



**KENYA SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT STUDY:  
SROI EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM  
“CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE PEACE  
IN THE COAST REGION OF KENYA: MOMBASA,  
LAMU, KILIFI AND TANA RIVER COUNTIES”**

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**DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH  
(DRG-LER) II ACTIVITY  
KENYA SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT  
STUDY:**

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“CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE  
PEACE IN THE COAST REGION OF KENYA:  
MOMBASA, LAMU, KILIFI AND TANA RIVER  
COUNTIES”**

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## ACRONYMS

CICC	Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics
DRG-LER II	Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance – Learning, Evaluation, and Research Activity
EQ	Evaluation Question
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IIGH	Institute on Inequalities in Global Health
KII	Key Informant Interview
NORC	National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago
SROI	Social Return on Investment
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	University of Southern California

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Institute on Inequalities in Global Health (IIGH) at the University of Southern California (USC), in collaboration with Search for Common Ground, was supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through NORC at the University of Chicago to develop a proof of concept to assess the social value, including quantifying the impact, of youth-led and youth-supporting peace and security efforts in Kenya using the social return on investment (SROI) model. SROI is a framework for measuring and accounting for the value of an intervention, organization or policy. It measures changes in ways that are relevant to the people that experience or contribute to it by capturing the value of social, economic, and environmental outcomes, and uses monetary values to represent these outcomes.

As part of the proof of concept, a call was initiated for youth-led and youth-supporting peace and security efforts in Kenya interested in participating in the study to be evaluated according to the SROI methodology. Response to the call resulted in a list of approximately 300 interventions which were reviewed and shortlisted for participation by the research team based on certain criteria (i.e., whether the program was youth-led or youth-supporting, the number of beneficiaries and key stakeholder groups affected, how long the program lasted, key program activities, program location(s), availability of data, etc.) and availability of resources to conduct the study. One of the four interventions selected was Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya: Mombasa, Lamu, Kilifi and Tana River Counties, and is the focus of this report. This program was implemented in Kenya during 2019-2021 by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC).

USC partnered with SVT Group (a US consulting firm specializing in SROI impact assessment), AMREF Health Africa (the largest health development NGO in Africa) and Rural Senses (a social enterprise research organization) to conduct the overall research including the SROI evaluation of the program. The SROI evaluation was guided by the following five main questions:

- 1) Who are the key stakeholders of the intervention?
- 2) What outcomes do key stakeholders experience?
- 3) What is the relative value of the outcomes to key stakeholders?
- 4) What is the social return on investment (SROI) of the program?
- 5) How can the results of the SROI analysis be used to improve future programming?

## EVALUATION DESIGN

The SROI evaluation design included a desk review of 135 documents as well as data collection using mixed methods. This included focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and quantitative online surveys. Data was collected between June 2022 – October 2022.

At the outset of the evaluation, members of the research team conducted discussions with the staff of the intervention to define the scope of the analysis, including the identification of main activities, key stakeholders and how best to engage them. In addition, a theory of change workshop was conducted with program staff to identify from their perspectives what were the key outcomes of the intervention and their underlying assumptions. A map of the “well-defined outcomes,” meaning specific changes in wellbeing experienced by stakeholder groups “that provide the best opportunity to increase or decrease

value,”<sup>1</sup> was developed through engagement with all key stakeholders to understand from each of their perspectives the outcomes they experienced, including intended and unintended, and any positive and negative outcomes.

Qualitative data collection was collected from a purposive sample of key stakeholders identified, including youth (age 18-35), women participants (over age 35), religious leaders, security actors, and program staff. It included 7 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) (2 with youth, 2 with women participants, 2 with religious leaders, and 1 with program staff), and 3 key informant interviews (KIIs) with security actors. After data collection, transcripts were translated then analyzed and coded in Excel.

Quantitative data collection included online surveys programmed in Kobo Collect to collect data from stakeholder groups that had large numbers of participants, in this case youth, women participants, and religious leaders, to obtain more representative samples. Sixty-one (61) respondents completed the surveys including youth, women participants, and religious leaders. Quantitative data was cleaned, then analyzed using Excel software.

The outcomes identified by key stakeholders were monetized using two different approaches to valuation: cost-based valuation (using literature) and stakeholders-stated preference valuation (during FGDs, KIIs, and online surveys). The monetized values of outcomes were used to calculate SROI ratios.

Preliminary results and findings were presented to key stakeholders during validation sessions, followed by revisions to the analysis as relevant.

Understanding the relative value of outcomes to stakeholders during periods of heightened tension or conflict can provide further important information for peacebuilding efforts. As the national elections in Kenya took place in August 2022, this presented a unique opportunity to understand how the outcomes created by peacebuilding interventions may be valued differently in this context. As such, an additional round of quantitative data collection was conducted after the elections through online surveys administered in October 2022. Surveys were programmed in Google surveys. Sixty-eight (68) respondents completed the surveys including youth, women participants, religious leaders, security actors and staff. Data was analyzed using Excel. An additional SROI ratio in the context of the elections was calculated based on this data.

Final results were shared with key stakeholders in December 2022, including a discussion of how results can be used and recommendations for future programming to grow social value creation.

## **MAIN FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

A summary of main findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the evaluation are presented in the table below.

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<sup>1</sup> Standards on Applying Principle 2: Understand What Changes, Part 1. Social Value International (2021)

**Table 1: Evaluation Findings**

<p><b>EQ1: WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS OF THE INTERVENTION?</b></p> <p>Key stakeholders of this intervention are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Youth (18-35) participants in programming</li><li>• Women (35+) participants in programming</li><li>• Religious leaders</li><li>• Security actors</li><li>• Program staff</li></ul>
<p><b>EQ2: WHAT OUTCOMES DO STAKEHOLDERS EXPERIENCE?</b></p> <p>Youth participants of programming experienced:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Increased leadership skills</li><li>• Increased networking and opportunities</li><li>• Increased religious tolerance</li></ul> <p>Women participants of programming experienced:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Increased capacity for peacebuilding</li><li>• Increased interfaith dialogue</li><li>• Increased networking and opportunities</li><li>• Increased inclusion in peacebuilding processes</li></ul> <p>Religious leaders experienced:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Increased outreach to at-risk youth</li><li>• Increased capacity for peacebuilding</li><li>• Increased networking and opportunities</li><li>• Increased interfaith dialogue</li></ul> <p>Security actors experienced:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Reduction in crime</li></ul> <p>Program staff experienced:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Increased capacity for peacebuilding</li></ul>
<p><b>EQ3: WHAT ARE THE RELATIVE VALUES OF THESE OUTCOMES?</b></p> <p>Based on stakeholders-stated preference valuation;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Youth participants most valued their increased religious tolerance,</li><li>• Women participants most valued their increased inclusion in peacebuilding processes,</li><li>• Religious leaders most valued their increased interfaith dialogue,</li><li>• Security actors most valued the reduction in crime they experienced, and,</li><li>• Program staff valued their increased capacity for peacebuilding.</li></ul>
<p><b>EQ4: WHAT IS THE SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT (SROI) OF THE PROGRAM?</b></p>

Findings suggest a strong positive impact of the program.

Results of the cost-based valuation using literature, which is traditionally how economic analyses are done, suggest that for every \$1 invested in the program, approximately \$1.51 in social value is created (with a sensitivity analysis range from \$0.30 to \$2.25).

Results of the stakeholders-stated preference valuation, which allowed for a fuller picture of the outcomes including that which is most valuable to stakeholders experiencing the program, suggest that for every \$1 invested in the program, approximately \$7.01-\$10.04 in social value is created (with a sensitivity analysis range from \$1.40 to \$15.06).

Results of the stakeholders-stated preference valuation in the context of the national elections suggest that for every \$1 invested in the program, approximately \$16.33-\$32.54 in social value is created (with a sensitivity analysis range from \$3.27 to \$48.81).

#### **EQ5: HOW CAN THE RESULTS OF THE SROI ANALYSIS BE USED TO IMPROVE FUTURE PROGRAMMING?**

Results of the SROI according to cost-based valuations found in the literature can be used to understand value of the intervention to the State and areas it may want to further invest in. Results of the SROI according to stakeholders-stated preference valuation can be used in multiple ways, including but not limited to understanding what outcomes mattered most to key stakeholders, what negative outcomes may have been experienced, and how to increase value for different stakeholder groups.

Results of the SROI analysis also demonstrate the added value of this approach over current approaches to evaluation used in this sector, including but not limited to its encouragement of decision-making based on value, not outputs. Outputs do not reflect the whole picture but have often been the basis for many decisions in aid and development programming.

### **Box 1: Evaluation Recommendations**

Three specific recommendations were identified for this program to increase value in the future. They are:

- 1) Increase the scope and number of outreach events. Participants expressed that they felt the outreach events and the opportunity to interact with other community members to share peace messaging was a valuable experience to them and that creating more of these opportunities in future programming could be beneficial to them.
- 2) Increase the recognition and branding of the program. Stakeholders expressed that by increasing the recognition and branding of the program (i.e., through t-shirts or other promotional materials), this would give their outreach efforts more legitimacy and credibility, and also help in attribution and making the value of these efforts more measurable.
- 3) Focus on extending the duration of desired outcomes. While many outcomes created positive value for stakeholders, these outcomes sometimes only lasted a year or less than a year. As such, programming should be adapted to focus on extending the duration of desired outcomes.

## EVALUATION PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS

### PURPOSE

The Institute on Inequalities in Global Health (IIGH) at the University of Southern California (USC), in collaboration with Search for Common Ground, was supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through NORC at the University of Chicago to develop a proof of concept to assess the social value, including quantifying the impact, of youth-led and youth-supporting peace and security efforts in Kenya using the social return on investment (SROI) model. SROI is a framework for measuring and accounting for the value of an intervention, organization or policy. It measures changes in ways that are relevant to the people that experience or contribute to it by capturing the value of social, economic, and environmental outcomes, and uses monetary values to represent these outcomes.

As part of the proof of concept, evaluations of various youth-led and youth-supporting peace and security interventions were carried out using the SROI model. One of the evaluations, an SROI evaluation of the Program Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya: Mombasa, Lamu, Kilifi and Tana River Counties, is the focus of this report.

USC worked with SVT Group (a US consulting firm specializing in SROI impact assessment) and two local research partners, AMREF Health Africa (the largest health development NGO in Africa) and Rural Senses (a social enterprise research organization) who led data collection (focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and quantitative surveys) for this evaluation. The evaluation data collection was carried out between June 2022 and October 2022, with validation meetings with key stakeholders in July and September 2022, respectively. The research team included Dr. Shubha Kumar (research team lead and SROI expert), Sara Olsen (SROI expert), Aaron Mallett (research analyst), Samuel Muhula (local co-investigator), Yau Ben-Or (local research support), and Ngesa Maturu (lead local data collector). The research team was closely advised by Saji Prelis (youth, peace and security expert), Adrienne Lemon (Search for Common Ground Senior Director for Strategy and Learning), and an Expert Advisory Group (representatives from various organizations engaged in youth, peace and security (see Annex J for full list) to provide guidance and context about the peacebuilding field, including common practices, key actors at the international, regional, national, and local levels, and relevant key reports and publications.

### EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The research team was tasked with answering the following questions for the SROI evaluation:

- 1) Who are the key stakeholders of the intervention?
- 2) What outcomes do key stakeholders experience?
- 3) What is the relative value of the outcomes to key stakeholders?
- 4) What is the social return on investment (SROI) of the program?
- 5) How can the results of the SROI analysis be used to improve future programming?

## PROGRAM BACKGROUND

*Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya* was implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) from 2019 to 2021 in the Coast Region of Kenya (Kilifi Mombasa, Kwale and Lamu Counties). It was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The overarching goal of this intervention was to facilitate sustainable conflict mitigation and support the transition to peaceful relations at the local levels in which it operated. It aimed to do this through addressing patterns of prejudice/stereotypes among different groups to support the development of relationships and establishment of trust in local communities and peace structures.

Core program activities included:

- Community-led conflict assessments
- Conflict resolution trainings
- Connector programs
- Provisioning of IT and office equipment to community hubs
- Provisioning of business plans to peace committees to support income-generating programs
- Park beautification
- Sub-county bi-annual program review meetings with community leaders and local actors to review program
- Sensitization and participatory workshops
- Meetings with sub-county security actors
- Training of trainers for psychosocial support services and provisioning of these services through counselling and trauma healing sessions
- Mediation trainings
- Inter- and intra-community dialogue sessions
- Youth accountability forums
- Women barazas
- Radio programs
- Next election dialogue forums
- Theatre outreach events
- Cultural events
- Community policing workshops
- Symposium on Peacebuilding and Preventing Violent Extremism

The objectives of the program were:

1. Key local stakeholders are engaged in Kenya peacebuilding and conflict management efforts.
2. Enhanced social cohesion in Kenya's conflict affected areas in the coast region.
3. Local and national peace building initiatives are building on community policing mechanisms.

## METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

The research team applied the internationally-recognized approach to SROI analysis (articulated by Social Value International) to conduct the evaluation of this program. This included a stakeholder-centric mixed-methods approach including a document review and qualitative and quantitative data

collection to generate credible evidence to answer the evaluation questions. The design included focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews (KIIs), and quantitative online surveys with key stakeholders. Local research staff worked closely with USC to validate instruments and translate them from English to Kiswahili for data collection. Figure 1 provides a high-level overview of the SROI analysis process. An extended methodology section can be found in **Annex B – Extended Methodology**.

**Figure 1: SROI Analysis Process**



## DESK REVIEW

The research team conducted a literature review of peacebuilding outcomes and how they have been monetized in previous peer-reviewed literature and reports. In addition, the research team reviewed all documents pertaining to the Program Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya: Mombasa, Lamu, Kilifi and Tana River Counties provided by IOM and CICC including interim and final evaluation reports. In total, 135 (5 reports provided by program staff and 130 from a literature search) documents were reviewed to either provide context or provide further evidence to support findings for the evaluation questions.

## **ESTABLISHING THE SCOPE OF ANALYSIS**

At the outset of the evaluation, members of the research team conducted discussions with the staff of the intervention to define the scope of the analysis. This stage included identifying the key activities that were part of the intervention, the time period over which they occurred, and their locations, and which of those would be included in the analysis. In addition, this stage included identifying the key stakeholders of the intervention and the best methods for engagement with key stakeholders for data collection.

## **THEORY OF CHANGE WORKSHOP**

Members of the research team conducted a theory of change workshop with program staff to identify from their perspectives what were the key outcomes of the intervention and their underlying assumptions. A map of well-defined outcomes was developed through engagement with all key stakeholders to understand from each of their perspectives the outcomes they experienced, including intended and unintended, and any positive and negative outcomes. (Given the focus was on identifying key outcomes, and not so strictly the cause and effect over time to the extent that formal theories of change typically do, this resulted in a map of well-defined outcomes instead of a traditional theory of change diagram.)

## **QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION**

### **FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS**

Five moderators conducted a total of 7 FGDs with key stakeholders of the intervention. Two FGDs were conducted with youth, 2 with women participants, 2 with religious leaders participating in programming, and 1 with program staff. The purpose of the FGDs was to understand from stakeholders' perspectives what were the key outcomes they experienced as a result of the intervention, how they would describe the changes they experienced (indicators), how long outcomes lasted (duration), their relative importance or value, what would have happened anyway without the intervention (deadweight), how much of the outcomes they experienced they would attribute to the intervention (attribution), if the outcomes dropped off over time (drop-off), and any recommendations they have for the future. The extent to which outcomes experienced by program stakeholders may have resulted from those outcomes simply shifting away from other stakeholders who would otherwise have experienced those same outcomes if not for the program activities (displacement) was considered to be zero. Six of the focus groups were conducted in-person while the 7<sup>th</sup> (with program staff) was conducted online via Zoom.

### **KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS**

The local research team also conducted semi-structured KIIs with additional key stakeholders of the intervention who were unable to be engaged via focus groups including security actors. In total, 3 KIIs were conducted. The purpose of the KIIs was similar to the purpose of the FGDs and the same instrument was used. All interviews were conducted via telephone.

Data for FGDs and KIIs was entered into Kobo Collect. After data collection, transcripts were translated from Kiswahili to English where necessary and analyzed using content analysis and coded in Excel.

## QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

Based on the qualitative data collection and analysis of outcomes, online surveys were developed to understand the quantity of people from key stakeholder groups that had large numbers of participants (in this case youth participants, women participants, religious leaders and security actors) that experienced the outcomes identified during the qualitative data collection phase, along with how long outcomes lasted (duration), their relative importance or value, what would have happened anyway without the intervention (deadweight), how much of the outcomes they experienced they would attribute to the intervention (attribution), if the outcomes dropped off over time (drop-off), etc. Online surveys were translated into Kiswahili and programmed in Kobo Collect. Surveys were administered to youth, religious leaders, and women (35+) participants. Sixty-one (61) respondents completed the surveys. Quantitative data was cleaned and analyzed using Excel software.

