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USAID KENYA NIWAJIBU WETU (NIWETU)

Final Report

This publication was produced by Kenya NiWajibu Wetu under Contract No. AID-OAA-I-13-00013/AID-615-TO-16-00010 at the request of the United States Agency for International Development. This document is made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author or authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the U.S. Government.

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Final Report

Program Title:	Kenya NiWajibu Wetu
Sponsoring USAID Office:	United States Agency for International Development/Kenya
Contract Number:	AID-OAA-I-13-00013/AID-615-TO-16-00010
Contractor:	DAI Global, LLC
Date of Publication:	July 28, 2020
Author:	Kenya NiWajibu Wetu

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	After Action Review
AID-Africa	Access Initiative for African Development
AMEP	Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AS	Al-Shabaab
ASDEF	African Social Development Focus
C4C	Champion for Change
CAP	County Action Plan
CAP Cycle	Complexity Aware Planning Cycle
CBO	Community Based Organization
CC	County Commissioner
CEF	CVE County Engagement Forum
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CS3	Center for Secure and Stable States
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DA	Delta Africa
DOS	U.S. Department of State
FOAID	Focus on Arid Lands and Integrated Development
FY	Fiscal Year
GOK	Government of Kenya
HO	Home Office
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IP	Implementing Partner
IWOF	Isiolo Women of Faith

J2SR	Journey to Self-Reliance
KACPEN	Kamukunji Community Peace Network
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
KSG	Kenya School of Government
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MF	Malaika Foundation
MOI	Ministry of Interior and National Coordination
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NA	Needs Assessment
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Center
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIWETU	NiWajibu Wetu
NPR	National Police Reserves
NSA	Non-state Actors
NSCVE	National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism
NTA	Non-traditional Actors
OCS	Officer in Charge of Station
RCAP	Rapid County Action Plan
RDI	Raia Development Initiative
SCORES	Sensitization of Community on Radicalization and Empowerment Solutions
SMI	Security Management Institute
ST	Steering Team
STTA	Short-term Technical Assistance
TA	Technical Assistance
USAID	United States Agency for International Development


USG	United States Government
VE	Violent Extremism
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization

I. INTRODUCTION TO NIWETU

Kenya NiWajibu Wetu (NIWETU) was a four-year USAID activity designed to improve the capabilities of communities and government to identify and respond to violent extremism (VE) threats in Kenya. Kenya NiWajibu Wetu is a Kiswahili phrase that translates to “Kenya is Our Responsibility.” NIWETU’s technical approach was grounded in Kenya’s National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE), and found inspiration in the Kenyan National Anthem and Constitution of Kenya (2010) Bill of Rights, which encourages action and partnership between communities and government in the pursuit of national security.

NIWETU led USAID’s countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts to achieve two key objectives in Kenya: (1) Community mobilization to address VE enhanced; and (2) Government responsiveness to VE improved. NIWETU strengthened CVE knowledge and skills among at-risk populations and empowered local, sustainable CVE networks to take action to address VE. At the same time, NIWETU provided targeted CVE assistance to county governments, strengthened national and intergovernmental CVE platforms, and developed the indigenous CVE research capabilities of Government of Kenya (GOK) counterparts.

Figure 1. NIWETU’s Goal, Objectives, and Key Activities



In implementing these activities to meet its two objectives, NIWETU met or exceeded 11 of 13 of its indicator targets across the life of the project. Please see Annex II for a more detailed breakdown of NIWETU’s quantitative achievements as well as a discussion of discrepancies between actuals and targets. Additionally, Annex III breaks down the results of NIWETU’s VE Index to determine VE and security trends in its core counties from the baseline to endline.

Table 1: Quantitative Impact

Indicator #	Indicators	Final Target	Final Actual
1.1	# of civil society organizations that partner with the Government of Kenya in CVE activities	40	36
1.2	% of community members (non-government officials) trained who indicate they are likely to implement what they learned during training	85%	90%

1.3	# of people participating in USG-supported events, or activities designed to build mass support for CVE	15,055	18,029
1.4	# of community-based organizations supported by USG assistance	76	59
1.5	# of domestic NGOs engaged in monitoring or advocacy work on human rights receiving USG support	1	1
1.6	# of community members (non-governmental officials) trained, mentored, provided TA	1,565	2,546
1.7	# of women, youth, and marginalized individuals who are beneficiaries of USG-funded interventions	8,500	12,076
1.8	# of local women participating in a substantive role or position in CVE supported with USG assistance	343	426
1.9	# of local youth participating in a substantive role or position in CVE supported activities with USG assistance	489	688
2.1	# of initiatives directly supported or adopted by county/national government, designed in response to community concerns around VE	27	67
2.2	% of county/national officials trained who indicate they are likely to implement what they learned during training	85%	97%
2.3	# of county/national officials trained, mentored, provided TA as a result of USG assistance	818	1,138
2.4	# of county/national entities receiving USG support	26	63

II. THE KENYAN CVE CONTEXT

Over the last decade, Kenya has faced a growing VE threat from the Somalia-based al-Shabaab (AS) and other affiliated Islamist terror groups. While the country suffered a number of deadly terrorist attacks at the end of the 20th Century—most notably the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in Nairobi that claimed more than 200 victims and wounded thousands of others—the VE threat significantly escalated following Kenya’s invasion of neighboring Somalia during Operation Linda Nchi in 2011. The operation was sparked by AS incursions into Kenya, including the kidnapping of aid workers in Northeastern Kenya. While the operation was deemed a success, Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) troops remain in Somalia to this day as part of the larger African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force in Southern Somalia.

In the years following Operation Linda Nchi, AS has executed a number of high-profile attacks on civilian targets in Kenya, including a 2013 attack on the upscale Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi that left more than 60 dead and the 2015 attack that killed over

There was fear with no solutions. We feared radicalization and terror, but there was no relationship between the police and the community. Furthermore, everyone was afraid that if you did speak with the police, you would be arrested or questioned.

- A community member in Wajir County

140 students and staff at Garissa University in Northeastern Kenya. While these significant, brazen attacks shocked the Kenyan public and made international headlines, there was also a more insidious trend of small-scale attacks and creeping insecurity across much of Kenya’s predominately rural, arid northeast. Roving bands of AS militants planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along lonely country roads, tore down telecommunications towers essential for communication and commerce, and harassed or murdered anyone who spoke out against them. In some of the most affected areas, residents dared not even say the name “al-Shabaab.” Residents of some communities in Mandera South, for example, used an ever-changing thesaurus of euphemisms to speak covertly about the group: *aligarob*, a spiky weed that grows in the

nomadic pasturelands of Northeastern Kenya; “those sheikhs”; and “Arsenal,” after the popular U.K. football club. Meanwhile, VE recruiters parasitically preyed on desperate and disaffected youth in both the border areas and in towns and cities across Kenya. Fear of AS—exacerbated by lack of awareness about early warning signs of recruitment, the drivers of VE, and techniques for countering VE—made sustained CVE action incredibly difficult.


At the same time, the GOK was taking halting steps toward embracing a softer approach to the accelerating VE threat. In September 2016, it would launch the NSCVE, which proposed nine CVE pillars for the government and other CVE stakeholders to focus on for national CVE action. However, government-led CVE action at the county level proved elusive. There was little interest in prioritizing and coordinating national CVE activities at the highest levels of the Kenyan government, and county and community leaders lacked the skills and resources needed to implement strategies at the grassroots level. At the same time, distrust between security forces and the communities most affected by VE hobbled any local, informal CVE efforts. It was in this complicated VE and CVE landscape that NIWETU launched its first activities in the last quarter of 2016.

III. NIWETU’S CVE APPROACH

A Systems-Based CVE Approach

Over the last four years, NIWETU devised and fully operationalized a systems-based approach to CVE. By focusing on strengthening capabilities, establishing linkages between CVE actors, and encouraging communities and government actors to devise and foster their own CVE initiatives, this whole-of-society approach has proven more effective and more sustainable than existing CVE approaches, which tend to focus narrowly on VE drivers.

Figure II. NIWETU’s Theory of Change



NIWETU's approach complemented existing CVE approaches that focus heavily on engaging at-risk individuals and their immediate contacts (including friends, family, and community members). This systems-based approach to CVE recognized that—while it is essential to reach out to individuals vulnerable to VE recruitment and those close to them—it is equally important to engage the key stakeholders within the larger system that can drive long-term, sustainable CVE action.


Though NIWETU always endeavored to embrace an “all of society approach” to CVE,¹ many initial activities and even the initial NIWETU goal language—to “contribute to the reduction in VE among at-risk individuals and communities in Kenya”—reflected the established drivers-based approach. Over the first two years of programming, however, NIWETU's activities and approach shifted. Instead of directly engaging with at-risk individuals to address the key drivers of VE, NIWETU and its partners began to strengthen the CVE capabilities of the stakeholders in the broader system in which VE occurs.

To reflect this emerging systems-based approach, NIWETU worked closely with its partners at USAID to both adapt its goal language and to devise a conceptual framework that logically represented the new tack NIWETU had embraced in its CVE work. First, to better reflect its more sustainable, systems-based approach to CVE, NIWETU and USAID agreed to update the NIWETU goal language to “improve the CVE capabilities of communities and government to identify and respond to VE threats.” This language highlights that NIWETU's approach is rooted in building capabilities, while the onus to actually reduce VE incidents is on local actors, who develop and implement their own strategies and initiatives.

Next, the team constructed a conceptual framework that illustrated how NIWETU's work with a diverse group of stakeholders is interconnected and supports this overall goal. The conceptual framework (see Figure II) captures the *Why* (NIWETU's goal to improve CVE capabilities to identify and respond to VE threats), the *Who* (government, CSOs, influencers, and communities), the *How* (NIWETU's specific tasks), and the *What* (NIWETU's four result areas from its Theory of Change) of NIWETU's approach. It demonstrates how specific NIWETU interventions are applied to four carefully chosen entry points in the CVE system in Kenya, and how these targeted interventions contribute to NIWETU's four result areas. The framework stresses the importance of taking stock of the interconnectedness of CVE stakeholders and solutions, and ensuring that NIWETU interventions contribute to and strengthen existing networks. Finally, the framework demonstrates the importance of learning in NIWETU's approach, with research and learning underpinning all NIWETU decision making.

