transfer responsibility for managing component activities to local stakeholders.

In its FY10 Implementation Plan, C-SAFE Zimbabwe established the following exit criteria for the VGF component:

- Increased cereal production, improved income opportunities, and/or increased availability of affordable cereal for sale based on new assessment results showing sufficient improvement in household food security in the targeted geographic area;
- Existing local capacity for support from the community, local private, or GoZ institutions; and
- Incapacitation of local agencies resulting from political interference.

In order to facilitate an efficient exit from VGF target communities, the Implementation Plan outlined C-SAFE's intention to: sustain VGF at a low level during the post-harvest period (distribution to no more than 10% of the most vulnerable households); create linkages with complementary livelihood security initiatives and provide referrals to locally-based social welfare groups.[59] Likewise, documents note C-SAFE's intention to request and extension of complementary OFDA funding for complementary FFA inputs (tools, fertilizer, pesticide, etc.) that are not typically funded by FFP.

> *"Why is your program coming to an end when there are no programs to replace it? There are many vulnerable people out there who cannot afford a decent living. How will they survive?"*
>
> - *Institutional Feeding supervisor*

While the FY09 Annual Results Report states that "the consortium established linkages with social service providers through referral networks", primary qualitative data suggest that little coordinated effort has been made to inform beneficiaries about alternative forms of support or increase their capacity to establish such links after C-SAFE closes. While many beneficiaries and stakeholders acknowledged notification of the pending closure of C-SAFE,

[59] C-SAFE. 2009.

it must be noted that simple notification of closure or scale-down of activities does not constitute an exit strategy.

Despite stating its expectation that participating institutions, CBOs, and FBOs would take over operation of IF/CK activities as economic conditions in urban centers improve, there is no such sign of improvement and growing anxiety among beneficiaries and stakeholders regarding the end of C-SAFE support that many (including orphans, chronically ill, elderly, homeless) have become dependent on. For example, evaluators met with the manager of a community kitchen in Bulawayo that houses many orphans, street children and mentally disabled. She explained that prior to C-SAFE, the shelter had no reliable way of feeding them, some of whom are as young as 1 year old. She was very concerned about what will happen to the urban homeless after the close of C-SAFE and worries that without a reliable source of food, impoverished young girls in the community may end up being sexually exploited by men in order to obtain food for themselves and their families.

The abrupt end of ESBF (following discontinuation of the component by FFP in August 2009) left school officials, parents and children confused and disappointed, particularly given the positive influence of ESBF rations on school attendance. Many stated that they expected school enrolment to decline as children lost an important incentive for attendance and faced increasing pressure to work for food and/or income to support their families. ikewise, some MAP retailers expressed concern over the impact of C-SAFE closure on vulnerable urban households. They explained that many such households have become dependent on affordable sorghum meal and that the termination of MAP will come as a real blow to the community. An example was offered of the many female-headed households caring for orphans in predominantly urban areas. Without MAP sorghum, retailers expect access to cereals to be negatively affected given that they cannot afford to purchase corn meal. The termination of the MAP component will also pose a serious challenge to the financial security of retailers who reportedly used commissions from the sale of MAP sorghum to pay workers and other business expenses.

D. Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) has played a very large role in C-SAFE. A comprehensive set of monitoring tools tracks critical processes throughout program intervention, including beneficiary selection, activity implementation, commodity distribution, and follow-up monitoring of beneficiaries. The C-SAFE M&E department consists of a team of six M&E specialists and one coordinator. This team develops tools, oversees implementation in the field, and analyzes datasets. The M&E departments of each of the partners collect the information in the field from the stakeholders. Overall, there were nearly 75 individuals collecting data on a monthly basis for C-SAFE.

A wide range of different tools have been designed and implemented to monitor C-SAFE interventions. A monthly post-distribution monitoring (PDM) tool collected information from beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in rural areas. This tool includes questions to determine household food security and economic status (necessary information to compute HDDS, HFIAS, MAHFP, asset index, household income and debt) and participation in the rural-based C-SAFE interventions (VGF, FFA). This information was used to compare indictors of food security status among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In

addition, this monthly form included questions regarding respondents' impressions on the accuracy of targeting criteria and the adequacy of rations. In mid-2009 a new FFA PDM tool was developed and starting in the 2009/10 season implemented in communities with FFA programs.

For CK and IF, end use monitoring tools were implemented to determine ration adequacy and beneficiary impressions of the program. Separate forms were implemented for beneficiaries, managers of the institutions, and cooks in the institutions to assess the adequacy of the rations delivered and identify any problems with the provision of food supplies.

A large number of monitoring tools were implemented for MAP. A monthly questionnaire of households residing in the neighborhood of the MAP retailers obtained information to compute food security indicators at the household leave. Questions sought to determine whether or not households purchased sorghum meal, reasons for purchase, how they use the sorghum meal, and the quality of the meal. In addition, "false shopping" surveys were conducted monthly at selected retailers. In these surveys, interviewers pretended to purchase sorghum in the shops, to see if the shops were following the established procedures – selling at the appropriate price, not allowing more than the maximum number of packets purchased per customer, etc. An informal market survey was also conducted in informal markets nearby the MAP outlets. These surveys provided information about prices of different types of meals, and helped determine if sorghum meal was being resold in these markets.

These monitoring tools were implemented among a very large sample on a monthly basis. While the consortium deserves credit for maintaining a commitment to accountability, evaluators believe that the considerable amount of information generated by C-SAFE's M&E system was more than could be adequately processed for the benefit of program management. While several managers of specific interventions reportedly found the detailed information provided by the M&E system useful for making management decisions, most managers indicated that the amount of information they received from M&E unit was actually more detail than they needed on a monthly basis.

In addition to the large number of questions in the monitoring forms, the sample sizes for which the information was collected were very large. For example, one-half of the IF sites were monitored each month. Collection of monthly information from such large samples every month was not necessary for project monitoring purposes, and imposed a heavy burden on the M&E staff.

The very detailed data collection for monitoring purposes also placed heavy burdens on community members. The C-SAFE M&E officer reported that the communities often complained about any monitoring that required their time but did not result in changes to the beneficiary list. For example the PDM reports largely asked the same sets of questions as the household registration forms, and some respondents reportedly became frustrated with having to answer the same questions again. The M&E officer reported that many people, especially non-beneficiaries, began to refuse to answer questions.

Qualitative responses suggest that much of the detailed monthly monitoring information was collected in response to requests made from the donor representative – FFP/Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the donor provided all necessary resources and support to C-SAFE to respond to these requests and all

consortium members reported that they were provided with all the necessary support from the donor to meet the monitoring information requests.