## OUTCOMES VALUATION

The outcomes identified by key stakeholders were monetized using two different approaches to valuation: cost-based valuation (using financial proxies for similar outcomes found in the literature) and stakeholders-stated preference valuation (derived directly from stakeholders via FGDs, KIs, and online surveys). The purpose of valuation is to reveal the value of outcomes and show how important they are compared to the value of other outcomes. SROI uses monetary values to represent outcomes as money is a widely accepted way of conveying value. The monetized values of outcomes were used to calculate the SROI ratios.

(1): For the cost-based valuation using literature, the research team identified similar outcomes that had been valued using financial proxies in relevant published reports and literature. This approach is traditionally how economic analyses are done. Some outcomes had previously been monetized in the literature according to value to the State (i.e., how much money the government would save, or gain in tax revenue, if a specific outcome occurred). Other outcomes had been previously monetized in other SROI reports according to stated preference valuation. Where information on financial proxies was not available, the research team used the market price method to assign values (i.e., how much would it cost to purchase an experience that leads to similar outcomes). Financial values from the literature were adjusted for time horizon or purchasing power parity as appropriate (i.e., if an outcome was valued in the United Kingdom using the market price method, the research team considered what would the price be in KES factoring in purchasing power parity).

(2): For the stakeholders-stated preference valuation, a list of common items in the market that stakeholders might find valuable was created by the local field research team and validated with key stakeholders in validation sessions after the first round of data collection. Each item on the list had an approximate market price (which was hidden) and items were shown in order by price. Respondents were asked to select which items from the list the outcome would fall between, if they had to say how relatively important to them the outcome in question was compared with these items. After responses were collected, the value of the outcome was equated to the average value of the market-priced items the outcome fell between. This correlation occurred by averaging the responses from the stakeholders and using the upper and lower values to estimate the valuation. For example, if the average valuation was 4.3, the valuations of items corresponding to '4' and '5' would be used to establish the low valuation and high valuation. Table 1 shows the item list as presented to stakeholders and Table 2 shows the items and their corresponding valuations.

**Table 2: List of Items Presented to Stakeholders to Establish Their Valuations**

Item Number	Item Description
1	Airtime for One Week
2	Used Mobile Phone
3	32" TV
4	Laptop
5	Plot of Land (40 x 80 square feet)
6	Business investment in a flock of chickens
7	Used car
8	New tuk-tuk
9	Buying a land a building a home for myself
10	Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm
11	Apartment in Mombasa
12	100 acres of land in the Central Region of Kenya where the land is fertile
12	Apartment in Syokimau*
13	Two Apartments in Mombasa
14	A Beachfront Property

\* Some stakeholders stated that they felt an Apartment in Syokimau (a highly sought-after residential area of Nairobi) was not relevant to them but that an area of land in central Kenya was. Where this secondary option was relevant, it was given.

**Table 3: List of Items and Their Corresponding Valuations**

	Items for Stakeholder Stated Preference Valuation	Value in Kenyan Shillings (KSh)	Value in United States Dollars (USD)
1	Airtime for one week	700	\$5.83
2	Used Mobile Phone	10,000	\$83.34
3	TV 32"	20,000	\$166.67
4	Laptop	30,000	\$250
5	Plot of Land (40x80)	100,000	\$833.34
6	Business Investment in Flock of Chickens	200,000	\$1,666.67
7	Used Car	300,000	\$2,500
8	New Tuk-Tuk	500,000	\$4,166.67
9	Buying land and building a home for myself	1,000,000	\$8,333.34
10	Starting a tent chair hiring business	2,000,000	\$16,666.67
11	Apartment in Mombasa	5,000,000	\$41,666.67
12	Apartment in Syokimau	7,000,000	\$58,333.34
13	100 acres of land where the land is fertile	7,500,000	\$62,500
14	Two apartments in Mombasa	10,000,000	\$83,333.34
15	Beachfront Property	15,000,000	\$120,000

\* A rough conversion of 1 USD = 120 KSh was used throughout the program as informed by local research partners.

## **CALCULATION OF THE SROI RATIO**

Calculation of the SROI ratio involved taking into account the monetized value of each outcome, the quantity of stakeholders experiencing the outcome, subtracting for deadweight, attribution, drop-off, and discounting projected values to present value to arrive at the impact for each outcome. The sum of all values was calculated, from which the total investment was subtracted, and then the total value was divided by the total investment to arrive at the SROI ratio.

After calculating the SROI ratio, sensitivity analyses were conducted to assess the extent to which the results would change if some of the assumptions made in the previous stages (i.e., monetized value of outcomes, deadweight, attribution) were changed. The aim of such analyses was to test which assumptions have the greatest effect on the model.

## **VALIDATION SESSIONS WITH KEY STAKEHOLDERS**

Preliminary SROI results and findings were presented to key stakeholders during validation sessions in July and September 2022, followed by revisions to the analysis as relevant. A total of 47 stakeholders participated in the final validation sessions.

## **ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS: SROI IN THE CONTEXT OF ELECTIONS**

Understanding the relative value of outcomes to stakeholders during periods of heightened tension or conflict can provide further important information for peacebuilding efforts. As the national elections in Kenya took place in August 2022, this presented a unique opportunity to understand how the outcomes created by peacebuilding interventions may be valued differently by stakeholders in this context. As such, an additional round of quantitative data collection was conducted after the elections through online surveys programmed in Google surveys, translated into Kiswahili, and administered in October 2022. Sixty-eight (68) respondents completed the surveys including from all stakeholder groups. Data was cleaned and analyzed using Excel. An additional SROI ratio in the context of the elections was calculated based on this data.

## **REPORTING AND USING RESULTS**

Final results were presented to program staff and additional key stakeholders in December 2022. This included discussion of how the results can be used, including key strengths of the interventions as well as key recommendations to inform the strategic design of programming to grow more social value.

## ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

The following assumptions were made when conducting this analysis:

1. **Scope.** While the intervention was implemented in multiple counties, this analysis focused on the programming in Mombasa only (given limits on human and financial resources to conduct the study). In addition, this analysis only included a subset of activities implemented in Mombasa, focusing on those activities that occurred over a longer time period and were therefore more likely to have a sustained and recognizable outcome. The activities included in the analysis were: the connector program, radio programming, inter- and intra- community dialogues, women barazas and the youth accountability forum. Given this limited scope, the SROI ratio calculated here will be different compared to if the intervention was analyzed in its entirety, and is likely underestimated in this analysis.
2. **Investment.** The estimated budget that was spent for the programming in Mombasa (out of all counties where the intervention was implemented) was \$317,250 according to data provided by IOM staff. However, an estimated budget for the subset of activities in Mombasa included in the analysis was not available. As such, the research team prorated this total amount by 33.4% given roughly only one third of the program activities in Mombasa were included in the analysis. As such, \$107,865 was used as the budget for this program when calculating the results.

The following limitations should be considered when interpreting results from this report:

1. **Results: Attribution and Deadweight.** While findings suggest that the intervention contributed to and helped achieve outcomes that stakeholders experienced, causality cannot be pinpointed. A variety of other factors and/or assistance from other interventions may have also contributed to results, and this evaluation does not use a randomized control trial methodology to tease out attribution and deadweight. It does however ask stakeholders to estimate how much of the outcomes they experienced were attributable to the intervention under analysis (i.e., attribution), as well as how much of the outcomes they experienced would have happened anyway based on other factors/trends (i.e., deadweight) and both of these estimates from stakeholders are taken into account in the SROI calculation.
2. **Recall Bias.** As several questions raised during the data collection processes addressed issues that took place in the past, recall bias may have affected the responses provided due to discrepancies in the accuracy or completeness of recollections of past events.
3. **Halo Bias.** There is a known tendency among respondents to under-report socially undesirable answers and alter their responses to approximate what they perceive as the social norm, called halo bias. This can manifest in responses from key stakeholders, especially youth, who may have a tendency to respond favorably to questions as key beneficiaries of the intervention. The research team made efforts to explicitly ask about any negative outcomes stakeholders may have experienced, and to gather information from a wide range of stakeholders and number of respondents to adjust for this bias and triangulate responses among each group.
4. **Sampling for FGDs.** The research team sought to select 8-12 respondents for each FGD. Participants were sampled from lists of individuals involved in relevant activities provided by the implementing organization. This does not sample for the entirety of the population of participants but focuses on participants that were included in the lists leading to possible selection bias.

5. **Survey Sampling.** The method of sampling for the online surveys focused on reaching as many stakeholders as possible to achieve statistically representative samples of the stakeholder groups. However, the research team acknowledges a potential limitation of relying too heavily on those who responded as the desired sample size was not met in some cases. This was particularly problematic in the additional round of online surveys administered post the national elections in Kenya. Response rates are noted in the report. The research team was also aware of participant fatigue due to multiple data collection efforts.
6. **Environmental Factors.** Factors such as the national election in Kenya led to difficulties in data collection with security actors in particular. Multiple interviews had to be delayed or cancelled as security actors were busier and more difficult to reach around this period. The research team extended the data collection timeline and was able to conduct some of the planned interviews, however, this environmental factor could have influenced the quality of data collected from the respondents due to distractions or incomplete responses.
7. **Timing of the Analysis.** Generally, peacebuilding interventions seek to create long-term community change through their actions. The intervention analyzed ended within the 12 months preceding the analysis. While this timeframe may lend to more accurate recall of the impacts of the program by its participants than if the study were done later, longer-term outcomes that may have been created by the program were not yet possible to observe and analyze.
8. **Cost-Based Valuation Using Literature.** This analysis is one of the first known studies to apply SROI methodology to peacebuilding interventions. Consequently, the approach of using financial proxies to translate well-defined outcomes into monetary terms is not as well-developed in peacebuilding literature as it has been in other areas where SROI and/or similar approaches are more commonly used (e.g. Health Program Analysis). The literature review conducted as part of this study only surfaced 5 studies where monetization of outcomes was done in the peacebuilding field. The majority of these used stakeholder preference valuation to determine their valuation. Valuations established through stakeholder preferences should be leveraged with caution as it is likely that preferences are not the same across populations. Additionally, the scales or instruments used to establish stated preference valuations in other studies were not clear so it could not be established whether the scales used in this study were similar to ensure comparability of results. As such, results using this approach should be interpreted with caution. However, the research team employed an alternate approach to valuation in this study via stated preferences with stakeholders in this study, which provided a more accurate basis for results in this context. It is likely that as SROI methodologies are used more in the analysis of peacebuilding interventions, a consensus will emerge regarding the proper techniques to monetize relevant outcomes, and thus develop SROI ratios that more accurately reflect the social value created by peacebuilding interventions.

## FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

### FINDINGS

#### EQ1: WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS OF THE INTERVENTION?

Program staff identified key stakeholders of the intervention, including all groups who participated in programming, those who were involved with the coordination and delivery of the program, and any other parties who were significantly affected by the program. In addition, to ensure that any other stakeholders or sub-groups of stakeholders were not missing, participants were asked during qualitative data collection to identify other groups who they felt may be affected by the programming. The groups who were deemed to be materially affected based on (1) staff report, (2) self-reported outcomes from the qualitative data collection, and/or (3) identification by parties included in the qualitative data collection were then included in the analysis. Table 4 summarizes each stakeholder group, their relationship to the program and the rationale for inclusion or exclusion from the analysis.

**Table 4: Key Stakeholders of the Program and Inclusion or Exclusion from SROI Analysis**

STAKEHOLDER GROUP	DESCRIPTION	RATIONALE FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION
Youth	Program beneficiaries	Included as intended beneficiary of programming
Women (35+) Participants of Programming	Program beneficiaries	Included as intended beneficiary of programming
Religious Leaders	Program beneficiaries	Included as intended beneficiary of programming
State Actors	Indirect beneficiaries	Included as indirect beneficiary of programming
Program Staff	Provider of programming	Included as affecting and affected by programming
USAID	Provider of funding	Excluded as priorities understood through program staff

**Table 5: Key Stakeholders Reached**


Stakeholder Group	Population Size (Mombasa)	Number of Participants in Focus Groups or Interview	Number of Respondents to Survey	Number of Respondents to Post-Election Survey
Youth	60	20	25*	14*
Women (35+) Participants of Programming	55	24	18*	10*
Religious Leaders	55	24	14*	21*
Security Actors	23	3	1*	21*
Staff	15	15	-	3*

\*Indicates where a representative sample size was not reached.

#### EQ2: WHAT OUTCOMES DO KEY STAKEHOLDERS EXPERIENCE?

Key stakeholders included in the analysis identified several outcomes that they experienced as summarized in Figure 2 on the next page.

**Figure 2: Map of Well-Defined Outcomes for the Program**



**EQ3: WHAT IS THE RELATIVE VALUE OF THE OUTCOMES TO KEY STAKEHOLDERS?**

The relative value of outcomes experienced by each stakeholder according to the cost-based valuation (using literature) (also known as “benefit-transfer method”) is presented in Table 6. This approach of using literature is how many traditional economic analyses are done. As described in the limitations, it is worth noting that most of these outcomes have not been previously monetized in the literature. Only a few outcomes could be monetized according to previous literature as related to value to the State, whereas most other outcomes were monetized based on market price method, and a handful based on stakeholder stated preferences from other studies and adapted for time horizon or purchasing power parity to this context.


**Table 6: Condensed Impact Map (Cost-Based Valuation Using Literature)**

Stakeholders	Outcomes  Outcome description	Extrapolated Quantity	Express the relative importance (value) of the outcome		Deadweight %	Displacement %	Attribution %	Drop off %	Impact calculation
			Valuation approach (monetary)	Monetary valuation					
Youth (18-35) Participants of Programming	Increased networking and opportunities	58	Cost of Joining Toastmasters for One Year	\$110.00	19%	0%	26%	-51%	\$3,797.80
	Increased Leadership Skills and Capacity	58	Cost of Leadership Development Seminar (Kenya)	\$1095.00	18%	0%	26%	-56%	\$38,272.09
	Increased religious tolerance	53	Avoided cost to the State of one incidence of conflict	\$433.00	13%	0%	28%	-56%	\$14,321.01
Women	Increased Networking and Opportunities	55	Cost to Join Women's Chamber of Commerce (Tanzania) for One Year	\$38.00	28%	0%	28%	-59%	\$1,083.46
	Increased Interfaith Dialogue	55	Avoided cost to the State of one incidence of conflict	\$433.00	29%	0%	29%	-61%	\$12,005.14
	Increased capacity for peacebuilding	55	Cost of Introductory Peacebuilding Course (Kenya)	\$200.00	32%	0%	32%	-61%	\$5,086.40
	Increased Inclusion in peacebuilding processes	55	Increase in Global GDP Per Capita as a result of the elimination of Gender-Based Discrimination in Social Institutions	\$764.00	32%	0%	32%	-61%	\$19,430.05
Religious Leaders	Increased Networking and Opportunities	55	Cost of Joining Toastmasters for One Year	\$110.00	25%	0%	20%	-57%	\$3,630.00
	Increased Interfaith Dialogue	55	Avoided cost to the State of one incidence of conflict	\$433.00	23%	0%	21%	-57%	\$14,486.66
	Increased Capacity for Peacebuilding	55	Cost of Introductory Peacebuilding Course (Kenya)	\$200.00	27%	23%	23%	-50%	\$4,760.99


Stakeholders	Outcomes  Outcome description	Extrapolated Quantity	Express the relative importance (value) of the outcome		Deadweight %	Displacement %	Attribution %	Drop off %	Impact calculation
			Valuation approach (monetary)	Monetary valuation					
	Increased Outreach to at-risk Youth	47	Avoided costs to the State associated with a reduction in Anti-Social Behaviour	\$842.54	25%	0%	25%	-58%	\$22,342.40
Security Actors	Reduction in crime	23	Avoided cost to the State of one incidence of conflict	\$433.00	25%	0%	50%	0%	\$3,734.63
Staff (IOM and CICC)	Increased capacity for peacebuilding	10	Market rate for professional peacebuilding educational course	1664.24	25%	0%	0%	-67%	\$12,481.79

The relative value of outcomes experienced by each stakeholder according to stakeholders-stated preference valuation are presented in Figures 3-7.


**Figure 3: Relative Value of Outcomes for Youth (n=27)**




**Figure 4: Relative Value of Outcomes for Women (35+) Participants of Programming (n=18)**




**Figure 5: Relative Value of Outcomes for Religious Leaders (n=15)**



**Figure 6: Relative Value of Outcomes for Security Actors (n=1)**




**Figure 7: Relative Value of Outcomes for Program Staff (n=15)**




Based on stakeholders stated preference valuation, findings suggest that the most value was created for youth (57-64%), followed by Women (35+) Participants of Programming (20-21%), and followed by other key stakeholders, which is consistent with the primary targets of the intervention (see Figure 8).

**Figure 8: Relative Value Created for Stakeholder Group**




The additional findings of the evaluation, based on stakeholders-stated preference valuation of the value of outcomes in the context of the election, are presented below.