¹ See pg. 19 of Task Order AID-615-TO-16-00010
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Figure III: NIWETU's Conceptual Framework



After finalizing this unique conceptual framework, NIWETU conducted rigorous real-world testing to ensure that it reflected the realities of NIWETU's systems-based CVE approach in Kenya. Using NIWETU's Complexity Aware Planning Cycle Framework (CAP Cycle Framework), the team tested the conceptual framework in the context of Isiolo County (see pg. 13 for more information about the CAP Cycle Framework). This rigorous testing demonstrated how the systems-based CVE approach works in practice. For example, NIWETU found that integration between different stakeholder groups happens organically—as well as deliberately—through the way that activities are set up and complement each other. By specifically designing activities meant to engage different stakeholder groups—like at-risk youth and the police, or parents and education officials—NIWETU and its partners were able to strengthen linkages within the larger ecosystem of CVE actors. Furthermore, this research found that for local CVE decision-making forums to be most effective, they must be representative of the community and have strong community engagement. Focusing on one group of community members—losing sight of the diversity of actors and institutions with roles to play in CVE—is a recipe for a weak and fleeting CVE initiative.

NIWETU's endline research found that the systems-based approach ultimately proved instrumental to its success. However, this conceptual framework and systems-based approach were not only a boon for NIWETU's work; these concepts have also influenced the CVE thinking of NIWETU's partners in Kenya as well as USAID. In Kenya, NIWETU has observed its partners prioritizing building partnerships within the wider CVE community rather than siloing their specific portfolio of activities. For example, NIWETU's CVE Champions for Change (C4C) across all five of NIWETU's core counties—Garissa, Isiolo, Mandera, Nairobi, and Wajir—have actively nurtured CVE partnerships with government officials and the private sector to improve their CVE work. Even within the GOK, NIWETU has seen unprecedented cooperation between different government agencies. After over a year of direct NIWETU engagement—including communicating the importance of building sustainable linkages between different CVE actors—KSG signed separate Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with both the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and the Ministry of Interior and National Coordination (MOI), cementing future coordination between these key government CVE actors. At the same time, NIWETU has seen its approach influence USAID's CVE thinking. NIWETU contributed to the new USAID CVE policy, which is currently in draft form and pending release. This new draft policy stresses that, in addition to focusing on drivers, CVE practitioners should consider systems thinking and encourage linkages between different CVE actors.

Ultimately, NIWETU's conceptual framework and systems-based approach to CVE contributed to USAID's nascent Journey to Self-Reliance (J2SR) policy framework, which underscores the need to strengthen the capacity and encourage the commitment of partner governments, organizations, and individuals to fully own and embrace development initiatives. By working within existing institutions and strengthening linkages, NIWETU encouraged Kenyan CVE actors to take credit for and continue CVE initiatives in

NIWETU's J2SR Maps

During Y4, the NIWETU team developed “J2SR roadmaps” showcasing the various steps taken to strengthen capacity and encourage commitment for five key NIWETU activities: CVE County Action Plan implementation; the Kenya School of Government's Security Management Institute; C4Cs; the CVE Toolkit; and CVE strategic communications efforts. While NIWETU envisioned the road mapping process to facilitate reflection and serve as a communications tool with partners on the journey thus far, the mapping exercise also served as an opportunity to plan. By laying out what NIWETU and its partners have accomplished to reach the final goal for each activity, the team was able to identify which actions NIWETU and other CVE actors should take to foster local stakeholders as they continue their journey. Each of the five maps is included in the appropriate section of this report.

the future. Later sections of this report will highlight specific contributions that NIWETU and its partners have made to J2SR.

CVE Research in Action

Throughout the duration of its contract, NIWETU has decisively used research and learning initiatives to better understand the CVE environment in Kenya, and to improve its activities. In a fluid—and at times insecure—operating environment, constant assessment and adaptation was necessary to ensure that NIWETU activities were relevant, adhered to “do no harm” principles, and was responsive to changing dynamics. NIWETU used its CAP Cycle Framework to integrate a culture of self-reflection and processes for analysis and decision-making throughout the team. Key components of the CAP Cycle Framework included initial Actors and Opportunities Mapping research in 10 counties; targeted quarterly research activities; ongoing environmental scanning; and baseline, midline, and endline evaluations. The CAP Cycle Framework was also closely linked to other cornerstone NIWETU strategies, including the Learning Agenda, Gender Plan, and Communications Plan. Each of these strategies both informed and drew upon research findings from the CAP Cycle Framework. Importantly, all four of these frameworks ultimately fed back into NIWETU’s decision making, embodying a “research in action” spirit that improved CVE outcomes.

NIWETU kicked off its CVE research portfolio before developing any specific CVE programming. Prior to organizing its initial baseline evaluation, NIWETU conducted Actors and Opportunities Mapping in 10 counties across Kenya—Garissa, Isiolo, Kilifi, Kwale, Lamu, Mandera, Mombasa, Nairobi, Tana River, and Wajir. This rapid and light-touch research informed NIWETU’s early programming by creating hotspot snapshots of VE threats and CVE opportunities, and flagging the highest priority entry points for NIWETU interventions in each county. For example, mapping in Isiolo County emphasized that, while the county has largely been spared from devastating VE attacks, it remains a center for AS recruitment. Understanding recruitment trends in Isiolo helped NIWETU and its partners design and implement activities that engaged parents, teachers, and other community members likely to have access to at-risk youth.

In addition to these early mapping exercises, NIWETU carried out regular formal research designed to inform the CVE decisions of NIWETU and its partners. These quarterly research assignments included illuminations of emerging CVE trends, but also assessments of ongoing NIWETU activities. Earlier quarterly research tended to focus on the former. For example, building on the Actors and Opportunities Mapping mentioned above, NIWETU’s Y1Q2 research sought to better understand the peculiarities of the VE recruitment pipeline in Isiolo Town. While this research was designed to help NIWETU, USAID, and local CVE stakeholders better understand recruitment in this key VE hotspot, it also informed NIWETU’s future programming in the community. NIWETU’s research uncovered that parents often unwittingly introduce their children to VE recruiters when they prod out-of-school youth to seek work with prominent community members. These respected individuals sometimes serve as conduits between youth and recruiters. In this complex recruitment environment, NIWETU and its partners understood that it was essential to educate and engage parents and teachers so that they effectively counter this recruitment network. Through partnerships with Isiolo Women of Faith (IWOF) and Sensitization of Community on Radicalization and Empowerment Solutions (SCORES), NIWETU organized a conversation forum for VE-affected parents and helped education sector stakeholders incorporate CVE into school clubs and conversations in the classroom. Sometimes, quarterly research would unearth ancillary important findings. When conducting research on the plight of out-of-school students in Wajir following

a string of VE attacks on teachers, NIWETU incidentally found that chiefs² were essential CVE stakeholders that had not been engaged by other ongoing CVE activities in Wajir County. Based on this finding, NIWETU partnered with local civil society organization (CSO) African Social Development Focus (ASDEF) to conduct CVE trainings for over 200 chiefs across Wajir's six sub-counties.

While quarterly research was typically designed to inform NIWETU's activities, some assessments were conceived at the behest of NIWETU's partners in the GOK. As VE attacks spiked in the Garissa sub-counties of Fafi, Hulugho, and Ijara, MOI requested that NIWETU conduct research on the growing AS presence in neighboring Boni Forest, long thought to be one of the primary AS enclaves in Kenya. Similarly, NIWETU's research on the "key ingredients" for successful CVE County Action Plans (CAPs) was later enthusiastically received and adopted by NIWETU's partners in NCTC.

Finally, quarterly research afforded NIWETU staff the ability to step back and reflect on activities that might require amendments. In one notable example, research found that NIWETU's C4C action plans were not always targeting the groups with whom C4Cs had the most influence. Furthermore, the research exposed that, while women played an outsized role in CVE, the majority of the C4Cs' action plans did not account for women as essential CVE influencers in their respective counties. Based on the findings of this research, many of NIWETU's C4C groups adapted their action plans to be more responsive to both community needs and to the strengths of the C4C cohorts. For example, C4Cs in Kibra, Nairobi added a component designed to engage mothers of at-risk youth in their community.

NIWETU supplemented this formal, scheduled research with ongoing environmental scanning. Rapid research and intelligence gathering proved critical for maintaining NIWETU's contextually aware, adaptive, and responsive programming. In each of its core counties, NIWETU's county-based staff relied on their networks of contacts to report on and provide context for emerging security situations. NIWETU staff have identified burgeoning VE trends and hotspots, alerted USAID to potential community conflicts, and flagged opportunities for new CVE activities. Occasionally, NIWETU staff identify an emerging trend that warrants further investigation, but due to the sensitive nature of the context or the urgency of a threat, a rapid, light touch approach is needed. In these cases, NIWETU staff can decide to initiate a Rapid Response Assessment to quickly assess an emerging trend and provide NIWETU and its partners with recommendations for addressing that trend. NIWETU ultimately conducted nine Rapid Response Assessments, ranging from studies of the interplay between government demolition of buildings in the Nairobi slums and VE to snap assessments of community-security distrust after a prominent imam was arrested in Marsabit County. Perhaps NIWETU's most successful and impactful rapid response explored the role of National Police Reservists (NPRs) in combatting VE in Wajir, and exposed the extreme deficiencies and risks that NPRs face in the county. NIWETU hired a local consultant with both a background in the security forces and strong community ties to lead the rapid response research. Ultimately, the research found that—due to poor management, lackluster training, and scarce resources—NPRs in Wajir were unfit to serve as frontline security forces against heavily armed AS militants. More troubling, NIWETU's researcher determined that AS had developed specific strategies for targeting NPRs in some communities, including using local informants to report on NPR movements. NIWETU presented its findings to officials from the GOK, USAID, and the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to inform and advocate for better support to NPRs serving in Northeastern Kenya.

² Chiefs are the grassroots representatives of the national government in Kenya. Unlike other national government officials at the county level, chiefs are typically from the communities they serve.


Finally, NIWETU's baseline, midline, and endline compared perceptions of CVE capabilities across NIWETU's five core counties throughout the life of the project. This research helped NIWETU gauge progress in improving CVE capabilities in its four key result areas:

1. Improved CVE Skills and Knowledge
2. Community-led CVE Strategies and Initiatives
3. CVE Networks Established
4. Increased Government Capacity

Key results of NIWETU's baseline, midline, and endline are included in the commentary in Section 2 of this report.

