



USAID Côte d'Ivoire

CÔTE D'IVOIRE POLITICAL TRANSITION AND INCLUSION PROGRAM FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

An Evaluation for Learning, Evaluation, and Research
Activity II (LER II 030)

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This document was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development's Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Center under the Learning, Evaluation and Research Activity II (LER II) contract: GS10F0218U/7200AA18M00017.

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ACRONYMS

2C2PF	Comité de coordination pour la participation politique des femmes Coordinating Committee for Women's Political Participation
AMELP	Activity Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Plan
ARK	Action rurale de Korhogo Rural Action of Korhogo
CCM	Civil-military committees
CEI	Commission Electorale Indépendante Independent Election Commission
CIED	Concertation interpartis pour des élections démocratiques Interparty Coalition for Democratic Elections
CNDH	National Commission on Human Rights
COI	Conflict of interest
COR	Contracting Officer Representative
CSO	Civil society organization
CREFDI	Centre de recherche et formation sur le développement intégré Center for Research and Training on Integrated Development
ET	Evaluation team
FGD	Focus group discussion
FOSCAO	Forum de la société civil de l'Afrique de l'ouest West African Civil Society Forum
FPI	Front Populaire Ivoirien Ivoirian Popular Front
GOCI	Government of Côte d'Ivoire
INDIGO	Initiative de Dialogue et de Recherche-Action pour la Paix Initiative of Dialogue and Research – Action for Peace
IR	Intermediate result
KII	Key informant interview
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
ODAFEM	Organisation pour le Développement des Activités des Femmes Organization for the Development of Women's Activities
PDCI	Parti démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire Democratic Party of Ivory Coast

PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
POECI	Plateforme des organisations de la société civile pour l'observation des élections en Côte d'Ivoire Platform of Civil Society Organizations for the Observation of Elections in Côte d'Ivoire
PSC	Community Solidarity Plan
PSCPD	Plateforme de la Société civile pour la Paix et la démocratie Civil Society Platform for Peace and Democracy
PTI	Political Transition and Inclusion
PVE	Preventing violent extremism
P/CVE	Preventing/countering violent extremism
PYPA	Program for Young Politicians in Africa
RASALAO-CI	Réseau d'Action Sur les Armes Légères en Afrique de l'Ouest, section Côte d'Ivoire Network of Action on Light Arms in West Africa, Côte d'Ivoire section
RDA	Rassemblement Démocratique Africain African Democratic Rally
RHDP	Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace
RIJLI	Réseau Ivoirien des Jeunes Leaders pour l'Intégrité Ivoirian Network of Young Leaders for Integrity
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VE	Violent extremism
VSLA	Village savings and loan association

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

The Political Transition and Inclusion (PTI) program is a four-year, \$11.2 million program awarded to the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) in July 2018. PTI is designed to reinforce Ivoirians' efforts to strengthen inclusion and democratic processes as firewalls against further violence and instability and to help local and national institutions gain the legitimacy and inclusivity needed to achieve sustained reconciliation and participatory democracy. PTI seeks to contribute to long-term political stability in Côte d'Ivoire through inclusive political processes and the resolution of deep-seated grievances at the local and national levels. PTI is currently in its fourth and final year.

PURPOSE AND METHODS

The purpose of this endline evaluation is to assess and document the extent to which PTI contributed to achieving its objectives. The evaluation offers an in-depth understanding of PTI's successes, adaptations, challenges, and lessons learned in terms of youth and women's political participation, community-based activities, and how Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) efforts have worked in northern border areas. Based on these findings, recommendations suggest adjustments to PTI programming in its final year and for future democracy and governance programming in Côte d'Ivoire once PTI comes to an end in 2022.

The evaluation engages methods that minimize bias while providing strong evidence to respond to each of the five evaluation questions. The evaluation used a mixed-methods design that incorporates quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis methods. The qualitative data collection included a review of relevant PTI documents; in-depth key informant interviews (KIIs) with beneficiaries, partners, and stakeholders in PTI activities; and focus group discussions (FGDs) with PTI beneficiaries. During the evaluation, PTI was able to access quantitative data from the Independent Election Commission (CEI) on women's and youth voter registration in 2020 and women and youth candidates in the 2021 legislative elections. Analysis of these data contributed to findings and conclusions.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

EQ1: CONSIDERING THE EXISTING EVIDENCE AND COMPETING FACTORS INFLUENCING YOUTH AND WOMEN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND INCLUSION, IS PTI BEST DESCRIBED AS CONTRIBUTING TO A DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT, MODERATE IMPROVEMENT, MINOR IMPROVEMENT, NO IMPROVEMENT, PALLIATIVE EFFECT, OR NEGATIVE IMPACT ON YOUTH AND WOMEN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND INCLUSION (A) OVERALL AND (B) SPECIFICALLY WITHIN POLITICAL PARTIES? PLEASE PROVIDE SUPPORTING EVIDENCE OF ANY CHANGES IN PARTICIPATION AND INCLUSION AND PTI CONTRIBUTION.

The evaluation team (ET) analyzed the breadth and depth¹ of the participation of women and then youth in both political processes generally and specifically in political parties. In analyzing the four parts to this question, the ET found a minor improvement in women's participation in political processes and a moderate improvement in their participation in political parties. The ET found a moderate improvement in youth participation in political processes and a minor improvement in their participation in political parties.

¹ Breadth refers to how widespread participation was across PTI locations, while depth refers to its importance, i.e., how meaningful it is. The level of improvement is determined by a combination of both breadth and depth of participation; more examples of breadth and depth resulted in a determination of a higher level of improvement.

The ET found a **minor** improvement in women's participation in political processes, primarily because PTI contributed to the passage of the quota law for women candidates, which represents a noteworthy milestone for women in Côte d'Ivoire.

The ET found a **moderate** improvement in youth political participation, primarily because of PTI's contribution to a successful advocacy program to make voter registration more accessible. In all but one PTI location, voter registration from 2018 to 2020 increased more than at the national average; most locations saw drastic increases. The ET found examples of youth political engagement in the site visits, including the Interparty Coalition for Democratic Elections (CIED). This was partially offset by mixed results in 2020 youth voter registration in PTI locations as compared to the national average.

The ET found a **moderate** improvement in women's participation in political parties, primarily because the increase in the number of female legislative candidates in PTI locations from 2016 to 2021 drastically outpaced the national average. This was offset by mixed results in other areas, including the lack of results in advancing women's leadership within political parties and the limited number of examples of women's activism in parties from the site visits. The depth of women's participation as candidates across PTI locations was mixed because there were examples both of women being pressured to drop out in favor of the party's chosen male candidate, as well as of women participants in PTI programs agreeing to run, now or in the future, because of what they learned and experienced through PTI.

The ET found a **minor** improvement in youth participation in political parties, primarily because NDI staff and local CIED representatives offered examples of party activism from four site visits. Results were otherwise mixed. Youth face stronger headwinds in parties, where youth may include those in their 40s, so obtaining leadership positions is challenging. No one under 25 was proposed by any party. Youth mentorship in political parties is advancing but needs more time to demonstrate results. Youth efforts to advocate for a charter on youth leadership in political parties are promising but need more time to be consolidated. Eleven of 15 PTI locations underperformed the national average in nominating youth candidates for the 2021 legislative elections, but this dataset is not available to the ET for previous years so change over time cannot be examined.

EQ2: WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES PTI CONFRONTED OR CONTINUES TO CONFRONT IN PROMOTING YOUTH AND WOMEN PARTICIPATION AND WHAT ARE THE LESSONS LEARNED THAT COULD BE APPLIED IN FUTURE INTERVENTIONS BOTH IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE AND BEYOND IN INCREASING WOMEN AND YOUTH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION?

NDI's primary challenge was managing its consortium of local partners. PTI's approach was to partner with women's and youth groups to develop activities that targeted women's and youth political participation and community cohesion. Over the course of implementation, NDI dropped two grants before they were signed and discontinued or suspended three grants because of questions surrounding either their capacity, political independence of the organization, and/or contested leadership. These five represented half of the 10 local grants/partners.

NDI may have underestimated the challenges it would face with such a large consortium, including the need to develop the capacity of local partners and address questions surrounding internal governance. NDI provided its local grantees administrative, program, and financial management capacity-building support, based on the pre-award questionnaire (PAQ) prepared by potential subgrantees that assesses internal capacity and organizational setup and is used to identify areas for improvement after the subgrant is issued. NDI first reported on the assistance provided to subgrantees at the end of its first year (NDI FY19 Q4 report, 2019). Both the Year 2 and Year 3 workplans describe at length the challenges identified and support planned to address challenges relating to both administrative and management capacity as well as internal governance. NDI increased its grants and finance staff to be able to effectively manage and support its grantees. An important lesson is the need to thoroughly investigate an organization's leaders, structure, management, and systems from the start to ensure an organization is able to receive funding

and to plan for capacity-building and management oversight in proportion to the number of grants anticipated.

COVID-19 suspended many activities, but NDI and its partners were resilient in finding ways to adapt activities. NDI, its partners, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) developed a contingency plan, which they updated based on government measures. All activities were reviewed to see which were at risk and how to revise them. Several had to be postponed, but many were adapted. Examples include: Tea debates became radio debates, meetings and mentoring moved online, WhatsApp groups were created to enhance communication, larger rooms were rented to allow for social distancing once in-person workshops became possible, and partners made greater use of social networks for messaging. A lesson learned is to incorporate communication technologies into programming from the outset to have greater flexibility and more options for activity implementation.

Ivoirian partners frequently cited limited resources, especially at the local level, as either a challenge or a missed opportunity in terms of an activity they would have liked to implement but could not due to lack of funding.

EQ3: HOW DID PTI ADAPT OR NOT ADAPT ITS APPROACH TO PROMOTING YOUTH AND WOMEN PARTICIPATION GIVEN CHALLENGES WITH THE 2020 ELECTION? WAS THE LEVEL OF ADAPTATION APPROPRIATE?

PTI and its partners adapted by engaging in advocacy activities that succeeded in encouraging peaceful protests and avoiding violence in PTI locations. When the ruling party's presidential candidate, Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly, died unexpectedly in July 2020, President Ouattara reversed his decision not to run for another term and announced in August 2020 that he would seek a third mandate. His decision led many opposition parties to boycott the presidential election. Once the context of the 2020 presidential elections abruptly changed, PTI successfully adapted its approach and pivoted away from promoting voter turnout in favor of supporting youth and women as advocates for peaceful protest to calm tensions. These activities were supported extensively by partner radio stations and broadcasts by CIVILIA, the pen name for the young female journalist who covers all PTI activities in twice-weekly national radio broadcasts, through intermittent local radio broadcasts, and on social media. National and local stakeholders expressed widespread agreement that violence did not occur in PTI locations because of PTI interventions. Partners at the local level took a leading role in calming tensions. Advocacy activities by local partners succeeded in encouraging peaceful protests and avoiding violence.

EQ4: HOW WELL HAVE COMMUNITY-BASED ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY SOCIO-ECONOMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP INTERVENTIONS TOWARD YOUTH AND WOMEN, BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN TARGETED COMMUNITIES? WHAT CHALLENGES DID PTI CONFRONT OR CONTINUE TO CONFRONT AND WHAT ARE THE KEY LESSONS AND BEST PRACTICES LEARNED FROM THIS APPROACH?

PTI implemented socio-economic entrepreneurship interventions very well in targeted communities. The decades of instability and social unrest that disrupted social capital justified PTI's decision to establish village savings and loan associations (VSLAs). PTI partners and beneficiaries in all locations expressed strong support for VSLAs. Partners in both program components cited VSLAs as improving women and youth participants' economic situations and contributing to social cohesion, a sign of the synergies between the two sub-purposes. A CIED member noted that improving women's and youth's economic situations can also give them the resources to engage in political activities; the Coordinating Committee for Women's Political Participation (2C2PF) agreed that lack of resources was a primary challenge faced by women. The income generated by the VSLAs, although important at an individual level, is currently too small to significantly affect economic inclusion in targeted communities, though funds may accumulate over time with each successful lending cycle.

PTI helped the groups adapt to the challenges brought on by COVID-19 through a variety of information and communication technologies. A lesson learned is to incorporate communication technologies into programming from the outset to have greater flexibility and more options for activity implementation.

Heterogeneous VSLAs (i.e., created with mixed genders and ethnicities), proved very successful; the approach taken by CARE should be seen as a best practice because of how mixed groups strengthened understanding of opposing groups and contributed to social cohesion.

EQ5: HOW WELL HAVE P/CVE INTERVENTIONS BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN TARGETED AREAS, MAINLY AT THE NORTHERN BORDER? WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES PTI CONFRONTED OR CONTINUES TO CONFRONT AND WHAT ARE THE KEY LESSONS AND BEST PRACTICES LEARNED FROM THIS APPROACH?

Overall, the ET found evidence that P/CVE interventions have been implemented well. PTI partners and beneficiaries in Tengréla and Bouaké believe that PTI's awareness-raising in partnership with local institutions has been effective. Raising awareness of violent extremism (VE) is needed in Côte d'Ivoire because of heightened VE activity along the northern border. The targeting and content of VE messaging have been appropriate because they have helped to create a common understanding of VE among a variety of actors, from moto-taxi drivers to imams leading prayers in mosques.

PTI supported existing civil-military committees (CCMs) and helped to establish interfaith committees; both are good local institutions for P/CVE because of their composition, role, and collaboration with local authorities. The CCM includes state and non-state representatives and is tasked with supporting collaboration between security forces and the community, while the interfaith committees bring together representatives of different faiths and play a lead role in raising awareness within their respective communities. The president of the Tengréla interfaith committee is a member of the CCM. In Bouaké, for example, the CCM has 40 members: 25 community representatives (traditional, religious, union, women, etc.) and 15 representatives of security forces and the administration. The head of the CCM attends the departmental security council.

Challenges largely beyond PTI control include illegal mining, border control, and actions by security forces, which may create openings that VE actors can exploit. PTI committees and platforms have not yet reached villages outside of Tengréla where the majority of youth are both illiterate and engaged in illegal mining, which VE actors exploit. Border closures have not entirely closed off traffic, as those seeking to cross are using moto-taxis to circumvent border controls by going off-road or paying a small bribe to avoid a military checkpoint. Indeed, several interviewees in Tengréla noted the rotation of troops into northern areas has resulted in petty corruption—i.e., small bribes to avoid military posts.

Working with religious leaders to build an understanding of VE should be considered a best practice because of how it reduces stigmatization and lays the foundation for a range of other activities. A lesson NDI learned was to create a common understanding of VE, its different dimensions, and the different types of actions that can be supported. Strengthening communication across community groups is another best practice because it contributes to collaboration. The example cited in Tengréla was the ability for community groups to share information on potential threats and then collectively report them to local authorities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

EQ1: WOMEN'S AND YOUTH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

- PTI should (and plans to) engage its partners, including the CIED and 2C2PF, to analyze the gaps between the quota law and the electoral code to eventually harmonize them.
- In designing the follow-on program, USAID should support PTI partners and/or other civil society organizations (CSOs) to support women political party members to collaborate, network and advocate for their interests.
- In designing a follow-on program, USAID should support PTI partners and/or other CSOs to prepare for the next local elections where women and youth candidates may have more opportunities.

- In designing a follow-on program, USAID should build on the successes of youth engagement to expand outward from PTI locations and further reduce the manipulation of youth to engage in violence.
- In designing a follow-on program, USAID should support PTI partners and/or other CSOs in a campaign to expand access to voter registration.
- In designing a follow-on program, USAID should support the CEI to implement electronic capture of voters' demographic data.
- USAID and PTI should continue to use youth and women's groups such as VSLAs to raise awareness of participation in the electoral process.

EQ2: CHALLENGES, LESSONS LEARNED, AND BEST PRACTICES

- In developing its strategy for a follow-on program, USAID should strengthen its relationship with the CEI so that any unease over the handling of a former NDI grantee can be resolved.
- USAID implementing partners should thoroughly assess financial and administrative capacity for partners, develop capacity-building plans, and evaluate progress annually.
- In developing its strategy for a follow-on program, USAID should assess the opportunity cost of providing additional funds to local-level partners.

EQ3: 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

- In developing its strategy for a follow-on program, USAID should establish partnerships in locations where violence took place and consider expanding into those areas in any follow-on program.

EQ4: ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITIES

- PTI should prioritize the funding of group-led projects to strengthen the economic empowerment of vulnerable groups and further contribute to social cohesion.
- In developing its strategy for a follow-on program, USAID should extend and/or expand PTI's VSLA approach to other communities that have been recently affected by political violence.

EQ5: PREVENTING/COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

- In developing its strategy for a follow-on program, USAID should continue to support P/CVE interventions.
- PTI should continue to engage in dialogue with government officials, security forces, and community leaders to address other issues that can undermine P/CVE activities.

BACKGROUND

PTI SCOPE AND THEORY OF CHANGE

The PTI program is a four-year, \$11.2 million program awarded to the NDI in July 2018. PTI is designed to reinforce Ivoirians' efforts to strengthen inclusion and democratic processes as firewalls against further violence and instability and to help local and national institutions gain the legitimacy and inclusivity needed to achieve sustained reconciliation and participatory democracy. PTI seeks to contribute to long-term political stability in Côte d'Ivoire through inclusive political processes and the resolution of deep-seated grievances at the local and national levels. PTI is currently in its fourth and final year.

PTI's theory of change posits that politically engaged women, youth, and marginalized people will help the Government of Côte d'Ivoire (GOI) to "establish an environment conducive to inclusivity," and thereby create a more credible political transition and foster adequate conditions for continued stability in Côte d'Ivoire and the region.

PTI is a complex program with two sub-purposes, five Intermediate Results (IRs), and six Sub-IRs. Multiple consortium partners implement activities in 15 locations across five districts. The evaluation research questions address PTI performance in encouraging the political engagement of women and youth, in addition to community-based interventions and activities designed for P/CVE.

PTI ACTIVITIES

The PTI consortium includes international and local partners; its local partners are both geographic and thematic. Partners cover a range of activities that cross sub-purposes and IRs. Though it has evolved over time, the consortium and their areas of intervention as described in the Year 3 workplan are indicated below.