The M&E unit planned to develop an integrated data base in which information from all the monitoring tools would be combined. This database was never created, reportedly due to a lack of time to devote to this exercise. The actual practice was to compile the results from each individual survey and then provide them to the appropriate manager. However, lacking an integrated database, compilation of results from across the various interventions had to be done manually.

Initially, the lack of consistent and coordinated monitoring among individual members presented a major challenge for C-SAFE Zimbabwe. This was partly due to the fact that the C-SAFE M&E coordinator had no direct management control over the M&E staff of the implementing agencies. Respondents did claim, however, that by the end of the project coordination of M&E activities among three agencies was had improved significantly – all had adopted the same methodologies and individual M&E departments fully understood their roles and responsibilities regarding collection, analysis and dissemination of data. Interviews with current and former C-SAFE staff also revealed that agency M&E departments were always consulted before changes were made to C-SAFE monitoring systems to allow for feedback and time to prepare for any needed changes.

Despite these successes, the C-SAFE M&E coordinator expressed concern that the project management staff of the agencies were often not fully aware of the scope of the activities carried out by their M&E units, nor did they understood the purpose of these activities (including the need to respond to requests from the donor). This reportedly led to situations where M&E staff were pulled into other activities, and struggled to meet their regular reporting requirements.

One of the important areas of innovation in the M&E system of C-SAFE has been the introduction of PDAs for data entry in the field. This new technology has greatly reduced the time needed to transfer data from the field into computer-based databases. Again, FFP supported the adoption of new technologies and materials for improvement of program M&E. When the PDAs were purchased all staff from each consortium member were brought together for training on the equipment and various technical aspects of their usage.

The Humanitarian Accountability system put in place by WVI (and eventually adopted by the other two partners) allowed beneficiaries the opportunity to give ideas and feedback for the betterment of the program and/or register complaints regarding perceived breaches of agreements made the communities. As mentioned earlier, consortium members helped establish food distribution committees and Help Desks at all FDPs for the express purpose of soliciting beneficiary comments. While the main objective of this system is to improve quality of service delivery by being more responsive to the concerns of beneficiaries, the Humanitarian Accountability system also provides an important alternative channel for monitoring project activities. Information provided directly from community members was reportedly then triangulated (assessed in conjunction with) information from monthly monitoring tools. In the view of the evaluators, this comprehensive approach to M&E appears to be an effective way of implementing a participatory and robust monitoring and evaluation process.

Information received from community members can also provide very useful information about the effectiveness of targeting, particularly the degree to which the targeting mechanisms used by the project conform with (or fail to conform with) community perceptions regarding the relative vulnerability of beneficiary households and their need for external assistance.

E. Commodity Management

From the outset of C-SAFE programming in 2003, one of the major advantages of the program has been that it offers an alternative to the WFP commodity pipeline for southern Africa. In effect, this made food distribution in participating countries less prone to pipeline breaks that posed serious constraints to operations. Since 2007, World Vision Zimbabwe has had primary responsibility for importing, transporting and distributing the following commodities on behalf of the C-SAFE consortium:

- Bulgur wheat;
- Corn meal;
- Sorghum;
- Vegetable oil; and
- Pulses (yellow peas)

Table 27 provides a summary description for commodities distributed during FY10 under each of the individual C-SAFE components.[60] Data show that overall, peak distribution of commodities occurred in January – March 2010, which accords with the typical rise in food insecurity experienced prior to harvest. It also demonstrates the degree to which food distribution was drastically scaled back in preparation for closure of the program. Summaries of commodity losses for each of the C-SAFE partners are included in Annex 5.

[60] Complementary data on commodity distribution for FY07, 08, and 09 were not made available to the evaluators.

Table 27: Summary of FY10 Food Distributions per Program, by Commodity

	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June
MT Sorghum									
Urban MAP	650.0	450.0	511.2	599.0	620.0	770.0	844.0	-	-
TOTAL	**650.0**	**450.0**	**511.2**	**599.0**	**620.0**	**770.0**	**844.0**	-	-
MT Cereal									
Rural VGF	2,147.3	3,350.1	3,663.5	5,700.8	5,941.3	5,945.1	2,078.1	-	-
FFA	0.0	121.5	64.4	244.7	308.0	212.5	329.9	-	-
Cholera Response	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	63.9	39.9	0.0
Institutional Feeding	57.1	24.5	26.8	41.0	35.4	59.7	44.1	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**2,204.4**	**3,496.2**	**3,754.8**	**5,986.5**	**6,284.8**	**6,217.4**	**2,516.0**	**39.9**	**0.0**
MT Pulses									
Rural VGF	214.7	335.0	366.3	570.1	1,069.4	1,070.1	748.1	-	-
FFA	0.0	24.3	11.9	48.9	51.3	39.1	55.0	-	-
Cholera Response	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.7	6.7	0.0
Institutional Feeding	4.8	2.0	2.2	3.4	3.0	5.0	3.7	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**219.5**	**361.4**	**380.5**	**622.4**	**1,123.7**	**1,114.2**	**817.4**	**6.7**	**0.0**
MT Oil									
Rural VGF	128.8	201.0	219.8	342.1	356.5	356.7	249.4	-	-
FFA	0.0	8.9	4.4	18.0	18.8	14.4	20.2	-	-
Cholera Response	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.9	2.4	0.0
Institutional Feeding	2.9	1.2	1.3	2.1	1.8	3.0	2.2	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**131.7**	**211.2**	**225.5**	**362.1**	**377.1**	**374.1**	**275.7**	**2.4**	**0.0**
C-SAFE TOTALS									
Sorghum	**650.0**	**450.0**	**511.2**	**599.0**	**620.0**	**770.0**	**844.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**
Cereal	**2,204.4**	**3,496.2**	**3,754.8**	**5,986.5**	**6,284.8**	**6,217.4**	**2,516.0**	**39.9**	**0.0**
Pulses	**219.5**	**361.4**	**380.5**	**622.4**	**1,123.7**	**1,114.2**	**817.4**	**6.7**	**0.0**
Vegetable oil	**131.7**	**211.2**	**225.5**	**362.1**	**377.1**	**374.1**	**275.7**	**2.4**	**0.0**
GRAND TOTAL	**3,205.6**	**4,518.7**	**4,872.0**	**7,570.0**	**8,405.6**	**8,475.7**	**4,453.0**	**49.0**	**0.0**

The Chief-of-Party noted that access to sufficient commodities was "not a problem" for C-SAFE. In fact, C-SAFE expected to have approximately 13,000 metric tons of commodities left over after the close of the current SYAP on June 30, 2010. He also noted the low level of commodity losses reported over the life of the program (estimated at less than .05 percent).

