EVALUATION OF USAID'S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, 2000-2004

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We would like to express our unlimited admiration for all of the national and international humanitarians who have devoted their energies to assisting the people of the DRC, many with a firm commitment to finding a solution to the causes of conflict and vulnerability. We have unlimited empathy for the IDPs and other vulnerable people who have suffered from the effects of conflict so dramatically. We hope that this evaluation will contribute to helping them return to productive lives.

DRC - Political Map



This map indicates the different political/military zones and divisions that were operative from 1999, after the signing of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement, to 2003, when the country was unified under the Transitional Government. The diagonal slashes mark the area in Eastern Congo in which most of the violence and conflict occurred after 1999. It is noted that both the underlying map, produced by MONUC, and the boundaries of the Eastern Area of Violence are rough renderings.

In the period 1998-99, internal displacement mainly occurred along what later became the cease-fire line (shown in violet). After 1999, the majority of IDPs were found in the Eastern Area of Violence.


CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
SUDAN
CAMEROON
GABON
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
ANGOLA
ZAMBIA
TANZANIA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
UGANDA
Bangui
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
KINSHASA
Bandundu
BANDUNDU
ÉQUATEUR
ORIENTALE
MANIEMA
SUD-KIVU
NORD-KIVU
KASAÏ-ORIENTAL
KASAÏ-OCCIDENTAL
KATANGA
BAS-CONGO
Bujumbura
Kigali
Democratic Republic of the Congo
International boundary
Province boundary
National capital
Province capital
Railroad
Road
*Kinshasa (Ville de Kinshasa) has status equal to that of a province.
0 100 200 Kilometers
0 100 200 Miles
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.
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Acronyms

AAA	Agro Action Allemande; German Agro Action (GAA)
AAH	Action Against Hunger, Action Contra La Faim (ACF)
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ALISEI	Associazione per la cooperazione internazionale e l'aiuto umanitario
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
ASRAMES	Association pour l'Approvisionnement en Médicaments Essentiels
CAP	UN Consolidation Appeals Process
CESVI	Cooperazione e Sviluppo
CHAP	UN OCHA Common Humanitarian Action Plan
COOPI	Cooperazione Internazionale
CPN	Culture of Peace Network
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
FIVIMS	Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping System
HRFOC	Human Rights Field Office for the DR Congo
DCHA	USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement, Reintegration
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
EHI	OCHA Emergency Humanitarian Interventions Fund
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWER	Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
FHI	Food for the Hungry International
FFP	USAID Food for Peace
FFT	Food-for-Training
FFW	Food-for-Work
FY	Fiscal Year
GAA	German Agro Action; Agro Action Allemande (AAA)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IASC	UN Interagency Standing Committee
ICD	Inter-Congolese Dialogue
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IFESH	International Foundation for Education and Self-Help
IMC	International Medical Corps
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KAPB	Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices and Behaviour
LPI	Life and Peace Institute
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MERLIN	Medical Emergency Relief International

MLC	Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo
MoH	Ministry of Health
MONUC	Mission d'Observation des Nations Unies au Congo
NCC	National Crisis Committee (within the Minister of Health)
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OHCHR	UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
MSF	Medicines Sans Frontieres, MSF – H (Holland)
NFI	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non-government Organization
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	UN Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs
OECD DAC	Organization for Economic and Cultural Development Advisory Committee
OFDA	USAID/DCHA's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OTI	USAID/DCHA's Office for Transition Initiatives
OSAPY	Organisation pour la Sédentarisation, Alphabétisation et la Promotion des Pygmées
OVG	Goma Volcano Observatory
OXFAM/UK	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief/United Kingdom
PPC	USAID's Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination
PRM	US State Department Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration
QUIPs	UN Quick Impact Projects
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SOW	Statement of Work
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WFP	World Food Programme
WVI	World Vision International
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United State Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WFP EMOP	Emergency Operations Programme
WFP PPRO	Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation Operation
WFP VAM	Vulnerability Assessment Mapping

Armed Groups

ALIR	Armee de Liberation du Rwanda (Ex-FAR/Interahamwe)
ADF	Allied Democratic Front
AFDL	Alliance de Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo
ALC	Armee de Liberation du Congo (FLC)
ANC	Armee Nationale Congolaise (RCD-G)
FAA	Forces Armees Angolaises
FAC	Forces Armees Congolaises
FAP	Forces d'Autodefense Populaires
Ex-FAR	Former Forces Armees Rwandaises
FAZ	Forces Armees Zairoises
FDD	Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie
FDLR	Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda
FLC	Front de Liberation du Congo
FLN	Forces de Liberation Nationales
FNL	Forces Nationales d Liberation
FUNA	Former Uganda National Army
Interahamwe	Rwandese Hutu Militia
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
Mai Mai	Anti-Rwandan, anti-government rebel force (also Mayi Mayi)
MLC	Mouvement de Liberation du Congo
NALU	National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
NDF	Namibian Defence Force
PALIR	Peuple Arme pour la Liberation du Rwanda
RCD-G	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie - Goma
RCD-K	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie - Kisangani
RCD-ML	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie - Mouvement de Liberation
RCD-N	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie - National
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
UNRF	Ugandan National Republican Front
UNITA	The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
WNBF	West Nile Bank Front
ZNDF	Zimbabwean National Defense Force

An Evaluation of USAID's Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2000 - 2004[1]

Undertaken by Muko Mubagwa, Sheila Reed, and Herbert Weiss, June 2004

(The views expressed in this report represent those of the authors and not necessarily those of USAID, Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., or Louis Berger International, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Background

The DRC is ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world and has the world's highest maternal and crude mortality rates (CMRs). The estimated population of 55 million in the DRC subsists on a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $107. Due to six years of conflict, over three million Congolese are estimated to be internally displaced, and 286,770 are refugees fleeing from armed conflict that still continues in parts of Eastern DRC. The DRC hosts 389,500 refugees, mainly from Angola and Sudan. The country is also vulnerable to many natural hazards, including volcanic activity, floods, drought, army worm invasions, epidemics, foot and mouth disease, landslides, and erosion.

Three great violent struggles have rocked the DRC and Central Africa in the last ten years. The first was triggered by the genocide of Rwandan Tutsi in 1994 and the subsequent mass exodus of one million Hutu, who settled in Eastern DRC. Then in 1996, Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola attacked the DRC (then Zaire) under the guise of a Congolese revolutionary alliance led by Laurent Kabila. The alliance ultimately defeated the government of President Mobuto.

In 1998, the Kabila-led government expelled the Rwandan military. The Rwandans and Ugandans then re-invaded the DRC, but the Angolans switched sides and were soon joined by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Chad. The international community's efforts to end the war resulted in the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement of 1999, which established four political/military zones and left RCD/Goma in control of the East. A UN peacekeeping mission, MONUC, was launched, but the number of troops was insufficient to control the violence.

In parts of the RCD/Goma territory a grassroots rebellion, the Mai Mai, took root against the RCD and their Rwandan sponsors. The Mai Mai subsequently became allied with the Rwandan and Burundian insurgency movements and this alliance was given military and political support by the Kinshasa authorities. The internal violence resulted in an estimated three million deaths. In January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated and was immediately replaced by his son,

[1] The evaluation focuses on IDPs and IDP-affected zones, along with conflict-related programs and food assistance in these same areas.

Joseph. An Inter-Congolese Dialog took place in 2002 but did not include the Mai Mai. In 2003, a Transitional Government was established.

Some areas of the DRC have experienced intense violence. In May 2003, a long-term, inter-ethnic struggle between the Hema and Lendu erupted in violence in Ituri, causing the displacement of over 100,000 people. The Lusaka agreement received only selective attention both nationally and internationally. While a cease fire zone was established, cease-fire violations committed by Kinshasa were never denounced. Although some private and international NGOs undertook to facilitate local cease-fire negotiations with the Mai Mai, these initiatives did not receive support from MONUC or key players, such as the US. Some efforts did succeed, including that between the Mai Mai leader General Padiri and RCD-Goma.

Major goals of the transition, the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of Congolese armed groups and the Disarmament, Demobilization, Resettlement, Repatriation, and Reintegration (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups, have not yet been attained. The Rwandan Hutu militia (Interahamwe) has not agreed to disarm and repatriate, which is causing significant tension between the DRC and Rwanda.

Despite the grave problems, the international community and the Transitional Government have made progress. MONUC has now placed most of its political and military assets in the East, informal attempts have been made to negotiate cease-fires and power-sharing agreements between Mai Mai groups and the RCD/Goma. Some RCD/Goma administrative officials have been confirmed in their posts by the Transitional Government.

Evaluation Statement of Work and the Team Composition

There were numerous factors motivating USAID to support this evaluation, including seeking a more effective way to target humanitarian assistance in the DRC, gaining a deeper understanding of field practice in regard to the protection of IDPs and other vulnerable groups to underpin the policy on IDPs that is currently being developed within USAID, and supporting an initiative of the Good Humanitarian Donorship group, composed of organizations promoting principles and good practices.

The criteria for the evaluation were selected from those recommended by the international interagency forum Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) and OECD DAC. They are: Relevance and Appropriateness, Effectiveness, Impact, Efficiency, Coherence and Sustainability.

Three people form the independent evaluation team. Dr. Muko Mubagwa is a development economist at Bukavu University and Institute of Rural Development. Sheila Reed, the team leader, is a humanitarian crisis analyst with 19 years of experience. Professor Herbert Weiss is a political analyst specializing in the DRC.

Information Collection Methods and Constraints

The methodology for the evaluation was diversified. All major findings were triangulated. Participatory and gender aware approaches were employed. Vulnerable group perspectives were

sought out. The methods included a document review and structured key informant and focus group interviews with communities, Congolese NGOs, and management staff from USAID, the State Department, the DRC government, USAID partner and non-partner organizations, and other donor organizations.

The questionnaires were developed by the external evaluators and were used as to guide the focus group discussions and key informant interviews. Interviews were conducted in 18 communities and with 60 staff from assistance organizations and government. Questionnaires were e-mailed to stakeholders who could not be interviewed, with a 25% return. A major constraint to the analysis was insufficient time to pursue issues in depth. There were also time and logistical constraints to accessing more remotely located community members and program sites.

Main Findings

The evaluators understood the terms of reference to seek an evaluation of the humanitarian crisis in the DRC and the successor failure of US responses to this crisis. The evaluators sought to assess the humanitarian crisis independently of any administrative regulations or practices, which are often temporal in nature. The question, therefore, boiled down to this: how great was the crisis and to what extent have US efforts mitigated or resolved it?

Overall Finding

In the context of the worst humanitarian crisis in recent memory, with over three million deaths since 1998 attributed directly or indirectly to the series of conflicts and ensuing anarchy, it would be difficult for an evaluation to assess humanitarian relief in an entirely positive perspective. Nevertheless, US humanitarian relief efforts have saved many Congolese lives and prevented, to some extent, still more chaos and suffering. The heroic efforts of individuals working in the DRC on humanitarian relief efforts cannot be praised enough. Despite some discrete findings to the contrary, well to be expected in such an environment, their overall efforts have been efficient, focused, and, above all, courageous. On a broader level, however, that of humanitarian policy, the international community has obviously failed the DRC. The situation remains chaotic. In what has been a client-state of the US almost since its independence, overall US policy has failed the Congolese and the American people.

Relevance/Appropriateness

In the DRC, most organizations, in principle, do not emphasize protection of IDPs separately from other groups, although they are mindful of their rights and special vulnerabilities. However, in practice, there were some imbalances in the assistance provided to IDPs in camps and IDPs who had sought refuge with host families, and also between IDPs and host communities with similar needs. In the DRC context, separate programs for IDPs can result in unfairness that can strain relationships between IDPs and host communities.

Effectiveness

USAID/DRC has a long-term development strategy which touches upon many of the recommended actions set out in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. However, gaps exist in some areas and the depth of coverage varies. USAID has not publicized a transitional strategy that informs other actors of the funding that is available and the plans made for linking emergency programs to development and covering needs of IDPs as they return to their homes.

OFDA's programs rely on stable partnerships, mainly through non-competitive grants. OFDA has broadened its partnerships and programmatic themes for greater effect, and its efforts to be responsive have improved collaboration. OTI's "Congo en Action pour la Paix" program has been evaluated by both OTI and CARE, and these evaluations offer useful lessons and best practices for implementation of peacebuilding programs and working with local NGOs. While the impacts of some of the grants implemented were positive, a number of the grants were not sustainable, nor appropriate for short-term assistance.

Food aid is a predominant funding area for USAID/DRC. Food items are distributed that are not part of the traditional diet, and their monetization may be doing harm by creating opportunities for corruption and profiteering on relief foods. Food aid sales create the same problems as cash distribution; it is not known how the proceeds are spent and whether women and children ultimately receive the nutritional packages intended for them.

Timeliness was constrained by materials acquisition delays and project approval times which are too long for emergency situations. Local communities saved lives in the first days of the emergencies because they were able to respond immediately. Humanitarians faced many problems because access to IDPs was often difficult to organize. In seeking to overcome this bottleneck, they strategized, developed EHI initiatives, employed Air Serv operations and, recently, were able to benefit from the increased MONUC presence in Eastern DRC.

While efforts have been made, the prevention and mitigation of Sexual and Gender Based Violence in DRC has received less attention than warranted by the scope of the problem, both from USAID and from other organizations.

Impact

The accomplishments of the assistance community are vast and have at times been outstanding, given the difficult and dangerous environment that exists in the DRC. Media attention resulted in humanitarian focus on the Goma volcanic eruption and the violence in Ituri, while other areas may have had greater needs. Regrettably, the impact of USAID and other international donor efforts was sometimes affected by interference and corruption on the part of local administrations and military actors, among others. Neither humanitarian programs nor conflict transformation programs have had a significant countrywide impact on the root causes of conflict: the motivations of the armed groups, the proliferation of arms, and the pilfering of natural resources.

Efficiency

In the early years of the humanitarian response, weaknesses in coordination mechanisms between international NGOs negatively affected efficiency. Where cooperation did exist, it was often grounded not in inter-organizational agreements but in individual relationships. USAID's partners were mostly all experienced in emergencies, although some staff may have lacked the political insight needed to select the best strategies.

Co-ordination/Coherence

USAID/DRC effectively utilizes the mechanisms of OCHA to promote coordination and policy coherence in the DRC. Under OCHA, a Common Humanitarian Action Plan has been elaborated each year, and OCHA is now taking more responsibility for determining where organizations can and should work. Interviewees felt that more inter-regional coordination was needed, especially for preparedness purposes, such as obtaining supplies for emergencies.

The Consolidated Appeals Process is seen by participants as a very useful bridge to other funding mechanisms. Donors, such as USAID and ECHO, are also cooperating, both inside and outside the CAP. OCHA's approach in the DRC has been to work on advocacy and access in the field with the rebel groups and USAID has supported this role. The CAP results from 2000 – 2004 indicates extremely weak support for Protection/Human Rights/Rule of Law activities undertaken by UN OHCHR and others, such as UNIFEM. The US never appears as a donor in this category, although some funding is provided by the USAID mission outside the CAP.

Sustainability/Connectedness

The relatively few problems that occurred between IDPs and host communities were mainly due to inequities in assistance targeting. Feelings of inequity arose most often when encamped populations received disproportionate assistance or were perceived to be advantaged. Generally, the host families benefited when IDPs living with them received separate assistance and when community-wide interventions were made. Important differences existed between those who had integrated into host communities and those who stayed in camps. Hosted IDPs tended to find livelihoods, generally working on other peoples land, more quickly than those in camps.

The distrust of national NGOs by international organizations has placed limits on capacity building initiatives and opportunities for greater coverage of affected people. Some Congolese NGOs reported that they frequently provided information and advice to international NGOs setting up their programs, yet were sidelined once those programs were established. The need to overcome barriers to cooperation should not be ignored as growing numbers of people in need are accessed, and long-term development necessitates long-term presence.

Recommendations

The recommendations made below are all deemed to be "do-able" and within the capacity of the US Government. However, the evaluators did not see their task as being restricted by US regulations, policies or laws that are currently in place. In our opinion, if the logic of

humanitarian aid demands that such restrictions be changed, then effecting such changes should become a priority goal for the near future.

1. The US Government should include a local peace-making component under USAID management as part of its humanitarian and "preventive" strategy. This should form part of the most basic humanitarian agenda and not be left to national or international political actors. When humanitarian representatives note the existence of, or the potential for, conflict, human rights abuses and/or population displacement, they should see it as their responsibility to attempt mediation between the conflicted forces. This should be accomplished by initiating mediation and reconciliation efforts aimed at all levels of society. USAID should train and employ mediation experts to be assigned to all of its conflict related programs. The employment of material incentives, even to armed groups, as rewards for implementing cease-fire agreements and peace building is one practical option to be considered.

There exists a political and ethical contradiction between expending a huge human and financial effort to deal with the effects of specific conflicts and, at the same time, not having the authority or the necessary skills to mitigate or resolve such conflicts.

2. USAID should focus on providing assistance impartially to "people most in need" rather than specifically to IDPs. This category of people in dire need of humanitarian assistance will naturally include most IDPs.

This study questions whether emphasis on IDPs rather than vulnerable populations is appropriate in the DRC. In some instances, the most abused and needy individuals were unable to leave their homes and, because of that misfortune, were refused the assistance reserved for IDPs. Many humanitarian organizations in the DRC do not, in principle, emphasize protection of IDPs separately from other groups. However, in practice, some assistance is directed to IDPs when they are not in as great need as other community groups or families. In the DRC, separate programs for IDPs can result in unfair practices, which can strain relationships between IDPs and neighboring or host communities.

3. In the interest of assuring an equitable distribution of assistance, USAID should undertake household surveys in order to compare "assistance-in-relation-to-need" as it applies to different categories of persons in need. USAID monitoring visits should include interviews with host community members and IDPs living in various situations.

IDPs in the DRC find themselves in a variety of different situations, which can be categorized into three types: (1) IDPs in camps that are frequently located near towns, large villages or along main roads; (2) IDPs who have found shelter with communities or families, typically in towns or large villages; and (3) IDPs that have escaped into forest or savannah areas that are often unreachable by NGOs due to security concerns and impassable roads.

The tendency to focus on assisting IDPs in camps is unfair to those who find shelter with families or ethnic kin, and who are more likely than encamped IDPs to be integrated into productive activity. IDPs and other vulnerable people should not be drawn to camps because

they do not receive assistance elsewhere. Identifying IDPs living in host communities and allocating aid so has not to favor them over the host communities, whose standards of living typically fall because of their presence, is a difficult, time-consuming, and potentially costly enterprise. Nonetheless, there are persuasive long-range advantages to undertaking such a task.

4. FFP should sponsor a "Food Aid Targeting" study for the DRC so that it can better understand who receives the food, how it is used, under what circumstances it is sold, and what is purchased in its place, in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness of the food aid program.

In some areas of the DRC, distributed food items are being rejected by some IDPs and/or vulnerable populations and being sold for cash. As a result, food aid may be doing harm by creating opportunities for corruption and profiteering. It is not known how the cash from food sales is spent and whether the monetization of food aid succeeds in giving women and children the nutrition that they need.

5. USAID should more actively promote and support capacity development for local NGOs, particularly with respect to strengthening their capacities to respond to emergencies. Due to the administrative weaknesses of some NGOs, an investment may have to be made in ensuring initial oversight by international staff. This action can be undertaken directly by USAID or through support for NGO partner initiatives.

The relationships between international and local NGOs in the DRC are complex. International NGOs often do not trust local NGOs because some of them have misused resources in the past and because of their weak administrative capacities. This widespread lack of trust is a barrier to efficiency and effectiveness. However, greater involvement by Congolese NGOs in humanitarian assistance is essential for several reasons. First, they are often on the scene of emergency situations before international NGOs arrive. Second, they are the most logical bridge between emergency aid and sustainable development. Third, international NGOs will, one day, move on to other parts of the world, thereby threatening the continuity of leadership and the social structures they developed.

6. USAID should encourage the hiring of long-term experts in the Congo and more Congolese staff to ensure that programs are underpinned with in-depth political and social insight. It would be desirable for supervising personnel to remain "in country" for longer periods in order to attain the information base with which to evaluate Congolese NGOs. The hiring of female staff, particularly Congolese, may help in dealing with issues of SGBV.

The expatriate personnel of USAID's partners were mostly experienced in emergencies. However, many did not have long-term experience in the DRC. Very few appear to have learned any local languages and some did not even speak French with fluency. Therefore, they were probably handicapped in understanding the local political, ethnic and social environment. This lack of familiarity becomes a particularly acute handicap in transferring responsibilities to Congolese NGOs, which must be evaluated not only for their capacity but also for their perceived position in local society.

7. USAID, and especially OFDA, should consider developing mechanisms that allow for faster, field-based, approval of program funds in emergency situations. This should be linked to the strengthening of local NGO emergency response capacities.

Based on the survey findings, approval of requests for OFDA funds appears to take too long, so that aid often is delayed in the first critical weeks of an emergency. USAID has considered vesting small grants authority in local representatives as do other donors. This solution should be given further consideration as it would seem to address the issue of timeliness of aid.

8. USAID/DRC should implement a strategy tying funding for shorter-term goals – usually linked to emergency situations - to funding for longer-term goals – usually linked to sustainable development. Regarding IDPs, this strategy should focus on making sure that they receive adequate support when they return home.

There is a large gap between emergency assistance and development assistance. In this regard, USAID/DRC's plans were perceived as unclear by many NGO partners. In addition, successful reintegration of returnees will require support for rebuilding devastated villages and local economies.

9. Coordination of humanitarian programs by the international community should be further strengthened. USAID should continue to support OCHA and strengthen both its coordination capacity and its ability to influence programming decisions of international and national NGOs.

The potential for excellent coordination among international and national NGOs has improved significantly since the reorganization of OCHA. However, there is still need for further improvement. At the local level, coordination often depends on personal relationships.

10. USAID should be transparent with regard to its strategies and policies for humanitarian assistance. This principle should be extended to, and followed by, partner organizations as well. Local community members should be informed of the rationales behind USAID's programs and projects.

There are growing resentments toward the international community and the US in the DRC. To be effective, the US must take these resentments into account even though many of them are ill-founded, contradictory, and unreasonable. One way of addressing this problem as it relates to emergency relief programs is attain and maintain high levels of transparency.