Three additional interconnected strategies served as cornerstones of NIWETU's adaptive approach: the Learning Agenda, Gender Plan, and Communications Plan. NIWETU's leadership stressed the importance of these three documents and invested considerable time and resources into their development and implementation, despite the documents not being contract deliverables. The Learning Agenda, Gender Plan, and Communications Plan each contributed to NIWETU's adaptive approach and ensured that NIWETU's programmatic decisions were rooted in emerging good practices.

Figure IV: Organizational Structure of NIWETU Strategy Documents



NIWETU designed its Learning Agenda to both better inculcate a culture of learning and data-driven decision-making within NIWETU's strategy and activities, and to improve how the team shares learnings with colleagues, partners, USAID, and other CVE practitioners. Key learning activities included:

1. **Monthly Learning Reviews.** At the end of each month, all NIWETU staff gathered to discuss key learnings from their respective portfolios. Learnings included emerging good practices, new VE trends, or interesting approaches from the broader CVE community. Importantly, all monthly learnings included key action points: how could learnings be incorporated into NIWETU's work?
2. **Partner Learning Sessions.** Each year, NIWETU convened a workshop with all past, current, and planned partners to discuss lessons learned and catalyze collective learning. These sessions served as means for NIWETU to both disseminate what it had learned over the previous year and also encourage future partnerships between local CVE stakeholders across Kenya.

NIWETU's Communications Plan also fed into and drew from the Learning Agenda. The plan endeavored to improve internal and external audiences' understanding of NIWETU's successes, challenges, lessons learned, and emerging good practices. Importantly, the plan was as heavily focused on internal communications as it was on communicating with USAID and other external stakeholders. To prevent learnings from being bottled up or siloed within specific NIWETU portfolios, the plan called for products and activities specifically designed to disseminate learnings across the NIWETU team. After Action Reviews (AARs) were one activity intended to cultivate and disseminate internal learning and adaptive management. NIWETU ultimately organized AARs after five flagship activities for staff to reflect upon key activities and provide recommendations for future CVE action. Importantly, AARs were triggered not only when the NIWETU team experienced challenges, but also after highly successful activities.

Finally, NIWETU's Gender Plan established NIWETU's approach to practically and responsibly integrate gender considerations into project decision-making. NIWETU's Gender Plan was based on a comprehensive gender analysis that NIWETU conducted in four target counties after its first year of programming. This analysis found that not only are women increasingly involved in VE groups as recruiters, spies, and supporters, but more importantly, that women serve unique and essential roles as CVE actors who complement the roles of other stakeholders. Using this analysis, NIWETU developed a transformative Gender Plan that incorporated a gender lens into all aspects of project decision-making, including knowledge and learning, programming, and operations.

Key Lessons Learned for Fully Incorporating Gender Thinking in CVE Activities

NIWETU derived the following key learnings from a review designed to test and adapt the first iteration of the Gender Plan.

1. While women-only forums can be useful under some circumstances, it is often better to encourage the inclusion of women in existing male-dominated spaces.
2. Women play a key role in community healing, but more thinking is needed to better assess and understand how men and women process and cope with trauma differently.
3. Women participation in key government departments remains low, which can hamper the introduction of gender thinking to GOK-led activities. It is important to find mechanisms that elevate women in other positions of leadership—including leaders of CSOs and women's groups—to ensure that they are part of CVE decision making.

NIWETU's diverse research and learning tools were essential to NIWETU's achievements, which are outlined in the following section.

IV. NIWETU'S ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES, AND LESSONS LEARNED

This section will highlight NIWETU's key achievements in its four CVE result areas: improved CVE skills and knowledge; community-led CVE strategies and initiatives; CVE networks established; and increased

government capacity. In addition to highlighting NIWETU achievements, this section will explain how NIWETU's work has supported J2SR and driven sustainable CVE programming.

Improved CVE Skills and Knowledge

Despite a swelling VE threat in Northeastern Kenya and Nairobi in the years preceding NIWETU's launch, the concept of VE remained elusive to many of the Kenyans most affected and at-risk. NIWETU and partner staff recount community members expressing that VE was mainly a problem that bled into their communities from “over the border” (in Somalia), or conflating VE with other forms of violence that plague some of NIWETU's hotspot communities. In hardscrabble Kamukunji, for example, some community members asserted that VE included the gang violence and extrajudicial killings that they experienced regularly. For NIWETU, it was essential to disentangle VE from these other forms of violence, help key CVE stakeholders understand emerging trends, and offer guidance on the role that these stakeholders could play in driving CVE initiatives.

NIWETU efforts to improve CVE knowledge and skills can be grouped into two broad categories:

1. In-person training sessions, workshops, and conversations;
2. CVE strategic communications efforts that utilized radio, television, and written materials to share CVE information.

CVE Trainings and Workshops

The majority of NIWETU's CVE knowledge and skills activities during the first half of its contract fell under category (1). Trainings targeted a broad swath of community CVE stakeholders, including VE-affected women; teachers and school administrators; out-of-school youth; *boda boda* operators; and religious leaders, among others. Trainings covered the full of scope of VE and CVE knowledge and skills, including demystifying the basics of VE, explaining why people join VE groups, and practical information on how to counter VE activities.



Majengo community member Francis Kinyua hones his facilitation skills at a CVE Facilitation Guide “training of trainers” workshop.

Photo Credit: Hank Nelson/NIWETU

According to NIWETU's endline research, a majority of endline respondents said that they had gained new CVE knowledge and skills as a result of NIWETU-supported trainings and workshops. Interestingly, NIWETU found that women more frequently reported using their new abilities “very often” than men, though both groups stressed the utility of their new CVE knowledge and skills. This finding continues to highlight the need to specifically target women for CVE trainings due to the important role they play in CVE efforts. NIWETU ultimately trained, mentored, and technically supported 2,546 individuals across Kenya.

As highlighted in the endline, NIWETU's knowledge and skills trainings also had unintended positive consequences with perhaps longer term benefits than simply improving CVE understanding. According to the endline, CVE workshops and trainings elevated certain community members to become CVE “ambassadors” and “influencers” within their wider social circles and communities. Community members who participated in trainings were seen as trustworthy sources of CVE knowledge, and in some cases these trainees went on to establish their own CVE initiatives without direct NIWETU support.

J2SR Highlight 1: CVE Facilitation Guide

Developed and refined with guidance from NIWETU's partners, the CVE Facilitation Guide was designed to support community members to lead CVE and VE conversations within their own communities. Under past initiatives, CVE experts were often brought in from other communities to lead these sessions. This practice both reduced the effectiveness of these sessions while also reducing the likelihood of locally-sustained results. By training community members to lead these sessions with their own neighbors, the CVE Facilitation Guide increased the likelihood of participants opening up during the sessions and following up with facilitators in the future. According to one community member in Kamukunji, “If we know the person, we will believe in that person. If [the facilitator] is someone from a different area, no one will open up.”

NIWETU witnessed how strengthening local facilitation capacities has continued without direct USAID support. In Kamukunji, facilitators trained using the CVE Facilitation Guide used their new skills to conduct separate CVE facilitations with at-risk youth from the community. This result reflects the promise of fostering local capabilities and encouraging partners to continue using their new skills after the partnership ends.



Women from Kibra, Nairobi share their personal VE experiences and discuss ways to counter VE in their community. NIWETU's approach encourages local ownership over CVE initiatives—Kibra NiWajibu Wetu (Kibra is Our Responsibility). Photo credit: Hank Nelson/NIWETU

In parts of Kamukunji, for example, youth who participated in Kamukunji Community Peace Network (KACPEN) trainings later formed their own informal networks to share CVE and VE information with their contemporaries.

NIWETU's knowledge and skills trainings have also helped to disseminate CVE skills and knowledge to stakeholders who are often overlooked by CVE programming. For example, in Nairobi's ethnically and religiously diverse community of Kibra, it is essential that all community members know how to identify and respond to VE recruitment. However, CVE trainings in the sprawling slum have in the past focused primarily on the Nubian and Muslim community—a small segment of the population that has been most affected by VE but should not be expected to bear the burden of driving CVE actions alone. NIWETU and partner Bawaki Network trained an ethnically and religiously diverse swath of Kibra and encouraged these trainees to amplify their messages to new communities. Soon after the training, priests from Kibra's Olympic Catholic Church invited imams trained by Bawaki to share CVE lessons with their parishioners at Sunday Mass. NIWETU found that secondary and tertiary informal trainings like these continued to drive CVE engagement and understanding long after NIWETU-funded activities came to an end. This snowballing effect that communicates CVE knowledge and understanding to disparate parts of a community is an essential component of NIWETU's systems-based approach to CVE. The number of community members reporting that they participated in a CVE training in the last year has consistently risen since the baseline, while the number of people who believe that the CVE lessons were useful and report that they use their new skills is higher than at baseline.

Taking a step further by formalizing their efforts, student trainees under SCORES's activity in Isiolo revived their schools' dormant Amani Clubs³ and added a CVE plank to the clubs' charters. Knowledge and skills trainings not only improved the CVE awareness of these stakeholders—it also empowered and inspired them to become CVE leaders in their communities. In accordance with NIWETU's systems-based approach—which prioritizes the interconnectedness of NIWETU's four main result areas—this outcome feeds directly into NIWETU's second result area to foster community-led CVE strategies and initiatives.

CVE Strategic Communications

Beginning in its second year of implementation, NIWETU worked with media and CSO partners across Kenya to design and launch CVE strategic communications activities. These strategic communications activities used radio, television, and online platforms to widely disseminate CVE messages in Kenya, including to populations



A community influencer from Wajir County records a radio broadcast advising other youth on the dangers of VE. Photo Credit: Delta Africa

³ Amani Clubs were initially founded across Kenya to promote peace between different ethnic and religious groups following widespread political violence in 2007-2008.

that NIWETU was not able to target with traditional CVE trainings.

These strategic communications activities took different forms based on the target audience and the objectives of the programming. In Garissa and Wajir, NIWETU and partners Access Initiative for Development (AID-Africa) and Delta Africa (DA) melded traditional CVE knowledge and skills trainings with a radio talk show format. After conducting CVE workshops with groups of youth in VE-affected communities, NIWETU and partner staff identified participants who could serve as “CVE influencers” by participating in a radio talk show that covered the key topics from the in-person CVE workshops.