In interviews with C-SAFE senior staff, consortium member representatives and institutional stakeholders (WFP, FFP, government) the management of commodities over the life of C-SAFE has been well coordinated and efficient. Given the difficulties associated with the scale of the food security crisis, the need to coordinate distributions among three institutional members, and the fact that Zimbabwe is

a land-locked country, C-SAFE deserves credit for maintaining commodity management systems that resulted in relatively few logistical problems or commodity losses.

Nonetheless, C-SAFE documents do highlight several of the primary challenges encountered in commodity management over the life of the program, most of which resulted from dynamic changes in the operational environment and continued deterioration of the economic situation. Obstacles to efficient commodity management included erratic fuel supplies, frequent cuts in electricity and the lack of reliable local suppliers of necessary goods and services. As a result of each of these factors, transportation of commodities was often delayed and the consortium has been forced to spend considerable effort coordinating external purchases in an effort to minimize the time, transaction and transport costs of regional procurement. Documents state that the regional commodities unit in Durban has assisted C-SAFE in these efforts.[61]

The C-SAFE Chief of Party also noted that due to requirements regarding Bills of Lading and the challenges associated with inland transportation, and long delays in processing also delayed payments to transport companies, in some cases up to one year. In his opinion, the practical difficulty of distributing commodities for C-SAFE was heightened by the fact the program had no central warehouse in Harare. Rather, commodities were delivered to warehouses of individual consortium members located in operational districts.

Finally, it was reported that the coordination of commodities between C-SAFE and WFP in Zimbabwe has been fairly well-managed with one significant exception. As reported earlier in this document, the delayed repayment of commodities borrowed by WFP from C-SAFE forced the consortium to cut rations under the VGF program from 10 kg to 5 kg of cereal per month in March 2009. Given the fact that targeted VGF already fell well short of the demand for assistance, the further reduction in rations ensured that subsequent VGF distributions had little immediate or lasting impact on the food security of beneficiary households.

V. Conclusion

A. Summary of Findings

Over the past several years numerous factors – including severe drought, political turmoil, periodic bans on certain NGO activities and near collapse of the Zimbabwean economy have created enormous operational constraints to development programming. As a result, C-SAFE and other humanitarian actors in Zimbabwe have concentrated primarily on short-term responses to widespread food insecurity. As is stated throughout this report, each of the institutional members of the C-SAFE Zimbabwe consortium deserves considerable credit for their response to a particularly complex emergency. Above all, the evaluators have determined that the consortium has maintained a very flexible, responsive and at times innovative approach to alleviating household food security in operational areas. Based on data contained in this and previous reports, it is clear that C-SAFE Zimbabwe has protected and/or improved

[61] World Vision. 2007b. C-SAFE Semi-Annual Narrative Report (January 1 – June 30, 2007).

access to food for millions of people throughout the country. It has also had limited success in creating productive assets aimed at increasing resilience to future shock among communities participating in the FFA component.

Along with these critical successes, the C-SAFE Zimbabwe consortium also experienced substantial challenges and shortcomings throughout the period under evaluation. First and foremost, communication and coordination between individual consortium members and donor representatives was often sporadic and ineffective, particularly during the early stages. Examples of this are seen in the extended delay in appointing a Chief-of-Party for the consortium and lack of clarity over which activities had the full support of FFP-Zimbabwe. Ultimately, these obstacles compromised the degree to which C-SAFE could provide an integrated package of assistance that was appropriately targeted to food insecure households. These and other findings are summarized in more detail below.

Appropriateness of emergency response

Initiated as a Single Year Assistance Program (SYAP) C-SAFE Zimbabwe was intended primarily to address transitory vulnerability to food insecurity. However, in response to the ongoing economic and political turmoil in the country, C-SAFE Zimbabwe has maintained involvement in school feeding and asset creation, and support for urban cereal markets, each of which are typically better suited to addressing chronic food insecurity. The complexity of this dilemma is heightened by uncertainty regarding the nature of ongoing political, economic, and environmental threats in Zimbabwe. Given the current political stalemate, the continuing global economic recession, and ongoing climate change, it is uncertain whether the nature of risks to food and livelihood security in Zimbabwe are themselves transitory or chronic. While the food security situation has improved somewhat since 2008, C-SAFE staff are concerned that an increasing focus on recovery and longer-term development strategies on the part of the donor may be premature. Accordingly, future food security initiatives must give careful consideration to designing interventions that are most appropriate for the particular vulnerability context in Zimbabwe. For example, while the safety net/VGF component of C-SAFE Zimbabwe was clearly effective in addressing acute, transitory food insecurity in the wake of political and economic shocks, it has been less effective in improving the status of chronically food insecure households.

> *In terms of saving us from short-term hunger C-SAFE did a lot for us. It is unfortunate that C-SAFE is pulling out at the wrong time. This is definitely the wrong time. Wait until the rains fall. Right now we have no plan. We cannot stand alone . Even though the food was inadequate, the gap it filled could not be filled again. We cannot stand alone right now.*
>
> - *Focus Group Participant*

Safety Net / Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)

Qualitative feedback from institutional stakeholders and beneficiaries strongly suggest that the safety net and VGF components of C-SAFE Zimbabwe saved thousands of lives during extreme food shortages caused by poor harvests, hyper-inflation, and political oppression. Respondents repeatedly claimed that without such support many of the most vulnerable in Zimbabwe – orphans, elderly, chronically ill – would have starved.

Analysis of quantitative data shows that VGF has helped maintain the food security status of beneficiaries at the same level of non-beneficiaries in rural areas. Both qualitative and quantitative results indicate that targeting of VGF has generally reached the more vulnerable households (lower asset index), and that the intervention helped to maintain current food security indicators (HDDS, HFIAS, MAHFP) at similar levels with non-beneficiaries.

By far the single biggest issue surrounding the effectiveness of this component concerned the transition from safety net (blanket feeding) to VGF. In an effort to effectively respond to the dynamic food security situation in Zimbabwe, C-SAFE was often constrained by government restrictions on VGF and/or limited food resources to meet an overwhelming need on the part of a vulnerable population. While the transition from blanket feeding did improve the efficiency of commodity distribution through a more deliberate approach to targeting, many respondents felt that the proxy indicators used focused too much on asset ownership as a measure of vulnerability and did not take critical cultural / social factors into consideration. While the evaluators commend C-SAFE for improving the targeting of this component, many beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries felt that VGF had limited impact on household food security, particularly after ration sizes were cut.