**Figure 9: Relative Value of Outcomes for Youth (Post-Election) (n=14)**




**Figure 10: Relative Value of Outcomes for Women (Ages 35+) (Post-Election) (n=10)**




**Figure 11: Relative Value of Outcomes for Religious Leaders (Post-Election) (n=21)**



**Figure 12: Relative Value of Outcomes for Security Actors (Post-Election) (n=21)**



**Figure 13: Relative Value of Outcomes for Staff (Post-Election) (n=3)**



**EQ4: WHAT IS THE SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT (SROI) OF THE PROGRAM?**

The findings of the evaluation, according to cost-based valuation (using the literature), suggest that for every \$1 invested in the program, approximately \$1.51 in social value is created (with a sensitivity analysis range from \$0.30 to \$2.25).

Total Monetized Impact	\$155,340
Total Present Value	\$161,911
Total Investment	\$107,865
Social Return on Investment (SROI)	\$1.51

The findings of the evaluation, based on stakeholders-stated preference valuation, suggest that for every \$1 invested in the program, approximately \$7.01-\$10.04 in social value is created (with a sensitivity analysis range from \$1.40 to \$15.06).

Total Monetized Impact	\$1,129,320 - \$1,770,562
Total Present Value	\$838,577 - \$1,082,878
Total Investment	\$107,865
Social Return on Investment (SROI)	\$7.01-\$10.04

The additional findings of the evaluation, based on stakeholders-stated preference valuation of the value of outcomes in the context of the election, suggest that for every \$1 invested in the program, approximately \$16.33-\$32.54 in social value is created (with a sensitivity analysis range from \$3.27 to \$48.81). It's important to note that this result should only be interpreted as suggestive given that full data was not collected for this calculation (i.e., deadweight, attribution, and drop-off were assumed to be the same as in the earlier results) and the sample was far from representative.

Total Monetized Impact	\$1,819,526 - \$3,692,010
Total Present Value	\$1,761,688 - \$3,512,230
Total Investment	\$107,865
Social Return on Investment (SROI)	\$16.33 - \$32.54

Additional detailed results and information are available in Appendix G.

#### **EQ5: HOW CAN THE RESULTS OF THE SROI ANALYSIS BE USED TO IMPROVE FUTURE PROGRAMMING?**

Results of the SROI analysis can be used to improve future programming in multiple ways.

Results from the cost-based valuation (using literature), which are often based on large sample sizes and statistics, and consider the value to one key stakeholder (i.e., cost savings to the State), can generally provide insight on how the State is affected by the intervention, including areas it may want to invest in further. However, given the dearth of literature in this context, and the narrowness of the perspective on value applied, the utility of this set of results may be limited.

Results from the stakeholders-stated preference valuation suggest which outcomes were most important to key stakeholders who experienced the program and can be used in multiple ways. First, these insights can be used to identify the activities or approaches that are most associated with these outcomes as ones that should be continued or expanded. Second, any negative outcomes that stakeholders described present an opportunity to dig deeper to understand what led to those outcomes and how they might be prevented or reduced in the future. Third, findings can elucidate any sub-groups of stakeholders who may be experiencing outcomes differently and opportunities to better meet their needs. Fourth, if there were outcomes that stakeholders did not report as having experienced, but were intended by program managers and/or donors, it opens the dialogue for why that was the case, and if there was a potential mismatch between what mattered to decision-makers versus users of the intervention, or the approaches used, that can be considered in future design. Finally, the fact that stakeholders are asked to provide their experience of value embodies an approach to understanding and to accountability that recognizes the important role the various stakeholders play in creating positive change. This itself may enhance the rapport between funders, program implementers and communities, and improve the ability of program operators to deliver meaningful benefits to communities experiencing conflict.

Results from the stakeholders-stated preference valuation in the context of the national elections can be further useful in understanding the value of this peacebuilding intervention to stakeholders during periods of heightened tension. Given that many peacebuilding programs in Kenya have been developed in response to experiences of violent elections or conflict, these findings (while only suggestive) imply this intervention is even more valuable in such contexts, and contributed to what proved to be a relatively peaceful election in 2022, which is of utmost importance.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Three specific recommendations were identified for this program to increase value in the future. They are:

- 1) Increase the scope and number of outreach events. Participants expressed that they felt the outreach events and the opportunity to interact with other community members to share peace messaging was a valuable experience to them and that creating more of these opportunities in future programming could be beneficial to them.
- 2) Increase the recognition and branding of the program. Stakeholders expressed that by increasing the recognition and branding of the program (i.e., through t-shirts or other promotional materials), this would give their outreach efforts more legitimacy and credibility, and also help in attribution and making the value of these efforts more measurable.
- 3) Focus on extending the duration of desired outcomes. While many outcomes created positive value for stakeholders, these outcomes sometimes only lasted a year or less than a year. As such, programming should be adapted to focus on extending the duration of desired outcomes.

## CONCLUSIONS

Findings, based on both valuation approaches and across data collected both pre- and post-election, suggest that the program has had a positive impact on the communities in which it operates. While the youth participants benefitted the most from the intervention, there was clear benefit to all stakeholder groups including women participants, religious leaders, security actors and staff working on the program. Results of the stakeholders-stated preference valuation suggest that for every \$1 invested in the program, between \$7.01 and \$10.04 of social value is created, with the estimated social value of the intervention increasing even further in the context of an election.

Despite the limitations noted in this report, using the SROI approach for this evaluation provided added value over traditional evaluation approaches used in this sector in the following ways:

- 1) SROI analysis prioritized the voice of all key stakeholders and what mattered most to them. It did this by asking stakeholders what outcomes they experienced and the relative importance of them. Through this process, SROI allowed for the measurement of 'softer' intangible outcomes as opposed to solely focusing on 'hard' tangible or economic outcomes. These 'softer' outcomes are often excluded from traditional program evaluation and economic analyses due to the difficulty of quantifying them. However, this analysis found that these intangible outcomes (i.e., increased empowerment and inclusion, and increased networking) were the most important to stakeholders.
- 2) SROI analysis provided insights to avoid or mitigate harmful effects. SROI engaged key stakeholders in defining what changed for them and explicitly required them to consider both any positive and negative consequences they might have experienced. These insights can be used to mitigate these harms from occurring in the future.
- 3) SROI examined sustainability by considering how long outcomes lasted and how they dropped off over time and factored those into the calculations of value.
- 4) SROI elucidated value for money. While most programming in this space has inherently been understood as valuable by program staff and donors, SROI made that value explicit by assigning a dollar value to outcomes.

- 5) SROI analysis encourages decision-making based on value, not outputs. Outputs do not reflect the whole picture but have often been the basis for many decisions in aid and development programming.

Ultimately, as the goals of programming and evaluation are to improve the well-being of communities, understanding, measuring and valuing what matters most to all key stakeholders of peacebuilding interventions is key to proving and improving value.

## **ANNEXES**

## ANNEX A: SOURCES OF INFORMATION

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## ANNEX B: DETAILED METHODOLOGY

Social Return on Investment (SROI) Analysis is a methodology that seeks to measure and account for the value (economic, social and/or environmental) created through (or diminished by) a program, policy, or intervention. Table B.1 outlines the six-step process of analysis and table B.2 outlines the eight principles that govern how SROI (and Social Value Analysis) should be applied.

**Table B. 1: The SROI Analysis Process (Adapted from SVI, 2022)**

<p><b>Step 1: Establishing scope and identifying key stakeholders.</b> It is important to clearly delineate the scope of what is to be included in the SROI analysis – including what activities will be analyzed, who will be involved in the process and how they will be included.</p>
<p><b>Stage 2: Mapping outcomes.</b> As stakeholders are engaged with, the relationship between inputs, outputs and outcomes becomes clearer. As a result, these can be mapped into a <i>Theory of Change and Impact Map</i>.</p>
<p><b>Stage 3: Evidencing outcomes and giving them a value.</b> In this stage, data is collected to understand if outcomes have occurred and to assign them a monetized value.</p>
<p><b>Stage 4: Establishing Impact.</b> Now that evidence of outcomes has been collected and they have been monetized, change because of other factors, or that would have occurred anyway, must be controlled for to establish the true impact of the intervention.</p>
<p><b>Stage 5: Calculating the SROI.</b> At this stage, the value of all outcomes is calculated by summing total benefits and subtracting any negatives. This total value is then compared to the investment into the intervention (both financial investment and non-monetary investments) to generate an SROI ratio (the ratio of outputs to investment). This ratio is then tested for sensitivity.</p>
<p><b>Stage 6: Reporting, using, and embedding.</b> This last step of the SROI process shares findings of analysis with stakeholders, verifying the report, and sharing recommendations to improve the impact of the program.</p>

**Table B. 2: Social Value Principles (Adapted from SVI, 2022)**

<p><b>Principle 1: Involve stakeholders.</b> This suggests that stakeholders are best placed to describe how an intervention has affected them and means that they are consulted throughout the analysis process.</p>
<p><b>Principle 2: Understand what changes.</b> This requires that the Theory of Change or Impact Map (both describing how the change occurs) be articulated and evidence-based - involving stakeholders, positive and negative outcomes, and intended and unintended outcomes.</p>
<p><b>Principle 3: Value what matters.</b> This suggests that it is important to understand the relative importance or value of different outcomes – especially to the stakeholders that experience them.</p>
<p><b>Principle 4: Only include what is material.</b> This means that only what has been determined to be of importance to stakeholders is included (i.e. what may affect future decisions).</p>
<p><b>Principle 5: Do not overclaim.</b> This means that an intervention should only claim the value it has created. This requires considering impact that may be created by other interventions, the amount of future change to happen as a result of the program, and counterfactual impact.</p>
<p><b>Principle 6: Be transparent.</b> This means that at each step of the analysis, the process and decisions made should be documented to ensure it is a fair and honest representation of the actual impact of the scope of analysis.</p>

**Principle 7: Verify the result.** SROI Analysis results should be independently assured to ensure that the decisions made by those responsible for the analysis were reasonable.

**Principle 8: Be responsive.** Social value should be optimized through timely decision making, supported by appropriate accounting and reporting.

## **ANNEX C: FOCUS GROUP GUIDE (ENGLISH VERSION)**

### **Guide for Focus Groups/Interviews with Key Stakeholders (i.e., Youth (18-35) Participants of Programming, Women, Religious Leaders, etc.)**

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this focus group [or interview] today. My name is Ngesa/Mariam/Other of Rural Senses. Our purpose is to evaluate the effects of the [program name]. As part of this effort, we are doing focus groups and interviews with key stakeholders of the program like yourselves, to understand from their perspectives what the program's effects were.

This study will be used to improve the program and similar programs so that they can be as beneficial as possible for young people and your community. Your responses will be anonymous- we will not associate anyone's name with anything you say. We are an independent party and we want to capture the reality and your honest feedback, whether good or bad. We expect this session to last approximately 90 minutes.

Our objectives are to:

- I. Understand your perspectives in terms of any positive or negative changes, both intended and unintended, experienced by participants or other key stakeholders as a result of the program
- II. Explore what the importance of that change has been to the participants and other key stakeholders

We plan to share results with participants and other interested parties during and upon completion of the evaluation – we will reach out to you by the end of September regarding the results.

If you agree to participate, we will continue, if you don't want to participate you are free to leave.

Introduction round (present yourself and a animal/fruit name)

#### **First let's just start by talking about your involvement with the program.**

1. How would you describe your experience in the program in your own words?

#### **Now let's think about what the program's effects were.**

2. What were you hoping the program would do for you?
3. What positive changes did you experience as a result of the program? (Probe: did it affect your knowledge/attitudes/behavior, interactions with others, quality of life, safety, less violence, empowerment, business, policies, etc.) (note: list the top 2-5 outcomes that come up)
4. What negative changes did you experience as a result of the program, if any? (note: 1-2 if any)
5. Were there any results or changes that surprised you? If so, what were they?
6. For each change you experienced:
  - 6.1. Change title:
  - 6.2. Positive/Negative change?
  - 6.3. How could you tell that had changed?
  - 6.4. How much did it change (a little, significantly, a lot)?

7. Of all these changes, which ones (1-3) were most important to you and why?
8. For each of the most important changes:
  - 8.1. How long did the changes last? (a few days, weeks, months, years, ongoing- if years specify how many years)?
  - 8.2. Did the effects change over time (increased a lot over time, increased a bit over time, no change, decreased a lot over time, decreased a bit over time)?
  - 8.3. If the program didn't exist, is there anything else that would have led to any of the same changes?
  - 8.4. What or who else contributed to any of these changes, and how?
  - 8.5. How much of the changes would you say was caused by the program? (0% - none, 25% - some, 50% - half, 75% - a lot, 100% - all)?
9. Who else did the program affect in a significant way?
10. for each affected stakeholder from previous question:
  - 10.1. Stakeholder title
  - 10.2. How were they affected?
11. Do you have any suggestions or ideas how the program could be improved in the future?

**In the last part of this focus group, we want to discuss the value of other items with regards to the change. We are now going to present you with a list of items. Let's go over them to estimate their approximate market price.** [Put up images, cards, or list of those items from lowest to highest value].

12. For each of the most important change:
  - 12.1. Where would you place the value of that change in relation to these items? Facilitator notes down the 2 items below and above the change.
13. Is there anything else you'd like to share with us?

**Thank you so much for your time!**

**List of items:**

Item	~value (KS)	~value (US\$)
Airtime for 1 week	700	7
Used mobile phone	10,000	100
Laptop	30,000	300
TV "32	20,000	200
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)	100,000	1,000

Item	~value (KS)	~value (US\$)
Used car	300,000	3,000
Apartment in Mombasa	5,000,000	50,000
Apartment in Syokimau	7,000,000	70,000
Beachfront Property	12,000,000	120,000

## ANNEX D: SURVEY INSTRUMENTS FOR EACH STAKEHOLDER (ENGLISH VERSIONS)

### SURVEY – YOUTH

Thank you for taking the time to do this survey. It should take no more than 30 minutes. Please answer truthfully. Your answers will be confidential and only used to help improve future programs like the Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya Program.

Some youth were asked about what had changed for them as a result of the Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya Program. We will tell you what the youth we talked to said - we want to know if you have experienced the same changes or not.

This first set of questions is aimed to understand who the program has reached:

1. Did you participate in the "Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya" Program?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
  - c. I don't recall
2. In what year did you participate?
  - a. 2017
  - b. 2018
  - c. 2019
  - d. 2020
  - e. 2021
  - f. 2022
3. In what county do you live?
  - a. Mombasa
  - b. Kilifi
  - c. Lamu
4. Age (Range)
  - a. 18-24
  - b. 24-29
  - c. 30-35
  - d. other
5. Gender:
  - a. Male
  - b. Female
  - c. Other

#### Outcome #1 – Networking and Opportunities

1. Some youth that participated in this program experienced more networking and opportunities as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
  - a. I experienced more networking and opportunities as a result of this program. (Go to next question)

- b. I haven't yet experienced more networking and opportunities as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
  - c. I do not think I will experience more networking and opportunities as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
- 2. How could you tell that your networking and opportunities had increased?
  - a. Increased recognition of and connection to local chiefs, religious leaders, elders and officials
  - b. Increased job opportunities
  - c. Increased collaboration with other youth on local community programs
  - d. More connection to other local youth
  - e. Increased opportunities to share knowledge about peace
  - f. Increased opportunity to attend local council sessions
  - g. Increased sense of connection to other youth
  - h. Increased opportunity to attend other trainings to build skills
- 3. By how much did your networking and opportunities increase as a result of this program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Significantly
  - c. A lot
- 4. How long after you finished being involved in this program, did you experience increased networking and opportunities?
  - a. This change ended once the program ended.
  - b. A few days
  - c. Weeks
  - d. Months
  - e. Years (if selected, dropdown 1, 2, 3 or more years)
  - f. Ongoing
- 5. How did the increase in your networking and opportunities change over time?
  - a. My increased networking and opportunities continued to increase a lot over time
  - b. They continued to increase a bit over time
  - c. The amount of increase in my networking and opportunities stayed the same
  - d. The initial change decreased a bit over time
  - e. The initial change decreased a lot over time
- 6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased networking and opportunities?
  - a. No
  - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
  - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
  - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
- 7. How much of the increased networking and opportunities would you say was caused by the program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Half
  - c. A lot
  - d. All

## Outcome #2 - Youth Empowerment

1. Some youth that participated in this program experienced increased empowerment (i.e. increased confidence, leadership skills, political empowerment and financial resources) as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
  - a. I experienced more empowerment as a result of this program.
  - b. I haven't yet experienced more empowerment as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
  - c. I do not think I will experience increased empowerment as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that your empowerment increased? (Select all that apply)
  - a. Increased financial position
  - b. Increased understanding of leadership and what makes a good leader
  - c. Increased confidence and knowledge of political processes leading to increased participation in elections
  - d. Increased confidence to lead community programming for the betterment of the community
  - e. Increased personal confidence and positive self image
3. By how much did your empowerment increase as a result of this program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Significantly
  - c. A lot
4. How long after you finished being involved in this program, did you experience increased empowerment?
  - a. This change ended once the program ended.
  - b. A few days
  - c. Weeks
  - d. Months
  - e. Years (if selected, dropdown 1, 2, 3 or more years)
5. How did the amount you felt your empowerment had increased change over time?
  - a. My empowerment continued to increase a lot over time
  - b. It continued to increase a bit over time
  - c. The amount of increased empowerment I felt stayed the same
  - d. The change decreased a bit over time
  - e. The change decreased a lot over time
6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased empowerment?
  - a. No
  - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
  - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
  - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
7. How much increased empowerment would you say was caused by the program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Half
  - c. A lot
  - d. All