International partners:

- CARE for entrepreneurship activities
- GeoPoll for quantitative survey research
- Internews for cross-cutting media activities

Local geographic partners implement activities in support of citizen consultation monitoring committees, community solidarity plans (PSCs), and participatory youth action research. They also support thematic partner activities in their respective districts.

- Rural Action of Korhogo (ARK) in four locations in Savanes district (North)²
- Civil Society Platform for Peace and Democracy (PSCPD) in three locations in the Vallée du Bandama (Center)
- Organization for the Development of Women's Activities (ODAFEM) in four locations in Montagnes District (West)
- West African Civil Society Forum (FOSCAO) in four communes in the District of Abidjan³

Local thematic partners implement activities in support of specific IRs or Sub-IRs:

- Center for Research and Training on Integrated Development (CREFDI) for qualitative research
- 2C2PF for women's political participation and activism in political parties.

² NDI has discontinued working directly with ARK and will instead hire some of its staff as focal points.


³ FOSCAO is facing an internal leadership issue; until resolved, NDI is hiring key staff as consultants.

- Initiative of Dialogue and Research – Action for Peace (INDIGO)⁴ for election and long-term political context observation
- CIED for interparty dialogue
- Ivoirian Network of Young Leaders for Integrity (RIJLI) for youth political participation and activism in political parties.
- Program for Young Politicians in Africa (PYPA) for youth political participation and activism in political parties.

PTI IMPACT INDICATORS AND IMPACT AREAS

PTI's results framework is included below (Figure 1). Partners for specific IRs and Sub-IRs have been added. PTI's two sub-purposes are heavily intertwined, with mutually reinforcing activities. Youth and women are both targets and partners for PTI activities. Having youth and women's organizations such as RIJLI, PYPA, and 2C2PF as partners amplifies women's and youth voices and contributes to activities designed to increase their political participation as well as community cohesion. PTI activities are also primarily community-based and have sought to create linkages between partners in each sub-purpose.

FIGURE 1: PTI RESULTS FRAMEWORK, ADAPTED TO INCLUDE PARTNERS



Source: PTI AMELP, September 2021 update

⁴ NDI named POECI in its application to USAID for election observation activities. It subsequently launched a competitive process resulting in the selection of INDIGO.

EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS

The purpose of this endline evaluation is to assess and document the extent to which PTI contributed to achieving its objectives. KIIs, FGDs, and site visits offer an in-depth understanding of PTI's successes, adaptations, challenges, and lessons learned in terms of youth and women's political participation, community-based activities, and how P/CVE efforts have worked in northern border areas. Based on these findings, recommendations suggest adjustments to PTI programming in its final year and for future democracy and governance programming in Côte d'Ivoire once PTI comes to an end in 2022.

The Scope of Work is included in Annex A. The evaluation questions are as follows:

- EQ1: Considering the existing evidence and competing factors influencing youth and women political participation and inclusion, is PTI best described as contributing to a dramatic improvement, moderate improvement, minor improvement, no improvement, palliative effect, or negative impact on youth and women political participation and inclusion (a) overall and (b) specifically within political parties? Please provide supporting evidence of any changes in participation and inclusion and PTI contribution.
- EQ2: What are the challenges PTI confronted or continues to confront in promoting youth and women participation and what are the lessons learned that could be applied in future interventions both in Côte d'Ivoire and beyond in increasing women and youth political participation?
- EQ3: How did PTI adapt or not adapt its approach to promoting youth and women participation given challenges with the 2020 election? Was the level of adaptation appropriate?
- EQ4: How well have community-based activities, particularly socio-economic entrepreneurship interventions toward youth and women, been implemented in targeted communities? What challenges did PTI confront or continue to confront and what are the key lessons and best practices learned from this approach?
- EQ5: How well have P/CVE interventions been implemented in targeted areas, mainly at the northern borders? What are the challenges PTI confronted or continues to confront and what are the key lessons and best practices learned from this approach?

The evaluation questions address selected aspects of the PTI program, so there are aspects of the program not addressed by the evaluation. EQ1–EQ3 focus primarily on IRs 1.2 and 1.3, although those IRs include more than women and youth political participation. EQ4 focuses primarily on Sub-IR 2.1.3, though most PTI activities are designed to be community-based in both their design and implementation. EQ5 focuses primarily on IR 2.1.1, but PTI's P/CVE approach is also cross-cutting in design and implementation.

SELECTION CRITERIA AND SAMPLING

The ET selected five of the 15 PTI locations for site visits using the following criteria: presence of activities for most, if not all, of the evaluation questions; ensuring political balance so that the sites reflect the political spectrum; and different types of localized conflict. Table 1 lists the sites and how they reflect these criteria. There are also variances in education levels across urban, peri-urban, and rural locations, which enhanced the data collection and is reflected in the data analysis. Each site visit lasted two days.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF SITE VISITS AND SELECTION CRITERIA

District (4)	Location (5)	Evaluation Question	Political Balance	Localized Conflict
Abidjan	Abobo Yopougon	EQ1–EQ4	Dominated by either the government (Abobo) or the opposition (Yopougon)	Both have experienced localized political conflict since 2010
Montagnes (West)	Duekoué	EQ1–EQ4	Dominated by the opposition	Long-standing land disputes between <i>autochthones</i> (indigenous) and <i>allochthone</i> (foreign)
Savanes (North)	Tengréla	EQ1–EQ5	Dominated by the government	Extremist activity near the border
Vallée du Bandama (Center)	Bouaké	EQ1–EQ4	Contested by the major political parties	Tensions between ethnic groups Baoulé and Malinké in the region have resulted in violence (Béoumi)

DATA COLLECTION

The evaluation relied on three principal data sources: document review, including monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and election data, KIIs, and FGDs.⁵

Document review. The ET reviewed PTI’s program description, cooperative agreement, annual workplans, select quarterly reports, miscellaneous activity reports, and success stories. These provided invaluable information on program activities, locations, and partners, which the ET reviewed to select locations, identify stakeholders, and develop the interview guide for the KIIs and FGDs. See Annex B for a list of documents referenced.

M&E data. The ET also reviewed PTI’s Activity Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Plan (AMELP); the Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP); and an indicator table showing targets and results to date. The ET accessed indicator data from NDI, including a September 2021 update provided to the ET on October 1, 2021. The ET has incorporated data from one outcome indicator into the findings for EQ1 and data from seven output indicators into the findings for EQ4. There are no indicators focused specifically on EQ5.

Election Data. In addition, during the course of the fieldwork, the ET requested data from the CEI on female and youth voter registration prior to the 2020 presidential elections and 2021 legislative elections, female and youth voter turnout in the 2021 legislative elections, and female and youth candidates in the 2021 legislative elections. The ET accessed three data sets from the CEI on 2020 voter registration and one on 2021 legislative candidates. Both were disaggregated by age, sex, and department. The ET had access to three datasets on voter registration. The first data set came from the CEI via the Platform of Civil Society Organizations for the Observation of Elections in Côte d'Ivoire (POECI). It isolates existing registrations (pre-2020) and the new registrants in 2020 by sex but not age, but the latter are provisional. The CEI provided the ET a dataset of the finalized list that did not separate new 2020 registrants. The ET was able to merge the two data sets to create a final list of new registrants in 2020. Neither included a breakdown of voter registration by commune for Abidjan. The ET is reporting the Abidjan results but did not factor them into the analysis because PTI targeted four of Abidjan’s 13 communes. After the report

⁵ The workplan included direct observation as a data source for Q4, but this did not prove to be useful and thus is not included in the report.

was submitted, the CEI provided additional data on PTI locations, which the ET analyzed to understand the percentage increase from 2018–2020 for both women and youth in PTI locations, not including Abidjan. The dataset on 2021 legislative candidates included a breakdown by commune for Abidjan so the ET’s analysis includes these locations. The ET also requested demographic data on voter turnout in the 2021 elections, which the CEI does not have in electronic form. These data are incorporated into findings, conclusions, and recommendations for EQ1.

Key informant interviews. The ET interviewed 84 individuals (29 percent female, 71 percent male) with 44 key stakeholders and partners in Abidjan and across the five evaluation sites (Table 2 below). Interviews sought out the views of a diverse group of stakeholders, capturing the experiences of women and youth. The ET interviewed fewer women than anticipated; this did not become a limitation because men held many of the leadership positions at PTI partner organizations. At the national level, the ET interviewed program staff at USAID, NDI, CARE, Internews, and thematic partners. The ET also interviewed representatives of the CEI. In the site visits, the ET interviewed geographic partners, CIEDs, PSCs, interfaith committees, CCMs, CARE staff, INDIGO election observation coordinators, radio station staff, and others. In several cases, group interviews were conducted to maximize the number of views sought for the evaluation. Interview guides are included in Annex C and a summary of KIs is included in Annex D.

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF KIIS ACROSS LOCATIONS

Location	Partner Number	Female Number	Female Percentage	Male Number	Male Percentage	Total
Abidjan	12	9	31%	20	69%	29
Abobo	5	3	38%	5	63%	8
Bouaké	9	8	42%	11	58%	19
Duekoué	5	2	22%	7	78%	9
Tengréla	9	1	9%	10	91%	11
Yopougon	4	1	13%	7	88%	8
Total	44	24	29%	60	71%	84

Focus group discussions. The ET organized five FGDs with 49 beneficiaries of PTI activities representing 32 different affiliations (Table 3 below). Program beneficiaries have specific insights on program activities different from stakeholders. Facilitating a conversation among beneficiaries about program results, challenges, and adaptation complemented information gleaned from KIIs and the document review. The ET recruited beneficiaries through PTI’s local partners, indicating the criteria for selection and/or selecting beneficiaries from a list provided by PTI. Participants were selected to reflect a cross-section of men, women, and youth. Due to time constraints, the ET planned and held one FGD per site visit, designating specific topics for each site visit. To maintain political balance, the ET organized FGDs on EQ1–EQ3 in Abobo (government stronghold) and Yopougon (opposition stronghold). The ET organized FGDs on EQ4 in Duekoué and Bouaké, and on EQ5 in Tengréla. See Annex E for a list of FGD participants by location and affiliation.

TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF FGDs ACROSS LOCATIONS

Location	Evaluation Question	Partner Number	Female Number	Female Percentage	Male Number	Male Percentage	Total
Abobo	EQ1–EQ3	8	4	40%	6	60%	10
Bouaké	EQ4	5	5	45%	6	55%	11
Duekoué	EQ4	4	6	55%	5	45%	11
Tengréla	EQ5	8	2	22%	7	78%	9
Yopougon	EQ1–EQ3	7	4	50%	4	50%	8
Total		32	21	43%	28	57%	49

DATA ANALYSIS

The ET numbered the questions to facilitate the coding of responses by question and recorded the demographic information for each interviewee to allow for analysis by location, stakeholder, and sex. Each ET member was responsible for coding their notes by numbered question; notes were reviewed and consolidated at the end of each day or as soon as practical. The ET discussed emerging patterns and possible themes during the fieldwork and tested these patterns during subsequent interviews.

After completing the fieldwork, the ET dedicated three days for data analysis prior to the out-brief with USAID, which was essential to informing the high-level, preliminary findings for the out-brief. The ET reflected on the purpose of the evaluation as well as the logic behind each of the evaluation questions to reaffirm our approach to analyzing the data.

The ET categorized and coded data against the evaluation questions and indicators, allowing for the identification of patterns and themes across site visits and sources. The ET used a grid format to compare and analyze data across interviews, synthesizing and summarizing the data collected by indicator in order to effectively answer each evaluation question. Data coding and analysis continued after the outbrief, highlighting gaps to be addressed through follow-up queries.

The ET created a matrix of data sources, methodology, and indicators for each evaluation question (Table 4 below). Though some data sources are specific to each question, it is important to note that key informants identified for a specific evaluation question often had pertinent observations for other evaluation questions. For example, the ET interviewed local CIED representatives about women's and youth political participation, but they also commented on VSLA activities; VSLA members often commented on women's and youth political participation. Indicators were adapted as needed during data analysis. As a result, findings rely on indicators collectively because some were more pertinent than others.

TABLE 4: MATRIX OF DATA SOURCES, METHODOLOGY, AND INDICATORS BY EVALUATION QUESTION

Data Sources	Methodology	Indicators
EQ1: Considering the existing evidence and competing factors influencing youth and women political participation and inclusion, is PTI best described as contributing to a dramatic improvement, moderate improvement, minor improvement, no improvement, palliative effect, or negative impact on youth and women political participation and inclusion (a) overall and (b) specifically within political parties? Please provide supporting evidence of any changes in participation and inclusion and PTI contribution.		

Data Sources	Methodology	Indicators
Document review: Workplans, quarterly reports, miscellaneous activity reports, PTI indicator table. KIIs: <i>National:</i> NDI, Internews, POECI, INDIGO, CIED, RIJLI, 2C2PF, PYPA, CEI. <i>Site Visit:</i> District-based partners; partner focal points, local platforms, community leaders; women's or youth groups. FGD: PTI program beneficiaries	Coding and qualitative analysis of document review, KIIs, FGDs. Triangulation of information obtained through desk review, KIIs, FGDs.	Perception of change over time in youth and women's overall political participation and inclusion and specifically within parties. Evidence of change in breadth, depth, and frequency of participation of women and youth overall in political processes and specifically within parties. Perception of quality and efficacy of PTI contributions to youth and women political participation overall and within political parties. Evidence of external factors contributing to or hindering youth and women's political participation and inclusion overall and within political parties.
EQ2: What are the challenges PTI confronted or continues to confront in promoting youth and women participation and what are the lessons learned that could be applied in future interventions both in Côte d'Ivoire and beyond in increasing women and youth political participation?		
Document review: Same as Q1. KIIs: Same as Q1, especially those who are representatives of PTI management structures (both national and district-based). FGD: Same as Q1.	Coding and qualitative analysis of document review, KIIs, FGDs. Triangulation of information obtained through desk review, KIIs, FGDs.	Challenges identified and addressed through modified workplans or activity implementation. Perceived efficacy of how PTI addressed challenges. Perception of how PTI consortium management structures contributed to or hindered addressing challenges. Evidence of lessons learned triangulated across data sources.
EQ3: How did PTI adapt or not adapt its approach to promoting youth and women participation given challenges with the 2020 election? Was the level of adaptation appropriate?		
Document review: Year 3 workplans, quarterly reports, and miscellaneous activity reports. KIIs: Same as Q2. FGD: Same as Q1.	Coding and qualitative analysis of document review, KIIs, FGDs. Triangulation of information obtained through desk review, KIIs, FGDs.	Challenges identified and addressed through modified workplans and/or activity implementation. Perception of how well PTI consortium management structures contributed to or hindered adaptation. Evidence of lessons learned based on triangulation across data sources. Evidence of external factors contributing to or hindering adaptation.
EQ4: How well have community-based activities, particularly socio-economic entrepreneurship interventions toward youth and women, been implemented in targeted communities? What challenges did PTI confront or continue to confront and what are the key lessons and best practices learned from this approach?		
Document review: Workplans, quarterly reports, miscellaneous activity reports, VSLA success stories, PTI indicator table. KIIs: <i>National:</i> NDI, Internews, CARE. <i>Site visits:</i> CARE; VSLA leaders; community leaders; and representatives of women, youth, or marginalized groups. FGD: VSLA members.	Coding and qualitative analysis of document review, KIIs, FGDs. Triangulation of information obtained through desk review, KIIs, and FGDs.	Perception of activity effectiveness in targeted communities. Challenges identified and addressed through modified workplans and/or activity implementation. Evidence of lessons learned based on triangulation across data sources. Evidence of best practices based on triangulation across data sources.

Data Sources	Methodology	Indicators
		Evidence of external factors contributing to or hindering the effectiveness of social entrepreneurship activities.
EQ5: How well have P/CVE interventions been implemented in targeted areas, mainly at the northern borders? What are the challenges PTI confronted or continues to confront and what are the key lessons and best practices learned from this approach?		
Document review: Workplans (especially elements pertaining to P/CVE approach), quarterly reports, miscellaneous activity reports, PTI indicator table. KIIs: NDI, CARE, Internews, ARK, religious or interfaith groups. FGD: Members of women, youth, or marginalized groups who participated in P/CVE activities.	Coding and qualitative analysis of document review, KIIs, FGDs. Triangulation of information obtained through desk review, KIIs, and FGDs. Analysis of how the PTI consortium members applied the P/CVE approach outlined in the Y2 and Y3 workplans.	Perception of P/CVE approach and its relevance to the evolving situation in Côte d'Ivoire, especially the north. Perception of activity effectiveness in targeted communities. Challenges identified and addressed through modified workplans or activity implementation. Evidence of lessons learned based on triangulation across data sources. Evidence of best practices based on triangulation across data sources. Evidence of external factors contributing to or hindering the effectiveness of P/CVE activities.

LIMITATIONS AND MITIGATION

The evaluation is limited by both time and resources. With only three weeks allotted for fieldwork, the ET was limited in the number of sites it could visit and the number of interviews it could reasonably conduct in this timeframe. The ET sought to conduct approximately eight interviews and one focus group per site, but was not always able to interview all partners and stakeholders at each site. With only two days per site visit, if a given interviewee was unavailable or canceled at the last minute, there was little opportunity to reschedule. Weak correlation across sites may not be indicative of substantial findings, given the relatively small sample size.

USAID decided to evaluate aspects of the PTI program; not all program elements are included in the evaluation. In order to answer the evaluation questions, the ET needed to understand the context in which activities have been designed and are being implemented. For example, the ET needed to understand how PTI adapted its program in light of the changed context for the 2020 presidential elections overall in order to understand how it adapted its program activities related to the political participation of women and youth (EQ3). Many interviewees had pertinent opinions on PTI-adapted activities writ large more often than on the specific question of female and youth participation. The ET determined that stakeholder perceptions about the program overall are important to convey to USAID, even if fewer stakeholders were able to knowledgeably speak to youth and female participation.