1 Evaluation Background

1.1 Evaluation Purpose and Motivating Factors

This evaluation of USAID/DCHA's humanitarian response in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) focuses on the relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, and overall impact of DCHA's relief and rehabilitation programs during the period FY 2000 – FY 2004, with particular emphasis on assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs). There were numerous factors that motivated USAID to support this evaluation and the evaluation team. They include:

- Providing a learning exercise for DCHA
- Seeking a more effective way forward in targeting humanitarian assistance in the complex political and social environment of the DRC
- Gaining a deeper understanding of field practice in regard to protection of IDPs and other vulnerable groups to underpin the policy on IDPs that is currently being developed within USAID
- Underpinning a broad policy on IDPs as that currently being developed with USAID
- Supporting an initiative of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Group, composed of donors and other organizations promoting principles and good practices
- Supporting a coordinated effort of donors and other organizations to evaluate assistance to IDPs and enter the findings into an ALNAP database, where they can be used as a basis for comparison between countries

1.2 Users of the Evaluation

Anticipated users of the evaluation include:

- USAID and partner organization staff
- State Department staff
- Staff of international organizations that are members of ALNAP
- The Good Humanitarian Donorship Group

1.3 The Evaluation Team

Three people form the independent evaluation team. Dr. Muko Mubagwa is a development economist at Bukavu University and Institute of Rural Development in the DRC. Sheila Reed, the team leader, is a humanitarian crisis analyst with 19 years of experience. Professor Herbert Weiss is a political analyst specializing in the DRC.

1.4 Work Schedule and Statement of Work

Dr. Weiss and Ms. Reed conducted interviews in Washington, DC prior to traveling to the DRC. While in Washington, they met with 16 staff from USAID, the State Department and the Brookings Institution to gather feedback on the Statement of Work (SOW), including stakeholder objectives for the evaluation if different from those in the SOW, and to establish contacts for information collection purposes. It was ascertained by DCHA staff that the evaluation could examine projects and programs in effect from FY 2000 through FY 2004. Once

in Kinshasa, the team gathered input on the evaluation objectives from OFDA, OTI and other USAID mission staff.

The fieldwork for the evaluation took place over a period of five weeks in the DRC. The USAID office in Kinshasa kindly provided (a) office space, a vehicle and driver for the team's use in Kinshasa; (b) security assistance, telecommunications, and email connections; and (c) administrative support to plan and implement the field visit.

The full SOW and lists of persons and documents consulted are annexed to this report.

1.5 Constraints Experienced

The team experienced several constraints to data collection and analysis.

- The SOW offered over 60 questions to be answered. The team attempted to address each question, but time constraints limited the depth of the team's response.
- Transportation to and within the eastern areas of the DRC is limited to MONUC flights, as commercial airlines are considered to be security risks. Availability of seats for humanitarians on MONUC flights is dependent on the agenda of MONUC. As a result of having to wait for places on the flights, team travel to the east was delayed and one planned community visit (Kindu) had to be cancelled.
- Once in the east, the team was dependent on NGOs for transportation and security, and only a limited number of roads were passable and relatively secure. Data collection was thus restricted to "roads more traveled" rather than more remote spots.
- Due to time constraints, the team was not able to investigate the extensive volume of quarterly and end of project reports issued from FY 2000 – FY 2004. Further, the reports were produced in different formats. There is little doubt that a survey of these reports would have enriched this evaluation, but this would have required weeks of time. Standard formatting and reporting requirements could facilitate future reviews.

1.6 Multi-Method Approach

The evaluation team employed a diversified methodology, including both participatory and gender aware approaches. In addition, all major findings were triangulated, using three or more sources. The following tools and methods were used.

Document Review. Documents were reviewed as they became available, although time prohibited an exhaustive document review. (See Annex E for a list of documents consulted.)

Questionnaire for Management Informants. A management questionnaire was developed and used as a guide for interviewing informants on management aspects. Approximately 60 management staff were interviewed, including staff from the US and DRC governments and from local and international NGOs. The questionnaire was sent by email to approximately 40 people who could not be personally interviewed. Ten people completed and returned the questionnaire and others were followed up with phone interviews. The responses to the written questionnaires were tallied and the results synthesized. The individual responses in both interview and written form are confidential.

Focus Group Interviews. A "Community Questionnaire" was created to guide focus group discussions with program beneficiaries, including questions related to satisfaction with the assistance received, participation, impact and sustainability. The results were tallied and synthesized.

Interviews with Congolese NGOs. A questionnaire was developed for the purpose of reaching staff of local NGOs, many of whom had partnered with CARE and IRC to implement OTI and OFDA funded programs. Ten NGOs were interviewed and the interviews were compiled and analyzed.

Sampling Technique. Sampling was purposive. The intended design of the field visits had to be modified somewhat due to the logistical constraints described above. The team split up after arriving in the east. Dr. Mubagwa conducted interviews in the Bukavu area and traveled to Uvira and Sange, while Dr. Weiss and Ms. Reed visited Bunia, the Beni-Eringetti axis, Butembo, Goma, Bukavu and Kalemie. Interviews took place in 18 locations.

The community sampling included people and groups with the following characteristics:

- Minority groups, Pygmie (Kabulo) and Banymulenge (Kalemie)
- Female IDPs in women's focus group (Beni)
- Urban encamped IDPs (Beni)
- Urban hosted IDPs (Bunia, Bukavu)
- Rural encamped IDPs (Kabutonga)
- Rural hosted IDPs (Uvira, Sante, Botueya)
- Host community family, sympathetic host, ethnically similar (Eringetti: Nande)
- Encamped, unsympathetic host, ethnically different (Beni: Nande – Dutera)
- Large encamped population, greater than 10,000 (Oicha – Eringeti axis)
- Small (less than 1,000) encamped population (Kabutonga)
- Former refugee returnees now living as IDPs (Kabutonga)
- Currently benefiting from USAID-supported programs (Beni, Oicha, Botueya)
- Benefited in the past from USAID programs, returnees (Kabulo)
- Neglected, encamped and hosted (Kabutonga, Bunia)
- Formerly outside Kinshasa government control (Botueya, Kabulo)
- IDPs experiencing displacement more than three times (Uvira)
- IDPs displaced for more than two years (Bunia)
- Returnees from refuge in forest area (Pygmie and Bantu, Kabulo area)

Other Methods. Direct observation was used to judge differences in standards of living among IDPs and vulnerable people between regions and between urban and rural areas, and to assess the efficiency of distribution operations.

1.7 Triangulation and Bias Reduction Methods

All findings are triangulated (using three or more sources). The evaluators tried to mitigate the following biases in their research design:

Security Bias. Due to security concerns, most communities visited were along more frequently travelled corridors, where security issues could be addressed. Dr. Mubagwa elected to travel by road to Sange-Uvira since he was familiar with the area and the local languages, thereby providing a valuable perspective on the situation in that area.

Logistical Accessibility Bias. Air travel in the east was dependent on flight schedules and seat availability, limiting the team's flexibility for site visits. The team attempted to collect perspectives from NGOs working in remote areas.

Proximity and Road Bias. Most communities visited were on the main roads. Passage on many of these roads was extremely rugged. Since most areas where IDPs live were not accessible the team, the team attempted to collect examples from NGOs working in remote areas.

Partner Organization Bias. Many of the NGOs and UN organizations providing assistance in the DRC receive bilateral or multilateral US funding. The evaluators attempted to include as many non-USAID partner organizations as possible.

Timeline Bias. The team found that key informants who had analytical perspectives on 2000 - 2002 were rare, and that those who had moved on were difficult to communicate with. Thus, the interviews tended to be focused on 2002 to the present. The earlier years were addressed mainly through document review.

1.8 Incorporation of Gender and Vulnerable Group Perspectives

In most communities, groups gathered spontaneously to participate in discussions. We found that community members were interested in and willing to discuss the issues raised in the evaluation. In most cases, the gatherings included both men and women and people of different age groups. Efforts were made to encourage women and the elderly to participate in the discussion and questions were directed to them specifically.

2 The Context in the DRC

The DRC is ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world and has the world's highest maternal and crude mortality rates (CMRs). CMRs have increased significantly in recent years, rising from 1.3/1000 in 1997 to estimated 2003 rates of 3.5/1000 in the East and 2.0/1000 in the West (see MONUC DRC political map, page iv)[2]. The increase is attributed to disease, malnutrition and insecurity, and in the East to the violent struggles between Mai Mai and RCD/Goma forces and more recently between Mai Mai and ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces and between military units loyal to Kinshasa and some former RCD/Goma forces. Excess mortality attributed to war and war-related disease and famine of over three million people since 1998 far exceeds the number of deaths in Rwanda, Cambodia, or Sudan in the recent tragedies there.

The estimated population of 55 million in the DRC subsists on a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $107 per year. GDP per capita has shrunk by 72% since independence in 1960. Life expectancy is only 46 years for men and 51 years for women. It is estimated that over three million Congolese are internally displaced, of which 286,770 are refugees fleeing from armed conflict that still continues in parts of eastern DRC. In addition, the DRC hosts 389,500 refugees, mainly from Angola and Sudan. The DRC is also vulnerable to many natural hazards, including volcanic activity, floods, drought, army worm invasions, epidemics, foot and mouth disease, landslides, and erosion.

The DRC economy grew by 3% to $5.4 billion in 2002. Most, if not all, of this growth occurred in the capital of Kinshasa and in Bas Congo province. The remainder of the country probably experienced no or negative economic growth in 2002. In absolute terms, all sectors, including agriculture, have contracted sharply over the past 40 years. Roughly two-thirds of the population lives in rural areas; many people are cut off from market access due to poor roads and transport networks and insecurity. Exacerbating the extreme poverty are lack of access to and availability of fundamental health services, and an abysmal lack of basic education structures.

2.1 Recent History of Transition and Conflict

An analysis of its history challenges some general impressions that the DRC is a hotbed of violence, massacres, rapes, and other human rights abuses. For the vast majority of the Congolese and in the largest areas of the country, quite the opposite is true. Demonstrations of violent characteristics are very limited to specific time periods and relatively small regions of the country. Over the last 40 years, there has been much more ongoing violence in the countries which surround the DRC - Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, and Congo/Brazzaville.

The culture of non-violence in the DRC allowed President Mobutu Sese Seko to hold on to power for 32 years, despite the declining standards of living under his corrupt rule. The courage and energy to rise up against the government by employing violent means had largely been

[2] "East" and "West" has several connotations. In recent years "East" has referred to the areas under the control of the RCD/Goma. However, when reference is made to mortality, it clearly means the RCD/Goma areas which have been plagued by massive violence because of the struggles between the Mai Mai uprising against the RCD/Goma. This roughly covers most of North and South Kivu, Northern Katanga and parts of Maniema. In the RCD/Goma areas to the west of this zone, mortality rates were probably similar to those cited for the "West"

dissipated during the failed revolutionary years, 1963-68. Since then, the conflicts in the DRC have been largely a result of the presence of insurgency movements against the governments of neighboring countries, such as Angola, Uganda and Rwanda. (See Annex B for detailed discussion of historical context).

Three major violent struggles have rocked the DRC and Central Africa in the last ten years. The first important event in this cycle was the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi in 1994. This was followed by the victory of the Tutsi-led RPA over the Hutu-dominated Rwandan government, which led to the mass exodus of over one million Hutu who settled in eastern DRC close to the Rwandan frontier. Refugee camps in the DRC sheltered the political leadership of those who had committed the genocide, as well as structured units of the defeated Rwandan Hutu army, and the Hutu militia, the Interahamwe. The camps were used as launching pads to attack Rwanda. The new Tutsi-led Rwandan government demanded that the Hutu in the camps be disarmed and controlled, but the UN did not respond to this demand.

In 1996, Rwanda and its then ally Uganda took matters into their own hands and attacked the DRC (then Zaire), covering this invasion with the creation of a Congolese revolutionary alliance led by Laurent Kabila. The invasion was joined by Angola. It took this alliance about eight months to defeat the Congolese (Zairian) government of President Mobutu and to occupy the capital, Kinshasa, ending the 'First Congo War."

The Kabila-led government sidelined most Congolese political parties and civil society and established a narrowly-controlled government. But Kabila's "sponsors" (Angola, Rwanda and Uganda) became increasingly dissatisfied with him as he attempted to assert his independence. In the summer of 1998, Kabila expelled the Rwandan military. The Rwandans and Ugandans re-invaded the DRC and were poised to rapidly conquer Kinshasa and end Kabila's presidency. However, Angola switched sides and intervened militarily to save the Kabila regime. It was soon joined by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Chad. The "Second Congo War" had begun.

During much of 1998 and 1999, the international community, and especially several African states, made efforts to end the war. Finally, when a military stalemate developed, a cease-fire agreement was negotiated in Lusaka. The Lusaka Agreement recognized four large political/military zones, each with African state allies or sponsors. The Kinshasa authorities controlled the west and south of the country, the RCD/Goma the east, the RCD/ML the northeast, and the MLC the north.

Most areas were internally passive but some were plagued by intense violence (see Political Map, page iv). In parts of the RCD/Goma territory a grass-roots rebellion – the Mai Mai – gained wide popular support and focused violent protests against that authority and its Rwandan sponsors. Similarly, in the RCD/ML region, violent struggles developed between ethnic groups, resulting in millions of deaths and large numbers of IDPs. For much of the period under discussion, the Kinshasa authorities[3] supported the internal violence against the RCD/Goma both

[3] In this report, "Kinshasa authorities" refers to the Kinshasa government functioning from May 1997 to June 2003. It controlled about half the territory of the DRC after the Second Congo War started in August 1998. Since June 2003, a new government has been formed which includes all the major militarized and non-militarized factions of the DRC. It is referred to as the "Transitional Government".

militarily and politically, *even after the cease-fire agreement was signed*. The Mai Mai also made an alliance with the Rwandan and Burundian insurgency movements – the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and the FDD - operating in eastern DRC.

Laurent Kabila was assassinated on January 16, 2001 and was immediately replaced by his son, Joseph, ushering in a more hopeful period of intensified movement towards peace. A Transitional Government was established in June 2003. The new government is currently made up of the President, four Vice-Presidents and 62 Ministers and Vice-Ministers, including representatives of eight factions - former enemies who are wary of each other and in a strongly competitive mode. Recent events have demonstrated that the greatest problem facing the government and the country continues to be the ongoing violence in the East.

2.2 Peace building in the DRC: the US, the UN and Africa

The US has long considered the DRC a particularly important country in sub-Saharan Africa. During the Cold War, the US maintained a strategic alliance with President Mobutu, who generally supported US interests throughout this period. Along with South Africa and Nigeria, the Congo is one of the few African countries that can have a significant impact beyond its borders. The DRC borders nine countries, including such other states of strategic interest to the US as Angola, Sudan, and Uganda. It can clearly serve as a force either for progress on the continent, or for instability.[4]

Once a military stalemate occurred in the Second Congo War, US diplomacy under the Clinton administration made great efforts to ensure that peace negotiations succeeded, and similar efforts were made by South Africa and the European Union. The outcome was the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement, which was negotiated to a very large extent by Africans and combined peacemaking clauses that were both international and internal. The agreement rested on four main pillars:

- All foreign armies - Angola, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe – were to withdraw from the DRC.
- Foreign insurgency militia operating in the DRC against the governments of their home states were to be disarmed and dismantled, including those of Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda.
- An internal dialogue was to be held including all Congolese factions, armed and unarmed, to decide upon the modalities of forming a transitional government. This was to be followed by the writing of a new constitution and elections.
- The UN would participate in the form of a Chapter 7 Mission. The Security Council did not at first fully agree to this request, but did establish a cease-fire observation mission – MONUC – which included the expedition of military forces.

The Lusaka Agreement achieved its principal goal – the establishment of a cease-fire zone. Unfortunately, while the cease-fire was largely respected along the line separating the Kinshasa controlled area from the "rebel" controlled area, the conflicts in Eastern DRC increased in intensity and expanded to ever larger areas.

[4] USAID DRC Integrated Strategic Plan FY 2004 – 2008, p.3

The "Third Congo War" refers to the ongoing violence in Eastern DRC. It has produced by far the largest number of casualties, has existed for longer than either of the first two wars, and did not end after creation of the coalition Transitional Government. The intensity of this war is best illustrated by comparing the number of people killed by an act of war along the cease-fire line with those killed in the Kivus. During the period between 1999 and 2001, for every person killed along the cease-fire line, 90 people were killed in the Kivus.

Yet it is noteworthy how little attention was given to this war until the flurry over the massacres in Bunia, in Ituri Province, in 2003. After the end of the Second Congo War, the international community was focused on implementing the Lusaka Agreement and creating the Transitional Government. However, the Kinshasa authorities continued to pour oil on the fires raging in the East. Politically, the violence in the East worked to the advantage of the Kinshasa authorities since their principal rival, the RCD/Goma, and its backer, Rwanda, lost credibility, especially among the Congolese public, as a result. The US and the UN acknowledged the disaster that was enveloping Eastern DRC by sending most of the humanitarian aid to the East. But stopping the violence was put on the shelf for the following reasons:

- Kinshasa was opposed to mediation between the Mai Mai and RCD/Goma because it strongly supported the Mai Mai and correctly saw this struggle as having the effect of profoundly weakening the RCD/Goma.
- US policy focused on getting along with President Kabila who opposed any easing of the burdens carried by his RCD/Goma opponents.
- While most African states had supported the invasion of the DRC during the First Congo War, they took the opposite position during the Second Congo War. For the international community and especially the US, the danger existed that supporting peace or cease-fire negotiations in the East would be seen as "proof" that the US supported Rwanda.
- The Bush Administration was critical of the support given by its predecessor to Rwanda and wanted to pursue what it saw as a more neutral policy.

As a result of this selective attention, cease-fire violations committed by Kinshasa were never denounced. For instance, military support for the Mai Mai was not denounced or declared a violation of the Lusaka Agreement. When battalion-sized Rwandan Hutu units crossed the cease-fire zone in the spring of 2001 to join the ex-FAR/Interahamwe guerrilla units in the Kivus, no violation was declared.

Potential for Local Conflict Reduction Negotiations

Despite the political considerations cited above, various groups concerned about the slaughter taking place in Eastern DRC sought ways to reduce the fighting. Since sending a peace *enforcing* mission was generally deemed beyond the realm of the possible, such goals had to focus on local cease-fire negotiations. This approach was given some encouragement when some of the main parties to the conflict indicated a willingness to negotiate.

As early as October 1999, a group of traditional leaders of South Kivu, the Mwami or Bami, met at a conference and recommended:

> "intensification of pacification conferences between tribes in conflict especially between the Bembe and the Rega, the Banyamulenge and neighboring tribes"[5]

In the summer of 2001, an important UNDP mission report noted that a potential for local cease-fire negotiations between some Mai Mai groups and the RCD/Goma existed and could be pursued.

> "In recent months, [Spring/Summer 2001] some attempts have been made both by some Mai Mai units and by the RCD and even the Rwandan authorities to come to an accommodation. Negotiations along these lines have taken place but up to the present have not resulted in any firm agreements. Nevertheless, de facto cease-fires do exist between some Mai Mai units and the Rwandan/RCD forces."[6]

In March 2002, a UNDP-sponsored conference at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy on "Promoting Human Security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" made the following recommendation:

> "The international community ought to facilitate inclusive local dialogues between civil society organizations, local and traditional authorities, representatives of warring groups [our emphasis], and other legitimate authorities. What [donors] can do is to create flexible mechanisms for providing support to these initiatives. Especially in the Eastern Congo, support for a multitude of such initiatives is urgent and can have pay-offs in terms of conflict prevention and reconstruction"[7]

It should be noted that this conference brought together about 40 of the most knowledgeable experts on conflict in Africa, including current and former officials from the Department of State, USAID, and the National Security Council, among others. However, neither the UN nor the US Government adopted the above-cited recommendations.

Some private and international NGO initiatives along these lines were undertaken but, without support from MONUC or key players such as the US, progress was extremely slow. During 2003-2004, some local cease-fire negotiations have succeeded. The most important was the agreement between the Mai Mai leader General Padiri and the RCD/Goma.

It is important to note that the particularly lethal situation existing in Ituri is different from the situations in the Kivus. In Ituri, a mutually genocidal struggle between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups developed and rapidly increased in intensity. Cease-fire negotiations were attempted by the early leaders of the RCD/ML in 1999 - 2000, but with little success. The first negotiations which held any serious hope of success took place in the spring of 2001 when, as a result of pressures from Kampala, the entire Ugandan sphere of influence in Eastern Congo was

[5] Conference des Bami du Sud-Kivu, "Rapport final" p. 6

[6] "UNDP/Donor Mission to the DRC and the Great Lakes Region", 6 August – 13 September 2001, ERD/UNDP, p.38].

[7] "Promoting Human Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo", The Political Dimensions of the On-Going Crisis in the DRC: Policy Recommendations, Policy Recommendation V, Boston, March 1, 2002

unified under the leadership of Jean-Pierre Bemba, the President of the MLC. This unification involved the areas controlled by the MLC and the RCD/ML (see Political Map, page iv) and took the name of Front de Liberation Congolais (FLC).

Bemba incorporated the leaders of the RCD/ML in the new movement and then proceeded to undertake several daring initiatives. He gained Mai Mai approval for integrating their warriors into the FLC army and assigning them the role of frontier guards. He created a joint Hema-Lendu assembly, which was to establish peace between the two ethnic groups. He managed to get the approval of the Catholic Church and Ugandan military representatives for this agreement. However, none of these hopeful developments received the slightest international or US support and the agreement soon collapsed.

Some months later, the RCD/ML, having broken its alliance with the MLC and its incorporation into the FLC, made an alliance with the Kinshasa authorities. The Hema-Lendu conflict deteriorated even further and eventually aroused the interest of the international community. An Ituri Pacification Commission was established with support from the Kinshasa authorities, MONUC, and the main Western embassies in Kinshasa. The Commission's attempts at resolving the Ituri conflict also failed and, in the end, a peace enforcement mission with Security Council authorization was established. At the beginning, this mission was a French military operation called "Artemis", but some months later it was taken over by MONUC.

This complex history clearly suggests that the international community was only willing to support peace initiatives in Eastern DRC when they conformed to the political interests of the Kinshasa authorities. In Ituri, that was the case after Kinshasa made an alliance with the RCD/ML, but not before. In the Kivus, that did not happen at all.

In the meantime, the humanitarian disaster created by the different conflicts in Eastern DRC and the huge numbers of IDPs that they produced was given serious attention by the humanitarians. In Bunai, MONUC created a camp to which the lucky civilian escapees could repair. No one knows how many Iturians were killed outside the limited confines of French/MONUC military protection around Bunia. All over Eastern DRC, funds running into the hundreds of million dollars have been spent dealing with the effects of conflict while the donors have refused to undertake any effective programs of conflict reduction or conflict prevention.

Stalling of the DDR/DDRRR Programs

One of the major goals of the transition, the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of Congolese armed groups and the Disarmament, Demobilization, Resettlement, Repatriation, and Reintegration (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups, has not yet been attained. The Interahamwe, the Rwandan Hutu militia, have not agreed to disarm and repatriate, which is causing significant tension between the DRC and Rwanda.