### Outcome #3 - Capacity

1. Some youth that participated in this program experienced increased capacity (e.g. an increased sense of personal skills and capacity) as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
  - a. I experienced increased capacity as a result of this program. (Go to next question)
  - b. I haven't yet experienced increased capacity as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
  - c. I do not think I will experience increased capacity in the future as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that your capacity had increased? (Select all that apply)
  - a. Development of knowledge on how to start community programs
  - b. Increased knowledge of leadership skills and sense of personal capacity to act as a leader in the community
  - c. Attendance at council sessions
  - d. Increased sense of personal capacity to act as peace ambassador in the community and share peace messaging
  - e. Increased personal skills (i.e. speaking in front of groups)
  - f. Increased knowledge and understanding of the peace process (e.g.. arbitration, mediation, etc.)
3. By how much did your capacity increase as a result of this program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Significantly
  - c. A lot
4. For how long after you finished being involved in this program did you continue to experience increased capacity?
  - a. A few days after the program ended
  - b. Weeks after the program ended
  - c. Months after the program ended
  - d. Years (if selected, dropdown 1, 2, 3 or more years)
  - e. Ongoing
  - f. This change ended once the program ended.
5. How did your increased capacity change over time for you?
  - a. Increased a lot over time
  - b. Increased a bit over time
  - c. No change
  - d. Decreased a lot over time
  - e. Decreased a bit over time
6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased capacity?
  - a. No
  - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
  - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
  - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
7. How much increased capacity would you say was caused by the program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Half

- c. A lot
- d. All

#### Outcome #4 – Religious Tolerance

1. Some youth that participated in this program experienced increased religious tolerance (e.g. fostering better relations between different faith groups and encouraging brotherhood) as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
  - a. I experienced more religious tolerance as a result of this program. (Go to next question)
  - b. I haven't yet experienced more religious tolerance as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
  - c. I do not think I will experience more religious tolerance as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that your religious tolerance had increased? (Select all that apply)
  - a. Increased sense of connection to youth of other faiths
  - b. Increased sense of commonality between youth of different faiths
  - c. Increased sense of understanding of other religious practices
  - d. Attendance at religious events of other faiths
  - e. Increased respect of youth of other faiths
3. By how much did your religious tolerance increase as a result of this program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Significantly
  - c. A lot
4. How long after you finished being involved in this program, did you experience increased religious tolerance?
  - a. A few days
  - b. Weeks
  - c. Months
  - d. 1 year
  - e. 2 years
  - f. 3 years or more
  - g. This change ended once the program ended.
5. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased religious tolerance?
  - a. No
  - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
  - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
  - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
6. How much increased religious tolerance would you say was caused by the program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Half
  - c. A lot
  - d. All

## Important! Your Preferences

In each of the next few questions, we ask you to rate how important each outcome is to you, on a scale of 1 to 5.

On the scale:

1 = This change was unimportant to me.

5 = This change was extremely important to me.

1. Increased networking and opportunities
  - a. I did not experience this change
  - b. 1
  - c. 2
  - d. 3
  - e. 4
  - f. 5
2. Increased empowerment
  - a. I did not experience this change
  - b. 1
  - c. 2
  - d. 3
  - e. 4
  - f. 5
3. Increased capacity
  - a. I did not experience this change
  - b. 1
  - c. 2
  - d. 3
  - e. 4
  - f. 5
4. Increased religious tolerance
  - a. I did not experience this change
  - b. 1
  - c. 2
  - d. 3
  - e. 4
  - f. 5

## Important! Valuation

In this last part of the survey we want to understand how you would estimate the value of the changes you experienced in relation to market prices for common goods (listed in the chart below).

Airtime for one week
1
Used mobile phone
2
TV 32"
3
Laptop
4
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)
5
Business investment in flock of chickens
6
Used car
7
New tuk-tuk
8
Buying land and building a home for myself
9
Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm
10
Apartment in Mombasa
11
100 acres of land at the central area where the land is fertile
12
Two apartments in Mombasa

I. Increase in networking and opportunities:

- a. 1
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8
- i. 9
- j. 10
- k. 11
- l. 12

2. Increased empowerment:

- a. 1
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4

- e. 5
  - f. 6
  - g. 7
  - h. 8
  - i. 9
  - j. 10
  - k. 11
  - l. 12
3. Increased capacity:
- a. 1
  - b. 2
  - c. 3
  - d. 4
  - e. 5
  - f. 6
  - g. 7
  - h. 8
  - i. 9
  - j. 10
  - k. 11
  - l. 12
4. Increased religious tolerance:
- a. 1
  - b. 2
  - c. 3
  - d. 4
  - e. 5
  - f. 6
  - g. 7
  - h. 8
  - i. 9
  - j. 10
  - k. 11
  - l. 12

Thank you for your time.

### **SURVEY – WOMEN**

Thank you for taking the time to do this survey. It should take no more than 30 minutes. Please answer truthfully. Your answers will be confidential and only used to help improve future programs like the Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya Program.

Some women were asked about what had changed for them as a result of the Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya Program. We will tell you what the women we talked to said - we want to know if you have experienced the same changes or not.

This first set of questions is aimed at understanding who the program has reached:

1. Did you participate in the "Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya" Program?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
2. In what year?
  - a. 2017
  - b. 2018
  - c. 2019
  - d. 2020
  - e. 2021
  - f. 2022
3. In what county do you live? [all counties]
4. Age (Range)
  - a. 18-24
  - b. 24-29
  - c. 30-35
  - d. other
5. Gender
  - a. Male
  - b. Female
  - c. Other

Next, we'll ask questions about how this program has impacted you.

#### Outcome #1 - Networking Opportunities

1. Some women that participated in this program experienced increased networking opportunities (e.g. increased opportunity to meet other women in the community and other important community members) as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
  - a. I experienced more networking opportunities as a result of this program. (Go to next question)
  - b. I haven't yet experienced more networking opportunities as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
  - c. I do not think I will experience more networking opportunities as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
2. If you experienced more networking opportunities, how could you tell that your opportunities had increased? (Select all that apply)
  - a. I experienced increased collaboration with others
  - b. I participated in skills sharing among women
  - c. I got to know pastors and prominent sheikhs
  - d. I had increased knowledge of Governors and high-level employees
  - e. I experienced increased collaboration with other organizations and opportunity to join other programs

- f. I felt an increased sense of sisterhood with other women in the community
- g. I felt an increased opportunity to share peace messaging in the community
- 3. By how much did your networking opportunities increase as a result of this program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Significantly
  - c. A lot
- 4. How long after you finished being involved in this program did you experience increased networking opportunities?
  - a. A few days after the program ended
  - b. Weeks after the program ended
  - c. Months after the program ended
  - d. Years (if selected, dropdown 1, 2, 3 or more years)
  - e. Ongoing
  - f. This change ended once the program ended.
- 5. How did the increased networking change over time for you?
  - a. My increased networking continued to increase a lot over time
  - b. It continued to increase a bit over time
  - c. The amount of increase stayed the same
  - d. The change decreased a bit over time
  - e. The change decreased a lot over time
- 6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased networking opportunities?
  - a. No
  - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
  - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
  - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
- 7. How much of your increased networking opportunities would you say was caused by the program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Half
  - c. A lot
  - d. All

#### Outcome #2 - Interfaith dialogue

- 1. Some women that participated in this program experienced increased interfaith dialogue (i.e. increased communication and dialogue between members of different faiths) as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
  - a. I experienced more interfaith dialogue as a result of this program. (Go to next question)
  - b. I haven't yet experienced more interfaith dialogue as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
  - c. I do not think I will experience more interfaith dialogue as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
- 2. How could you tell that interfaith dialogue had changed?
  - a. I experienced more tolerance/Uvumilivu of other religions and members of other religions

- b. I felt more acceptance of members of other religions
  - c. I experienced more freedom of religious expression without worry of repercussions
  - d. I experienced collaboration with members of other religions/religious leaders of other faiths
  - e. I attended at other houses of worship or religious services that did not belong to my own religion
  - f. I experienced willingness to work with members of other religions/be seen in public working with members of other religions
  - g. I experienced unification of various religions to preach peace
3. By how much did your interfaith dialogue increase as a result of this program?
    - a. A little
    - b. Significantly
    - c. A lot
  4. For how long after you finished being involved in this program did you experience increased interfaith dialogue?
    - a. This change ended once I stopped being involved in program.
    - b. A few days
    - c. Weeks
    - d. Months
    - e. 1 year
    - f. 2 years
    - g. 3 years or more
  5. How did the amount you felt your interfaith dialogue had increased change over time for you?
    - a. The increase in my interfaith dialogue continued to increase a lot over time
    - b. The increase in my interfaith dialogue continued to increase a bit over time
    - c. The increase in my interfaith dialogue stayed the same
    - d. The increase in my interfaith dialogue decreased a bit over time
    - e. The increase in my interfaith dialogue decreased a lot over time
  6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased interfaith dialogue?
    - a. No
    - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
    - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
    - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
  7. How much increased interfaith dialogue would you say was caused by the program?
    - a. A little
    - b. Half
    - c. A lot
    - d. All

### Outcome #3 - Skill attainment

- I. Some women that participated in this program gained skills (e.g. an increase in their peace-building skills) as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
  - a. I gained skills as a result of this program. (Go to next question)

- b. I haven't yet gained skills as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
  - c. I do not think I will gain skills as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
- 2. How could you tell that your skills had increased?
  - a. I developed greater mediation skills
  - b. I felt my decision making on emerging issues and violence became easier
  - c. I developed a deeper understanding of peace
  - d. I developed skills related to peace
  - e. My understanding grew of how to share peace messaging with community
  - f. My understanding grew of the elements of radicalization and extremism
- 3. By how much did your skills increase as a result of this program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Significantly
  - c. A lot
- 4. How long after you finished being involved in this program, did you use the increased skills?
  - a. This change ended once the program ended.
  - b. A few days
  - c. Weeks
  - d. Months
  - e. Years (if selected, dropdown 1, 2, 3 or more years)
  - f. Ongoing
- 5. How did your level of increased skills change over time for you?
  - a. Increased a lot over time
  - b. Increased a bit over time
  - c. No change
  - d. Decreased a lot over time
  - e. Decreased a bit over time
- 6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to gaining skills?
  - a. No
  - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
  - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
  - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
- 7. How much of your increased skills would you say was caused by the program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Half
  - c. A lot
  - d. All

#### Outcome #4 - Women's empowerment

- I. Some women that participated in this program experienced increased empowerment (e.g. increased confidence or ability to participate) as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
  - a. I experienced increased empowerment as a result of this program.
  - b. I haven't yet experienced increased empowerment as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (skip to next outcome)

- c. I do not think I will experience increased empowerment after participating in this program. (skip to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that your empowerment had increased? (Select all that apply)
    - a. I gained the ability to attend meetings that had been previously reserved for men
    - b. I was included in decision making processes
    - c. I was more involved in the community
    - d. I felt greater confidence when speaking to other women about radicalization and extremism or to police and security actors
    - e. I was recognized for my contributions to the community
    - f. I felt more confidence to take action and speak up in the community
  3. By how much did your empowerment increase as a result of this program?
    - a. A little
    - b. Significantly
    - c. A lot
  4. How long after you finished being involved in this program, did you experience increased empowerment?
    - a. This change ended once the program ended.
    - b. A few days
    - c. Weeks
    - d. Months
    - e. Years (if selected, dropdown 1, 2, 3 or more years)
    - f. Ongoing
  5. How did the amount you felt your empowerment had increased change over time?
    - a. My empowerment continued to increase a lot over time
    - b. It continued to increase a bit over time
    - c. The amount of increased empowerment I felt stayed the same
    - d. The change decreased a bit over time
    - e. The change decreased a lot over time
  6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased empowerment?
    - a. No
    - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
    - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
    - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
  7. How much increased empowerment would you say was caused by the program?
    - a. A little
    - b. Half
    - c. A lot
    - d. All

### Important! Your Preferences

In each of the next few questions, we ask you to rate how important each outcome is to you, on a scale of 1 to 5.

On the scale:

0 = I didn't experience this change.

1 = This change was unimportant to me.

5 = This change was extremely important to me.

1. Increased networking opportunities
  - a. I did not experience this change
  - b. 1
  - c. 2
  - d. 3
  - e. 4
  - f. 5
2. Increased interfaith dialogue
  - a. I did not experience this change
  - b. 1
  - c. 2
  - d. 3
  - e. 4
  - f. 5
3. Increased skills
  - a. I did not experience this change
  - b. 1
  - c. 2
  - d. 3
  - e. 4
  - f. 5
4. Women's empowerment
  - a. I did not experience this change
  - b. 1
  - c. 2
  - d. 3
  - e. 4
  - f. 5

Important! Valuation

"In this last part of the survey we want to understand how you would estimate the value of the changes you experienced in relation to market prices for common goods (listed in the chart below)."

Airtime for one week
1
Used mobile phone
2
TV 32"
3
Laptop
4
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)
5
Business investment in flock of chickens
6
Used car
7
New tuk-tuk
8
Buying land and building a home for myself
9
Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm
10
Apartment in Mombasa
11
100 acres of land at the central area where the land is fertile
12
Two apartments in Mombasa

How important is that outcome to you compared with these other things you might value? Where would you place the importance of that outcome in relation to two of these items?

I. Networking opportunities:

- a. 1
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8
- i. 9
- j. 10
- k. 11
- l. 12

2. interfaith dialogue:

- a. 1
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8
- i. 9

- j. 10
- k. 11
- l. 12

3. increase in my skills is more valuable to me than:

- a. 1
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8
- i. 9
- j. 10
- k. 11
- l. 12

4. Women's empowerment:

- a. 1
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8
- i. 9
- j. 10
- k. 11
- l. 12

Thank you for your time.

## SURVEY – RELIGIOUS LEADERS

Thank you for taking the time to do this survey. It should take no more than 30 minutes. Please answer truthfully. Your answers will be confidential and only used to help improve future programs like the Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya Program.

Some religious leaders were asked about what had changed for them as a result of the Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya Program. We will tell you what the Religious Leaders we talked to said - we want to know if you have experienced the same changes or not.

This first set of questions is aimed to understand who the program has reached

1. Did you participate in the "Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya" Program?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
  - c. I don't know
2. In what year?
  - a. 2017
  - b. 2018
  - c. 2019
  - d. 2020
  - e. 2021
  - f. 2022
3. In what county do you live?
  - a. Mombasa
  - b. Kilifi
  - c. Lamu
4. Age (Range)
  - a. 18-24
  - b. 24-29
  - c. 30-35
  - d. Other
5. Gender
  - a. Male
  - b. Female
  - c. Other

Next, we'll ask questions about how this program has impacted you.

### Outcome #1 – Networking Opportunities

1. Some religious leaders that participated in this program experienced more networking opportunities (e.g. increased opportunity to meet other faith or other community leaders) as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience?
  - a. I experienced more networking opportunities as a result of this program. (Go to next question)

- b. I have not yet experienced more networking opportunities as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
  - c. I do not think I will experience more networking opportunities as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that your networking opportunities had increased? (Select all that apply)
    - a. I experienced increased collaboration with others
    - b. I experienced skills sharing among religious leaders
    - c. I got to know other pastors and prominent sheikhs
    - d. I gained increased knowledge of Governors and high-level employees
    - e. I experienced increased collaboration with other organizations and opportunity to join other programs
  3. How much did your networking opportunities increase as a result of this program?
    - a. A little bit
    - b. Significantly
    - c. A lot
  4. For how long after you finished being involved in this program did you continue to experience increased networking opportunities?
    - a. This change ended once the program ended.
    - b. A few days
    - c. Weeks
    - d. Months
    - e. 1 year
    - f. 2 years
    - g. 3 years or more
  5. How did the change in your networking opportunities vary over time?
    - a. The increase in my networking opportunities continued to increase a lot over time
    - b. The increase in my networking opportunities continued to increase a bit over time
    - c. No change
    - d. The increase in my networking opportunities decreased a bit over time
    - e. The increase in my networking opportunities decreased a lot over time
  6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased networking opportunities?
    - a. No
    - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
    - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
    - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
  7. How much of your increased networking opportunities would you say was caused by the program?
    - a. A little
    - b. Half
    - c. A lot
    - d. All

## Outcome #2 - Interfaith Dialogue

1. Some religious leaders that participated in this program experienced more interfaith dialogue (e.g. learning from other faith leaders about their religion and practices) as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience?
  - a. I experienced more interfaith dialogue as a result of this program. (Go to next question)
  - b. I haven't yet experienced more interfaith dialogue as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
  - c. I do not think I will experience more interfaith dialogue as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that interfaith dialogue had changed? (Select all that apply)
  - a. I experienced more tolerance/Uvumilivu of other religions and members of other religions
  - b. I felt more acceptance of members of other religions
  - c. I experienced more freedom of religious expression without worry of repercussions
  - d. I experienced collaboration with members of other religions/religious leaders of other faiths
  - e. I attended at other houses of worship or religious services that did not belong to my own religion
  - f. I experienced willingness to work with members of other religions/be seen in public working with members of other religions
  - g. I experienced unification of various religions to preach peace
3. By how much did your interfaith dialogue increase as a result of this program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Significantly
  - c. A lot
4. How long after you finished being involved in this program, did you experience increased interfaith dialogue?
  - a. This change ended once the program ended.
  - b. A few days
  - c. Weeks
  - d. Months
  - e. 1 year
  - f. 2 years
  - g. 3 years or more
5. How did the amount you felt your interfaith dialogue had increased change over time for you?
  - a. The increase in my interfaith dialogue continued to increase a lot over time
  - b. The increase in my interfaith dialogue continued to increase a bit over time
  - c. The increase in my interfaith dialogue stayed the same
  - d. The increase in my interfaith dialogue decreased a bit over time
  - e. The increase in my interfaith dialogue decreased a lot over time
6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased interfaith dialogue?
  - a. No
  - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
  - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
  - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
7. How much increased interfaith dialogue would you say was caused by the program?