The ET noted in its workplan and in brief a question about which activities can be considered as P/CVE. Those found under Sub-IR 2.1.2 address P/CVE, as well as other issues. They involve a smaller set of stakeholders, so there were fewer interviews related to EQ5 than for other questions. The Tengréla site visit focused much more on EQ5 than other questions, whereas site visits to Abobo, Duekoué, and Yopougon focused mostly on EQ1–EQ4. Given how PTI addressed push/pull factors in its Y2 and Y3 annual workplans, it is possible to consider a wide range of activities in the north as contributing to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), but they have not been designed as P/CVE activities, per se.

The ET organized one focus group per site visit, which were mixed groups of men and women. Traditionally, the best practice is to separate women and men to ensure that women are comfortable

expressing themselves. To overcome this obstacle, the ET actively encouraged women to speak, at times holding the floor open for them to engage. This technique was not always required; women's voices dominated in the Bouaké and Yopougon focus groups.

In the face of these time constraints, the ET did not have adequate time to investigate the political participation of marginalized groups, as suggested by NDI in its written feedback to the scope of work. Though this is an important consideration, EQ1 is essentially four questions because it addresses women and youth participation in the political process and specifically in parties. Parts a and b of the question need to be addressed for both women and youth; adding marginalized groups to the analysis would have required a level of effort that was greater than anticipated.

FINDINGS

As noted, PTI is a complex program with a range of partners who intervene in limited geographic areas and in specific topics. PTI's complexity is a source of strength because political transitions and VE require complex solutions and approaches. PTI incorporates social and political inclusion in one program to address the complexity of Côte d'Ivoire's development context and the legacy of ethnic and religious conflict. Addressing the growing VE threat is sensitive because of its perceived link to Islam. The approaches adopted to strengthen political and social inclusion are mutually reinforcing. But the complexity of the program also presented challenges, especially in the multitude of partners that comprise the PTI consortium. Consortium challenges are discussed in more detail in EQ2.

A socio-political crisis divided the country in two from 2002–2010, with rebel forces controlling the north and government forces controlling the south. The 2010 presidential elections resulted in months of violence that convulsed the nation. The legacy of violence and conflict is especially pronounced in PTI locations and spawned the conditions USAID seeks to address through PTI. Eleven years later, the context in Côte d'Ivoire is much improved but still fragile. Many interviewees talked about how social cohesion is an underlying theme to all activities. As one PSC leader noted, *"social cohesion is never fully achieved; it's an ongoing effort."*

PTI is designed to address the interrelated challenges of political participation and community cohesion; partners and stakeholders often demonstrated an understanding of how activities in one sub-purpose complemented activities in the other sub-purpose. For example, interviewees engaged in strengthening women's and youth political participation understood their lack of resources as a key obstacle; they appreciated how entrepreneurial activities addressed that challenge. Participants in entrepreneurial activities discussed how their eyes had been opened to the need for their own political engagement. This intertwining of activities is a source of strength, creating a feedback loop among different partners as they implement their activities.

Women and youth are both targets and partners in PTI activities. IRs 1.2 and 1.3 explicitly target women's and youth participation. NDI chose to partner with organizations run by youth (PYPA, RIJLI) and women (2C2PF) to implement these activities. NDI also encouraged the local CIEDs and PSC committees⁶ to put women and youth in positions of responsibility, giving them a voice in how IR 1.1 was implemented, even though it does not expressly target women and youth. Finally, the VSLAs established by CARE target marginalized women and youth, giving them an opportunity to increase their earning potential, but PTI engaged them in other activities in ways that allowed them to understand the political participation component of the program and in some cases spurred their political participation. Partnerships with women and youth organizations are discussed in greater detail under EQ1 and EQ2.

The ET found many synergies across the program. Though partners appreciated the complementarity across sub-purposes, their knowledge of program activities was uneven, despite the synergies.

⁶ Stakeholders often referred to these committees as "PSCs" so this shorthand has been used throughout the report.

Coordination between partners was less evident at the local level and interviewees were divided on the effectiveness of synergy meetings held to foster coordination. Coordination issues are discussed in greater detail under EQ2.

PTI is designed to have media as a cross-cutting component, supporting all elements of the program. Internews support has come in a variety of forms: communications training for PTI partners, training and programming for radio stations in PTI locations, a Media Lab for hands-on mentoring of partner staff, training and public awareness on hate speech, and a bi-monthly radio production on P/CVE. PTI partners were most familiar with CIVILIA, a young female journalist who is part of the PTI staff and covers all its activities through both Facebook posts and a twice-weekly morning broadcast on Radio de la Paix (Peace Radio, formerly the ONUCI radio station). Media activities are integrated into findings to the extent they were explicitly referenced by interviewees.


EQ1: WOMEN'S AND YOUTH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

EQ1: Considering the existing evidence and competing factors influencing youth and women's political participation and inclusion, is PTI best described as contributing to a dramatic improvement, moderate improvement, minor improvement, no improvement, palliative effect, or negative impact on youth and women political participation and inclusion (a) overall and (b) specifically within political parties? Please provide supporting evidence of any changes in participation and inclusion and PTI contribution.

For part (a) of EQ1, addressing overall political participation and inclusion, the ET examined three types of participation and inclusion in political processes included in PTI workplans: registering to vote, engagement at the local and national level, and voting. As noted previously, women and youth are both targets of and partners for PTI activities, making partner activities relevant forms of engagement, especially at the local level where PTI-supported platforms are not receiving direct financing from PTI.

The ET examined these types of participation in terms of breadth, depth, and frequency. Breadth refers to how widespread participation was across PTI locations. A higher number of positive examples in more locations indicated more improvement. Depth examines how meaningful a type of participation might be—i.e., its overall importance or meaning. A more important or meaningful result from an activity or series of activities indicated more improvement. Frequency examines how often a given type of participation was cited by interviewees, but was dropped from the analysis due to lack of data points.

FIGURE 2: LEVEL OF IMPROVEMENT FOR WOMEN AND YOUTH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (A) AND SPECIFICALLY IN POLITICAL PARTIES (B)



The ET followed a similar approach for part (b), examining three types of participation in political parties: engagement and advocacy within the party, obtaining a leadership position, and running for office in the 2021 legislative elections. The ET also regarded these types of participation in terms of breadth and depth.

The ET determined level of improvement based on a combination of breadth and depth across all types of participation in parts (a) and (b) and for both women and youth. More examples of breadth and depth indicated a higher level of improvement. The ET has separated its findings into four categories: political participation of women, political participation of youth, women's participation in political parties, and youth participation in political parties. These are summarized in Figure 2 and described in detail on the following pages.

PTI CONTRIBUTED TO A MINOR IMPROVEMENT IN WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL PROCESSES (PART A).

The ET found a minor improvement in women's participation in political processes, primarily because PTI contributed to the passage of the quota law for women candidates, which represents a noteworthy milestone for women in Côte d'Ivoire. This was offset by comparatively fewer examples of women's political participation in the site visits, mixed results in the percentage increase of women's voter registration from 2018–2020 in PTI locations as compared to the increase nationwide, and mixed results in the percentage of women who registered in 2020 as compared to the national average.

BREADTH OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL PROCESSES

The ET found that the breadth of women's political participation showed mixed results. Voter registration exceeded the national average level in six PTI locations, four of which are government strongholds. PTI partners were able to cite positive examples in only two site visits. Women hold CIED leadership positions, but their engagement or activities were not cited during the site visits.

Voter registration. Based on the ET's analysis of the 2018 and 2020 voter lists, which were obtained by POECI from the CEI, women's voter registration declined in 2020 as a percentage of the electorate nationwide because 237,798 more men than women registered to vote in 2020 (POECI, 2020). Young women accounted for most of that gap in that 216,506 fewer young women registered than young men. One possible explanation is that fears of violence leading up to the presidential vote discouraged women from registering more so than men. The impact skewed the gender gap by a full percentage point; women constituted 50 percent of the electorate before registration was opened in 2020 but only 49 percent of the electorate by the time registration closed.


Despite this gap, new voter registration for women in 2020 met or exceeded the national average in six PTI locations, four of which are considered northern government strongholds (M'Bengué, Korhogo, Ouangolodougou, and Tengréla), as reflected in Figure 3 below. New voter registration was lower than the national average in five PTI locations, four of which are dominated by the opposition (Boulequin, Duekoué, Guiglo, and Man). Of those areas that are contested, Bouaké and Sakassou exceeded the national average and Beoumi did not.⁷ As a result, the factor determining where a PTI location outperformed the national average may have more to do with political tendency than PTI efforts.

⁷ The ET requested data by department and by commune for Abidjan; the CEI only provided data by department. Abidjan results may be misleading because the ET worked in four communes. Results are included in the graphic for informational purposes only.

FIGURE 3: WOMEN'S VOTER REGISTRATION IN PTI LOCATIONS



FIGURE 4: PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN WOMEN'S REGISTRATION IN PTI LOCATIONS, 2018–2020



As shown in Figure 4 above, the percentage increase in women's voter registration from 2018 to 2020 surpassed the national increase in six PTI locations and fell short of the national average in five PTI locations. The patterns are similar in that northern locations either surpassed the national increase or came very close (Tengréla). Some PTI locations in the West and Center surpassed the national increase, while others fell short of it.

Political engagement. The ET found examples of women's political engagement in two site visits. In Abobo, FGD participants believed that women were more present in the polling stations and registered in higher numbers compared to previous years. In Bouaké, the PSC indicated there was high participation by women in the elections. In Duekoué, PTI partners did not cite examples of women's engagement in political processes, noting that women preferred social or economic to political activities (e.g., getting involved in the health crisis to raise awareness about COVID-19 prevention measures).

CIEDs typically have a leadership structure of 12–14 posts, including a president, vice presidents, and secretaries-general in charge of different functions. CIEDs are expected to have at least two women in leadership positions, and some have as many as five (NDI FY19 Q1 report, 2018). Women's participation in CIEDs was not immediately evident in the site visits.

DEPTH OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL PROCESSES

The ET found that the depth of women's political participation was very positive, primarily because of the successful efforts to pass the quota law even though PTI's contribution was limited. Voter registration drastically outpaced the national average in two locations and drastically underperformed the national average in only one location.

Advocacy. Passage of the quota law is a noteworthy accomplishment because it mandates that 30 percent of the candidates on party lists for all legislative, municipal, and regional elections are female. Parties that submit lists that are 50 percent female are eligible for additional public funding. NDI's reporting at the time the law was passed acknowledged that the text does not contain provisions for sanctions against parties that do not respect the quotas and has no impact on single-member districts; these gaps would later prove significant. NDI reporting also details the somewhat limited contributions it had in shaping the bill, primarily because the government already knew what it wanted to include.⁸ Nonetheless, NDI and 2C2PF provided technical assistance to an event organized by UN Women in June 2019 to discuss the draft bill's contents. PTI used several avenues for promoting the bill, including "Gender Friday" events with the U.S. Embassy and CIVILIA broadcasts (NDI FY19 Q3 report, July 2019).

Voter registration. Women's registration drastically outpaced the national average in M'Bengue and Korhogo and was considerably lower in Bolequin. The increase in women's registration from 2018 to 2020 outpaced the national average by more than 10 percentage points in four locations; women's registration in M'Bengue increased by an astonishing 89 percent. The greater increase in registration in the North was most likely due to the strong support for the government. Nonetheless, the other PTI locations in the West and Center were only slightly under the national average, and PTI locations in the West and Center also saw above-average increases from 2018 to 2020.

PTI CONTRIBUTED TO A **MODERATE** IMPROVEMENT IN YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL PROCESSES (PART A).

The ET found a moderate improvement in youth political participation, primarily because of PTI's contribution to a successful advocacy program to make voter registration more accessible, above-average increases in voter registration from 2018–2020 in all but one PTI location, large increases from 2018–2020 in most locations, and examples of youth political engagement in the site visits, including the CIEDs. This was partially offset by mixed results in the levels of 2020 youth voter registration in PTI locations.

BREADTH OF YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL PROCESSES

The ET found that the breadth of youth political participation showed mixed results, with more positive than negative results. Youth voter registration as a percentage of the electorate surpassed the national average in six PTI locations for both the 18–25 and 26–36 age groups, and interviewees in three site visits cited examples of youth engagement. CIEDs also reported working with youth, with evidence of leadership roles in two local CIEDs.

Voter registration. Based on the ET's analysis of the 2020 voter list, youth in the 18–24 age group comprise eight percent of the national electorate and youth in the 26–35 age group comprise 27 percent. Voter registration was the same or higher than the national average in six PTI locations and lower than the national average in five PTI locations, not including Abidjan. It should be noted that Côte d'Ivoire follows the African Union definition of youth, which is from 18–35, as opposed to the USAID definition of youth, which is from 18–24. The ET is reporting both age groups. The ET found similar results for the 26–35 age group (Figures 5 and 6 below).

⁸ In its response to the draft evaluation report, NDI noted it had worked with stakeholders on the quota bill with NED funding prior to PTI.

FIGURE 5: YOUTH (18–25) VOTER REGISTRATION IN PTI LOCATIONS





FIGURE 6: YOUTH (26–35) VOTER REGISTRATION IN PTI LOCATIONS



The percentage increase from 2018 to 2020 was significantly higher for both age groups in all locations as compared to the increase at the national level, based on data provided by the CEI for PTI locations. The number of youth in the 18-24 age group more than doubled from 2018 to 2020; 10 locations surpassed this rate of increase, not including Abidjan. Only one location fell short. The percentage of registered youth in the 25-36 age group declined by one percent from 2018 to 2020; all PTI locations experienced an increase as shown in Table 5 below.

TABLE 5: PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF YOUTH VOTER REGISTRATION, 18–25 AND 26–35, 2018–2020

Region	PTI Location	Percentage Increase Youth 18 25	Region	PTI Location	Percentage Increase Youth 26 35
North	M'bengue	3155%	North	M'bengue	541%
North	Ouangolodougou	989%	North	Ouangolodougou	263%
North	Korhogo	417%	Center	Beoumi	114%
Center	Bouake	383%	North	Korhogo	101%

West	Blolequin	330%	West	Blolequin	98%
Center	Beoumi	291%	West	Man	69%
West	Duekoue	226%	West	Duekoue	55%
Center	Sakassou	178%	Center	Sakassou	51%
West	Man	172%	North	Tengréla	37%
North	Tengréla	154%	Center	Bouake	27%
	National	109%	West	Guiglo	13%
West	Guiglo	97%		National	-1%

Political engagement. The ET found examples of youth political engagement in four site visits. In Yopougon, one youth researcher commented on how she decided to vote because of her participation in PTI. In Bouaké, interviewees talked about pressure from supporters of the ruling party on youth who did not intend to vote in the presidential election to explain why and ultimately give up their boycott. The PSC calmed tensions, easing the pressure on those youth. In Duekoué, interviewees agreed that youth did not respond to the *mot d'ordre*, the term used to describe instructions from party leaders to its supporters. Not wanting to risk conflict, they engaged in a series of interventions to build awareness among youth. A member of the CIED described how he engaged the prefect once he learned that youth were being manipulated to disrupt the vote; the prefect, PSC, and CIED worked together to prevent violence. The CIED member saw the success in preventing violence as a change in mentality.

Two local CIEDs described youth participation in the CIED, but outreach to youth was frequently cited as a principal activity undertaken by the CIEDs to prevent election-related violence. NDI reporting describes how CIEDs reconciled young people from different parties, noting that for the 2021 legislative elections, youth became community organizers and agents (NDI FY21 Q3 report, 2021). NDI also described how in Man, youth from other parties supported an event organized by a youth member of the Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), a sign of fraternity-building among them.

DEPTH OF YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL PROCESSES

The ET found very positive depth of youth political participation, primarily because of PTI's contribution to supporting youth group advocacy to make voter registration more accessible. Voter registration also drastically surpassed the national average in four locations and drastically underperformed in only two locations. More importantly, the rate of increase in youth voter registration from 2016 to 2018 was drastically above-average high in most locations, spanning government, contested, and opposition strongholds.

Voter registration. Registration levels for youth as a percentage of the electorate drastically outperformed those at the national level by 6–14 points in Bouaké, Korhogo, M'Bengué, and Ouangolodougou. Only Bouaké is a political battleground; the other three locations are government strongholds where voters have an incentive to register and limited security concerns. Only two of five locations were lower than the national level by six or more points; both were in the Center—Beoumi and Sakasso. Results in the West were mixed: slightly higher in Guiglo and slightly lower in Blolequin, Duekoué, and Man. The rate of increase from 2018 to 2020 was highest in M'Bengué and Oungalodougou and lowest in Guiglo and Tengréla.

Advocacy. Youth advocacy efforts to make voter registration more accessible were successful; PTI contribution to this effort was evident, though some of it started under a grant from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and continued under PTI once NED funding ended. PTI youth partner RIJLI conducted focus group research on why youth did not vote; one reason cited was the financial challenges related to getting the necessary administrative document. RIJLI formed a youth-based coalition (including PTI partners 2C2PF and PYPA) to promote broader youth registration; it also held a press conference calling for national identity cards to be free (NDI FY19 Q3 Report, July 2019). NDI staff noted that President Ouattara was moved by this rationale and approved issuing a new birth certificate free of charge, along with a nationality certificate valid only for voter registration (NDI FY20 Q3 report, July 2020).

PTI CONTRIBUTED TO A MODERATE IMPROVEMENT IN WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES (PART B).

The ET found a moderate improvement in women's participation in political parties, primarily because of the increase in female candidates, even if it fell short of the national quota. This was offset by mixed results in other areas, including the lack of results in advancing women's leadership within political parties, the limited number of examples of women's activism in parties from the site visits, and successes and failures in promoting women candidates.

BREADTH OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES

The ET found that the breadth of women's participation in political parties showed mixed results. The most positive contribution came primarily from the increase in female candidates, even if the increase fell short of the national quota.

Legislative Candidates. Analysis from 2C2PF indicates that PTI locations saw a bigger increase in female candidates from 2016 to 2021 than the increase nationwide, which suggests PTI contributed to women's participation in political parties. In 15 PTI locations, there were 42 female candidates in 2016 and 61 candidates in 2021, which is a 45 percent increase. Nationwide, there were 166 female candidates in 2016; in 2021 and 213 female candidates in 2021, which is a 28 percent increase and surpassed NDI's internal target of 15 percent (PTI PMP, 2021). Seven PTI locations saw an increase from 2016, five saw no change, and only three saw a decrease.