This two-tiered approach to strengthening CVE skills and knowledge proved effective in building a small cadre of local CVE influencers, and then giving these influencers a platform to communicate with a wider audience of their peers. In addition to amplifying CVE messages to a wider audience than would be possible through traditional workshops, these radio programs helped NIWETU and its partners penetrate into regions where mounting insecurity made in-person CVE events impossible. For example, AID-Africa specifically targeted communities in the Garissa sub-counties of Fafi, Hulugho, and Ijara, where AS has recently made significant inroads. Radio programming also afforded community members anonymity while they absorbed new CVE messages from the comfort of their own homes.

Key Learnings for Co-Designing Strategic Communications

Developing a co-design process tailored to the needs and skills of each partner was an essential piece of each strategic communications activity. For its first strategic communications activities with local partners in Garissa and Wajir, NIWETU initially took a backseat approach to the design and development of radio programming content. However, it was soon evident that the partners in both counties would benefit from dedicated co-design processes with NIWETU’s strategic communications staff. With very different levels of experience, each of these two inaugural strategic communications partners required a different approach to co-design. While the partner in Wajir had significant media experience—including dedicated staff for strategic communications and even their own recording studio—the partner in Garissa was a newcomer to the field. NIWETU staff held just a brief meeting with the Wajir partner to discuss key themes and edit the initial treatments, but opted for a full-day co-design brainstorming session with the Garissa partner that ran the gamut from the basics of strategic communications activities to more advanced themes. NIWETU also provided consistent, rapid technical support to both partners as they began to record and air their programs. NIWETU replicated this flexible, personalized approach co-design for the subsequent five activities.

Amplifying the authentic voices of VE-affected individuals and CVE influencers was crucial to the success and impact of these CVE strategic communications activities. For example, NIWETU and partner Raia Development Initiative (RDI) planned to craft short television documentaries that told the stories of VE-affected women in Wajir County. However, the initial plan to script the documentaries was soon scrapped in favor of crafting a short list of basic talking points—key messages that NIWETU and its partner agreed should be in the documentaries. Next, RDI shared those talking points with the subject of each documentary and conducted a “pre-interview.” This pre-interview served as the “script,” which

NIWETU and USAID staff reviewed and approved before the final interview that was ultimately televised. This process ensured that the documentary subjects were empowered to speak in their authentic voices, while also providing a degree of quality control.

In addition to these smaller-scale strategic communications activities, NIWETU and media partner Tanashati Communication Ltd. developed and launched a thirteen-episode rap opera web series designed to help youth in Kenya identify and resist radicalization. “Majuto”—“Regrets” in KiSwahili—tells the story of a recent high school graduate who dreams of a music career, but after a series of misfortunes and poor decisions, is recruited into a VE group by a man that he knows and trusts. NIWETU and Tanashati worked together for the full cycle of program development, including writing the initial treatment, casting and hiring a crew, filming and pre-testing pilot episodes, re-writes, and filming and editing the final series. Majuto stars prominent artists from Kenya’s vibrant music and television scene, including rapper King Kaka, who developed the musical content for the series and plays the main character as an older man reflecting on his decisions.

J2SR Highlight 2: Co-creating with a Private Sector Partner


Co-creating the Majuto rap opera story, scripts, and dissemination strategy with Tanashati—a Kenyan small business—is building the technical capacity of the partner to continue producing high-quality CVE strategic messaging. Tanashati will be one of the few local media houses with the technical expertise and experience to produce these sorts of programs and can build its future business producing socially-conscious programs on the back of its partnership with NIWETU. Indeed, Tanashati’s lead scriptwriter recently reached out to NIWETU staff to share a treatment for a new CVE series that profiles VE-affected youth in the scriptwriter’s home county on the Kenyan Coast.



“Majuto” filming on location in Old Town Mombasa. Photo Credit: Ronald Ojwang/NIWETU

As of this report’s submission, the series has garnered approximately 52,000 total views on YouTube, while the YouTube page has accumulated over 1,000 subscribers. Feedback for the program was overwhelmingly positive, with some commenters expressing that the story of a young man struggling to get by was the “story of [his] life” and other commending the quality and immersiveness of the episodes. Many viewers called for more episodes that explored the main character’s life after being imprisoned for VE-related offenses. Unfortunately, NIWETU and Tanashati faced a number of challenges during dissemination of the series, many of them directly as a result of the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak in Kenya. For example, watch parties at select secondary schools and other events targeting youth were scrapped to conform with government-mandated social distancing mandates.

Figure V: “Majuto” J2SR Map



These changes to the dissemination strategy likely reduced Majuto's reach. However, a follow-up evaluation of the program found that those who did watch the program later took specific CVE actions:

- 75% of viewers said that they had discussed what they learned from the program with friends or family;
- 52% of viewers warned a friend or family member about specific issues that they learned about in the program.

These results demonstrate that the series resonated with the target audience and that the series' key messages were amplified beyond the initial viewership.

Community-led CVE Strategies and Initiatives

Building on CVE knowledge and skills trainings, NIWETU worked closely with its partners and community influencers to cultivate and foster community-led CVE strategies and initiatives. In addition to small-scale community-led strategies and initiatives mainstreamed into other NIWETU activities, NIWETU developed and led an ambitious and innovative effort to nurture a community-led CVE initiative from the ground up. The Kamukunji Intervention was a bespoke suite of consecutive, complementary activities designed to test NIWETU's theory of change in Nairobi's Kamukunji Sub-County. The portfolio of activities

started with community trauma healing, progressing into building CVE knowledge and skills, then prioritizing community CVE networking, before tying these three activities together to drive CVE action.⁴ The intervention is guided by the Kamukunji Steering Team (ST), which met on a semi-regular basis to monitor and assess progress made on the four intervention activities. The ST—which comprised staff from DAI's Center for Secure and Stable States (CS3), NIWETU representatives, local government administrators, CSO stakeholders, and media figures—was also tasked with leading the Kamukunji Evaluation.

An outcome harvesting exercise conducted by the ST after the trauma healing sessions ended highlighted the importance of community healing in CVE programming. Participants noted that it would have been very difficult for them to hold community CVE conversations or network with a diverse group of CVE stakeholders without first opening up about the trauma they had faced because of VE, heavy-handed security tactics, and crime in Kamukunji. Trauma healing had a marked effect on the effectiveness of later CVE activities at the personal, familial, and community level:

- I. Personal level: Participants were better positioned to avoid or prevent violence, and were more patient and prone to stop and reflect before reacting violently to a specific situation. Men who participated were more aware of their tendency not to share their feelings and were more open

Key Learnings for Addressing the Effects of Trauma

During the knowledge and skills training component of the Kamukunji Intervention, several participants in each conversation session struggled to discuss how VE had affected them, sometimes breaking down and having to leave the room. These participants included both individuals who had successfully completed the community healing workshops and those who had not participated, demonstrating that trauma continues to persist even for those who have learned coping mechanisms. At the same time, KACPEN staff and the facilitators—several of whom had participated in the community healing—were better prepared to respond and show compassion to those still suffering from trauma. According to one KACPEN staff member who participated in the trauma healing sessions and led the CVE knowledge and skills conversations, trauma healing is a process. You cannot expect all participants to cope similarly or to have fully healed concurrently. Whether or not you have conducted trauma healing sessions prior to a CVE activity, make sure that you have staff or partners who are qualified to provide support to participants. If you do not have staff with trauma healing skills, consider identifying a knowledgeable expert—inadequate support can in some cases deepen hopelessness and accentuate trauma.

⁴ Unfortunately, NIWETU was unable to carry out the final activity in the broader Kamukunji Initiative—CVE action. This activity was contingent on additional funding and time, which ultimately did not come to fruition when NIWETU did not receive an extension.

to expressing themselves. All participants had increased empathy for the issues facing their fellow community members.

2. Family level: Female participants had improved relations with their children, while children were likewise more willing to communicate with their parents. Estranged family members reported that they were better able and more willing to reconcile differences, and male participants reported reduced domestic violence in their families.
3. Community level: The most common outcome was a reduction in conflict and violence between women at the community watering point. Participants reported that they are more open to sharing their problems with close friends and family members and felt a burgeoning spirit of collaboration, including with people of different faiths. Government representatives reported better working relations with their colleagues and communities, and youth said they were more willing to report issues to chiefs who had participated in the trauma healing sessions.

After completing trauma healing exercises and training community members in CVE knowledge and skills, NIWETU staff worked with hyper-local partner KACPEN to bring together a diverse group of CVE stakeholders to craft an inclusive CVE Network Plan of Action for Kamukunji. During brainstorming meetings for the plan, NIWETU staff took note of what they referred to as “the power and impact of honest and authentic conversations” between community members and security officials. In a country where police impunity and extrajudicial violence are rampant, Kamukunji is especially infamous for its poor community-security relations. Years of forced disappearances and murders by police hit squads have eroded trust between community members and the police. This bleak history made the success of community-security dialogue all the more surprising and encouraging. During the plan of action development meetings, the Officer in Charge of Station (OCS) for Shauri Moyo quickly distinguished herself as a champion for community-security relationship building. She shared her personal phone number with community participants and implored them to reach out to her with any concerns or questions about police activity. These sorts of frank conversations are essential for building trust, and both NIWETU staff and community members felt hopeful that the CVE Network Plan of Action would lead to effective CVE initiatives in the sub-county.



Shauri Moyo OCS Alice Chedotum (foreground) distinguished herself as a champion for NIWETU's community-security relationship building in Kamukunji. Photo Credit: KACPEN


Unfortunately, a series of obstacles and challenges would prevent NIWETU, KACPEN, and other local CVE stakeholders from fully realizing the potential of the Kamukunji Intervention. Soon after KACPEN and its community and security partners finalized the CVE Network Plan of Action, violent protests erupted in Kamukunji after a police officer shot and killed an unarmed youth. The shooting—which was caught on video—prompted several days of unrest in Kamukunji as protestors clashed with security forces, who fired live rounds as the confrontation escalated. Several more community members were killed or seriously wounded before the protests ended. The goodwill between the community and security officers—cultivated over months of delicate interactions between the two groups—evaporated overnight. While community members and security forces later expressed their willingness to continue with implementation of the plan, the shooting and subsequent protests demonstrate the inherent fragility of community-led CVE initiatives and networks.