One of the first steps is to integrate the Congolese armies and militias, but progress has been limited for the following reasons:

- The proliferation of military structures due to internal dissention. In 1999, there were four administrations and armies; the Kinshasa authority's, the RCD/Goma's, the RCD/ML's and the MLC's, in addition to Mai Mai areas of control that were not officially recognized. Today there are many divisions among these groups. The RCD/ML split into many factions, which were partly responsible for the particularly vicious conflict in Ituri. Efforts at negotiations will now have to deal with the difficulty of playing with many actors.
- The redrawing of the administrative map in the northeast of the country. "Governors" were appointed in administrative units that previously had been headed by "District Commissioners." Ituri, which had been a "district," became a "province," as did the northern part of North Kivu. These changes resulted in the undermining of local "establishments," dual authorities, and lack of compliance by military commanders who have been placed under the authority of their recent enemies.
- Because the Mai Mai and RDC/Goma have not been effectively integrated, large areas of the Kivus are controlled by Mai Mai groups, while the main road arteries and the towns are controlled by the RCD/Goma. These divisions pose major obstacles for negotiation of access to vulnerable groups by national and international humanitarian organizations.

Despite the above-cited grave problems, the international community and the Transitional Government have made some progress that may offer hope for the future. MONUC has now placed most of its political and military assets in the East where the violence is taking place rather than keeping them on the cease-fire line where there has not been any conflict for more than two years. Informal attempts have been made to negotiate cease-fire and power-sharing agreements between Mai Mai groups and the administrative structure that was put in place by the RCD/Goma and is now theoretically absorbed into the unified structures of the Transitional Government.

2.3 The Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance

USAID humanitarian funds in the DRC were mainly linked to mitigating the effects of conflict. In 1999, the US Ambassador issued a disaster declaration due to the complex emergency, and this declaration has been renewed every year since. (Other recent disaster declarations were issued in response to natural disasters, such as the 2001 floods and the 2002 volcanic eruption of Mt. Niyragongo in Goma.) US funds for humanitarian assistance increased each year, from $31.1 million in 2000 to $105.4 million in 2004 (see table: US Assistance to the DRC, Section 3.1.1), reflecting the increasing intensity of the violence and the skyrocketing numbers of vulnerable people. The DRC crisis has already claimed more lives than the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath.

Casualties and Effects of Conflict[8]
3.4 million deaths from 1998 – 2002
800,000 deaths in 2002
Mortality related to war 2003: 1,460/day
Victims of sexual violence identified since 1998: 25,000 women in South Kivu Province 11,350 in Maniema Province 3,250 in Kalemie, North Katanga Province 1,625 in Goma, South Kivu Province
Landmines: 165 mined areas in 11 provinces

The costs of responding to the effects of war in the DRC have skyrocketed, but with insufficient focus on stopping or reducing conflict. Since the end of major military confrontations along what became the cease-fire line, conflicts have been confined to Eastern DRC and have tended to be more small-scale and local, a tendency which has grown **a**s foreign armies have been withdrawn but proxy militia and purely local militia have increased in number. The international community and the US have approached the three Congo Wars in very different ways: During the First Congo War the invading armies were, in effect, given a green light. The only major effort at reducing conflict concerned the avoidance of bloodshed in the capture of Kinshasa. In the Second Congo War, great effort was expended to arrive at a cease-fire. This succeeded and the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement projected the departure of foreign armies, the disarming of foreign militia, the reunification of the Congo, and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission. However, during the Third Congo War, concentrated in the East, little was done to reduce violence and conflict. Yet it was this last war that resulted in the largest number of casualties and created the greatest number of IDPs.

In addition, this geographically limited war has lasted longer than the first two wars. Why was the disastrous impact of the Third Congo War so neglected when, from a humanitarian perspective, it required the most aggressive intervention? The answer is, clearly, that political and diplomatic choices were made to that effect. But this raises the question of whether the terms of reference of humanitarian aid should not include the task of conflict reduction and mediation independently of other policies.

Indeed, it is against the backdrop of military-political interactions that humanitarian assistance in the DRC must be seen. Humanitarian aid was, quite logically, channeled increasingly to the East where the needs were the greatest. However, preventive efforts, which may have entailed negotiation and mediation especially at the local level, were almost completely absent. The spending of hundreds of million of dollars to alleviate the consequences of violence cannot reverse the effects of the destruction, massacres, rapes, and other abuses that have overwhelmed the coping capacity of DRC civilians caught in war.

[8] Compiled from OCHA 2004 CAP and Landmine Monitor Report 2003

DRC Timeline[9]		
Year	**Political events**	**Humanitarian concerns**
2000	Feb. – DRC human rights group ASADHO reports Ugandan support for Lendu killings March – MONUC deploys first batch of liaison officers to Bunia May - RCD- Goma establishes an inter-department commission on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of child soldiers June – Heavy fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in Kisangani June - President Kabila establishes a National Commission on Demobilisation and Reintegration July – Insecurity prevails - Kinshasa is in security phase 3 and the rest of the country in security phase 4 August - Kabila inaugurates the Transitional Parliament with handpicked members without consulting civil society Guerrilla type warfare involving Mai Mai and strong ethnic elements goes on in North and South Kivus and Ituri Provinces in East – "Third Congo War". Nov – "Putsch" - Divisions in RCD-ML come to a head and Wamba is removed, Two more RCD factions start up – Nationale and Populaire	Jan. – MSF reports 180,000 IDPs in Ituri, 9.1 % acute malnutrition MSF-H suspends Ituri operations due to attacks on its personnel Feb - EHI operations with hundreds of tons of urgently needed relief supplies were flown across the frontline and to previously inaccessible areas in western DRC ICRC obtained unconditional access to all prisoners and detainees in western DRC and commenced a systematic monitoring of detention conditions and assessment of extra-judicial detentions. May - Human Rights Watch report mentions US indifference to suffering in the east July - Murders and arbitrary executions occur, for example, in the IDP camp in Sake, North Kivu October - OCHA's CAP reports increases in child and maternal mortality and absolute mortality rates Some 37,000 Sudanese refugees who had been forced to repatriate or were dispersed by the SPLA in 1998, have returned to sites in northeastern DRC.
Year	**Political events**	**Humanitarian concerns**
2001	January – Lendu-Ngiti militia attack Nyankunde, reportedly a coalition between ex-FAZ, Mai Mai and Lendus; Lendu-Ngiti attack Ugandans near Bunia airport A new rebel alliance, the FLC, is formed combining MLC and RCD-ML, led by Bemba Laurent Kabila assassinated – replaced by son Joseph who is more cooperative than father. Feb. – A peace pact is signed between Hemas and Lendus March – FLC reaches accord with the Mai Mai April – UN Panel of experts publishes first report on exploitation of resources in DRC concluding that Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are illegally profiting. May – Government lifts ban on opposition parties and then blocks opposition demonstration in Kinshasa June – Bemba's and Nyamwisi's troops clash at Beni, new alliances form in preparation for the Inter-Congolese Dialog (ICD) July – Ceasefires violated; RCD/Goma captures Mpala and Tenbwe in North Katanga; Interhamwe moving in North Kivu Oct. - First attempt at ICD aborted in Addis Ababa	Jan. – Thousands of civilians displaced and 250 killed near Nyankunde; 3,500, mainly Hema, seek refuge in Uganda Feb – UN estimates 140,000 IDPs in Ituri; 2 m countrywide April – Six ICRC staff are killed in Ituri – all humanitarian activities halt May – 25,000 flee into DRC from CAR following coup attempt June – Humanitarian activities resume in Ituri; Mai Mai kidnap ACF staff for a week on the Ruzizi plains July – Geneva humanitarian conference endorses health and food security focus; Northern Katanga opens up after three years and high malnutrition found - WFP organizes airlift UN EPI vaccinates 9.76 million children; WHO/UNICEF find that health system will cease to function without external support Aug. – IRC suggests 2.5 m died of malnutrition and disease between 1998 and 2001 Nov. - US Ambassador re-declares emergency in DRC; UN CAP funded at 64%

[9] Compiled from OFDA Situation Reports, OCHA CAP reports, and Human Rights Watch reports, 2000 - 2004

Year	**Political events**	**Humanitarian concerns**
2002	Jan. 17 – Mt. Nyiragongo in Goma erupts Feb – Following clashes between RCD factions in Ituri, Uganda warns UN to send troops; MONUC plane downed by accidental MLC gunfire in Kindu April – ICD Sun City meetings reach agreement but power sharing not worked out; RCD-K-ML splits again May - Kinshasa government sends interior and human rights ministers to Ituri - 20,000 deaths reported over past three years June – Mai Mai seize Pweto from RCD-G but it is regained despite treaty requirements that RCD leave the town: MONUC's mandate extended for one year – it has disarmed 1,800 ex-FAR and has about 4,000 staff July – Peace accord between Rwanda and the DRC signed in Pretoria; Commercial traffic on the Congo river resumes; 50,000 displaced by fighting between Rwanda troops and Banyamulenge in South Kivu Aug. – Bloody fight in Bunia and Hema militias seize Bunia: UN and South Africa establish joint secretariat to oversee peace agreement Sept. – Luanda accord signed between Uganda and DRC – 100 day timetable set for withdrawal of UPDF Oct. – Second UN report on illegal exploitation of DRC resources damns Uganda's role in provocation of ethnic conflict for economic gains as well as its support for "elite networks"; Mai Mai capture Uvira for five days; 30,000 flee from Lomami River area from RCD-G Nov. – Governor of Ituri assassinated Dec. – Comprehensive peace deal signed at ICD talks in Pretoria; MONUC documents human rights abuses in Mambasa including execution, rape and cannibalism	Jan. – 300,000 temporarily displaced in Goma, 80,000 homeless; 34 m in aid quickly pledged March – IRC workers harassed in Goma during phase-down of wat/san project; ACF found 20% malnutrition around Shabunda: Measles spread to Kinshasa from the East – vaccination campaign intensified April – New Humanitarian Coordinator arrives May – Six donor mission concludes need for strengthened OCHA and high level negotiator for non-state actors on issues of access Humanitarian organizations estimate 500,000 displaced in Ituri: 2.2m countrywide June – Looting of IRC health centers in South Kivu: 27,000 displaced by Mai Mai in Kindu July – Uvira opens up and 50,000 recently displaced receive assistance; Cholera epidemic in Kalemie Aug. – Widespread killings of civilians in Bunia, 10,000 families displaced; SC-UK reports conflict spreading HIV/AIDs Sept. – Radio Okapi journalist abducted in Equateur by MLC after interviewing child soldiers Oct. – Amnesty International warns UN Security Council of possible genocide in Ituri; Humanitarians have trouble securing flight permissions to Bunia; Human Rights Watch urges the UN to increase MONUC presence; Numbers of people in need rise as foreign troops withdraw Nov. – Tensions build in Ituri and UN, NGO and human rights groups warn of a potential humanitarian disaster Dec. – Lubanga, UPC president, guarantees security for NGOs in Ituri after UN OCHA's representative expelled
Date	**Political events**	**Humanitarian concerns**
2003	Feb. – MONUC helicopter fired upon and all flights to Bunia suspended March – UPDF clash with clash with Hema UPC forces in Bunia, UPDF controls Bunia: MONUC facilitates ceasefire between armed groups in Ituri April - Kabila promulgates transitional constitution; no command structure for new army agreed upon; MONUC destroys 1,192 mines near Bunia; Ituri Pacification Committee inaugurated May – UPC attacks Lendus in Bunia after UPDF withdraws; May 16 - Kabila signs ceasefire with Hema and Lendu; 100 people per hour enter Eringeti from Bunia area on May 16 June – GDRC and opposition groups signed an agreement breaking the deadlock over military structure; the structure will contain RCD-G and MLC	Jan – Feb: WFP airlifts food to IDPs in Bunia and with Merlin to Kindu. Airlift of food to Kabala, Kongolo and Nyunza in Katanga; WFP food in 13 ship convoy reaches Katanga by river Feb. – Cholera epidemic continues, spreading from Katanga to Kasai Orientale: Influenza epidemic kills more than 1,000 in Equateur March – COOPI workers abducted by Ngiti militia but returned in two days April – 20 million vulnerable due to insecurity, 2.7 m IDPs, Refugees from DRC,.38m and in the DRC .33m; Massacre of up to 1,000 in Drodro, Ituri District; MONUC delivered assistance to survivors; IRC releases mortality study indicating that 3 million had died 1999-2001 from disease, malnutrition and insecurity.

	influence as well as GDRC; Ceasefire agreement is signed by GDRC, RCD-G and RCD-K-ML in Bujumbura, monitored by MONUC; 8,500 French-led multi-national force (MNF) assumes peacekeeping duties in Bunia, averts genocide but not massive displacement July – 25,000 seek MONUC protection in Bunia August – Active armed groups in Ituri meet for their fourth consultation: UPC, FPDC, PUSIC, FAPC, FNI; Fighting near Butembo between Mai Mai and RCD-K-ML displace thousands from Lubero Sept. – MONUC replaces the MNF, conducts house to house searches for weapons Nov. – MONUC deploys 85% of peacekeepers from former ceasefire line to Bunia, Kindu, and Uvira, to monitor and assist with DDR Dec. – Interhamwe occupy 8 villages and 25,000 flee to Kando, 75 km from Bukavu, where there is a MONUC presence; Mai Mai forces arrive in Lubalenge to participate in the DDR	May – Two Red Cross Volunteers die in Bunia violence; 100 humanitarian workers evacuated; Over 120,000 IDPs enter North Kivu; Multi-UN team conduct needs assessment in Bunia and assistance sent in; USAID's EDRC visits Bunia; Organization staff returns. June – OFDA airlifts supplies from Italy and Kuwait for North Kivu; OFDA Director visits Eastern DRC but RCD-G movement prevents visit to Beni; GAA distributes monthly food ration to 1000 families in Butembo Oct. – UN escorted humanitarian convoy attempts to extend South Kivu presence beyond Bukavu; Cholera outbreaks in Katanga and Kasai; US Ambassador re-declares disaster Nov. – Walikale opens up and urgently requires assistance but poor roads hinder access; Lubero remains inaccessible due to Interhamwe activities Dec. – As Mai Mai from Maniema are demobilized, 25,000 IDPs are able to return home
Date	**Political events**	**Humanitarian concerns**
2004	Jan. – Interhamwe attacks cause 10,000 to flee near Bukavu; Burundian armed opposition group continues to operate along DRC shore of Lake Tanganika; Mai Mai forces loot, rape and murder in 50 villages near Kitenge on the rail line March – MONUC accelerates deployment of Kivu brigade, around 4,000 peacekeepers arrive in Bukavu April – Serefule appointed Governor of the Kivus May - MONUC accused of taking weak action to control Bukavu takeover; MONUC offices stoned and looted in Kinshasa; May - Killings of Banyamulenge by Congolese soldiers prompt renegard commanders to take hold of the city; Bukavu erupts in violence, UN offices looted in the eastern areas June - Government re-takes control of Bukavu	Jan. – GAA inaugurates 48 km rehabilitated road from Bunia to Kasenyi to facilitate the return of IDPs Feb. – Humanitarians advised to avoid travel to rural areas outside Bukavu; Northern Kitenge remains inaccessible leaving 10,000 IDPs without assistance May - International staff evacuated from Bukavu; Rapes and killings by renegade soldiers documented June – UNHCR registers 19,000 refugees who have crossed into Burundi from Bukavu area July - The "peace train," traveled 870 miles on a reopened, restored route after six years, the restoration of a vital link was sponsored in part by OFDA

3 Evaluation Findings

The following represents a summary analysis of findings from interviews with approximately 70 management level personnel from government, international and national organizations and field research in 18 communities where numerous focus groups and interviews took place, along with document review. (Please see the annexes for "Community Interview Analysis," "National NGO Interview Analysis," "Persons Consulted", and "Documents Consulted"). The evaluation team has pledged confidentiality to all interviewees and does not identify them directly unless explicit permission was given.

3.1 Relevance and Appropriateness

These criteria are concerned with assessing whether programming is in line with global and local needs and priorities. Is there a clear commitment to humanitarian principles (in particular, the principles of impartiality and humanity) in agency policy on humanitarian assistance? Specifically, is humanitarian assistance being provided proportionate to need?

3.1.1 Draft Policy on USAID's Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons

Internal conflict, such as the one plaguing the DRC, is typically the cause of widespread human rights abuses against civilians and their displacement within their countries. There were at least 25 million people internally displaced by conflict in 47 countries at the end of 2001 – approximately twice the number of refugees (12 million) estimated by UNHCR as of January 2001.[10] For more than a decade, international assistance organizations have been engaged in an ongoing debate regarding assistance and protection efforts, which were regarded as uneven and insufficient. Critical actions taken to improve assistance and protection for IDPs have included:

- Development of non-binding "*Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*" by the Representative of the UN Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons, and endorsed by the UN General Assembly, UN agencies, NGOs and many governments, including the USG. (1998)
- Publication by OCHA of "Handbook for Applying the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement," developed by the Brookings Institution, and "Manual on Field Practice in Internal Displacement," developed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. (1999)
- Issuance of a UN policy paper on *Protection of Internally Displaced Persons* and related operational guidance to UN Humanitarian/Resident Coordinators in countries experiencing displacement. (1999)
- Creation of an IDP Unit within the OCHA/Geneva office. (2002)

Prompted by the international discussion and the alarming numbers of IDPs worldwide, the US Government has focused on refining its approach to IDP assistance. Recommendations were offered in several studies, including the 1999 Brookings Institution report entitled: "*The USG and Internally Displaced Persons: Present But Not Accounted For,*" the 2000 Halperin/Michel inter-agency review of humanitarian and transition programs, and the 2001 GAO report,

[10] Note that there were an additional 3.8 million Palestinians who were under the mandate of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA).

"Internally Displaced Persons Lack Effective Protection." A milestone was reached by clarifying the division of funding responsibilities between DCHA and PRM in the *"PRM-DCHA Funding Guidelines in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies."* These guidelines confirm DCHA's leadership role in providing emergency relief assistance for IDPs, and the need for consultations with PRM in cases where DCHA is not covering emergency IDP needs.[11]

In 2002, DCHA sponsored an assessment to determine how USAID serves IDPs and how the agency might improve its overall efforts to assist them. A discussion paper was prepared by Dina Esposito[12] and, in the past two years, USAID has acted upon several of this paper's recommendations. These actions include the development of a draft policy on "USAID Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons" that seeks to institutionalize USAID's commitment to protecting IDPs, as well as actions that demonstrate a stronger commitment to strategic planning to improve IDP responses.

Evidence of Heightened USAID Commitment to IDP Response. A core group within USAID/ Washington, under the direction of the Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (PPC), is steering IDP policy development, drawing on the guidance of experts from the Brookings Institution and Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies. A number of developments in the past two years herald a strategic approach for covering protection needs. These include:

- Positioning a *focal point for IDPs* in OFDA to help raise awareness on the issue, promote the draft policy, and gauge what the policy means to staff in their daily work
- Devotion of time by DCHA staff to IDP-related issues within their areas of special focus
- The formation of a Conflict Mitigation and Management Unit within DCHA and its development of a core, generic strategy
- The formation of an Abuse Prevention and Protection Team (APPT) that can identify contentious issues and flash points regarding assistance to IDPs
- Development of a companion document to the Draft "Policy on USAID Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons," consisting of a set of guidelines for addressing all phases of assistance
- Evaluations such as this, which gather information on operational realities to help flesh out generic guidelines.

The Drafting of USAID's IDP Policy and Accompanying Guidelines. The drafted policy and accompanying guidelines, if accepted as currently written, clearly establish USAID as the lead agency for IDP assistance. This clarification in itself has smoothed the way to effecting more decisive steps to protect IDPs. However, although PRM has approved the draft strategy, tensions remain between DCHA and PRM regarding resources for countries where PRM, through UNHCR, serves IDPs, such as in Colombia, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan.

[11] The guidelines also indicate that when PRM's primary partners (e.g., UNHCR and ICRC), are principal providers of aid to IDPs, PRM will fund those organizations in consultation with DCHA.
[12] Esposito, Dina M., "USAID and Internally Displaced Persons, A Discussion Paper, Prepared for USAID/DCHA/OFDA," December 2, 2002.

The drafting process, guided by PPC, was initiated in May 2003 by an assessment survey of USAID missions worldwide. The survey revealed that:

- Funds allocated for assistance to IDPs can be quantified to some degree (an estimated $120 million per year during FY 2001 – FY 2003 and $185.7 million per year when including food aid but not including OFDA and OTI).
- 37% of all missions supported programs assisting IDPs
- A wide variety of interventions are typically used, ranging from basic needs to legal protection
- Assistance is provided to IDPs as one of many other vulnerable groups, including refugees, returnees, and residents or host recipients. IDPs receive a major proportion of resources targeted for those in need.

The policy, still in draft form, has been vetted extensively in working groups. The language has been fine-tuned by lawyers alert to potential legal repercussions. A barrier to harmonious policy development is that the US Government has not ratified most of the supporting international treaties. Another is that US law provides only a minimum statutory basis for government action on behalf of IDPs. It is hoped that having the appropriate legal considerations already built in will facilitate actions to support the three core guiding principles: Do No Harm, Support the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, and Ensure Comprehensive Commitment.

USAID's Advocacy Role. Discussion is in the early stages regarding human rights and protection. Staff are still exploring what protection means to the Agency and clarifying the distinction between the modes of protection that can be covered by programs such as OTI's and OFDA's. Other deliberations involve how the Agency can integrate principles of protection into existing programs as well as determining the best means of training staff and raising awareness within the bureaus. The dialog is still concentrated among a relatively small group, but is expected to expand soon. The discomfort among USAID staff regarding the role they can and should play to protect human rights within development and humanitarian assistance programs serves to flag some potential problems that may occur when the policy is approved and begins to be translated into reality.

There is a potential, for example, for tension between focus on IDPs and "those most in need," Sometimes it may be necessary to document why IDPs do not need assistance, relative to others. The litmus test of the policy development exercise is whether it will create assistance and protection disparities between IDPs and other vulnerable people. If it does, then it is perceived to be off track. The policy puts the onus on governments to take responsibility for their own IDP problem. In this regard, it is critical to establish policy discussions with these governments.

Operationally, DCHA serves IDPs but does not always track or identify them. Many units of USAID include a discussion of IDPs when reporting on their annual activities. Since 1998, there has been some tracking of IDP aid recipients by FFP, but the numbers are not considered to be reliable because the definition of IDP was often arbitrary. A 2003 PPC survey indicated that IDPs were usually not disaggregated in nutrition and population surveys.

This evaluation did not examine in detail the approaches to advocacy and protection used by USAID missions in countries other than the DRC. However, interviewees indicated that Agency policy in terms of placing special focus on IDPs is often determined by the specific country context, and that the degree of concentration on IDP issues may depend on the interests of the USAID Mission Director. Some partner organizations find that the definition of protection varies with individuals in USAID and, furthermore, that definitions vary among implementing partners. Comprehensive protection includes confronting inherent dangers as seen in the unfolding of the Darfur, Sudan and Chad emergencies, which humanitarians are not normally equipped to address. Although USAID has lagged behind the UN in articulating policy, ECHO and DFID have not yet produced such policy documents.