Emergency School-Based Feeding (ESBF)

As mentioned, the ESBF component was formulated primarily in response to government restrictions on VGF and was ultimately discontinued by the donor due to concerns regarding the FFP mandate for supporting Food for Education (FFE) initiatives. However, beneficiaries confirmed that during implementation, ESBF had a positive impact on school enrolment and that meals provided to school-aged children (regardless of enrolment status) improved household food distribution and enabled parents to allocate cash that would have been spent on food purchases to meet other expenses (health care, transportation, agricultural inputs, etc.). Finally, despite being given advance notice, most respondents felt the end of ESBF was abrupt and that the end of school meals would inevitably lead to a decline in enrolment.

Food for Assets (FFA)

Given the impact of continued water shortages on agricultural yields, the FFA component, which largely focused on provision and/or rehabilitation of water infrastructure, was an appropriate response to food insecurity in C-SAFE operational areas. Respondents also reported that the targeting of the intervention, towards food insecure households with adequate labor capacity, was both justified and transparent. Community members also verified that they were centrally involved in the selection of FFA projects and most have established systems for ensuring the maintenance of infrastructure created through FFA.

Analysis of qualitative data also reveals that among some target communities, rehabilitation of gullies, and dams has increased the ability of households to produce vegetable crops and provide water for livestock, both of which support improved food security and income generation. However, despite these achievements, evaluators identified certain factors that limit the effectiveness of the component. Feedback from C-SAFE staff and beneficiaries reveal that in their view, FFA activities were implemented over a limited period of time and had minimal program coverage. Other respondents noted that following payment of rations for work performed, beneficiaries realized little benefit from improved

water infrastructure due to the fact that their homes are too distant from water points for use in vegetable cultivation. Similarly, quantitative data show while FFA beneficiaries were more likely to report production increases than non-beneficiaries they were also more likely to report production decreases in the past three years than were non-beneficiaries. In the opinion of the evaluators, this may be due to the fact that irrigated agricultural systems are typically more susceptible to pests/diseases. Accordingly, future projects should have complementary technical support to go with irrigation investments to overcome these types of problem. Finally, despite the progress made through the component, the overwhelming majority of beneficiaries confirmed that involvement in FFA projects had done little to improve their capacity to cope with future food security crises.

Market Assistance Program (MAP)

The Market Assistance Program (MAP) implemented by C-SAFE Zimbabwe is widely credited with being an innovative and effective response to rising levels of food insecurity in urban areas of the country. Qualitative feedback from C-SAFE staff, millers, shop owners, and beneficiaries confirm that the program provided an affordable alternative to maize and that the program was implemented in an efficient and transparent manner. Data also show that in addition to supporting affordable access to cereal among the most vulnerable urban households, the MAP program has also influenced the preference for milled sorghum among less food insecure households. Nonetheless, C-SAFE did encounter significant challenges to implementing the MAP program, particularly due to the national and global economic climate. The targeting of MAP through appropriate pricing was made completely infeasible during the hyperinflation that gripped the economy until dollarization in 2009. This was due to the fact that the real value of receipts from the program continually fell behind the actual costs. Furthermore, because the price of the commodity was fixed in nominal terms, the real price continued to fall, increasing the demand for the commodity above the capacity to provide. In addition, when no other cereals were available in shops, all consumers demanded the commodity, and targeting became ineffective.

Results from the quantitative survey, undertaken at a time of stable prices and availability of other commodities clearly show that purchases of sorghum meal were higher for poorer consumers. Providing the sorghum strategically in shops in low-income areas also helped to focus the targeting to poorer consumers. Meanwhile shop owners claim that the high volume of customers seeking to purchase C-SAFE sorghum also supported their businesses. Finally, the vast majority of shop owners expressed the opinion that the MAP program was well-coordinated and responded effectively to initial concerns over the quality of packaging and milling.

Institutional Feeding (IF) / Community Kitchens (CK)

The objective of the IF and CK components was to provide assistance to vulnerable populations that had lost support from other sources (government and private donors) as a result of the economic crisis. In fact, qualitative information gained through focus group discussions and key informant interviews suggest that food assistance provided through IF and CK components did provide much needed, but temporary relief from food insecurity for particularly vulnerable populations including orphans, street children, homeless adults, chronically ill hospital patients, and the mentally or physically disabled.

However, findings also show that there is a considerable risk in providing safety net support to chronically food insecure populations as part of an emergency program. As evidenced by the close of C-SAFE, an emergency-response program can only provide support for a relatively short period of time. If other donors are not in a position to take over the financial support of these operations (as is currently the case), institutional partners will be unable to sustain safety net services. As a result, religious, private, and community-based institutions participating in the IF/CK component face an abrupt loss of financing and most will be forced to discontinue their services. While C-SAFE members have made some effort to promote income-generating activities and production of nutritious foods (gardening, poultry) among participating institutions, insufficient attention has been made to developing viable exit strategies that link beneficiaries with other service providers or partners institutions with alternative sources of support.

Targeting and Distribution

Analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data suggest that at the community level, targeting of the ESBF, FFA, and MAP components of C-SAFE was appropriate and effective in meeting the needs of especially vulnerable households. Respondents repeatedly confirmed that targeting mechanisms for each of these components was transparent and justifiable. They did however, share deep concern and frustration over the process through which the VGF program was targeted. Initially, they shared the opinion of external consultants that the use of the Productivity Requirement Ratio (PRR) as a basis for beneficiary selection was overly reliant on asset ownership and other indicators that did not accurately reflect vulnerability to food insecurity in the current context. C-SAFE tried to address these concerns by institute a process of community-based screening and verification of beneficiaries. Nonetheless, respondents felt that narrower targeting of the VGF component led to considerable exclusion error and undermined traditional safety nets by creating tension among community members.

On a separate note, C-SAFE staff and other institutional stakeholder continue to express some skepticism over the methodologies employed in national ZimVAC assessments as well as the validity of information they provide on vulnerability to food security at the district level. Unfortunately, the use of ZimVAC assessments to direct the allocation of food assistance in Zimbabwe has evolved into a highly political process that is unlikely to change in the near future.