In addition to its community-based activities, NIWETU partnered with international experts and Kenyan CSO the Malaika Foundation (MF) to create a locally-informed CVE Toolkit that MF can use to train Kenyan non-state actors (NSAs) and non-traditional actors (NTAs). Before designing the Toolkit, NIWETU and its partners carried out a wide-reaching Needs Assessment (NA) intended to identify key skills gaps and areas of focus for the CVE Toolkit. This NA helped NIWETU narrow its focus for the CVE Toolkit to four essential components:

1. Introduction to CVE
2. Operational Skills for CVE
3. Building Resilience Skills in Youth
4. Undermining VE Narratives

Working closely with a team of national and international CVE experts, NIWETU developed modules for each of the components above and tested them with a diverse group of MF staff and other Kenyan CVE leaders. This testing process ensured that the Toolkit was contextually appropriate and designed to address the specific CVE needs of Kenyan NSAs and NTAs, while also enhancing the skills of MF and positioning them to lead CVE initiatives in Kenya after NIWETU closes. Empowering this local CVE actor is central to NIWETU's contributions to J2SR. MF now has not only the skills, but the credibility and connections needed to implement a capacity building roadmap for local partners across Kenya.

Figure VI: CVE Toolkit J2SR Map



CVE Networks Established

Strengthening relationships between diverse CVE stakeholders was an essential part of NIWETU's CVE systems-based approach to CVE. Previously, CVE actors in Kenya were typically siloed within their own activity areas. CVE practitioners rarely had opportunities to engage with and learn from their counterparts working in different communities and counties. Even within communities, there might be little contact between different actors working in the broader CVE space, such as religious leaders, CSOs, and government officials.

NIWETU's emphasis on cohering different CVE actors together in networks was meant to encourage learning and to foster more sustainable and inclusive CVE initiatives. In an effort to bring together CVE influencers from across NIWETU's five core counties, NIWETU supported the development of a CVE C4C Network. For 14 months, NIWETU worked closely with 50 C4Cs—individuals with access to and credibility with at-risk communities—to develop and implement locally-specific CVE action plans across 10 sub-counties. The C4Cs in each sub-county included a diverse swath of community influencers, from religious leaders to chiefs to media personalities. For example, in Wajir County the champions' cohort included two former security officers, a respected imam, CSO representatives, a former teacher, and the manager of a Wajir community radio station. After training each of these C4Cs using NIWETU's CVE Champions Manual, NIWETU worked with each team to write a CVE action plan for the county (see Table 1). Each county group also founded a local Community-Based Organization (CBO), which facilitated NIWETU financial support and increased the groups' legitimacy and longevity.



NIWETU C4Cs from Isiolo and Wajir discuss lessons learned during the second national network meeting.
Photo Credit: Hank Nelson/NIWETU

Table II: C4C Action Plans

Sub-County	Action Plan Vision Statement	Sample Activities
Dadaab	Creating a VE-free Dadaab Community through Community Mobilization and Sensitization on CVE.	- Disseminate CVE public service announcements (PSAs) on community radio stations. - Hold 5 public barazas.⁵ - Advocate for devolving Garissa County Action Plan activities to Dadaab Sub-County.
Garissa Township	Increased CVE Awareness Among the Student Community in Garissa Township Sub-County, Garissa County.	- Conduct CVE sensitization visits to schools in Garissa Township. - Hold intra-school football tournaments where CVE messaging is shared.
Isiolo North	Improved CVE Awareness among Community Members for Increased Resilience to VE in Isiolo North Sub-County, Isiolo County.	- Hold CVE awareness events at public barazas and with youth and women self-help groups. - Lobby the Isiolo County Commissioner to incorporate CVE into county celebrations and events.
Garbatulla	A Secure and VE-free Garbatulla Sub-County Through Increased Stakeholder Collaboration and Community CVE Awareness Creation.	- Hold CVE community awareness forums at marketplaces and watering holes. - Communicate CVE successes and receive feedback from the public via a community radio program.
Mandera East	Improved Community-Security Relations to Better Respond to Violent Extremism in Mandera East Sub-County.	- Hold dialogue sessions with community and security representatives. - Organize CVE walks for community members and security officials. - Lobby for CVE to be incorporated into existing community/security dialogue platforms.
Mandera South	Mainstream CVE into Students' Way of Life Through CVE Awareness Creation and Capacity Building in Schools.	- Sensitize students on CVE and VE. - Organize inter-school CVE debate competitions and football matches where CVE is discussed. - Lobby for more involvement of Parent-Teacher Associations and other education stakeholders in CVE activities.
Kamukunji	A VE-free Kamukunji Community by Awareness Creation through Art and Media.	- Conduct CVE visits and conversations at "bazes" and video dens—popular youth gathering places—in Majengo. - Organize community talent shows with CVE content. - Hold CVE street theatre events.
Kibra	We Envision a VE-free, and Peaceful-Cohesive Kibra Community.	- Develop CVE PSAs for local radio. - Mentor students on CVE initiatives. - Record short CVE videos and podcasts to be shared over social media and WhatsApp.
Wajir East	Building a VE-free Generation of Young People in Wajir East Sub-county Through Education.	- Share CVE lessons at schools where national testing was cancelled last year. - Mentor members of each school's peace clubs in CVE.
Wajir South	Build a VE-free Wajir South through Awareness Creation and Collaborative Partnerships with Traditional Women Groups.	- Conduct radio talk show programs to share the CVE experiences of women and encourage other women to embrace CVE. - Partner with women from traditional groups, local, and county government on CVE issues.

⁵ Barazas are traditional gatherings where a respected leader or government official discusses key issues with the community.

In addition to supporting the individual action plans of each C4C cohort, NIWETU facilitated networking and sharing of lessons learned between champions from different counties through social media and two national network meetings. During the national network meetings, champions shared their successes, challenges and lessons learned to date in implementing their respective action plans. In many cases, champions from one county were able to advise champions from another county

on the challenges they were facing based on their past experiences conducting CVE work in their own communities. Often, one champion group was able to directly supplement the skills of another through networking. For example, when the C4C team in Dadaab was struggling to design a professional pamphlet to distribute to at-risk youth, the Wajir East team offered to share a template that they developed for a similar activity. Sharing expertise and resources is a significant boost to CVE influencers, who are often working on shoestring budgets without the ability to hire external support.

The C4Cs have endeavored to preserve their national network going forward, agreeing to begin laying the groundwork for a national consortium of champions that can continue to share lessons and resources in the future. C4Cs have also formed networks with other CVE stakeholders in some of NIWETU's core counties. In Mandera, the C4Cs lent their support and expertise to a county government effort to recruit 300 ward-level CVE champions. By networking with the county government, the C4Cs were able to positively impact the county government's nascent program while also legitimizing the C4Cs work and opening the door for more cooperation in the future. C4Cs in Wajir also networked—and ultimately partnered—with county and national government officials to organize a CVE training for women in Wajir Town. The C4Cs conducted this activity by pooling together their own resources, demonstrating that successful CVE activities do not require bloated budgets when community members are willing to volunteer their time to lead them. After the meeting, the C4Cs met with the First Lady of Wajir County and agreed to an informal partnership to provide food and other resources to the families of NPRs killed by AS militants.

In addition to the formal networking efforts of the C4C activity, NIWETU mainstreamed the need for better CVE networking across its county-level activities. When holding CVE knowledge and skills trainings with a diverse community of stakeholders, for example, NIWETU and its partners would stress the importance of forming formal and informal CVE networks and encourage ongoing trust-building and information sharing. According to NIWETU's endline assessment and other monitoring and environmental scanning activities, NIWETU activities have blossomed into informal CVE networks across NIWETU's five core counties. The proliferation of formal and informal CVE networks that continue to function without NIWETU support exemplifies how NIWETU activities have contributed to J2SR. Key examples include:

1. In a small community in Wajir South,⁶ women trained by partner Focus on Arid Lands and Integrated Development (FOAID) formed an informal network of single mothers to share information and discuss how to best disseminate what they learned to other vulnerable women.

J2SR Highlight 3: Supporting Sustainability in NIWETU's Champions' Network

NIWETU's CVE Champions model is designed to provide the C4Cs in each county with the necessary technical, financial, and networking support they will need to continue their CVE efforts after NIWETU closes. Part of that support effort includes introducing the C4Cs to new sources of independent funding. In both Garissa and Mandera, NIWETU supported its C4Cs to apply for independent USAID funding under the Kaunti Kuimarisha activity. In Garissa, NIWETU staff are advising C4Cs on how best to identify and reach out to consortium partners with whom they can submit a proposal for USAID grants. These efforts by NIWETU staff in Garissa and Mandera support USAID's push to directly fund county-level development actors.


⁶ Community name omitted due to security concerns.

One woman from the network also connected with nearby security forces and worked with the informal network to report suspicious activity that might be connected to a VE threat. According to one network member, the network thwarted at least one suspected VE recruit who unwittingly asked a member of the network for directions to the Somali border and was subsequently reported to the security forces. The network also coordinated to disseminate CVE knowledge and skills to women living across the adjacent border with Somalia.

2. NIWETU's trauma healing initiatives catalyzed a plethora of informal psychosocial support and discussion groups in Kamukunji. According to the NIWETU endline, a group of young men and boys started a group called Maendeleo ya Wanaume to serve as an informal self-help network for survivors of trauma and a support group for those still struggling. Similarly, women who participated in the trauma-healing workshops formed self-help groups to provide informal psychosocial support and sometimes financial assistance to members suffering from trauma.
3. Following SCORES' training of *boda boda* operators in Isiolo County, a chief from Garbatulla reported that authorities viewed *boda boda* networks as vital sources of information about security and VE-related incidents. In the past, relations between security forces and *boda boda* operators have been fraught and distrustful, so this is a particularly surprising and inspiring finding.

NIWETU's quantitative endline findings also reflect this general strengthening of CVE networks. In all but one county, respondents report that CVE networks have greatly improved in strength, number, and effectiveness since the baseline. The reason for greater pessimism among Nairobi respondents is unclear, but might be due the county and national governments' comparative weakness in proactively cultivating CVE relationships compared to their counterparts in other counties. Nairobi is yet to launch its CAP and county and national government officials have shown a general unwillingness to prioritize CVE efforts and work with other CVE stakeholders. Additionally, the endline results for Nairobi focus on Kibra, so the significant improvements in CVE networks in Kamukunji would not be reflected in these findings.