Some major USAID partners, such as CARE, IRC and UNICEF, are reinforcing their programmatic language and strategies to be "rights-based". This means that their staffs are studying human rights issues and promoting rights and responsibilities to project participants and local authorities, among others. Additionally, they are branching out to address other rights that have not been traditionally part of their programs. US NGOs get significant support from each other in raising awareness, and go to the general public and to Congress to raise funds. It was felt that greater support by USAID for the advocacy networks would serve to attract more resources, particularly for Africa.

3.1.2 The Relevance of USAID Policy for Internally Displaced Persons in the DRC

The reasons for inadequate response to the needs of IDPs worldwide, taken in a modified form from Esposito's paper[13], are particularly salient for FY 2000 - FY 2004 in the DRC. They include:

- insecurity, which limits access of aid agencies and endanger the lives of humanitarian aid workers
- the inability of the government to provide access and/or services to IDPs
- the absence of a binding legal framework that lays out the rights of IDPs and the responsibilities of governments and international bodies to ensure those rights are met
- insufficient donor funds to meet all needs
- lack of clear institutional arrangements to coordinate access and set priorities, resulting in a "patchwork" of aid.

3.1.3 A Forgotten Emergency?

> *"Direct attacks on civilians by warring parties are part of the harsh reality of most conflicts across the globe. From Liberia to Uganda, Chechnya to Colombia, international humanitarian law is not adequately upheld or enforced by the international community, and the suffering of civilians continues unabated. There is substantial humanitarian aid for "priority cases" and not enough for the rest. Donor governments rapidly donated some US $2bn to postwar Iraq. This represents about $74 per person in need. By contrast, donors only gave $17 per person to the Democratic Republic of Congo." (OXFAM International, 2003)*

[13] Ibid.

At the end of 2003, the DRC had the second largest number of IDPs in the world after Sudan, which has 4 million. Certainly, resources have been insufficient to assist them in the past five years,despite the fact that the two major donors, ECHO and USAID, have significantly increased their funding. The response to the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) may be a relatively weak indicator of interest. Only 44% of the amount requested for 2004 was received. In 2003, funding outside the CAP was $20.1 million, and much more was given in bilateral assistance. In 2004, donors reported that the DRC is the third-best funded crisis after Iraq and Afghanistan, yet the amount per needy person varies widely. This evaluation was not able to tally the relative amount of resources allocated to diplomatic and peacekeeping missions.

The chart below indicates roughly the humanitarian assistance funds allocated to the DRC by OFDA, USAID and all donors relative to the numbers of IDPs. It is to be noted that in 2002, a significant percentage of the funds were allocated to the response to the volcanic eruption of Mt. Niyragongo. Donor response to this crisis was swift and decisive. The response resulted in an influx of humanitarian organizations and expansion of services by many already in residence.

US Assistance to the DRC, Funds in millions US dollars*								
Year	**IDPs**	**OFDA**	**FFP/Title II**	**OTI**	**DG**	**Child and DA**	**USAID**	**Humanitarian Global - Cal. Year**
2000	1.0 m	13.0	4.5	0.0	3.0	10.5	31.1	27.5[14]
2001	2.0 m	21.8	14.2	0.0	4.9	19.5	60.7	152.9
2002	2.7 m	26.8	16.5	3.3	1.5	4.5	73.8	136.9
2003	3.4 m	31.8	36.7	4.4	4.8	11.3	105.4	156.7
2004 (March)	3.0 m	22.5	26.3	2.7	NA	NA	NA	113.8 (June estimate)*

- Note: 2004 figures are not finalized

3.1.4 Defining, Counting and Targeting IDPs in the DRC

USAID/DRC considers issues of vulnerability among the general population, where IDPs tend to be among the most vulnerable, as the focus of its efforts. Although USAID/DRC has not assigned a focal point for IDP issues within its Mission, this focus is likely to be implicitly undertaken by OFDA. An additional, newly-assigned, OFDA officer will maintain monitoring operations in the East. USAID/DRC has consistently tried to address IDP issues, but funding uncertainties have been a constraint.

OTI generally sees IDPs as one of the vulnerable groups that will benefit from its activities. IDPs may be specifically targeted if they are critical to the transitional program strategy. In the 2002 program, IDPs were not specifically targeted, but were among the conflict-affected communities targeted for assistance. In the 2004 program just getting underway, OTI includes IDPs as one of the groups they are trying to support for reintegration.

[14] The global figure for 2000 does not reconcile with USAID totals for that year.

For OFDA, IDPs fall among the people affected by conflict and natural disaster that it seeks to assist. Most OFDA projects were targeted to areas receiving IDPs. OFDA's criteria for program support issued every year from FY 2001 – FY 2004 do not solicit projects targeted specifically for IDPs; rather, IDPs are mentioned as one potentially needy group. All partner NGOs have targeting policies, but very few single out IDPs to be specifically targeted. However, all OFDA partner organizations refer to IDPs as a category of needy people and, in most cases, account for them in project proposals and in quarterly reports.

IDP MAP – OCHA Kinshasa



FFP's programming instruments in the DRC are the World Food Programme's Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) and Emergency Operations (EMOP). PRROs and EMOPs address IDPs as a separate category of beneficiaries, and 364,000 are targeted under the ongoing PRRO. WFP tracks women and children as well as IDPs among the population it serves.

OFDA, WFP, and USAID's Democracy and Governance program all work closely with UN OCHA on IDP issues in the DRC. OCHA DRC staff includes a permanent IDP focal point stationed in Kinshasa, who makes frequent trips to the East. Data on IDPs are collected regularly throughout the OCHA network in partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council (since 1999, but more intensively in recent years). By virtue of DCHA's funding allocations for OCHA's coordination function and USAID/DRC's close association and frequent communications with other organizations within the OCHA coordination "structure," USAID lends significant support for focus on IDP issues. (See Section 3.5 for more detail on OCHA's activities.)

3.1.5 Identification of Vulnerable People

Most NGO and UN staff in the DRC are aware of and/or have received training in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and human rights instruments. However, many interviewees are, in principle, opposed to developing a special focus on IDPs that may result in creating inequity in assistance to vulnerable groups. Some staff interviewed offered the following principles:

- Our focus should be on legal issues and the protection of all civilians in war, referring to the Geneva conventions and the human rights instruments such as the Convention on Rights of the Child, as well as Congolese legal instruments. The DRC is a state party to all major human rights instruments as well as the Geneva Conventions.
- Our assistance should be based on prioritized needs in order to protect lives and livelihoods, meet shelter and other human needs.

Definition and Identification. The definition and identification of IDPs and the variety of their needs are extremely problematic, and disparities were found among practitioners. The following are some descriptions of IDPs offered by organizations, placed into rough categories.

By times of displacement:

- Newly displaced
- Chronic displaced, resettled
- Multiple displacements from home or from other areas of displacement

By nature or reason for displacement:

- IDP fitting classic definition
- "Roving," those who refuse to be counted
- Seasonal migrants
- Destitute people or indigents
- Repatriated refugees who fear going home

By locations and shelter types:

- Camped, organized, living in plastic roofed houses
- Camped, informal, local housing materials
- Living with host families in their homes or compounds
- Living in marginal conditions, in shanty towns
- Living in close proximity to people they are working for
- Living in the forest or jungle

By types of assistance received:

- None, "survivors", lived on coping mechanisms, inaccessible
- Complete basic needs

- Partial needs

A typical IDP in the DRC probably does not exist, but if one were to develop a simplistic profile, one might find:

- Most frequently, a woman, often head of household, who has suffered physical and sexual violence
- Less frequently, a man who has suffered physical violence
- A child who may have suffered or seen both physical and sexual violence
- Displaced more than once, from their homes or from an area of displacement
- Flees a relatively short distance from home (less than 50 km), typically from a rural area toward an urban center
- Living in host communities with host families or in the forest with similar or closely related ethnic groups.

Discussion of the definition raises more questions:

- Are women who sleep in banana groves every night, to avoid rape and attack, IDPs? They lack shelter and flee from fear and their ability to earn a living is seriously impaired.
- What is the IDP "border?" How many kilometers does one have to go to be an IDP?
- Does the IDP's ability to flee imply that they have less vulnerability or access to greater assets before flight than those who are "forced" to stay?

Counting and Classification. There is disagreement among international staff as to who should be counted as an IDP and, in general, numbers are viewed with skepticism. Some respondents disagree, for example, with OCHA's counting of the long term (more than ten years) displaced among the IDP population, when they should be regarded as "resettled". Humanitarian organizations may count those with nomadic lifestyles (e.g. in Masisi) and others with seasonal movements, which might be economically motivated. In short, few organizations trust each other's numbers, or any numbers. Since funding and targeting are based on numbers, this is unsettling.

There are disparities in the way that accessible IDPs are counted. They are counted more often in camps and in small towns than in large towns, where they are usually not counted. Several organizations claim that it is nearly impossible to count IDPs in towns larger than 100,000 because no reliable administrative mechanisms exists to structure and monitor the counting procedure.

Implications of the Definitions and Classifications on Targeting for Assistance. In the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, there is a tendency to prescribe protection activities for IDPs as if IDPs can be easily identified and assisted. This is not the case in the DRC, where most IDPs are able to integrate within a host community and are very often concentrated in remote, inaccessible and insecure areas. The numbers of IDPs encamped in DRC were difficult to ascertain, but OCHA estimates that only about 10 % are currently in reachable camps. However, as noted above, there are uncertainties concerning these estimates

The humanitarian response in accessible areas has often been to provide assistance to communities, as distinct from IDPs and other vulnerable individuals. However, there is a lack of scientific studies to justify this response, and most population data are outdated. For their assessments in terms of numbers, assistance organizations rely on local administrative community and NGO structures, with some spot checks for validity. Many organizations, such as WFP, depend on numbers provided by OCHA. Registration is often undertaken by local administrative structures that may tamper with procedures, according to our interviews with NGOs and comments from community focus groups. In some areas, it is estimated that up to 30% of those registered as IDPs are actually local people who have managed to be registered.

The manner in which IDPs are defined, characterized and counted relates closely to the types of assistance they need and the types of assistance they are offered. There may be vastly different needs between IDP categories, for example, depending on whether they are long-term or short-term. The failure to agree upon definitions and characteristics could promote discrepancies in terms of relative needs and the kinds of assistance received.

> **1999.** People were stranded in Kinshasa following violence from the second war and were unable to return home. Most stayed with host families. Many were sufficiently well off to afford air tickets or ground transportation to reach Kinshasa. Some received US Government humanitarian assistance for several years because their leader was outspoken and politically well connected.
>
> **2000.** After the Lusaka Agreement was signed, refugees from surrounding countries were repatriated on flights funded by UNHCR. Once in Kinshasa, they lacked host families or were unable to return to their homelands due to violence or inadequate resources. Most of these people received no assistance and some became destitute.
>
> **2004.** Mine workers and their families were expelled from Angola and some were robbed of assets at the borders with Bandundu and Western Kasai. They were temporarily displaced inside the DRC while trying to reach their homelands. Due to their large numbers, assessment missions were deployed and people were registered for assistance.

Our study found indications of an imbalance in assistance between IDPs who were in camps and those who had sought refuge with host families. This reached alarming proportions in some areas, with some hosted IDPs seldom if ever receiving assistance while camps down the road had monthly food distributions.

The term “hosted” is also suspect because many IDPs who seek help from families end up living in very squalid conditions in compounds or simply near the family they asked for help, without any real support. For example, returnees who had fled to Kalemie in 2001 and 2002, and who had sought refuge within host communities, observed that those in camps received various forms of assistance while they had received little or none. They tried on several occasions to register and join the camps, but they lacked an “interlocutor” who could help them to get in. Their “lesson learned” was to go to a camp immediately if they were displaced in the future.

Risks and Limitations of the Usage of the Category of "Internally Displaced People" For the Targeting of Recipients of Humanitarian Assistance

Modified from a discussion paper prepared by Action Against Hunger (ACF) for this evaluation

Today, the status of "IDP" as a selection criterion for humanitarian assistance is commonly accepted by international assistance organizations. Action Against Hunger finds two main human rights protection issues in usage of the label:

1. Impartiality - the risk of discrimination and injustice
2. Humanity - the risk of inadequate assistance.

Furthermore, organizations risk being manipulated by the population if the label of IDP is used imprecisely or is unmodified by other criteria, resulting in possible mis-targeting of resources.

When humanitarian aid is based on assumptions that IDPs are (a) systematically vulnerable people, and/or (b) always more vulnerable than an indigenous person, the following may result:

* Discrimination between groups whose vulnerability may be similar

* A perceived injustice by indigenous people who have shared their meager resources. Exclusive targeting of IDPs and exclusion of indigenous populations may create social tensions between the two groups.

* Overlooking the needs of indigenous populations who have suffered violence and extreme vulnerability but have not hosted IDPs or significant numbers of IDPs

* Overlooking the needs of those who were not able to flee

To prevent discrimination, ACF devotes a greater proportion of its administrative costs to needs evaluations with the result that the purpose of humanitarian aid is far more likely to be fulfilled

Example 1 - The "revolt" of indigenous hosts in Equateur Province, Katanga. Generally in the DRC, host families welcome displaced people, sharing their houses, meals, goods, tools, and way of life. This hospitality results in enormous pressures on personal, familial, and local environmental resources. In 2001, a humanitarian agency aimed to distribute fishing equipment to IDPs in Equateur Province. On the day of the distribution, the indigenous fishermen who had shared their equipment, and whose standard of living had deteriorated, demonstrated their anger at being excluded by attacking the whaleboat that transported the fishing supplies and stealing everything.

Example 2 - Relative vulnerability of IDPs in the territory of Malemba Nkulu, North Katanga. The territory of Malemba Nkulu hosts an estimated 40,000 IDPs originating from northern and eastern areas under the control of the RCD or the Mai-Mai. The population of Malemba Nkulu is estimated at 300,000 and thus the IDPs represent about 13% of the population. At the end of 2002, ACF conducted an evaluation for targeting agricultural and fishing supplies. The results indicted that IDPs were neither more nor less vulnerable than the local population. Indigenous households with a female head of household, or families with few income generating members or many dependents, may be more vulnerable than IDPs.

Example 3 - Economic migrants from Boende, South Equateur Province: In Boende, an evaluation mission located several thousand people they believed to be IDPs, and raised an alarm prompting an emergency food distribution. However, ACF had provided assistance to this zone for a year and had only identified a few long-term IDPs, mostly economic migrants who had moved voluntarily to establish themselves in a more economically active area and with easier access to basic goods and services.

In the DRC as elsewhere, IDPs housed in camps render the problems of aiding them much easier for the donor community, but camp dwellers typically become far more dependent on aid than those living with host families. It is often the case that those living with host families participate in whatever economic activity the host is involved with or find work in the community; however,

sometimes IDPs may be exploited by host communities when they have to work in exchange for housing and food. In principle, this may be viewed as mutually beneficial unless the exchange is grossly exploitative. In the DRC, aid agencies may be assuming that host families or communities provide adequate protection for IDPs without this being fully justified. Such assumptions should be tested regularly.

Our study also indicated that the tendency to focus on assisting camps and IDPs may occur at the expense of vulnerable host families and host communities. Many NGO and UN staff remarked on the obvious lowering of the standard of living of host families over months and years of sharing resources with IDPs. In the words of a host community interviewee: "When you take in an IDP you become one." In its quarterly reports from 2001 – 2004, MERLIN notes increases in "indigent" populations, described as people who cannot pay for health services, acknowledging that some are impoverished local families or IDPs who were not assisted.

In the DRC, access to IDPs does not mean that assistance is provided to them – a significant number of accessible people are not assisted by international organizations. According to April 2004 OCHA estimates, of the 1.4 million IDPs in the Kivus, Maniema, and North Katanga, 400,000 are beyond access, and only 45% of those within reach are actually receiving assistance. These estimates suggest that a greater effort should be made to identify IDPs who have taken refuge with host families and to identify the needs of both parties.

Participants in an OCHA workshop, held in April 2004, reaffirmed the need to identify and count IDPs in the Kivus, Maniema and North Katanga in order to facilitate their return. They planned to conduct censuses through door to door household surveys. It was suggested that the criteria for vulnerability for assistance should be established and consensus attained between all assistance actors in order to reduce tensions between IDPs, returnees and communities. Some NGOs such as Solidarities are establishing information collection procedures and databases in their target areas to track changes in numbers and demographics.

3.2 Effectiveness

This criterion is used to assess the extent to which USAID's programs achieved their purpose. This section includes discussions on:

- USAID/DRC's strategy for protection and advocacy
- OTI's CAP
- Timeliness of operations
- Struggling for access
- Uses of food aid
- Gender issues

3.2.1 USAID/DRC's Strategy for Protection and Advocacy

USAID/DRC's Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) provides the basis for its activities in FY 2004 – 2008 and replaces a 1999 country strategy that reflected the flexibility needed to address the instability in DRC at the time. The Strategic Objectives cover USAID's programmatic interests in health, democracy and governance, livelihoods, and education, with a sub-objective for DDR.

Human rights protection is clearly a concern. The ISP is designed to produce robust results under three scenarios: successful transition, protracted transition, and stalled transition.

USAID/DRC Integrated Strategic Plan, FY 2004 – FY 2008



Figure 2.1. USAID/DRC's Goal and Overall Framework

The ISP, written in early 2003, offers connections between longer-term programs undertaken by the mission and shorter term interventions by OFDA, OTI, and FFP. There is a one-page description of the programs of OFDA, OTI and FFP and they are all "mapped" together (see below). The strategic planning among the mission and humanitarian actors has been cooperative. In its May 2004 assessment, FFP mentions that the ISP established nutrition as a cross cutting issue, and FFP plans to pursue an integrated approach with the mission in livelihoods development. OFDA's and FFP's strategies are firmly connected within the UN OCHA-directed Coordinated Humanitarian Action Plan, which is defined by the government and the humanitarian community.

In terms of whether strategic planning outcomes covered IDP protection needs, connecting short-term and long-term goals, there are some general indicators. As Ms. Esposito mentions in her report, many of USAID's humanitarian and development programs fall well within the UN definition of protection. In the matrix found in Annex E, activities conducted or supported by DCHA and USAID/DRC are noted relative to activities mentioned in USAID's "Implementation Guidelines – USAID Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons" (Draft 4/5/04). Although this "test" is simplistic and does not study depth or coverage, it serves to illustrate that USAID/DRC's interventions meet a wide array of protection needs. A significant proportion of protection activities are undertaken by OCHA.



Although it is commendable that USAID assistance touches on so many protection needs, a look at the distribution of funds indicates that food aid is emerging as the dominant area. As pointed out by Kunder in 1999, "*..Title II programs address only a narrow portion of the spectrum of physical needs confronting the internally displaced and address only indirectly the protection needs of internally displaced communities.*" If food aid is to be the largest focus, measures should be taken to use it in a calculating fashion to address priority human rights protection needs and for peacebuilding rather than pacification. (See discussion below on "Food Aid Issues.")

There is a funding anomaly that is reputedly well known among practitioners, which could create imbalances in protective services. This occurs when programs that have been initiated using OFDA funds, in particular, look for a new home to ensure continuity and sustainability when OFDA funds dry up. Partner organizations often find that the mission programs cannot absorb them at the time they need to make the transition. This results in a patchwork operation when NGOs must take short-term grants and use creative fund management in order to achieve goals in capacity development or rehabilitation, for example.

Program transition is also affected by changing levels of crisis. When areas become accessible, assistance must usually be brought in quickly, and might have to be diverted from other areas. In 2003, access was opened to areas of North Katanga and OFDA responded to high levels of malnutrition by funding airlifts of food and supporting supplementary feeding, health services and food security programs. OFDA plans to discontinue or reduce funding for North Katanga. Yet WHO health indicators demonstrate there is clearly still an emergency in this area.

Transparency of Strategy. Many interviewees wondered whether USAID had a written strategy, because at the time of the evaluation the ISP was not on the internet nor was it widely

available. (Note: The ISP after a brief delay is now accessible on USAID's external website.) Many would have liked to have seen a well publicized transitional strategy addressing how the durable aspects of emergency programs are going to be sustained, and whether USAID will support them directly or coordinate with other donors to ensure continuity. The dissemination of a transitional plan by ECHO was well appreciated. Although the ECHO plan is thin on human rights discussions, it revolves around ECHO's Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) funding mechanism, which promotes a firm funding and strategic connection between different phases of programming. USAID might have avoided some of this criticism with earlier and wider circulation of its drafts.

OFDA's programming strategy for the DRC relied on traditional partners with track records of achieving results in their traditional areas of interest. Most grants were non-competitive and most funding was allocated through grant extensions. Some organizations who had not previously partnered with OFDA in the DRC, such as Solidarites and Premiere Urgence, later joined the ranks, and funding became more evenly distributed across target areas. It also appears that OFDA attempted to balance funding and sector support more evenly in 2003, with health, food security, logistics, and other areas (including administration and social service projects) each receiving about a quarter of the funding. Funding for water and sanitation was mentioned as a critical unmet need by interviewees, especially in camps, although this sector may be covered by other organizations.

OFDA's call for proposals based on a disseminated list of priorities was an approach well liked by some partners, as it allowed them to develop proposals based on needs assessments and their own capacities, in contrast to ECHO's more directive approach. However, some interviewees felt that the priorities identified by OFDA were not sufficiently clear or well enough focused, leaving them to submit their best guesses as to what USAID would be likely to fund. Needless to say, such a process can be very time consuming. At the same time, a more disciplined top-down approach might have resulted in less innovative projects. The use of pre-awarded umbrella contracts is a mechanism that might enhance the speed and regularity of the grants process, while leaving room for creativity on the part of individual NGOs.

Another concern expressed by some interviewees was that funding was provided to organizations based on personal trust relationships rather than objective proposal evaluation criteria. (Presumably once they were short-listed, proposals were scrutinized by technical advisors at headquarters, who often sought detailed changes.) Although personally-developed trust relationships are valuable in seeking impact, the absence of a list of evaluation criteria and objective analysis of project proposals based on those criteria can easily result in the exclusion of new, untested organizations. Some organizations expressed great frustration with the process of seeking funding from USAID. They complained that the criteria sent out were not clear enough and their project submissions were rejected for reasons that they didn't understand.

3.2.2 Timeliness Issues

Timeliness implies providing assistance in time to prevent death and disease. In the ideal sense, the ultimate goal of timeliness is prevention of displacement. In a continuously evolving

situation, certain times are ripe for interventions and if timing is missed, the interventions may be less effective.