Analysis of qualitative information related to food distribution reveals that it has been relatively efficient, particularly given the operational constraints faced by C-SAFE. This includes the lack of a national port, the need to coordinate delivery of commodities among consortium members, the lack of central warehouse, and government policies affecting both food imports and distribution of food assistance (e.g. prohibition of VGF). Overall, there were very few complaints regarding either the quality, or the timeliness of food distributions. There has been, however, considerable discontent among beneficiaries following the reduction of monthly cereal rations from 10 kg to 5 kg (in March of 2009). According to C-SAFE staff, this adjustment was forced upon the consortium by the delayed repayment of commodities loaned to WFP. Respondents claimed that due to the cultural practice of sharing food assistance among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, the reduced rations often did not last an entire month and did little to alleviate household food insecurity. Many also argued for a greater number of FDPs based on their inability to arrange transportation of rations to their distant home sites.

Program Coordination

Evaluators acknowledge that C-SAFE Zimbabwe has been very responsive to the dynamic, and rapidly deteriorating social and economic environment in Zimbabwe over the course of its implementation. Working in separate areas of the country, consortium members have at times been forced to rapidly scale-up, alter, and in some cases discontinue individual components of an integrated emergency response. And while coordination and communication systems have generally improved over the life of the program (2007-2010) the evaluation has revealed a number of lapses in program coordination. First and foremost, the absence of a Chief of Party and irregular communication between the Steering Committee and other institutional stakeholders has had an adverse impact on the coordination of C-SAFE Zimbabwe. In addition to the volatile political and economic environment in Zimbabwe, coordination of the emergency food security program was also hampered by various, and at times contradictory, strategy positions taken by the donor and its representatives in country. Additionally, representatives of member institutions reported that particularly during the initial stages of the program, technical expertise was not adequately utilized for the benefit of the consortium, but rather was housed within individual agencies. These issues were rectified to a certain degree by the establishment of a separate "Program Management Unit" in 2009.

B. Recommendations and Lessons Learned

Program Coordination

- Future consortium efforts should be founded on clear lines of authority with respect to program managers in each member institution. They should be supported by a distinct management unit capable of sustaining stakeholder dialogue for improved program coordination.

- Future food security activities implemented through institutional partners (institutional feeding, school-based feeding, clinical food support for the chronically ill) should be supported by well-designed and feasible exit strategies. This must go beyond simple notification of transition dates to include realistic alternatives to external food and non-food support. Despite a significant impact on the immediate food security of beneficiaries, the lack of viable exit strategies will clearly limit the longer-term impact of C-SAFE activities. When developing exit strategies in Zimbabwe, particular attention should be paid to creating linkages with livelihood support services and income-generating activities.

- When designing and implementing future FFA projects, member institutions should place greater emphasis on integrating project plans with disaster relief assistance provided by District Administrations, ward development committee plans and available Agritex (agricultural extension) services.

- Consortium members should continue to proactively engage ZimVAC, WFP, and other institutional stakeholders in order to improve the methodology and accuracy of population-based food security assessments conducted at the national level.

- Qualitative data suggests that in some cases, miscommunication led to confusion regarding dates of distribution and ration sizes. In the future, consortium members should seek ways of improving both the frequency and consistency of information dissemination. Community "mobilization" should be consistently managed through the office of the ward counselor and should include regular input from traditional (non-government) community leaders.

Program Design

- Findings from previous HLSA reports suggest that households participating in more than one type of interventions tend to achieve better food security outcomes. Accordingly, future programs should place a high priority on implementing packages of complementary interventions (e.g. FFA, conservation farming, ESBF) in particularly food insecure areas. Explicit linkages should be made between VGF, ESBF, and FFA components in order to enhance the resilience of the most vulnerable households.

- In order to meet the immediate need for assistance among rural households while supporting longer-term improvements in food and livelihood security, future food security initiatives should place greater emphasis on implementation of FFA activities. Such projects, if identified, designed and resourced appropriately, could significantly increase the productive capacity of food insecure farming households currently dependent on C-SAFE assistance.

- In order to have a more sustainable impact on the food and livelihood security of populations in targeted wards, FFA activities should be clustered (to achieve synergy / complementarity) and implemented over a longer period of time.

- Given the extremely high prevalence of food insecurity in operational districts (50-60% of all households), future programs should carefully evaluate the relative costs and benefits of different targeting approaches to VGF/Safety Net. Depending on the severity of food insecurity at the national level, future emergency responses may consider reintroducing blanket feeding (i.e. not targeting at all) rather than investing in the data collection, processing, analysis and verification necessary for effective targeting of food assistance.[62] In addition to potentially decreasing administrative costs, qualitative information strongly suggests a blanket feeding approach is more amenable to traditional community safety nets and has a more significant impact on the food security of beneficiary households.

- Qualitative data suggests a significant need for non-food support in C-SAFE operational areas. In Zimbabwe, this should include support for livestock generation (many vulnerable households have had to sell draft animals, making them more vulnerable to food insecurity over the long-term). Vulnerable households also lack access to productive infrastructure (water) and agricultural inputs. In implementing future Title II programs in Zimbabwe, member institutions should continue to place a high priority on securing complementary funding for non-food items (from OFDA, etc.)

[62] Technical Assistance for Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO). 2009. C-SAFE Targeting in Zimbabwe: Review of Current Methods and Comparison with Alternatives. February 2009.

Targeting and Distribution

- Results from the quantitative survey reveal that food insecurity is much greater in rural areas than in urban areas. The relative distribution of resources and support between rural and urban areas should be adjusted accordingly. (Note: C-SAFE only directed about 20 percent of all project resources toward urban populations. This seems appropriate.)

- Qualitative data strongly suggested that the efficiency and safety of food distributions was compromised by the fact that many beneficiary households are quite distant from designated food distribution points (FDP). In the future, food security initiatives similar in scale to the C-SAFE should strongly consider establishment of a greater number of FDPs in order to decrease wait times, transportation costs, and the risk of violence among beneficiaries.

- In order to reduce targeting error and eliminate documented biases against households with assets and those engaged in non-agricultural activities, future food security programs should consider using proxy means testing method for targeting rather than the PRR-based method employed by C-SAFE. Information for developing an accurate proxy means model should be collected as part of a population-based baseline survey, prior to beneficiary selection.63

- In order to counter/prevent resentment over targeted VGF distribution in wards with high prevalence of food security, some beneficiaries recommended registration of beneficiaries on a rotating basis, or distribution over a shorter time period in order to ensure that all needy households had equal access to needed food assistance.