Figure VII: C4C J2SR Map



Increased Government Capacity

NIWETU prioritized training government and security officials to address VE threats in its five core counties. These activities included targeted trainings for chiefs in Wajir County; joint community-security trainings and CVE conversations in Mandera; and ongoing informal CVE counseling for government officials by NIWETU's county-based staff. NIWETU's endline suggests that community members have noticed that the government is more responsive to the VE threat in their communities. Dramatic improvements in government CVE responsiveness in Isiolo and Mandera in particular reflect that the national and county governments in these two communities have prioritized CVE efforts since their respective CAPs launched in late 2018 and early 2019. In Isiolo, then-County Commissioner (CC) John Ondego was an early champion of the CAP development and implementation process and proactively took steps to sharpen the CVE knowledge and skills of his staff. For example, Ondego and the Isiolo CC's office applied for NIWETU funding to conduct CVE knowledge and skills trainings for women security officials in the county. In Mandera, the county government demonstrated particular attentiveness to CVE initiatives, creating its own Department for CVE and De-Radicalization and supporting CVE champions at the ward level. Lower endline scores for Garissa, Nairobi, and Wajir can be explained in part by government inaction, as well as a string of VE attacks that occurred immediately before endline data collection began. Both Garissa and Wajir suffered a series of deadly attacks on civilians in December 2019 and January 2020, which likely suppressed confidence in the government's ability to deal with the AS threat in those counties. In Nairobi on the other hand, the county government's failure to prioritize CVE has likely depressed community impressions of government responsiveness.



Garissa County Commissioner Joshua Chepchieng discusses the Garissa CAP with Governor Ali Korane (center) and NCTC Head of Prevention and Resilience Njenga Miiri (right) at the launch event in Garissa Township. Photo Credit: Hank Nelson/NIWETU

In addition to its frequent engagement with government officials at the county and national level, NIWETU succeeded in partnering with the GOK on two major initiatives: supporting the development and launch of CVE County Action Plans (CAPs) and the founding of the Security Management Institute (SMI) at the Kenya School of Government (KSG).

Supporting CVE County Action Plans

NIWETU's support for 41 CAPs is one of its signature achievements. When NIWETU launched in 2016, there was little county-level implementation of the NSCVE. While the NSCVE provided a framework for CVE work, its nine pillars⁷ had not been operationalized on the county or local level. With support from donors, the GOK launched the so-called “first wave” CAPs in four of Kenya's five coastal counties in 2017 and 2018. However, with the exception of the Mombasa CAP, these plans saw limited success due to lack of political will and financial and institutional support for CAP implementation.

In 2018, NIWETU began working with national, county, and local CVE stakeholders to support development of CAPs in four of its core counties: Garissa, Isiolo, Mandera, and Wajir. Each 5-year CAP defined the unique VE context of the county and prioritized which of the NSCVE's nine pillars should be tackled first to address the VE threat. Drawing on the expertise of a diverse group of CVE stakeholders in each county—including youth, women, religious leaders, government and security officials, and media representatives—each CAP also included additional pillars tailored to the specific VE challenges in that county. For example, stakeholders in Isiolo added a “Women Pillar” to recognize the important role that women and girls play in both VE and CVE activities and to ensure that women-focused CVE programming was a CAP priority from the start.

After the CAPs launched, each county founded a CVE County Engagement Forum (CEF) tasked with implementing the CAP and coordinating CVE activities across the county. Each CEF is co-chaired by the governor and county commissioner and comprises government officials, security officers, and civil society representatives. New CVE stakeholders and activities in the county must work with the CEF to ensure that their activities are contributing to CAP implementation and correspond with the county's priority pillars.

NIWETU saw mixed success in CEF engagement and CAP implementation progress. As one might expect, CEFs were successful when local national and county government officials showed a strong interest in CVE and prioritized CAP implementation. In

Key Lessons Learned for CAP Development

NIWETU's quarterly research on the “10 Essential Ingredients for CAP Development” informed future decision making for both NIWETU and its partners in the GOK. NIWETU conducted this research soon after completing the last of four so-called “second wave” CAPs for Garissa, Isiolo, Mandera, and Wajir. Drawing on its learnings from developing these CAPs and the expertise of its CVE partners in each county, NIWETU drafted a short list of “key ingredients” for successful CAP development and implementation. For example, NIWETU's research identified the need to develop the County Engagement Forums (CEF)—the body tasked with implementing each CAP at the county level—before launch the CAP itself. This sequencing ensures that CAP implementation can begin immediately after launch, when the political will to do so is at its highest. The research also identified the need for diverse CEFs that exemplify the diversity of CVE stakeholders in the county and do not over-represent government and security officials.

These recommendations proved particularly useful when NIWETU later partnered with NCTC to develop 37 additional CAPs across Kenya. For these CAPs, the CEF was appointed and empowered during initial CAP development and membership included a diverse group of stakeholders, including religious leaders, youth, and women's groups.

⁷ Pillars include: Psychological, Education, Political, Security, Faith-Based and Ideological, Training and Capacity Building, Arts and Culture, Legal and Policy, and Media and Online.

Isiolo, the CC and County Secretary both showed early interest in CAP implementation. The CC in particular championed CAP implementation and ensured that the CEF met on a monthly basis. The consistency of CEF meetings and strong engagement from the CC secured early CAP implementation successes in Isiolo that were lacking in other counties. On the other end of the spectrum, county and national officials showed little interest in CAP implementation in Wajir, where progress in CAP implementation was slow despite steady pressure from NIWETU and CSO partner staff.

In each of the four counties, NIWETU also supported local organizations to launch “quick-win” activities designed to make immediate progress toward CAP implementation by addressing specific CAP priority pillars. These “quick-win” activities—which include community-security relationship building and imparting CVE messages to parents, teachers, and students—have demonstrated to county-level officials what work can be done. However, it is important to recognize that they are not a substitute for the initiatives that the county and national government must launch without USAID funding to ensure that the CAPs are working toward sustainable implementation.



*Bungoma County Commissioner Stephen Kihara (second from left) speaks with media during development of the Bungoma RCAP.
Photo Credit: Hank Nelson/NIWETU*

After completing the initial four CAPs, NIWETU and its government and CSO partners had the opportunity to reflect on what worked—and what could have been improved—in CAP development. This research (see box on pg. 33) proved prescient when NCTC asked NIWETU to help it to develop 37 “Rapid CAPs” (RCAPs) in all remaining Kenyan counties. AS’s attack on the 14 Riverside complex in January 2019 had laid bare something that NIWETU and its partners had foreseen in the years leading up to the attack—that VE groups were making inroads into new communities and recruitment was no longer restricted to the “hotspot” counties on the coast and along the Somali border. In the wake of the attack, President


Uhuru Kenyatta issued a Presidential Directive for every county to develop a CAP before June 30, 2019. It speaks to the close relationship that NIWETU had developed with its government partners that NCTC approached NIWETU to help it accomplish this monumental task.

In each of the remaining 37 counties, the five-month CAP development process was distilled into three days of intensive engagement with security, government, and civil society stakeholders in each county. NIWETU staff accompanied partners NCTC and MF—a Kenyan CSO that had supported the four previous CAPs—during an exhausting two-month flurry of RCAP development. Despite the complexity of this activity, RCAP development largely went off without a hitch due to camaraderie between NIWETU and its partners, the flexibility of NIWETU’s grants and logistics team, and the successful operationalization of learnings from the “second wave” of CAPs.

Figure VIII: CAPs J2SR Map

NIWETU and the Journey to Self Reliance

Strengthening Capacity and Commitment in CVE County Action Plan (CAP) Implementation



Security Management Institute: A Sustainable CVE Government Training and Research Center


Through constant engagement with its government partners, NIWETU successfully supported the founding of the SMI at KSG. The SMI is the first CVE government training and research hub in Kenya, and indeed is the first CVE-focused think tank in East Africa, presenting an incredible opportunity for KSG to lead the regional academic and policy conversation. SMI will provide CVE trainings and official certificates to high-level GOK public servants, while simultaneously mainstreaming CVE knowledge and skills into all training programs. KSG also signed MOUs with NCTC and MOI to lay the groundwork for future trainings and joint CVE research assignments. In a GOK environment defined by inter-departmental rivalries—especially between organizations with overlapping mandates—these sorts of partnerships would have been impossible without consistent NIWETU engagement and mediation over the last two years.

The level of trust and mutual respect between NIWETU and its GOK partners that was required for both the RCAP and the SMI activities to succeed should not be understated. Neither of these activities would have been possible without years of consistent engagement between NIWETU staff and key government officials, including NCTC Head of Prevention and Resilience Njenga Miiri and MOI Deputy Minister for Internal Security Thomas Sakah. Indeed, NIWETU's professionalism and consistent support for GOK initiatives had a snowballing effect for CVE initiatives. By showing support for GOK-driven initiatives like the CAPs, NIWETU was able to demonstrate its willingness to work with NCTC in good faith on future activities, including the SMI. By the time the SMI officially launched in 2020, NIWETU staff members were communicating with Miiri and other top officials on a daily basis. NCTC trusted NIWETU and actively sought NIWETU advice, and NIWETU honored that trust by encouraging GOK agencies to take credit for their achievements.



GOK officials participate in a NIWETU-supported MOI CVE training. Photo Credit: Hank Nelson/NIWETU

Figure IX: SMI J2SR Map



V. THE STATE OF VE AND CVE IN KENYA

NIWETU staff and partners agree that CVE stakeholders in Kenya are more focused, coordinated, and prepared than ever before to take on the VE threat. There is an unprecedented level of CVE cooperation between CSOs, community members, influencers, and government officials. NIWETU has directly contributed to this cooperation by supporting institutionalized CVE strategies and instruments like the CAPs and the SMI; training key stakeholders and linking them with potential partners; and fostering an inclusive, sustainable, and adaptive approach to CVE across Kenya. NIWETU's endline results support these findings, with respondents feeling more confident and hopeful about the level of CVE knowledge and skills, the effectiveness of community-led CVE initiatives, the strength of CVE networks, and the ability of the GOK to adequately counter VE.