Based on data obtained from the CEI for the 2021 legislative elections, disaggregated by location and type, the percentage of women titular candidates was higher than the national average in six PTI locations and lower than the national average in nine locations (Figure 7). This trend was reversed in the secondary list (Figure 8), where eight PTI locations exceeded the national average. Successful titular candidates take office whereas those on the secondary list take office only if the titular candidate steps down while in office. Parties may use the secondary list to reach specific demographic groups, which they use in their campaign messaging.⁹

⁹ CEI data on women and youth candidates is available in electronic format for 2021 but not 2016, so the ET did not attempt to replicate the analysis prepared by 2C2PF, which the ET found interesting but insufficient to draw findings. The ET also notes that the CEI provided data disaggregated by commune for Abidjan, so it is not clear why they were not able to do so for voter registration.

FIGURE 7: WOMEN TITULAR CANDIDATES IN PTI LOCATIONS





FIGURE 8: WOMEN SECONDARY CANDIDATES IN PTI LOCATIONS



Party Activism. The ET found examples of women's engagement in party activities in three site visits. In Bouaké, VSLA member Camara Assetou was a mayoral candidate in 2018. In Tengréla, the PYPA focal point was a candidate. In Yopougon, two PTI partner members were legislative candidates. PYPA member Awa Keita convinced her party to propose her, overcoming the obstacles of being young and female. VSLA member Clarisse Kouame was also a candidate, encouraged by her participation in PTI activities.

DEPTH OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES

The ET found that the depth of women's participation in political parties showed mixed results because NDI staff and PTI partners at the national level provided examples of successes and failures of women candidates and the lack of interest from women to serve as mentors in PTI-supported programs.

NDI confirmed that 2C2PF's mentoring program has stalled because it was unable to secure commitments from women to serve as mentors for the next generation. 2C2PF referenced the "Queen Bee" syndrome where once women have arrived in a position of power, they block access to other women. 2C2PF cited the lack of time and willingness as possible factors. No one cited examples of women recently gaining a leadership position within her party as a sign of progress.

Despite the increase in the number of female candidates in 2021, political parties did not respect the quota law—nationwide, only 13 percent of titular (*titulaire*) candidates were women whereas the quota set the bar at 30 percent. The CEI did not enforce the quota because the law had not been integrated into the electoral code. One analysis is that parties want to win; their approach is always going to focus on putting forward the strongest candidate, suggesting that women are not *perceived* as the strongest candidate. Indeed, in Duekoué, a woman candidate was pressured by her party to drop out in favor of the preferred male candidate. 2C2PF advocated extensively for the passage of and adherence to the law through a public awareness campaign, outreach to political parties, an activist guide for women, and other events. CIVILIA amplified this advocacy campaign through radio broadcasts and Facebook posts.

PTI CONTRIBUTED TO A MINOR IMPROVEMENT IN YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES (PART B).

The ET found a minor improvement in youth participation in political parties, primarily because NDI staff and local CIED representatives offered examples of party activism from four site visits. Results were otherwise mixed. Youth mentorship in political parties is advancing but needs more time to demonstrate results. Youth efforts to advocate for a charter on youth leadership in political parties are promising but need more time to be consolidated.

BREADTH OF YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES

The ET found that the breadth of youth participation in political parties showed some positive results because CIED representatives offered examples of party activism from four site visits.¹⁰

Legislative Candidates. Based on data obtained from the CEI for the 2021 legislative elections, disaggregated by location and type, the percentage of youth (25–36) titular candidates surpassed the national average of 8 percent in two locations, met the national average in two locations, and fell short in 11 locations. Of these 11 locations, no youth ran as a candidate in four locations. Results were slightly better for secondary candidates, where the percentage of youth (25–36) candidates surpassed the national average of 14 percent in four locations and fell short in 11 locations. Both exceed NDI's target of 5 percent (PTI PMP, 2021). There were no candidates under the age of 25 in any location. See Figures 9 and 10 below. However, this dataset is not available for earlier elections, therefore conclusions about change in youth participation cannot be drawn.

¹⁰ When the ET requested candidate data by age and department, the CEI responded with two data files, one labeled 25–35 and the other labeled 36+. Both files contained the same data, making it impossible to analyze youth candidates vis-à-vis the entire candidate pool.

FIGURE 9: YOUTH TITULAR CANDIDATES IN PTI LOCATIONS





FIGURE 10: YOUTH SECONDARY CANDIDATES IN PTI LOCATIONS



Party Activism. Stakeholders offered good examples of youth engagement in political parties in four site visits. The president of the CIED Abobo was elected to the National Assembly in 2021. Although he is in his forties, he is considered young by his party, the RHDP. A CIED member in Bouake is also the Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI) secretary-general in charge of youth. He is very active in his community and took a public position, calling on former President Laurent Gbagbo to favor reconciliation following his release and return to Côte d'Ivoire, once the International Criminal Court dropped charges of crimes against humanity following the 2010 election violence. It was seen as something he could not have done before because the political environment would not have allowed a forthright statement of this nature from a member of his own party and the polarized nature of reconciliation in Bouake. The local CIED in Duekoué argued that its contribution to youth participation was that many of its members were candidates in 2021,

including the secretary-general and the assistant director. The CIED was created to calm the political atmosphere. Violence occurred in nearby Bangolo, where they were blocking roads, but not in Duekoué. Youth in the CIED wanted to put forward candidates for municipal elections who may be independent of their parties. In Yopougon, a PYPA member was a *titulaire* candidate in 2021.

DEPTH OF YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES

The ET found that the depth of youth participation in political parties showed promising results that have yet to be consolidated. Mentoring of youth in political parties has gotten off the ground, with examples from two parties, and parties have signed the charter advocating for more youth leadership in parties but they have not put it into effect.

PYPA has launched the Ivorian Charter for Youth Political Empowerment, part of Cote d'Ivoire's global commitment to youth empowerment with the United Nations, which commits parties to train and empower young people. Specifically, the charter asks parties to commit to having young people represent 30 percent of the members of internal decision-making bodies and 30 percent of the party nominees on the lists for elected assemblies. As of June 2020, 16 parties had signed the charter, the video of which was shared on the CIVILIA Facebook page, but PYPA had been unable to hold face-to-face meetings with party leaders to secure personal commitments, though COVID-19 and the elections may have been a factor (NDI FY20 Q4 report, 2020).

In Year 3, PTI launched the Emerging Political Leaders Academy to develop opportunities for parties to incubate youth leadership within their party and help them add value, thereby demonstrating the important contributions youth can make. Stakeholders offered two examples of parties activating youth training programs led by youth academy participants:

- Democratic Party of Ivory Coast–African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA)—movement of the new majority. Youth in the party engaged in advocacy, creating a movement within the party not just as voters, but also as candidates. NDI staff also noted a PTI youth partner trained in an academy and created a movement within the party.
- FPI and RDA reactivated their internal party schools to educate youth members on party ideology.

Mentoring through the Emerging Political Leaders Academy is active. No one cited examples of youth holding a leadership position other than a youth-designated title.

EQ2: CHALLENGES, LESSONS LEARNED, AND BEST PRACTICES

EQ2: What are the challenges PTI confronted or continues to confront in promoting youth and women participation and what are the lessons learned that could be applied in future interventions both in Côte d'Ivoire and beyond in increasing women and youth political participation?

LOCAL GRANTS AND PARTNERS

NDI's primary challenge was managing its consortium of local partners. NDI proposed a large consortium in its submission to USAID, naming three international and 10 local organizations in its application, each intervening in specific areas. The size and composition of the consortium was both a strength and a weakness. In Year 3, NDI's consortium included three international partners and 10 local partners, though some of the local partners changed. As noted, part of PTI's approach was to partner with women's and youth groups to develop activities that targeted women's and youth political participation and community cohesion. Over the course of implementation, NDI dropped two grants before they were signed and discontinued or suspended three grants, described below. NDI's Year 2 and Year 3 annual workplans describe capacity-building efforts to address challenges faced, with updates in the quarterly reports on efforts undertaken, progress achieved, and next steps. NDI also reported on the steps it had taken to continue activities, often by paying costs directly in lieu of issuing subgrants.

PROBLEMATIC GRANTS

POECI. Though its award from USAID includes approval for a sub-award to POECI, NDI did not continue with POECI once USAID raised questions about its independence, leadership, and a conflict of interest (COI). This has caused lingering issues with the CEI, whose board and staff include two former POECI leaders. Those involved in the issue surrounding POECI have different perspectives, along with their own version of events.

POECI was created with USAID assistance and had a relationship with both USAID and NDI from its parallel vote tabulation in the 2015 elections and a sample-based observation of the 2016 legislative election. NDI proposed POECI for long-term observation of the 2020 presidential and 2021 legislative elections. PTI issued a subgrant to POECI to observe the October 2018 municipal elections; two interviewees with oversight responsibilities believed the report held back on some criticisms, which they saw as a sign of its weakening independence.

In 2016, the African Court on Human and People's Rights found the CEI deprived opposition and independent candidates of their rights to equality before the law because the government and ruling party combined held a majority of seats on the board. CSOs were advocating for adding civil society representatives to the board, along with reducing the influence of the ruling party. In April 2019, a conflict emerged when a POECI representative took a stand that his organization did not support, arguing that a compromise put forward by the government was acceptable because the government and ruling party representatives combined would be offset by civil society representatives (NDI FY19 Q3 report, 2019). USAID saw this as another indication that the leadership was losing its independence.

A reform bill passed on July 3, 2019 that President Ouattara claimed reduced “those close to power”¹¹ from about half to a third of the board (France 24, 2019). In the reconstituted CEI, two individuals involved in creating POECI came to have prominent roles, either as staff or board members. POECI's secretary-general was named CEI secretary-general. Its coordinator was named to the National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH), which was allocated a seat on the CEI board. Another POECI-founding member and its spokesperson was named to the CNDH board. POECI's July 2019 general assembly elected new leadership so their roles formally ended even though they never resigned when they took government positions.

USAID argued that POECI cannot credibly observe an election when its leaders are part of the election commission organizing those elections. Based on the timeline above, the COI issue seems to have been resolved when POECI's general assembly elected a new board and leadership that did not include those who joined the CEI. One interviewee acknowledged that despite leaving the organization, POECI founders were going to remain influential even without a formal role. In August 2019, POECI received a formal communication that NDI would open up the long-term observation to a competitive selection process. POECI did not apply, convinced it was not going to be selected. The process resulted in the selection of INDIGO, an organization founded with support from Interpeace, a Swiss non-governmental organization.

Without judging who is right or wrong, the ET has several observations. The issue lingers at the CEI, where the leadership told the ET they do not understand why PTI is working with INDIGO instead of POECI. Former POECI leaders are in influential positions at the CEI and CNDH. INDIGO's access at the CEI appears to be limited; POECI has data from the CEI on the 2020 electorate that INDIGO was not able to obtain. There is no indication of whether the CEI grasps the COI issue, or believes it has been resolved with the change in leadership at POECI.

Network of Action on Light Arms in West Africa, Côte d'Ivoire section (RASALAO-CI).

NDI's award from USAID included approval for a subaward to RASALAO-CI, which was tasked in Year I with producing a diagnostic report on the security situation and CCMs in five PTI locations. NDI found that it underestimated the time required for analysis and the preliminary research report required

¹¹ <https://www.france24.com/en/20190819-ivor-coast-activists-opposition-restrictions-2020-election>

significant revision because RASALAO-CI administered far more questionnaires than was planned and a key person charged with writing the report left the organization (NDI FY19 Q4 report, 2019). PTI instead decided to work directly with the CCMs for better collaboration between security and civilians. PTI took over finalizing the report and created a practical guide to local governance, introducing both to the CCMs.

RIJLI. NDI's award from USAID included approval for a subaward to RIJLI, which was receiving support from NDI through a NED grant and formed an advocacy coalition of 18 partners (NDI report FY19 Q4, 2019). In September 2020, the Executive Secretary sought to stay in his position beyond his eligibility according to internal policies that stipulate the ceiling for staff is 32 years of age. RIJLI coalition members were split on the issue, leading to an internal governance crisis.¹² NDI instead decided to work through the coalition formed by RIJLI, paying all activity costs directly.

ARK. NDI's award from USAID included approval for a subaward to ARK, but performance and management issues led NDI to allow the ARK grant to expire without issuing a new one (NDI FY21 Q2 report, 2021). Workplans for Year 1 and Year 2 describe capacity-building efforts to address challenges identified. ARK experienced high turnover according to NDI; ARK focal points told the ET during the site visit that they had been asked to give a portion of their salaries to the organization, causing discontent. NDI is now working directly with some of the former ARK focal points, hiring them as consultants.

FOSCAO. NDI's award from USAID included approval for a subaward to FOSCAO. NDI suspended the grant over contested leadership and is currently working directly with FOSCAO focal points for the targeted communes in Abidjan, hiring them as consultants.

An important lesson is the need to thoroughly investigate an organization's leaders, structure, management, and systems from the start to ensure an organization is able to receive funding and to plan for capacity-building and management oversight in proportion to the number of grants anticipated.

OTHER MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES

NDI may have underestimated the challenges it would face with such a large consortium, including to need to develop the capacity of local partners and address questions surrounding internal governance. NDI provided its local grantees administrative, program, and financial management capacity-building support, based on the pre-award questionnaire (PAQ) prepared by potential subgrantees that assesses internal capacity and organizational setup and is used to identify areas for improvement after the subgrant is issued. NDI first reported on the assistance provided to subgrantees at the end of its first year (NDI FY19 Q4 report, 2019). Both Year 2 and 3 workplans describe at length the challenges identified and support planned to address challenges relating to both administrative and management capacity as well as internal governance. NDI also increased its grants and finance staff to effectively manage and support its grantees. An important lesson is to plan for capacity-building.

The role of PTI's geographic partners (ARK, FOSCAO, ODAFEM, PSCPD) is to implement a specific set of activities, namely support for the citizen consultation monitoring committees under IR 1.1, youth-led participatory action research and related activities under Sub-IR 2.1.1, sharing Geopoll data findings with community leaders under Sub-IR 2.1.1, and the PSCs under Sub-IR 2.1.2. PTI's thematic partners implement activities at the national and local levels to varying degrees. CIEDs are active in all PTI locations. The ET was able to meet with a PYPA member in Yopougon, but the focal point in Duekoué had to cancel at the last minute. The ET met with INDIGO election observation coordinators in all five locations. Geographic partners do not supervise activities implemented by thematic partners in their locations, but NDI reporting indicates the geographic partners support thematic partners' activities and play a

¹² A coalition member told the ET that NDI supported the Executive Secretary retaining his position; in its response to the draft evaluation, NDI reported it chose not to continue with a subgrant to RIJLI given the uncertainty over when the leadership issues would be resolved.

coordinating role by hosting synergy meetings. Interviewees were evenly divided on the effectiveness of coordination efforts and synergy meetings, which may have been infrequent.

COVID-19

Like many other projects around the globe, PTI identified numerous ways to adapt its activities during the pandemic. NDI, its partners, and USAID developed a contingency plan, updated based on government measures. All activities were reviewed to see which were at risk and how to revise them. Elements included:

- Limiting the number of people in physical proximity and having everyone telework using Zoom and Google Meet for online meetings and workshops.
- Providing a handwashing kit and developing social distancing protocol.
- CIVILIA and local radio partners supporting the COVID-19 prevention campaign.
- Some partners using the PTI committees to carry out awareness activities.
- Increasing the internet allocations for staff.
- Holding virtual training with political parties and women.
- Introducing COVID-19 awareness into all activities.

Activities that were revised include the following:

- PYPA tea debates became radio debates to avoid large gatherings.
- Unable to arrange in-person meetings with party leaders to promote youth candidates, PYPA developed a written memorandum that it delivered to inform the parties of the Charter.
- In the summer of 2020, CARE created a WhatsApp group to enable VSLA groups to communicate with CARE and each other. CARE's training on VSLA methodology progressed more slowly than expected, as did finalizing beneficiary selection and preparations for Tier B training.
- Internews staff worked from home and provided distance mentoring for the community radio stations and civic partners.
- NDI developed online substitutes for in-person meetings and rented larger rooms for training workshops to allow for social distancing.
- Partners increased their use of social networks for messaging on COVID-19 and PTI activities. Online debates were not seen as effective, given the challenge of having a productive discussion.

Other activities were postponed or canceled: a launch ceremony for the CIED, at which PYPA had also planned to hold a signing ceremony for the youth political participation charter; 2C2PF's planned *Marche Blanche* promoting the gender quota; and an initial PSC workshop in Korhogo.

A best practice is to incorporate communications technologies into programming from the outset. Partner access and regular usage of communications tools facilitate their ability to adapt to situations where they are not able to do face-to-face conversations or meetings.

FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR LOCAL PARTNERS

A lack of financial means at the local level was cited during all site visits by one or more partners (CIED, PSC, radios, CCM, interfaith platforms) in almost all locations. Some examples include:

- Reimbursement for transportation or communications was an issue for two PTI partners, who cited examples where the reimbursement was insufficient.
- Two CIEDs indicated they would like to benefit from additional resources for opening an office, preparing their reports, and organizing activities. One tried to organize monthly dues, but CIED members did not have the resources to contribute so it was discontinued after only a few months.
- A PSC indicated the neighborhood meetings were valuable but required resources to have chairs, a tent, and a sound system. The PSC would like to expand to rural villages but lacks resources to hold public meetings.

- One PTI partner was dismayed that NDI rejected a budget that included paying 5,000 CFA (about \$10) to each participant for their attendance when NDI paid the same amount for its activities.

Like any other implementing partner, NDI faced budget ceilings for all of its activities. Increasing the grant ceilings or providing additional resources at the local level would have required cutting funds elsewhere.

EQ3: 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

EQ3: How did PTI adapt or not adapt its approach to promoting youth and women participation given challenges with the 2020 election? Was the level of adaptation appropriate?