[63] Technical Assistance for Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO). 2009. C-SAFE Targeting in Zimbabwe: Review of Current Methods and Comparison with Alternatives. February 2009.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Statement of Work

1. Background

Since 2003, the Consortium for Southern Africa Food Security Emergency – Zimbabwe (C-SAFE) has been implementing a wide variety of emergency programming interventions. The objective of the program is to contribute to reduce vulnerability to food insecurity among targeted populations of Zimbabwe through a set of complementary program objectives;

1. Protected and/or improved access to food for individuals and households vulnerable to food insecurity.
2. Productive assets and capabilities protected and/or improved for individuals and households vulnerable to food insecurity.

The interventions under Strategic Objective One provide short-term, targeted food assistance to vulnerable households to protect them from acute food insecurity. This is achieved through three primary strategies:

1) direct transfer to vulnerable groups through institutions including primary schools;
2) targeted food assistance through safety-net/vulnerable group distributions;
3) subsidized sales of sorghum to low-income groups through MAP.

Under Strategic Objective Two, interventions contribute to the improvement of productive assets, livelihood opportunities and human capabilities of vulnerable individuals and households. This will be achieved through resiliency enhancement projects that focus upon building productive assets and improving agriculture production benefiting the most vulnerable to food insecurity.

2. Objective

Since this grant cycle began in early 2007, a quantitative, population-based evaluation has not been performed for the explicit purpose of assessing the impact of the program, although Household Livelihood Security Assessments (HLSA) have been completed in 2007 and 2009. The HLSA is a comprehensive tool that measures process, methods, efficiencies and outputs and it is expected that the indicators from this tool be incorporated into the evaluation to allow for temporal analysis of program implementation. The Evaluation questionnaire should further incorporate recommendations from the HLSA 2009 report to ensure that lessons learnt from past exercises are built upon to make the evaluation more appropriate. For example, the TANGO report highlights the need for a more varied list of assets to be captured to allow for better wealth differentiation between households.

The overall purpose of this evaluation is to lead a participatory and objective assessment of the C-SAFE Zimbabwe program (February 2007- June 2010) funded by USAID/Food for Peace in terms of its appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency and impact. The evaluation will also look at best practices in each area of the program but with more emphasis on ESBF and MAP since these are unique programs

implemented in Zimbabwe. The evaluation will also be useful for informing any future programming in the country in response to emergencies or transitions situations.

It is important to note that the comparison of data collected during this evaluation to the EOP performed in October 2006 will not be a straightforward exercise given the contextual changes that have occurred in Zimbabwe during the period of this grant. Attention needs to be paid to these changes in order to properly assess the impacts of the program.

Specific attention will be given to the expected results of the program which include:

- Adequate number of Months of Adequate Food Provisioning in targeted populations;
- Improved Household Dietary Diversity Score among beneficiaries;
- Decreased Household Food Insecurity Access Scores among targeted groups; and
- Average number of assets (productive and non productive) owned increased/maintained by target populations, understanding that the individual households have changed over the life of the program.

The table below highlights the intermediate result indicators of concern in more detail.

Goal : Reduced Vulnerability to Food Insecurity among targeted communities in Zimbabwe			**Goal Indicator:** HDDS, HFIAS and Months of Adequate Food Provisions	
Strategic Objective	**SO/Impact Indicators**	**Intermediate Result**	**IR Indicators**	**Interventions**
Protected and/or improved food access for vulnerable individuals and households (*linked to FFP IR2.1: Human capabilities protected and enhanced)*	Food Security Indicators stabilized through hungry season Number of households benefiting from activities to maintain or improve household access to food	1.1 Increased access to food for urban/peri-urban/rural individuals and households vulnerable to food insecurity in wards/suburbs with a high prevalence of food insecurity	o Targeting efficacy (exclusion, inclusion error rates by intervention); o Proportion of MAP sorghum purchased by low income HH's o Average # of meals consumed per day by children and adults;	o Rural VGF o MAP
		1.2. Community resilience protected and enhanced through protected/consistent access to food for chronically vulnerable individuals and households in operational areas (safety-nets)	o # of individuals/households accessing food through targeted safety nets	o IBF o VGF o MAP
2. Productive assets maintained and/or improved for vulnerable individuals and households living in food insecure areas (*linked to FFP IR2.2: Livelihood capacities protected and enhanced*)	Assets' maintenance or increase levels among Program's target populations;	2.1 Vulnerable communities and households have maintained productive assets and have improved access to water for productive uses	o # of communities with infrastructure improved o # and % of households in target communities benefiting from assets supported by the program o Types of benefits derived from the assets	o FFA

3. Qualitative Research Questions:

In the pursuit of sustainable livelihoods, there are two interrelated sets of issues – one is the application/leveraging of food assistance and its contribution, constraints, and effects (intended and unintended) upon the immediate, medium and longer term food security of target groups and; two is the appropriateness and effectiveness of the specific intervention through the C-SAFE program.

Specific questions to be explored by the evaluation team should include but not be limited to:

- FFA
    - How has FFA sustained/created the asset base of vulnerable communities/households?
    - What lessons can be drawn from the consortium experience in FFA: lessons on process, methods, efficiencies and outputs?
- Safety-Net/ Vulnerable Group Feeding
    - How did SN/VGF improve access to food in vulnerable communities/households?
    - How has targeting impacted the communities' traditional safety-net systems?
    - What lessons can be drawn from the consortium experience in SN/VGF: lessons on process, methods, efficiencies and outputs?
- Institution-Based Feeding
    - How has IBF improved access to food in vulnerable institutions and the populations they serve?
    - What lessons can be drawn from the consortium experience in IBF: lessons on process, methods, efficiencies and outputs?
- MAP
    - How has MAP improved access to cereals for vulnerable urban households in low-income suburbs?
    - What effects, if any, exist on the marketing of other cereals, which were replaced by sorghum and the implementation of the MAP.
    - What lessons can be drawn from the consortium experience in MAP: lessons on process, methods, efficiencies and outputs?
    - Did the MAP create a situation of taste change by the consumers, which is reversible/irreversible?
- Emergency School-Based Feeding
    - What has been the effectiveness of ESBF in improving access to food for vulnerable communities/households
    - What lessons can be drawn from the consortium experience in ESBF: lessons on process, methods, efficiencies and outputs?
- Overall
    - Are there benefits to multiple intervention participation by beneficiary households?
    - What are the effects (intended or otherwise) of the C-SAFE interventions?
    - What are the relevant stakeholders' perceptions about the program? How are they engaged and involved?
    - What are the potential learning opportunities for future programs?