NIWETU county-based staff report that there has been a general shift in the way that VE-affected communities think about CVE. In places like Wajir and Mandera, community members are increasingly emboldened to speak out against VE and see their own contributions as essential to CVE success. NIWETU staff and partners report that fewer residents feel compelled to use euphemistic language—*aligarob*, “those sheikhs,” Arsenal—to covertly discuss AS, a sign that community members are more comfortable speaking out against VE. There is also an understanding in many communities that CVE efforts must embrace a “whole-of-society” approach. In Garissa County, NIWETU staff report organic CVE networking between groups that did not previously work together. Youth are using social media to spread



C4Cs from Wajir County have formed new partnerships with government officials after their official engagement with NIWETU ended. Photo Credit: Hank Nelson/NIWETU

CVE messages, which also would have been unthinkable in the prevailing climate of fear and suspicion after the 2015 Garissa University attack.

NIWETU has also seen tremendous growth in its cadre of CVE partners across Kenya. At the national level, NCTC has fully taken on the mantle of CVE coordinator and leader for the GOK. NCTC leaders like Miiri have organized county level meetings and strategy workshops for county and national government leaders across Kenya and have demonstrated a real willingness and capability to lead CVE efforts across government systems. Similarly, NIWETU's CSO partners and C4Cs are continuing to drive CVE activities in their respective communities. In Mandera and Nairobi, for example, NIWETU C4Cs have incorporated CVE messaging into public health campaigns in the wake of the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak in Kenya. In Isiolo, NIWETU partners like IPL and SCORES have successfully advocated for CVE material to be mainstreamed into public health broadcasts. NIWETU's co-creation process and emphasis on strengthening partner skills has greatly improved the capacity of civil society partners and prepared these partners to carry out CVE activities without direct support in the future.

Despite these many encouraging signs, future CVE initiatives face a number of challenges in Kenya. First, AS remains a powerful force in the border regions and has demonstrated a resilience and adaptability that will continue to make it a dangerous foe in the future. Throughout the last four years, NIWETU has watched as AS has rapidly adapted its targets, tactics, and tradecraft across Kenya. For example, VE hotspots in Mandera County are constantly shifting as AS applies pressure in one sub-county, retreats, and promptly launches an attack in a different sub-county. Traditional hotspots like Mandera East and Mandera South continue to suffer attacks, but AS has made inroads into new communities—NIWETU staff warn that Banisa and Mandera North in particular are the new frontier for VE and CVE work in the region. Similarly, investigations into the I4 Riverside attack illuminated the extent of AS's recruitment networks in urban centers across Central Kenya, which was not previously considered a VE hotspot. AS's geographical adaptability validates NIWETU's systems-based approach, but also portends difficulties for the GOK and other CVE actors if they cannot mainstream their efforts across the country.



NIWETU C4Cs distribute hand sanitizer in Kibra during the COVID-19 pandemic.

It also remains to be seen if county governments in particular will continue to prioritize CVE initiatives. Despite the commitment and support of national government officials at KSG, MOI, and NCTC, most county governments have wavered in providing full-throated support for institutionalizing CAPs and other CVE activities. County assemblies and county leadership will need to pass legislation supporting and financing the CAPs to ensure their long-term viability. While some counties have demonstrated a willingness to prioritize CVE work—Mandera is a particularly encouraging example—others have thus far faltered in maintaining sustained support for these initiatives. As new challenges and threats arise in these counties—including rising COVID-19 cases and environmental threats like drought, flooding, and locusts—it might be increasingly difficult for CVE stakeholders to hold the attention of county leaders. NCTC must take a leadership role to ensure that counties continue to prioritize CAP implementation.

ANNEX I: SUSTAINABILITY AND LOCAL CONTRIBUTIONS

NIWETU calculated estimated GOK and community contributions to NIWETU's CVE activities to track the commitment of Kenyan CVE actors to CVE work. According to this analysis, community members have contributed approximately **\$495,000** to NIWETU's CVE work, while GOK partners have contributed **\$478,000** for a total of **\$974,000**. Unsurprisingly, the analysis found that contributions increased sharply from Y1 to Y2 before peaking at Y3—coinciding with the RCAP development and other major activities—before beginning to level off as most activities closed in Y4.

The leveraging analysis compiled M&E data, information on activities that NIWETU did not directly fund, and other estimates of in-kind and monetary contributions to CVE work. NIWETU also estimated daily rates for participants and the costs of different in-kind contributions (including transportation and event space). Below is a breakdown of the data sources NIWETU used:

- *M&E data:* NIWETU used timesheets and the aforementioned estimated daily rates to determine how much community and government activity participants contributed by attending NIWETU-sponsored events without compensation. This input accounted for the greatest portion of both government and community contributions—\$370,000 and \$340,000, respectively.
- *C4Cs contribution:* NIWETU staff estimated the average days per quarter that NIWETU's C4Cs contributed and applied an estimated daily rate for civil society staff and chiefs.⁸
- *High-level government contribution:* NIWETU staff estimated the average time spent liaising with high-level government officials from NCTC and MOI per quarter and applied a blended rate for these officials.
- *Partner contributions:* NIWETU partners participate in a rigorous co-design process with NIWETU before each activity launches. NIWETU grants staff estimated the time contribution of partner staff before the grant launch.
- *CAP implementation contributions:* In each of NIWETU's core counties, government officials and community members have donated time and other in-kind contributions to facilitate CAP implementation. NIWETU county staff estimated the value of these contributions.

Table III: Leveraging Data

Totals	Y1Q1	Y1Q2	Y1Q3	Y1Q4	Y1 Total	Y2Q1	Y2Q2	Y2Q3	Y2Q4	Y2 Total	Y3Q1	Y3Q2	Y3Q3	Y3Q4	Y3 Total	Y4Q1	Y4Q2	Y4Q3	Y4Q4	Y4 Total to Date	Total (USD)
Government:	\$-	\$ 1,751	\$ 4,635	\$ -	\$ 6,386	\$ 7,092	\$ 10,489	\$ 23,714	\$ 45,152	\$ 86,447	\$ 56,158	\$ 10,017	\$ 115,522	\$ 72,978	\$ 254,675	\$ 67,984	\$ 48,811	\$ 13,981	\$ -	\$ 130,776	\$ 478,284
Community:	\$-	\$ 3,502	\$ 90,581	\$ 3,629	\$ 97,712	\$ 7,691	\$ 10,822	\$ 21,378	\$ 67,541	\$ 107,431	\$ 69,019	\$ 33,882	\$ 68,666	\$ 35,121	\$ 206,688	\$ 45,914	\$ 37,472	\$ 215	\$ -	\$ 83,601	\$ 495,433
																				Total:	\$ 973,717

⁸ One C4C is a chief, while the other 49 are civil society representatives.

ANNEX II: QUANTITATIVE IMPACT

NIWETU met or exceeded—sometimes significantly—the life of project targets for 11 of its 13 activity indicators. This section will delve into all cumulative indicator totals that deviate significantly ($\geq 10\%$ or $\leq 10\%$ difference) from the target number.

Indicator 1.1 is one of the two indicators where NIWETU fell slightly short of its target: NIWETU intended to foster partnerships between **40** CSOs and GOK counterparts, but ultimately was able to do so for **36** civil society partners (**90% of the target**). This deficit is largely explained by NIWETU's slow start working with the GOK during Y1, which was part of a larger trend across most indicators. In Y1, NIWETU managed to foster partnerships between 4 CSOs and their GOK counterparts, against a target of 10. Ultimately, with the addition of the program development officers (PDOs) at the county level and dedicated government liaison staff at the national level, NIWETU's engagement with the GOK greatly increased from Y2 of the activity. Indeed, NIWETU exceeded its target for Y2 – Y4. NIWETU's ability to adjust after a slow first year is indicative of the team's adaptability and flexibility.

Indicator 1.4 is the second indicator where NIWETU fell short of its target: NIWETU intended to partner with 76 CBOs, but ultimately partnered with 59 local organizations (**78% of the target**). This reflects a shift in NIWETU's focus across the life of the project. Instead of working with a larger group of CBOs, NIWETU prioritized deeper engagement with a comparatively smaller number of partners. This deeper, longer-term engagement helped NIWETU better strengthen the capacity and CVE skills of its CBO partners.

NIWETU met or exceeded its targets for all other indicators. In many cases, NIWETU exceeded its target by more than 10% due to the RCAP activity, which was not a planned activity when NIWETU devised indicator targets as part of its AMEP. Because of this, NIWETU engaged with significantly more community members and government officials, and supported considerably more GOK CVE initiatives when the RCAP activity was implemented during Y3. Below are indicators that NIWETU exceeded due in part to the RCAP activity:

- Indicator 1.3: 18,209 people participated in activities designed to build mass support for CVE, exceeding the target of 15,055 by 120%.
- Indicator 1.7: 12,076 women, youth, and marginalized people were beneficiaries of NIWETU activities, exceeding the target of 8,500 by 142%.
- Indicator 2.1: GOK adopted 67 CVE initiatives, exceeding the target of 27 by 248%.
- Indicator 2.4: 63 GOK entities received NIWETU support, exceeding the target of 26 by 242%.

Other cases where NIWETU exceeded its targets can be attributed to widespread interest in and enthusiasm for CVE activities at the community level. For example, NIWETU M&E staff note that activities that engaged youth (Indicator 1.9) and those that provided training and mentoring to community members and government officials (1.6 and 2.3) frequently saw many more participants at events than the partner intended. Community members and government officials who were not officially invited would frequently show up at events due to widespread interest in CVE activities and the general lack of these activities at the community level in some of NIWETU's core counties. Importantly, these

events also proved useful to the participants: NIWETU exceeded its targets for the percentage of community members and government officials who said they were likely to use what they had learned during a training by 106% and 114%, respectively.

Finally, NIWETU's over-performance on Indicator 1.8 is linked to a larger shift in NIWETU thinking to more actively engage with women stakeholders and encourage women to participate substantively in CVE efforts. This shift was part of NIWETU's Gender Plan and subsequent series of activities specifically designed to engage women stakeholders in Isiolo, Nairobi, and Wajir.

In addition to its AMEP, NIWETU constructed a VE Index to measure VE and security trends in each of NIWETU's core counties. Annex III presents the VE Index findings from baseline to endline.

Please see page 42 for a breakdown of NIWETU's progress on its indicators.