PTI AND ITS PARTNERS ADAPTED BY ENGAGING IN ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES THAT SUCCEEDED IN ENCOURAGING PEACEFUL PROTEST AND AVOIDING VIOLENCE IN PTI LOCATIONS

The 2020 presidential elections were not what was expected, and PTI's level of adaptation was appropriate. When the ruling party's presidential candidate, Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly, died unexpectedly in July 2020, President Ouattara reversed his decision not to run for another term and announced in August 2020 that he would seek a third mandate. His decision led many opposition parties to boycott the presidential election. Once the context of the 2020 presidential elections abruptly changed, PTI successfully adapted its approach and pivoted away from promoting voter turnout in favor of supporting youth and women as advocates for peaceful protest to calm tensions, supported extensively by partner radio stations and CIVILIA broadcasts.

National and local stakeholders expressed widespread agreement that violence did not occur in PTI locations because of PTI interventions. Advocacy activities by local partners succeeded in encouraging peaceful protests and avoiding violence. Partners at the local level took a leading role in calming tensions. The CIEDs, PSCs, PYPA, and VSLAs all helped to stabilize the situation. The adaptations to project activities are described below.

The CIEDs in Yopougon and Duekoué stated that their members from the opposition respected the boycott but did not try to impede voting, rejecting the *mot d'ordre* from the party to prevent others from voting by all means. In Abobo, the RHDP leadership of the CIED invited the FPI representative to the interview with the ET; both talked about the need for peace regardless of whether the party position was to boycott.

PYPA organized "coffee breaks" on youth participation throughout the program; with the changed context, they adapted to focus on the preservation of social peace instead of promoting voter turnout. PYPA recruited and trained focal points who formed their own network at the local level, using these networks to preserve social peace.

PSCs in Bouaké and Duekoué indicated they also intervened to calm tensions surrounding the boycott because of their method of working—building bridges across groups in conflict. In Duekoué, they started with two neighborhoods on opposite sides: Carrefour and Kokoma. They asked a traditional leader to lead a public meeting in Kokoma, explaining everything in French, Guéré, and Malinké. Realizing everyone had the spirit of peace, Kokoma residents asked the PSC to see Carrefour (a Guéré neighborhood) say the same thing. Then they went with FPI and RHDP representatives who each spoke in both established credibility in the neighborhood for being able to calm tensions and prevent violence later on. The PSC in Duekoué worked closely with the CIED to alert the prefecture to potential incidents of violence, including youth from the nearby town of Bangolo who were trying to get youth in Duekoué to join them in blocking the road. Sadly, violence did occur in Bangolo, but PSC and CIED efforts prevented violence in Duekoué.

VSLA members indicated that the elections tested group cohesion. In Bouaké, a female Malinké VSLA leader found youth were blocking the road to curtail voting in a neighboring Baoulé village. She used her network to identify another female Baoulé leader who could calm the situation, but other youth arrived

who wanted to attack those trying to calm the situation. The solidarity and social cohesion between the two women contributed to resolving the standoff, which could have easily degenerated.

Focus group participants in Yopougon, which is dominated by the opposition, discussed fears in the community, including how they saw people who had packed their bags and were getting ready to flee out of fear of what might happen. Their fears were not unjustified; a CIED leader from Yopougon shared how his car had been set on fire in the violence following the 2010 elections. To their surprise and delight, no violence occurred.

INDIGO election observation coordinators also described in detail the tensions in the communities where they are based. NDI reporting confirmed that INDIGO coordinators and observers confronted intimidation, and in some cases, violence during recruitment, training, and on election day (NDI FY21 Q4 report, 2021).

Internews media and awareness-building activities played a big role in calming election tensions. CIVILIA was often cited for her interviews and Facebook postings on a wide range of activities, including efforts by women and youth organizations to advocate for calm ahead of the elections. The radio stations engaged in PTI activities also played a big role in calming tensions. Many participants acknowledged that national radio and television did not cover their activities, so CIVILIA and the radio station contributed to filling that gap.

EQ4: ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITIES

EQ4: How well have community-based activities, particularly socio-economic entrepreneurship interventions toward youth and women, been implemented in targeted communities? What challenges did PTI confront or continue to confront and what are the key lessons and best practices learned from this approach?

SOCIO-ECONOMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP INTERVENTIONS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED VERY WELL IN TARGETED COMMUNITIES

The decades of instability and social unrest that disrupted social capital justified the creation of VSLAs, which are the centerpiece of PTI's socio-economic entrepreneurship efforts. PTI partners at the national level and across all five site visits expressed strong support for VSLAs. Partners in both components cited VSLAs as improving women and youth participants' economic situation and contributing to social cohesion, a sign of the synergies between the two sub-purposes and the recognition that improving women and youth's economic situation can also give them the resources to engage in political activities, which increases political participation.

CARE's approach to VSLAs has always been to allow groups to establish themselves based on affinity to ensure strong cohesion within the group. PTI took a different approach, which was to seek applications and then establish groups that were explicitly heterogeneous (mixed ethnicity and gender). CARE noted the approach was surprisingly effective because group cohesion developed over time, turning diversity into a strength. The approach is relevant to the post-conflict context of Côte d'Ivoire, where there is a dislocation of the social fabric and mistrust between communities.

PTI encountered a delay in launching activities with CARE because the process to select ProPortion to research viable economic activities took longer than expected (PTI Year 2 workplan, 2019). None of the CARE representatives, village agents, or VSLA members volunteered concerns about the viability of the activities supported by the loans. All but one of the VSLAs (60/61) continues to function, according to NDI reporting.

PTI has seven output indicators to track progress in socio-economic entrepreneurship activities. In Year 2, PTI met three targets related to the number of women and youth who have access to capital, the number of microenterprises supported, and the number of women and youth supported who open an account. PTI did not meet three targets on the number of women and youth receiving information on

enterprise development, the number of clients benefitting from financial services, and the number of training days provided. In Year 3, PTI either met or was on track to meet six of seven indicators; only the number of training days appears to be falling far short of the target. The percent of local leaders and community members having an improved perception and satisfaction of the level of contribution of women and youth entrepreneurs to the community exceeded the Year 1 target, while data was not available in Year 2 (NDI PMP, September 2021).

PTI's media activities also contributed to the success of the intervention. CIVILIA and the partner radio stations broadly advertised the opportunity to apply for participation in the VSLA, described the training and other activities undertaken, and promoted success stories that could encourage entrepreneurship and promote social cohesion. As part of the outreach efforts, Internews indicated it simplified the language being used by CARE.

PTI employed an outward-looking and participatory process to solicit and select candidates. Geographic partners participated in the selection process, contributing to synergies across partners. In Duekoué, youth and women representatives in the prefecture contributed to outreach and established a selection committee that included local religious and political leaders. In Duekoué, CARE grouped 100 persons into six VSLAs and later established four “spontaneous” VSLAs with 95 individuals who appreciate the technique.

In Bouaké, focus group participants appreciated the method used for VSLA training because it allowed people who did not know each other and were not of the same ethnic group or religion to come together. It also encouraged social cohesion and peace between members and their communities. FGD participants appreciated PTI's focus on social entrepreneurship because it not only improved individuals' economic situation but also contributed to the community as a whole because of the focus on funding businesses that fulfill community needs, promoting social cohesion.

CARE also facilitated interregional visits between members of ethnic groups previously in conflict. For instance, a Malinké woman from Abobo visited a VSLA in a Gueré neighborhood in Duekoué for a short stay. This was an opportunity for better mutual understanding, which also led to the establishment of a business deal (trade of rice) and discussion on the topics of political participation and social cohesion.

THE INCOME GENERATED BY THE VSLAS, ALTHOUGH IMPORTANT AT AN INDIVIDUAL LEVEL, IS CURRENTLY TOO SMALL TO SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT ECONOMIC INCLUSION IN TARGETED COMMUNITIES

CARE established three tiers of opportunities: Tier A offers intensive training and guaranteed credit to a smaller group; Tier B offers advanced training and credit opportunities; Tier C offers basic training and credit opportunities to a wider group. CARE also developed democracy and citizenship training.

The VSLA approach relies on member contributions to generate capital for loans, which takes time for all members to have access. Members establish the weekly dues, typically 200–1000 CFA or less than \$2, resulting in a small capital base that can increase over time with multiple successful loan cycles. In Bouaké, VSLA members described loans ranging between 40,000–100,000 CFA (about \$70–\$200). Members take turns accessing the capital, and once a loan is repaid with interest, capital becomes available for additional loans. PTI indicates that CARE has reached 60 of 61 VSLAs and more than 1,000 beneficiaries in the Tier B and C training (NDI FY21 Q3 report, 2021).

VSLAs wanted financial support for group projects that go beyond what the group dues would support. PTI reports that 45 of the higher-performing VSLAs have been chosen to develop business plans for larger projects, which will require financing outside the VSLAs. CARE has selected the 100 participants for Tier A “business accelerator” opportunities and trained the village agents.

PTI HELPED THE GROUPS ADAPT TO THE CHALLENGES BROUGHT ON BY COVID-19 THROUGH A VARIETY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES

Using a “mother SIM” allowed members to pay weekly dues by mobile instead of through meetings. CARE also created a virtual library of training materials and developed a digital platform that contains the curriculum. As a consequence, CARE continues to respond to solicitations from other communities that were not involved in the project to take advantage of trainings led by the village agents thanks to the digitalization of materials set in their tablets. Further, CARE also encouraged all VSLA participants to have a mobile money account to limit cash manipulation and also to ease the shift from informal to formal financial inclusion in a Microfinance Institution.

PTI/CARE also facilitated online experience sharing among VSLA members during the COVID-19 lockdowns by allowing virtual meetings. The WhatsApp groups allow CARE to regularly discuss challenges and other critical issues with the VSLAs.

EQ5: PREVENTING/COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

EQ5: How well have P/CVE interventions been implemented in targeted areas, mainly at the northern borders? What are the challenges PTI confronted or continues to confront and what are the key lessons and best practices learned from this approach?

STAKEHOLDERS IN TENGRÉLA AND BOUAKÉ BELIEVE THAT PTI'S AWARENESS-RAISING IN PARTNERSHIP WITH LOCAL INSTITUTIONS HAS BEEN WELL IMPLEMENTED

Stakeholders appreciated NDI's approach to implementing P/CVE activities and described what they perceived as effective. The ET notes that NDI's approach has evolved over time to focus on awareness-raising in partnership with local institutions.

REFINING THE APPROACH

Though mentioned in its results framework, PTI greatly expanded its P/CVE activities at USAID's request. At the outset, PTI addressed P/CVE as part of a larger set of activities focused on community cohesion. Beginning in Year 2, PTI identified VE push/pull factors, building social capital, and media awareness-raising. Push factors that might drive people toward VE include poor relations between security services and the public, frustration with the government, economic/political inequality, poor sense of belonging, and local conflicts. Exclusion and marginalization are common threads. Pull factors that might attract people toward VE include extremist religious views, social media messaging, and inflammatory discourse. These focus on inclusion and build on feelings of exclusion. The Year 2 and Year 3 workplans identify how a range of PTI activities can contribute to P/CVE, even if not designed as P/CVE activities, per se.

NDI staff acknowledged the need to clarify and focus the approach. PTI conducted several consultations with stakeholders, especially religious leaders, to determine how to get communities to buy into the notion that VE is a threat and therefore P/CVE is relevant. VE is sensitive and complex. Its sensitivity comes from the perception that religion is at the heart of extremism, which religious leaders find stigmatizing. The first task then was to raise awareness of religious leaders, so they could take action in their communities. PTI asked religious leaders to collectively define VE, different dimensions of VE, and the types of actions they could undertake, including the question of radicalization of women and youth who are vulnerable to recruitment. NDI also noted the need to reach traditional chiefs because of their influential role in the community. PTI media activities—including CIVILIA broadcasts, social media posts, and programming on local radio stations—further disseminated the messaging.

AWARENESS-RAISING

Raising awareness of VE is needed in Côte d'Ivoire because of VE activity in Cote d'Ivoire along the border with Mali and Burkina Faso that resulted in 31 battles, four explosions, 27 acts of violence against civilians,

and 103 reported fatalities in the past year.¹³ The targeting and content of VE messaging have been appropriate because it has helped to create a common understanding of VE among a variety of actors, from moto-taxi drivers to imams leading the prayers in mosques.

Awareness-raising in collaboration with local institutions, especially the interfaith platforms and CCMs, has been at the heart of PTI's efforts to prevent VE and address conflict. NDI opted for an inclusive working relationship with all members of the community regardless of their background, the strengthening of social capital to build trust in the community, and the development of a strong relationship with security forces.

Training sessions have included simulations of scenarios on preventing the emergence of VE, focusing on two factors that affect VE: polarization of ideological cleavages and social inequalities. A training in April 2020 asked participants to develop four scenarios that were combinations of low/high polarization and low/high inequality. The recommendations they developed target the push factors described above.

In Bouaké, stakeholders believe there is a great awareness of the threat of VE among the population. CCMs and interfaith committees believe that sensitization and awareness campaigns have led communities to regularly report the movements of suspicious people: *"Two days after our meeting in a community, we received a phone call to report that there was a suspicious person lodging in a hotel in their neighborhood; that was indeed true! We had received at least three cases of the kind from a variety of neighborhoods including Belleville and Dar-Es-Salam."*

Religious leaders described how they try to mitigate the VE threat through PTI by developing a strong network and close collaboration with all the mosques enlisted in the city, building on previous efforts to foster social cohesion. An Imam note: *"We have a clear idea of the program of the 300 mosques in the city since we are in permanent contact with their leaders. We are therefore aware of anything bad happening in their mosque. We can react appropriately in that case through constructive communication."*

According to an Imam, an important result is the *"low probability of the local populations (living in Tengréla) to join VE groups thanks to the sensitization activities carried out by religious groups (in mosques) and other groups established by PTI."* In other words, stakeholders argue that the VE threat is not internal to the village, but seems to come much more from beyond the borders than from inside Tengréla.

An Imam who is also a member of the CCM in Tengréla noted: *"We intervene in a preventive way with awareness-raising through sermons in places of worship: radicalism is not Islam. There is not a single son of Tengréla who favors violent extremism. It would be hard to see a local who could fit into any VE group."* Religious leaders better peoples' understanding of VE and appreciate that messaging is addressing the potential stigmatization of Islam.

Stakeholders believed gaining a better understanding of P/CVE has reduced the antagonism between Malinké and Senoufo populations in the North. The Senoufo are indigenous, while the Malinké are from other regions in Côte d'Ivoire or West Africa. Senoufo are primarily animist or Catholic, whereas the Malinké are primarily Muslim and feel stigmatized by VE discussions. The discussions on VE have allowed for discussion of other issues. PTI activities writ large helped to promote social cohesion because they allow partners to talk about sensitive subjects such as VE without stigma.

PARTNERSHIP WITH LOCAL INSTITUTIONS

The CCMs and interfaith committees are good local institutions for P/CVE because of their composition, role, and collaboration between them and local authorities. The CCM includes state and non-state representatives and is tasked with supporting collaboration between security forces and the community, while the interfaith committees bring together representatives of different faiths and play a lead role in

¹³ From the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>, accessed on October 22.

raising awareness within their respective communities. For example, the president of the Tengréla interfaith committee is a member of the CCM. In Bouaké, the CCM has 40 members: 25 community representatives (traditional, religious, union, women, etc.) and 15 representatives of security forces and the administration. The head of the CCM attends the departmental security council.

The interfaith committees have helped to overcome stereotypes and build collaboration. PTI partners are using a bottom-up approach because starting at the community level helps them understand what threats they can signal to authorities. A CIED representative noted, “*We have helped the administration to explain in Tengréla and in the villages...Any suspicious movement must be reported.*” He argues that community members can recognize suspicious movements or gatherings, noting that defense forces alone cannot do everything. They realized they knew when outsiders were coming through their community. The presence of non-residents is something they should signal; before, they just observed it happening without saying anything.

Ensuring committees like the CIED, CCM, and interfaith platforms understand VE threats is effective. Stakeholders described how their committees talked to each other when they identified a potential threat, and then discussed with the prefect with the latest information. The prefect, who is the government’s representative for the department, prompts state actions. The reverse was also true—the prefect would share information with the committees and ask that religious leaders communicate with their congregants.

CHALLENGES LARGELY BEYOND PTI CONTROL INCLUDE ILLEGAL MINING, BORDER CONTROL, AND ACTIONS BY SECURITY FORCES, WHICH CREATE OPENINGS VE ACTORS CAN EXPLOIT

ILLEGAL MINING AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE

PTI committees and platforms have not yet reached villages outside of Tengréla where the majority of youth are both illiterate and engaged in illegal mining. As one PTI partner noted, “*The real problem is the mines. We know that 70 percent of what happens there is not under government control.*” He realizes it is a problem that needs tackling. Illegal activities operate in the shadows and youth are economically vulnerable, creating a window of opportunity that VE actors can exploit. Mining enterprises are required to give 5 percent of their revenues for activities in support of local development and it is the prefect who leads the local committee tasked with allocating and managing the mining funds devoted to supporting local development. Some PTI partners argue that the committee, led by the prefect, is not as transparent with the management of those funds as they would like it to be.

NDI staff emphasized the distance between youth and authorities, in that youth do not perceive the problem because information is not shared with them. Including them in the P/CVE activities increases understanding on both sides. PTI associated local authorities in all of their P/CVE activities so they could understand and speak to both youth and women directly.

BORDER ISSUES

Like other West African nations, Côte d’Ivoire closed its border to control the spread of COVID-19, which created a parallel, non-legal means for crossing the border. Those seeking to cross the border will use moto-taxis to avoid regular border crossing with established checkpoints. Moto-taxis are used because they can go off-road, more easily avoiding checkpoints. The pattern has contributed to the trafficking of goods and could allow for clandestine border crossings by VE actors. There is also poor control or tracking of new settlers (displaced persons) from neighboring countries facing VE and terrorist attacks (Burkina Faso and Mali).

SECURITY FORCES AND COMMUNITY-BASED SECURITY

Focus group participants in Tengréla noted the rotation of troops into northern areas has resulted in petty corruption (i.e., small bribes to avoid military posts). When rotations occur, the new arrivals set out to profit from the mission. Because the rotation is of short duration, the interaction of soldiers with the

community remains limited. Once the relational problem between security forces and the community was identified, PTI developed a guide and sponsored workshops through the CCMs in five locations. Collaboration and dialogue with security forces have just gotten started but are needed because the public's distrust of the military has been a barrier.

LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

Lessons learned include the following:

- P/CVE should be a continuous and long-term intervention through communication, media outreach, public debate, and other means.
- Due to the complex nature of VE, continuous dialogue with government officials, security forces, and community leaders is needed and should address other issues (e.g., bribes, gender-based violence, barriers to girls' education, youth attitudes to easy enrichment). These can undermine the effectiveness of P/CVE activities.
- Continuous research on the context will contribute to identifying and updating fragility and resilience factors, as well as the tactics, strategies, and methods that VE groups use for recruitment and communication.

Best practices include the following:

- The identification of push and pull factors was relevant to a better design of the intervention because it allowed PTI to frame the discussion for community-based actors.
- The grassroots collaborative approach was useful to start building trust among stakeholders and strengthen social capital. PTI was able to identify actors to support strategies adapted to VE.
- Establishing mechanisms to monitor existing conflicts and grievances allows local institutions to signal potential threats and other potential drivers of VE expansion including illegal commercial activities and illegal migration.

CONCLUSIONS

EQ1: WOMEN'S AND YOUTH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IMPROVED MORE FOR YOUTH THAN FOR WOMEN, WHEREAS PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES IMPROVED MORE FOR WOMEN THAN FOR YOUTH

The ET analyzed the breadth and depth of the participation of women and youth in political processes generally and specifically in political parties. In analyzing the four parts to this question, the ET found a moderate improvement for youth participation in political processes and a minor improvement in their participation in political parties. The reverse was true for women. The ET found a minor improvement in their participation in political processes and a moderate improvement in their participation in political parties.

The ET determined PTI's contribution to this improvement based on the activities that PTI partners implemented. As noted, PTI engaged youth and women's organizations and also encouraged the platforms and committees it helped to establish to include women and youth in leadership positions. As a result, positive results brought about by PTI partners also contributed to improvements. The level of improvement is determined by the breadth and depth of the results stemming from PTI activities.

The ET found that youth contributions to advocating for peaceful elections and preventing violence were the most compelling contribution to the determination of moderate improvement. There was no election-related violence in PTI locations, which stakeholders widely attributed to PTI efforts to foster dialogue, collaboration, and mutual understanding across opposing groups, whether political or ethnic. There was widespread agreement among NDI staff and PTI partners at the national and local level (FGD participants, CIED, PSC, INDIGO election observation coordinators, ARK, etc.) that youth are manipulated to be

perpetrators of violence and disruption. PTI partners advocated for peaceful elections; many of these partners were either youth organizations or had youth in leadership positions. Further, the ET found several examples where PTI partners collaborated with each other and occasionally with local authorities to prevent acts of violence during the election.

The ET determined that there was a moderate improvement in women's participation in political parties primarily from the increase in the number of female legislative candidates in PTI locations from 2016 to 2021 drastically outpaced the national level. That there was an increase nationwide is positive, and the fact that the increase was even greater in PTI locations demonstrates positive contributions from PTI partners in these locations.

EQ2: CHALLENGES, LESSONS LEARNED, AND BEST PRACTICES

PTI'S CONSORTIUM IS BOTH A STRENGTH AND A WEAKNESS

PTI's consortium of 10 local partners posed significant management challenges, but the diversity of partners provided multiple means to give women and youth leadership roles, contributing to the improvements in participation described above. As a result, the composition of the consortium was both a strength and a weakness.

NDI experienced performance or leadership problems with five local partners. In its first three years, NDI issued grants to eight local organizations, three of which it suspended or discontinued because of performance (ARK, RASALAO) or leadership (FOSCAO) issues. Based on their past collaboration, NDI's cooperative agreement included approvals for subawards to POECI and RIJLI but planned awards were never issued once leadership and internal governance issues emerged.

NDI engaged a variety of Ivorian partners with diverse compositions and expertise. Several of these partners are women and youth organizations, and their presence in the consortium gave women and youth a greater voice in advocating for women's and youth political participation and provide examples of how women and youth can contribute.

Giving women and youth a voice is not easy. RIJLI's leadership issue emerged when the executive secretary effectively aged out of his position based on internal rules but wanted to stay on regardless. The organization has been weakened significantly as a result. Though led by a woman, 2C2PF's coordinator for PTI activities is a man. One cannot expect women and youth organizations to hire exclusively youth and women, but doing so demonstrates that women and youth are capable. As PYPA noted, *"We want to show them we can take on more responsibility."*

In addition to grant recipients, NDI worked directly with platforms and committees, paying directly for costs associated with activities. CIEDs were encouraged to put women and youth in positions of responsibility, giving them a higher profile in their community than they might otherwise have, especially when addressing or preventing instances of conflict. This was not universally appreciated; one stakeholder argued it would have been better to put an older, more influential party leader in charge of the CIED because the person would have carried more weight. Comprised entirely of women and youth, VSLAs also engaged in political processes, going well beyond the reason for their establishment but contributing to program objectives nonetheless.

SMALLER CONSORTIUMS ARE EASIER TO MANAGE, BUT SYSTEMATICALLY ENGAGING LOCAL PARTNERS IS MORE SUSTAINABLE

As the prime awardee, NDI is held accountable for all PTI activities, including those undertaken by its partners. NDI must implement activities and submit both program and financial reports explaining how funds were spent. If a partner is not able to implement or cannot prepare a technical or financial report, NDI is still responsible for ensuring award terms and conditions are met. NDI needs its grantee partners to both implement effectively and submit the required program and financial reports.

USAID policy is to engage local actors and support local organizations to build sustainability, but fulfilling requirements is harder for some local partners. Engaging Ivoirian partners to implement activities is inherently more sustainable because the organization will continue beyond the project. It may be more efficient to open an office in a region than work through a local CSO, but the office closes when the project ends. The local CSO is more likely to continue functioning, albeit with different sources of funding. Engaging local partners does not necessarily offer cost savings for a complex program such as PTI. Though not examined in detail during this evaluation, it may in fact be less expensive and more efficient to open regional offices, but those gains could well be offset by the loss of sustainability when programs end and offices close. This is an interesting hypothesis to explore in future research.

Some reduction of consortium members may be advisable, but the ET found clear benefits to the presence of both thematic and geographic local partners, even though the geographic partners implement only a portion of the PTI activities taking place in their region and are not tasked with supervising activities implemented by other partners (e.g., 2C2PF, CIED, PYPA, RIJLI) in their regions. As such, geographic partners are not a true equivalent of opening a regional office, even though they do offer some of those functionalities.

EQ3: 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

PTI'S PIVOT WAS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE COULD UNDERMINE THE PROGRESS COTE D'IVOIRE HAS MADE OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS

PTI's pivot was effective because of the platforms it created, especially the CIEDs and the PSCs. PTI's primary advantage in facing the potential for election violence was that it had been operational for two years, giving them a solid foundation to build on when tested in the 2020 elections. The CIEDs were important as platforms for communication between political parties. The national CIED was created in 2018 and local chapters have been established at regular intervals since then. PTI recently reported establishing new CIEDs with United Nations Development Programme funding in locations where violence took place in 2020, a further sign of their relevance. Even if national leadership does not actively participate, leaders cannot easily walk away from or turn their backs on CIED activities.

EQ4: ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITIES

PTI'S APPROACH TO SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP CONTRIBUTED TO BOTH PROGRAM SUB-PURPOSES

PTI is designed to address interrelated challenges of political participation and community cohesion. Interviewees and focus group participants overall perceive PTI as contributing to social cohesion, economic inclusion, and political participation in beneficiary communities. Entrepreneurial activities are part of a sub-purpose that aims to strengthen community cohesion by leveraging social capital to address community grievances and internal and external conflict risks, but PTI's approach contributed to both program sub-purposes.

Research participants engaged in strengthening women's and youth political participation understood their lack of resources as a key obstacle; they appreciated how entrepreneurial activities addressed that challenge. Participants in entrepreneurial activities discussed how their eyes had been opened to the need for their own political engagement. This intertwining of activities is a source of strength, creating a feedback loop among different partners as they implement their activities.

IT TAKES MORE TIME AND EFFORT TO CREATE A HETEROGENEOUS VSLA, BUT RESULTS ARE BETTER

CARE representatives expressed surprise that heterogeneous VSLAs function better than homogenous, but the approach has been very successful and contributed to social cohesion in PTI locations. Given the interrelated nature of PTI's two sub-purposes, this approach was entirely appropriate, but it also took much more time to establish. PTI did broad outreach to identify candidates, created selection committees

to review applications, and then formed the groups—vastly different from its stated key principle of self-selection in the formation of groups.¹⁴

EQ5: PREVENTING/COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

INCREASED EMPHASIS ON P/CVE HAS BEEN APPROPRIATE, GIVEN THE EVOLVING CONTEXT IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE AND THE SAHEL REGION AND ITS APPROACH HAS BECOME MORE FOCUSED

Awareness-building is perceived as reducing the stigma associated with VE, especially among Muslim religious leaders, and has allowed PTI to collaborate on identifying potential threats. Establishing a common understanding of VE in communities that were unknowingly facing serious VE threats is necessary for communities to effectively take part in PVE efforts. The identification of push and pull factors was relevant to better design the intervention. Through a well-tailored approach, PTI was able to identify actors to support a PVE strategy. The grassroots collaborative approach was useful to foster trust among stakeholders and strengthen social capital. Site visits and fieldwork help to confirm that preventing VE must be a context-specific approach due to underlying cultural factors.

RECOMMENDATIONS

EQ1: WOMEN'S AND YOUTH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

- **PTI should (and plans to) engage its partners, including the CIED and 2C2PF, to analyze the gaps between the quota law and the electoral code so as to eventually harmonize them.** Passage of the quota law was a noteworthy accomplishment, but implementation has been problematic. Based on interviews with NDI staff, 2C2PF, CIEDs, and the CEI, there are several factors: gaps in the law, inconsistencies with the electoral code, and the desire of political parties to put forward their most competitive candidates. Political parties may have realized they did not need to respect the law. Addressing the gaps and harmonizing the quota law with the electoral code will contribute to leveling the playing field.
- **In designing a follow-on program, USAID should support PTI partners and/or other local CSOs to encourage collaboration and networking among women political party members,** either through an existing association or alternative mechanisms. Women's voices are marginalized in political parties and there need to be more opportunities for them to collaborate, connect, and advocate for their interests. Given the lack of momentum in the mentoring program, an alternative is to support an association similar to PYPa or a platform along the lines of the CIED. Both PYPa and the CIED have had an impact based in part on how they are conceived and how they operate. PTI or a successor program may wish to convene a workshop to discuss these options.
- **In designing a follow-on program, USAID should support PTI partners and/or other local CSOs to prepare for the next local elections, where women and youth candidates may have more opportunities.** PTI partners are well-positioned to advocate for and support women and youth candidates for the next local elections. Youth especially may find greater traction, where age might not be as great a factor as in legislative elections. A local elected office is often a stepping stone to a higher office, so these efforts could serve to build a pipeline of future women and youth candidates.
- **In designing a follow-on program, USAID should build on the successes of youth engagement to expand outward from PTI locations.** It was widely noted that no violence occurred in PTI locations, but there was violence in other locations. New CIEDs have been established in some of these areas.

¹⁴ See <https://www.care.org/our-work/education-and-work/microsavings/vsla-101/>

- **In designing a follow-on program, USAID should support PTI partners and/or other local CSOs in a campaign to expand access to voter registration.** The advocacy campaign launched by PTI partner youth groups to make voter registration more accessible was successful but did not fundamentally change the fact that registering to vote requires access to civil documents that may be difficult to obtain, cost-prohibitive, or both. Increasing access to voter registration could include both short- and long-term solutions. Short-term solutions include sponsoring special events—especially outside of urban centers—where staff are available to provide civil documents and/or register voters. Long-term solutions would focus on advocacy for reducing or streamlining the fee structure and expanding availability of civil documents.
- **In designing a follow-on program, USAID should support a campaign to expand windows for voter registration.** In reviewing the 2020 registration data, the ET found large gaps between male and female registration, especially among youth. Voter registration was not reopened between the October 2020 presidential and March 2021 legislative elections, so the gap between male and female voters (237,798) remained. If eligible voters did not register for the presidential election due to security concerns, they may have been willing to register for the legislative elections, which were not being boycotted and thus did not pose the same threat of violence. Given that the electorate was evenly divided between men and women before 2020, the ET concludes that approximately 237,798 women were likely deprived of the opportunity to vote. Given that the climate was calmer for the 2021 legislative elections, not reopening registration could have disenfranchised women, especially young women. This could be the basis of an argument to open voter registration before every election if future elections are close together but not simultaneous.
- **In designing a follow-on program, USAID should support the CEI to implement electronic capture of voters' demographic data during the vote.** The ET hoped to compare women and youth voter turnout from the 2016 and 2021 elections to see if there was an increase in PTI locations compared to the national average. Unfortunately, the CEI informed the ET that this data is not available electronically. Voter registration lists are maintained in electronic format, but only votes are tabulated electronically. Polling agents track on paper who has voted, but not electronically. Additional software and training would be required to make tracking of demographic data possible. CEI staff requested support to make this happen. Having access to demographic data on voter turnout would offer opportunities to assess the real gaps in terms of youth and women engagement. Support in PTI's final year could involve PTI partners hosting roundtable discussions and/or conducting a technical diagnostic of the problem by election IT specialists, with long-term solutions included in the design of follow-on activities.

EQ2: CHALLENGES, LESSONS LEARNED, AND BEST PRACTICES

- **In developing its strategy for a follow-on program, USAID should strengthen its relationship with the CEI so that lingering issues caused by previous dealings with POECI can be resolved.** Though its concerns were valid, USAID's decision to effectively cease working with POECI by using a competitive process to select a partner for long-term observation activities has had lasting repercussions. Former POECI leaders are in influential positions in government and have not forgotten. USAID's voice in elections is considerable and so other donors followed its lead and ceased working with POECI. There is no indication that Ivoirian stakeholders perceived the COI in the same way as USAID. Turning back the clock is neither possible nor practical, but finding a way to foster relationships is advisable.
- **USAID implementing partners should thoroughly assess financial and administrative capacity for partners, develop capacity-building plans, and evaluate progress annually.** When programs establish consortia with local partners, the lead organization should carry out an initial assessment before signing any grant agreement to understand existing processes and staff skillsets. NDI has also suggested that lead implementing organizations might include an approval

requirement for staff deemed essential. This would ensure the necessary staff are available and appropriate for the proposed activities. The assessment should include research into the organization's structure and leadership. The lead partner should use the assessment to design a capacity-building plan, updated annually based on progress (or lack thereof).

- **In developing its strategy for a follow-on program, USAID should assess the opportunity cost of providing additional funds to local-level partners.** Access to resources was one of the most common concerns raised by PTI partners working at the local level (e.g., CIEDs, PSCs, VSLAs, INDIGO election observation coordinators, PYPA). Many stakeholders had activities they would have liked to implement if they had a place and equipment to conduct activities and write reports as well as greater reimbursement for expenses incurred. The ET acknowledges that budget limitations affect activity decisions. More is almost always better, but not always possible. The decision to provide additional resources in one area will require providing fewer resources in another area. The ET was not tasked with this question but does recommend further discussions to understand the potential tradeoffs between depth and breadth. There may be benefits to expanding resources for the local level, but it may require working in fewer locations or undertaking fewer activities in the existing locations.

EQ3: 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

- **In developing its strategy for a follow-on program, USAID should establish partnerships in locations where violence took place and consider expanding into those areas in any follow-on program.** PTI platforms and partners were successful in preventing violence in PTI locations, which have a history of election-related violence. That history and context justified their choice when PTI launched operations, but a new analysis is warranted to see if the political terrain has shifted and violence could become a problem in other locations. USAID may wish to consider expanding outward from PTI locations to nearby towns and villages or adding additional locations, as it did in Year 3 when it added Lakota and Gagnao. Indeed, NDI PTI reported establishing new CIEDs with United Nations Development Programme funding in Abengourou, Bondoukou, Daoukro, Bonoua, Agboville, and Divo—all locations that experienced violence in 2020.

EQ4: ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITIES

- **PTI should prioritize the funding of group-led projects to strengthen the economic empowerment of vulnerable groups and further contribute to social cohesion.** PTI's approach for the VSLAs was to focus on vulnerable women and youth; selection criteria, for example, emphasized women-led households more narrowly than just women. Several VSLA members expressed a desire for access to greater funds for group projects that go beyond what the VSLA can generate internally. Tier A "business accelerator" opportunities are just getting started. Efforts to seek additional funding for these group projects are worthwhile and should be prioritized over other activities with the VSLAs.
- **In developing its strategy for a follow-on program, USAID should extend and/or expand PTI's VSLA approach to other communities that have been recently affected by political violence.** As described above, there may be additional locations where the VSLA approach would contribute to reducing tensions, especially when working in collaboration with PTI partners promoting social cohesion through interparty dialogue, interfaith dialogue, and political participation of women and youth.

EQ5: PREVENTING/COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

- **In developing its strategy for future programs, USAID should continue P/CVE interventions.** PTI efforts in communication, media, and public debate should continue because stopping community support can create a breach that allows the proliferation of VE.

- **PTI should maintain and expand continuous dialogue with government officials, security forces, and community leaders to address related issues that could undermine PVE efforts.** PTI partners, especially the CCMs and interfaith committees, are tackling VE issues through awareness-raising and collaboration to signal potential threats to government authorities. There is a range of issues that could undermine the effectiveness of existing PVE activities. VE is complex, as are the problems in the communities at risk of extremism. Corruption, gender-based violence, barriers to girls' education, and youth attitudes to easy enrichment all have the potential to undermine PVE efforts. PTI may wish to consider integrating these issues into its training and awareness-building activities.

ANNEX A. STATEMENT OF WORK

FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF POLITICAL TRANSITION AND INCLUSION PROGRAM (PTI)

C.I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The Political Transition and Inclusion (PTI) activity in Côte d'Ivoire is a four-year program (July 2018 - July 2022). It is an \$11.5 million activity. PTI is designed to reinforce Ivoirians' efforts to strengthen inclusion and democratic processes as firewalls to further violence and instability, and to help local and national institutions gain the legitimacy and inclusivity needed to achieve sustained reconciliation and participatory democracy.