4. Methodology

For the purpose of this evaluation both quantitative and qualitative methods will be applied. The quantitative part will be done through a. the review of M&E existing information (desk review) and b. by a quantitative survey will based in an Evaluation Design Type I (Simple pre-post) in a population based

representative cluster sample. If demographic information at community level is available, a Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sample selection method will be applied. The data will be collected using a semi-structured questionnaire that will be applied at household level. This type of methodology will be used to assess the Impact indicators mentioned in Section 2 of this Exhibit.

On the other hand, the qualitative review will focus on gathering appropriate data that will facilitate a deeper understanding of processes and approaches, perceptions and behaviors and other factors that have contributed to the achievement and/or non-achievement of targets.

For this review methods such as Focus Group Discussions and key stakeholders interviews will be used to complement and explain the quantitative results and to respond to the research questions.

The study will be undertaken in a participatory manner, working with stakeholders and program staff to draw lessons and document learning and effects. The consortium will avail all existing M&E data and the consultant will make use of available secondary data as much as possible. The role of the M&E coordinator for the consortium, as well as, other M&E resources will be key for the design and implementation of this evaluation. In addition to that, data collectors will be hired and trained apply the household questionnaire.

An evaluation team, under the leadership of the consultant, will be conformed as follow:

- Agriculture specialist
- Infrastructure specialist
- Nutrition specialist
- Field data collectors

5. Consultant's Requirements

1) The consultant will be responsible for the analysis framework and report writing.

2) The outcomes from this study will be:

a. A presentation of draft findings to consortium group
b. A detailed report outlining findings and recommendations for future emergency programming and the specific results of the C-SAFE program. The outline for the this report is as follow
   - Executive summary (3 pages)
   - Summary of program/project objectives
   - Evaluation methodology
   - Description of findings
   - Discussion, including lessons learned
   - Conclusions and recommendations
c. A summary report for advocacy to stakeholders
d. A complete database with the quantitative data collected during the household interviews.

3) Field work to take place during April 2010 with all deliverables complete by mid-May 2010.

6. Qualifications of research team

The research team should be made up of individuals who should have the following attributes:

1) A lead Consultant with proven minimum 10 years experience in design, implementation and evaluation of development and relief programs; the choice of who leads the team will be made in consultation with FFP Mission/ Regional and FFP/W.
2) Strong understanding of food security, nutrition and livelihoods systems in a relief and/or developmental context;
3) Experience in community based approaches and participatory techniques within livelihoods programmes; Understanding of FFA, MAP, VGF, ESBF, IF, CK programming.
4) Experience in community based approaches and participatory techniques within livelihoods programmes;
5) Demonstrated ability in the use of qualitative methods (PRA); and
6) Strong analytical skills and research skills.

Annex 2: Evaluation Schedule

C-SAFE Zimbabwe End of Project (EOP) Evaluation Work Plan

Date	Activity/Task	Participants
Monday April 19, 2010 (National holiday)	TANGO consultants arrive	Mark Langworthy and Tom Spangler
Tuesday April 20	Orientation meeting/interviews with C-SAFE Management - Review project documents - Review/revise draft data collection tools - Discuss structure of evaluation teams (quantitative and qualitative) - TANGO to present EOP evaluation overview (including proposed calendar) - Working group to revise evaluation plan	TANGO consultants Anthony E. Koomson – Chief of Party, C-SAFE Yvonne Manyika – C-SAFE M&E Coordinator Farai Mutibvu – C-SAFE Program Quality Coordinator Other Key Partner Contacts (WV, CARE, CRS)
Wednesday April 21	Training of enumerators/interviewers - Background on C-SAFE Zimbabwe and EOP evaluation - Training of enumerators on HH questionnaire, PDAs - Training of qualitative team on topical outlines and interview techniques - Develop field logistics plan	TANGO consultants Yvonne Manyika – C-SAFE M&E Coordinator Farai Mutibvu – C-SAFE Program Quality Coordinator
Thursday April 22	Training of enumerators/interviewers	
Friday April 23	Training of enumerators/interviewers	
Saturday April 24	Pre-test of quantitative and qualitative instruments	
Sunday April 25	Field teams depart for respective sites	

Date	Activity/Task	Participants
Monday April 26	Field work begins	
Tuesday April 27		
Wednesday April 28		
Thursday April 29		
Friday April 30		
Saturday May 1	Tom Spangler departs Zimbabwe	
Friday May 7	Mark Langworthy departs Zimbabwe	

Annex 3: List of Individuals Consulted

Person Interviewed	Organization	Designation
C-SAFE Zimbabwe Offices		
Anthony Koomson	C-SAFE Zimbabwe	Acting Chief of Party
Farai Mutibvu	C-SAFE Zimbabwe	C-SAFE Program Quality Coordinator
Yvonne Manyika	C-SAFE Zimbabwe	C-SAFE M&E Coordinator
World Vision		
Bhekimpilo Khanye	World Vision - Zimbabwe	Executive Associate
CARE		
Carol Sherman	CARE - Zimbabwe	Country Director
Patrick Ndungu	CARE - Zimbabwe	Relief Coordinator
Paul Townsend	CRS - Zimbabwe	Country Representative
Sasha Angelevski	CRS - Zimbabwe	Nutritional Support Unit Director
USAID / Food for Peace		
Amy Sink	FFP – Southern Africa	Team Leader
Fanuel Cumanzala	FFP Zimbabwe	
World Food Programme (WFP)		
Sam Chimwarza	WFP – Zimbabwe	Program Officer, Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) Unit
Tsungai Chibwe	WFP – Zimbabwe	Senior Program Assistant, Operations
Liljana Jovceva	WFP – Zimbabwe	Program Assistant
Government		
	Insiza District Administration	Representatives of Disaster Relief Committee
	Insiza District Administration	Agritex (agricultural extension)
	Insiza District Administration	Social Welfare
	Gutu District Administration	Representatives from Social Services
	Gutu District Administration	Agritex (agricultural extension)
	Gutu District Administration	Natural Resources
	Gutu District Administration	Community Services Officer from Ward Council

Annex 4: Documents Reviewed

C-SAFE Zimbabwe. 2009. Annual Implementation Plan FY10, October 1, 2009 – June 30, 2010. October 20, 2009.

Technical Assistance for Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO). 2009. C-SAFE Targeting in Zimbabwe: Review of Current Methods and Comparison with Alternatives. February 2009.

World Vision. 2007a. C-SAFE Zimbabwe FY07 Single-Year Assistance Program (SYAP) Proposal. January 1, 2007.