Table IV: Cumulative M&E Targets and Actuals

Indicators	FY2017 Targets		FY2017 Actuals		FY2018 Targets		FY2018 Actuals		FY2019 Targets		FY2019 Actuals		FY2020 Targets		FY2020 Actuals		Cumulative Total (Targets)		Cumulative Total (Actuals)		% Achieved Against Yearly Targets
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
1.1 Number of civil society and private sector organizations that partner with government of Kenya in CVE activities	10		4		17		20		12		11		1		1		40		36		90%
1.2 % of community members (non-government officials) trained who indicate they are likely to implement what they learned during training	60%		58%		60%		92%		85%		100%		85%		98%		85%		90%		106%
1.3 Number of people participating in USG-supported events or activities designed to build mass support for CVE	1,350		844	182	4500		3353	1475	6000		6614	3033	3205		1563	965	15,055		12,374	5,655	120%
1.4 Number of community-based organizations supported by USG assistance (disaggregated by focus on women, youth and other)	15		7		35		30		25		21		1		1		76		59		78%
1.5. Number of domestic NGOs engaged in monitoring or advocacy work on human rights receiving USG support	1		0		1		0		1		1		0		0		1		1		100%
1.6 Number of community members (non-governmental officials) trained, mentored, provided TA	15		581	36	500		506	374	800		486	315	250		152	96	1565		1725	821	163%
1.7 Number of women, youth and marginalized individuals who are beneficiaries of USG funded interventions	300		654	182	2700		1791	1475	3600		3143	3033	1900		833	965	8500		6421	5655	142%
1.8 Number of local women participating in a substantive role or position in CVE supported with USG assistance	30		10		113		214		150		157		50		45		343		426		124%
1.9 Number of local youth participating in a substantive role position in CVE supported with USG assistance	100		28	11	150		185	128	150		115	109	89		57	55	489		385	303	141%
2.1 Number of initiatives directly supported by or adopted by county/national government, designed in response to community concerns around VE	3		3		10		12		12		50		2		2		27		67		248%
2.2 Percentage of county/national officials trained who indicate they are likely to implement what they learned during training	60%		53%		60%		92%		85%		100%		85%		100%		85%		97%		114%
2.3 Number of county/national officials trained, mentored, provided TA	18		31	7	200		258	43	300		304	217	300		229	49	818		822	316	139%
2.4 Number of county/national entities receiving USG support	3		0		10		13		12		49		1		1		26		63		242%

ANNEX III: VE INDEX

Garissa

Statements	Level of Agreement	
	Baseline	Endline
Extremism and recruitment to join extremist groups is less of a problem now than it was 12 months ago.	3.95	2.89
Organized crime and gang activity is less of a problem now than it was 12 months ago.	3.54	3.39
Community members feel safer now than they did 12 months ago.	4.04	2.26
Over the past 12 months, the number of extremist attacks in this county has decreased.	3.82	2.02
Over the past 12 months, the number of extremist attacks throughout Kenya has decreased.	3.87	2.50
Overall average score	3.84	2.61

The VE index in Garissa indicates that respondents feel overall security has declined since the baseline. Qualitative responses reference an increase in the number of VEO attacks in the county, particularly on local schools. It is important to note the endline research occurred immediately after a spate of highly visible, deadly AS attacks in Garissa and Wajir, which likely affected the VE perceptions of respondents. Some community members also pointed toward a greater prevalence of AS communication within their communities, often threatening or warning of imminent attacks in order to scare the population. Recruitment of youth by VEOs remains an issue and some noted that individuals who had been “disappeared” were reportedly observed by pastoralists conducting armed raids in rural areas. When discussing gang activity, a respondent said that *boda boda* drivers are fearful of driving past Bula Mzuri due to a youth gang called “Squad Chafu.”

Isiolo

Statements	Level of Agreement	
	Baseline	Endline
Extremism and recruitment to join extremist groups is less of a problem now than it was 12 months ago.	4.48	3.67
Organized crime and gang activity is less of a problem now than it was 12 months ago.	4.06	3.44
Community members feel safer now than they did 12 months ago.	3.97	4.38
Over the past 12 months, the number of extremist attacks in this county has decreased.	3.85	3.94
Over the past 12 months, the number of extremist attacks throughout Kenya has decreased.	4.68	2.98
Overall average score	4.20	3.68

The overall average VE index moderately declined in Isiolo, while there was a slight improvement in perceptions of community safety and frequency of VE attacks. Those reporting a decline in security noted a perceived uptick in recruitment activity, noting that some of the organizers of the I4 Riverside attacks were allegedly from Isiolo. Respondents also reported an increase in problems arising from cattle rustling

among pastoralists and drug abuse. Conversely, those who said security improved highlighted better police-community relations and more moderate messaging from local religious leaders. Further, some attributed improved levels of safety to more frequent security patrols and more active Nyumba Kumi activity.

Mandera

Statements	Level of Agreement	
	Baseline	Endline
Extremism and recruitment to join extremist groups is less of a problem now than it was 12 months ago.	2.88	3.84
Organized crime and gang activity is less of a problem now than it was 12 months ago.	1.86	3.77
Community members feel safer now than they did 12 months ago.	3.5	3.47
Over the past 12 months, the number of extremist attacks in this county has decreased.	3.24	3.38
Over the past 12 months, the number of extremist attacks throughout Kenya has decreased.	3.48	3.02
Overall average score	2.99	3.50

There was a notable improvement in the average VE index in Mandera between baseline and endline, spurred by a perceived drop in VE recruitment and organized crime. Several respondents pointed to increased sensitization around VE among religious leaders and community elders as a result of their participation in CVE forums. Many also noted that youth had become more aware of the dangers of radicalization and were therefore less vulnerable to recruitment activities. A few respondents referenced an attack on a passenger bus that occurred around the time of the endline but acknowledged that generally attacks had decreased. There was also a reported decline in organized crime, while petty theft and drug sales persisted.

Nairobi

Statements	Level of Agreement	
	Baseline	Endline
Extremism and recruitment to join extremist groups is less of a problem now than it was 12 months ago.	2.94	3.55
Organized crime and gang activity is less of a problem now than it was 12 months ago.	2.60	3.37
Community members feel safer now than they did 12 months ago.	2.78	3.60
Over the past 12 months, the number of extremist attacks in this county has decreased.	4.42	3.54
Over the past 12 months, the number of extremist attacks throughout Kenya has decreased.	4.04	2.43
Overall average score	3.36	3.30


The average VE index in Nairobi remained largely unchanged between baseline and endline. However, there was a notable decrease in levels of recruitment, gang activity, and improved perceptions of safety. Conversely, respondents considered the overall frequency of attacks to have increased. Qualitative


responses attributed the decrease in VE recruitment to more CVE sensitization among youth and more constructive relationships with security actors. Similarly, respondents linked the reduction in organized crime to an increase in the number of mentorship programs and livelihood opportunities for youth in local communities. The perceived increase in attacks was reportedly due to highly visible incidents, such as the 14 Riverside attacks and the recent extrajudicial killings carried out by police.


Wajir

Statements	Level of Agreement	
	Baseline	Endline
Extremism and recruitment to join extremist groups is less of a problem now than it was 12 months ago.	4.16	3.47
Organized crime and gang activity is less of a problem now than it was 12 months ago.	4.77	3.11
Community members feel safer now than they did 12 months ago.	4.66	3.28
Over the past 12 months, the number of extremist attacks in this county has decreased.	4.83	2.65
Over the past 12 months, the number of extremist attacks throughout Kenya has decreased.	4.59	2.52
Overall average score	4.60	3.01

Qualitative responses pointed toward a moderate decrease in security due to a perceived increase in VEO activity in Wajir. Similar to Garissa, respondents cited a recent uptick in AS attacks in Wajir East that occurred in December 2019 and January 2020, contributing to security concerns in surrounding communities. Feedback indicated that, while instances of VEO activity had increased in some areas, communities were more inclined to report such incidents to security forces. A large proportion of respondents highlighted the lack of employment opportunities and livelihoods for youth as a key issue contributing to instability.







ANNEX V: INVENTORY OF DELIVERABLES

Year 1 Deliverables:

1. Year 1 Work Plan
2. Year 2 Work Plan
3. Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (AMEP)
4. Branding and Marking Plan
5. Risk Mitigation Plan
6. Complexity Aware Planning (CAP) Cycle Framework
7. Grants Manual
8. Baseline Assessment
9. Y1 Annual Learning Report
10. Quarterly Research Report: “Recruitment Dynamics in Isiolo”
11. FY 2017 Q1, Q2, and Q3 Quarterly Reports
12. FY 2017 Annual Report
13. Bi-weekly Reports for September 2016 – September 2017

Year 2 Deliverables:

1. Year 3 Work Plan
2. NIWETU Revised AMEP
3. Revised Branding and Marking Plan
4. Y2 Annual Learning Report
5. Quarterly Research Report: “Gender Analysis”
6. Quarterly Research Report: “Dynamics in Garissa Boni Forest”
7. Quarterly Research Report: “Impact of School Closure on Vulnerability in Wajir County”
8. Quarterly Research Report: “Assessment of Improved Skills and Knowledge Activity Outcomes”
9. FY 2018 Q1, Q2, and Q3 Quarterly Reports
10. FY 2018 Annual Report
11. Bi-weekly Reports for October 2017 – September 2018

Year 3 Deliverables:

1. Year 4 Work Plan
2. NIWETU Revised AMEP
3. Revised Risk Mitigation Plan
4. Midline Assessment
5. Y3 Annual Learning Report
6. Quarterly Research Report: “The County Action Plan Formation Process: Isiolo, Garissa, and Mombasa”
7. Quarterly Research Report: “Comparative Analysis of Community and Government Responses in the Aftermath of the Westgate and 14 Riverside Attacks”
8. Quarterly Research Report: “Understanding NIWETU’s CVE Approach: A Case Study Analysis of Isiolo Engagement”
9. Quarterly Research Report: “Understanding the Networks of NIWETU’s CVE Champions”
10. FY 2019 Q1, Q2, and Q3 Quarterly Reports
11. FY 2019 Annual Report
12. NIWETU Bi-weekly Reports for October 2018 – September 2019

Year 4 Deliverables:

1. Revised Y4 Work Plan
2. NIWETU Revised AMEP
3. NIWETU Closedown Plan
4. Endline Assessment
5. Y4 Annual Learning Report
6. Quarterly Research Report: “Understanding Key Actions for Successful County Action Plan Implementation”
7. Quarterly Research Report: “Understanding Gender-related Outcomes of NIWETU Grants, and a Review of NIWETU’s Gender Plan”
8. CVE Strategic Communications Evaluation
9. FY 2020 Q1, Q2, and Q3 Quarterly Reports
10. Final Report
11. NIWETU Bi-weekly Reports for October 2019 – August 2020