Despite impressive economic growth in recent years, Côte d'Ivoire's nascent democracy remains fragile. A peaceful transition and transfer of power from one elected president to another after the 2020 election did not take place. President Ouattara decided to seek a third term (constitution calls for two) after the death of his party's candidate, former Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly.

The PTI's activity aims at supporting USAID's Côte d'Ivoire DRG strategy, Political Inclusion and Accountability (PIA). The purpose of the PIA Project is to improve the Ivoirian population's confidence in the Government of Côte d'Ivoire (GOCI). The PTI activity seeks to contribute to long-term political stability in Côte d'Ivoire through inclusive political processes and the resolution of deep-seated grievances at the local and national level. PTI is anchored upon two sub-purposes:

- Sub-Purpose 1: The GOCI is more inclusive of citizens' needs and concerns, particularly for youth and women in marginalized and conflict-risk areas
- Sub-Purpose 2: Community cohesion strengthened in key regions, particularly for youth and women, in marginalized and conflict-risk areas

The PTI program comprises a blend of activities and initiatives aimed at peacebuilding and conflict prevention, democratic governance, preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) and economic incentives and opportunities for youth, women, and other marginalized groups. The media component crosscuts all sub purposes and will reinforce the role of openness and participation of youth and women in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and economic development as Ivoirians advocate for inclusive political and electoral reforms. Through a bottom-up approach, the PTI activity engages diverse actors such as community leaders, traditional chiefs, private sector entrepreneurs and innovators, religious leaders, and youth members of demobilized armed groups.

The development hypothesis underpinning this activity states that:

If:

If youth, women, and marginalized youth participate and engage the GOCI to establish an environment conducive to inclusivity,

Then:

The political transition in 2020 will be more credible, fostering adequate conditions for continued stability in Côte d'Ivoire and the region.

Specifically, If political and community actors:

- Have increased knowledge, skills and opportunity to better exchange with citizens regarding citizens' concerns, needs, and grievances and expectations for elected leaders, including through a conflict sensitive approach;
- Open the ranks of their leadership at the national and local levels to include more diverse voices from women, youth, and marginalized communities in political structures and through civil society;

- Are assisted and encouraged to apply the formal electoral “rules of the game” with regard to issues including candidate registration, political consensus, and conflict mitigation;
- Sense that elected officials will be held accountable for delivering the solutions proposed in their campaign platforms;
- Have positive local narratives that reinforce legitimate community voices;
- Have access to better quality and more credible news and information;
- Expand dialogue on citizens’ grievances and preventing violent extremism concepts; and
- Have economic opportunities that address local grievances, particularly for youth and women;

Then:


- Citizens’ meaningful participation, engagement, and community cohesion in the political system will improve because stronger and more active interactions between citizens and those in power will shift incentives – away from behaviors that undermine the public good, and toward achieving priorities that respond to citizens’ grievances for a peaceful transition and consolidation of stability in Côte d’Ivoire and the West Africa region;
- Community members will have a greater understanding of their environment, including differing perspectives;
- Communities will become more cohesive and empowered to resist conflict and extremist ideologies.

C.2. PURPOSE OF THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

The Contractor will conduct a final evaluation to assess the performance of the PTI activity to determine if planned activities are leading to activity objectives and desired improvements in the political processes and community resilience in Côte d’Ivoire. Evaluation findings will be used by USAID to inform on progress to date in improving the socio-political stabilization process and as a learning tool to inform future activity designs and programming. As the PTI activity and work-plan is monitored through a flexible complex evaluation and monitoring tool, the PTI team will be able to make some minor adjustments that could include but are not limited to work plan changes and activity monitoring and learning plan adjustment. Additionally, evaluation findings will be used to inform new designs, especially with regards to DRG activities, Women, Peace and Security (WPS) efforts, and the Global Fragility Act (GFA) around countering violent extremism.

C.2.1. TARGET AREAS AND GROUPS

MAP OF TARGETED PTI ACTIVITY



In close coordination with USAID, the Contractor must implement the evaluation in selected PTI's targeted areas at different levels (national, district and community) targeting different stakeholders involved in the activity. This must include PTI's regional organizations, government officials, religious and traditional leaders, relevant CSOs, media, other local government officials, community leaders, targeted communities and sub partners. PTI's 15 focus cities are: **Bouake, Sakassou, Beoumi, Korhogo, Ouangolodougou, Tengréla, Mbengue, Man, Duekoué, Guiglo, Bloléquin, Koumassi, Yopougon, Abobo, Anyama**

C.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE PTI FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

The main objective of this evaluation is to assess and document the extent to which PTI contributed to achieving its objectives. Specifically, the performance evaluation must address the following objectives:

1. Conduct a comparative analysis of PTI's key performance indicators at baseline, mid-line and near-final to assess changes in indicators.
2. Document any PTI's successes, best practices, lessons learned and challenges the activity encountered.
3. Determine the effectiveness and relevance of the approach(es) used to meet activity objectives and document any lessons learned, best practices and challenges to inform future programming.
4. Ascertain the extent to which local level synergy committees at national and local level helped to advance collaborative and participatory engagement for community conflict prevention and resilience in targeted areas
5. Determine the extent to which political inclusion and community cohesion initiatives in key regions particularly for youth and women, in marginalized and conflict-risk areas were able to reach expected results

6. Identify any internal and external factors that affected the implementation of the PTI project.
7. Propose any recommendations based on the findings that would help inform future programing.

C.3.1. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The Contractor must, at a minimum, address first the two main following and subsequent questions:

1. To what extent did PTI's interventions in the 15 targeted areas help address the government's inclusion of citizen needs and concerns and lead to youth and women's political participation and community resilience?
 - a. What change, if any, noted in political participation and inclusion as well as political dialogue and peaceful resolution of grievances at national and community level?
 - b. How is the WPS Strategy implemented in the program? Identify lessons learned and/or best practices
 - c. Identify the areas where gender inequality is of greatest concern in the program activities as well as successful examples of gender equality and women's empowerment.
 - d. What are some risks associated with women's participation in political processes? How are activities mitigating such risks?
2. To what extent did PTI interventions toward youth, women and political leaders promote meaningful political participation and inclusion ahead of the 2020 presidential election?
 - a. How has women and youth political participation changed?
 - b. What change, if any, was noted in youth and women political engagement and dialogue among political parties?
3. To what degree has PTI related innovative media and gender activities been mainstreamed and did they lead to a comprehensive change at the national and community level?
4. To what extent have community-based activities, particularly socioeconomic entrepreneurship interventions toward youth and women, brought positive economic and social benefit in the targeted communities? What are the key barriers that still need to be addressed to ensure a sustainable socio-economic reintegration?
5. How effective have P/CVE interventions been implemented in targeted areas mainly at the northern border areas? What are the key lessons, best practices, and challenges learned from this approach?

C.3.2. TASKS

The Contractor must perform the following tasks as part of this scope of work:

1. Draft inception report
2. Develop the evaluation methodology
3. Test and verify the evaluation methodology
4. Deploy a field team taking into account COVID-19 measures
5. Collect the relevant data to inform the evaluation
6. Conduct oral debrief meetings with USAID on the preliminary findings of the evaluation
7. Host a stakeholder's learning workshop to present the draft evaluation findings for their validation and inputs
8. Develop a DRAFT post-evaluation action plan, for finalization and implementation by the Mission
9. Draft Final Report
10. Submission of Contracting Officer's Representative (COR)-approved final report to the Development Experience Clearinghouse

C.4. RESULTS: DELIVERABLES AND OUTPUTS

The Contractor must furnish the following deliverables and reports:

I. Inception Report

The inception report must describe the conceptual framework the evaluator will use to undertake the evaluation and the justification for selecting this approach. It must detail the evaluation methodology (i.e. how each question will be answered by way of data collection methods, data sources and sampling). The report must also contain a work plan, which indicates the phases in the evaluation with key deliverables and milestones. USAID/Côte d'Ivoire will review this report and the Contractor must receive approval from the COR of the report before it begins implementing the evaluation plan. The inception report must clearly document and discuss how gender analysis will be integrated into the design of the evaluation.

The inception report must at least contain the following:

- a. A work plan, including COVID-19 mitigation plan, which indicates the phases in the evaluation with key deliverables and milestones and key personnel responsibility.
- b. Complete set of evaluation questions and elaborate on them as necessary. Any questions added during the contract negotiations must be clearly indicated and any deleted questions must be mentioned with a reason as to their exclusion.
- c. Discussion of the overall approach of the evaluation, highlighting the conceptual model(s) adopted. This must incorporate an analysis of the intervention logic of the program.
- d. Discussion of risks and limitations that may undermine the reliability and validity of the evaluation results.
- e. Specification of indicator, index, or indicators that must be used as a guide in answering each question.
- f. Discussion of the data collection and data analysis methods that will be used for each question. State the limitations for each method. Include the level of precision required for quantitative and qualitative methods and value scales or coding used for qualitative methods. Standard data collection methods for USAID evaluations are: surveys, questionnaires, interviews, focus groups, document review and observations.
- g. Detail key data sources that will be selected to answer each evaluation question.
- h. Explanation of how existing data will be incorporated and used to answer the evaluation questions.
- i. Discussion of the sampling methods and details. Include area and population to be represented, rationale for selection, mechanics of selection, sample size (for each unit of analysis), sample precision and confidence and limitations.
- j. Summarized evaluation methodology in an evaluation planning matrix that must contain the following column headings: evaluation question, measure (s) or indicator(s), data collection method(s), data source, design strategy / framework for each question, sampling methodology, data collection instrument(s) for each question and data analysis methodology on each evaluation question.
- k. Timeline showing the evaluation phases (data collection, data analysis and reporting) with their key deliverables and milestones.
- l. Specific responsibilities of each team member for each evaluation phase. Include any changes in the ET.
- m. Discussion of logistics of carrying out the evaluation. Include specific assistance that will be required from USAID, such as providing arrangements for key contacts within the Mission or Government.

- n. Appended draft instruments for data collection specific to questions and indicators in the evaluation.
- o. Standard USAID work plan outlying timeframes, etc. for implementation.

2. Evaluation Methodology (submitted within the Inception report)

The performance evaluation must utilize the mixed methods research design employing both quantitative and qualitative methods to strengthen the validity of the findings and provide room for data triangulation. The Contractor must describe and document the methodological approach that will be used and this should follow USAID Evaluation best practices. The model must include an evaluation framework and assessment tools for each evaluation question and highlight the conceptual model(s); specify the measurement criteria to be used to respond to each question. It must discuss any risks and limitations that may undermine the reliability and validity of the evaluation results.

In order to ensure the maximum value for learning and use, a description of the proposed evaluation methodology must include the following, at a minimum:

- a. **Methods of data collection:** The Contractor must clearly highlight the different methods and tools that will be utilized to collect both quantitative and qualitative data such as structured questionnaires for beneficiary interviews; analysis of secondary data/outputs from performance monitoring system, focus group interviews with beneficiary, key informant interviews with USAID staff, implementing partners or government staff, community leaders and other stakeholders.
- b. **all datasets generated during the performance of the evaluation must be submitted in a machine-readable, non-proprietary format and excluding any personally identifiable information, with supporting documentation describing the dataset, such as code books, data dictionaries, data gathering tools, notes on data quality, and explanations of redactions.** All datasets created during the evaluation must be submitted to the Development Data Library per open data requirements found in ADS 579, USAID Development Data, and per the instructions outlined in ADS 302mas (302.3.5.22). The Contractor must submit the Dataset and supporting documentation within thirty (30) calendar days after the Dataset is first used to produce an intellectual work or is of sufficient quality to produce an intellectual work
- c. **Sampling:** The Contractor must propose how sampling will be done and propose the appropriate sample sizes required to ensure scientific rigor.
- d. **Data analysis:** The Contractor must provide the plan for analysis of all qualitative and quantitative data collected. This should include how different secondary sources of data collected by PTI (e.g. annual beneficiary surveys/outputs from performance monitoring system, etc.) will be utilized to answer the evaluation questions.

Constraints to Data Collection and Analysis

Below are the anticipated constraints to be met during data collection and analysis.

- a. *Comparative analysis:*
- b. *Language:* Most stakeholders, community leaders or frontline staff (partners or government) will not be comfortable to communicate in English hence the Contractor must include individuals fluent in French in the ET to assist with translations during focus group discussions and key informant interviews. The Contractor is discouraged from using project staff as translators.
- c. *COVID-19:* ALL COVID-19 measures will be required to be followed. As such, gatherings will need to be kept small...

3. Debriefing Meeting

The Contractor must debrief USAID on the preliminary findings of the evaluation. This can be a virtual debrief if necessary. This meeting must provide a summary of any analytical results; discuss challenges, successes and way forward. The Contractor must deliver an oral presentation of the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations for each question to USAID, prior to finalizing the draft evaluation report. The team leader of the ET will be required to routinely update the evaluation point of contact on the progress of the evaluation.

4. Learning Workshop and Post-Evaluation Action Plan

In coordination with USAID, and in support of Agency collaboration learning and adaptation methodologies, the contractor must organize a learning workshop and produce a post-evaluation action plan, respecting COVID-19 measures and restrictions (which will be held virtually if necessary due to COVID-19 measures). The focus of the workshop is to generate varied and diverse learning points including useful and actionable suggestions or proposals for addressing recurrent development challenges (based on the specific activity evaluation) in the Ivorian context with the end goal being to enhance achievement of USAID objectives.

The workshop must bring together key stakeholders jointly identified by the contractor, USAID and activity beneficiaries to stimulate discussion around the evaluation topic. Inclusion of a wide array of stakeholders is expected to bring to bear different contextual experiences to broaden the learning base, share best practices, exchange knowledge on critical activity lessons, evaluation results, discuss barriers, and recommend approaches to further enrich learning and the success of USAID activities. This will inform operational, tactical and strategic decisions into other on-going programs and the planning of future programs, as well as capture a broad array of stakeholder thought processes. The specific objectives of the learning event are:

- To disseminate findings and recommendations from the assessment.
- To review in-depth the key lessons and their implication for future programs; and
- Most importantly, to engage stakeholders on the evaluation topic, to share lessons learned, barriers, successes, discuss recommendations and to generate a dialogue that captures stakeholder input, thoughts, and ideas on the technical approach used to achieve activity results as presented in the evaluation.

The contractor will be responsible for documenting the learning points that will emanate from the discussions and knowledge sharing. These will be appropriately captured in a post-evaluation action plan that will be shared with USAID, workshop participants and other targeted audiences no later than two-weeks after completion of the workshop. The contractor will be responsible for all costs and logistics including but not limited to: invitations, agenda, facilitation, coffee breaks, lunch, appropriate branding materials and all other aspects for this all-day workshop. The Contractor, in coordination with and approval of the COR will produce an event agenda, generate a list of invitees, produce all workshop materials, acquire a venue, and manage all aspects to ensure a successful workshop. The Contractor must produce a post-evaluation action plan that captures the learning dialogue, discussion surrounding key findings, conclusions and recommendations. The final COR approved report will, at a minimum, include an executive summary for the workshop, activity background, a workshop scope describing the reason for the workshop and transcribed discussions that provide details on the workshop proceedings focused on outcomes and takeaways surrounding the dialogue that ensues at the workshop.

5. Final Evaluation Report

The Contractor must submit a final evaluation report that is based on analyzed facts and evidence and fully addresses all the evaluation questions. The report must be 40-50 pages in length (excluding

annexes) and comply with the Checklist for Assessing USAID Evaluation Reports (see annexes). After taking into account all the new information and feedback provided on the final oral briefings and draft evaluation report, the Contractor must submit 10 hard-bound copies and an electronic version of the report to the Mission. The Contractor must also submit an electronic version in an appropriate media including all tools and products of the evaluation, including instruments and data in data formats suitable for reanalysis. The Contractor must ensure that Appendix I of the USAID Evaluation Policy – Criteria to Ensure the Quality of the Evaluation Report is followed. This includes:

- The evaluation report must represent a thoughtful, well-researched and well-organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the project, what did not and why;
- Evaluation reports must address all evaluation questions included in the scope of work;
- The evaluation report should include the scope of work as an annex. All modifications to the scope of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, ET composition, methodology or timeline need to be agreed upon in writing by the technical officer;
- Evaluation methodology must be explained in detail and all tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists and discussion guides will be included in an Annex in the final report;
- Evaluation findings will assess outcomes and impact on men, boys, women, and girls;
- Limitations to the evaluation must be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.);
- Evaluation findings must be presented as analyzed facts, evidence and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people's opinions. Findings must be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence;
- Sources of information must be properly identified and listed in an annex;
- Recommendations must be supported by a specific set of findings and should be action-oriented, practical and specific, with defined responsibility for the action.

The final evaluation report must contain the following sections:

- **Executive Summary:** This section shall be three to five pages in length and must summarize the purpose, project background, evaluation design and methodologies including main evaluation questions, key findings, conclusions, and recommendations and lessons learned from the evaluation.
- **Background:** This section must provide a brief description of the project that highlights the scope of the project, project development hypothesis, activities undertaken in the project, key impact indicators of the project and impact areas of the project. Other activities that complemented the project activities directly or indirectly in the intervention districts must also be highlighted.
- **Methodology:** This section must detail the methodology and related research protocols undertaken in conducting the evaluation, data collection, analysis, selection criteria/sampling, and related constraints or limitations encountered during the project implementation and evaluation.
- **Findings:** Empirical facts collected during the evaluation: This section must present findings from the evaluation. The evaluation findings must be presented as analyzed facts, evidence and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people's opinions. The evaluation findings must assess key outcomes and impacts as structured around the organizational framework of the evaluation questions. The findings must be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative and qualitative evidence analyzed through scientifically plausible methodologies. Sources of information used in arriving at the findings must be properly acknowledged and listed in an annex.