- a. A little
- b. Half
- c. A lot
- d. All

Outcome #3 - Capacity for peace-building

1. Some religious leaders that participated in this program experienced increased capacity for peace-building (e.g. development of a better understanding of peacebuilding and peace maintenance) as a result of this program. Which of these statements best

describes your experience with this program?

- a. I experienced increased capacity for peace-building as a result of this program. (Go to next question)
- b. I haven't yet experienced increased capacity for peace-building as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (Go to next outcome)
- c. I do not think I will experience increased capacity for peace-building as a result of this program. (Go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that your capacity for peace-building had increased? (Select all that apply)
  - a. I developed greater mediation skills
  - b. I felt my decision making on emerging issues and violence became easier
  - c. I developed a deeper understanding of peace
  - d. I developed skills related to peace
  - e. My understanding grew of how to share peace messaging with community
  - f. My understanding grew of the elements of radicalization and extremism
3. By how much did your capacity for peace-building increase as a result of this program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Significantly
  - c. A lot
4. For how long after you finished being involved in this program did you continue to experience increased capacity for peace-building?
  - a. A few days
  - b. Weeks
  - c. Months
  - d. 1 year
  - e. 2 years
  - f. 3 years or more
  - g. This change ended once the program ended.
5. How did increased capacity for peace-building change over time for you?
  - a. My capacity continued to increase a lot over time
  - b. It continued to increase a bit over time
  - c. The amount of increase stayed the same
  - d. The amount of change in my capacity decreased a bit over time
  - e. The amount of change in my capacity decreased a lot over time

6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased capacity for peace-building?
  - a. No
  - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
  - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
  - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
7. How much increased capacity for peace-building would you say was caused by the program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Half
  - c. A lot
  - d. All

#### Outcome #4 - Outreach to At-Risk Youth

1. Some religious leaders that participated in this program experienced increased outreach to at-risk youth as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
  - a. I experienced increased outreach to at-risk youth as a result of this program.
  - b. I haven't yet experienced increased outreach to at-risk youth as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (go to next outcome)
  - c. I do not think I will experience increased outreach to at-risk youth as a result of this program. (go to next outcome)
2. How could you tell that your outreach to at-risk youth had increased?
  - a. I connected to new youth to share peace messaging
  - b. I met with youth in new spaces (outside of places of worship)
  - c. I connected youth in the community to programming
3. By how much did your outreach to at-risk youth increase as a result of this program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Significantly
  - c. A lot
4. How long after you finished being involved in this program, did you experience increased outreach to at-risk youth?
  - a. A few days
  - b. Weeks
  - c. Months
  - d. 1 year
  - e. 2 years
  - f. 3 years or more
  - g. This change ended once the program ended.
5. How did the amount by which your outreach to at-risk youth increase change over time?
  - a. My increased outreach continued to increase a lot over time
  - b. It continued to increase a bit over time
  - c. No change
  - d. My increased outreach to at-risk youth, decreased a bit over time
  - e. My increased outreach to at-risk youth, decreased a lot over time

6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased outreach to at-risk youth?
  - a. No
  - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
  - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
  - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
7. How much increased outreach to at-risk youth would you say was caused by the program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Half
  - c. A lot
  - d. All

### Important! Your Preferences

In each of the next few questions, we ask you to rate how important each outcome is to you, on a scale of 1 to 5.

On the scale:

1 = This change was unimportant to me.

5 = This change was extremely important to me.

How important are these outcomes to you?

1. Increased networking opportunities
  - a. I did not experience this change
  - b. 1
  - c. 2
  - d. 3
  - e. 4
  - f. 5
2. Increased interfaith dialogue
  - a. I did not experience this change
  - b. 1
  - c. 2
  - d. 3
  - e. 4
  - f. 5
3. Increased capacity for peace-building
  - a. I did not experience this change
  - b. 1
  - c. 2
  - d. 3
  - e. 4
  - f. 5

4. Increased outreach to at-risk youth
  - a. I did not experience this change
  - b. 1
  - c. 2
  - d. 3
  - e. 4
  - f. 5

Important! Valuation

In this last part of the survey we want to understand how you would estimate the importance of the changes you experienced compared with things you might consider valuable. Please review the following chart:

Airtime for one week	1
Used mobile phone	2
TV 32"	3
Laptop	4
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)	5
Business investment in flock of chickens	6
Used car	7
New tuk-tuk	8
Buying land and building a home for myself	9
Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm	10
Apartment in Mombasa	11
100 acres of land at the central area where the land is fertile	12
Two apartments in Mombasa	

Where would you place the importance of that outcome in relation to two of these items?

For example, if you think the change is more important than a used mobile phone, but less than a TV - choose 2.

- I. Increased networking opportunities
  - a. 1
  - b. 2
  - c. 3
  - d. 4
  - e. 5
  - f. 6
  - g. 7

- h. 8
  - i. 9
  - j. 10
  - k. 11
  - l. 12
2. Increased interfaith dialogue
- a. 1
  - b. 2
  - c. 3
  - d. 4
  - e. 5
  - f. 6
  - g. 7
  - h. 8
  - i. 9
  - j. 10
  - k. 11
  - l. 12
3. Increased capacity for peacebuilding
- a. 1
  - b. 2
  - c. 3
  - d. 4
  - e. 5
  - f. 6
  - g. 7
  - h. 8
  - i. 9
  - j. 10
  - k. 11
  - l. 12
4. Increased outreach to at-risk youth
- a. 1
  - b. 2
  - c. 3
  - d. 4
  - e. 5
  - f. 6
  - g. 7
  - h. 8
  - i. 9
  - j. 10
  - k. 11
  - l. 12

Thank you for your time.

## SURVEY – SECURITY ACTORS

Thank you for taking the time to do this survey. It should take no more than 30 minutes. Please answer truthfully. Your answers will be confidential and only used to help improve future programs like the Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya Program.

Some security actors were asked about what had changed for them as a result of the Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya Program. We will tell you what they said - we want to know if you have experienced the same changes or not.

This first set of questions is aimed to understand who the program has reached:

1. Did you participate in the "Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya" Program?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
2. In what year did you participate?
  - a. 2017
  - b. 2018
  - c. 2019
  - d. 2020
  - e. 2021
  - f. 2022
3. In what county do you live?
  - a. Mombasa
  - b. Kilifi
  - c. Lamu
4. Age (Range)
  - a. 18-24
  - b. 24-29
  - c. 30-35
  - d. Other
5. What is your gender?
  - a. Male
  - b. Female
  - c. Other

Next, we'll ask questions about how this program has impacted you.

### Outcome #1 – Reduction in Crime

1. Some security actors that participated in this program noticed a reduction in crime as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience? Please select only one.
  - a. I noticed a reduction in crime as a result of this program. (Go to QUESTION 2)
  - b. I have not yet noticed a reduction in crime, but think I might in the future. (Go to outcome 2)
  - c. I do not think I will notice a reduction in crime as a result of this program. (go to outcome 2)
2. How could you tell that the level of crime had decreased? (Select all that apply)

- a. Reduced number of incidents reported
  - b. Increased sense of safety when in the community
  - c. Decreased idle youth
  - d. Increased number of youth engaged in legal employment
  - e. Increased number of youth applying for jobs
  - f. Increased number of youth engaged in community programming
  - g. Reduced use of violence among youth when responding to provocation
  - h. Decreased drug use among youth
  - i. Increased confidence among youth to enter police stations
  - j. Improved relationship between youth and the government (e.g. increased number of youth engaging with government services)
3. By how much did crime reduce as a result of this program?
    - a. A little
    - b. Significantly
    - c. A lot
  4. How long after you finished being involved in this program, did you experience a decreased level of crime?
    - a. This change ended once the program ended.
    - b. A few days
    - c. Weeks
    - d. Months
    - e. Years (if selected, dropdown 1, 2, 3 or more years)
  5. How did this change over time for you?
    - a. The decrease in crime continued a lot over time
    - b. The decrease in crime continued a bit over time
    - c. The decrease in crime remained the same over time
    - d. The decrease in crime faded a lot over time
    - e. The decrease in crime faded a bit over time
  6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to a reduction of crime?
    - a. No
    - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
    - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
    - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
  7. How much of the reduction in crime would you say was caused by the program?
    - a. A little
    - b. Half
    - c. A lot
    - d. All

Outcome #2 - Increased confidence in Government/NGO Programming

- I. Some Security Actors that participated in this program noticed community members increased confidence in government/NGO programming as a result of this program. Which of these statements best describes your experience with this program?
  - a. I noticed community members increased confidence in government/NGO programming as a result of this program. (Go to question 2)

- b. I haven't yet noticed community members increased confidence in government/NGO programming as a result of this program, but think I might in the future. (Go to next section)
  - c. I did not notice community members increased confidence in government/NGO programming as a result of this program.
- 2. How could you tell that confidence in the government/NGO programming had increased? (Select all that apply)
  - a. Increased numbers of community members engaging with programming
  - b. Increased number of community members applying for jobs related to programming
  - c. Decreased community bias towards programming
  - d. Increased number of youth willing to work with programming to earn and income
- 3. By how much did confidence in government/NGO programming increase as a result of this program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Significantly
  - c. A lot
- 4. How long after you finished being involved in this program, did you notice confidence in government/NGO programming?
  - a. This change ended once the program ended.
  - b. A few days
  - c. Weeks
  - d. Months
  - e. Years (if selected, dropdown 1, 2, 3 or more years)
- 5. How did this change over time?
  - a. Confidence in government/NGO programming continued to increase a lot over time
  - b. Confidence in government/NGO programming continued to increase a bit over time
  - c. The increased confidence in government/NGO programming did not change over time
  - d. The increased confidence in government/NGO programming decreased a lot over time
  - e. The increased confidence in government/NGO programming decreased a bit over time
- 6. If the program did not exist, is there anything else that would have led to increased confidence in government/NGO programming?
  - a. No
  - b. Yes, but less than I have experienced
  - c. Yes, at the same level I have experienced
  - d. Yes, even more than I have experienced
- 7. How much of the increased confidence in government/NGO programming would you say was caused by the program?
  - a. A little
  - b. Half
  - c. A lot
  - d. All

### Important! Your Preferences

In each of the next few questions, we ask you to rate how important each outcome is to you, on a scale of 1 to 5.

1 = This change was unimportant to me. 5 = This change was extremely important to me.

How important are these outcomes to you?

Reduction in crime?

- a. I did not notice this change
- b. 1
- c. 2
- d. 3
- e. 4
- f. 5

Increased confidence in government/NGO programming

- a. I did not notice this change
- b. 1
- c. 2
- d. 3
- e. 4
- f. 5

Important! Valuation

In this last part of the survey we want to understand how you would estimate the importance of the changes you experienced compared with things you might consider valuable. Please review the following chart: Where would you place the importance of that outcome in relation to two of these items? For example, if you think the change is more important than a used mobile phone, but less than a TV - choose 2.

Airtime for one week
1
Used mobile phone
2
TV 32"
3
Laptop
4
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)
5
Business investment in flock of chickens
6
Used car
7
New tuk-tuk
8
Buying land and building a home for myself
9
Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm
10
Apartment in Mombasa
11
100 acres of land at the central area where the land is fertile
12
Two apartments in Mombasa

#### Reduction in crime

- a. 1
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8
- i. 9
- j. 10
- k. 11
- l. 12

#### Increased confidence in Government/NGO Programming

- a. 1
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6

- g. 7
- h. 8
- i. 9
- j. 10
- k. 11
- l. 12

**SURVEY – YOUTH (POST-ELECTION)**

Thank you for participating in this survey. It should take about 5 minutes to complete.

Previously, we asked you about the changes you experienced as a result of the **Program: Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya.**

We also asked how you might estimate the importance of these changes compared with things you might consider valuable (according to the scale below).

We want to understand if the value of these changes remained the same or perhaps became more or less important to you in context of the recent elections.

Please answer truthfully. Your answers will be confidential and used to help improve future peacebuilding programs.

Airtime for one week
1
Used mobile phone
2
TV 32"
3
Laptop
4
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)
5
Business investment in flock of chickens
6
Used car
7
New tuk-tuk
8
Buying land and building a home for myself
9
Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm
10
Apartment in Mombasa
11
100 acres of land at the central area where the land is fertile
12
Two apartments in Mombasa

1. Previously, **youth** valued the importance of **increased leadership skills and capacity**, on average, as between **7-8**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
  - Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
  - Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)
2. Previously, **youth** valued the importance of **increased networking and opportunities**, on average, as between **7-8**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
  - Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
  - Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)
3. Previously, **youth** valued the importance of **increased religious tolerance**, on average, as between **9-10**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

## SURVEY – WOMEN (POST-ELECTION)

Thank you for participating in this survey. It should take about 5 minutes to complete.

Previously, we asked you about the changes you experienced as a result of the **Program: Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya**.

We also asked how you might estimate the importance of these changes compared with things you might consider valuable (according to the scale below).

We want to understand if the value of these changes remained the same or perhaps became more or less important to you in context of the recent elections.

Please answer truthfully. Your answers will be confidential and used to help improve future peacebuilding programs.

Airtime for one week
1
Used mobile phone
2
TV 32"
3
Laptop
4
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)
5
Business investment in flock of chickens
6
Used car
7
New tuk-tuk
8
Buying land and building a home for myself
9
Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm
10
Apartment in Mombasa
11
100 acres of land at the central area where the land is fertile
12
Two apartments in Mombasa

4. Previously, **women** valued the importance of **increased interfaith dialogue**, on average, as between **7-8**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

5. Previously, **women** valued the importance of **increased networking opportunities**, on average, as between **7-8**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

6. Previously, **women** valued the importance of **increased capacity for peacebuilding**, on average, as between **8-9**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

7. Previously, **women** valued the importance of **increased empowerment and inclusion**, on average, as between **8-9**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

## SURVEY – RELIGIOUS LEADERS (POST-ELECTION)

Thank you for participating in this survey. It should take about 5-10 minutes to complete.

Previously, we asked you about the changes you experienced as a result of the **Program: Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya**.

We also asked how you might estimate the importance of these changes compared with things you might consider valuable (according to the scale below).

We want to understand if the value of these changes remained the same or perhaps became more or less important to you in context of the recent elections.

Please answer truthfully. Your answers will be confidential and used to help improve future peacebuilding programs.

Airtime for one week
1
Used mobile phone
2
TV 32"
3
Laptop
4
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)
5
Business investment in flock of chickens
6
Used car
7
New tuk-tuk
8
Buying land and building a home for myself
9
Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm
10
Apartment in Mombasa
11
100 acres of land at the central area where the land is fertile
12
Two apartments in Mombasa

8. Previously, **religious leaders** valued the importance of **increased interfaith dialogue**, on average, as between **3-4**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

9. Previously, **religious leaders** valued the importance of **increased networking opportunities**, on average, as between **3-4**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

10. Previously, **religious leaders** valued the importance of **increased capacity for peacebuilding**, on average, as between **3-4**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

11. Previously, **religious leaders** valued the importance of **increased outreach to at-risk youth**, on average, as between **2-3**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

## SURVEY – SECURITY ACTORS (POST-ELECTION)

Thank you for participating in this survey. It should take about 5 minutes to complete.

Previously, we asked you about the changes you experienced as a result of the **Program: Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya**.

We also asked how you might estimate the importance of these changes compared with things you might consider valuable (according to the scale below).

We want to understand if the value of these changes remained the same or perhaps became more or less important to you in context of the recent elections.