First Responders. Our community surveys at 18 sites indicated that, consistently, the first groups to respond to the arrival of displaced persons were local NGOs and community members. Certainly, they were the only responders in places that were not accessible to the international community. In places without large numbers of IDPs, entire groups of people received no international assistance and suffered when local communities could not support them.

For example, during the massive displacement from Ituri in May 2003, large numbers of people began to walk to North Kivu. By May 16, 100 people per hour were passing through or stopping in Eringeti, a town of 14,000, some having walked for days. The immediate response from local people was to share what water supplies and food they could spare, while World Vision staff distributed supplementary food it had in stock. A local NGO attempted to manage a response by collecting local funds and purchasing food on the local market. Churches offered assistance and space on their properties. The town already had experience responding to IDPs because this was the second "great wave" of them; the first was in 2002, when very little international help was received. Furthermore, the residents had been IDPs themselves for two weeks in 2002 when the RCD/ML army advanced from the north.

Examples of Immediate and Subsequent Assistance Providers

Displacement Situation	Immediate Assistance	Subsequent Assistance
2002, Bunia, hosted female HoH IDP, 3 children	Local families – food and shelter	Late 2003, WFP, suppl. food, donated clothing
June 2002, Botueya, (25 km from Butembo), hosted IDPs in former Mai Mai controlled area, multiple displacements	Local families	February 2003, GAA, seeds and tools
July 2003, Kabutongo, 14 km from Kalemie, IDPs and refugee returnees camped	Set up camp 4-5 km from a village which helped them	September 2003, Caritas, 15 day ration; February 2004, WFP/FAO, food and seeds
January 2002, Bukavu, Female IDP	Host family	None
'96, '97 and '04, IDP family, Kasenga near Uvira	Host family	Received aid only once in 1997 from Caritas
May 16, 2003, Eringetti, IDPs from Ituri	Local NGOs and people, World Vision; Health services in 2 days	WFP food in two weeks; other services 2 weeks

Local assistance was obviously inadequate for the sheer numbers of people arriving in North Kivu in mid-May 2003, and had to be supplemented quickly with other resources. Fortunately, World Vision's presence in Eringeti facilitated alerting the international organizations and organizing assessments. Health service NGOs, such as MERLIN, responded within days. WFP had to summon up reserves from Kampala, which took two weeks to arrive. OFDA airlifted non-food supplies from Italy and Kuwait on June 5.

NGOs were not aware of some or any contingency plans, despite plenty of early warning. With the recent initiatives by OCHA in coordinated contingency planning, timeliness should improve. A planning exercise was held just before violence broke out in Bukavu in May 2004.

Waiting for Approval. OFDA was generally praised for its responsive program and its support for needed airlifts, which saved many lives. However, some partner organizations cited examples when proposals required more than a month to go through channels and be approved. Until such approval was received, NGOs did not feel confident to proceed. Some interviewees felt this delay was due to the limited representation of OFDA in the East – in part a result of the difficult conditions there. Others cited a perceived slow feedback from headquarters in making decisions. In several cases, IDPs had moved on before projects to assist them could be started.

Optimally, funds are required in two weeks or less to implement timely responses, particularly when IDPs overwhelm local abilities to provide them with shelter, water and food. Under these circumstances, OFDA should consider ways to accelerate its grant approval and disbursement processes. Lessons might be learned from ECHO, which in the views of several interviewees used a more expeditious process. ECHO's representatives can decide on the spot to fund programs with 80% certainty, allowing organizations to proceed with initial steps.

In a recent business review process, WFP has determined that less than two-thirds of food aid worldwide is distributed on time. In order to improve response time, WFP will establish an in-house bank to lend funds immediately to its country programs. WFP also hopes to save on storage, transport and local procurement of food. The DRC is one of four pilot countries for this new emergency lending program.

3.2.3 The Struggle for Access

Aside from the premier constraint of insufficient resources, interviewees cite lack of access as a major barrier to effective assistance. In Eastern DRC, access was constrained in two major ways -- by roads that were in horrific condition or impassable, and by unacceptably high levels of insecurity due to armed groups and/or the presence of landmines. Access problems left communities, such as those in Maniema and North Katanga, isolated from services for years, resulting in severe health and nutrition emergencies. In towns controlled by militias, only 10-20% of affected people made it to safe areas to receive assistance. At this writing, OCHA estimates that over 400,000 IDPs (27%) remain inaccessible in the Kivus, Maniema, and North Katanga, in addition to numerous other vulnerable people.

Humanitarians we interviewed expressed a deep sense of helplessness in regard to their inability to assist hundreds of thousands of people whom they could not reach. Some organizations were self-critical, stating they could have been more aggressive in seeking access and, in some cases, chose instead to remain safe in the protected towns or working within their comfort zones. Smaller NGOs had more at stake in taking risks to obtain access. The efforts of several "courageous" NGOs to reach places trapped by violence were praised by communities and assistance organizations. The successes of these brave staff members were attributed to their willingness to live and work in isolated places and to the efficacy of their relationships with

communities and local NGOs. UNICEF, among others, is now working with local churches to facilitate access.

A comprehensive and inclusive strategy for gaining access, such as the access strategy developed for southern Sudan, was missing in the DRC. Interviewees felt that there should be different approaches, all operating at the same time, to gain access through the local people, NGOs, local governments such as the RCD, other armed groups, MONUC, and the media. Media attention was insufficient. Security incidents reported to MONUC or OCHA were not always followed up.

From 1999 on, OCHA's Emergency Humanitarian Interventions (EHI) approach was very useful in sponsoring initiatives to open humanitarian space, facilitate clearances from authorities, and establish priorities. In 2000, over 30 EHI operations, involving hundreds of tons of urgently needed relief supplies, were flown across the frontline and to previously inaccessible areas in Kinshasa-controlled western DRC. OCHA reports that, in 2002, there was a widening of humanitarian space amidst accelerated deployment of relief personnel and supplies along the troop disengagement-demarcation lines.

When its mandate was bolstered in July 2003 after the Ituri crisis, MONUC played a significant role in opening access to some areas, such as around Bunia. But some humanitarians felt that protection by MONUC troops posed a dilemma in that it had the potential for compromising humanitarian neutrality. In addition, MONUC troops were unreliable in assisting with relief convoys. Ultimately, in many areas, NGOs negotiated their own access by developing relationships with the militias and gathering information from their local networks. They frequently convoyed unarmed trucks, but also moved food and non-food items to distribution points where high levels of risk existed, particularly from armed people acting on their own.

Several OFDA grants addressed the access issue. In addition, OFDA staff discussions with the UN and NGOs on the access problem produced some major breakthroughs and collaborative efforts. For example, OFDA assisted OCHA to address problems of isolation and lack of services in Maniema by supporting CARE and Merlin to work in this area. In South Kivu, OFDA supported the creation of an umbrella group of local NGOs, managed by IRC, for the purpose of increasing access.

Support for Air Serv is widely thought to have saved a significant number of lives by increasing access for humanitarian personnel. For example, Air Serv helped to open access to Lodja, an extremely impoverished area. Most interviewees felt that the restoration of the rail services from Lubumbashi to Kindu, supported by OFDA and implemented by FHI, CRS, CARE and CONCERN, was an outstanding contribution to the national transition, and would serve to open up many hard-to-access areas and contribute to regional food security.

Several OFDA food security grants funded road building projects, most of which were supported by food and/or cash for work. Some of OTI's small grants during 2002 - 2003 also supported road construction. The results of the road construction projects were mixed, in that the roads require constant repair and a sustainable basis for maintaining them was not always provided for, since community participation without incentives could not be guaranteed. Nevertheless, road construction projects were widely appreciated by communities. German Agro Action reported

successes in constructing roads in North Kivu and along 48 km from Bunia to Kasenyi in Ituri, creating employment opportunities, improving security of movement, reducing costs of transport, and improving market prices.

3.2.4 OTI's CAP (Congo en Action pour la Paix)

In September 2002, CARE and OTI signed a two-year cooperative agreement for nearly $6 million to implement a national peace-building program via a mechanism for making subgrants to civil society organizations known as Congo en Action pour la Paix (CAP). The objectives of the program were highly relevant in that they aimed to increase access to balanced information, increase national dialogue, and promote linkages among communities. However, after a year of activity, OTI closed the CAP program prematurely because it was not satisfied with the rate of implementation, and elected to shift focus to other activities due to the changing political environment. CAP was evaluated through an internal OTI and CARE "Lessons Learned" exercise that critiqued the administrative relationships, as well as through a recently released "Final Evaluation" supported by CARE. These evaluations provide important lessons and best practices, both for peace-building projects and for working with local NGOs.

CARE began program implementation in the DRC in September 2002. Offices were established, first in Kinshasa and then in Bukavu, Kindu, and Kisangani. In 2003, OTI recommended that CAP expand to Ituri, and CARE established an office in Bunia in March 2003. By the time the decision was made to close program activities in December 2003, CARE had initiated 65 grants across the five sites.

Both CARE and OTI were unhappy with the administration of the program; CARE was new in the DRC, the management of the inputs was too logistically complex, and OTI wanted fast results. Yet the final evaluation found that some good results were achieved and that, had a few more essential management ingredients been added to promote better cooperation, even more impact would have been realized.

Some interviewees outside the program felt that CAP's sustainability potential was low due to the "pilot project" nature of OTI's programs. Our NGO survey indicated positive attitudes on the actual inputs, such as internet cafes in Uvira. One interviewee stated "the internet cafes made people think in more peaceful ways and militia came to use the internet rather than fight." NGO partners felt that the attitude of management was one of "just do it" with little care given to actual capacity development. However, CARE's evaluation found that NGOs reported gains, including improved efficiency and credibility, increased self-confidence, better acquaintance with peace and related issues, and development of expertise in specific areas (conflict resolution, etc.).

Sustainability was an issue in both the selection of the projects and their implementation. The sustainability potential was more evident among projects involved in direct communication, where future continuation does not depend on further structures or equipment, such as providing the best information and development of new themes and strategies. One project, "the Integration of Pygmies and Bantus" was a complex project involving the resettlement of Pygmies within Bantu communities. The project aimed to negotiate peaceful coexistence between two ethnic

groups, but this process is a complex undertaking and was not appropriate for a program that operates through short-term funding mechanisms.

3.2.5 Food Aid Issues

Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation. Since FFP did not have a representative in the DRC, monitoring visits were conducted through periodic visits to the DRC by REDSO and Washington based staff. Monitoring was reported through sitreps by WFP and cables from FFP staff. FFP's monitoring-at-a-distance of WFP's programming was also weakened by the fact that WFP tends to do little consultation with donors when elaborating their programs. FFP supported an assessment mission to the DRC in March 2004, following a fact-finding mission in December 2003. In its assessment report, FFP suggests that a FFP officer be posted in the DRC and that a FSN FFP officer be hired to support the transition from emergency assistance to development programs, particularly IDP return and resettlement.

The only evaluation that attempts to measure the impact of food aid in the DRC in previous years was conducted by WFP in April 2003. Importantly, the WFP team interviewed a significant number of IDPs (663), almost 60% of them women. Unfortunately, the evaluation process was waylaid; only parts of the findings were made accessible to the humanitarian community and not until February 2004. Had these findings been made available to FFP earlier, more progress might have been made in improving program effectiveness.

The WFP study found that WFP assistance had contributed to strengthened food security when food was effectively combined with other inputs, such as land, tools and seeds, security and social infrastructure. Food aid helped women recipients to cope better with displacement and helped all recipients build short-term assets. The study notes that WFP did not use assessments effectively to distinguish needs of IDPs based on the different phases and circumstances of their displacement. Targeting processes were weak due to lack of needs-based eligibility criteria and less-than-transparent selection processes. Recommendations included the urgent need for strengthening food needs assessment and targeting processes, and establishing formal selection committees.

In our management interviews, many humanitarian staff called for an improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of WFP distributions. Interviewees reinforced WFP's evaluation recommendations, suggesting that:

- WFP modify its distribution numbers to more efficiently reflect those newly registered and those who have returned
- WFP seek agreement with other partners on a definition of vulnerability and the characteristics that make people eligible for food aid.
- A VAM unit is critically important for the DRC (such a unit is scheduled to be set up if adequate funding is available).

Another important study, Save the Children UK's draft "Great Lakes Food Security Study" conducted in the later part of 2003, raises some important questions. Why are household surveys that were conducted by NGOs in the DRC not always used to inform programming for either

food aid or food security? What are the barriers to consistent use of rapid assessments designed for emergency response?

Uses of Food. WFP tried to use food in a variety of creative ways to support vulnerable people, including SGBV victims, victims of HIV/AIDs, and child soldiers, although donors other than the US may be supporting food for work and training for some of these groups. WFP is constrained in supporting DDR with food for reintegrating ex-combatants. The requirement for a signed, witnessed agreement by former combatants pledging that they will no longer engage in combat was thought to be a major administrative barrier to the process. WFP staff would like to use food for longer-term development to assist female heads of households to develop livelihoods. Our survey also found this to be an expressed need by IDP women. According to the recent assessment report, FFP intends to support more developmental activities and will monetize food to support non-food needs.

The Sale of Food Aid. It is to be expected that some food aid will be sold; however, the blatant mass marketing of food aid in some areas may be doing harm. In some cases, two-thirds of all food is sold. In some places, merchants wait near the distribution area to make offers on maize flour and vegetable oil. The exchange rate is good, usually 3 to 1 for palm oil to vegetable oil and about 20% profit on the maize. Some interviewees were concerned that maize flour was being "recycled" through local markets to other countries. There are two major protection concerns:

- People receiving full rations may be able to profit from selling food aid, which is especially a concern if there is not enough food to go around. The same fears and problems that occur with cash distribution apply. It is not known how much of the money received for food sales goes to buy substitute commodities and whether women and children have received the amounts of food intended for them.
- Some interviewees felt that if food aid is stopped, especially for IDPs, the corrupt elites and marketing forces benefiting might promote a new emergency within two to three months.

Some of the issues involved in the distribution of food in an insecure environment as that of the DRC are unavoidable and difficult to surmount. Nevertheless, awareness is the first step in preventing problems before they arise and addressing them when they do.

Community Survey Findings. The community survey confirms WFP's 2003 evaluation findings that food aid reduced economic pressures on IDPs and local people but that, in many cases, the aid was inadequate or infrequently distributed. The distribution rationale was not understood by the communities. Some people received several distributions while others received none, some had full rations, others only half rations. Among the effects of food aid appreciated by recipients was the marketability of the food, especially oil and maize, and by local non-recipients, the lowering of market prices, especially for beans (if you were not the person trying to sell them). The food distributions also provided jobs for IDPs, which were generally rotated so more would have opportunity to work.

Acceptability of the maize varies within Eastern DRC. A few areas are already accustomed to eating maize, some eat it anyway, some mix the maize with manioc (cassava), their traditional food, and others sell all of the maize to buy manioc. Community members observed that the food aid beans required a significantly longer time to cook than local beans, thus utilizing extra fuel. Local NGOs seemed more disturbed by the types of foods distributed than were the recipients.

Many recipients of seeds, tools and "seed protection" food confirmed this combination to be the best assistance they could receive. This was verified by NGOs implementing food security programs. "If people have seeds, the harvest is almost guaranteed." Some local NGOs mentioned that international NGOs sometimes distributed seeds at the wrong time of the year, or seeds for food that was not accepted locally.

3.2.6 Gender Issues

Gender inequities and sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) are among the most difficult issues to deal with in the DRC. The humanitarian community has been sensitive to these issues in their planning, particularly with regard to distribution of food and non–food items. However, outside the realms of sectoral assistance, the humanitarian community has generally demonstrated a poor response to its protection responsibilities. Whatever programs have been put in place to address SGBV issues, they have not been successful in that the use of sexual violence as a form of conflict continues and tens of thousands of women have been affected.

Rapes and violence against women have been reported since the early 1990s and mention of the issue can be found since 1999 in OCHA's sitreps on Reliefweb. In regard to the situation in the DRC, Secretary of State Albright remarked to the United Nations Security Council in January 2000: *"there is no rationale of past grievance, political allegiance or ethnic difference that excuses murder, torture, rape or other abuses."* National participants in a series of country-wide IDP awareness workshops run by OCHA/ Norwegian Refugee Council in 2003 reported rapes of thousands of women in Eastern DRC by various armed groups over the past ten years, including many new cases since the establishment of the transitional government. In a January 2004 study of three IDP camps near Kalemie, MONUC's Human Rights Section reported that most women had been subjected to some form of molestation and that over 70% of women had been raped in the course of conflicts in MONUC Sector 4.

In 2003, at perhaps the height of the SGBV incidences, there was no comprehensive international response to address this issue. There were only a few NGO projects, such as IRC's and CARE's support for local NGO networks, receiving some funding from USAID and a few other donors, such as the Swiss Cooperation Agency. This is again surprising given the mainstreaming of SGBV awareness by UNHCR and the Women's Commission. In August 2003, prominent women parliamentarians and government leaders, as well as UN officials based in Kinshasa, undertook a fact-finding mission throughout DRC to assess the scope of sexual violence against women and to give more prominence to this issue.

At the request of the Kinshasa mission, DCHA ultimately fielded a team to report on the situation in early 2004. The team's in-depth report, drawing attention to itself through the title of "Sexual Terrorism," served to alert USAID to the range of abuses and offered comprehensive

recommendations, requiring political and humanitarian action at many political levels. Interviewees expressed relief that USAID/DRC is significantly increasing its efforts in 2004 to combat SGBV, which are expected to have some impact in breaking the trends and reducing impunity. Of particular importance is the creation of a coordinating mechanism within OCHA to help integrate SGBV concerns into all sectors and to promote close coordination with the MONUC Human Rights Section.

Interviewees mentioned some gender-related issues that need to be considered:

- There is further assessment needed of men's attitudes towards women at the household level, in order to prevent SGBV.
- Unemployed men and boys are often easy targets for recruitment by competing hostile groups. Their immersion in a culture of violence further contributes to SGBV.
- Programs to assist demobilized child soldiers may favor boys over girls.
- Efforts should be made to facilitate the hiring of women to work with humanitarian organizations, particularly Congolese women, by considering their voluntary professional experience as well as professional qualifications. This would significantly promote focus and information collection on SGBV.

3.3 Impact

This criterion assesses the real difference that programs and projects have made in addressing the needs of IDPs – positive and negative, short and long-term, direct and indirect.

3.3.1 Overview

Although overall funding was clearly inadequate, there is little doubt that USAID's resources contributed significantly to saving lives and livelihoods in the DRC. While no detailed outcome analysis was performed in this evaluation, most humanitarian partner organizations effectively pursued their objectives. Access problems and the difficulties of administration in the DRC environment caused delays and the need for grant extensions to utilize funds in many cases. Unfortunately, such difficulties cannot universally be avoided in situations as chaotic as the DRC.

Humanitarians reported feeling overwhelmed by the sheer scope of needs, the expanse of which became more overpowering in 2002 and 2003 as new areas were accessed and as outbreaks of violence caused new episodes of displacement and often reversed gains. As OCHA reports in the 2004 CAP review, *"The realities of local warlordism and the widespread lack of adherence to the commitments of the peace accords …provide a sobering counterweight to the positive advances made at national and international level."* By 2003, the fifth year of continuous war, coping mechanisms were at the point of exhaustion and there were alarming increases in the numbers of IDPs, from 2.7 million in January of 2003 to 3.4 million in August 2003 alone.

OCHA published some results of multiple indicator cluster surveys in its 2004 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (CAP). Infant mortality (under fives per 1000) held at 213 from 2002 to 2003, but all combined efforts did not manage to lower it. Maternal mortality decreased from

2250 to 1289 per 100,000 births from 2001 to 2003. Absolute morbidity from cholera increased more than threefold from 2001 to 2003 (WHO).

Volcanic Eruption in Goma. Humanitarian response to the January 2002 volcanic eruption that destroyed most of the business center and 15,000 houses in Goma benefited from worldwide television coverage of the eruption. Needs assessments indicated a need for shelter and restoration of livelihoods for both IDPs and residents. Several agencies used cash for work (CFW) and food for work (FFW) for rehabilitation. Ultimately, OFDA's support for the Goma Volcano Observatory and CONCERN's community preparedness for volcano hazards were considered to be appropriate preventive actions.

The Goma crisis illustrates the impact the media can have in making a difference. Donations of over $33 million were pledged within three weeks, more than one-third of the sums pledged for the total inter-agency CAP (2002) for the entire country. Many interviewees felt that the response was disproportionate to the needs, particularly since the relative need on almost every indicator was greater in rural areas in North and South Kivu.

Similarly, the 2003 Ituri crisis, described in more detail in other parts of the report, grabbed international attention and blindsided assistance actors to the persistent unfolding crises in other parts of the country, such as in Maniema and the Kivus. OFDA threw resources to the IDPs from Ituri, but continued support for Merlin and CARE in Maniema.

Predatory Activities. In all locations visited by the team, the impact of USAID and other international resources was affected by interference and corruption. Numerous oral testimonies affirmed this predatory behavior on the part of various elites. The presence of international resources offered elite groups an opportunity to benefit in a situation where there were few other sources of material wealth. In some areas, the result has been the development of a predatory system by local authorities and elites, and some international staff as well, to manipulate assistance inputs at the expense of affected people. Known locally as "operation retour," common practices included "taxing" food and non-food before or after receipt, skimming by police and military, and infiltrating IDP camps and hijacking the camp committees. More bureaucratic obstacles imposed by local authorities included import taxes and road repair taxes. Community members reported giving a percentage of their relief allocations, both food and non-food items, to local authorities or military groups. This occurred whether people were in camps or in villages, and seemed to be viewed as an expected outcome of receipt of material goods.

3.3.2 The Humanitarian Community and Conflict Transformation

In her studies of conflict transformation, Mary Anderson points to potential impacts of humanitarian aid on conflict. Some of the classic impacts occurred to some degree in the DRC: some resources were looted and taxed; some aid was unevenly distributed because of problems with access and identification of vulnerable people; and a market effect was created, particularly with food aid, influencing incentives. However intensely people may have tried to prevent these effects, resource transfer has affected inter-group relations in ways that are difficult to predict and subsequently may have contributed to conflict.

The most frequently repeated sentiments in interviews conducted during this evaluation confirm the obvious: "We need peace in the DRC," often stated in conjunction with the plea "Ask USAID to bring peace to the DRC." Congolese and international observers agree that most members of civil society want the country to be united and will choose to live peacefully when given the choice.

On the flip side of peaceful intentions are the warlords and anarchical armed groups, "spoilers" with vested interests in perpetuating conflict, subsisting on stolen civilian resources. The failure of the international community to react to cease fire violations and to take advantage of opportunities to negotiate a *modus vivendi* between with the Mai Mai and the RCD/Goma, among others, is described elsewhere in this report. Both civilians and humanitarians are hostages to these failures and, as a result, the current appalling situation of IDPs in the DRC can only be mitigated at best. The nature of "peace," particularly in the east, is increasingly a negative peace, imposed by the presence of international military forces under MONUC.