- **Conclusions (Interpretations and judgments based on the findings):** Evaluation conclusions must be presented for each key finding. The Conclusions must logically follow from the gathered data and findings. These must be explicitly justified. If and when necessary, the evaluator must state his/her assumptions, judgments and value premises so that readers can better understand and assess them.
- **Recommendations (Proposed actions for management):** This section must precisely and clearly present recommendations that must be drawn from specific findings. The recommendations must be stated in an action-oriented fashion, must be practical, specific, and with defined responsibility for the requisite action. The recommendations presented in this section must follow the evaluation questions as the organizational framework.
- **References:** This section should include all documents reviewed, including background documentation and records of technical data application and decision-making.
- **Annexes:** These may include, but not limited to, statement of work, tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists, discussion guides, sources of information, etc.

C.5. TEAM COMPOSITION

The Contractor must propose a diverse ET characterized by expertise in different key components of the PTI activity. As a means of building local capacity to undertake evaluations, the team composition should at least have one local expert as a key member of the ET.

C.6. PLACE OF PERFORMANCE

The place of performance is Côte d'Ivoire covering **Bouake, Sakassou, Beoumi, Korhogo, Ouanolodougou, Tengréla, Mbengue, Man, Duekoue, Guiglo, Bolequin, Koumassi, Yopougon, Abobo, and Anyama**. In close coordination with USAID, the team will determine the selected localities for the evaluation. The extent of travel will be determined by the evaluation design and data needs as agreed upon between the Contractor and USAID. This determination should take into consideration existing COVID-19 measures and restrictions at the time of the evaluation. The Democracy and Governance Officer will serve as the primary point of contact and COR for the Performance Evaluation. The performance evaluation is expected to be conducted between June and August 2021. The final evaluation report is expected no later than August 2021.

C.7. LOGISTICS

The Contractor will be responsible for all logistics including coordinating all travel throughout PTIs 15 targeted areas **Bouake, Sakassou, Beoumi, Korhogo, Ouanolodougou, Tengréla, Mbengue, Man, Duekoue, Guiglo, Bolequin, Koumassi, Yopougon, Abobo, and Anyama**, as well as lodging, printing, office space, equipment and car rentals, financing from the contract award and managing dissemination of results. The USAID Democracy and Governance Officer will provide support to set up initial meetings with key government officials and other stakeholders.

C.8. EXISTING SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The Mission will share the following documents with the successful ET to facilitate the desk review. The applicable documents are listed below:

1. PTI Program Description
2. PTI Cooperative agreement Number 72062418CA00004
3. PTI Annual reports (FY2019 and FY 2020)
4. Quarterly progress reports (FY2019 – FY2020)
5. PTI baseline report
6. PTI Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (PMEP)

7. Annual work plans (FY2019 – FY2020)
8. PTI Indicator Tracking Table (FY2019 – FY2020)
9. Checklist for Assessing USAID Evaluation Reports
10. USAID Evaluation Policy
11. List of PTI targeted areas and sub partners

ANNEX B. REFERENCES

Title of document	Source/ Author	Year
Description of the Political Transition and Inclusion Program	USAID	2017
NDI USAID Cooperative agreement	USAID	2018
PMP data table	NDI	2021
NDI PTI Cote d'Ivoire AMELP—REVISED	NDI	2018
NDI PTI Cote d'Ivoire PMP—REVISED	NDI	undated
Quarterly report January 1 to March 31, 2018 (FY18 Q2)	NDI	2018
Quarterly report October 1 to December 31, 2018 (FY19 Q1)	NDI	2018
Quarterly report April 1 to June 30, 2019 (FY19 Q3)	NDI	2019
Quarterly report July 1 to September 30, 2019 (FY19 Q4)	NDI	2019
Quarterly report October 1, 2019 to December 30, 2019 (FY20 Q1)	NDI	2019
Quarterly report January 1, 2020 to March 31, 2020 (FY20 Q2)	NDI	2020
Quarterly report April 1, 2020 to June 30, 2020 (FY20 Q3)	NDI	2020
Quarterly report July 1, 2020 to September 30, 2020 (FY20 Q4)	NDI	2020
Quarterly report October 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020 (FY21 Q1)	NDI	2020
Quarterly report January 1, 2021 to March 31, 2021 (FY21 Q2)	NDI	2021
Quarterly report April 1, 2021 to June 30, 2021 (FY21 Q3)	NDI	2021
Workplan Year 1	NDI	2018
Workplan Year 2	NDI	2019
Workplan Year 3	NDI	2020
FOSCAO intervention in Yopougon	FOSCAO	
CARE Soap production	CARE	
CARE VSLA Guiglo and Yopougon	CARE	
Microcredit—Political empowerment as well as financial	CARE	
Presidential elections 2020_ Indigo Press Releases and Statements	Indigo	2020
Observation scrutin présidentiel 2020_draft rapport final	Indigo	2020
Legislative elections 2021_Indigo's mid-day and preliminary post-election statements	Indigo	2021
Indigo Conducts a Successful PVT Despite a Spectre of Violence	Indigo	
Tengréla CVE Roundtable Discussion—Actionable Recommendations	Not specified	Not specified
Rapport sur le seminaire de reflexion interreligieux CVE	NDI/Consultant Arsène Brice BADO	2020
Rapport sur la formation du guide CVE et le the débat à Korhogo	NDI	2021
Rapport des activités CVE à Tengréla, M'Bengué et Ouangolodougou	NDI	2020
Rapport de mission de recherche CVE Mai 2019	NDI	2019
Interfaith dialogue solutions and scenarios	NDI	
Civilo-militaire mission reports: Tengréla	NDI	2021
Civilo-militaire mission reports: Ouangolodougou	NDI	2021
Civilo-militaire mission reports: Man	NDI	2021
Civilo-militaire mission reports: M'Bengué, Bouaké	NDI	2021

Civilo-militaire mission reports: Bouaké	NDI	2021
Misc Report Year 1 Participatory Action Research Trainer's Manual Monitoring committee action plans Manuel PSC_sept 2019 Guide_Comités de SUIVI PSC Geopoll final analysis Year Citizen consultation recommendations MATRICE D'ACTION DE LA CIED BOUAKE		2019
Misc Report Year 2 Synthesis of PAR reports (FR) Summary of CSP workshop discussions Proportion economic opportunity research report Political parties code of conduct Summary of CSP workshop discussions Declaration of PAR youth researchers (FR) Conflict sensitive journalism training Community solidarity plan Community solidarity plan from Anyama, Beoumi CIED interparty dialogue recommendations CIED action plans (FR)		2020
Misc Report Year 3 Activist guide CSO code of conduct		2021
Analyse de la Liste Electorale Provisoire 2020	POECI	2020
STAT_LED_2018_DEPT_AGE_SEX.CSV Voter registration for 2020, by department and age group	CEI	2021
STAT_LED_2020_DEPT_AGE_SEX.CSV Voter registration for 2020, by department, age group, and sex	CEI	2021
STATISTIQUE_EDAN_2021_ (25-35).CSV Candidates for legislative elections in the 25–35 age group, by type and sex	CEI	2021
STATISTIQUE_EDAN_2021_ (36 AND MORE).CSV Candidates for legislative elections over 35 age group, by type and sex	CEI	2021
Presentation Evaluation USAID PTI.PPT Summary of the number of female legislative candidates in 2016 and 2021	2C2PF	2021

ANNEX C. INTERVIEW GUIDES

Following field testing, the ET modified the interview guides from those submitted in the workplan. The ET found it was necessary to shorten the interview guides because several interviews were lasting more than an hour. The ET shortened considerably the interview guide for EQ1, removing questions related to the perception of change as these were the least reliable sources of information. The interview guides for EQ4 and EQ5 were simplified after field testing during the first few interviews.

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS: EQ1

Background

EQ1. Considering the existing evidence and competing factors influencing youth and women political participation and inclusion, is PTI best described as contributing to a dramatic improvement, moderate improvement, minor improvement, no improvement, palliative effect, or negative impact on youth and women political participation and inclusion (a) overall and (b) specifically within political parties? Please provide supporting evidence of any changes in participation and inclusion and PTI contribution.

KIs: *National:* NDI, Internews, POECI, Indigo, CIED, RIJLI, 2C2PF, PYP, political party representatives, election commission members, or staff. *Site Visit:* District-based partners; political party representatives; community leaders; representatives of women, youth, or marginalized groups; election observers.

FGD: Members of women, youth, or marginalized groups who participated in PTI activities related to political participation (part a) and female or youth political party membership (part b).

Introduction

My name is (*please indicate your name and family name*) and I am part of a team of experts from Cloudburst consulting; we are conducting the endline evaluation of the PTI Project. You have been identified as a project stakeholder and we wish to thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. Participation in this evaluation is voluntary and your decision to participate, or not participate, will not affect your current position. To maintain your anonymity, we will ensure that any information we include in the report is not attributed to anything you say and does not identify you as the respondent.

The interview should take approximately 40 minutes to one hour and, if you do not mind, I will be taking notes and would like to record the interview to ensure I capture your views accurately.

You may decline to answer any question or stop the interview at any time and for any reason. Do you have any questions or concerns?

Interview Date	
Interviewee Name(s)	
Gender	
Organization	
Location	
Role/Title	
Interviewer	

No.	Questions	Response
1.1	Could you describe your perspective on the PTI program?	
1.2	What, in your view, are the three most effective ways used by the project to collaborate with and engage stakeholders to strengthen youth/women's overall political participation (registration, engagement, voting barriers)?	
1.3	What are the three least effective collaborative approaches?	
1.4	Why are they more effective or less effective?	
1.5	Which of the different types of political participation of youth/women have been improved? Why? (Prompt, if needed, with examples of voter registration, voting barriers, party engagement.)	
1.6	Please give 2–3 examples of aspects (areas) where better improvement of youth/women political participation has been observed and why.	
1.7	Please give 2–3 examples of aspects (areas) where less or poor improvement of youth/women political participation has been observed and why.	
1.8	Which of the levels of inclusion of youth/women have been best promoted in political parties? Why? (Prompt, if needed, with examples of decision-making, engagement, or candidacy).	
1.9	Please give 2–3 examples of aspects (areas) where better improvement of youth/women inclusion political parties has been observed and why.	
1.10	Please 2–3 examples of aspects (areas) where less or poor improvement of youth/women inclusion in political parties has been observed and why.	
1.11	How effective were the PTI media activities in promoting women's voter registration, political engagement, and voting?	
1.12	How effective were the PTI media activities in promoting youth voter registration, political engagement, and voting?	
1.13	Were there any unexpected or unintended results or outcomes?	
1.14	Is there anything else you want to add?	

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS: EQ2

Background

EQ2: How did PTI adapt or not adapt its approach to promoting youth and women participation given challenges with the 2020 election? Was the level of adaptation appropriate?

KIIs: National: NDI, Internews, POECI, Indigo, CIED, RIJLI, 2C2PF, PYPA, political party representatives, election commission members, or staff. Site Visit: District-based partners; political party representatives; community leaders; representatives of women, youth, or marginalized groups; election observers. Especially important are those who are members of the different management and coordination structures, both national and local.

FGD: Members of women, youth, or marginalized groups who participated in PTI activities related to political participation (part a) and female or youth political party membership (part b).

No.	Questions	Response
2.1	Can you give an example of a success story in political participation and/or inclusion of youth/women?	
2.2	Can you give an example of an activity that sought to, but did not, increase the political participation of youth or women?	
2.3	What were the factors that contributed to these achievements and failures?	
2.4	Which factors were outside of PTI's control?	
2.5	What were the three biggest challenges faced in promoting youth voter registration, political engagement, and voting?	
2.6	How well did PTI adapt its programming to face those challenges?	
2.7	If there was one thing you could do differently, what would it be?	
2.8	Were there any unexpected or unintended results or outcomes?	
2.9	Is there anything else you want to add?	

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS: EQ3

Background

EQ3: How did PTI adapt or not adapt its approach to promoting youth and women participation given challenges with the 2020 election? Was the level of adaptation appropriate?

KIIs: National: NDI, Internews, POECI, Indigo, CIED, RIJLI, 2C2PF, PYPA, political party representatives, election commission members, or staff. Site Visit: District-based partners; political party representatives; community leaders; representatives of women, youth, or marginalized groups; election observers. Especially important are those who are members of the different management and coordination structures, both national and local.

FGD: Members of women, youth, or marginalized groups who participated in PTI activities related to political participation (part a) and female or youth political party membership (part b).

No.	Questions	Response
3.1	How would you infer youth and women felt about the 2020 general election as a result of PTI interventions at any stage of the electoral process? (Prompt, if needed, with examples of voter registration, confidence in the electoral system, campaigning, voting.)	
3.2	If there has been improvement in how youth and women felt about the 2020 general election as a result of PTI interventions, how did PTI's activities accomplish this? If not, why not?	
3.3	What were the most effective activities for changing the way youth and women perceived participation in political processes, including the 2020 election?	
3.4	What were the least effective activities for changing perceptions?	
3.5	How did the project adjust to political unrest inherent to the 2020 election? Which initiatives were most and least effective? At which stages of the electoral process was PTI effective and ineffective?	
3.6	Were there any unexpected or unintended results or outcomes?	
3.7	Is there anything else you want to add?	

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS: EQ4

Background

EQ4: How well have community-based activities, particularly socio-economic entrepreneurship interventions toward youth and women, been implemented in targeted communities? What challenges did PTI confront or continue to confront and what are the key lessons and best practices learned from this approach?

KIIs: *National:* NDI, Internews, CARE. *Site visits:* CARE; VSLA leaders; community leaders; and representatives of women, youth, or marginalized groups.

FGD: Recipients of the three tiers of training and support offered by CARE.

No.	Questions	Response
4.1	Tell us about your organization's role and perspective on the PTI program?	
4.2	What activities did you take part in?	
4.3	What do you think of the approaches or methods?	
4.4	Which were the most effective?	

No.	Questions	Response
4.5	Which were the least effective?	
4.6	What do you think of the role of the village agent?	
4.7	What were the obstacles you faced? How did you adapt it?	
4.8	What is your impression of the media activities of the PTI? (See if they cite CIVILIA.)	
4.9	What do you think of synergy meetings? Useful? Not useful?	
4.10	Were there any unexpected or unintended results?	
4.11	Do you have any other things to add or questions for us?	

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS: EQ5

Background

EQ5: How well have P/CVE interventions been implemented in targeted areas, mainly at the northern borders? What are the challenges PTI confronted or continues to confront and what are the key lessons and best practices learned from this approach?

KIIs: NDI, CARE, Internews, ARK, PLDI.

FGD: Members of women, youth, or marginalized groups who participated in CVE activities.

No.	Questions	Response
5.1	Could you describe your perspective on the PTI program?	
5.2	Which activities did you participate in?	
5.3	What do you think of the approaches or methods used by PTI?	
5.4	Which were the most effective and why?	
5.5	Which were the least effective and why?	
5.6	What were the obstacles you faced? How did you adapt it?	
5.7	What is your impression of PTI media activities?	
5.8	Did you see synergies between the different aspects of the program? Please describe.	
5.9	What about synergy meetings—useful or not?	
5.10	What is your perception of the external factors and their impact on the activities?	
5.11	Were there any unexpected or unintended results or outcomes?	
5.12	Is there anything else you want to add?	

ANNEX D. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

LOCATION/ ORGANIZATION	F	M	TOTAL
ABIDJAN	9	20	29
2C2PF	2	1	3
CARE	1	1	2
CEI		2	2
CIED		1	1
FNCR-CI		3	3
Internews	2	2	4
NDI	3	3	6
PNDIEV		1	1
POECI		2	2
PYPA		1	1
RIJLI		2	2
USAID	1	1	2
ABOBO	3	5	8
Chef Bete		1	1
CIED		3	3
FOSCAO	1		1
INDIGO		1	1
VSLA	2		2
BOUAKÉ	8	11	19
CARE	1		1
CCM	1		1
CIED		1	1
INDIGO		1	1
PNDIEV		5	5
PSC	2	1	3
PSCPD	2	3	5
Radio Saphir	1		1
VSLA	1		1

LOCATION/ ORGANIZATION	F	M	TOTAL
DUEKOUÉ	2	7	9
CIED		1	1
INDIGO		1	1
ODAFEM	1		1
ODAFEM	1	3	4
PSC Committee		1	1
Radio Voix du Guemon		1	1
TENGRÉLA	1	10	11
AJFDT	1		1
ARK		1	1
CCM		1	1
CIED		4	4
CNJCI		1	1
Forum des Religieux		1	1
INDIGO		1	1
Radio Binkadi		1	1
YOPOUGON	1	7	8
CIED		3	3
FOSCAO		2	2
PYPA	1		1
Radio Yopougon		2	2
TOTAL	24	60	84

ANNEX E. SUMMARY OF FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS

LOCATION AND AFFILIATION	WOMEN	MEN	TOTAL
ABOBO	4	6	10
AFRA PK18	1		1
Ayaunalaire	1		1
Membre POSCA		2	2
ONG Lumière du monde		1	1
President des jeunes Abobo		1	1
PT Association		1	1
Responsable communautaire POSCA		1	1
Vives Piasse	1		1
None provided	1		1
BOUAKÉ	5	6	11
AVEC Binkadi	1	2	3
AVEC Force	1	1	2
AVEC Sababougouma	1	1	2
AVEC Saramaya	1	1	2
AVEC Solidaire	1	1	2
DUEKOUÉ	6	5	11
Agent Villageois		1	1
AVEC Espoir	5	3	8
AVEC Petit Duekoué President		1	1
AVEC Spontanée	1		1
TENGRÉLA	2	7	9
Association de femmes Tengréla	1		1
Association Salubrité	1		1
CEDEAO		1	1
CNJCI SG communication et information		1	1
ONG Entente et Développement		1	1

President Moto taxi		1	1
PSC/ SG		1	1
Secrétaire CEDEAO		1	1
Secrétaire ONG BEST		1	1
YOPOUGON	4	4	8
Coordonnateur relais/INDIGO		1	1
Presidente/Belles Dames Solidaires	1		1
Presidente/Société civile	1		1
Presidente des associations des femmes/Groupe Espoir	1		1
RAP/Chercheur	1	1	2
Représentant AVEC		1	1
Secrétaire Général/PCS		1	1
TOTAL	21	28	49