Please answer truthfully. Your answers will be confidential and used to help improve future peacebuilding programs.

Airtime for one week
1
Used mobile phone
2
TV 32"
3
Laptop
4
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)
5
Business investment in flock of chickens
6
Used car
7
New tuk-tuk
8
Buying land and building a home for myself
9
Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm
10
Apartment in Mombasa
11
100 acres of land at the central area where the land is fertile
12
Two apartments in Mombasa

12. Previously, **security actors** valued the importance of a **reduction in crime**, on average, as **8**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

## SURVEY – STAFF (POST-ELECTION)

Thank you for participating in this survey. It should take about 5 minutes to complete.

Previously, we asked you about the changes you experienced as a result of the **Program: Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya**.

We also asked how you might estimate the importance of these changes compared with things you might consider valuable (according to the scale below).

We want to understand if the value of these changes remained the same or perhaps became more or less important to you in context of the recent elections.

Please answer truthfully. Your answers will be confidential and used to help improve future peacebuilding programs.

Airtime for one week
1
Used mobile phone
2
TV 32"
3
Laptop
4
Plot of land (40X80 square feet)
5
Business investment in flock of chickens
6
Used car
7
New tuk-tuk
8
Buying land and building a home for myself
9
Starting a tent/chair hiring business or a farm
10
Apartment in Mombasa
11
100 acres of land at the central area where the land is fertile
12
Two apartments in Mombasa

13. Previously, **staff** valued the importance of **increased capacity for peacebuilding**, on average, as **11**. In context of the recent elections, did its importance remain the same or do you feel this outcome became more or less important to you?

Response options:

- Its importance remained the same
- Its importance increased (if selected, select new range)
- Its importance decreased (if selected, select new range)

## **ANNEX E: IMPACT MAP (CONDENSED) STAKEHOLDERS-STATED PREFERENCE VALUATION**

See Tables E1 and E2 for the condensed impact maps using stakeholders-stated preference valuations.

**Table E. 1: Condensed Impact Map – Stakeholder Stated Preference Valuation (Low End Values)**

Stakeholders	Outcomes	Quantity (scale)	Express the relative importance (value) of the outcome		Deadweight %	Displacement %	Attribution %	Drop off %	Impact calculation
	Outcome description			Monetary valuation					
Youth (18-35) Participants in Programming	Increased networking and opportunities	58	Survey Data	2490.00	19%	0%	26%	-51%	85,968.35
	Increased leadership skills and capacity	58	Survey Data	2490.00	18%	0%	26%	-56%	87,029.68
	Increased religious tolerance	53	Survey Data	8300.00	13%	0%	28%	-56%	274,513.54
Women (35+) Participants in Programming	Increased networking opportunities	55	Survey Data	2490.00	28%	0%	28%	-59%	70,994.88
	Increased interfaith dialogue	55	Survey Data	2490.00	29%	0%	29%	-61%	69,036.50
	Increased capacity for peacebuilding	55	Survey Data	2490.00	32%	0%	32%	-61%	63,325.68
	Increased empowerment and inclusion	55	Survey Data	4150.00	32%	0%	32%	-61%	105,542.80
Religious Leaders	Increased networking opportunities	55	Survey Data	166.00	25%	0%	20%	-57%	5,478.00
	Increased interfaith dialogue	55	Survey Data	166.00	23%	0%	21%	-57%	5,553.78
	Increased capacity for peacebuilding	55	Survey Data	166.00	27%	0%	23%	-50%	5,131.97
	Increased outreach to at-risk youth	47	Survey Data	83.00	25%	0%	25%	-58%	2,200.98
Security Actors	Reduction in crime	23	Survey Data	4150.00	25%	0%	50%	0%	35,793.75
Staff (IOM and CICC)	Increased capacity	10	Survey Data	42500.00	25%	0%	0%	-67%	318,750.00

**Table E. 2: Condensed Impact Map – Stakeholder Stated Preference Valuation (High End Values)**

Stakeholders	Outcomes	Quantity (scale)	Express the relative importance (value) of the outcome		Deadweight %	Displacement %	Attribution %	Drop off %	Impact calculation
	Outcome description			Monetary valuation					
Youth (18-35) Participants in Programming	Increased networking and opportunities	58	Survey Data	4150.00	19%	0%	26%	-51%	143,280.58
	Increased leadership skills and capacity	58	Survey Data	4150.00	18%	0%	26%	-57%	145,049.47
	Increased religious tolerance	53	Survey Data	16600.00	13%	0%	28%	-56%	549,027.07
Women (35+) Participants in Programming	Increased networking opportunities	55	Survey Data	4150.00	28%	0%	28%	-59%	118,324.80
	Increased interfaith dialogue	55	Survey Data	4150.00	29%	0%	29%	-61%	115,060.83
	Increased capacity for peacebuilding	55	Survey Data	4150.00	32%	0%	32%	-61%	105,542.80
	Increased inclusion in peacebuilding processes	55	Survey Data	8300.00	32%	0%	32%	-61%	211,085.60
Religious Leaders	Increased networking opportunities	55	Survey Data	249.00	25%	0%	20%	-57%	8,217.00
	Increased interfaith dialogue	55	Survey Data	249.00	23%	0%	21%	-57%	8,330.67
	Increased capacity for peacebuilding	55	Survey Data	249.00	27%	0%	23%	-50%	7,697.96
	Increased outreach to at-risk youth	47	Survey Data	166.00	25%	0%	25%	-58%	4,401.96
Security Actors	Reduction in crime	23	Survey Data	4150.00	25%	0%	50%	0%	35,793.75
Staff (IOM and CICC)	Increased capacity for peacebuilding	10	Survey Data	42500.00	25%	0%	0%	-67%	318,750.00

## **ANNEX F: IMPACT MAP (CONDENSED) COST-BASED VALUATION**

See Table F1 for the condensed impact map using cost-based valuation.

**Table F. I: Condensed Impact Map– Cost-Based Valuation (Using Literature)**

Stakeholders	Outcomes	Extrapolated Quantity	Express the relative importance (value) of the outcome		Deadweight %	Displacement %	Attribution %	Drop off %	Impact calculation
	Outcome description		Valuation approach (monetary)	Monetary valuation					
Youth (18-35) Participants of Programming	Increased networking and opportunities	58	Cost of Joining Toastmasters for One Year	110.00	19%	0%	26%	-51%	3,797.80
	Increased Leadership Skills and Capacity	58	Cost of Leadership Development Seminar (Kenya)	1095.00	18%	0%	26%	-56%	38,272.09
	Increased religious tolerance	53	Avoided cost to the state of one incidence of conflict	433.00	13%	0%	28%	-56%	14,321.01
Women (35+) Participants of Programming	Increased Networking and Opportunities	55	Cost to Join Women's Chamber of Commerce (Tanzania) for One Year	38.00	28%	0%	28%	-59%	1,083.46
	Increased Interfaith Dialogue	55	Avoided cost to the state of one incidence of conflict	433.00	29%	0%	29%	-61%	12,005.14
	Increased capacity for peacebuilding	55	Cost of Introductory Peacebuilding Course (Kenya)	200.00	32%	0%	32%	-61%	5,086.40
	Increased Inclusion in peacebuilding processes	55	Increase in Global GDP Per Capita as a result of the elimination of Gender-Based Discrimination in Social Institutions	764.00	32%	0%	32%	-61%	19,430.05

Stakeholders	Outcomes	Extrapolated Quantity	Express the relative importance (value) of the outcome		Deadweight %	Displacement %	Attribution %	Drop off %	Impact calculation
	Outcome description		Valuation approach (monetary)	Monetary valuation					
Religious Leaders	Increased Networking and Opportunities	55	Cost of Joining Toastmasters for One Year	110.00	25%	0%	20%	-57%	3,630.00
	Increased Interfaith Dialogue	55	Avoided cost to the state of one incidence of conflict	433.00	23%	0%	21%	-57%	14,486.66
	Increased Capacity for Peacebuilding	55	Cost of Introductory Peacebuilding Course (Kenya)	200.00	27%	23%	23%	-50%	4,760.99
	Increased Outreach to At-Risk Youth	47	Avoided costs to the state associated with a reduction in Anti-Social Behaviour	842.54	25%	0%	25%	-58%	22,342.40
Security Actors	Reduction in crime	23	Avoided cost to the state of one incidence of conflict	433.00	25%	0%	50%	0%	3734.625
Staff (IOM and CICC)	Increased capacity for peacebuilding	10	Market rate for professional peacebuilding educational course	1664.24	25%	0%	0%	-67%	12,481.79

## ANNEX G: DETAILED RESULTS

### WELL DEFINED OUTCOMES

One of the important aspects of SROI analysis is the generation of well-defined outcomes which help to summarize the change experienced by a certain stakeholder group. These outcomes are then leveraged to develop a theory of change for the intervention. A well-defined outcome results from the participation of the stakeholder and describes what changed for them due to their participation (either positive or negative). This section will present the well-defined outcomes for each stakeholder group and the indicators they used to help describe these outcomes.

**Table G. 1: Well Defined Outcomes and Indicators for Youth**

OUTCOME	INDICATORS
<b>INCREASED LEADERSHIP SKILLS AND CAPACITY</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased financial position</li> <li>• Increased understanding of leadership and what makes a good leader</li> <li>• Increased confidence and knowledge of political processes leading to increased participation in elections</li> <li>• Increased confidence to lead community programming for the betterment of the community</li> <li>• Increased personal confidence and positive self-image</li> <li>• Development of knowledge on how to start community programs</li> <li>• Increased knowledge of leadership skills and sense of personal capacity to act as a leader in the community</li> <li>• Attendance at council sessions</li> <li>• Increased sense of personal capacity to act as peace ambassador in the community and share peace messaging</li> <li>• Increased personal skills (i.e. speaking in front of groups)</li> </ul>
<b>INCREASED NETWORKING AND OPPORTUNITIES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased recognition of and connection to local chiefs, religious leaders, elders and officials</li> <li>• Increased job opportunities</li> <li>• Increased collaboration with other youth on local community programs</li> <li>• More connection to other local youth</li> <li>• Increased opportunities to share knowledge about peace</li> <li>• Increased opportunity to attend local council sessions</li> <li>• Increased sense of connection to other youth</li> <li>• Increased opportunity to attend other trainings to build skills</li> </ul>
<b>INCREASED RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased sense of connection to youth of other faiths</li> <li>• Increased sense of commonality between youth of different faiths</li> <li>• Increased sense of understanding of other religious practices</li> <li>• Attendance at religious events of other faiths</li> <li>• Increased respect of youth of other faiths</li> </ul>

**Table G. 2: Well Defined Outcomes and Indicators for Women (Age 35+)**

OUTCOME	INDICATORS
<b>INCREASED RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased sense of connection to youth of other faiths</li> <li>• Increased sense of commonality between youth of different faiths</li> <li>• Increased sense of understanding of other religious practices</li> <li>• Attendance at religious events of other faiths</li> <li>• Increased respect of youth of other faiths</li> </ul>
<b>INCREASED CAPACITY FOR PEACEBUILDING</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I developed greater mediation skills</li> <li>• I felt my decision making on emerging issues and violence became easier</li> <li>• I developed a deeper understanding of peace</li> <li>• I developed skills related to peace</li> <li>• My understanding grew of how to share peace messaging with community</li> <li>• My understanding grew of the elements of radicalization and extremism</li> </ul>
<b>INCREASED INTERFAITH DIALOGUE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I experienced more tolerance/Uvumilivu of other religions and members of other religions</li> <li>• I felt more acceptance of members of other religions</li> <li>• I experienced more freedom of religious expression without worry of repercussions</li> <li>• I experienced collaboration with members of other religions/religious leaders of other faiths</li> <li>• I attended at other houses of worship or religious services that did not belong to my own religion</li> <li>• I experienced willingness to work with members of other religions/be seen in public working with members of other religions</li> <li>• I experienced unification of various religions to preach peace</li> </ul>
<b>INCREASED NETWORKING AND OPPORTUNITIES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I experienced increased collaboration with others</li> <li>• I participated in skills sharing among women</li> <li>• I got to know pastors and prominent sheikhs</li> <li>• I had increased knowledge of Governors and high-level employees</li> <li>• I experienced increased collaboration with other organizations and opportunity to join other programs</li> <li>• I felt an increased sense of sisterhood with other women in the community</li> <li>• I felt an increased opportunity to share peace messaging in the community</li> </ul>
<b>INCREASED INCLUSION IN PEACEBUILDING PROCESSES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I gained the ability to attend meetings that had been previously reserved for men</li> <li>• I was included in decision-making processes</li> <li>• I was more involved in the community</li> <li>• I felt greater confidence when speaking to other women about radicalization and extremism or to police and security actors</li> <li>• I was recognized for my contributions to the community</li> <li>• I felt more confidence to take action and speak up in the community</li> </ul>

**Table G. 3: Well Defined Outcomes and Indicators for Religious Leaders**

OUTCOME	INDICATORS
<b>INCREASED OUTREACH TO AT-RISK YOUTH</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I connected to new youth to share peace messaging</li> <li>• I met with youth in new spaces (outside of places of worship)</li> <li>• I connected youth in the community to programming</li> </ul>
<b>INCREASED CAPACITY FOR PEACEBUILDING</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I developed greater mediation skills</li> <li>• I felt my decision-making on emerging issues and violence became easier</li> <li>• I developed a deeper understanding of peace</li> <li>• I developed skills related to peace</li> <li>• My understanding grew of how to share peace messaging with community</li> <li>• My understanding grew of the elements of radicalization and extremism</li> </ul>
<b>INCREASED INTERFAITH DIALOGUE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I experienced more tolerance/Uvumilivu of other religions and members of other religions</li> <li>• I felt more acceptance of members of other religions</li> <li>• I experienced more freedom of religious expression without worry of repercussions</li> <li>• I experienced collaboration with members of other religions/religious leaders of other faiths</li> <li>• I attended at other houses of worship or religious services that did not belong to my own religion</li> <li>• I experienced willingness to work with members of other religions/be seen in public working with members of other religions</li> <li>• I experienced unification of various religions to preach peace</li> </ul>
<b>INCREASED NETWORKING AND OPPORTUNITIES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I experienced increased collaboration with others</li> <li>• I experienced skills sharing among religious leaders</li> <li>• I got to know other pastors and prominent sheikhs</li> <li>• I gained increased knowledge of Governors and high-level employees</li> <li>• I experienced increased collaboration with other organizations and opportunity to join other programs</li> </ul>

**Table G. 4: Well Defined Outcomes and Indicators for Security Actors**

OUTCOME	INDICATORS
<b>REDUCTION IN CRIME</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduced number of incidents reported</li> <li>• Increased sense of safety when in the community</li> <li>• Decreased idle youth</li> <li>• Increased number of youth engaged in legal employment</li> <li>• Increased number of youth applying for jobs</li> <li>• Increased number of youth engaged in community programming</li> <li>• Reduced use of violence among youth when responding to provocation</li> <li>• Decreased drug use among youth</li> <li>• Increased confidence among youth to enter police stations</li> <li>• Improved relationship between youth and the government (e.g. increased number of youth engaging with government services)</li> </ul>

**Table G. 5: Well Defined Outcomes and Indicators for Staff**


OUTCOME	INDICATORS
<b>INCREASED CAPACITY FOR PEACEBUILDING</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased adaptability to change</li> <li>• Increased empathy for and understanding of the role women can play in peacebuilding</li> <li>• Increased knowledge and understanding of the deployment and implementation of peacebuilding interventions</li> <li>• Increased collaboration with other staff to maximize program benefits</li> <li>• Increased leadership skills</li> </ul>

**RESULTS - STAKEHOLDER STATED PREFERENCE VALUATION (PRE-ELECTION)**

Overall results suggest that for every \$1 invested in peacebuilding through the *Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya Program*, between \$7 and \$10 in Social Value was created when using what program stakeholders stated to value their outcomes (this ranges from \$1.40 to \$15.06 when conducting a Sensitivity Analysis).

The total value created per stakeholder group varies depending upon the valuation used (low vs. high). For Youth (18-35) Participants of Programming, the percentage varies between 57% (Low Valuation) and 64% (High Valuation). For Women (35+) Participants of Programming, the value created ranges between 20% (Low Valuation) and 21% (High Valuation). Staff follow with a range of 20% (Low Valuation) to 12% (High Valuation). Finally, both Religious Leaders and Security Actors follow with 1% (both valuations) and 2% (both valuations) respectively. See Figure G1 for Low Valuation and High Valuation.

**Figure G. 1: Distribution of Value Created by Stakeholder Group (Stakeholder Stated Preference Valuation)**



For each main stakeholder group identified – Youth (18-35) Participants of Programming, Women (35+) Participants of Programming, Religious Leaders, Security Actors and Staff – a set of outcomes that were experienced because of the programming was identified. These identified outcomes were then used during our survey interviews to understand the relative importance of each outcome to the stakeholders.

For all stakeholder groups, the relative importance of the outcomes that were experienced follows in Tables G6-G8.