USAID has sponsored some community level conflict resolution mechanisms that have functioned well in the DRC in the past three years. Since 2001, Search for Common Ground (SFCG) has focused on supporting the InterCongolese Dialogue, currently funded by both DG and OTI. IFESH's work with 52 rehabilitation projects in both government and RCD-controlled areas richly illustrates the potentials and problems with community conflict management committees, as described in its 2002 - 2003 program evaluation. OTI's support for the MONUC-based Radio Okapi is well appreciated by local communities who depend on the radio as a major source of information, although the influence of its program choices have not been evaluated through a structured community-based survey to get listener feedback. (See earlier discussion regarding OTI's CAP.)

Interviewees mentioned that opportunities had been lost for leveraging assistance toward resolving root causes. First, the restriction of local mediation efforts with and between armed groups eliminated a critical step in peacebuilding – connection with key actors (see Anderson, 2004). Second, limited attention to a root cause of violence, arms proliferation, has resulted in communities that are now arming themselves in their own defense, and another major problem that has been widely publicized by the UN – natural resource exploitation – has not been addressed. Third, local networks, such as the churches and other NGOs, might have been used more effectively in order to conduct long-term, sustainable capacity development within these networks. It is widely believed that indigenous efforts at peacebuilding have the greatest impact, since outsiders simply do not stay long enough to build needed trust.

3.3.3 Strategic Directions for Peacebuilding

During May and June 2003, USAID/DRC conducted a Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA), which provides a complex analysis of root causes and transitional issues. This analysis informed the USAID Integrated Strategy 2004 – 2008 to support the intermediate objective "Improved Local Security and Stability through Conflict Management and Community Development Initiatives." The targeted areas were selected in coordination with OTI and OFDA based upon: (1) the level of conflict vulnerability within the province; (2) the potential for conflict within the province to destabilize the transition; and (3) potential synergies with other

strategic objectives. Eight activities are currently envisioned for the eastern provinces in areas of reintegration of ex-combatants, their dependents, and IDPs, thereby reaching 80,000 community members.

Coordination among peacebuilding programs is improving through OCHA. The team did not assess the degree to which a master framework has been created from the numerous conflict and vulnerability analyses that have already conducted, or whether all efforts at conflict transformation have been synthesized. However, these exercises are certainly warranted in the DRC.

3.4 Efficiency

This criterion measures how economically resources or inputs (funding, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to outputs.

Use of Resources

Efficiency, in the sense of costs/benefits, should be analyzed in relation to a similar emergency, if indeed one exists. This evaluation did not look into program expenditures in detail. Certainly, the cards in the DRC were stacked against an overall efficient operation in the earlier years. A centrally coordinated structure, with an institution at the top able to design an efficient plan that various participants would accept and follow, did not exist. The coordinating agency, OCHA, was understaffed and had to delegate its coordination responsibilities to other UN organizations, which each managed provinces. OCHA and, in some cases, the assigned humanitarian coordinators, had no authority to impose decisions on the participants. The result was a vast decentralized system that could probably be characterized as a mild form of anarchy, which was mitigated by the good will of local and international organization representatives and their commitment to work together. Even at the very local level until recently, no coordinated plans seemed to have been developed. Neither in the quality or quantity nor in the rhythm of implementation was there evidence of a visible master plan.

The humanitarian assistance providers we interviewed consistently mentioned two major constraints to the achievement of their objectives: lack of access and lack of resources. Other constraints cited were: (a) bureaucratic complexities because of the multiplicity of sources, (b) interference and obstructionism by government and military authorities, (c) corruption and falsification of food and other resource access permissions, (d) the time consumed in order to deal with issues a, b and c.

In terms of USAID's implementing partners, those that the team encountered appear to be dedicated and effective. However, there were limitations on the global effect of their interventions. First, there was uneven coordination among them. While OFDA partners are "coordination mainstreamed," they are less likely to actually collaborate and share resources, especially agency-centric resources. Indeed, it would seem that the coordination that does exist is a result of successful personal relationships rather than a structured coordination plan. (See further discussion under "Coherence".)

Second, frequently the expatriate personnel of the partner organizations have limited experience and work history in the DRC, and may not be fully aware of the political and economic intricacies operating there, which would also limit efficiency. However, the team met a number of outstanding exceptions in staff who were exceptionally aware of the forces dominating the arenas in which they operate.

3.5 Coherence

3.5.1 Organizational Coordination

This criterion assesses the coherence between the policies and programming of different agencies, and therefore addresses issues of coordination. It is concerned with consistency across agency policy, and between policy and operations.

In the past, the weakness of the UN coordination structure resulted in inefficiencies in humanitarian response in the DRC. However, the reorganization of OCHA, beginning in 2002, has resulted in the establishment of the right ingredients for a coherent picture of coordination and collaboration. At the national level, the government lacks capacity to take responsibility for coordination, and OCHA is attempting to fill this role. At the regional level, coordination is more successful, although interviewees felt that more connection has to be made between regions, especially for the purpose of preparedness, such as obtaining supplies for emergencies. There are 25 OCHA staff in the DRC, and many of them are particularly well informed about the country's political history.

OCHA receives kudos for its efforts these days, but it still suffers repercussions from its weaknesses in earlier years. For example, the response to the Ituri crisis resulted in a "stampede" of NGOs to the Beni-Eringeti axis, in hopes of managing exclusively relief efforts in sub-regions. OCHA was said to "have no teeth," or that it lacked the power to manage the assignment of territories to ensure coverage and avoid overlap. Now, OCHA is attempting to sort out these issues and take more responsibility for determining where organizations can and should work.

At present, USAID/DRC is effectively utilizing the mechanisms of OCHA to promote coordination and policy coherence in the DRC. Clearly, the problems created by the lack of either a quasi-command structure or systematic coordination have been recognized. Coordination groups, such as the HAG (Humanitarian Action Group) operating since 2002, have facilitated a more coordinated response. Under OCHA DRC, a Common Humanitarian Action Plan has been produced each year, based on a strategy elaborated at field workshops and a final national workshop in Kinshasa. Here to, one must stress the difficulty of coordinating so many independent actors in regions where basic communications are lacking.

3.5.2 Financial Coordination

The Consolidated Appeals Process does not usually secure a major percentage of the funds it requests, but is seen by participants as a very useful bridge to other funding mechanisms. Participation by organizations in the CAP appeals to donors because it assures them that coordination and agreement on needs have taken place. Donors feel better about supporting

organizations outside the CAP when those organizations have participated in the CAP process and arrived at priorities together.

Donors are also cooperating, both inside and outside the CAP. ECHO and USAID both describe their relationship as an extremely collaborative one, and this is borne out in programs with shared funding, particularly in the area of health services. OCHA's approach in the DRC was to work on advocacy and access in the field with the rebel groups. USAID has supported this role and also brought other donors into that, especially the EU and DFID. ECHO had its own coordination mechanisms and approach but it is getting more involved.

The CAP is a rather weak indicator of the total funding picture, but OCHA compiles data on all donations. A glance at the CAPs from 2000 – 2004 indicates extremely weak support for Protection/Human Rights/Rule of Law activities undertaken by UN OHCHR and others, such as UNIFEM. The US never appears as a donor in this category; however, some funds are provided by the USAID mission outside the CAP. At the very least, the US should ensure support for regular assessments to consider what actions may be required to protect civilians from the worst effects of conflict.

3.6 Sustainability/Connectedness

This criterion assesses the extent to which short-term emergency interventions have been carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account. This section covers:

- Relationships between IDPs and host communities
- Relationships between international and national NGOs

3.6.1 Relationships between IDPs and Host Communities

Our community survey suggests that, relative to the numbers of affected people, few problems occurred between IDPs and host communities. In general, Congolese host communities exhibited extraordinary humanity and kindness in their support for IDPs. As mentioned earlier in this report, the stresses that occurred were mainly due to inequities in assistance targeting. Generally, the host families benefited when IDPs living with them received separate assistance, and when community-wide interventions were made.

In the 18 communities, visited, feelings of inequity were mentioned most often in cases where encamped populations had received disproportionate assistance or were perceived to be advantaged. Local people describe wishing that they might have had certain non-food items, such as kitchen sets, which were of better quality than theirs. One local family told about having to flee with the IDPs into the forest, where IDPs were able to use the donated plastic sheeting they had been given for makeshift shelters while local families had to collect vegetation for this purpose. Local people describe camp populations receiving technical inputs, such as for construction of modern latrines, which they did not receive, while also expressing appreciation for the technical assistance brought to their areas by the international organizations. Local people derided IDPs who had become dependent on relief assistance, most notably when they were in

camps. There was also some resentment regarding community land that was donated for the camps.

To test the question of the effect of ethnicity on IDP/host community relationships, the team interviewed dozens of people representing the various scenarios described below.

- **IDPs taking refuge among members of their own ethnic group.** This is probably the most desirable circumstance, since ethnic solidarity seems to produce substantial protection for IDPs. However, one may wonder whether such IDPs were not economically better off than other IDP groups. (For example, the Nande operating commercially in Bunia who at the outbreak of hostilities moved back to their heartland in Beni and Butembo.)
- **IDPs taking refuge in neighboring but not hostile communities in an ethnic group different from their own.** First, it should be clear that in these circumstances, relations are more tenuous. Second, if these IDPs are given IDP-targeted aid, this can certainly lead to resentment within the host community.
- **IDPs taking refuge in communities ethnically antagonistic toward them.** This is clearly the most precarious of the IDP conditions and may easily degenerate into a secondary or tertiary persecution. For example, the current (minority) Banyamulenge returnee community in Northern Katanga is assertively fearful of antagonism from the surrounding community. Under such circumstances, relationships between the IDPs and the host community administration and military become a crucial variable.

Our community survey indicated that important differences existed between those IDPs who had integrated into host communities and those who had stayed in camps. Hosted IDPs tended to find livelihoods, generally working on other people's land, more quickly than those in camps. Encamped IDPs were often not able to find work in communities and became more dependent on relief assistance. Encamped women had time on their hands and sought livelihood training as a way to use their time and develop themselves, while hosted IDP women struggled to find food each day.

3.6.2 Relationships between International and National NGOs

One of the great dilemmas of humanitarian assistance in the DRC is the relationship between international and national/local NGOs. A significant number of Congolese NGOs from the over 20 interviewed reported that they frequently provided information and advice to international NGOs setting up their programs, yet they got sidelined when those programs were established. (This was also true of some professional IDPs wishing to assist international organizations.) While some of this behavior might be considered normal in a situation where groups compete for resources, the frequency with which international NGOs were accused of ultimately ignoring potential local partners has to be a cause for concern. A typical scenario is as follows:

- A crisis develops when a significant number of IDPs arrive in a particular locality. Typically, local NGOs or sympathetic families offer food and housing. Sometime later, one or more international NGOs arrive with the goal of helping the affected people. They first consult local NGOs or another civil society structure in order to identify the affected

population and obtain basic information as to their places of origin, numbers, ethnic backgrounds, etc.

- The international NGO goes about setting up programs and bringing in the supplies – food, plastic sheeting, tools, medical supplies, etc. The international NGO representatives have work tools that are beyond the means of local NGOs. One particularly important asset that local NGOs don't have are the four wheel drive vehicles that are often only available to international NGO representatives, but that are virtually essential for reaching vulnerable populations located beyond the outskirts of towns.
- When substantial quantities of supplies finally start to arrive, local Congolese NGOs, and often professional IDPs, are not invited to participate in the programs. The "internationals" supervise every aspect of the distribution process, sometimes arriving with Congolese personnel hired far away. Thus, local NGOs and other members of civil society feel that, despite their local knowledge, experience and language skills, they cannot even aspire to become the partners of the "internationals".

According to a number of Congolese interviewees, the above-cited tendencies contribute to several unfortunate developments:

- Local elites become alienated from the international personnel
- International staff are not very good at separating the most needy IDPs and vulnerable people from people who are simply looking for hand-outs. This produces a certain amount of fraud and waste.
- International staff, being cautious about security, often do not venture very far from the towns, with the result that large numbers of targeted groups are left to cope on their own, sometimes in extreme distress.

Congolese NGOs feel they can access more remote areas more cost effectively than their international counterparts, and that they have the connections to negotiate with armed groups where "internationals" prefer not to go, or are positively prevented from going. They would also be in a better position than international staff to identify genuinely needy persons and groups and therefore reduce the amount of fraud.

In the DRC, donors including USAID choose to channel the bulk of their financial and material aid through international NGOs and leave it to them to develop and define relations with Congolese organizations. The team found that many of OFDA's partners work with local NGOs, but that not all had effective capacity development programs for them. Others international NGOs partnered with very few local groups. For example, of UNICEF's 50 partners, only six are national NGOs. (CARE's NGO partners through the OTI CAP program are discussed in a previous section.)

Both international and national NGO staff cite reasons for distrust and under-utilization of national NGOs:

- Most Congolese NGOs do not have sufficiently developed structures and administrative skills to be able to handle large budgets.

- International NGOs have lost large sums of money through misuse by Congolese NGOs in the past.
- Congolese NGOs are often run by ethnically homogeneous personnel and this poses real dangers in situations where ethnic competition and conflict are endemic.

These reservations are serious, and are reflected in cases where IDPs and other needy people have not received the assistance intended for them. Some IDPs have grown to mistrust national NGOs when they feel that goods were misappropriated. The team heard about a case in an IDP camp where plastic sheeting was distributed by a local NGO working for an international NGO. The amount distributed was less than had been promised, so the IDPs came to the conclusion that the committee of the local NGOs had kept the missing sheeting for themselves.

There is undeniably a pernicious problem in the DRC of corruption and nepotism – a widespread heritage of Mobutu's regime. Notwithstanding this historical reality, many NGOs have changed or are willing to change their management approaches. International organizations often lack empathy for the disadvantages faced by Congolese NGOs. For example, local organizations are not able to secure funds from their Congolese supporters and are therefore dependent on international funds and subcontracts. They lack administrative resources, yet often subcontracts assume that they can use their own resources. Congolese NGOs staff are eager for capacity development but may lack transportation to participate when an international NGO organizes a seminar or other training opportunity.

At this juncture in international humanitarian history in the DRC, the requisite to intensify work with local NGOs probably overshadows any reservations held in the past. Reasons include:

- The potential for opening access to thousands of people who can benefit from humanitarian aid, resulting in a dramatic upsurge in caseloads. FFP (May 2004) identified at least eight areas where food aid needs may "spike" in 2004. There are simply not enough international NGOs to cover some areas, particularly in South Kivu.
- Insufficient funding to deal with the above, which will require belt tightening and more efficient use of resources.
- Creating a cadre of humanitarian practitioners who stay in situ and act as a bridge between crisis response and development projects to help achieve that elusive goal - sustainability.
- Coverage of gaps in assistance, particularly for the disabled and elderly who cannot reach distribution sites and for psychosocial and other protection needs
- Not least, respect for the principle of "We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities" (The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief), which includes working through local NGOs as partners.

The selection of local NGOs can be a daunting task but there is experience among international organizations in this regard. OTI and IRC both selected partners from hundreds of candidates for their grants to local NGOs. Ideally, selection of the candidates should be based upon deep familiarity and long-term contact with the world of Congolese NGOs; unfortunately, the relatively short stays among international staff do not favor this. In some situations, religious

organizations have local representatives with decades of experience in the same region, who may be able to assist.

Increasing Access and NGO Capacity Development through USHIRIKA

Ushirika, an Umbrella Grant programme developed by IRC, supports and strengthens local associations and NGOs providing humanitarian assistance in the DRC. Since its launch in July 2001, the programme has developed partnerships with 24 non-profit associations and NGOs and reached close to 150,000 vulnerable people living in conflict-affected communities. The program received two phases of funding from OFDA.

The strategy aimed to provide financial assistance to experienced local partners, as well as technical assistance to further strengthen these organizations and improve their impact in the field. In the first phase, 12 local partners received sub-grants for the implementation of projects in the areas of emergency aid, food security, water and sanitation and income-generating activities. Capacity-building activities aimed at improving their skills in project design, administrative and financial management and reporting. Phase 2, initiated in May 2003, built on the successes and lessons learnt from the first phase. The project ultimately expanded to cover both South Kivu and northern Katanga provinces.

The Ushirika programme cycle included a call for proposals, a multi-step project and partner selection process, the redesign of projects with selected partners and the joint signature of contracts, project implementation with support from the Umbrella Grant team, and evaluation and audit of partner projects and institutions. Emphasis was placed on project quality and utilization of Sphere minimal standards. Eventually the call for proposals process was simplified to reduce the time and resources invested by local associations in submitting proposals and a more in-depth selection process was developed including field visits to potential partners.

Throughout the projects, IRC supported close monitoring of partner projects and provision of on-going technical assistance by full-time technical advisors. Two perspectives were represented through evaluations. Partner NGOs were evaluated by IRC and IRC's management of the project was evaluated by partner NGOs. In general, partner NGO projects had a positive impact in reducing vulnerability of affected people. Community training by partner NGOs resulted in increases in technical capacity for agricultural production and increases in new initiatives. Projects tended to have a positive impact on the relationships between men and women, encouraging both (and their children) to participate actively.

The advantages of working through partner NGOs were numerous. They tend to have a high level of expertise in their intervention sectors, collaborate at some level with other civil society organisations, and are well known by the target community and local stakeholders. On the other hand, managerial capacity was weakened if the organizations lacked a clear mission statement or did not have internal administrative and financial procedures adapted to their organizational structures. Overall data collection, monitoring and evaluation of projects and activities remain a difficulty for most partners. Very few women occupy posts of responsibility within the organisations. Some partners found that IRC's rigor required them to invest a lot of time and energy in implementing projects, which may have restricted their time to pursue other opportunities for funding.

Source: IRC, DRC "Ushirika Umbrella Grant Program, Summary Evaluation Report," May 2004.

4 Recommendations

The recommendations made below are all deemed to be "do-able" and within the capacity of the US Government. However, the evaluators did not see their task as being restricted by US regulations, policies or laws that are currently in place. In our opinion, if the logic of humanitarian aid demands that such restrictions be changed, then effecting such changes should become a priority goal for the near future.

1. The US Government should include a local peace-making component under USAID management as part of its humanitarian and "preventive" strategy. This should form part of the most basic humanitarian agenda and not be left to national or international political actors. When humanitarian representatives note the existence of, or the potential for, conflict, human rights abuses and/or population displacement, they should see it as their responsibility to attempt mediation between the conflicted forces. This should be accomplished by initiating mediation and reconciliation efforts aimed at all levels of society. USAID should train and employ mediation experts to be assigned to all of its conflict related programs. The employment of material incentives, even to armed groups, as rewards for implementing cease-fire agreements and peace building is one practical option to be considered.

There exists a political and ethical contradiction between expending a huge human and financial effort to deal with the effects of specific conflicts and, at the same time, not having the authority or the necessary skills to mitigate or resolve such conflicts.

2. USAID should focus on providing assistance impartially to "people most in need" rather than specifically to IDPs. This category of people in dire need of humanitarian assistance will naturally include most IDPs.

This study questions whether emphasis on IDPs rather than vulnerable populations is appropriate in the DRC. In some instances, the most abused and needy individuals were unable to leave their homes and, because of that misfortune, were refused the assistance reserved for IDPs. Many humanitarian organizations in the DRC do not, in principle, emphasize protection of IDPs separately from other groups. However, in practice, some assistance is directed to IDPs when they are not in as great need as other community groups or families. In the DRC, separate programs for IDPs can result in unfair practices, which can strain relationships between IDPs and neighboring or host communities.

3. In the interest of assuring an equitable distribution of assistance, USAID should undertake household surveys in order to compare "assistance-in-relation-to-need" as it applies to different categories of persons in need. USAID monitoring visits should include interviews with host community members and IDPs living in various situations.

IDPs in the DRC find themselves in a variety of different situations, which can be categorized into three types: (1) IDPs in camps that are frequently located near towns, large villages or along main roads; (2) IDPs who have found shelter with communities or families, typically in towns or

large villages; and (3) IDPs that have escaped into forest or savannah areas that are often unreachable by NGOs due to security concerns and impassable roads.

The tendency to focus on assisting IDPs in camps is unfair to those who find shelter with families or ethnic kin, and who are more likely than encamped IDPs to be integrated into productive activity. IDPs and other vulnerable people should not be drawn to camps because they do not receive assistance elsewhere. Identifying IDPs living in host communities and allocating aid so has not to favor them over the host communities, whose standards of living typically fall because of their presence, is a difficult, time-consuming, and potentially costly enterprise. Nonetheless, there are persuasive long-range advantages to undertaking such a task.

4. FFP should sponsor a "Food Aid Targeting" study for the DRC so that it can better understand who receives the food, how it is used, under what circumstances it is sold, and what is purchased in its place, in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness of the food aid program.

In some areas of the DRC, distributed food items are being rejected by some IDPs and/or vulnerable populations and being sold for cash. As a result, food aid may be doing harm by creating opportunities for corruption and profiteering. It is not known how the cash from food sales is spent and whether the monetization of food aid succeeds in giving women and children the nutrition that they need.

5. USAID should more actively promote and support capacity development for local NGOs, particularly with respect to strengthening their capacities to respond to emergencies. Due to the administrative weaknesses of some NGOs, an investment may have to be made in ensuring initial oversight by international staff. This action can be undertaken directly by USAID or through support for NGO partner initiatives.

The relationships between international and local NGOs in the DRC are complex. International NGOs often do not trust local NGOs because some of them have misused resources in the past and because of their weak administrative capacities. This widespread lack of trust is a barrier to efficiency and effectiveness. However, greater involvement by Congolese NGOs in humanitarian assistance is essential for several reasons. First, they are often on the scene of emergency situations before international NGOs arrive. Second, they are the most logical bridge between emergency aid and sustainable development. Third, international NGOs will, one day, move on to other parts of the world, thereby threatening the continuity of leadership and the social structures they developed.

6. USAID should encourage the hiring of long-term experts in the Congo and more Congolese staff to ensure that programs are underpinned with in-depth political and social insight. It would be desirable for supervising personnel to remain "in country" for longer periods in order to attain the information base with which to evaluate Congolese NGOs. The hiring of female staff, particularly Congolese, may help in dealing with issues of SGBV.

The expatriate personnel of USAID's partners were mostly experienced in emergencies. However, many did not have long-term experience in the DRC. Very few appear to have learned any local languages and some did not even speak French with fluency. Therefore, they were probably handicapped in understanding the local political, ethnic and social environment. This lack of familiarity becomes a particularly acute handicap in transferring responsibilities to Congolese NGOs, which must be evaluated not only for their capacity but also for their perceived position in local society.