World Vision. 2007b. C-SAFE Semi-Annual Narrative Report (January 1 – June 30, 2007).

World Vision. 2008. C-SAFE Semi-Annual Narrative Report (January 1 – June 30, 2008).

World Vision. 2009. C-SAFE Zimbabwe: Annual Results Report (ARR), Fiscal Year 2009. November 2, 2009.

Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC). 2008. Interim Rural Food Security Assessment. National Report. 30 August 2008.

Annex 5: Summaries of Commodity Losses: FY07 – FY09

CARE

SUMMARY OF LOSSES FY 07	QTY (Kgs)	VALUE (US$)	AMOUNT RECOVERED	Less Due to CARE (US$)	Total Due to USAID (US$)
TRANSIT INLAND	3,824.0	2,109.1	3,163.6	0.0	3,163.6
Warehouse Shortages	827.1	698.8	0.0	0.0	698.8
Distribution (FDP)	88.2	104.5	0.0	0.0	104.5
Warehouse Disposal	12,280.4	4,057.0	0.0	0.0	4,057.0
Milling Losses	2,280.9	880.5	0.0	0.0	880.5
Warehouse reconstitution loss	23.4	25.2	0.0	0.0	25.2
TOTAL	**19,324.0**	**7,875.0**	**3,163.6**	**0.0**	**8,929.5**
SUMMARY OF LOSSES FY 08	**QTY (Kgs)**	**VALUE (US$)**	**AMOUNT RECOVERED**	**Less Due to CARE (US$)**	**Total Due to USAID (US$)**
TRANSIT INLAND	4,725.7	4,096.0	4,096.0	0.0	4,096.0
Warehouse Shortages	1,214.4	986.5	0.0	0.0	986.5
Distribution (FDP)	749.2	539.7	0.0	0.0	539.7
Warehouse Disposal	709.0	445.5	0.0	0.0	445.5
TOTAL	**7,398.3**	**6,067.7**	**4,096.0**	**0.0**	**6,067.7**
SUMMARY OF LOSSES FY 09	**QTY (Kgs)**	**VALUE (US$)**	**AMOUNT RECOVERED**	**Less Due to CARE (US$)**	**Total Due to USAID (US$)**
TRANSIT INLAND	20,229.2	18,557.2	18,557.2	0.0	18,424.3
Warehouse Shortages	827.1	698.8	0.0	0.0	698.8
Distribution (FDP)	88.2	104.5	0.0	0.0	104.5
Warehouse Disposal	12,303.8	4,082.3	0.0	0.0	4,082.3
Milling Losses	2,280.9	880.5	0.0	0.0	880.5
TOTAL	**35,729.2**	**24,323.1**	**18,557.2**	**0.0**	**24,190.2**

Catholic Relief Services (CRS)

SUMMARY OF LOSSES FY07	QTY (Kgs)	VALUE (US$)	AMOUNT RECOVERED	Less Due to CRS (US$)	Total Due to USAID (US$)
TRANSIT INLAND	2,988.0	3,417.6	3,417.6		3,417.6
Warehouse Disposals	3,575.0	2,445.0	0.0	0.0	2,445.0
Distribution Losses(Disposals)	2,407.0	2968.0	0.0	0.0	2,968.0
TOTAL	**8,970.0**	**8830.7**	**3,417.6**	**0.0**	**8,830.7**
SUMMARY OF LOSSES FY08	**QTY (Kgs)**	**VALUE (US$)**	**AMOUNT RECOVERED**	**Less Due to CRS (US$)**	**Total Due to USAID (US$)**
TRANSIT INLAND	15,032.0	8,872.5	8,872.5	0.0	8,872.5
Warehouse Disposals	4,500.0	2,152.4	0.0	0.0	1,235.7
Warehouse losses	3,733.0	3,271.3	0.0	0.0	3,271.3
Distribution Losses(thefts)	2,481.0	1,969.6	0.0	0.0	3,063.6
TOTAL	**25,746.0**	**16,265.7**	**8,872.5**	**0.0**	**16,443.0**
SUMMARY OF LOSSES FY09	**QTY (Kgs)**	**VALUE (US$)**	**AMOUNT RECOVERED**	**Less Due to CRS (US$)**	**Total Due to USAID (US$)**
TRANSIT INLAND	19,386.0	16,374.1	16,374.1	0.0	16,374.1
Warehouse Disposals	11,4025.0	71,095.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Warehouse Leakages	391.7	859.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Distribution Losses(thefts)	1,296.1	1,884.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Warehouse losses	22,820.0	2,8642.7	0.0	0.0	28,642.7
TOTAL	**157,918.8**	**118,855.1**	**16,374.1**	**0.0**	**45,016.7**

World Vision

SUMMARY OF LOSSES FY 07	Quantity (MT)	VALUE (US$)	AMOUNT RECOVERED	Less Due to WV (US$)	Total Due to USAID (US$)
TRANSIT INLAND	2.9	1,678.2	1,678.2	0.0	2,315.0
Warehouse Disposals	0.3	155.2	155.2	0.0	0.0
Distribution Losses	3.0	1,906.3	1,906.3	0.0	0.0
Warehouse Losses	0.1	40.6	40.6	0.0	39.9
TOTAL	**6.2**	**3,780.2**	**3,780.2**	**0.0**	**2,355.0**
SUMMARY OF LOSSES FY 08	**Quantity (MT)**	**VALUE (US$)**	**AMOUNT RECOVERED**	**Less Due to WV (US$)**	**Total Due to USAID (US$)**
TRANSIT INLAND	5.2	4,122.1	4,122.1	0.0	4,122.1
Warehouse thefts	11.9	13,282.9	13,282.9	0.0	13,282.9
Milling losses	0.4	208.7	208.7	0.0	208.7
Warehouse Disposals	0.1	45.0	45.0	0.0	0.0
Warehouse reconstitution loss	0.1	88.3	88.3	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**17.7**	**17,747.0**	**17,747.0**	**0.0**	**17,613.6**
SUMMARY OF LOSSES FY 09	**Quantity (MT)**	**VALUE (US$)**	**AMOUNT RECOVERED**	**Less Due to WV (US$)**	**Total Due to USAID (US$)**
TRANSIT INLAND	7.9	7,654.1	11,480.0	0.0	1,1480.0
Warehouse Disposals and Leakages	4.5	3,342.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Distribution losses	1.5	1,313.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**13.8**	**12,310.3**	**11,480.0**	**0.0**	**11,480.0**