**Table G. 6: Relative Importance of Outcomes for Youth (18-35)**

OUTCOME	RELATIVE IMPORTANCE TO YOUTH (18-35) PARTICIPANTS OF PROGRAMMING
Increased religious tolerance	1
Increased networking and opportunities	2
Increased leadership skills and capacity	3

**Table G. 7: Relative Importance of Outcomes for Women Participants (35+) of Programming**

OUTCOME	RELATIVE IMPORTANCE TO WOMEN
Increased capacity for peacebuilding	1
Increased networking and opportunities	2
Increased interfaith dialogue	3
Increased inclusion in peacebuilding processes	4

**Table G. 8: Relative Importance of Outcomes for Religious Leaders of Programming**

OUTCOME	RELATIVE IMPORTANCE TO RELIGIOUS LEADERS
Increased outreach to at-risk youth	1
Increased capacity for peacebuilding	2
Increased networking and opportunities	2
Increased interfaith dialogue	4

One key insight delivered by our analysis was around the duration of outcomes. Participants were asked to quantify how long after the program ended did, they continue to experience the outcome in question on the following scale: a few days, a few weeks, a few months, 1 year, 2 year, 3 years or more than 3 years. It was found that not all groups experienced outcomes that lasted for a full year after the program ended. To establish the duration of each outcome, a weighted average of the answers was calculated using the conversion outlined in Table G9. Note that this was applied to both valuation techniques.

**Table G. 9: Conversion Chart used to Establish Outcome Duration**

SURVEY RESPONSE	FRACTIONAL YEAR	DECIMAL USED TO CALCULATE DURATION
A few days	3/365	0.00821918
A few weeks	3/52	0.05769231
A few months	5/12	0.4166667
1 Year	1/1	1
2 Years	2/1	2
3 Years	3/1	3

Outcomes and their durations are presented in Table G10.

**Table G. 10: Outcomes and their Durations**


STAKEHOLDER AND OUTCOME	OUTCOME DURATION (YEARS)
<b>YOUTH (18-35) PARTICIPANTS OF PROGRAMMING PARTICIPANTS (18-35)</b>	
Increased networking and opportunities	1.26
Increased leadership skills and capacity	0.35
Increased religious tolerance	0.50
<b>WOMEN (35+) PARTICIPANTS</b>	
Increased networking and opportunities	0.55
Increased interfaith dialogue	0.50
Increased capacity for peacebuilding	0.37
Increased inclusion in peacebuilding processes	0.65
<b>RELIGIOUS LEADERS</b>	
Increased networking and opportunities	1.95
Increased interfaith dialogue	2.10
Increased capacity for peacebuilding	1.96
Increased outreach to at-risk youth	1.68
<b>SECURITY ACTORS</b>	
Reduction in crime	1*
<b>STAFF</b>	
Increased job satisfaction	1*
Increased capacity for peacebuilding	1*

\* For outcomes that were identified during focus groups and interviews, specific questions to establish duration were not always asked. As a result, it is assumed that these outcomes lasted for 1 year (minimum amount of time used in Social Value International Methodology).


To ensure that the results align with the Social Value International principle of not overclaiming results, results were adjusted to account for these durations. As the Social Value International Impact Map Template uses years as the unit of analysis, the value created in the first year was multiplied by the fractional year (where there was one) in order to get a more accurate representation of the value created.

Using stakeholders-stated preference valuation, all outcomes for youth (18-35) participants of programming were able to be monetized. The three outcomes that generated the most value for youth across both low and high valuations were: (1) Increased religious tolerance, (2) Increased leadership skills and capacity and (3) Increased networking and opportunities. Of note, youth did not experience any outcomes that created negative value. Figure G2 presents all outcomes and their valuations across both low valuations and high valuations. Figures G3 and G4 present these valuations relative to one another.


**Figure G. 2: Value of Outcomes for Youth (18-35)**



**Figure G. 3: Relative Value of Outcomes for Youth (18-35) (Low End Values)**




**Figure G. 4: Relative Value of Outcomes for Youth (18-35) (High End Values)**




For Women Participants of Programming – four key outcomes were experienced. These are: (1) Increased capacity for peacebuilding, (2) Increased Networking and opportunities, (3) Increased inclusion in peacebuilding processes and (4) Increased interfaith dialogue. Their valuations and relative value are shown in Figures G5, G6 and G7.


**Figure G. 5: Value of Outcomes for Women (35+)**



**Figure G. 6: Relative Value of Outcomes for Women (35+) (Low End Values)**




**Figure G. 7: Relative Value of Outcomes for Women (35+) (High End Values)**




Religious Leaders experienced four key outcomes – (1) Increased capacity for peacebuilding and (2) Increased networking and opportunities, (3) Increased interfaith dialogue and (4) Increased outreach to youth at risk of radicalization. Their valuations are presented in Figure G8 and Relative Values in Figure G9 and G10.


**Figure G. 8: Value of Outcomes for Religious Leaders**



**Figure G. 9: Relative Value of Outcomes for Religious Leaders (Low End Values)**




**Figure G. 10: Relative Value of Outcomes for Religious Leaders (High End Values)**




Security Actors experienced one key outcome – reduction in crime. The valuation for this outcome is presented in Figure G II.

**Figure G. 11: Value of Outcomes Security Actors**



Finally, staff members working on the *Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya program* also experienced one key outcome – increased capacity for peacebuilding. Valuations for this outcome are presented in Figure G12.

**Figure G. 12: Valuation of Outcomes for Staff**



**SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS**

To understand how changes to any of the assumptions made affect the overall SROI found, a range of sensitivity analyses were conducted.

The first scenario tested changes to the attribution assumptions. It was assumed in the analysis that the values for attribution were as stakeholders said about what amount of the change experienced is caused by this program. Attribution was calculated asking stakeholders how much of the change that they experienced was caused by the program. Stakeholders responded as follows: none, a little, half or a lot. These were correlated with percentages as follows: none (0%), a little (25%), half (50%) or a lot (75%). A weighted average was then taken to determine an attribution percentage.

While the program did contribute to the changes that participants experienced, the reality is that multiple interventions operate in the same communities in which the program operates, potentially contributing the program's effects in a way that is difficult to tease apart. Therefore, adjusting the assumed attribution values will account for the effect of this potential overlapping. Attribution values were increased from their Baseline (Surveyed) result by 10% and 25%. The resulting SROI can be found in Table G11 (Low Valuation) and Table G12 (High Valuation).

**Table G. 11: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Attribution (+10% and +25% from Baseline) (Low End)**

	BASE CASE (LOW FINANCIAL PROXY, ATTRIBUTION AS SURVEYED)	ATTRIBUTION +10% FROM BASE CASE	ATTRIBUTION +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,129,320	\$982,016	\$518,721
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$838,577	\$660,905	\$410,856
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$7.01	\$1: \$6.13	\$1: \$4.81

**Table G. 12: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Attribution (+10% and +25% from Baseline) (High end)**

	BASE CASE (HIGH FINANCIAL PROXY, ATTRIBUTION AS SURVEYED)	ATTRIBUTION +10% FROM BASE CASE	ATTRIBUTION +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,770,562	\$1,550,440	\$1,177,757
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,082,878	\$940,360	\$731,584
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$10.04	\$1: \$8.74	\$1: \$6.78

Across all levels of attribution, the program has a strong positive SROI.

A further sensitivity analysis was conducted to understand how changes to deadweight can also affect the total Social Return on Investment. The original deadweight assumption was calculated again using a weighted average of stakeholder responses. However, this time stakeholders were asked how much of

the change would have occurred in the absence of the program using the same scale. The answers were correlated to the same percentages to allow the calculation of a weighted average.

Similarly to attribution, by increasing deadweight values it is testing assumptions on how much change would have occurred in the absence of this program. Change may occur in the absence of one specific program, due to other factors such as the population growing tired of economic disruption after COVID 19 – understanding how the SROI created by the program is affected by this is key to understanding overall value. Tables G13 and G14 outline how changes to deadweight (+10% from Baseline and +25% from baseline) affect the Social Value created at both Low and High Stakeholder Preference Valuations

**Table G. 13: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Deadweight (+10% and +25% from Baseline) (Low End)**

	BASE CASE (LOW FINANCIAL PROXY, DEADWEIGHT AS SURVEYED)	DEADWEIGHT +10% FROM BASE CASE	DEADWEIGHT +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,129,320	\$982,402	\$762,025
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$838,577	\$656,337	\$507,300
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$7.01	\$1: \$6.08	\$1: \$4.70

**Table G. 14: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Deadweight (+10% and +25% from Baseline) (High End)**

	BASE CASE (HIGH FINANCIAL PROXY, DEADWEIGHT AS SURVEYED)	DEADWEIGHT +10% FROM BASE CASE	DEADWEIGHT +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,770,562	\$941,282	\$725,866
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,082,878	\$833,417	\$621,023
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$10.04	\$1: \$8.73	\$1: \$6.76

Across all levels of deadweight, the program has a strong positive SROI.

A final sensitivity analysis was conducted to test the assumed valuations. Analyses were conducted at 20% of the base case financial proxy, 50% of this proxy and 150% of this proxy in order to test if Social Value is still created at these levels. Table G15 presents the results of this scenario when testing the Low Survey Proxies and Table G16 presents this for the High Survey Proxies.

**Table G. 15: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Monetized Values at 20%, 50% and 150% of base case (low end)**

	BASE CASE (LOW FINANCIAL PROXY)	FINANCIAL PROXY 20% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 50% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 150% OF BASE CASE
<b>TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE</b>	\$1,129,320	\$255,864	\$564,660	\$1,693,980
<b>TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE</b>	\$838,577	\$151,139	\$337,847	\$1,133,542
<b>TOTAL INVESTMENT</b>	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865
<b>SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT</b>	\$1: \$7.01	\$1:\$1.40	\$1:\$3.50	\$1:\$10.51

**Table G. 16: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Monetized Values at 20%, 50% and 150% of base case (high end)**

	BASE CASE (HIGH FINANCIAL PROXY)	FINANCIAL PROXY 20% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 50% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 150% OF BASE CASE
<b>TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE</b>	\$1,770,562	\$354,113	\$885,281	\$2,665,844
<b>TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE</b>	\$1,082,878	\$216,576	\$541,439	\$1,624,317
<b>TOTAL INVESTMENT</b>	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865
<b>SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT</b>	\$1: \$10.04	\$1:\$2.01	\$1:\$5.02	\$1:\$15.06

Across all valuations and scenarios, the program still has a strong positive SROI.


Based on the totality of these sensitivity analysis, when using stakeholder valuations – this program has a Social Return on Investment Ratio between \$1: \$2 \$1:\$16.

### RESULTS – COST-BASED VALUATION

When estimating the value for outcomes using financial proxies for outcomes based on market rates and other financial proxies identified through the literature search, it was found that for every \$1 invested in the program, \$1.75 in Social Value is created (with a range of \$0.30 to \$2.62 after Sensitivity Analysis).


When using this strategy, the value created for each stakeholder group is different compared to that of the stakeholders-stated preference valuation approach. The most value is created for religious leaders, followed by other stakeholders.

**Figure G. 13: Distribution of Value Created for Each Stakeholder (Cost-Based Valuation)**




In this monetization approach, all outcomes were able to be monetized. The three outcomes that generated the most value for Youth (18-35) Participants of Programming across were: (1) Increased leadership skills and capacity, (2) Increased religious tolerance and (3) Increased networking and opportunities. Consistent with the stakeholders-stated preference valuations, youth did not experience any outcomes that created negative value. Figure G14 presents all outcomes and their valuations across both Low Valuations and High Valuations. Figures G15 presents these valuations relative to one another.

**Figure G. 14: Value of Outcomes for Youth (18-35) (Cost-Based Valuation)**




**Figure G. 15: Relative Value of Outcomes for Youth (18-35) (Cost-Based Valuation)**




For Women (35+) Participants of Programming – four key outcomes were experienced. These are: (1) Increased capacity for peacebuilding, (2) Increased Networking and opportunities, (3) Increased inclusion in peacebuilding processes and (4) Increased interfaith dialogue. Their valuations and relative value are shown in Figures G16 and G17.

**Figure G. 16: Value of Outcomes for Women (35+) (Cost-Based Valuation)**




**Figure G. 17: Relative Value of Outcomes for Women (35+) (Cost-Based Valuation)**




Religious Leaders experienced four key outcomes – (1) Increased capacity for peacebuilding and (2) Increased networking and opportunities, (3) Increased interfaith dialogue and (4) Increased outreach to youth at risk of radicalization. Their valuations are presented in Figure G18 and Relative Values in Figure G19.

**Figure G. 18: Value of Outcomes for Religious Leaders (Cost-Based Valuation)**




**Figure G. 19: Relative Value of Outcomes for Religious Leaders (Cost-Based Valuation)**




Security Actors experienced one key outcome – reduction in crime. The valuation for this outcome is presented in Figure G20.

**Figure G. 20: Value of Outcomes for Security Actors (Cost-Based Valuation)**



Staff working on the *Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya* program also experienced one key outcome – increased capacity for peacebuilding. Valuations for this outcome are presented in Figure G21.

**Figure G. 21: Valuation of Outcomes for Staff (Cost-Based Valuation)**



## SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

To understand how changes to any of the assumptions made affect the overall Social Value created, a range of Sensitivity Analyses were conducted.

The same analyses were conducted on the literature valuations as were done on the stakeholders-stated preference valuations. To summarize, the following were tested:

- 1) Changes to attribution (+10% and +25% to base case)
- 2) Changes to deadweight (+10% and +25% to base case)
- 3) Changes to valuation (20%, 50% and 150% of base case)

The base case for attribution and deadweight were the levels established through surveys of stakeholders, and for financial proxies it was the valuation established through the literature.

Results for each of the sensitivity analyses are presented in Tables G17-G19.

**Table G. 17: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Attribution (+10% and +25% from Baseline) (Cost-Based)**

	BASE CASE (ATTRIBUTION AS SURVEYED)	ATTRIBUTION +10% FROM BASE CASE	ATTRIBUTION +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$155,340	\$134,431	\$115,497
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$161,911	\$191,780	\$173,427
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$317,250
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$1.51	\$1: \$1.78	\$1: \$1.61

Across all levels of attribution, the program has a positive SROI.

**Table G. 18: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Deadweight (+10% and +25% from Baseline) (Cost-Based)**

	BASE CASE (DEADWEIGHT AS SURVEYED)	DEADWEIGHT +10% FROM BASE CASE	DEADWEIGHT +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$155,340	\$135,045	\$104,463
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$161,911	\$192,242	\$108,303
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$107,850	\$107,865	\$107,865
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$1.51	\$1: \$1.78	\$1: \$1.00

Across all levels of deadweight, the program has a positive SROI.

**Table G. 19: Sensitivity Analysis of Financial Proxies at 20%, 50% and 150% of base case (Cost-Based)**

	BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 20% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 50% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 150% OF BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$155,340	\$31,086	\$230,266	\$242,866
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$161,911	\$32,382	\$386,414	\$1,145,098

	BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 20% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 50% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 150% OF BASE CASE
<b>TOTAL INVESTMENT</b>	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865
<b>SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT</b>	\$1: \$1.51	\$1:\$0.30	\$1:\$3.58	\$1:\$2.25


Based on the totality of these sensitivity analysis, when using financial proxies from market rates and economic valuations – *Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya* has a Social Return on Investment Ratio between \$1: \$0.30 and \$1: \$2.25.

**RESULTS – STAKEHOLDER STATED PREFERENCE (POST-ELECTION)**

As previously mentioned, the timeframe of this analysis afforded the unique ability to understand how the 2022 Kenyan national elections influenced results through repeating the Social Return on Analysis process. Results from the analysis show that for every \$1 invested, between \$16 and \$32 in social value was created. To understand the Social Value that was created during the Election, outcomes were valued based on what stakeholders stated. This ratio changed to \$1: \$3.27-\$48.81 when conducting a sensitivity analysis.

During the post-election period, the relative value created for each stakeholder group was the similar to that of the original survey valuations. Figure G22 presents the Relative Valuations for both Low and High Valuation.

**Figure G. 22: Relative Value Created for Stakeholders Post- Election (Stakeholders-Stated Preference Valuation)**




In this monetization approach, all outcomes for Youth (18-35) Participants of Programming were able to be monetized. When compared to the pre-election period, there is a shift in the outcomes that have created the most value for youth. In the post-election period these are: (1) Increased leadership skills and capacity, (2) Increased networking and opportunities and (3) Increased religious tolerance. All outcomes still generated positive value for youth. All valuations in this period are shown in Figure G23.

These results demonstrate that in the post-election period, there is a significant growth in value creation.


While this clearly demonstrates that there is value created for Youth (18-35) Participants of Programming during the election period, it is also important to understand how this value compares relative to outside of the election context. Figure G23 presents the value created for Youth (18-35) Participants of Programming both before and after the election.