7. USAID, and especially OFDA, should consider developing mechanisms that allow for faster, field-based, approval of program funds in emergency situations. This should be linked to the strengthening of local NGO emergency response capacities.

Based on the survey findings, approval of requests for OFDA funds appears to take too long, so that aid often is delayed in the first critical weeks of an emergency. USAID has considered vesting small grants authority in local representatives as do other donors. This solution should be given further consideration as it would seem to address the issue of timeliness of aid.

8. USAID/DRC should implement a strategy tying funding for shorter-term goals – usually linked to emergency situations - to funding for longer-term goals – usually linked to sustainable development. Regarding IDPs, this strategy should focus on making sure that they receive adequate support when they return home.

There is a large gap between emergency assistance and development assistance. In this regard, USAID/DRC's plans were perceived as unclear by many NGO partners. In addition, successful reintegration of returnees will require support for rebuilding devastated villages and local economies.

9. Coordination of humanitarian programs by the international community should be further strengthened. USAID should continue to support OCHA and strengthen both its coordination capacity and its ability to influence programming decisions of international and national NGOs.

The potential for excellent coordination among international and national NGOs has improved significantly since the reorganization of OCHA. However, there is still need for further improvement. At the local level, coordination often depends on personal relationships.

10. USAID should be transparent with regard to its strategies and policies for humanitarian assistance. This principle should be extended to, and followed by, partner organizations as well. Local community members should be informed of the rationales behind USAID's programs and projects.

There are growing resentments toward the international community and the US in the DRC. To be effective, the US must take these resentments into account even though many of them are ill-founded, contradictory, and unreasonable. One way of addressing this problem as it relates to emergency relief programs is attain and maintain high levels of transparency.

The recommendations made below are all deemed to be "do-able" and within the capacity of the US Government. However, the evaluators did not see their task as being restricted by US regulations, policies or laws that are currently in place. In our opinion, if the logic of humanitarian aid demands that such restrictions be changed, then effecting such changes should become a priority goal for the near future.

Annex A: Scope of Work

Evaluation of USAID/DCHA Humanitarian Response in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 2000 – 2003

Purpose

The U.S. Agency for International Development's Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/DCHA) seeks to assess its relief and rehabilitation programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 2000 and 2003. This evaluation will focus on the effectiveness, sustainability, and overall impact of DCHA's activities, with a particular emphasis on internally displaced persons. DCHA seeks a team of three experienced professionals to conduct research in the field and Washington over an estimated period of 45 days.

Background

In August 1998, an armed attack against the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GDRC) by the Rwanda-backed Congolese Democratic Assembly (RCD) opposition group sparked violence that involved five countries in the region. During July-August 1999, the GDRC; the governments of Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe; and the main Congolese opposition groups RCD and the Uganda-backed Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) signed the Lusaka Peace Accords. The Lusaka agreement required signatories to agree to a cease-fire and to create the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), a mechanism for all groups to discuss peace implementation. The U.N. Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) began in November 1999. MONUC monitors the cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign forces, and assists in disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation.

The ICD concluded on April 2, 2003, in Sun City, South Africa, with an agreement to establish a government of national unity and a transition constitution. President Joseph Kabila will remain in office for a transitional period of approximately two years, to be followed by democratic elections. On April 4, 2003, President Kabila promulgated the transition constitution. Members of the RCD, the MLC, other opposition groups, and civil society are now sharing four vice-presidential positions and other key government posts.

Insecurity in rural and urban areas has restricted access to agricultural land, decreasing harvest yields and contributing to the food security crisis. Lack of access to traditional markets has further discouraged farming. Poverty is widespread and the health care system has eroded due to a lack of resources and continuous looting by different parties in the conflict. Although President Kabila has attempted to address these difficulties, the Congolese economy faces numerous constraints, and insecurity has resulted in limited private sector activities. According to the U.N., approximately 20 million people in the DRC remain vulnerable due to chronic insecurity and the potential for conflict.

Evaluation Questions

The evaluation will address the following series of questions.

1. Relevance

This criterion is concerned with assessing whether programming is in line with local needs and priorities. Specifically, is humanitarian assistance being provided impartially, proportionate to need?

Review of agency policy
This part of the evaluation should establish whether there is a clear commitment to humanitarian principles (in particular the principles of impartiality and humanity) in agency policy on humanitarian assistance.

- Does USAID policy refer to and/or incorporate the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement?
- What is USAID's policy towards IDPs? Are they regarded as a special category, distinct from other vulnerable groups? How are IDPs defined? Is policy towards IDPs implicit or explicit? Are policies consistent between USAID/Washington and missions and between multilateral and bilateral donors?
- To what extent is agency policy on IDPs generic, and to what extent is it flexible and determined by the specific country/ context? How appropriate and relevant is the approach adopted? For example, if internal displacement is a consequence of the violation of minority rights, to what extent is this addressed by agency policy?
- Does USAID have an IDP focal point in Washington that monitors application of policy? How does the agency disseminate policy to make sure Missions are aware and understand?
- Is agency policy on IDPs sensitive to gender and generational issues?
- How are countries and cases being prioritized by agencies? To what extent is there an impartial allocation of agency resources to IDPs at global level, according to need?

Evaluation of operations in DRC
- How are the needs and/ or rights of IDPs defined by a) the USAID Mission in DRC, and b) its operational partners in DRC?
- Is the vulnerability of IDPs viewed by USAID as a protection issue where human rights are violated through violent conflict and consequent displacement or an issue of material deprivation which threatens lives and livelihoods?
- What are the implications of this understanding for the evaluation and provision of program assistance? How appropriate is this to the context and needs of IDPs in DRC?
- How have humanitarian needs evaluations been carried out by operational partners (and, where relevant, by USAID)?
- To what extent have these evaluations explored the underlying causes of vulnerability and displacement? To what extent is it informed by political analysis, including an analysis of the conflict, of power relations and an analysis of how rights are being violated?
- What categorizations have been applied to understand the vulnerability of different groups, and how appropriate is that to the specific context?

- What level of need is regarded as the 'trigger' for the provision of humanitarian assistance? Has this remained constant or changed over time? Is there any evidence of the 'normalization' of the humanitarian emergency? Does this respect the humanitarian principles of impartiality and humanity?
- To what extent have IDPs (and other vulnerable people) been consulted about their needs and about an appropriate response? To what extent do they feel that agency assistance has been relevant?
- Is the provision and distribution of humanitarian aid proportionate to need?
- How is targeting being carried out by operational partners? For example, is it being done according to pre-determined categories of vulnerable people (i.e. separating out IDPs), and/ or is it being done according to a comparative evaluation of need? How appropriate and relevant is this approach to targeting?
- Have issues of gender and generation been adequately addressed in the provision and distribution of humanitarian aid?
- If IDPs are being targeted as a separate category of vulnerable people, is there any evidence that this is at the expense of other vulnerable groups, or is it proportionate to the vulnerability and needs of other vulnerable groups?
- Are the programming choices of operational partners appropriate to the needs and rights of IDPs?
- To what extent have issues of protection been addressed and met, directly and/ or through advocacy? (see point under coherence).
- Does the program combine an appropriate mix of material assistance and other protective activities, e.g. lobbying, advocacy etc?
- Are there any gaps?

2. Effectiveness

This criterion assesses the extent to which USAID's programs achieved their purpose. As far as possible, this should draw on the views of IDPs and vulnerable people themselves.

Evaluation of operations

- How clearly stated are the overall objectives and outcomes of USAID's strategy for responding to the needs/rights of IDPs? How clear is the strategy in terms of finding the best way to achieve these outcomes? Does the USAID strategy on IDPs include an advocacy component? Has advocating for IDPs with authorities and humanitarian community been effective?
- Has progress towards achieving these objectives and outcomes been carefully and consistently monitored, by USAID and its operational partners, informing subsequent modification of programming? Have appropriate indicators for monitoring been used?
- How timely has the provision of humanitarian assistance to IDPs been?
- How successfully has access to IDPs been secured, within and outside conflict zones?
- To what extent have operational partners demonstrated awareness of 'Sphere' and been able to meet Sphere standards?
- What lessons about providing assistance to IDPs have been learned and applied between different emergencies, particularly by the agency, but also by its operational partners?

3. Impact

This criterion assesses the real difference that programs and projects have made in addressing the needs of IDPs – positive and negative, short and long-term, direct and indirect.

On the international humanitarian system

- How has USAID policy towards IDPs impacted the ability of the international humanitarian system to respond to the specific needs of IDPs? For example:
  - What has been the impact on institutional mandates to address the protection needs of male and female IDPs, children and aged, in terms of clarity, appropriateness, and effectiveness of the division of responsibility?
  - What are the implications of USAID's choice of operational partners for channeling its funds to address the needs of various groups of IDPs, both positive and negative?

On IDPs and other vulnerable people

- To what extent have the protection and material relief needs of IDPs been met taking gender, age, and ethnicity into consideration, and what has been the impact?
- To what extent have the underlying causes of the various IDP groups' vulnerability been addressed, and what is the impact?
- What impact has the provision of humanitarian assistance had on relations between IDPs and host/ other vulnerable people (positive and negative), for example in terms of exacerbating or reducing conflict?
- What has been the overall impact of treating IDPs as a special category, or not?

4. Efficiency

Evaluation of operations

- Were financial resources used efficiently by the USAID (and in turn, by its operational partners), in terms of achieving maximum impact?
- Has USAID made well-informed decisions (according to expertise and capacity) about its choice of implementing partners?

5. Coherence

This criterion assesses the coherence between the policies and programming of different agencies, and therefore addresses issue of coordination. It is concerned with consistency across agency policy, and between policy and operations.

Review of agency policy

- How coherent is USAID's policy towards IDPs with the policies of other agencies? What are the implications?
- Has USAID supported a collaborative approach to IDPs, in both policy and operational terms? What have been the implications (positive and negative)?
- To what extent does the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) encourage a coherent approach amongst agencies to assisting IDPs? Does the agency participate in CAP workshops where

strategies are developed, and does it monitor CAP with a view to ensuring gaps do not exist? How effective is this?
- How effectively does USAID participate in information sharing – with other agencies, with the host government, and with coordination bodies

Evaluation of operations
- To what extent are operations on the ground in DRC consistent with USAID's policy on IDPs? What are the implications?
- To what extent is there coherence between the programming approaches of different donors and their implementing partners in DRC? What are the implications? To what extent have agencies identified and acted upon their particular comparative advantage/ added value in addressing the humanitarian needs and rights of IDPs?
- How effective is coordination? How has USAID engaged with coordination mechanisms and processes, and/or to what extent has it encouraged its operational partners to engage with coordination mechanisms and processes? What are the implications?

6. Connectedness

This criterion assesses the extent to which short-term emergency interventions have been carried out in a context which takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account.

Evaluation of operations
- Has USAID (or its implementing partners) attempted to address the root causes of displacement and vulnerability, at an operational and/ or political levels? To what extent are short, medium, and long-term objectives geared towards creating lasting solutions?
- Has responsibility for addressing the needs of various groups of IDPs been appropriately identified (i.e. with states) and encouraged/ advocated by USAID and its implementing partners?
- To what extent has capacity building of local structures and organizations been part of USAID's (and its operational partners') approach in DRC? Was this appropriate? To what extent was it informed by an analysis of conflict dynamics?
- Has the design and implementation of emergency interventions by operational partners been informed by an analysis of conflict dynamics? To what extent have interventions exacerbated, or reduced the likelihood of violent conflict, either as an explicit objective, or indirectly?
- Has the design of program interventions by operational partners taken into account and attempted to minimize the potential negative impact on vulnerability of IDPs in the longer-term (for example, that the provision of large quantities of relief resources might make IDPs more vulnerable to attack in the future)?
- Has the design of program interventions by operational partners taken into account the longer-term environmental consequences of the provision of humanitarian assistance to IDPs?
- How would USAID decide that there is no further need for humanitarian assistance to IDPs? In other words, how would USAID determine that displacement has ended?
- Is there any evidence of follow-up monitoring of the situation of IDPs after they have returned home, or been re-settled, and aid assistance has ceased?

- To what extent have different aid instruments (i.e., humanitarian and development aid) been used coherently and effectively to address the needs of IDPs, and the protracted nature of many IDP situations? Have there been any gaps? How are decisions made and how flexible are agencies to respond to displacement especially when it is short term or unexpected?

Evaluation Team & Estimated Level of Effort

The three-person evaluation team will consist of a team leader and two project specialists. To provide a broader perspective and better facilitate data collection, prospective evaluation teams are strongly encouraged to include at least one DRC national as a team member, and also to include a mix of genders. DCHA staff will assist as necessary with the facilitation of meetings and procurement of documents. The team should collectively possess the following set of skills:

- In-depth understanding of critical issues related to internal displacement
- Specific training and/or extensive practical experience in developing or implementing protection activities
- Specific training and/or extensive practical experience in developing or implementing activities aimed at sustaining local livelihoods
- Extensive experience implementing humanitarian relief programs in complex emergencies in various geographic regions around the world, preferably from several perspectives (UN/IO, NGO, donor)
- Experience carrying out two or more major humanitarian evaluations for a major donor, international NGO, or international organization.
- General familiarity with the political and humanitarian context in DRC, particularly over the past 3 years
- Basic understanding of USAID grant management procedures

The team leader will be a Senior Level Humanitarian and Crisis Analyst. The second team member will be a Mid-Level Institutional Analyst. The third team member will be either a Junior Level Operations Research Analyst or a Cooperating Country National / Third Country National. All three members will participate for the entire duration of the evaluation.

Methodology and Estimated Timeline

The evaluation team will conduct the evaluation and complete the report in approximately 45 days.

Key informant interviews and document review in Washington, DC (8 days).
Field work and data collection in DRC (22 days)
Writing report (10 days)
Briefing DCHA staff (2 days)
Final report revisions and printing (3 days)

Annex B: Survey Instruments

B.1. COMMUNITY QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Are you a local or a displaced person or have you returned home?

(**Purpose of question:** To identify the interviewees, their genders and ages, ethnic groups, places of origin, and whether they are IDPs, returnees, from host families or communities, or others.)

2. If you are, or were, a displaced person, when were you displaced and where did you go? Were you displaced more than once? If you are displaced, why did you come here? How long have you been here? (**Purpose of question:** To define their situation, length of stay, circumstances of displacement.)

3. Was the help useful? Did it help to meet your most important needs? What did you receive and from whom? What did you find the most helpful? The least helpful? **(Purpose of question:** To find out what they received and if it met their priorities or if their priorities were not met.)

4. Did women, children, elderly, ill, and other groups receive the assistance they needed? (**Purpose of question**: To find out if the special needs of the generally most vulnerable people were addressed.)

5. How is life for you here? Do you have land to grow food, health facilities, education, clean water, etc. (**Purpose of question:** To determine how people have been accepted locally and what support they have been given.)

6. Did anyone ask you what you needed? Who was the first, second, third, etc. to ask you about needs and opinions when you arrived? (**Purpose of question**: To determine if people felt consulted, when they were consulted and by whom.)

7. What were your most important needs? Were you able to meet some of your own needs?

(**Purpose of question:** To find out what they perceived as their greatest needs and what resources they were able to bring or found locally. These could include food, water, security, finding their family members, peace, etc. and could change over time, so the question could be phrased as what you needed when you arrived (note date) and what you need now.)

8. How long was it after you arrived, or when people arrived, before you got help?

(**Purpose of question:** To determine how rapid the response was and who were the early responders and what assistance arrived first, and later.)

9. Did you have any problems related to assistance you received? How were these problems addressed? (**Purpose of question**: To find out whether assistance actually did harm, what good it did, and what problems came up as a result of assistance, as well as whether the problems were resolved positively.)

10. What assistance was most helpful to you in the short-term, in the long-term? (**Purpose of question**: To see if assistance programming is sustainable.)

11. Have people from assistance organizations or within the community come to ask you your opinions on what you need and what you have received? Who and when, how often? (**Purpose of question**: To see if people were routinely consulted and the assistance monitored, or surveys done such as nutrition, etc.)

12. Do you have any recommendations or other comments or questions? (**Purpose of question**: To allow some time for free discussion and to propose solutions to the problems and to give people more time to think about their answers to the above questions.)

B.2. COMMUNITY INTERVIEWS ANALYSIS

Interviews with Community Members took place from May 10 to May 24, 2004 in Bunia, Eringeti, Beni, Buteuya (near Butembo), Kabulo, Kabatonga (Maketo, Tundwa) Kalemie, Bukavu, Kasenge, Baraka, Sange, and Uvira. Most IDPs interviewed fled from inter-ethnic fighting and/or harassment, theft and rape by armed groups. Host communities interviewed had either taken in families or had assisted them as they arrived in the community.

Interviews – Locations and Descriptions of People Interviewed:

1. **May 10, Bunia Town:** Woman, Hema, Hosted/Integrated Displaced in Urban center; Fled with three children from Baheme North, a place where both Hema and Lendu live. There are about 10,000 people, it is 65 km from Bunia. Population of Bunia:

2. **May 11, Eringeti Town:** Family and extended family living in one compound – Nande. Two brothers and their wives, five children and an aunt. The population of Eringeti is about 14-18,000. The displaced are about 13,000 living in camps or designated areas.

3. **May 11, Beni Town:** Key Informant, Abby (Catholic Priest), Local Host for IDPs and helped many to find hosts. Population of Beni is about 100,000

4. **May 12, Beni Town**: IDP, Female, Nande, Hosted/living in Beni town, from Bunia area

5. **May 12, Beni Camp:** Woman's Focus Group: 7 women; Mélange of ethnic groups. Camp population: 2,000; First they fled to Bunia from Niamkunde area due to inter-ethnic fighting and then to Beni in May of 2003.

6. **May 14, Village near Butembo**: Botueya, Key Informant, Chef du Developpement; Head of village committee, Nande host community hosting Nandes, population 2,300, with IDPs, 5,655. 25 km from Butembo, Some may be former Mai Mai. (Also made courtesy call to Village Security.)

7. **May 22, Maketo.** Returnees from Kalemie. Focus group, Mixed sex and age; Baololo, Conversation dominated by Matriarch, Population 1,500, 35 km from Kalemie;

8. **May 22, Tundwa.** Focus Group, mainly Pygmies and some Batunga, mixed sex and age; Returnees from the forest (some staying five years in the forest). Conversation dominated by the Chef du Pygmies; Population of the town – 470 Batunga families and 45 Pygmie families. 30 km from Kalemie,

9. **May 24, Kabulo.** Focus group, IDP camp, mixed sex and age, Population 1,200 with 90 refugee returnees from Tanzania refugee camps, originally from Wimbi, Kambara and Fizi areas, 20 different ethnic groups,

10. **May 25, Kalemie.** Focus group, male, Banyamulenge. Migrants. Fled in 1998 and returned in 2000, evacuated by other Banyamulenge to Burundi on a barge with all their animals. About 850 living in Kalemie.

May 10 - 14: Interviews in Bukavu and Uvira area:

11. **Bukavu (Funu quarter, shanty town):** IDP, Female, Mashi, Hosted by local family upon arrival but now living in rented rooms; Fled from Walungu area in January of 2002 due to harassment from Mai Mai (Mundundu 40 militia) and constant theft of personal property by them.

12. **Bukavu (Karale quarter):** IDP, Male, ethnic group??, Hosted alternately by several relatives; Fled from Ninja in 2000, 70 km from Bukavu. Fled due to frequent looting by Mai Mai and Interhamwe, and fearing rape of his wife.

13. **Bukavu (Rukumbuka quarter**): IDP, Male and Female, Bushi. Sharing donated quarters with other IDPs. Fled from Mushinga, 50 km from Bukavu, due to constant extractions of their personal property by the Mai Mai (Mundundu 40) and the Interhamwe.

14. **Bukavu:** Male, IDP, Hosted IDP, Fled from Shabunda due the forced weekly donation for the Mai Mai and loss of his business through looting. His wife and children fled to another area.

15. **Kasenge:** Focus Group, 12 Male and Female, Hosted IDPs, Fled three times from Lemera, first in 1996 with the advance of Kabila and later due to fear of armed groups. Some first settled in Luberizi and later went to Kasenge.

16. **Uvira:** Female, IDP, Widow with children, Hosted by relative. Fled from Minembwe due to fighting between Mai Mai and Banyamulenge or Burundian armed groups.

17. **Baraka:** Female, 24, Rape Victim.

18. **Sange:** Male, Host community member, shop owner.

General Findings Regarding IDPs:

- Violent conflicts, usually occurring in rural environments, have produced most IDPs.
- They typically flee toward urban centers
- The majority of these IDPs are taken in by family members, friends or strangers.
- The arrival of IDPs further reduces the standard of living of host families who are typically poor and deprived.
- By becoming IDPs, adults and children face malnutrition and other deprivations.
- Food aid, brought by international NGO's, arrives late and is quantitatively insufficient.
- Food and other aid tends to be distributed in urban or quasi urban settings

- Counting for distribution does not often take into account the pace of return or displacement; people who arrive later sometimes fail to be registered and receive assistance
- Corrupt practices often accompany aid given by international NGO's.
- The food which is distributed is sometimes inappropriate, for instance, beans which must cooked for an unusually long time given to IDPs who have difficulty finding heating materials.
- The corn flour is known to "hurt your stomach" but it protects against famine. Many IDPs would have preferred rice.
- Shelter and water and sanitation are major needs and are usually not included in assistance packages for IDPs not living in camps and local people.
- Women who have been raped suffer intense psychosocial effects and lack support to deal with this.
- Women are often required to help military people when they relocate their posts in rural areas. They are forced to carry the tents, etc.

Immediate and Subsequent Assistance Providers		
Displacement Situation	**Immediate Assistance**	**Subsequent Assistance**
2002, Bunia, hosted female HoH IDP, 3 children	Local families – food and shelter	Late 2003, WFP, sup. food, donated clothing
June 2002, Botueya, (25 km from Butembo), hosted IDPs in former Mai Mai controlled area, multiple displacements	Local families	February 2003, GAA, seeds and tools
July 2003, Kabutongo, 14 km from Kalemie, IDPs and refugee returnees camped	Set up camp 4-5 km from a village which helped them	Sept.2003 Caritas, 15 day ration; WFP/FAO, Feb. 2004, food and seeds
January 2002, Bukavu, Female IDP	Host family	None
Returnees after five years in the forest, Tundwa near Kalemie (entire village)	None while in forest, Pygmies helped Bantu community survive	One month after their return they received food, seeds and tools, sporadic health services
'96, '97 and '04, IDP family, Kasenga near Uvira	Host family	Received aid only once in 1997 from Caritas
May 16, 2003, Eringetti, IDPs from Ituri	Local NGOs and people, World Vision; Health services in 2 days	WFP food in two weeks; other services 2 weeks
May, 2004 - Family from Lemera, also displaced in 1996 and 1998 to Sange	Local family support immediately; Assessment by OCHA and health assistance shortly thereafter;	Food assistance after 13 days; a one-time distribution, partial ration.
Banyamulenge community displaced in 1998 from Kalemie area and returned in 2000	Evacuated by Banyamulenge from Bukavu and hosted by them for two years on the Ruzizi plateau in Burundi	Some food assistance from WFP while IDPs; now self-sufficient

Humanitarian Assistance in General:

Greatest needs: There were a number of immediate needs, food, shelter and household item but security was noted as the greatest need. "Older" (more than two years) IDP communities and their host show a great deal of initiative in ameliorating their situation. They often lack resources to carry out their ideas for development. For example, some feel that they are best suited to reintegrate their own child soldiers rather than outsiders and are well aware of the problems that can occur when former soldiers are idle. In this case, the food for work and cash for work programs are extremely useful. Other visions include introduction of cash crops such as cocoa and vanilla.

Recommendations and Final Comments from Communities:

- Patience and hope will solve the situation and the building of a State of law.
- To the international NGOs: Set up humanitarian assistance distribution monitoring system at all levels.
- However small it is, assistance is very important and helpful to the recipients. It should be provided rather than stolen.
- Put strong pressure on belligerents to stop violence and bring peace.
- To be an IDP or not is hard, horrible, and humiliating, because of widespread acts of sexual violence, pillage and fire of properties when there is trouble.
- Despite the assistance, IDPs and other local populations are exhausted to move from one place to another in search of food, security, etc. Intervention for the sake of humankind is a must.
- There is a strong need for shelter assistance for private homes and schools. Local materials are not always available or free. For example, a press to make bricks is expensive.
- There is a strong need for improved water and sanitation and hygiene training to go along with those.
- International organizations should listen to visionaries in local communities.
- Ensure free education for children and women, it is a human right.

B.3. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NATIONAL NGOS

1. Are you familiar with USAID's activities in the DRC? Please describe them? Were you a partner with USAID projects and programs?
2. What is your opinion on the design of the assistance, was it appropriate and effective? ,
3. Were resources used efficiently, especially people and material resources?
4. What has been the impact of the programs you are familiar with, both positive and negative?
5. What have you observed in relation to international support for capacity development of local people and organizations? Was it effective? Will it help to better serve vulnerable people?
6. With regard to the root causes of the conflict, do you think that effective steps have been taken to end it? Why or why not?
7. What has been the reaction to rapes and other human rights abuses? Have effective action been taken? Why or why not?
8. What recommendations do you have to improve international assistance to the DRC?
9. What roles have and should local authorities play?

B.4. NATIONAL NGO SURVEY – SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

National NGOs were interviewed in the Ruzizi plain (Uvira, Luberizi, Sange, and Baraka) and Bukavu Region (Bukavu City, Walungu, Kabare, and Nindja). The majority of NGOs interviewed had implemented projects as "sub-partners" of USAID partner, including CARE (OTI's implementing agency) and IRC, WFP, and ACF/AAH, among others. Others are civil society institutions and actors, such as local churches and elites or intellectuals.

General impressions included:

- USAID humanitarian assistance has contributed to assist IDPs, but it is not always publicized or recognized as assistance from the US
- There are delays and insufficiencies in the assistance
- In most cases, the international humanitarian aid is only distributed in city centers, and less in rural places.
- Humanitarian assistance has contributed to dependency by local people on international assistance. The concept of development means receiving assistance replacing former ideas of "self- determination.

Summary of Discussions:

The Congolese are both victims and perpetrators of the humanitarian crisis. Weakened by moral and material poverty, Congolese have fallen prey to external manipulation. The root causes of displacement have not been adequately addressed and limited discussion has taken place with armed groups, such as the Interahamwe. Displacement has been caused by and also resulted in malnutrition, death and destruction of infrastructure. Repetitive displacements have resulted in abandonment of farming and fishing. For the first time in recent history, there are cases of malnutrition in Ruzizi plain, a region rich in agricultural and fishing resources.

Interviewees noted that very little had been done by government authorities and or armed groups to relieve the suffering, from 2000 to the present. Several armed groups have extracted money from vulnerable people and these actions have gone unpunished. The international community also bears responsibility. The citizens from the large international community provide arms and ammunitions used by the armed groups.

Effectiveness of assistance: Few host families are able to support the IDPs for a long stay. Obviously, tension exists between host families and the IDPs, although hospitality is on the part of host families is the undisputed reason for their support. Very often, only the strong IDPs reach urban centers or other distribution places and have the opportunity to receive assistance. There are many who cannot be reached in the rural places, often elderly, and those with psycho-social problems. These vulnerable people are often not identified by the international community, rather they receive assistance by local NGOS.

Predatory activities: Inefficiencies in delivery of assistance may be due partially to "Operation Retour". This occurs when part of the assistance intended for IDPs and other affected people is "skimmed" by international and local staff, as well as local administrators. For example, medical

personnel working in health centers do not receive adequate compensation from patient fees and mismanage the medicine in order to improve their low revenues.

Food aid and food security issues: Food aid has generally been inadequate and civil society lacks an understanding of the logic used by international assistance providers in selection of food items and timing of distributions. The majority of peasants are acquainted with other types of foods than those received by them. Consequently, maize that constitutes an important part of the assistance is sold at the city market places. This means that the assistance benefits the city populations who are acquainted with the international food. While people are genuinely appreciative of food aid, they offer several criticisms. The beans provided take longer to cook and use more precious fuel. Seeds provided may be unfamiliar foods and there is a lack of technical information for growing them.

OTI CARE CAP project: The projects carried out with OTI funds were important and helpful to the people. For example, armed groups turned to use the Internet together rather than shooting each other and youth started to learn how to use computers.

However, numerous problems were mentioned:

- In some cases, it took ten months for budget approval and more than 20 months to implement some of the plans.
- Such programs offer no future hope because they are intermediary between humanitarian assistance and assistance to development.
- Low cost materials were supplied rather than those intended.
- Monitoring by CARE and OTI was very poor.
- These are kind of "just do it" projects, i.e. take the money, buy what you need, and leave us alone.
- The projects cannot be regarded as true collaboration between international and national NGOs.

NGO Capacity Development - Few international NGOs take time and funds to do true capacity development, yet they set high standards for local NGOs staff as criteria for choosing them as partners. There is a strong need of training of specialists in NGO management, evaluation, psychology, human rights, and special training for female staff.

Recommendations

- Above all, the return of peace is the most urgent need
- The humanitarian assistance for war victims should be durable and appropriate to their traditions to ensure their successful rehabilitation.
- The return of people to their traditional habitats is critical.
- Improve timing in funding.
- Improve "real" capacity development including technical training to encourage and support local NGO managers.
- Replace "just do it" projects with longer term sustainable activities.

- The opinion of the IDPs and local people should be factored into the way assistance is provided.
- The action in the field should be continually monitored to correct inequities in assistance.
- Those committing human rights violations should be brought to justice.
- Financing the infrastructure development projects, roads, health centers, etc, using food for work, should be considered a priority.

B.5. MANAGEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Evaluation of USAID/DCHA Humanitarian Response in the DRC, 2000-2003

The U.S. Agency for International Development is evaluating its relief and rehabilitation programs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) between 2000 and 2003. The evaluation focuses on the relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and overall impact of the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) projects and programs undertaken through its offices, including OFDA (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance), OTI (Office of Transition Initiatives), Food for Peace, and Democracy and Governance (DG). Particular emphasis will be given to issues related to internally displaced persons (IDPs) since USAID is currently finalizing a policy document on assistance to IDPs.

Background: In August 1998, an armed attack against the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GDRC) by the Rwanda-backed Congolese Democratic Assembly (RCD) opposition group sparked violence that involved five countries in the region. During July-August 1999, the GDRC; the governments of Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe; and the main Congolese opposition groups RCD and the Uganda-backed Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) signed the Lusaka Peace Accords. The Lusaka agreement required signatories to agree to a cease-fire and to create the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), a mechanism for all groups to discuss peace implementation. The U.N. Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) began in November 1999. MONUC monitors the cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign forces, and assists in disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation.

The ICD concluded on April 2, 2003, in Sun City, South Africa, with an agreement to establish a government of national unity and a transition constitution. President Joseph Kabila will remain in office for a transitional period of approximately two years, to be followed by democratic elections. On April 4, 2003, President Kabila promulgated the transition constitution. Members of the RCD, the MLC, other opposition groups, and civil society are now sharing four vice-presidential positions and other key government posts.

Current situation: Insecurity in rural and urban areas has restricted access to agricultural land, decreasing harvest yields and contributing to a food security crisis. Lack of access to traditional markets has further discouraged farming. Poverty is widespread and the health care system has eroded due to a lack of resources and continuous looting by different parties in the conflict. Although President Kabila has attempted to address these difficulties, the Congolese economy faces numerous constraints, and insecurity has resulted in limited private sector activities.

According to the U.N., approximately 20 million people in the DRC remain vulnerable due to chronic insecurity and the potential for conflict. Significant constraints have limited the successful implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs. There are approximately 1.5 million IDPs (OCHA April 2004 estimate) mainly concentrated in the eastern part of the country, and about one third of them cannot be reached by humanitarian organizations due to insecurity and logistical problems.

In 2003, DCHA provided over $70 million to assist the DRC. Programs focused on health, water and sanitation, nutrition and food security, air transport, child reunification, coordination, food distribution and small grants to support the Lusaka Peace Accords.

The Evaluation Team: Three people form the independent evaluation team. Professor Herbert Weiss is a political analyst specializing in the DRC. Dr. Muko Mubagwa is a development economist at Bukavu University and Institute of Rural Development. Sheila Reed is a humanitarian crisis analyst and is the team leader. The evaluation will take place over a period of five weeks in the DRC and also in Washington DC.

The Questionnaire: The team is very grateful for your opinions and your time in completing the attached questionnaire. The sources of information will remain strictly confidential. Your inputs and recommendations will contribute to our recommendations and we hope and anticipate that they will improve assistance to the affected people in the DRC.

Please provide examples of good practices or lessons learned and note the month or year that you are referring to. We request that you kindly provide us with or direct us to sources of data or documents. Your recommendations are also appreciated. Your analysis will be compiled with information obtained through key informant and focus group interviews with managers and affected people.

Please return questionnaires to sheilareed@earthlink.net or reed@interworksmadison.com before May 20, 2004.

Thank You Very Much,

Sheila Reed
Muko Mubagwa
Herbert Weiss

Part 1: Respondent's personal information

Name:

Organization:

Location:

Responsibility in organization:

What is/was your role in the supporting the people of the DRC or in addressing IDP issues?

How long have you been associated with the DRC?

How many times did you visit the DRC? Which areas did you visit? Were you there recently?

Part 2: Relevance/Appropriateness – ***This section establishes whether there is clear commitment to humanitarian principles, particularly impartiality and humanity, in USAID humanitarian assistance policy.***

1. Does USAID regard IDPs as a special category, distinct from other vulnerable groups? What is the evidence for your answer? For example, are IDPs specifically mentioned in project documents, counted or otherwise specifically targeted for certain types of assistance?
2. To what degree do you think that USAID policy as demonstrated in humanitarian operations incorporates the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement? (See OCHA website for the complete body of principles.) Please offer examples where a principled approach was either implicitly or explicitly followed, or was weakly or not demonstrated.
3. Please mention any consistencies or inconsistencies that you have noticed between actions relative to IDP issues in different countries, or between USAID/Washington DC and its missions, or between USAID and other donors or other US assistance organizations.
4. Do USAID staff and partners in the DRC demonstrate a holistic perspective on protection of human rights? If not, in what way is it limited? How is the viewpoint demonstrated in accountability mechanisms, such as monitoring and evaluation? Does the viewpoint differ between USAID and its partners?
5. What approaches and actions are taken by USAID and its partners when peoples' rights are violated? To what degree are country or area-specific solutions pursued and creative alternatives explored? To what degree do policies at headquarters level promote or constrict ameliorating actions?
6. What are the problems in definition of IDPs in the DRC? Have assistance organizations organized their responses around the definition(s) and how?

Part 3: Effectiveness – *This criterion assesses the extent to which USAID's programs achieved their purpose.*

7. Did USAID have a clear strategy for responding to the needs of IDPs in the DRC from 2000 to 2003? Did the strategy dii the Has progress How
8. To what extent do you think affected people in the DRC were consulted about their needs and priorities? How appropriately do you think that the needs were met? Were the appropriate types of assistance provided? For example, was there an appropriate mix of material assistance and other protective activities such as advocacy or dialog?
9. Can you suggest improvements in targeting of assistance and types of assistance provided?
10. How successfully has access to IDPs and other affected people been secured in the DRC? How well did USAID and its partners work together to gain access?
11. What lessons have been learned about providing assistance to IDPs and other affected people in the DRC? Were these lessons and/or lessons from other countries applied by USAID and its operational partners?

Part 4: Outcome/Impact – *This part assesses the real difference that programs and projects have made in addressing the needs of IDPs and other affected groups both positive and negative, short and long term and direct and indirect.*

12. How has USAID policy toward IDPs impacted the ability of the international humanitarian system to respond to needs of IDPs, either positively or negatively? For example, have responsibilities been effectively covered by the range of organizations and/or among

USAID's partners to address protections needs of all groups, male, female, children, and aged, etc.?

13. What impact has the provision of humanitarian assistance had on relations between IDPs and host communities and other vulnerable people, for example, in terms of exacerbating or reducing conflict?
14. What has been the overall impact in terms of the directing the appropriate amount of assistance to IDPs when they have been treated as a special category? When they have not been considered a special category?

Part 5: Efficiency - ***This criterion measures how economically resources and inputs – fund, materials, expertise, time, etc – are converted to outputs, considering institutional, technical, financial management and other arrangements.***

15. Were financial resources used efficiently by USAID and its operational partners in the DRC in terms of achieving maximum impact?
16. How were the resources distributed geographically in the DRC relative to needs? Were the resources shifted as the needs and locations of IDPs changed?
17. Has USAID made well informed choices, relative to expertise and capacity, in its choice of implementing partners, relative to the analysis of needs?

Part 6: Coherence – This criterion assesses the coherence between the policies and programming of different agencies and therefore addresses the issues of coordination. It is concerned with consistency across agency policy and between policy and operations.

18. How coherent is USAID's policy towards IDPs with the policies of other organizations? Has USAID supported a collaborative approach to the assistance to IDPs both in terms of policy and operations, and what has been the result of the approach taken?
19. To what extent does the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) encourage a coherent approach among agencies assisting IDPs? Does USAID effectively monitor the CAP strategy to ensure that gaps are addressed?
20. How effectively does USAID participate in information sharing with other agencies? With the host government? With the coordination bodies?
21. Is there coherence between the programming approaches of different donors and their implementing partners in the DRC? Do they identify and act upon their comparative advantages in addressing the needs?

Part 7: Sustainability/Connectedness - This criterion assesses the extent to which short-term emergency interventions have been carried out in a context which takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account.

22. To what extent have the underlying causes of vulnerability in the DRC been addressed, either at operational or political levels? To what extent are short, medium and long-term objectives geared toward creating lasting solutions?

23. To what extent have programmatic decisions in the DRC been informed by political analysis of the conflict and power relationships as well as an analysis of human rights violations? Do project designs and evaluations take these analyses into account?
24. To what extent has capacity building of local structures and organizations been part of USAID's approach in the DRC? Were the approaches taken appropriate?
25. Has the design of program interventions attempted to minimize potential negative impacts on the affected people and their environment? For example, did the provision of relief resources make IDPs more vulnerable to attack?
26. To what degree did USAID and its partners conduct follow-up monitoring of the situation of IDPs after they returned or resettled and/or no longer received assistance?
27. To what extent did USAID and its partners evaluated the assistance programs and share the results of those evaluations?
28. How effectively did humanitarian and development aid address the protracted nature of the IDP situation? Were organizations able to respond to short-term or unexpected displacement?

Annex C: Persons Consulted

USAID/Washington DC

Gilbert Collins
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Nick Cox
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US Embassy

DRC Transitional Government

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The Presidency of the Republic

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National Assembly

Cleophas Kamitatu
Senator
Senate

Ambassador Andre M. Kapanga
Principal Counselor for Politics and Diplomacy
The Presidency of the Republic

Jean Mbuyu Luyongola
Minister
Ministry of Industry, Small & Medium Enterprises

Abbe Muholongu Malumalu,
Apollinaire President,
Independent Electoral Commission

Jacqueline Bisimwa Murangaza
Member of Parliament
National Assembly

Catherine Nzuzi wa Mbombo
Minstry of Solidarity and Humanitarian Affairs

Ambassador D. Kazadi Nyembwe
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National Assembly

Enock Sebineza
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National Assembly

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Humanitarian Rights Officer
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Sandra Lattorf
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UNICEF/Goma

Shannon Strother
Emergency Officer
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Noel P. Tsekouras
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Cyriul Musila
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aid workers network
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Representative
DanChurch Aid

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Program Officer
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NRC/Goma

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Steven Sharp
Director
International Foundation for Education
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National Director
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Professor, Goma University Center

Jose Kabwiku
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Emmanuel Lubala,
Lawyer and author
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Julienne Lusenge
SOFEPADI
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Esperance Maereduka
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Paroisse de Beni Cite
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Beni

Kamasi Ndabaga
Encadrement des Personnes Vulnerables en Afrique (EPVA)

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Promotion Sante et Developpement Feminin (PROSADEF)

Tite Senanda
Banyamulenge spokesperson
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Annex D: Documents Consulted

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Annex E

General Activities in Support of the Guiding Principles in the DRC *(Excerpted from Draft "Implementation Guidelines – USAID Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons")* (This list only presents examples and does not imply coverage needed. It does not mention all activities during the period evaluated nor all USG activities.)		
1. General Activity	**USAID-supported Activity in the DRC**	**Date Comments**
Translate the Guiding Principles and the Handbook into local languages	OCHA, Translated Guiding Principles into Swahili and French, in storybook format; Cassette for Radio Okapi	2003-2004
Collect and disaggregate population data on IDPs	OCHA with NRC	1999 - 2004
Integrate humanitarian, development and protection initiatives on behalf of IDPs	USAID 2004-2008 Mission Strategy – partially integrated	Does not cover humanitarian aspect in-depth
	OCHA – CHAP and HAG,Donor Group	2002 - 2004
	OFDA Partner NGO strategies	
Support efforts of national and local authorities on behalf of IDPs	All actors to some degree; OCHA/NRC workshops on the Guiding Principles	
Engage both government and opposition forces on behalf of IDPs	DG partners - IFESH, Global Rights	Limitations to engaging with armed forces
	OFDA Partner Organizations, OCHA	Gaining Access
	OTI/CARE/SFCG - Mediation	2002 - 2003
2. Activities Related to Protection from Displacement		
Promote good governance, transparency and rule of law	DG and OTI strategies and programs	Similar but overlap avoided
Strengthen democratic institutions and civil society to promote peace agendas	DG and OTI strategies and programs	
Support programs to combat discrimination against minorities	DG -	
	OTI – OSAPY, Pygmie-Bantu, others; CARE/CAP, Radio Okapi	2002-2003, not all objectives met
Support internal displacement early warning systems to alert communities and assist with contingency planning	OCHA, mainly with assistance organizations	Recent initiative
Gather information, report and support advocacy to minimize displacement	OCHA through network of assistance organizations	
Build local government capacity to mitigate displacement	OCHA, DG	
Organize international presence in threatened communities for prevention	Joint assessment missions with MONUC	Late prevention
3. Activities Related to Protection During Displacement		
3.A Enhancing Protection of Physical Security and Freedom of Movement		
Advocate with government authorities on IDP protection issues	ICRC – Human rights training for national military; OFDA Partner NGOs	
Encourage the planning of reception areas and long term residence that enhance the safety of new arrivals and residents with attention to preventing gender based violence	UNICEF, IRC	Prevention should be implemented in the earlier stage
Collaborate to draw attention to the	OCHA	

IDP's rights		
Sensitize peacekeepers about IDPs	OCHA and partner NRC briefings prior to deployment and upon deployment to the DRC; Military participation in QUIPs	
Increase landmine awareness within IDP communities	OCHA – through DanChurch Aid – Kalemie and others	
Establish international presence near concentrations of IDPs to enhance protection	OFDA partners, World Vision -Eringeti, GAA – Butembo/Bunia, Merlin, PU and Solidarities – Beni, OCHA	Limited due to lack of access and insecurity
3.B Preserving Family and Community Among the Displaced		
Support programs to prevent separation of children from their families; Support care, documentation and reunification	SC-UK – Reunified 2,500 children in Ituri; Child soldier reunification – CARE, IFESH and IRC, OTI 2004	Prevention limited
Collaborate with organizations having experience in protection, tracing	ICRC, IRC, SC-UK	
3.C Protecting Social, Economic and Cultural Well-Being of IDPs		
Support culturally appropriate needs assessments, disseminating this information widely to stakeholders	OCHA	Limited dissemination
Provide agricultural inputs, livestock	Livelihoods program; OFDA food security programs through partners	
Advocate for IDPs to have access to land and livelihoods	OFDA partners, OCHA, OCHA through NRC	
Promote income generating opportunities in displaced communities	Livelihoods program	Targeting?
Support mass immunization campaigns	UNICEF and partners, Merlin	
Support health care and training of health professionals, reproductive and HIV/AIDs	UNICEF, Merlin, IMC, GOAL,	
Support education of IDPS host community at primary and secondary	DG - Education program: OFDA partners	Long term
3.D Protecting Rights to Enjoy Basic Freedoms		
Support documentation for IDPs and for women in their own names	Registration – WFP	
Support outreach campaigns to guarantee right to a legal identity	OCHA through NRC, land rights	
Protect integrity of documentation to prevent abuses	OFDA partners, WFP registration card changed every two months	
Incorporate community preferences and needs of women and children	All USAID DRC to some degree	
Undertake special programs for the disabled and elderly	OFDA partners	
Support protection of religious freedom with local and national governments		
4. Activities Related To Return, Resettlement and Reintegration		
Support comprehensive planning by government authorities to enhance process of return	OCHA	
Promote efforts to enable displace communities to assess conditions in their home areas	OFDA and partners, Premiere Urgence and Solidarities, Ituri	
Monitor returnee programs to avoid artificial inducements to return to hostile	DG, OFDA and partners - Reintegration of ex-combatants	

areas		
Establish an international presence in areas of return for protection	OFDA and partners, Premiere Urgence and Solidarities, Ituri	
Consider gender issues in returnee housing programs		Housing programs?
Provide health services to meet needs of returnees, including psychosocial programs for IDPs and returnee children		
Support the reintegration of child soldiers and former combatants	Child soldier reunification – CARE, IFESH and IRC, OTI 2004	
Promote durable solutions to land and property issues, through local and national governments, including compensation from loss of land during displacement	OCHA with NRC	