**Figure G. 23: Value of Outcomes for Youth (18-35) Pre- and Post- Election (Stakeholders- Stated Preference Valuation)**



There is a minor shift in the relative value of outcomes during the post-election period. The relative value of outcomes at both low and high valuations are presented in Figure G24.


**Figure G. 24: Relative Value of Outcomes for Youth (18-35) Participants of Programming Post-Election (Stakeholders- Stated Preference Valuations)**



For Women Participants in Programming – four key outcomes were experienced. These are: (1) Increased capacity for peacebuilding, (2) Increased Networking and opportunities, (3) Increased inclusion in peacebuilding processes and (4) Increased interfaith dialogue. Their valuations and relative value are shown in Figures G25-G26.


As with youth, it is clear that value is created in the post-election period for this stakeholder group. This is also shown through Figure G25 that shows this value compared to the pre-election period.

**Figure G. 25: Value of Outcomes for Women Pre- and Post- Election (Stakeholders- Stated Preference Valuation)**




There is no difference in the relative value of outcomes during the post-election period. The relative value of outcomes at both low and high valuations are presented in Figure G26.

**Figure G. 26: Relative Value of Outcomes for Women Post-Election (Stakeholders- Stated Preference Valuations)**




For Religious Leaders – there were no changes to the outcomes. However, there was an increase in the social value created for this stakeholder group. See Figures G27-G28 for more detailed valuations and relative value.

**Figure G. 27: Value of Outcomes for Religious Leaders Pre- and Post- Election (Stakeholders-Stated Preference Valuation)**




**Figure G. 28: Relative Value of Outcomes for Religious Leaders Post-Election (Stakeholders-Stated Preference Valuations)**




Security Actors also saw an increase in the value that was created for them in the post-election period. Figure G29 presents the valuation at low and high levels and compares it to the valuation Pre-election.

**Figure G. 29: Values of outcomes for Security Actors Pre- and Post-Election (Stakeholders- Stated Preference Valuation)**



Additional analysis examined how the election affected the value of outcomes experienced by Staff Members working on the *Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya* program. There were slight changes to the one key outcome – increased capacity for peacebuilding - as staff were better able to triangulate the value – a lower bound was created for the value. Valuations for this outcome are presented in Figure G30.

**Figure G. 30: Value of Outcomes for Staff Pre- and Post-Election (Stakeholders- Stated Preference Valuation)**



## SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Consistent with both Pre-Election scenarios, sensitivity analysis was conducted to ensure the robustness of the results presented. The sensitivity analyses were conducted on both Low and High Valuations obtained from the post-Election surveys and tested the following scenarios follows:

- 1) Testing levels of attribution (+10% and +25% from Base Case)
- 2) Testing levels of deadweight (+10% and +25% from Base Case)
- 3) Testing levels of valuation (20%, 50% and 150% of Base Case).

The results are presented in the following Tables:

- 1) Attribution – Tables G20 and G21
- 2) Deadweight – Tables G22 and G23
- 3) Valuation – Tables G24 and G25

**Table G. 20: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Attribution (+10% and +25% from Baseline) (Post-Election) (Low End)**

	BASE CASE (LOW FINANCIAL PROXY, ATTRIBUTION AS SURVEYED)	ATTRIBUTION +10% FROM BASE CASE	ATTRIBUTION +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,819,526	\$1,664,547	\$1,182,079
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,761,688	\$1,529,830	\$1,162,041
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$317,250
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$16.33	\$1: \$14.11	\$1: \$10.77

**Table G. 21: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Attribution (+10% and +25% from Baseline) (Post-Election) (High End)**

	BASE CASE (HIGH FINANCIAL PROXY, ATTRIBUTION AS SURVEYED)	ATTRIBUTION +10% FROM BASE CASE	ATTRIBUTION +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$3,692,010	\$3,172,170	\$2,392,410
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$3,512,230	\$3,028,927	\$2,306,973
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1:\$32.54	\$1: \$28.08	\$1:\$21.39

Based on this sensitivity analysis, at all levels of attribution the program has a strong positive SROI in the post-election period.

**Table G. 22: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Deadweight (+10% and +25% from Baseline) (Post-Election) (Low End)**

	BASE CASE (LOW FINANCIAL PROXY, DEADWEIGHT AS SURVEYED)	DEADWEIGHT +10% FROM BASE CASE	DEADWEIGHT +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,819,526	\$1,573,537	\$1,204,553
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,761,688	\$1,524,903	\$1,169,726
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$107,865	\$106,865	\$106,865
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$16.33	\$1: \$14.14	\$1: \$10.84

**Table G. 23: Sensitivity Analysis based on changes to Deadweight (+10% and +25% from Baseline) (Post-Election) (High End)**

	BASE CASE (HIGH FINANCIAL PROXY, DEADWEIGHT AS SURVEYED)	DEADWEIGHT +10% FROM BASE CASE	DEADWEIGHT +25% FROM BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$3,692,010	\$3,192,463	\$2,443,144
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$3,512,230	\$3,038,143	\$2,330,013
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1:\$32.54	\$1:\$28.17	\$1:\$21.60

Again, the results of this sensitivity analysis demonstrate that the program generated a strong positive Social Return on Investment in the Post-Election period.

**Table G. 24: Sensitivity Analysis based on Monetized Values at 20%, 50% and 150% of base case (Post-Election) (Low End)**

	BASE CASE (LOW FINANCIAL PROXY)	FINANCIAL PROXY 20% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 50% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 150% OF BASE CASE
TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,819,526	\$363,905	\$909,763	\$2,729,289
TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE	\$1,761,688	\$352,338	\$880,844	\$2,642,530
TOTAL INVESTMENT	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865
SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT	\$1: \$16.33	\$1:\$3.27	\$1:\$8.17	\$1:\$24.60

**Table G. 25: Sensitivity Analysis based on Monetized Values at 20%, 50% and 150% of base case (Post-Election) (High End)**

	BASE CASE (HIGH FINANCIAL PROXY)	FINANCIAL PROXY 20% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 50% OF BASE CASE	FINANCIAL PROXY 150% OF BASE CASE
<b>TOTAL MONETIZED SOCIAL VALUE</b>	\$3,692,010	\$738,,402	\$1,846,005	\$5,538,014
<b>TOTAL PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE</b>	\$3,512,230	\$702,046	\$1,755,115	\$5,265,344
<b>TOTAL INVESTMENT</b>	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865	\$107,865
<b>SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT</b>	\$1:\$32.54	\$1:\$6.51	\$1:\$16.27	\$1:\$48.81

Based on the results of this sensitivity analysis – there is positive Social Value generated across all levels of valuation.

Based on the totality of these sensitivity analysis, when using stakeholder valuations – *Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya* has a Social Return on Investment Ratio between \$1: \$3 and \$1: \$49.

## ANNEX H: IMPACT RISK ASSESSMENT

For each outcome that it seeks to deliver or understand, *Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace in the Coast Region of Kenya* faces impact risks. According to the Impact Management Program consensus, “[i]mpact risk is the likelihood that impact will be different than expected, and that the difference will be material from the perspective of people or the planet who experience impact.” One of the primary such risks is evidence risk, which is closely related with the credibility of the assessment in the eyes of its audience. We have rated the evidence risk for each outcome and financial proxy used in this analysis. Three aspects of Accuracy are considered in our Evidence risk rubric: volume of evidence, rigor of evidence, and applicability of evidence. Additionally, the Consequences of inaccuracy are rated.

### RUBRIC FOR IMPACT RISK: EVIDENCE

A (Likelihood of Accuracy) + B (Consequences) = Evidence Risk

The rating is on a 1 - 10 scale, 10 being highest risk, as follows:

#### EVIDENCE RISK RATING: LIKELIHOOD OF ACCURACY

- 1 = Extremely unlikely to be inaccurate, based on: statistically significant sample size/very large sample size relative to size of affected population, well-documented and robust methods of measurement and/or analysis, recency from 0-3 years old, and highly similar population and context to that in our study.
- 2 = Very unlikely to be inaccurate, based on: nearly statistically significant sample size/sizeable sample size relative to size of affected population, well-documented and reasonable methods of measurement and/or analysis, recency from 4-6 years old or better, and similar population and context to that in our study.
- 3 = Moderately likely to be inaccurate, based on: somewhat less than statistically significant sample size relative to size of affected population, mostly well-documented and reasonable methods of measurement and/or analysis given the nature of the intervention and study, recency being from 7-9 years old or better, and population and context somewhat similar to that in our study or better.
- 4 = Highly likely to be inaccurate, based on: sample size not close to representative of size of affected population, patchy discussion of methods of measurement and/or analysis and/or some quality issues with methodology, study being 10-12 years old or better, and/or population and context being significantly different than that in our study.
- 5 = Extremely likely to be inaccurate based on: sample size insufficient relative to size of affected population, unclear methods of measurement and/or analysis, study >12 years old or better, and population and context significantly different than that in our study.

#### EVIDENCE RISK RATING: CONSEQUENCES

- 5 = Catastrophic, in that human life is at risk if the assessment of impact is inaccurate.
- 4 = Major in that severe damage to peoples' well-being could occur if the assessment is inaccurate.
- 3 = Moderate in that significant damage to peoples' well-being could occur.
- 2 = Minor in that some disruption to quality of life is possible.

- I = Insignificant in that only minor problems would ensue if the assessment of risk is inaccurate.

**Table H. 1: Impact Risk Assessment**

STAKEHOLDER AND OUTCOME	EVIDENCE RISK LIKELIHOOD	EVIDENCE RISK CONSEQUENCES	OVERALL EVIDENCE RISK RATING
<b>YOUTH PARTICIPANTS</b>			
Increased networking and opportunities	3	I	4
Increased leadership skills and capacity	3	I	4
Increased religious tolerance	3	2	5
<b>WOMEN</b>			
Increased networking and opportunities	3	I	4
Increased interfaith dialogue	3	2	5
Increased capacity for peacebuilding	3	I	4
Increased inclusion in peacebuilding processes	3	2	5
<b>RELIGIOUS LEADERS</b>			
Increased networking and opportunities	3	I	4
Increased interfaith dialogue	3	2	5
Increased capacity for peacebuilding	3	I	4
Increased outreach to youth at-risk of radicalization	3	2	5
<b>SECURITY ACTORS</b>			
Reduction in crime	5	2	7
<b>STAFF</b>			
Increased job satisfaction	3	I	4
Increased capacity for peacebuilding	3	I	4
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>4.6</b>

The overall assessment of the risk that the evidence is inaccurate, and of the severity of the consequences of that inaccuracy to stakeholders experiencing the impact of this program, is 4.6 out of 10.

## ANNEX I: FINANCIAL PROXY SOURCES AND ASSUMPTIONS

**Table I. I: Cost-Based Analysis Financial Proxy Sources and Related Assumptions**

STAKEHOLDER GROUP	WELL-DEFINED OUTCOME	FINANCIAL PROXY	SOURCES	RELATED ASSUMPTIONS
Youth (18-35) Participants of Programming	Increased Networking Opportunities	Cost of Joining Toastmasters for One Year	<a href="https://www.toastmasters.org/membership/my-first-meeting">https://www.toastmasters.org/membership/my-first-meeting</a>	Local Kenyan Toastmasters did not publish localized prices as of (1/10/2022), market rate established with prices published by Toastmasters international
	Increased Leadership Skills and Capacity	Cost of leadership development seminar	<a href="https://www.theknowledgeacademy.com/ke/courses/leadership-training/leadership-skills-/">https://www.theknowledgeacademy.com/ke/courses/leadership-training/leadership-skills-/</a>	Leadership development seminar leads to similar indicators that this group experienced. Local market rate as of 1/10/2022.
	Increased Religious Tolerance	Avoided cost to the state of one incident of violence	<a href="https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/EVP-2021-web-1.pdf">https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/EVP-2021-web-1.pdf</a>	Economics and Peace Institute estimation of per capita direct and indirect costs of violence. Assume that costs are saved when violence is reduced and that at least 1 person is involved in an incidence of violence. Assuming that increased interaction between members of different religious leads to a decrease in violence.
Women (35+) Participating in Programming	Increased Networking and Opportunities	Cost to Join Women's Chamber of Commerce (Tanzania) for One Year	<a href="https://www.twcc-tz.org/membership/how-to-join/">https://www.twcc-tz.org/membership/how-to-join/</a>	Assuming that Women's Chamber of Commerce would lead to a more similar experience to that of the programming than compared to toastmasters. Tanzanian Shillings converted to Kenyan Shillings as of 1/10/2022/

STAKEHOLDER GROUP	WELL-DEFINED OUTCOME	FINANCIAL PROXY	SOURCES	RELATED ASSUMPTIONS
	Increased Interfaith Dialogue	Avoided cost to the state of one incident of violence	<a href="https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/EVP-2021-web-1.pdf">https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/EVP-2021-web-1.pdf</a>	Economics and Peace Institute estimation of per capita direct and indirect costs of violence. Assume that cots are saved when violence is reduced and that at least 1 person is involved in an incidence of violence. Assuming that increased interaction between members of different religious leads to a decrease in violence.
	Increased Capacity for Peacebuilding	Cost of introductory peacebuilding course	<a href="https://africapeaceinstitute.org/registration/">https://africapeaceinstitute.org/registration/</a>	Level of peacebuilding education provided by Program similar to that provided by Introductory Peacebuilding course Market rate established through search of Introductory Peacebuilding course in Kenya
	Increased inclusion in peacebuilding processes	Increase in Global GDP Per Capita as a result of the elimination of Gender-Based Discrimination in Social Institutions	<a href="https://www.oecd.org/development/gender-development/SIGI_cost_final.pdf">https://www.oecd.org/development/gender-development/SIGI_cost_final.pdf</a>	OECD estimates of Per Capita increases in Global GDP per capita as a result of the elimination of Gender
Religious Leaders Participating in Programming	Increased Networking and Opportunities	Cost of Joining Toastmasters for One Year	<a href="https://www.toastmasters.org/membership/my-first-meeting">https://www.toastmasters.org/membership/my-first-meeting</a>	Local Kenyan Toastmasters did not publish localized prices as of (1/10/2022), market rate established with prices published by Toastmasters international
	Increased capacity for peacebuilding	Cost of introductory peacebuilding course	<a href="https://africapeaceinstitute.org/registration/">https://africapeaceinstitute.org/registration/</a>	Level of peacebuilding education provided by Program similar to that provided by Introductory Peacebuilding course Market rate established through search of Introductory Peacebuilding course in Kenya

STAKEHOLDER GROUP	WELL-DEFINED OUTCOME	FINANCIAL PROXY	SOURCES	RELATED ASSUMPTIONS
	Increased interfaith dialogue	Avoided cost to the state of one incident of violence	<a href="https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/EVP-2021-web-1.pdf">https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/EVP-2021-web-1.pdf</a>	Economics and Peace Institute estimation of per capita direct and indirect costs of violence. Assume that costs are saved when violence is reduced and that at least 1 person is involved in an incidence of violence. Assuming that increased interaction between members of different religious leads to a decrease in violence.
	Increased outreach to at-risk youth	Avoided costs to the state associated with a reduction in Anti-Social Behaviour	<a href="https://www.niaa.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/indigenous/Youth-Prevention-and-Diversion-Circular-Head-Aboriginal-Corporation/pdf/C_HAC_YPD_Forecast_SROI_PDF.pdf">https://www.niaa.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/indigenous/Youth-Prevention-and-Diversion-Circular-Head-Aboriginal-Corporation/pdf/C_HAC_YPD_Forecast_SROI_PDF.pdf</a>	SROI Analysis of Indigenous Youth Program in Australia used “Willingness to Be a leader in the community” to express a similar outcome. Financial Proxy in AUD, Converted to USD using 0.66 AUD: USD (as of 1/10/2022) then to Kenyan PPP as 43.8 LCU/INT)
Security Actors	Reduction in Crime	Avoided cost to the state of one incident of violence	<a href="https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/EVP-2021-web-1.pdf">https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/EVP-2021-web-1.pdf</a>	Economics and Peace Institute estimation of per capita direct and indirect costs of violence. Assume that costs are saved when violence is reduced and that at least 1 person is involved in an incidence of violence. Assuming that increased interaction between members of different religious leads to a decrease in violence.



## ANNEX J: LIST OF EXPERT ADVISORY GROUP MEMBERS

**Table J. 1: List of Expert Advisory Group Members**

<b>MEMBER'S NAME</b>	<b>ORGANIZATION REPRESENTED</b>
Dr. Rhuks Ako	African Union Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security
Terri-Ann Gilbert	Commonwealth Secretariat
Christine Odera	Commonwealth Youth Peace Ambassadors Network
Viridiana Wasike-Mutere	National Youth Council of Kenya
Mattias Lundberg	World Bank
Eliska Jelinkova	United Network of Young Peacebuilders
Jessica O'Connor	US Agency for International Development
Steve Commins	Scholar-practitioner
Joao Felipe Scarpelini	UN Population Fund
Cristina Petcu	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mridul Upadhyay	Youth Observer
Adrienne Lemon	Search for Common Ground
Matteo Busto	UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs