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DRAFT EVALUATION REPORT: FINAL EVALUATION OF THE USAID/MALI EDUCATION EMERGENCY SUPPORT ACTIVITY (EESA)

May 7, 2020

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USAID/MALI: THE EDUCATION EMERGENCY SUPPORT ACTIVITY (EESA)

FINAL EVALUATION

Summative qualitative evaluation of the Education Emergency Support Activity (EESA). The activity was implemented from January 2016-December 2018 in the regions of Segou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal in Mali. The activity included the construction and rehabilitation of schools, and the capacity building of Civil Society Organizations, teachers, school administrators, and Ministry of Education officials.

May 7, 2020

DISCLAIMER

The author's views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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Any errors in the report are the sole responsibility of the report authors.

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ABSTRACT

This is a final evaluation of USAID/Mali's Emergency Education Support Activity (EESA), which increased primary school accessibility, improved education delivery, and built community and institutional capacity around conflict-affected schools in five northern and central regions of Mali. EESA was implemented by CAMRIS International from January 2016-December 2018. Key activities included school construction and remediation, WASH infrastructure and hygiene training, and capacity building with teachers (on conflict-sensitive skills, gender awareness and professional development), with community and school management committees (including emergency planning and school management) and with regional education authorities (including education management systems). The evaluation addresses questions categorized along 3 lines of inquiry: 1) project implementation; 2) project management; and 3) project sustainability. The evaluation team sampled 94 of EESA's 250 schools in all five regions using local data collectors, who work in their home communities due to severe security and travel-related constraints. Evaluation methods included individual and key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and a parent survey. Key findings include that, in addition to the tangible school infrastructure benefits, EESA's most important contributions were to parents, school personnel and school and community management committees. EESA's use of community-based agents who served as trainers, coaches, and mobilizers was a key contributor to project achievements; however, the approach also lacked a viable exit plan for sustained employment of AMCs after the activity ended. The evaluation found strong evidence that supports EESA's overall success as a model activity for supporting primary education in conflict-affected regions in Mali and elsewhere.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The final evaluation of USAID/Mali's Emergency Education Support Activity (EESA) was conducted by The Mitchell Group, Inc. (TMG) between January and April 2020. The evaluation has two main purposes: 1) to assess the efficacy and feasibility of the intervention model; and 2) to inform USAID/Mali's program design and decision-making, in particular, for the Mission's Country Development Strategy Cooperation Strategy (CDCS). The evaluation documents the extent to which targeted beneficiaries benefited from EESA and identifies programmatic and management factors that may have contributed to or detracted from intended results, and assesses the activity's potential for sustainability.

Activity Background/Context: EESA was implemented by a consortium led by CAMRIS International from January 2016 to December 2018. The Activity's purpose was to ensure that schools in regions that have experienced ongoing violent conflict during the past decade remain safe and accessible for primary education learners. EESA worked with a total of 250 primarily rural schools in Mali's five Central and Northern regions namely Segou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. EESA therefore focused on three intermediate results (IR): 1) increased availability of safe and accessible primary schooling; 2) improved delivery of conflict-sensitive basic educational services; and 3) strengthened institutional capacity to deliver education services in conflict-affected environments.

Evaluation Questions: The final evaluation focused on questions in three lines of inquiry:

I Project Implementation

I: To what extent has the activity contributed to student enrolment and learning outcomes? To what extent did the project reach its targets in terms of new entrant students (including grade I and re-

entrant children in other grades)? Why or why not? How have results benefited boys and girls differently, if at all?

2. Based on beneficiaries' perspectives, to what extent did capacity-building efforts (including the use of mobile technology) for education personnel¹ and parents meet beneficiaries' needs, increase knowledge and skills, and change behaviors and teaching practices?

3. How Did the Project Affect Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) and School-Based Organizations (SBOs)? To what extent did project activities help to empower and strengthen the capacity of CBOs and SBOs and how has this influenced the quality of primary schooling?

II Project Management

4. What was the contribution of project management approaches such as establishing the project HQ in the Segou Region and embedding EESA within the MOE have on results?

5. What factors enabled or inhibited project implementation and the achievement of Activity results?

6. How effectively did the EESA project adapt to the evolving security situation? To what extent did the insecurity impact implementation?

III Crosscutting: Lessons Learned and Sustainability

7. How sustainable are project achievements? What strategies and approaches did the activity use to promote the sustainability of outcomes and how successful those have been?

Evaluation Scope: This evaluation focuses on project implementation and management. In terms of implementation, the evaluation assesses key outcomes, including student enrollment and learning outcomes and the effectiveness of capacity-building efforts for school-based and community-based organizations. Key issues covered in the evaluation include capacity building for school management, instructional quality, school security, including emergency planning; gender equity and countering gender-based violence (GBV); and new school construction and school rehabilitation including water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) facilities. The evaluation also assesses the contribution of project management approaches, reviewing the factors enabling or inhibiting project implementation and the achievement of results and EESA's ability to adapt to the evolving security situations. As a cross-cutting issue, the evaluation assesses the degree to which project achievements are sustainable, highlighting strategies and approaches that contributed to, or detracted from, sustainability.

Evaluation Methods and Limitations: The evaluation mainly relies on a qualitative approach informed by document review and field research, although it also cites relevant primary quantitative data from field research as well as secondary quantitative data from EESA reports. Primary qualitative data was derived from key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs). Respondents included former senior EESA staff, community-based and school-based organization committee members, teachers, school directors, parents, and primary school students, and regional education

¹ Defined as teachers, education administrators, and MOE staff.

ministry officials. The evaluation team visited all five implementation regions and collected data from a total of 94 schools (38% of EESA's total).

The evaluation team included an expatriate team leader and an expatriate evaluation specialist, four local sector specialists (education, gender, construction, and WASH) and a team of 16 data collectors who, for security reasons, were recruited from and deployed to their own local areas of residence. The evaluation successfully mitigated many limitations due to Mali's degrading security environment. As salient examples, travel opportunities for the team leader and evaluation specialist were restricted; a national teachers strike closed schools and limited access to teachers and school directors; and the original sampling strategy was modified to substitute several schools that were not in the most insecure "red zones." Moreover, because it was necessary to use local data collectors who had access to communities in less secure areas, it was necessary to conduct additional training on qualitative data collection, including conducting interviews and focus groups, and taking detailed notes in situ. In addition, the only means to travel to four out of five of EESA regions was through United Nation's flights. Evaluators therefore relied on USAID/Mali to purchase limited seats on these flights. Because of sporadic availability and unpredictable schedules, many key evaluation staff members experienced substantial delays in deployment to the field, which contributed to difficulties in planning and coordination. Despite these limitations, the evaluation team was able to collect a wealth of data to ground reporting on its findings and to make evidence-based recommendations. A final limitation was the impact of the COVID-19 viral pandemic, which caused the expatriate team members to leave Mali several days earlier than planned, thereby accelerating the end of the analysis and reporting process.

Key Findings: EESA met or exceeded all targets except for the number of new student enrollments. (See Annex VI for EESA's 2018 indicator performance report including all reported target vs actual figures). The project's most important contributions were to direct beneficiaries: parents, school personnel and school and community-based management committees. A key achievement included school infrastructure improvements, which provided tangible focal points for school management committees to increase awareness of the importance of education and further mobilized support for increased enrollment and improved attendance in conflict-affected communities. Not only was this component an important USAID/Mali legacy, but infrastructure investment leveraged other progress within the Malian education system. However, despite this investment, there remains unmet needs within EESA communities, including potable water points and latrines that are in disrepair at some schools, and the lack of walled or fenced security enclosures at many schools.

EESA's capacity-building activities for school-based and community-based organizations were instrumental in promoting community engagement with schools. This was evidenced by collaboration on emergency planning; increasing school enrollment, particularly for girls; oversight of teachers' comportment with girls; and addressing absenteeism. Teachers benefited from EESA's training activities through an enhanced understanding of gender equity and security awareness, as well as improved skills in pedagogy, student psychological support, conflict, gender-based violence, emergency awareness, and understanding and teaching about hygiene. Students benefited from EESA's psychosocial support services and extra after-hours remedial classes, which helped students catch up on studies after extended absences. Girl students benefited from improved teacher attitudes and school practices' progress toward greater gender equity, increased proportional enrollment numbers, and increased awareness and planning at school and community levels to prevent gender-based violence.

The use of community-based agents (AMC)—who served as trainers, coaches, mobilizers and local "eyes and ears" for EESA—was also a key contributing factor to EESA's achievements. Although activities during the first 9 months focused on needs assessment (through the RERA study) and recruitment challenges, and therefore full implementation in the field was shortened to a two-year period, the AMC-focused strategy allowed for rapid achievements within a very compressed timeframe. However, one structural weakness of the AMC-based approach was the lack of a viable "exit plan," for sustained employment of AMCs after the activity ended.

At the project management level, the evaluation finds that it was beneficial to locate EESA's headquarters (HQ) in Segou rather than Bamako, as Segou was more accessible to many key activity stakeholders. The location of EESA HQ in Segou also mitigated many of the daily challenges, such as heavy traffic and resultant commute time, that occur in a large city such as Bamako. However, the decision to locate in Segou may have constrained EESA's recruitment pool as some highly qualified staff may have been reluctant to re-locate outside of Bamako.

During EESA's period of performance, and despite a fluid and often rapidly changing security environment in the Northern regions, there were only a few events that resulted in the school closures or extended interruptions among EESA's schools. However, EESA, which was designed as a post-conflict—as opposed to an active conflict—activity did influence outcomes, in that violent conflict and security events were still occurring in and around EESA's communities during the implementation period. As a result, general insecurity loomed large; many stakeholders lived in fear; and although EESA's contribution to emergency planning was very successful, by necessity, this occasionally took precedence over its other important educational contributions. Fortunately, in the sampled communities and schools, there were relatively few actual emergency events. However, some respondents described EESA's interventions as contributing to an exacerbation of existing tensions between those community members that promoted more secularized education with more religiously conservative community members who opposed secular education, particularly for girls.

Recommendations: EESA's largest component—new school construction and rehabilitation of existing schools has leveraged other progress within the Malian education system. Based on EESA's experience, recommendations include:

#1. Support for school infrastructure construction and rehabilitation should be encouraged.

A key contributor to EESA's overall success was its support for school- and community-based management committees, which was particularly important in rural communities. Community mobilization agents were especially important, but, as EESA's employees, ceased operations after EESA's closure.

#2. Continue to use the model of community mobilization agents to support school-based and community-based management committees.

The evaluation found a key EESA element of sustainability was its contribution to management and oversight capacity with regional education academies. EESA helped education officers better integrate their work with community- and school-level management committees in such areas as emergency planning, pedagogy training and school oversight. Moreover, EESA's training modules and curricula have been integrated into standard training for education in emergencies at the national level. EESA's

inclusion of, and close working relationships with, regional and local education authorities was mutually beneficial. It not only enhanced the legitimacy of the activity; it also promoted deeper engagement between education authorities and community- and school-level management committees.

#3. Involve education authorities with community- and school-level management committees.

Psychosocial support, an important EESA element, contributed to mitigating some psychological insecurity affecting students.

#4. Reinforce psychosocial counseling and training in conflict-affected communities and schools.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AE | Académie d'Éducation |
| AMC | Agent de Mobilisation Communautaire |
| AME | Association des Mères d'Élèves |
| APE | Association des Parents d'Élèves, |
| BESSOC | Bureau d'Expertise en Sciences Sociales et Culturelles |
| CA | Communauté d'Apprentissage |
| CAP | Centres d'Animation Pédagogique |
| CBO | Community-Based Organization |
| CDCS | Country Development Cooperation Strategy |
| CGS | Comité de Gestion Scolaire |
| CSO | Civil Society Organization |
| DNEF | Direction Nationale de l'Enseignement Fondamental |
| DNEN | Direction Nationale de l'Enseignement Normal |
| DNP | Direction Nationale de la Pédagogie |
| EDC | Education Development Center |
| EESA | Education Emergency Support Activity |
| EIE | Education in Emergencies |
| ERSA | Education Recovery Support Activity |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| FGM/C | Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting |
| GBV | Gender-Based Violence |
| GIZ | German Cooperation |
| GOM | Government of Mali |
| HH | Household |
| HHS | Household Survey |
| HNI | Human Network Initiative |
| INEE | Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies |
| IP | Implementing Partner |
| IR | Intermediate Result |
| IRB | Institutional Review Board |
| KII | Key Informant Interview |
| MAA | Mutual Assistance Agreement |
| MATD | Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale et de la Décentralisation |
| MEN | Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale |
| MOE | Ministry of Education |
| NGO | Non-Government Organization |
| PDSEC | Plan de Développement Social Économique et Culturel |
| POC | Point of Contact |
| PRAPS | Projet Régional d'Appui au Pastoralisme au Sahel |
| RERA | Rapid Education and Risk Assessment |
| SEE | Senior Evaluation Expert |
| SBO | School-Based Organization |
| SCOFI | Scolarisation des Filles |
| SNGP | Sub-National Governance Project |

| | |
|-------|----------------------------------------------------|
| SRGBV | School-Related Gender-Based Violence |
| TMG | The Mitchell Group, Inc. |
| TL | Team Leader |
| TOCOR | Task Order Contracting Officer's Representative |
| UNHAS | United Nations Humanitarian Air Service |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WASH | Water Sanitation and Hygiene |


SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

The purpose of USAID/Mali's Emergency Education Support Activity (EESA) was to ensure that schools are safe and accessible for all primary education learners. The activity was implemented by a consortium of partners from 2016-2018 in 250 schools in the regions of Segou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. The main objective was to achieve a measurable increase in equitable access to basic education for 80,000 returned and resident learners who were affected by the conflict in Mali. In addition to providing "soft" support through curriculum support and capacity development, the activity aimed to build or rehabilitate classrooms in 250 schools.

There were several articulated purposes of this final evaluation of the EESA program conducted by The Mitchell Group, Inc. (TMG), between January and April 2020. At a macro level, the evaluation was designed to assess efficacy and feasibility of the intervention model and to inform future investment decision-making. At the activity level, the purpose of the evaluation was to document the extent to which EESA impacted targeted beneficiaries and to identify factors that may have contributed to successes or challenges faced by the activity in achieving its results, including implementation and management approaches. In addition, the evaluation was asked to assess the sustainability potential of EESA's outcomes.

The audience for the evaluation findings and recommendations includes USAID/Mali, as well as the broader USAID and Government of Mali (GOM) audiences. At the Mission level, the evaluation will inform USAID/Mali's Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) planning process by providing insights into EESA's achievements and challenges. This will provide context to the Mission regarding the CDCS's strategic objectives. At the results level, the evaluation will inform and enable adaptation of future education programming in the context of Mali's crisis. The evaluation results will be shared with broader USAID audiences to inform other education programming, especially that which is taking place in similar conflict-affected locations. The outputs of this evaluation also seek to inform stakeholders within the GOM, as well as other donor agencies who are engaged in supporting Mali's Ministry of Education (MOE's) priorities. EESA's results framework is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: EESA Results Framework



EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation questions are categorized along three lines of inquiry: 1) project implementation, 2) project management, and 3) project sustainability. The evaluation questions pertaining to each of these lines of inquiry were provided by USAID/Mali and are detailed in section 4 on findings.

SECTION 2: BACKGROUND

The Northern Mali Conflict began in 2012 with a Tuareg rebellion against the Government of Mali, the roots of which lie in the perceived marginalization of Mali's northern territories by the central government in Bamako. A lack of quality public services, including education, was a major source of ethnic grievances. In response to study findings that concluded that inequitable access to quality education drives conflict in northern Mali, USAID/Mali designed and subsequently awarded the EESA activity to CAMRIS International in January 2016 for a 3-year performance period.

EESA's purpose was to ensure that schools are safe and accessible for all primary education learners. The program was implemented in 250 schools in the regions of Segou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal by a consortium of implementers.² EESA's main objective was to achieve a measurable increase of equitable access to basic education for 80,000 returned and resident learners who have been affected by the crisis and conflict in Mali. CAMRIS's final program report (December 2018) provided an overview of EESA's achievements during the three-year period of performance, including:

- 250 schools were rehabilitated, and 61 classrooms were newly built
- 206,062 children were newly enrolled in primary school, including 99,044 girls.
- 250 small grants were provided to communities to address education needs and support emergency and crisis planning and preparation.
- 1,851 teachers were trained on conflict-sensitive methods and skills, 1,678 teachers were trained on supporting learners' psychosocial wellbeing and 1,648 completed professional development training modules.
- 160 schools were provided with sanitation facilities and 48 schools were provided with clean water sources.
- 20 *Centres d'animation pédagogique* (CAPs) were provided with education management information systems (including computers and 25 CAP and *Académie d'éducation* (AE) officials were trained in their use.³
- 80,582 school kits were distributed to 42,134 boy and 38,448 girl students.
- 6,554 students attended remedial course instruction in order to accelerate lessons lost to extended absences and poor performance.

² CAMRIS with Juárez & Associates, Human Network International, and COBO Construction.

³ Académie d'Éducation (AE) and Centre d'Animation Pédagogique (CAP) are Ministry of Education decentralized services at regional and local levels.

EESA succeeded in meeting or exceeding 81% of the targets for its performance indicators. Unmet targets were related to new enrolments, which fell somewhat short of projections due to security-related constraints as well as due to inadequate tracking at the regional AE/CAP level.

SECTION 3: EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

METHODS

TMG used a mixed methods approach to conduct the final evaluation of the EESA program. These methods included: 1) Document review (see Annex IV for a list of documents reviewed); 2) key informant interviews (KIIs) with teachers and educators at the AE and CAP levels; 3) KIIs with key (former) EESA staff; 4) a parent survey; and 5) interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) at the community/school level. The evaluation team collected data from stakeholders associated with 94 schools in five regions (38% of the 250 schools reached by EESA). The evaluation team faced significant logistical challenges in the field (see limitations section below), including the availability of teachers due to a national teachers strike occurring during the period of data collection. Data collectors convened focus groups when multiple interview subjects were available.

SAMPLING

The evaluation team’s approach to select schools for sampling was based on the following criteria (in order of priority):

- **Security:** The initial list of EESA-supported schools was screened using security criteria several times, using the best available security information from EESA documents and the knowledge of (local) data collectors of their area of residence. Eighty-seven ESSA schools are currently located in “red zone” areas that cannot be safely accessed.
- **Representation** of both remote and centrally located schools.
- **Logistics** and accessibility constraints were important factors determining selection.
- **Availability:** Participants in interviews and focus groups were often selected through opportunistic sampling based on their availability during the national school strike that was taking place during the data collection period.

FIGURE 2: LOCATION OF SAMPLED SCHOOLS

| Region | # Schools Sampled |
|--------------|-------------------|
| Segou | 24 |
| Mopti | 25 |
| Timbuktu | 25 |
| Gao | 15 |
| Kidal | 5 |
| Total | 94 |

In total, the TMG evaluation team visited and interviewed subjects at 94 schools (see Figure 2).

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The evaluation conducted key informant and individual interviews with:

- Students
- Parents
- Teachers
- School Directors
- AE Directors and CAP Directors
- Former EESA staff members
- APE school committee members
- AME school committee members
- CGS community committee members

Demographic disaggregation of evaluation respondents is summarized in the Table 1: Respondents by Gender and Region and Table 2: Respondents by Stakeholder Type.

Table 1: Respondents by Gender and Region

| | Gao | Kidal | Mopti | Ségou | Timbuktu | Total |
|--------------|------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Females | 39 | 11 | 47 | 51 | 40 | 188 |
| | 25% | 31% | 27% | 28% | 24% | 26% |
| Males | 114 | 24 | 126 | 133 | 127 | 524 |
| | 75% | 69% | 73% | 72% | 76% | 74% |
| Total | 153 | 35 | 173 | 184 | 167 | 712 |

Table 2: Respondents by Stakeholder Type

| | AME | APE | CGS | School Director | Student | Teacher | Parents | Total |
|--------------|------------|------------|------------|------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|
| Females | 40 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 116 | 11 | 4 | 188 |
| | 82% | 5% | 4% | 9% | 42% | 16% | 44% | 26% |
| Males | 9 | 38 | 180 | 75 | 158 | 58 | 5 | 524 |
| | 18% | 95% | 96% | 91% | 58% | 84% | 56% | 74% |
| Total | 49 | 40 | 188 | 82 | 274 | 69 | 9 | 712 |

DATA COLLECTION APPROACH

Because of the severe security and logistical constraints, the data collectors were recruited from and deployed to their home regions and areas where they had the most familiarity. Because TMG's core team of evaluation specialists could not safely travel beyond the regional cities of Gao, Mopti, Ségou and Timbuktu, the evaluation depended heavily on the ability of the local data collectors to work independently, exercise flexibility when faced with field challenges and rely on their own best judgment working in a fluid security environment. Before deployment, TMG convened the data collectors as a group for a two-day training that included an orientation and EESA program background, guidelines for interviews and focus group discussions, data and personal security measures, and finalization and

validation of data collection instruments. Data collectors from the Segou, Mopti and Timbuktu regions were trained together. For logistical reasons, the Gao and Kidal-based teams were trained separately in Gao.

During field data collection, the data collectors worked in pairs with one partner charged with facilitating interviews and focus group meetings and the other charged with note-taking. A team leader from among the data collectors was assigned for each region and s/he in turn served as the coordinator and point of contact for the head of Bureau d'Expertise en Sciences Sociales et Culturelles (BESSOC), who served as the field supervisor for the team of data collectors.

DATA SECURITY AND DATA PROCESSING

The evaluation focused on qualitative data. Carrying electronic devices to collect data in the field was determined to be a security risk to data collectors, so hand-written interview and focus group notes were the main method of data capture. At the end of each day of field work, the data collectors reviewed and completed supplemental notes while they were fresh in their minds. The notes were then photographed and sent daily via an SMS-based application to BESSOC's team of Bamako-based transcribers to be transcribed into digital text. These were then processed through simple coding and entered into an MS Excel-based database for analysis.

To ensure the security of the data collectors as well as interview respondents, the original note pages were destroyed once photographs were transmitted and transcription was confirmed; photographs were then deleted from data collector phones.

DATA ANALYSIS

In order to fully capture nuanced qualitative data including illustrative anecdotes, take advantage of the data collectors' observations, and capture information that went beyond the written data notes, TMG convened BESSOC's team of data collectors at the end of the field data collection phase, together with TMG's core team of specialists and Team Leader for intensive debriefings. This resulted in a collective, participatory analysis process. Working in small groups and facilitated by TMG's core evaluation team, the data collectors shared their experiences, validated data from multiple sources and multiple locations, identified preliminary findings, and discussed recommendations provided by stakeholders during interviews and focus group discussions. The process addressed local data collector challenges and took advantage of their first-hand knowledge to capture data and stories from the field. This step enabled the evaluation team to confidently identify and understand the context of key evaluation findings, presented as preliminary findings to USAID/Mali, that are the core of this final evaluation report. The evaluation team also analyzed transcribed field data to capture the range and frequency of stakeholders' responses to questions and to validate findings.

LIMITATIONS AND MITIGATION APPROACHES

The evaluation team was constrained by a number of limitations that are further detailed in Annex II of this report. Limitations were related to a worsening security environment in the field, travel restrictions and available transportation (UNHAS flights) to the data collection regions, and a national teachers strike that limited access to school personnel in most areas. Other limitations were related to a late change in TMG's local data collection partner (BESSOC). While BESSOC was successful in rapid

recruitment and deployment of local data collectors in all five of EESA's regions, their preparation time was limited for preparing data chain protocols and data management. In addition, TMG prepared and submitted an Institutional Review Board application to the National Institute for Research and Public Health in accordance with required protocol in Mali. However, the team did not receive a response from the Institute despite repeated follow-up attempts.

SECTION 4: FINDINGS

The evaluation findings below are organized according to each of the seven evaluation questions according to the three broad lines of inquiry: 1) project implementation, 2) project management, and 3) lessons learned and sustainability. The questions on implementation focus on the school and community levels and their role in EESA's activities and contribution to enabling access to education and academic performance. Evaluation questions related to the project management section focus on governance as well as the degree to which EESA management adapted to the emergency context. The final evaluation question asks about lessons learned and the degree to which EESA activities have continued and achievements retained post-project.

1. To what extent has the EESA Activity contributed to student enrollment and learning outcomes? How did EESA affect parents, education personnel, and community and school-based organizations? To what extent did the project reach its targets of new entrant students? Have results benefited boys and girls differently, if at all?

1.1 Enrollment and Attendance

Training and engagement of parents and school management committees contributed to increasing attendance and improving educational outcomes. According to the final 2018 performance report submitted by CAMRIS, EESA substantially increased school enrollment over the duration of the project, logging a total of 55,073 new enrollments compared to 12,667 new enrollments at baseline in 2016. Of this final figure, 25,967 (47%) of newly registered students were female. To understand how EESA contributed to increasing student enrollment numbers, the evaluation team interviewed school directors, teachers, and members of school management committees.⁴ When asked to name the community-based activities that most incentivized school enrollment and attendance, teachers and school management committee members most frequently cited community mobilization (51%). Other incentives cited included school construction/renovation (29%); distribution of school kits (28%); and training (13%).

Community Mobilization: EESA's collaboration with school management committees was a core element of the EESA model and contributed greatly to its success. Because of the program's training activities, the committees improved their engagement with community members to manage school improvements through small grants, improve attendance, increase girls' enrollment, and monitor teacher performance. EESA trained these committee members to successfully apply community dialogue as a key technique to mobilize large numbers of community leaders, school personnel, and community-based management committees. According to interviews with school management committee members and school

⁴ School management committees (Comité de Gestion Scolaire – CGS) were composed of members of parent-teachers associations (Association des Parents d'Élèves – APE) and student-mothers associations (Association des Mères d'Élèves – AME).

directors, the dialogues successfully enabled communities to strategize solutions that enabled access, resulting in the increase in girls' attendance over the life of the project.

The evaluation found many examples of how community engagement solved problems in the schools. Active school management committee oversight of teacher attendance led to increased enforcement by school directors. For example, in the villages of Sinko Rangaba and Sokolo (Ségou), school management members frequently reported teacher absenteeism to education authorities. In another example in Sondoko, Commune of Djéptodii, EESA addressed community tensions with influential religious leaders threatening to close the school. Through community dialogue, parents who were concerned about their children's schooling developed their own solution to the problem. They collected a monthly fee of CFA 100 per student to pay a Koranic education tutor to provide Koranic courses inside the school to all students. As a result, the conflict was resolved and the community continued to educate their children with assurance from the religious leaders that they would not close the school.

School construction and rehabilitation: The evaluation found that school construction and rehabilitation was also a significant contributor to increased enrollments, especially among girls. In Kabara Sans Fils in the Timbuktu Region, the EESA program constructed the first school building for the community. Prior to this construction, children walked several miles to the nearest village to attend school. The head of the community's school management committee told the EESA evaluation team that the new school had a positive impact on girls' enrollments because families felt more secure sending their daughters to a school in their own village. In Boya Han in the commune of Rharous, EESA provided an informal school structure consisting of a straw shelter with no walls. Despite the temporary school building, parents mentioned that even this type of construction was an incentive for them to send their children to school.

Conversely, the lack of infrastructure was frequently cited by multiple stakeholder interviewed in all regions as disincentives to school enrollment and attendance. For example, the lack of walled enclosures around the area of the schools caused great concern and fear among parents, students, and teachers. Without enclosures, students feel vulnerable to theft, and bullying by outsiders. Respondents also reported that school property was vulnerable to vandalism and theft without enclosures. Many of the school management committee members interviewed were emphatic about the need to add school enclosures to improve security.

The lack of potable water at schools was also reported to have an impact on school attendance. While the EESA program tracked the existence of water sources on school grounds, it did not test or track if these water sources provided clean, potable water. While they may have been provided by EESA, at the time of the evaluation the school of Dogofry Missira in the CAP of Niono had neither latrines nor water sources. Data collectors observed that latrines in schools in Rharous, Banikane, Adiora and Boya Houassa were poorly maintained. In Sondogo, the latrines were not in working order and local student-mothers association (AME) members were fetching water from the village to supply the school. Many survey respondents cited these poor conditions as powerful disincentives for students' attendance.

While EESA's RERA-based design did not include provisions for EESA school feeding, in the majority of the communities, school feeding was cited as an activity that facilitated school enrollment. School management members, teachers and school authorities repeatedly noted that the provision of a school canteen to provide daily meals would be a significant incentive for sending all children to school. According to a more highly placed education official in the Ségou Region, in Dogofry and Diakoura, the presence of school canteens dramatically increased student enrollment. A school management committee president in Timbuktu contended that many families are unable to send their children to school with a daily meal, so parents often kept their children at home instead. Lack of school feeding

was noted as a factor of decreasing enrollment and attendance in some cases.

School kits: EESA distributed school kits to students in all regions. Parents, students, and teachers said the kits had a positive effect on enrollment and frequently cited them as a source of pride for students and parents. FGDs with community-based management committee members across the different regions reinforced that the kits provided incentives for students to attend school. FGDs with members of the school management committees revealed that many parents with limited means were willing to send their children to school because they were able to access the school kits. In some cases, Koranic school leaders requested school kits for their students.

Training: In interviews and focus group discussions with school management committee members, teachers, educational authorities (D/AE and D/CAP) and former EESA staff, the training activities were mentioned as having a major impact on the positive role and contribution that school management committee members played in increasing both educational access and quality. EESA delivered training to school management committee members on how to build awareness around the importance of education, gender inclusion, gender-based violence (GBV) and conflict management. It also delivered skills-building activities around WASH in schools, emergency planning, and the management of school improvement projects supported by small grants. Training that helped build awareness among parents, as well as training that provided school management committee members with tools to directly engage parents, were frequently mentioned as contributing to increased attendance. In interviews and focus group discussions with former EESA staff, school management committee members, teachers, and local educational authorities (Directeurs Académie d'Éducation (D/AE) and Directeurs Centres d'Animation Pédagogique (D/CAP), the trainings were cited as having a major impact on the positive role and contribution on school management committee members leading to increased educational access and quality. AME members said that they were unclear of their role and responsibilities in the education system until they were trained by the project.

1.2 Learning Outcomes

The data collected by focus groups and interviews suggest that training, distribution of teaching material, and community involvement have the greatest impact on learning outcomes. An analysis of that data is provided below. However, the EESA evaluation team was not given access to test scores, grades or other objective data that could corroborate improvements in academic outcomes.

The EESA final evaluation concludes that the three most significant contributing factors to learning outcomes reported were:

- 1) Improved pedagogy because of teacher and school management committee training (46%);
- 2) Provision of teacher kits and student kits (32%); and
- 3) Parent involvement in school activities (13%).

Other contributing factors to learning outcomes included after-hours remedial courses that were organized to help students catch up after extended absences. In addition, EESA small grants financed the installation of solar panels at several schools to allow evening classes to be conducted to reinforce learning in Diora (Ségou), Kabara Sans Fils (Timbuktu), and Dogofry (Mopti). During interviews, EESA staff reflected that while these extra evening classes were a good concept, they were not well integrated into EESA's overall strategy and planning for educational quality.

1.3 Girls' Enrollment

In interviews, school management committee members and teachers and school directors responded overwhelmingly that girls' enrollment had increased.⁵ Evaluators triangulated these responses within a sample of schools. Taken together, responses and sampled data point to the finding that EESA improved the level of girls' enrollment. Anecdotal evidence provided by multiple school level informants suggests that girls' attendance may have improved in some cases. In Ségou Region, those interviewed in Oulan (Boky Wéré, CAP of Macina) reported equal proportions of girls and boys enrolled. Data from Douentza (Mopti), showed that in four schools, girls' enrollment exceeded that of boys (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Oulan School Girls' Enrollment and Boys' Enrollment

| School | Girls' Enrollment Numbers | Boys' Enrollment Numbers |
|--------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| Gallou | 137 | 75 |
| Hombori Bèné | 162 | 133 |
| Sondoko | 109 | 105 |
| Gono | 154 | 100 |

As discussed above in 1.1, community dialogue played an important role in girls' education. AME members cited the important role EESA had in their active promotion of girls' education. The president of the AME in Hombori Bèné, noted that early marriage has also decreased because of EESA activities.

Despite these enrollment achievements, girls' daily attendance in schools remains a challenge. According to principals, many mothers frequently withdraw their daughters from school on a regular basis. For example, the EESA evaluation team learned that school is closed on market days in many locations to enable girls to help their mothers. In the Mopti region, mothers systematically take the girls out of school during planting and harvesting seasons.

Community dialogue used to develop local solutions to girls' enrollment: *EESA facilitated a one-day community dialogue at each school to bring together the Village Council, religious leaders, members of the school associations, women leaders, and teachers. AMCs were trained by education advisors in charge of SCOFI at the AE/CAP level and facilitated each dialogue. The dialogues identified barriers to girls' access and retention in school, and then led participants in a discussion to propose solutions. As follow-up to the dialogue, each school established a Commission with a signed commitment of the members to enact solutions. The EESA project team monitored adherence to all commitments. A total of 6,638 people (3,682 M, 2,956 F) participated in the community dialogues across the five regions. Each participating community signed a commitment document that is to be reviewed periodically for implementation.*

2. How did the project affect parents and education personnel? Based on beneficiaries' perspectives, to what extent did capacity-building efforts for education personnel and parents meet beneficiaries' needs, increase knowledge and skills, and change behaviors/teaching practices?

EESA's capacity building activities were developed based on a 2016 Rapid Education and Risk Analysis (RERA) conducted before the project. Their capacity building approach paired skills building to increase knowledge-sharing and tangible incentives (school kits, small grants, and infrastructure improvements) to

⁵ It is important to note that although enrollment data is frequently referenced to document educational attainment for girls, daily attendance data can be a more meaningful indicator of girls' opportunity to learn and participate in school. Unfortunately, the evaluators attempted, but were unable to procure verifiable attendance data from EESA schools or regional MEN offices.

encourage community participation in the management of their schools. The evaluation found ample evidence of those improved capacities being applied by educators, community management committees, and local leaders to resolve conflict and improve the management of their schools.

2.1 Increasing Knowledge and Skills

The EESA evaluation found that 98% of educational personnel and CGS/APE/AME members interviewed reported that EESA's capacity building activities were aligned with their needs.

Conflict Management: EESA targeted school principals and teachers to develop their knowledge and skills related to civil protection and security, conflict-sensitivity in education, preventing and eliminating school-related gender-based violence (SRGBV), resiliency, inclusion, culture of peace in education, and conflict transformation. Educators were trained how to recognize signs of distress in students, psychosocial support techniques, and improving health and hygiene practices in schools. School and community committee members were also trained on topics of security, SRGBV, and, most importantly, how to conduct community dialogue (more below). CGS members cited their enhanced ability to respond to threats from armed groups, enabling them to keep their schools open. Training for AME members led to them forming support groups for traumatized students. However, despite EESA's efforts, there are areas where communities remain hostile to secular education, particularly among some ethnic groups in some areas of the Mopti region.

Community Management of Schools: One of the most important and successful elements of the EESA activity was its focus on equipping and empowering community-based organizations with the skills to manage their schools. EESA addressed capacity gaps through training modules related to school management, promoting ownership over schools, and active engagement of the community by community organizations and educational personnel. There is general agreement from these stakeholders that these capacity building activities contributed to their increased awareness of their responsibility in management of their schools, enabling them to take an active role in school planning and management. This was corroborated by interviews with D/AEs, and D/CAPs. EESA trained members of CGS, APE, and AMEs in their roles and responsibilities in school management, SRGBV, improving student security, and health and hygiene practices. EESA then enabled these trainees to apply their skills through their support to the development and implementation of School Improvement Plans (SIPs) such as infrastructure repairs or other needs as identified by the CGS members. EESA's capacity building efforts also empowered CGS members to activate their consultative role with the educational authorities within their local government (referred to as "les Collectivités"). EESA-supported CGSs worked with mayors and signed a Mutual Assistance Agreement which was ignored before the EESA activities began.⁶

EESA's capacity building of AMEs focused on the following areas:

- The rights of children
- Girls' enrollment
- Reduction of GBV that occurs within or in route to/from schools
- Preventing harmful practices such as early marriage and the female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C)
- The importance of staying in school

⁶ The Mutual Assistance Agreement is a convention that local government signs with CGS whereby CGS are granted a quarterly subsidy for the management of the local school. Many CGS fail to sign it because they are not even aware of the existence of such an opportunity.

- Support for underperforming students in the classroom
- Organizing recreational activities and promoting children’s right to play

The discussions and interviews with AME members revealed that they appreciated the opportunity to participate in training activities that were designed specifically for them and reported that it changed their social status in the community. They noted that their opinions on early marriage and girls’ education have changed, and that they are now respected as influential decision-makers by community leaders. In the community of Hombori, mothers who participated in EESA’s AME training activities are now opposed to early marriage despite heavy societal pressure.

This training also had an impact on the larger community around the school, most importantly parents. Parents reported being active participants in school management and planning in many locations. In interviews, they demonstrated their perceptions on the importance of school, and local efforts to keep their schools open in the face of security threats. 43% of parents interviewed also reported the importance of school and the need for their engagement. 32% of parents reported changes in WASH practices and gender attitudes among themselves and other family members. 25% of parents reported increased vigilance against gender-based harassment.

The difference made by training and a school in Timbuktu

Kabara Sans Fils is a small village in the Timbuktu region that did not have a community school building until the EESA program constructed one. Children from the community had to walk long distances to access schools in neighboring communities. As a result of EESA’s activities, the village Chief was nominated to become the President of the CGS, and in this role, he quickly realized the benefit that a school building would have on his community. With skills developed in EESA capacity building efforts, he mobilized the community to contribute to the installation of solar panels at the new school. They pro-actively problem solved the installation, ensuring that the panels were installed on the school’s rooftop to prevent vandalism.

In recognition of the difference that EESA programming has made in the village, the President of the CGS stated, “All of our children are now going to school because they know we are protecting them. Even though the teachers are striking, they still come to school in the evening to help the students. I didn’t receive any training before EESA, but I realized the benefits of gender sensitization and the benefits of managing our local school. I never thought that someone who had never been to school could manage a school. With this training, we are all committed to making the school a success.”

2.2 Teaching Practices

In general, EESA’s capacity building activities were reported as being highly valued among teachers at both the community and Ministry levels. EESA training modules have been integrated as part of the initial national teacher training curriculum with the Teacher Training Institute (Institut de Formation des Maîtres - IFM). Despite these achievements, some teachers, school principals and D/CAP and D/AE noted that training of trainer activities were unsuccessful as some school principals were unable to later transfer their training to the teachers. Likewise, some teachers were unable to pass new knowledge gained from their training on to their students.

Because of EESA activities, teachers reported their increased awareness and engagement with subjects related to training on WASH, gender, sexually-related GBV, and security enhancement. Teachers unanimously reported that they were previously unaware of the relevance of these issues to their students’ education. Principals and teachers cited the most significant among EESA’s capacity building subjects as resulting in skills enhancements as follows:

| Which training subject strengthened your skills most? | % of respondents citing subject |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| Pedagogy | 31% |
| Planning and Management | 28% |
| WASH in Schools | 15% |
| Gender Sensitivity | 14% |
| Security and emergency planning | 7% |
| Promoting the awareness of the importance of education | 6% |

D/AE, D/CAP and activity point of contact (POC) interviewees also mentioned improvements in skills related to teacher interactions with students and providing psychosocial support to students. They reported seeing changes in teachers treating students with more dignity and gender-sensitivity. A teacher in an FGD in Timbuktu Region recounted a story that, after he received training on psychosocial support, he reported a student’s behavior to the principal. Based on his training, he later realized that what he had always considered as laziness in the student was an expression of distress due to a conflict situation at home. The issue was discussed with the parents and the student experienced a transformation that the teacher reported included excellent learning results.

2.3 Mobile Technology

The EESA project team reported challenges with applying mobile technology solutions in their final program report. These challenges related to poor Internet connectivity that limited the type of content that could be communicated (such as performance data). The EESA program used a mobile application called “Data Winners” that enabled AMCs to directly report to EESA’s project management staff. The GPS-enabled application allowed EESA management to track the location of AMCs and the schools they were interacting with. The EESA program distributed smartphones to the 20 participating CAPs to facilitate their participation in MOE services. The phones were provided with Orange sim cards, and additional SIM cards were distributed to CGS members, allowing them to receive money transfers of small grant funds through the Orange Money platform to implement their action plans. The EESA program also operated an informational 3-2-1 number through Orange telecom. However, EESA staff noted that the MOE reluctant to buy into the 3-2-1 system due to upcoming elections, and as a result, Orange delayed the launch until after EESA had ended field activities, and the number has since been disconnected. Thus, the evaluation concludes that while mobile technology did enhance project management to a limited degree, it did not have any sustainable impact on the education system at the local level.

3. To what extent have the project activities contributed to building capacity of community and school management committees? To what extent have the project activities contributed to empowering community- and school-based management committees? How has this influenced the quality of primary schooling?

EESA worked directly with school management committees in all 250 schools to build capacity in planning and school governance. The project also provided training in key subject areas such as WASH practices in schools, gender sensitization, security awareness and planning, school improvement projects and plans, and pedagogy. EESA took a participatory approach involving all school and community stakeholders to increase engagement in managing their school. According to interview respondents, EESA training with CGS, APE, and AMEs, particularly training that focused on their roles and responsibilities, resulted in parents taking an active role in school management, and working together with principals and teachers to improve attendance and learning outcomes.

One example shared by the DNEF-Adjoint concerned the CAPS of the Niono and Macina (Ségou Region) schools that had closed after a local crisis event. Following a community dialogue process that had been introduced by EESA training, without any external intervention, the local stakeholders including traditional and religious leaders, CGS, teachers and school directors met, discussed a security and management plan, and reopened the schools. He credited EESA with “saving the schools” through its contribution to improved management and planning skills among community stakeholders.

However, EESA did experience some limitations in their capacity building work with the CGS, APE, and AMEs. In many cases, CGS had difficulty in fully developing action plans and implementing school projects on their own without significant assistance from EESA technical staff. Some AMEs stated that they were unclear of their role even after EESA training. For the evaluation team, this can be attributed to a lack of post-training follow-up, inherent to the short duration of the project. Indeed, the CGS had only one opportunity to

develop action plans, many of which were seriously delayed by administrative procedures.

EESA was successful in establishing relationships between the CGS, APE, AMEs and school personnel for activity planning, and oversight in many schools. Of those interviewed, 47% of the respondents reported that they were adequately prepared to play a supervisory role in school management. In some cases, where the teachers are paid through the communities rather than the government, they have not participated in the national strikes, and the CGSs have been able to maintain educational continuity. CGS, APE, and AME interviewees made frequent mention of the positive influence that capacity building had on the quality of primary education.

According to several School Directors, the CGS enhanced oversight roles also improved educational quality by reducing teacher absenteeism, improving student attendance, reducing attrition, and enforcing regular classroom hours. Moreover, remedial lessons outside normal school hours in several of the schools visited allowed students who had extensive absences to catch up to their classmates. In some cases, CGSs facilitated electrification of classrooms and other school improvements using EESA small grant funding. The local CGS committees were also able to reflect community values by introducing new approaches to education. For example, in Sondoko, the CGS initiated Koranic teaching before normal classroom hours to accommodate religious concerns and enable the continuation of secular school activities.

In Dogofry, the CGS established a monthly payment of 500 FCFA per household to support a canteen to provide students with a daily meal. As noted previously in this report, interviewees stated that the daily provision of meals at school had a positive impact on school attendance.

4. What was the contribution of project management approaches (e.g. establishing the project headquarters in the Region of Segou and embedding the activity within the Ministry of Education) on overall activity results?

EESA's decentralized management approach of working at the regional level with the AEs and CAPs gave it legitimacy and legality within the framework of the MOE. As a result, EESA's points of contact in the community were able to efficiently and effectively facilitate communications and priorities between the EESA activity, the regional authorities, and Ministry staff in EESA training. The DNEF, the DNP and the DNEN were designated as EESA points of contact with the MOE at the department level. These POCs enabled:

- Adaptation of learning content to meet international standards (Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies - INEE).
- The integration of the project training modules into the curriculum of the *Institut de Formation des Maîtres* for pre-service training and continuing education.

- Training of trainers within the MEN (Teachers' Institute) with Education in Emergency Situations (including psychosocial support, culture of peace, gender sensitivity, and GBV).

The AMCs were the backbone of the operational implementation of EESA. They worked in their home areas, which enabled them to maintain operational continuity of the EESA activity despite Mali's insecure environment. For example, when motorcycle traffic was prohibited for security reasons, the AMCs continued to operate using public transport. In turn, the AMCs were in constant contact with EESA's headquarters and shared data in real time using EESA's Data Winners management information system. They monitored the progress of activities at the local level, including providing direct oversight of the use of small grant funding implemented by the CGS.

There were several cases where AMCs successfully intervened to prevent the inappropriate use of funds and procured materials.

Senior program staff, AEs and CAPs regarded the location of EESA being based in Segou as a positive contribution to the Activity's success. Segou offered many management advantages including access to vendors, quick and easy access to project sites in other regions, and availability of meeting space to convene trainings. However, EESA did experience some difficulties with recruitment of senior staff who were reluctant to relocate from Bamako to Segou. Overall, respondents cited it as a positive decision to locate EESA's main office in Segou rather than in Bamako.

5. What factors enabled or inhibited project implementation and the achievement of Activity results?

5.1 Enabling Factors

An important strategy enabling EESA's success was its coordination with the regional MEN services. The activity had an office in each AE with a point of contact to coordinate actions with the MEN at the regional level. Smartphones facilitated communication between the POC at the CAP level and EESA staff. Another key factor, as noted above, was EESA's use of community-embedded AMCs as change agents who provided ongoing, person-to-person coaching, guidance and support to the CGSs. Each AMC was assigned five schools. They developed mutual support with the communities, which enabled activities to be carried out, some of which were held at night or during difficult circumstances. For example, as an AMC from the Ségou region recalled, she just needed to call a President of the CGS and he would escort her from the bus to the village. According to the AMCs and the EESA coordinators, this support and close working relationships were key elements to EESA's successful implementation at the community level. Teacher interviews also confirmed that the AMCs played a key role in achieving results. As a teacher said, "Without the AMCs, the implementation of this project would be difficult. The do-it-yourself approach could not work since we were in an emergency." The AMCs worked directly with the CGSs who were key community stakeholders that enabled EESA's successful implementation.

EESA's decentralized model, which enabled project activities to be led by community members (CGSs) themselves, enabled stakeholder ownership over education-related planning and activities. This ownership was a particularly important enabling factor in an insecure and challenging environment where the lack of resources, capacity and infrastructure served as overarching challenges to the achievement of results. As one AMC pointed out to a CGS committee, "This is your school, we are just here to support you in building it up, helping to reopen, build, rehabilitate, and recruit teachers". This ownership enabled the CGSs to see the direct benefits for their work within their communities. EESA's approach to grassroots engagement with communities was a decisive factor in achieving results.

A large majority (91%) of school principals and teachers said that providing school kits and constructing or rehabilitating classrooms also boosted buy-in from communities for their schools. As D/CAP for Sévaré stated, “high visibility of USAID kits arouses admiration within a population of girls and boys and makes them want to go to school.”

EESA’s ability to be flexible in choosing schools to work with was an important factor that enabled project results. The selections were based on security and accessibility concerns from an initial list that was made based on other criteria in the 2016 RERA study. This allowed the activity to successfully adapt to Mali’s fluid security environment. For example, the Tenenkou and Youwarou CAPs were at high security risk. EESA management, with USAID/Mali’s concurrence, shifted personnel and resources to the CAPs of Djenné and Sofara. Similarly, NTilit Nord was initially chosen for school construction but could not be built due to difficulty in accessing water. Therefore, the EESA project was still able to achieve its results by transferring construction activities to Ansongo II. EESA built a single classroom rather than a block of three rooms at NTilit Nord. This had the effect of exceeding the target of 60 classes and instead achieving 61. EESA created local buy-in during the construction phases of the program by bringing together local community leaders, CGSs, and other stakeholders to discuss location, timelines, and other key factors before school sites were selected.

5.2 Constraining Factors

A key inhibiting factor was EESA’s short effective period of performance in launching field activities after the RERA study and recruitment of key personnel and local AMCs had been completed, a process that took nearly nine months. The recruitment of AMCs took more time than anticipated and did not conclude until July 2016. School selection was not completed, and activities did not begin until September 2016. . This nine-month delay shortened the effective duration of the project and reduced the available time for interventions to take root in communities. Repeated teachers’ strikes also negatively impacted project planning and implementation, even more than security issues. As the EESA coordinator for the Timbuktu region noted, striking teachers often attended training, but the overall number of teaching days in the classroom were limited and, thus, the EESA activity had only limited impact on education quality.

The prevailing security environment was an inhibiting factor on EESA’s results. EESA was designed as a transitional post-conflict activity predicated on the relative calm following the Algiers Agreements.

In January 2017, the President of Mali instituted restrictions on transportation, including the prohibition of two-wheeled vehicles in the Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal and the northern part of Segou as part of Mali’s DAMBE operation against terrorism. As a result, EESA’s AMCs, who had at first been able to reach two or three schools each day using their motorcycles, were forced to use public transportation, which was only available on market days. In areas where public transport is scarce, AMCs used donkey carts and other rudimentary means of transportation that were not subject to the travel ban. This constrained EESA’s ability to plan and implement community-based activities in many, particularly more rural, areas.

However, Mali has since returned to a state of intermittent, localized violence and crisis. EESA staff who were interviewed noted that many EESA communities were in a constant state of high alert. The prohibition of motorcycles caused delays in the work of AMCs as they were forced to use public transportation which extended their travel time. Very few of the 250 EESA schools had to close for security reasons. However, the prevailing security situation led to displacements in populations toward EESA schools. As

interviews with EESA staff, principals and teachers revealed, this displacement led to overcrowded classrooms, specifically in the areas of Tinéma, Macina; Ansongo, Timbuktu as well as Bel de Najji,

Diabaly; Drimbé and Galou, Douentza in the Mopti region. In addition to security problems, flooding of schools in the Mopti region also limited program results.

EESA also faced significant cultural and religious barriers for educational activities in some communities. The majority (89%) of school principals, teachers and CGS/APE/AME members, cited gender attitudes around early marriage for girls, and conflict between more secular versus religious education approaches that hindered the implementation of the project. In some locations, influential ethnic groups and nomadic groups are reluctant to educate girls and boys in a secular system. In addition, the practice of early marriage, despite being a key EESA intervention area, still prevails (e.g., some areas within the Mopti region), and prevents school-aged girls from exercising their right to education.

According to several D/CAPs interviewed, TOT for teacher training was discontinued in several schools because school principals did not achieve skill levels during their own TOT workshops to provide enough training or guidance to their teachers.

While security forces were the targets for more than half the security incidents in Mali during EESA implementation, the remainder of the targets were civilian. In each of the five Northern regions where EESA operated, attacks included killings, kidnapping, rapes, robberies, and other serious crimes against persons.

An inhibiting factor to the sustainability of results relates to the mobility of school principals and teachers. D/AEs in Ségou, Mopti, Timbuktu, and Gao complained that teachers or school principals trained to support project activities were transferred from their posts, often without the knowledge of the academic authorities. While the schools were supervised under the Ministry of Education, personnel management of the teachers themselves was under the Mayors, who are under the supervision of a different ministry (Ministry of Decentralization); the two governing ministries often did not coordinate or communicate the transfer of teachers between

different schools. Another inhibiting factor on EESA was that new students can only be enrolled every two years thereby skewing student enrollment numbers.

6. How effectively did EESA adapt to the evolving security situation? To what extent did the insecurity impact the implementation of the project?

Security incidents are frequent and serious in Mali. In a single quarter, EESA's security reports listed a total of 71 attacks, most of which were in the Northern regions where EESA operated. Although EESA was initially designed as a *post-conflict* activity, Mali's actual level of conflict, particularly in the North, worsened during EESA's period of performance to a state much closer to *conflict* level.⁷ This caused frequent disruption to programmed activities.

6.1 Impact of Security on EESA Implementation and Operations

Despite the significant operating constraints due to its security context, EESA implemented all planned activities and achieved or exceeded all but one of its targeted results, which was related to enrollment. From the outset, EESA continually adjusted programmed activities and plans to respond to the realities of the security context. Even at start-up, decisions around the inclusion of schools in the program were based on on-going security events and access challenges. Former EESA staff indicated in interviews that

⁷ For a cross-country analytical framework for measuring and categorizing conflict and governance in fragile states, see for example, UNDP, 2012, [Governance Measurements for Conflict and Fragility](#): a comparative inventory. For data on security incidents in Mali, see EESA 2018 Annual Report, Annex 3: "Security Incidents in FY 2018 Q1, Q2, Q3" as reported in the United Nations Quarterly Security Report. These data are also included in an annex to this report. Data for EESA schools is also included in the annexes.

approximately 50 schools that were initially designated as project sites were immediately removed from implementation once it was determined that the risks to staff and project assets were too high to implement project activities. EESA management, in consultation with USAID/Mali, substituted initial proposed locations with communities and schools in Tenenkou and Youwarou in the Mopti region with other locations in Sofara. In all five regions, project activities were constrained at certain times throughout the life of project (LOP), specifically in terms of access, logistical arrangements, and regulations put in place by authorities to respond to security incidents. Overall, although EESA's project management generally adapted well in response to changing conflict situations, some former EESA staff members indicated that their agility in terms of timely responses to a rapidly changing security environment was somewhat constrained by the need to balance contractual performance outcome measures with the desire to act in a more "rapid response" manner.

6.2 Emergency Planning

EESA conducted security training for teaching staff to prepare teachers to address external security threats in creative ways. One example comes from the community of Kouna, Macina. Teachers there held classes at night to give nearby members of extremist groups the impression, observing the school during the day, that the school was completely closed. Another example, shared by teachers in EESA schools, is that they responded to the increased risk of armed groups during crowded market days, which are often held on a weekday, by closing schools on those days and holding classes during the weekends instead. Many teachers also spoke of how training enhanced their skills to detect signs of distress in learners and how to provide psychosocial support resulting from security events. Despite this, there is also some evidence from interviews with principals, teachers, and D/CAPs that EESA program participants did not necessarily draw a direct connection between EESA's overall objectives to improve education in emergency contexts and the utility of emergency planning for potential events. Interviewees in Niono, Macina, Bourem and Ansongo, for example, acknowledged that they did not take into consideration how advanced emergency planning could better enable them to maintain educational services. EESA's security-related constraints with USAID branding and marking may have also prevented recognition of the program.

6.3 Continuity of Instruction

Despite the security context, schools in most project sites remained open during the entirety of EESA's implementation period. The exception to this were schools located in Beldhanadji in Ségou, and Ber in Timbuktu. The Beldhanadji School, which is in a highly unstable area,⁸ was closed for 6 months during EESA implementation and had not yet reopened as of 2019. The school in Ber was closed and reopened twice as a precautionary measure during the project implementation period. There were no cases reported throughout the five regions where school activities were moved to alternative facilities in response to security threats.

In addition to security problems, teachers' strikes also had a great effect on school disruptions, as reported by interview subjects from all five regions. For example, as reported by EESA's Chief of Party, some activities were delayed or could not be implemented as planned when, as a result of a strike, some teachers would leave their posts, effectively closing their schools.

⁸ The school was in Diabaly, a small town and rural commune in the Cercle of Niono in the Ségou Region. Many former residents of Diabaly were, at the time of the evaluation, internally displaced persons (IDP) residing in Dogofry, which is also in Niono Cercle.

7. How sustainable are EESA achievements? What strategies and approaches did EESA use to promote the sustainability of outcomes and how successful those have been?

Sustainability of project achievements should be analyzed considering the first nine months of the activity were focused on needs assessment and recruitment. As programming was not initiated in communities until nine months after the award, EESA's work in targeted schools was just two years in duration. Therefore, EESA faced an inherent limitation in terms of sustainability in its intended sub-intermediate results (sub-IR). In answer to the question on sustainability, this section discusses three primary categories of evidence related to sustainability, namely: 1) how capacity building has sustained behavior change; 2) the importance of supporting education through emergency planning; and, 3) sustained changes in national policy.

7.1 Capacity Building Sustained Behavior Change

The EESA final evaluation revealed evidence of sustainable shifts in perspectives and attitudes among teachers and principals because of EESA capacity building efforts. Most notably, perspectives and application of skills in the areas of education in emergency (EIE), gender and GBV, WASH, conflict management and the culture of peace shifted as a result. Teachers reported an increased awareness on gender equity which transferred to approaches in the classroom. For example, teachers reporting employing more equitable distribution of classroom chores among all students which had primarily been carried out by girls in the past. Training in EIE also enabled teachers to better understand how to support students in distress and to cope with security threats.

The training for school management committee members resulted in sustained engagement of the community in the management of their schools, efforts that have continued well beyond the completion of EESA activities. Several CGSs instilled a small user payment to maintain the water pumps on school properties. The CGSs routinely collect a monthly fee of 500 CFA francs from each household to maintain the school. Parents and teachers indicated that hygiene habits promoted by EESA continue to be practiced and are reinforced in both schools and households.

While school construction and infrastructure rehabilitation were Activity outputs, EESA's approach to build community capacity to develop SIP plans and implement them has continued to act as a strong incentive for student enrollment and attendance. Conversely, where these infrastructure elements are still missing (or deemed inadequate) there is evidence that this problem acts as a disincentive to enrollment and attendance.

At the national level, the pedagogy practices within EESA's training modules for MEN personnel have been integrated into the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) teacher training curricula throughout Mali. This includes a training of trainer's curricula specific to education in emergency situations. The comprehensive curriculum includes elements of psychosocial support, the culture of peace, gender sensitivity and GBV, particularly sexual violence.

7.2 Emergency Planning

Emergency planning was a critical element of EESA activities. It was envisioned to build resiliency within communities to minimize interruptions in education in the future. However, the EESA final evaluation did not demonstrate evidence of sustainability in continued emergency planning processes. EESA supported planning processes with CGSs resulting in the development of emergency plans. However, the team did not find any evidence in any location of the plans being tested or implemented in an actual emergency scenario.

Similarly, the EESA final evaluation concludes that EESA's emergency planning activities with the MEN have not resulted in sustained planning processes. Interviews with MEN did not reveal any evidence of ongoing emergency planning in response to security issues in several of the locations where EESA was implemented. Therefore, the evaluation cannot determine the sustainability of these activities at the level of MEN and the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD).

7.3 National Policies

In addition to its work with the MEN, EESA's activities with the MATD included signing of Mutual Assistance Agreements (MAA) with the CGSs of EESA schools. The MAA codifies sharing resources and other assistance in emergencies between CAPs. While there is no evidence these agreements are being implemented, their existence may be considered evidence that policies are evolving toward sustainable, mutual support between communities and regional authorities. Similarly, CGS action plans developed with EESA's support have been integrated into the Local Government Social, Economic and Cultural Development Plan (PDSEC) that enables school communities to direct their own development planning.

SECTION 5: CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation concludes that EESA's activity components, namely: 1) supporting school infrastructure; 2) building community stakeholder and MEN capacity; and 3) providing school kits and teachers kits to students, contributed to achieving increased primary school enrollments, particularly for girls.

EESA's work with school committees brought about fundamental changes in active engagement at both the school level (with school directors and teachers) and MEN level (with AE and CAP officials). According to many respondents, this increased engagement, together with enhanced skills resulting from EESA trainings, contributed to improved attendance, reduced teacher absenteeism, and enhanced girls' safety and classroom comfort. EESA's approach to working in the communities using AMCs also enabled effective continuity during crisis periods.

EESA achieved success in its work with school management committees by building the capacity of key community partners, while also strengthening their ability to assume their roles and responsibilities. As a result, CGS members were able to take charge of local schools and are now equipped with the skills and tools to continue to manage them. However, the short duration of EESA's direct work with the CGS on the management of schools limited some aspects of its potential sustainability. For example, it is not clear whether CGSs currently possess skills for the design of school improvement plans or that their commitment to promote schooling will be able to endure without external support.

EESA's community mobilization strategy of using AMCs was an effective contribution to constructive dialogue leading to support for EESA schools in some communities that were previously divided in their support for secular schools, especially for girls' participation and mixed-gender classrooms. Many school and community respondents indicated that AMCs were effective in instilling a lasting influence. However, according to some school and community members interviewed, because of the relatively long gap between the end of EESA activities and the evaluation site visits, there was some deterioration of the attitudes in regard to support for secular education and gender that EESA promoted.

EESA's infrastructure support functioned as an important platform that its other interventions depended on. New or rehabilitated schools were important both for tangible reasons, providing students with a viable learning environment, and symbolically, as a source of pride and focal point for communities to engage with Mali's education system to benefit their own local children. Improved water sources and

latrines were effective in increasing student health and safety, especially for girls. WASH training successfully resulted in changed behaviors among students at school and, as a side benefit, also extended to better hygiene habits at home. EESA's capacity building efforts with community-based management committees were successful in promoting emergency education planning, school improvement planning and in promoting creative solutions to security problems and school management challenges.

EESA also improved teachers' skills and shifted attitudes in areas such as girls' education, conflict management, school-based and gender-based violence as well as core competencies such as classroom management and pedagogy. While such subject areas were perceived as valuable, the training of trainers "cascading" model met with mixed success because the trainings offered were not always well matched to participants' experience and skill levels. After-hours remedial classes for students, while regarded by most parents and teachers as a good idea, were limited in scale and only implemented in a few schools. Moreover, these classes sometimes had the unintended consequence of being substitute opportunities for students who were not attending regular classes.

EESA was perceived as having a high level of legitimacy by Malian authorities as well as with the community and school-based organizations with whom it cooperated. Capacity building and coordination at the regional MEN level also promoted the sustainability of EESA's interventions. Although it is still too early to determine the ability of MEN to continue activities without continued follow-up support, MEN did integrate EESA's extensive education in emergency training modules into pre-service teacher training. Even in the absence of the EESA project, the training modules are now mainstreamed into MEN's approach, and according to several education officials interviewed for this evaluation, are expected to be used across all of Mali.

Security and crises have affected EESA's communities, sometimes severely. As a result, the unstable security situation has affected the sustainability of its results in some locations. While the stakeholders reported relatively few EESA school closures during the implementation period, in the time since EESA's completion, some communities served by EESA have become completely inaccessible. Therefore, the reported lack of school closures may not reflect the degree to which the schools were affected by frequent violence, including threats or perceived threats of violent events.

Importantly, using school closures and disruptions as an indicator of relative security levels, even in an educational context, may understate how insecurity affects schools. For example, many interview respondents indicate that building enclosures around schools can make a substantive difference. While EESA's infrastructure reflected MOE building guidelines (which did not include a requirement for school enclosures), respondents frequently mentioned the lack of enclosures around many schools as a serious problem exposing vulnerable children to local hoodlums and petty thieves.

In some cases, the fear of potential or quotidian violence can be nearly as psychologically damaging as actual violence or threats. Even where actual incidents were infrequent, perceptions and fears were still a serious constraint to parents' and students' motivation to attend school. For this reason, psychosocial support, an important EESA element, contributed to mitigating some psychological insecurity affecting students.

SECTION 6: RECOMMENDATIONS

EESA's largest component—new school construction and rehabilitation of existing schools has leveraged other progress within the Malian education system. Based on EESA's experience, recommendations include:

#1. Support for school infrastructure construction and rehabilitation should be encouraged.

A key contributor to EESA's overall success was its support for school- and community-based management committees, which was particularly important in rural communities. Community mobilization agents were especially important, but, as EESA's employees, ceased operations after EESA's closure.

#2. Continue to use the model of community mobilization agents to support school-based and community-based management committees.

The evaluation found a key EESA element of sustainability was its contribution to management and oversight capacity with regional education academies. EESA helped education officers better integrate their work with community- and school-level management committees in such areas as emergency planning, pedagogy training and school oversight. Moreover, EESA's training modules and curricula have been integrated into standard training for education in emergencies at the national level. EESA's inclusion of, and close working relationships with, regional and local education authorities was mutually beneficial. It not only enhanced the legitimacy of the activity; it also promoted deeper engagement between education authorities and community- and school-level management committees.

#3. Involve education authorities with community- and school-level management committees.

Psychosocial support, an important EESA element, contributed to mitigating some psychological insecurity affecting students.

#4. Reinforce psychosocial counseling and training in conflict-affected communities and schools.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The Contractor will conduct the performance evaluation of two USAID/Mali funded project for Education Office's Emergency Support Activity (EESA) as specifically detailed in Section C. The evaluation will help determine what final course recommendations are needed as well as inform the design of future projects.

BACKGROUND

The north of Mali has experienced unprecedented levels of conflict and destruction. Armed groups with conflicting agendas occupied the northern towns of Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao, removing more than a third of the country's territory from the central government's control. Islamist groups discouraged attendance at formal schools and destroyed or closed many schools; in other areas, the army and/or the jihadists took over schools to serve as temporary bases for commando raids and military operations. For close to a year, (until the successful democratic election in 2013), there was almost no access to school in any of the country's northern territories. The conflict resulted in learners missing years of schooling, lack of learning materials, exodus of qualified teachers, and traumatized teachers, learners, and families. According to the GOM's Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali (2013-2014), some 800,000 school age children affected by the conflict do not have access to education and need a suitable pedagogical approach. 2,486 schools should be reconstructed, and 2,486 school directors and 12,578 teachers need to be trained on education during emergencies.

Through this award, the contractor assisted the GOM's short-term plan to restore education venues, services and system capacity while leveraging the already high level of community engagement in education in Mali. The purpose was to ensure that schools are safe and accessible for all primary education learners (1st grade through 6th grade). Also, the contractor contributed to building the capacity of the Ministry of Education (MOE), communities, and schools to respond appropriately to emergency situations. The common thread among these elements is that they helped learners resume school in safe learning environments and catch up with the loss of schooling due to the conflict regardless of their gender, social status, and ethnic groups.


The Education Emergency Support Activity (EESA) project provided technical assistance and services to support the Government of Mali (GOM) to restore education venues, services, and system capacity for children in conflict-affected regions. It also had to leverage the already high level of community engagement in education in Mali to ensure that schools were safe and accessible for all learners, and built the capacity of the MOE, communities and schools to respond appropriately to emergency situations caused by armed conflict, crisis, or natural disasters. The USAID-EESA project was funded by USAID for a period of 3 years and implemented in 250 schools in the regions of Segou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. The total estimated cost of EESA plus fixed fee is \$14,575,565.

After the institutional crisis and the violent armed conflict that devastated the Northern regions in 2012, the government of Mali (GOM) struggles to provide quality basic services that promote the protection and development of children. The conflict has had a disproportionate negative impact on Mali's most vulnerable citizens – children, and caused displacement, lack of educational opportunities, increased protection risks, particularly gender-based violence, eroded state power and hindered community ability to ensure child wellbeing. With a total population estimated at 18, 000,000, Mali has a rapidly growing population of children (3 percent of total annual growth rate). An estimated 54 percent of the population is under the age of 18, and the future economic development, security and wellbeing of Mali and its children are

in peril if the education and training needs for children are not met. However, the development of recent peace negotiations and stabilization initiatives in northern Mali and increased government commitment to the education sector are strong indicators that now is the right time for increased investment to support the Malian education sector to address the effects of violent conflict.

The main objective of EESA is to achieve a measurable increase of equitable access to basic education for 80,000 returned and resident learners who have been affected by the crisis and conflict in Mali through three intermediate results as shown below:

1. Increased availability of safe and accessible primary schooling
2. Improved delivery of conflict-sensitive basic educational services
3. Institutional capacity to deliver educational services in conflict affected environment strengthened.



Activity Implementation Approach:

In the design and implementation of activities under this contract, the contractor was responsible for:

- Addressing the gender issues in C.2.I above in each activity and deliverable;
- Providing technical assistance for the implementation of the Project Results, including administrative, financial, and technical supervision and coordination to ensure the achievement of agreed-upon results;
- Procuring all project-funded commodities and supervising all sub-s and/or grantees carrying out tasks associated with the achievement of project objectives;
- Strengthening the organizational, managerial, and technical capabilities of the MOE at the national and district level; Promoting the development of effective learner policies

and strategies capable of increasing equitable access to education in crisis and conflict environments;

- Coordinating activities and supporting effective communication channels between Ministry partners at national, district, and school levels; as well as between the Ministry, non-Ministry partners, and project beneficiaries;
- Anticipating and resolving challenges that might hinder activity implementation in a proactive and timely manner so that interventions are not jeopardized;
- Timely delivery of all agreed-upon reporting requirements, and distribution to USAID/Mali of all analytical studies and materials developed during the course of activity implementation;
- Effective monitoring and reporting of activity impact, especially the collection and reporting of data on performance indicators;
- Complying with USAID’s branding policy and regularly submitting stories, photographs, and other means of sharing project successes with the public;
- Maintaining open and regular communication with USAID/Mali and attending workshops or meetings that promote synergy or the exchange of ideas and information between USAID/Mali’s implementing partners.

SUMMARY INFORMATION

Program being evaluated:

| | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Strategy/Project/Activity Name | Education Emergency Support Activity |
| Implementer | CAMRIS International, Inc. |
| Cooperative Contract # | AID-688-C-16-00001 |
| Total Estimated of Ceiling Evaluated | \$14,575,565 |
| Life of Strategy, Project Activity or | January 2016 – December 2018 |
| Active Geographic Regions | Segou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal |
| Development Objective(s) | Stabilization in Conflict Affected Areas Reinforced |
| USAID Office | USAID/Mali |

SCOPE

The Contractor will:

- Assess how well the project achieved the goal of restoring primary education in five conflict- affected regions in Mali (Segou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal);
- Examine how and the extent to which the Activity impacted targeted beneficiaries and factors that may have contributed to the Activity successes or challenges, including the Activity implementation and management approaches;
- Examine the long-term sustainability of Activity outcomes;
- Identify lessons learned and propose recommendations to inform future programing of education in crisis and conflict in Mali.

The results of the EESA evaluation will be used by the USAID/Mali Education Office to assess feasibility and value for money of the evaluated intervention model, to inform future investment decision-making. The results will be shared with broader USAID audiences, including USAID/Washington and other missions, to highlight best practices and lessons learned, and to inform upper management of the results achieved by the Mali mission in education in conflict-affected regions. Finally, relevant results will be shared with Government of Mali (GOM) counterparts and other donors to further promote improving basic education in the conflicted affected regions of Mali.

This final evaluation will allow USAID and implementing partner to appreciate the results of the Activity and the constraints and challenges encountered during implementation. Findings and lessons from the evaluation will be used to adapt future funding in education in conflict and crisis affected environments.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The final evaluation of EESA will investigate research questions in three broad categories: 1) Implementation progress, 2) Project management, 3) sustainability. Note that successful offeror may suggest refinements during the evaluation design phase in collaboration with USAID.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The three questions under this dimension seek to clarify how project results affected key beneficiaries (schools, students, education personnel, school-based organizations (SBOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs); how and why actual results differed from expected results, if at all; and the extent to which project results contributed to the overall goal and objectives of the EESA project based on the perspectives of beneficiaries.

Question 1:

To what extent has the Activity contributed to student enrolment and learning outcomes and how did it affect parents, education personnel, and community and school-based organizations? To what extent did the project reach its targets of new entrant students (including number of new entrants in grade 1 and number of re-entrant children in other grades)? Why/ Why not? How have results benefited boys and girls differently, if at all?

Question 2: How Did the Project Affect Parents and Education Personnel?

Based on beneficiaries' perspectives, to what extent did capacity-building efforts (including the use of mobile technology) for education personnel (teachers, education administrators, and ministry of education) and parents:

- a) meet beneficiaries' needs,
- b) increase knowledge and skills, and
- c) change behaviors/ teaching practices?

Question 3: How Did the Project Affect Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) and School-Based Organizations (SBOs)?

To what extent did project activities help to empower and strengthen the capacity of CBOs and SBOs and how has this influenced the quality of primary schooling?

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

- **Question 1:** What was the contribution of project management approaches (e.g. establishing the project headquarters in the Region of Segou and embedding the Activity within the MOE) on overall Activity results?
- **Question 2:** What factors enabled or inhibited project implementation and the achievement of Activity results?
- **Question 3:** How effectively did the EESA project adapt to the evolving security situation? To what extent did the insecurity impact the implementation of the project? For example, cite how many times was instruction shifted to out-of-school locations, how many schools closed for safety reasons and how many schools reopened?

Lessons Learned and Sustainability

Question: How Sustainable are the Project Achievements? What strategies/approaches did the Activity use to promote the sustainability of Activity outcomes and how successful those have been?

EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

- **Evaluation Design:** The Evaluation team is expected to employ a primarily qualitative evaluation approach to address the questions outlined above. Whenever feasible and relevant, the offeror should consider and suggest the use of quantitative data to help strength and enrich the qualitative findings. The overarching analytical strategy should be clearly summarized in an evaluation matrix that includes the following information:

Evaluation questions

- b) sub-evaluation questions, indicators or assessment criteria,
 - c) sampling/selection criteria, data sources and collection methods, and
 - d) data analysis methods.
- **Selection of Respondents/Sampling Strategy:** The offeror should carry out relevant data collection with a representative sample of purposively selected USAID project beneficiaries, partners, and host government counterparts at appropriate levels; and other key program stakeholders as appropriate in the five regions: Segou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. The offeror should propose an effective strategy for selecting respondents that will enable adequate geographical and language representation, cross-site comparison, and the capture of a diversity of perspectives, among other key considerations. Final criteria for sample selection should be developed by the offeror in consultation with USAID.
 - **Data sources and collection methods:** The offeror should collect both primary data and secondary data. Primary data may include, but are not limited to key informant interviews, focus group discussions, observations, and questionnaires. For secondary data, and whenever relevant, the offeror should consider complementary sources of secondary data, such as the Implementing Partners' performance reports and work plans, performance monitoring data, activity documents, Ministry of Education (MOE) national statistics, etc. Prior to any field work, the offeror is expected to carry out a targeted review and analysis of recent pertinent published literature on educational program evaluations in EICC context, particularly in Mali, as well as relevant project documents and performance data provided by USAID to: 1) gain a better and more in-depth understanding of the implementation of the EESA project and, 2) assess the quality and relevance of the data to help answer the evaluation questions. Primary data should only be collected if the data does not already exist via the IP's monitoring data, school administrative data, census data, etc. The offeror is expected to collect at least one round of data collection for each evaluation and should outline a clear plan and specify which data exactly would be collected and why.

The offeror should use, whenever possible, pre-existing data collection instruments with documented strong measurement validity and internal reliability and with a suitable plan for cultural adaptation. For new instruments, the offeror should propose a plan for the development, cognitive testing (to test reliability and validity of instruments), and piloting of the new data collection instruments. It should be noted that:

- Before beginning field work (including field testing), the evaluation team is required to share data collection instruments with USAID for review and feedback before they are used in the field.

- Issues of data confidentiality must be addressed.
 - The use of electronic data collection for quantitative data is required, whenever relevant.
 - Data collection methods must take into account contextual factors to maximize data reliability and minimize unintended consequences.
- **Data Analysis:** The offeror should analyze both primary and secondary data. All secondary data should be assessed for quality and relevance in answering the research questions. The offeror should provide a data analysis plan for the qualitative data, and for the quantitative data (if quantitative data is used) that directly addresses each evaluation question with specific methods for analyzing the data. The offeror should also describe how gender considerations will be taken into consideration particularly how differential impacts in men and women will be analyzed.
 - **Methodological limitations:** As part of USAID’s evaluation policy, the offeror is required to discuss and document any issues potentially affecting the quality of evaluation data (including the data validity, integrity, timeliness, precision, and reliability) in the evaluation planning stage, and to be assessed on an ongoing basis during implementation. The Evaluation team and USAID should discuss all limitations and measures to address or overcome limitations in the implementation phase and these should be detailed in the reports. The evaluation reports should be clear and transparent about any notable limitations and if and how they may affect the evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Data collection and analysis

USAID requests that the evaluator complete the following table as part of its detailed design and evaluation plan.⁹

| Evaluation question | Data source | Data collection method (including sampling methodology, where applicable) | Data analysis method |
|---------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
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EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

The offeror should propose a staffing plan that fully supports the requirements of this SOW. Given that the SOW includes two separate evaluations with likely competing demands, the offeror should make clear in their response how the proposed team will adequately and efficiently be able to manage and implement the two evaluations.

At the minimum, the staffing plan should: (1) list the proposed team members and clearly articulate each team member’s responsibilities within the team and their relevant qualifications

⁹ Another format may be used if the table is not preferred, but any chosen format should contain all the information specified for each question.

to meet these responsibilities (2) describe how the team members will work together, and their anticipated LOE for the duration of the evaluation activities. As part of this response, the evaluation team will need to complete the table below and provide CVs for all team members proposed.

The Offeror is subject to FAR 9.5 Organizational and Consultant Conflicts of Interest. The Offeror must review the regulation and determine if there is a conflict of interest for individuals or the organization. If a conflict of interest exists, the Offeror must submit a Conflict of Interest Mitigation Plan for the Contracting Officer to review and analyze.

Key personnel

- **Evaluation Team Leader:** The Evaluation Team Leader will be responsible for overall and day-to-day management of contract activities, involving multiple tasks across multiple locations. The Team Leader is the principal interlocutor between the Contractor team members and USAID and is responsible for the overall compilation of all deliverables under this contract. The person is responsible for staffing, project planning, project financials, and staff direction and oversight, and maintains and manages the relationship with USAID. S/he collaborates closely with technical evaluation staff to ensure quality of design, methodologies, tools, data collection processes and data analysis.
 - Graduate degree or higher in international development, information management, monitoring and evaluation, or related field.
 - At least seven (7) years of experience conducting qualitative research.
 - Education sector expertise, particularly education in crisis and conflict, with experience in Mali and/or Sub-Saharan Africa preferred
 - Strong background and training in qualitative research methodologies
 - Experience and knowledge of data analysis and data management techniques
 - Experience managing and coordinating complex evaluations, including evaluations of international projects.
 - Strong organizational, oral and written communication skills.
 - Proven ability in writing evaluation reports, delivering tailored presentations to different stakeholders, and the ability to use research findings to evaluate program implementation and operations.
 - Candidates speaking French in addition to English are required.

- **Senior Evaluation Expert:** The Senior Evaluation Expert will be responsible for supervising the quality of the evaluation design and execution, including qualitative data collection and analysis, identifying and disseminating findings, lessons learned, and evidence from evaluations.
 - Graduate degree in sociology, anthropology, education or related field with relevant experience in ethnographic research preferred.
 - Minimum 7 years of experience managing and conducting qualitative and mixed methods evaluations.
 - Extensive knowledge and experience in qualitative research methodologies.
 - Experience managing or conducting evaluation of education in Mali and in EICC contexts preferred.
 - Experience conducting site visits, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions
 - Candidates speaking French in addition to English strongly preferred.

- **School Construction Specialist:** The School Construction Specialist will work closely with the Team Leader and the Evaluation Expert in providing comments on the English versions of the data-gathering instruments before they are field-tested. He will design the

methods and materials of assessing the school construction and rehabilitation strategy implemented through the project as well as to assess the quality of the buildings constructed. He will have extensive experience in school construction programs for basic education in Mali. The School Construction Specialist will assist the foreign counterparts in compiling and analyzing the results of the field work. The School Construction Specialist will also review and comment on the successive drafts of the final report submitted by the Team Leader. As such, the School Construction Specialist will need to be familiar with the objectives and the methodology of the field research. The School Construction Specialist will have had experience in editing reports and studies on the primary education sector in Africa and preferably, in Mali. The School Construction Specialist will hold a civil engineer's degree with at least seven (7) years of experience evaluating or implementing education projects, preferably in Africa.

- **The Water Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH) specialist:** The WASH specialist will work closely with the Team Leader and the Evaluation Expert in providing comments on the English versions of the data-gathering instruments before they are field-tested. The WASH specialist will also review and comment on the successive drafts of the final report submitted by the Team Leader. As such, the WASH specialist will need to be familiar with the objectives and the methodology of the field research. The WASH specialist will have had experience in editing reports and studies on the primary education sector in Africa and preferably, in Mali. The WASH specialist will hold a degree in public health and have at least seven (7) years of experience either in managing or evaluating education projects.

- **The Specialist of Conflict & Crisis in Education:** The Specialist of Conflict & Crisis in Education will be responsible for presenting the research to the district and local education authorities. He will assist in designing the methods and materials of assessing the conflict sensitive materials used for instruction in reading, writing, and oral language. He will have extensive experience in basic education in Mali, either as certified teacher, principal, supervisor or administrator. The local expert in conflict and crisis in education will assist the foreign counterparts in compiling and analyzing the results of the field work. The local expert in conflict and crisis in education will hold a graduate degree in education, psychology, pedagogy, sociology, communication or any other related social science. He will have at least seven (7) years of experience evaluating and/or implementing projects of similar scope in Mali or other countries in Africa. She or he shall be familiar with the methods of teaching and assessing reading in the early primary grades. He should also be literate in at least one local language in the areas covered by the research. Prior work in local-language literacy training will be an advantage. She or he shall be familiar with the methods of assessing access to WASH in for early grade students. He should also be literate in at least one local language in the areas covered by the research. Prior work in local language will be an advantage.

Other personnel (Non-key personnel)

The Gender Specialist: The Gender Specialist will be responsible for presenting the research to the district and local education authorities. He will design the methods and materials of assessing the gender strategy implemented through the project as well as to review gender education programs and gender sensitive kits developed. She or he will have extensive experience in gender issues in basic education in Mali, either as educator or administrator as well as sociologist. The local expert in Gender will assist the foreign counterparts in compiling and analyzing the results of the field work. The local expert in Gender will hold a graduate degree in sociology, ethnology, anthropology, education or other relevant degree in social

science, and will have at least seven (7) years of experience evaluating and/or implementing projects of similar scope in Mali or other countries in Africa. He or she should also be literate in at least one local language in the areas covered by the research. Prior work in local- language literacy training will be an advantage.

The evaluator’s proposals should include additional non-key personnel who are expected to fulfill the technical roles on the evaluation team. Overall, these evaluation team members should demonstrate the following skills and experience:

- Strong technical competencies in applied qualitative techniques and methods and data analysis, including strong training in anthropological/ethnographic research
- Expertise designing, implementing, and managing mixed method evaluations and qualitative evaluations; from evaluation designs to data collection, analysis, and reporting.
- Strong competencies in developing questionnaires and qualitative data collection instruments (Key informant interviews, focus group discussions, etc....).
- Experience with quantitative research methods and data analysis
- Knowledge of Nvivo or Atlas TI or other qualitative software package preferred, meaning that lacking this skill is not disqualifying, but having it will be rewarding.
- Fluency in English and French preferred
- Malian nationals or expatriates with extensive experience working in Mali preferred

Citizens of or residents of Mali and other countries are eligible for the local specialists and non- key personnel positions provided that they speak the relevant local languages needed. USAID/Mali will weigh the composition of the evaluation team of each proposal to decide what is acceptable.

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD (IRB)

The research/evaluation must conform to legal and other requirements governing research with human subjects in the country where it is conducted. USAID accepts legitimate foreign procedural systems in lieu of the US-based IRB review only when they are determined to provide protection “at least equivalent” to the Common Rule. It is recommended that the US-based IRB review the host country procedural system with regard to human subject protection to make a determination whether it is at least equivalent to the Common Rule. IRB approval must be in place prior to data collection launch.

EVALUATION SCHEDULE

| Timing: Anticipated Months or | Proposed Activities | Important Considerations and Constraints |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| | Preparation of the work plan and evaluation design (Evaluation Design Report) | |
| | USAID review of the work plan and evaluation design | |
| | Travel and preparations for data collection | |
| | In-briefing | |
| | Data collection in -five regions | |
| | Data analysis | |
| | Report writing (First Draft) | |
| | USAID review of draft report | |
| | Presentation of Findings to USAID Mission and MoE | |
| | Incorporate USAID and MoE comments and prepare final report | |

Note: Data collection will be conducted in five (5) regions: Segou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal.

Suggested Level of Effort in days for each Evaluation/Analytic Team member:

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| | | |
|--|--|--|

| Activity/Deliverable | Team Lead/Key Staff I | Key Staff: 2-4, including a gender specialist | Logistics/ Program Assistant |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Number of persons | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| | Number of days required per person | | |
| Desk review | 5 | 5 | |
| Preparation for Team convening in-country | | | 2 |
| Travel to country | 2 | 2 (if expat) | |
| In-brief with Mission | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Evaluation Design Workshop | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Work plan and methodology briefing with | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| In-brief with project | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Data Collection DQA Workshop (protocol orientation/training for | 2 | 2 | |
| Prep / Logistics for Site Visits | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Data collection / Site Visits (including travel | 30 | 30 | 30 |
| Data analysis | 5 | 5 | 2 |
| Debrief with Mission with prep | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Stakeholder debrief workshop with prep | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Depart country | 2 | 2 | |
| Draft report(s) | 6 | 5 | 1 |
| Contractor Report QC Review & | 1 | 0.5 | |
| Revise report(s) per USAID comments | 3 | 2 | |
| Final copy editing and formatting | 1 | | |
| 508 Compliance editing | 1 | | |
| Evaluation Report(s) to the DEC | 0.5 | | |
| Total LOE per person (days) | 68 | 63 | 45.5 |
| Total LOE (person-days) | 68 | 189 | 45.5 |

LOGISTICS

The assignment is based in Bamako, Mali, with travel expected for field visits within Mali. The Contractor will be responsible for all off-shore and in-country logistical support. This includes arranging and scheduling meetings, international and in-country travel, hotel bookings, working/office space, computers, printing, and photocopying. The selection of key informants and sites for surveys will be established in consultation with the USAID/Mali Education Team.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The contractor will recruit and hire the evaluation team members, coordinate and manage the evaluation team. The contractor will also make logistical arrangements for the evaluation team, including travel and transportation, country travel clearance, lodging, and communications.

USAID/Mali will provide assistance with the following tasks:

- Mission Point of Contact: Throughout the in-country work, ensure constant availability of a Point of Contact person and provide technical leadership and direction for the team's work.
- Selection of Meetings Space: Provide guidance, if needed, on the team's selection of a meeting space for interviews and/or focus group discussions.
- Facilitate Contact with Implementing Partners: USAID/Mali will introduce the evaluation team to implementing partners and other stakeholders, and where applicable and appropriate, prepare and send out an introduction letter for team's arrival and/or anticipated meetings.
- Timely Reviews: Provide timely review of draft/final reports and approval of deliverables.

RESOURCES

- a. <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment>
- b. <https://dhsprogram.com/What-We-Do/survey/survey-display-405.cfm>
- c. [Annual work plans](#)

- d. Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
- e. ADS 201
- f. USAID Evaluation Policy
- g. Implementing Partner annual and quarterly reports
- h. The Annual work plans, the AMEP, the Implementation Partners annual and quarterly reports will be shared with the successful offeror. The additional documents provided are clear enough and not expected to impact the proposals preparation.

GENDER REQUIREMENTS

The USAID Gender policy requires that gender considerations be integrated into the entire activity cycle from design and implementation to monitoring and evaluation. All USAID funded activities will take into account the USAID Gender Policy to advance equality between females and males and empower women and girls to participate fully in and benefit from development activities. Activities will reflect strategies for: i) reducing gender disparities in access to, control over and benefit from resources, wealth, opportunities, and services; ii) reducing gender-based harmful traditional practices and mitigating their harmful effects on individuals and communities; and, iii) increasing the capability of women and girls to realize their rights, determine their life outcomes, and influence decision-making in households, communities, and societies. Gender considerations need to be integrated in the evaluation, including disaggregated analysis of data by gender to assess the differential impact of activities on men and women.

ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENT

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Section 117 requires that the impact of USAID's activities on the environment be considered and that USAID include environmental sustainability as a central consideration in designing and carrying out its development programs. This mandate is codified in Federal Regulations (22 CFR 216) and in USAID's Automated Directives System (ADS) Parts 201.5.10g and 204 (<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/>), which, in part, require that the potential environmental impacts of USAID-financed activities are identified prior to a final decision to proceed and that appropriate environmental safeguards are adopted for all activities. Offeror environmental compliance obligations under these regulations and procedures are specified in the following paragraphs of this RFTOP.

In addition, the contractor must comply with host country environmental regulations unless otherwise directed in writing by USAID. In case of conflict between host country and USAID regulations, the latter shall govern.

No activity funded under this award will be implemented unless an environmental threshold determination, as defined by 22 CFR 216, has been reached for that activity, as documented in a Request for Categorical Exclusion (RCE), Initial Environmental Examination (IEE), or Environmental Assessment (EA) duly signed by the Bureau Environmental Officer (BEO). (Hereinafter, such documents are described as "approved Regulation 216 environmental documentation.")

As part of its initial Work Plan, and all Annual Work Plans thereafter, the contractor in collaboration with the USAID Cognizant Technical Officer and Mission Environmental Officer or Bureau Environmental Officer, as appropriate, shall review all ongoing and planned activities under this award to determine if they are within the scope of the approved Regulation 216 environmental documentation.

If the contractor plans any new activities outside the scope of the approved Regulation 216 environmental documentation, it shall prepare an amendment to the documentation for USAID review and approval. No such new activities shall be undertaken prior to receiving written USAID approval of environmental documentation amendments.

Any ongoing activities found to be outside the scope of the approved Regulation 216 environmental documentation shall be halted until an amendment to the documentation is submitted and written approval is received from USAID.

OTHER REQUIREMENTS

All quantitative data collected by the evaluation team must be provided in machine-readable, non-proprietary formats as required by USAID's Open Data policy (see ADS 579). The data should be organized and fully documented for use by those not fully familiar with the project or the evaluation. USAID will retain ownership of the survey and all datasets developed.

All modifications to the required elements of the SOW of the contract/agreement, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology, or timeline, need to be agreed upon in writing by the CO.

ANNEX II: EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

LIMITATIONS AND MITIGATION APPROACHES

LIMITATIONS

The security situation has degraded considerably since EESA ended in December 2018. The United States Department of State recently (December 2019) downgraded Mali’s security level to the most severe “Do Not Travel” designation. This made it necessary for the core evaluation team members to curtail all travel beyond the regional capitals and required the Senior Evaluation Expert (American) to remain in Bamako during the field data collection phase.

Both security concerns for data collectors working in areas they were not familiar with and the distance between data collection sites meant that it was not possible for one team to do data collection in all sites.

Travel logistics for TMG’s core evaluation team members were very challenging. Data collection sites were far apart and ground transportation was both unsafe and far too time-consuming, but there were no/few commercial flights to the sites.

Seats on UNHAS flights (the only means to reach Mopti, Timbuktu and Gao in a reasonable amount of time) were limited and could only be procured by USAID on TMG’s behalf. Coordinating flights for multiple team members to multiple destinations proved to be difficult.

Flights were often cancelled for weather or security reasons, and team members were either bumped from flights or trapped at their destinations for a number of days.

Flight delays and cancellations reduced the number of available days in the field in some locations (Gao and Kidal in particular).

The additional data collectors hired to address unexpected travel limitations were hired after the original data collection team had been trained, and the timing and their remote location meant that they could not be brought to Bamako or Segou for training. This meant that these additional personnel were not provided the same training as the others.

Many schools were in designated “red zone areas” that were too dangerous for even local data collectors to access or included areas that have resulted in a high risk

MITIGATION APPROACHES

Conducting the two days of data collector training, three days of instrument testing, and a two-day final data collector debriefing process in Segou allowed the entire core evaluation team, including the Senior Evaluation Expert, to fully participate as planned.

Data collectors were recruited from and deployed in their home regions and areas, where they had the most familiarity. They were brought together in two groups (one in Segou and one in Gao) for training.

Because of the lack of commercial flights, team members depended on United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), which provided seats on an as available basis.

In order to address these constraints, BESSOC deployed additional data collectors in the field to be able to maintain planned sample sizes.

The evaluation team convened a 2-day debrief session among all data collectors to discuss and determine key findings.

To protect both potential respondents and the data collectors, these areas were eliminated from the sample set. This meant that the sampling plan was severely constrained to areas

to the security of interview subjects and focus group participants.

Even outside the “red zone areas” the security situation was fluid. In some cases, schools in the sample became too risky to visit at the time scheduled for data collection.

Records of interviews and focus groups posed a security risk for both data collectors and those who generously gave their time and provided information. Likewise, carrying electronic devices for data collection was also a security risk.

TMG prepared and submitted an Institutional Review Board (IRB) submission to the National Institute for Research and Public Health in accordance with required protocol in Mali.

The national teachers’ strike was a key constraint, making access to teachers and directors difficult.

Particularly in areas with security concerns, students were difficult to locate.

An additional challenge was the necessity of changing TMG’s local data collection partner after TMG’s core

around schools located in safe zones and close to main roads.

Data collection was cancelled or changed on short notice at some schools due to security developments. When possible, schools not originally chosen for the sample were added to replace schools that could not be visited. The flexibility and substitutions allowed for data collection at the expected number of schools.

Data collectors carried paper notebooks instead of electronic tablets and took hand-written notes during interviews and focus groups. They used smart phones to photograph their notes and used an SMS-based application to send the notes to BESSOC. Notes from previous data collection days were not carried in the field to ensure data security and protect interview subjects’ identities. They were instructed to destroy the paper notes after confirmation that the photographs were received by BESSOC.

Non-mitigated. The evaluation team did not receive a response from the Institute despite repeated follow-up attempts during the course of the evaluation. As of late April 2020 during the report preparation, the evaluation team has been advised that the official committee, Comité National d’Ethique de la Santé et des Sciences de la Vie has received the submission and is expected to issue an approval in the near future.

The data collection team exercised flexibility in seeking out teachers. Where teachers were difficult to locate in some communities, data collectors used several strategies including substitution of individual interviews instead of focus groups, using their personal networks in communities to connect with teachers in their homes. In other cases, data collectors were introduced to teachers by other stakeholders following another interview.

Teachers and school administrators were able to help locate some students. Data collectors then used a snowball sampling process, by which each student interviewed introduced the data collector to another student directly after completing the interview.

TMG was able to quickly identify and contract with a new data collection partner, BESSOC.

team had already arrived in Mali due to a contract disagreement with the original partner.

BESSOC had very little time to recruit a full team of (local) data collectors in all five regions, plan complex travel logistics and field deployments, arrange individual contracts and per diems, assist with finalizing instruments and arrange a two-day data collector training.

BESSOC was less experienced with qualitative methods and was on a steep learning curve for capturing and analyzing unfamiliar data types. BESSOC did not have adequate resources to quickly capture and analyze the data using traditional means, and data processing (transcription and populating a customized database) fell behind schedule.

The BESSOC team successfully coordinated the complex logistics and implemented the full sampling plan, including the addition of Kidal region.

The evaluation team addressed this constraint through the use of an extensive final debriefing using a participatory, small-group means to capture what the data collectors had learned during their field work

ANNEX III: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

GUIDE D'ENTRETIEN AE ET CAP

Identification de l'AE / CAP

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| Date | |
| Région | |
| Cercle | |
| Nom de la commune | |
| Ville / village | |
| Nom d'Académie | |
| Nom du CAP | |

Identification de l'enquêté

Nom et prénoms

Sexe :

Fonction

Contact téléphonique

Question d'évaluation 1 : Dans quelle mesure l'activité a-t-elle contribué à l'inscription des élèves et aux résultats communautaires et scolaires ? Dans quelle mesure le projet a-t-il atteint ses cibles d'inscription de nouveaux élèves (y compris le nombre de nouveaux entrants en première année et le nombre d'enfants retournant à l'école dans les autres classes)? Pourquoi / pourquoi pas? Comment les résultats ont-ils profité différemment aux garçons et aux filles scolaires et comment cela a-t-il affecté les parents, le personnel enseignant et les organisations

1. Quelles stratégies ont été mises en œuvre pour améliorer le taux d'inscription des enfants à l'école ? (y compris les enfants retournant à l'école)
2. Quelles stratégies ont été mises en œuvre pour favoriser l'inscription tant des filles que des garçons ? (y compris les enfants déplacés ou vivant avec un handicap)
3. Quelles stratégies ont été mises en œuvre pour favoriser l'implication ou l'engagement des parents, du personnel enseignant et des organisations ?

Question d'évaluation 2 : Comment le projet a-t-il affecté les parents et le personnel enseignant? Sur la base des avis des bénéficiaires, dans quelle mesure est-ce que les efforts de renforcement de capacités (y compris l'utilisation de la technologie mobile) pour le personnel éducatif (enseignants, administrateurs de l'éducation et ministère de l'Éducation) et les parents ont permis :

- a) de répondre aux besoins des bénéficiaires,
- b) d'accroître les connaissances et les compétences,
- c) de changer les comportements / les pratiques pédagogiques?

- 2.1. Comment les activités de renforcement de capacités ont-ils permis de répondre aux besoins du personnel éducatif ?
- 2.2 Comment les activités de renforcement de capacités ont-ils permis d'accroître les connaissances et les compétences
- 2.3 Comment les activités de renforcement de capacités ont-ils permis de changer les comportements / les pratiques pédagogiques?

Question d'évaluation 4 : Quelle a été la part des approches de gestions du projet (l'établissement du siège à Ségou, l'intégration de l'activité dans le ministère de l'éducation) aux résultats globaux du projet ?

4.1 En quoi l'établissement du siège à Ségou a permis l'atteinte des résultats du projet dans les autres régions ?

4.2 Quelle a été la valeur ajoutée de l'approche d'intégration du projet au niveau des AE et des CAP ?

Question d'évaluation 5 : Quels facteurs ont facilité ou entravé la mise en œuvre du projet et l'atteinte des résultats de l'activité ?

5.1 Quels sont les facteurs qui ont facilité la mise en œuvre du projet et l'atteinte de ses résultats dans votre zone de couverture ?

5.2 Quels sont les facteurs qui ont entravé la mise en œuvre du projet et l'atteinte des résultats dans votre zone de couverture ?

Question d'évaluation 6 : Dans quelle mesure le projet EESA s'est-il adapté à l'évolution de la situation en matière de sécurité ? Dans quelle mesure l'insécurité a-t-elle affecté la mise en œuvre du projet ? Par exemple, indiquez combien de fois les activités pédagogiques ont été déplacées vers des établissements extrascolaires, combien d'écoles ont fermé pour des raisons de sécurité et combien d'écoles ont rouvert ?

6.1 Dans votre zone de couverture, comment le projet EESA s'est-il adapté à l'évolution de la situation en matière de sécurité ?

6.2 En quoi l'insécurité a joué sur la mise en œuvre des activités du projet (déplacement / fermeture d'écoles, réouverture, suivi pédagogique, accompagnement psychologique, etc.) ?

Question d'évaluation 7 : Dans quelle mesure est-ce que les réalisations du projet sont durables ? Quelles stratégies / approches l'activité a-t-elle utilisées pour promouvoir la durabilité des résultats de l'activité et dans quelle mesure ceux-ci ont-ils réussi ?

7.1 Quelles sont vos leçons apprises dans le cadre de ce projet?

7.2 Quelles sont les activités habituelles du projet qui ne sont plus exécutées ?

7.3 Quelles sont les activités habituelles du projet qui continuent toujours ?

7.4 Quelles sont les stratégies mises en œuvre pour assurer la pérennité des actions du projet initiées dans vos écoles ?

7.5 Quelles sont vos recommandations pour l'amélioration du système éducatif en situation de crise et pour les interventions futures?

Merci pour votre participation !

GUIDE D'ENTRETIEN INDIVIDUEL AVEC LES DIRECTEURS DES ECOLES FONDAMENTALES

Identification de l'école

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| Date | |
| Région | |
| Cercle | |
| Nom de la commune | |
| Nom du village | |
| Nom d'Académie | |
| Nom du CAP | |
| Nom de l'école | |
| Statut de l'école 1. Publique 2. Communautaire | |

Identification de l'enquêté

Nom et prénoms

Sexe :

Ancienneté dans l'école

Contact téléphonique

QUESTIONS

Question 1 : Dans quelle mesure l'activité a-t-elle contribué à la scolarisation des élèves et aux résultats d'apprentissage et comment a-t-elle affecté les parents, le personnel éducatif et les organisations communautaires et scolaires ?

1.1 En quoi le projet a-t-il contribué à relever le niveau de scolarisation des enfants ?

- a. Construction entière de classes
- b. Réhabilitation
- c. Don de kits
- d. Implication de la communauté

1.2 Quelles sont les mesures que vous avez prises pour atteindre un taux de scolarisation élevé ?

1.3 Quel est le niveau de scolarisation des filles par rapport aux années antérieures ?

1.4 Dans quelle mesure le projet a-t-il contribué aux résultats scolaires ?

1.5 Comment le projet a affecté les parents, le personnel éducatif et les organisations communautaires et scolaires dans le processus de scolarisation ?

Question 2 : Comment le projet a-t-il affecté les parents et le personnel éducatif ?

2a : Selon les perspectives des bénéficiaires, dans quelle mesure les efforts de renforcement des capacités (y compris l'utilisation de la technologie mobile) pour le personnel éducatif (enseignants, administrateurs de l'éducation et ministère de l'éducation) et les parents : a) répondent-ils aux besoins des bénéficiaires b) augmentent-ils les connaissances et les compétences et c) changent-ils les comportements/les pratiques d'enseignement ?

2.1. Quels types de renforcements de capacité ont bénéficié les parents et le personnel éducatif ?

2.2 Ces renforcements de capacité ont-ils répondu aux besoins des parents et du personnel éducatif ?

2.3 En quoi les renforcements de capacité ont-ils accru les connaissances et les compétences en matière d'éducation du personnel éducatif ?

2.4 Quel est l'effet du projet sur le changement comportemental et pédagogique des enseignants ?

2.5 Quel est l'effet du projet sur le changement comportemental des parents sur la vie de l'école ? (*Wash, genre, gestion de l'école, violence basée sur le genre*)

Question 3 : Comment le projet a-t-il affecté les organisations de base communautaire et les organisations scolaires de base ?

3a : Dans quelle mesure les activités du projet ont-elles contribué à l'autonomisation et au renforcement des capacités des organisations communautaires et des organisations scolaires et comment cela a-t-il influencé la qualité de l'enseignement primaire ?

3.1 Quelle influence le projet a-t-il eu sur la qualité de l'enseignement primaire ?

3.2 Dans quelle mesure le projet EESA a-t-il renforcé les capacités des CGS / APE / AME ?

3.3 Dans quelle mesure le projet EESA a contribué à l'autonomisation des CGS / APE / AME ? (*nouvelles initiatives, participation effective aux activités*)

Question 4: Quelle a été la part des approches de gestion du projet (par exemple, l'établissement du siège du projet à Ségou et l'intégration du projet au ministère de l'éducation nationale) aux résultats globaux du projet ?

4.1 Quels ont été les avantages / inconvénients de l'établissement du siège du projet à Ségou par rapport aux résultats globaux du projet ?

4.2 Quels ont été les avantages / inconvénients de l'intégration du projet au ministère de l'éducation nationale) aux résultats globaux du projet ?

Question 5: Quels facteurs ont facilité ou entravé la mise en œuvre du projet et l'atteinte des résultats du projet ?

5.1 Quels sont les facteurs qui ont favorisé la mise en œuvre du projet et l'atteinte de ses résultats ? (*organisationnel, gestion, autres*)

5.1 Quels sont les facteurs qui ont entravé la mise en œuvre du projet et l'atteinte de ses résultats ? (*organisationnel, gestion, autres*)

Question 6: Dans quelle mesure le projet EESA s'est-il adapté à l'évolution de la situation en matière de sécurité ?

6a : Dans quelle mesure l'insécurité a-t-elle eu un impact sur la mise en œuvre du projet ? Par exemple, citez le nombre de fois où l'enseignement a été déplacé vers des lieux non scolaires, le nombre d'écoles fermées pour des raisons de sécurité et le nombre d'écoles ré ouvertes.

6.1 Quelles sont les mesures prises pour adapter le projet à l'évolution de la situation en matière de sécurité ? (*réorganiser l'emploi du temps, planification adaptée au nouveau contexte*)

6.2 Dans quelle mesure l'insécurité a-t-elle eu un impact sur la mise en œuvre du projet ??

- Déplacement vers des lieux non scolaires
- Fermeture de l'école
- Perturbation des programmes scolaires et programme de travail

6.3 Avez-vous reçu des élèves déplacées et quelles sont les dispositions que vous avez prises pour leur réinsertion ?

6.4 Combien de fois votre école s'est déplacée vers des lieux non scolaires pour des raisons de sécurité

6.5 Combien de fois votre école a été fermée pour des raisons de sécurité

6.6 Combien de fois votre école a été ré ouverte pour des raisons de sécurité

Question 7 : Dans quelle mesure les réalisations du projet sont-elles durables ? Quelle stratégie / approches l'activité a-t-elle utilisée pour promouvoir la durabilité des résultats de l'activité et dans quelle mesure ceux-ci ont-ils réussi ?

7.1 Quelles sont vos leçons apprises dans le cadre de ce projet?

7.2 Quelles sont les activités habituelles du projet qui ne sont plus exécutées ?

7.3 Quelles sont les activités habituelles du projet qui continuent toujours ?

7.4 Quelles sont les stratégies mises en œuvre pour assurer la pérennité des actions du projet initiées dans vos écoles ?

7.5 Quelles sont vos recommandations pour l'amélioration du système éducatif en situation de crise et pour les interventions futures?

Merci pour votre participation !

Focus Group pour l'entretien avec les OCB (CGS, APE, AME)

Groupes cibles

- Comité de gestion scolaire (CGS)
- Association des Parents d'Elèves
- Association des Mères d'Elèves
- **Identification de l'école**

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------|--|
| Date | |
| Région | |
| Cercle | |
| Nom de la commune | |
| Nom d'Académie | |
| Nom du CAP | |
| Village | |
| Nom de l'école | |
| Statut d'école 1. Publique 2. Communautaire | |

- **Identification des participants**

| N° | Nom et prénoms | Sexe | Fonction |
|-----------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| 1 | | | |
| 2 | | | |
| 3 | | | |
| 4 | | | |
| 5 | | | |
| 6 | | | |
| 7 | | | |
| 8 | | | |
| 9 | | | |
| 10 | | | |

QUESTIONS

Question I : Dans quelle mesure l'activité a-t-elle contribué à la scolarisation des élèves et aux résultats d'apprentissage et comment a-t-elle affecté les parents, le personnel éducatif et les organisations communautaires et scolaires ?

I.1 En quoi le projet a-t-il contribué à rehausser le niveau de scolarisation des enfants ?

- a. Construction entière de classes
- b. Réhabilitation
- c. Don de kits
- d. Implication de la communauté

I.2 Quelles sont les mesures que vous avez prises pour améliorer le taux de scolarisation des élèves notamment les filles ?

I.3 Dans quelle mesure le projet a-t-il contribué aux résultats scolaires (performance des élèves) ?

Question 2 : Comment le projet a-t-il affecté les parents et le personnel éducatif ?

2a : Selon les perspectives des bénéficiaires, dans quelle mesure les efforts de renforcement des capacités (y compris l'utilisation de la technologie mobile) pour le personnel éducatif (enseignants, administrateurs de l'éducation et ministère de l'éducation) et les parents : a) répondent-ils aux besoins des bénéficiaires b) augmentent-ils les connaissances et les compétences et c) changent-ils les comportements/les pratiques d'enseignement ?

- 2.1. Quels types de renforcements de capacité avez-vous bénéficié ?
- 2.2 Ces renforcements de capacité ont-ils répondu à vos besoins ?
- 2.3 En quoi les renforcements de capacité ont-ils accru vos connaissances en matière d'éducation ?
- 2.4 En quoi les renforcements de capacité ont-ils accru vos compétences en matière d'éducation ?
- 2.5 Quel est l'effet des renforcements de capacités sur le changement comportemental et pédagogique des enseignants ?
- 2.6 Quel est l'effet du projet sur le changement comportemental des parents sur la vie de l'école ?
(Amélioration de la fréquentation, Wash, genre, gestion de l'école, violence basée sur le genre)

Question 3 : Comment le projet a-t-il affecté les organisations de base communautaire et les organisations scolaires de base ?

3a : Dans quelle mesure les activités du projet ont-elles contribué à l'autonomisation et au renforcement des capacités des organisations communautaires et des organisations scolaires et comment cela a-t-il influencé la qualité de l'enseignement primaire ?

- 3.1 Dans quelle mesure le projet EESA a-t-il renforcé vos capacités (Wash, Genre, VBG en milieu scolaire, etc.)
- 3.2 Dans quelle mesure le projet EESA a contribué à votre autonomisation ?
- 3.3 Quelle influence le projet a-t-il eu sur la qualité de l'enseignement primaire ?

Question 5: Quels facteurs ont facilité ou entravé la mise en œuvre du projet et l'atteinte des résultats du projet ?

- 5.1 Quels sont les facteurs qui ont favorisé la mise en œuvre du projet et l'atteinte de ses résultats ?
(organisationnel, gestion, autres)
- 5.2 Quels sont les facteurs qui ont entravé la mise en œuvre du projet et l'atteinte de ses résultats ?
(organisationnel, gestion, autres)

Question 6: Dans quelle mesure le projet EESA s'est-il adapté à l'évolution de la situation en matière de sécurité ?

6a : Dans quelle mesure l'insécurité a-t-elle eu un impact sur la mise en œuvre du projet ? Par exemple, citez le nombre de fois où l'enseignement a été déplacé vers des lieux non scolaires, le nombre d'écoles fermées pour des raisons de sécurité et le nombre d'écoles ré-ouvertes.

- 6.1 Quelles sont les mesures prises pour adapter le projet à l'évolution de la situation en matière de sécurité ? (réorganiser l'emploi du temps, planification adaptée au nouveau contexte)
- 6.2 Dans quelle mesure l'insécurité a-t-elle eu un impact sur la mise en œuvre du projet ?

- Déplacement vers des lieux non scolaires
- Fermeture de l'école
- Perturbation des programmes scolaires et programme de travail
- Autres (citez)

6.3 Avez-vous reçu des élèves déplacées et quelles sont les dispositions que vous avez prises pour leur réinsertion ?

Question 7 : Dans quelle mesure les réalisations du projet sont-elles durables ? Quelle stratégie / approches l'activité a-t-elle utilisée pour promouvoir la durabilité des résultats de l'activité et dans quelle mesure ceux-ci ont-ils réussi ?

- 7.1 Quelles sont vos leçons apprises dans le cadre de ce projet?
- 7.2 Quelles sont les activités habituelles du projet qui ne sont plus exécutées ?
- 7.3 Quelles sont les activités habituelles du projet qui continuent toujours ?
- 7.4 Quelles sont les stratégies mises en œuvre pour assurer la pérennité des actions du projet initiées dans vos écoles ?
- 7.5 Quelles sont vos recommandations pour l'amélioration du système éducatif en situation de crise et pour les interventions futures?

Merci pour votre participation !

Question d'évaluation : Dans quelle mesure l'activité a-t-elle contribué à l'inscription des élèves et aux résultats communautaires et scolaires ? Dans quelle mesure le projet a-t-il atteint ses cibles d'inscription de nouveaux élèves (y compris le nombre de nouveaux entrants en première année et le nombre d'enfants retournant à l'école dans les autres classes)? Pourquoi / pourquoi pas? Comment les résultats ont-ils profité différemment aux garçons et aux filles? scolaires et comment cela a-t-il affecté les parents, le personnel enseignant et les associations ?

- 1) Le nombre d'inscriptions a-t-il augmenté ou diminué au cours de la dernière année ? Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas ? ENVOYEZ AU DIRECTEUR
 - Les inscriptions scolaires ont-ils augmenté pendant le projet de l'EESA ?
 - Les activités de l'EESA (avec les CGS/APE/AME) ont-elles aidé à augmenter le nombre d'inscriptions ?
 - Quelles étaient ces activités ?
- 2) Quelles activités du Projet EESA ont ciblé les CGS/APE/AME ?
 - Quels avantages avez-vous tiré du projet EESA ?
 - Équipement ?
 - Formation (3-2-1, WASH, sécurité, genre, autres ?)
 - Technologie mobile et système d'information sur la gestion de l'école

Question d'évaluation : Quels facteurs ont facilité ou entravé la mise en œuvre du projet et l'atteinte des résultats de l'activité ?

- 3) Quelles activités vous ont été utiles?
 - Lesquelles ne vous ont pas paru utiles ?
- 4) Les parents ont-ils bénéficié des activités du projet EESA ?
 - Quelles activités leur ont été le plus utiles?
- 5) Quels sont les résultats positifs ou les succès que votre comité a obtenus au cours de la dernière année après la fin de l'EESA ?
 - Quelle a été la part du Projet EESA dans ces succès ?
 - Quels sont vos projets pour l'année prochaine ? S'incrivent-ils dans la continuité de ce que vous faisiez avec EESA ?

Question d'évaluation : Dans quelle mesure le projet EESA s'est-il adapté à l'évolution de la situation en matière de sécurité? Dans quelle mesure l'insécurité a-t-elle affecté la mise en œuvre du projet? Par exemple, indiquez combien de fois les activités pédagogiques ont été déplacées vers des établissements extrascolaires, combien d'écoles ont fermé pour des raisons de sécurité et combien d'écoles ont ouvert?

- 6) Que pouvez-vous dire de la situation sécuritaire aujourd'hui ? Se présente-t-elle mieux ou pire qu'en 2017-2018 ?
 - Dans quelle mesure est-ce que les problème d'insécurité ont affecté l'école ?
 - Comment cette situation a affecté le travail de votre comité au sein l'école ?
- 7) L'école a-t-elle eu parfois besoin de délocaliser ses activités vers un autre lieu ?
- 8) L'école a-t-elle parfois fermé pour des raisons de sécurité ?

- Combien de temps ont duré ses fermetures / interruptions d'activités scolaires ?
- 9) Que fait votre comité dans les situations d'insécurité ?
- L'école fait-elle quelque chose de différent de ce que votre comité faisait avant l'arrivée du projet EESA ?
 - L'organisation des associations de parents se conduit-elle de manière différente ?
 - En quoi est-ce que le projet EESA vous a aidé à gérer les situations d'insécurité ?
- 10) Quels conseils voudriez-vous donner aux gestionnaires du projet EESA pour l'améliorer dans l'avenir ?

GUIDE FOCUS GROUP ENSEIGNANTS DES ECOLES FONDAMENTALES

Identification de l'école

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| Date | |
| Région | |
| Cercle | |
| Nom de la commune | |
| Nom du village | |
| Nom d'Académie | |
| Nom du CAP | |
| Nom de l'école | |
| Statut de l'école 1. Publique 2. Communautaire | |

Identification de l'enquête

| | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Nom et prénoms | |
| Sexe : | |
| Contact téléphonique | |

QUESTIONS

Question 1 : Dans quelle mesure l'activité a-t-elle contribué à la scolarisation des élèves et aux résultats d'apprentissage et comment a-t-elle affecté les parents, le personnel éducatif et les organisations communautaires et scolaires ?

- I.1 En quoi le projet a-t-il contribué à rehausser le niveau de scolarisation des enfants ?
- Construction entière de classes
 - Réhabilitation
 - Don de kits
 - Implication de la communauté

I.2 Quelles sont les mesures que vous avez prises pour atteindre un taux de scolarisation élevé ?

I.4 Dans quelle mesure le projet a-t-il contribué aux résultats scolaires ?

Question 2 : Comment le projet a-t-il affecté les parents et le personnel éducatif ?

2a : Selon les perspectives des bénéficiaires, dans quelle mesure les efforts de renforcement des capacités (y compris l'utilisation de la technologie mobile) pour le personnel éducatif (enseignants, administrateurs de l'éducation et ministère de l'éducation) et les parents : a) répondent-ils aux besoins des bénéficiaires b) augmentent-ils les connaissances et les compétences et c) changent-ils les comportements/les pratiques d'enseignement ?

2.1. Quels types de renforcements de capacité avez-vous bénéficié ?

2.2 Ces renforcements de capacité ont-ils répondu à vos besoins ? Si non, expliquez !

2.3 En quoi les renforcements de capacité ont-ils accru vos connaissances et vos compétences en matière d'éducation en situation d'urgence ?

2.4 Quel est l'effet du projet sur le changement comportemental des parents et des élèves ? (*Wash, genre, gestion de l'école, violence basée sur le genre*)

Question 3 : Comment le projet a-t-il affecté les organisations de base communautaire et les organisations scolaires de base ?

3a : Dans quelle mesure les activités du projet ont-elles contribué à l'autonomisation et au renforcement des capacités des organisations communautaires et des organisations scolaires et comment cela a-t-il influencé la qualité de l'enseignement primaire ?

3.1 Quelle influence le projet a-t-il eu sur la qualité de l'enseignement primaire ?

Question 4: Quelle a été la part des approches de gestion du projet (par exemple, l'établissement du siège du projet à Ségou et l'intégration du projet au ministère de l'éducation nationale) aux résultats globaux du projet ?

4.1 Quels ont été les avantages / difficultés du suivi des AE, CAP ?

Question 5 : Dans quelle mesure le projet EESA s'est-il adapté à l'évolution de la situation en matière de sécurité ?

5a : Dans quelle mesure l'insécurité a-t-elle eu un impact sur la mise en œuvre du projet ? Par exemple, citez le nombre de fois où l'enseignement a été déplacé vers des lieux non scolaires, le nombre d'écoles fermées pour des raisons de sécurité et le nombre d'écoles ré ouvertes.

5.1 Quelles sont les mesures prises pour adapter le projet à l'évolution de la situation en matière de sécurité ? (réorganiser l'emploi du temps, planification adaptée au nouveau contexte)

6.2 Dans quelle mesure l'insécurité a-t-elle eu un impact sur la mise en œuvre du projet ?

- Déplacement vers des lieux non scolaires
- Fermeture de l'école
- Perturbation des programmes scolaires et programme de travail

Question 6 : Dans quelle mesure les réalisations du projet sont-elles durables ? Quelle stratégie / approches l'activité a-t-elle utilisée pour promouvoir la durabilité des résultats de l'activité et dans quelle mesure ceux-ci ont-ils réussi ?

6.1 Quelles sont vos leçons apprises dans le cadre de ce projet EESA ? (*Wash, Genre, Réhabilitation*)

2.2 Quelles sont les stratégies mises en œuvre pour assurer la pérennité des actions du projet initiées dans vos écoles ?

6.3 Quelles sont vos recommandations pour l'amélioration du système éducatif en situation de crise et pour les interventions futures?

Merci pour votre participation !

Enquête auprès des parents d'élèves

Introduction

Bonjour, mon nom est _____ et nous vous rendons visite aujourd'hui parce que nous faisons une enquête auprès des parents de l'école. Nous sommes ici pour vous demander votre avis sur la vie de l'école, les enseignants et les expériences que vos enfants vivent en matière de sécurité à l'école. Nous aimerions vous demander la permission de vous poser quelques questions, mais nous ne recueillons pas votre nom ou toute autre information personnelle afin que personne ne sache ce que vous avez partagé. Avez-vous des questions à me poser ? Si vous préférez ne pas participer, il n'y a pas de problème pour vous ou vos enfants. Si vous ne vous sentez pas à l'aise avec les questions, vous n'êtes pas tenu d'y répondre. Ai-je la permission de vous poser des questions et d'écrire vos réponses ?

Inscription

1. Combien d'enfants avez-vous ?
2. Combien de vos garçons sont à l'école maintenant ? Combien y a-t-il de filles à l'école aujourd'hui ?

| F/G? (Sexe) | Age | Niveau |
|-------------|-----|--------|
|-------------|-----|--------|

3. Combien étaient scolarisés en **2018**? Combien de garçons étaient à l'école ? Combien de filles ?

| F/G? (Sexe) | Age | Niveau |
|-------------|-----|--------|
|-------------|-----|--------|

4. Combien de jours leur arrive-t-il de manquer les classes chaque mois ?

| F/G? (Sexe) | Age | Nbre de jours d'absence /mois | | | |
|-------------|-----|-------------------------------|-----|------|-----|
| | | 0-3 | 3-7 | 7-12 | >12 |
| | | 0-3 | 3-7 | 7-12 | >12 |
| | | 0-3 | 3-7 | 7-12 | >12 |
| | | 0-3 | 3-7 | 7-12 | >12 |
| | | 0-3 | 3-7 | 7-12 | >12 |
| | | 0-3 | 3-7 | 7-12 | >12 |
| | | 0-3 | 3-7 | 7-12 | >12 |

5. Quelles sont les raisons pour lesquelles les garçons manquent l'école ? Quelles sont les raisons pour lesquelles les filles manquent l'école ? (Cercle tous)

| F/G? (Sexe) | Raisons pour l'absence |
|-------------|------------------------|
|-------------|------------------------|

1. Parfois, ils sont trop malades pour assister
2. C'est trop dangereux (problèmes de sécurité)
3. Ils doivent travailler
4. Pas assez d'argent pour les frais
5. Mauvais résultats (difficulté avec les études)
6. L'enseignant est absent
7. L'école est en mauvais état
8. La salle de classe n'est pas confortable (il fait trop chaud, trop encombrée, trop sombre)
9. Les élèves ont peur
10. Les latrines sont mauvaises
11. Ils n'ont pas ce dont ils ont besoin pour assister (par exemple les uniformes, les livres, les fournitures scolaires)
12. Autres raisons

6. Les garçons, aiment-ils aller à l'école ? Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas ?

7. Les filles, aiment-elles aller à l'école ? Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas ?

Qualité de l'enseignant

8. Vos enfants ont-ils de bons enseignants ? Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas ?

9. Leurs enseignants sont-ils meilleurs ou pires que les enseignants d'il y a 3 ans ? Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas ?

Construction et rénovation des écoles

10. Aimez-vous le bâtiment de l'école ? Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas ?

Quel est l'état de l'école ?

- Nouveau
- Vieux mais en bon état
- Vieux et en mauvais état
- En très mauvais état

École de la deuxième chance

11. Est-ce que l'un de vos enfants participe à des programmes d'école de la deuxième chance ? (cours pour les élèves plus âgés qui ne vont pas à l'école pour rattraper leur niveau) ? Combien de garçons ? Combien de filles ?

- Si oui : les cours de l'école de la deuxième chance sont-ils utiles à vos enfants ? Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas ?
- Si non : Vos enfants assisteraient-ils à des cours d'école de la deuxième chance s'ils étaient disponibles ? Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas ?

Sécurité et sûreté

12. Y a-t-il eu des problèmes de sécurité à l'école ?

- Si oui : les problèmes de sécurité sont-ils moins graves ou pires qu'il y a 3 ans ?
- Si la situation est meilleure : Que pouvez-vous citer comme aspects positifs ? Pourvoir modalités
- Si elle est pire : Qu'est-ce qui s'est empiré ? Pourvoir modalités

13. Est-ce que vos enfants ont expérimenté l'une des situations suivantes à l'école ?
- La peur des adultes à l'extérieur de la communauté, par exemple la peur d'une attaque
 - Peur des adultes à l'intérieur de la communauté
 - Peur des autres élèves (intimidation)
 - Peur des enseignants ou des directeurs d'école
 - Violence physique ou sexuelle d'adultes
 - Violence d'autres élèves
14. Si oui, êtes-vous prêt à me dire ce qui s'est passé ? (S'ils ne souhaitent pas en discuter, passez à la question suivante)
15. Si oui, vos enfants ont-ils obtenu de l'aide d'enseignants ou de quelqu'un d'autre à l'école ?
- Quel genre d'aide ? (Décrire) Pourvoir modalités

Pratiques WASH

16. Votre école dispose-t-elle d'une source d'eau potable ? pourquoi/pourquoi pas ?
- Si oui,
- Fonctionnelle
 - Un peu fonctionnelle
 - Pas du tout fonctionnelle
17. Y-a-t-il des installations pour le lavage des mains dans votre école ?
- Oui
 - Non
 - Ne sait pas
18. Que pensez-vous du lavage des mains au savon par vos enfants à la maison à la sortie des toilettes et au moment des repas ?

A quelle fréquence est-ce que vos enfants se lavent les mains à la maison à la sortie des toilettes et au moment des repas ?

- Tout le temps
 - Parfois
 - Pas du tout
19. Durant les 3 dernières années, que pensez-vous du degré de propreté de votre école (cour, classes, latrines) ?
- Très bien
 - Bien
 - Passable
 - Pas du tout
20. Avez-vous des idées sur la façon dont votre école pourrait être meilleure ?
- Amélioration de l'infrastructure
 - De meilleurs enseignants
 - Plus de ressources (livres, fournitures, etc.)
 - Amélioration de la sécurité
 - Autres

21. Merci pour votre temps. Avez-vous des questions à me poser ?

(Prendre soigneusement note de leurs questions)

ANNEX IV: SOURCES OF INFORMATION

4.1 Documents reviewed

1. Gender Analysis 2018
2. List of Schools rehabilitated Y3 by CAP and Option
3. Liste des 250 écoles du projet
4. Mali EESA AID 688-C-16-00001 Annual Report FY 2018
5. Mali EESA AID 688-C-16-00001 Annual Report FY2016
6. Mali EESA AID 688-C-16-00001 Annual Report Year 2 FY2017
7. Mali EESA AID 688-C-16-00001 Final Report
8. Mali EESA Étude CGS Rapport Final
9. Mali EESA Gender Analysis Report, VF 2016
10. Mali EESA Rapid Education Risk Analysis 2016
11. Mali EESA Rapid Need Assessment 2016
12. Progress Against PMP Indicators FY2017 – Q4
13. Progress Against PMP Indicators October 2018
14. Rapport Analyse Indicateurs Revue 2019
15. Rapport du Third Party Monitoring pour le Projet EESA
16. Rapport RNA Final Sept 2016
17. Rapport Validé GREFFA-ERSAPACEEN 2017
18. Security Incidents in FY2018
19. Security Incidents in FY2018 Q4
20. Subgrants for SIPs Tracker
21. Success Story – Remedial Courses
22. Success Story Sansanding-Coura

4.2 List of Sampled Schools

| REGION | CERCLE | COMMUNE | VILLAGE | ECOLES |
|--------|----------|-----------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Ségou | Macina | Boky-Wéré | Boky-Wéré | Boky-Wéré premier cycle |
| Ségou | Macina | Boky-Wéré | Kouna | Kouna premier cycle |
| Ségou | Macina | Boky-Wéré | Oulan | Oulan premier cycle |
| Ségou | Niono | Nampalari | Nampala | 1er cycle de Nampala |
| Ségou | Niono | Dogofry | Dar salam K2 | 1er Cycle Darsalam K2 |
| Ségou | Niono | Dogofry | Dia coura | 1er Cycle de Dia Coura |
| Ségou | Niono | Dogofry | Djenne coura | 1er Cycle Djenné Coura |
| Ségou | Niono | Dogofry | Dogofry B | 1er Cycle Dogofry B |
| Ségou | Niono | Dogofry | Dogofry Ba | 1er Cycle Dogofryba |
| Ségou | Niono | Dogofry | Farabougou | 1er Cycle de Farabougou |
| Ségou | Niono | Dogofry | Goma coura | 1er Cycle de Gouma Coura |
| Ségou | Niono | Dogofry | Markala coura K02 | 1er cycle de Markala coura |
| Ségou | Niono | Dogofry | Missira K07 | 1er cycle Missira KO7 |
| Ségou | Niono | Dogofry | Sanssanding coura | 1er Cycle de Sanssanding Coura |
| Ségou | Niono | Dogofry | SégouCoro | Ségou Coro SK18 |
| Ségou | Niono | Dogofry | Sikasso Coura | 1er Cycle de Sikasso Coura |
| Ségou | Niono | Dogofry | Touba coura | 1er cycle de Touba coura |
| Ségou | Niono | Diabaly | Diabaly coura | Diabaly coura |
| Ségou | Niono | Diabaly | Kimbirila | Ecom Kimbirila |
| Ségou | Niono | Diabaly | Marakabachi | Ecom Marakabachi |
| Ségou | Niono | Diabaly | Niessoumana | Niessoumana |
| Ségou | Niono | Sokolo | Darsalam Sk 21 | Barou Diabaté |
| Ségou | Niono | Sokolo | Dougouba SK13 | Dougouba |
| Ségou | Niono | Sokolo | Sokolo 1 ^{er} C A | Sokolo 1 ^{er} cycle |
| Mopti | Douentza | Douentza | Drimbe | Ecole Fondamentale de Drimbe |
| Mopti | Douentza | Douentza | Every | Ecole Fondamentale de Every |
| Mopti | Douentza | Hombori | Gallou | Ecole Fondamentale de Galou |
| Mopti | Douentza | Hombori | Hombori | Ecole F de Hombori Benne |
| Mopti | Douentza | Djaptodji | Sondoko | Ecole Fondamentale de Sondogo |
| Mopti | Douentza | Petaka | Gono | Ecole Fondamentale Gono |
| Mopti | Koro | Bondo | Bondo | Ecole Fondamentale Bondo I |
| Mopti | Koro | Bondo | Dangatène | Ecole Fondamentake K.B. Togo |
| Mopti | Koro | Bondo | Ombo | Ecole Fondamentale de Ombo |
| Mopti | Koro | Bondo | Pomorododiou | Ecole F de Pomorododiou |
| Mopti | Koro | Koporona | Wol | Ecole F de wol Ansegue |
| Mopti | Koro | Koporopen | Guero Dogon | Guero Dogon |

| | | | | |
|----------|-----------|--------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| Mopti | Koro | Koporopen | Koporopen | Ecole F de Koporopen I A |
| Mopti | Koro | Koporopen | Koporopen | Ecole F de Koporopen I B |
| Mopti | Koro | Koro | BanaGakou | Ecole de Bana Gakou |
| Mopti | Koro | Koro | Dérou-Nâ | Ecole Fondamentale de Derou I |
| Mopti | Koro | Koro | Gakou | Ecole F de Gakou |
| Mopti | Koro | Koro | Kiniourodourou | Ecole F de kiriourodourou |
| Mopti | Koro | Koro | Kiri | Ecole Fondamentale de kiri |
| Mopti | Koro | Koro | Pongonon | Ecole F châda de pongonon |
| Mopti | Koro | Koro | Sana | Ecole Fondamentale Sana I |
| Mopti | Koro | Koro | Ségué | Ségué |
| Mopti | Mopti | Konna | Konna | Konna A |
| Mopti | Mopti | Konna | Kontza peulh | Kontza peulh premier cycle |
| Mopti | Mopti | Konna | Ouméré | Ouméré premier cycle |
| Timbuktu | Diré | Arham | Morikoira | Morikoira |
| Timbuktu | Diré | Garbakouira | Makalagoungou | Makalagoungou |
| Timbuktu | Diré | Diré | Diré | ABCII |
| Timbuktu | Diré | Diré | Diré | Ecole Mamadou Samassekou |
| Timbuktu | G-Rharous | Hamzakoma | Bougouni | Bougouni |
| Timbuktu | G-Rharous | Hamzakoma | Minkiri | Minkiri |
| Timbuktu | G-Rharous | Rharous | Boya Haoussa | Boya Haoussa |
| Timbuktu | G-Rharous | Rharous | Dangouma | Dangouma |
| Timbuktu | G-Rharous | Rharous | Rharous | Agaly Alhousseiny Maiga |
| Timbuktu | G-Rharous | Rharous | Rharous | Ecole Amadou Hama Maiga |
| Timbuktu | G-Rharous | Rharous | Rharous | Ecole Diamnbourou |
| Timbuktu | G-Rharous | Rharous | Salah koira | Salah koira |
| Timbuktu | G-Rharous | Serere | Mandiakoye | Faranbakaye |
| Timbuktu | G-Rharous | Ouinderden | Adiora | Ecole Youssouf ag Oumar |
| Timbuktu | G-Rharous | Banikane | Egachar | Mohamed Elmoctar Ag |
| Timbuktu | G-Rharous | Banikane | Gourzougueye | Ecole Agaly Sidaly |
| Timbuktu | Niafunké | Soumpi | Doua | Doua |
| Timbuktu | Niafunké | Soboundou | Goundam Tousekelle | Goundam Tousekelle |
| Timbuktu | Niafunké | Soboundou | Niafunké | Ecole Ousmane Macinanké |
| Timbuktu | Niafunké | Soboundou | Niafunké | Ecole Issa Maiga de Niafunké |
| Timbuktu | Niafunké | Soboundou | Ouro Esso | Ouro Esso |
| Timbuktu | Niafunké | Soboundou | Sibo | Ecole Ali Amadou Yattara |
| Timbuktu | Goundam | Bintagoungou | Bintagoungou | Alphahou |
| Timbuktu | Timbuktu | Alafia | Toya | Toya |
| Timbuktu | Timbuktu | Ber | Ber | Adoumaha ag Mohamed |
| Gao | Ménaka | Ménaka | Intibakatene | Intibakatene |
| Gao | Bourem | Bourem | Bourem Foghas | Bourem Plateau |

| | | | | |
|-------|----------|--------------|--------------|------------------------------|
| Gao | Bourem | Bourem | Chabaria | Chabaria |
| Gao | Gao | Anchawadj | Anchawadj | Tamagaste |
| Gao | Gao | Anchawadj | Gangabera | Gangabera premier cycle |
| Gao | Gao | Soni Ali Ber | Berrah | Berrah premier cycle |
| Gao | Gao | Soni Ali Ber | Zindiga | Zindiga |
| Gao | Ansongo | Ouattagouna | Fafa Haoussa | Fafa Haoussa premier cycle |
| Gao | Ansongo | Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna premier cycle |
| Gao | Ansongo | Ansongo | Ansongo | Ansongo B 2 |
| Gao | Ansongo | Ansongo | Bazi Haoussa | Bazi Haoussa premier cycle |
| Gao | Ansongo | Ansongo | Seyna | Seyna |
| Gao | Ansongo | Bourra | Golea | Golea |
| Gao | Ansongo | Bourra | Golingo | Golingo île |
| Gao | Ansongo | Bara | Tannal | Ecole fondamentale de Tannal |
| Kidal | Kidal | Kidal | Aliou | Aliou premier cycle |
| Kidal | Kidal | Kidal | BAM | BAM |
| Kidal | Kidal | Kidal | Kidal III | Kidal 3 |
| Kidal | Tessalit | Tessalit | Ahamboukar | Ahamboukar |
| Kidal | Tessalit | Tessalit | Tessalit | Ecole Ahmed ag Assalat |

4.3 Interviewee List

| exe | Position | School | 6. Town/village | Commune | Cercle | Region | Contact |
|----------|-------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------|--------|----------|
| Masculin | CGS | Ansongo II B | Ansongo | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Ansongo II B | Ansongo | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | 65850605 |
| Masculin | CGS | Ansongo II B | Ansongo | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | APE | Ansongo II B | Ansongo | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | AME | Ansongo II B | Ansongo | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | AME | Ansongo II B | Ansongo | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | AME | Ansongo II B | Ansongo | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Ansongo II B | Ansongo | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Ansongo II B | Ansongo | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Ansongo II B | Ansongo | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | 66426618 |
| Masculin | Enseignant | Bazi Haoussa | Bazi Haoussa | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Bazi Haoussa | Bazi Haoussa | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | 79220252 |
| Féminin | Elève | Bazi Haoussa | Bazi Haoussa | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Bazi Haoussa | Bazi Haoussa | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Bazi Haoussa | Bazi Haoussa | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Bazi Haoussa | Bazi Haoussa | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Enseignant | Djichini | Djichini | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | 96219115 |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Djichini | Djichini | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | 91296002 |
| Masculin | CGS | Djichini | Djichini | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Ecole fondamentale de Fafa | Fafa Haoussa | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Ecole fondamentale de Fafa | Fafa Haoussa | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Ecole fondamentale de Fafa | Fafa Haoussa | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | AME | Ecole fondamentale de Fafa | Fafa Haoussa | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |

| | | | | | | | |
|----------|-------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|-------------|---------|-----|-------------|
| Masculin | APE | Ecole fondamentale de Fafa | Fafa Haoussa | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Ecole fondamentale de Fafa | Fafa Haoussa | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Ecole fondamentale de Fafa | Fafa Haoussa | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Ecole fondamentale de Fafa | Fafa Haoussa | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Ecole fondamentale de Fafa | Fafa Haoussa | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Ecole fondamentale de Fafa | Fafa Haoussa | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Ecole fondamentale de Fafa | Fafa Haoussa | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Enseignant | Ecole fondamentale de Goléa | Goléa | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | 76 54 49 41 |
| Masculin | Elève | Ecole fondamentale de Goléa | Goléa | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Goléa | Goléa | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Goléa | Goléa | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Goléa | Goléa | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | APE | Goléa | Goléa | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | AME | Goléa | Goléa | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | AME | Goléa | Goléa | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Goléa | Goléa | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Goléa | Goléa | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Goléa | Goléa | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Goléa | Goléa | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Ecole fondamentale de Golingo | Golingo | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | 79426536 |
| Féminin | Elève | Ecole fondamentale de Golingo | Golingo | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Golingo | Golingo | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Golingo | Golingo | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Golingo | Golingo | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Golingo | Golingo | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Golingo | Golingo | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Golingo | Golingo | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |

| | | | | | | | |
|----------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|---------|-----|-------------------------|
| Masculin | CGS | Golingo | Golingo | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Golingo | Golingo | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Golingo | Golingo | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Golingo | Golingo | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Golingo | Golingo | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Golingo | Golingo | Bourra | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Ecole fondamentale de Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Ecole fondamentale de Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | 75.32.81.65 |
| Masculin | Enseignant | Ecole fondamentale de Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Ecole fondamentale de Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Ecole fondamentale de Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | APE | Ecole fondamentale de Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | AME | Ecole fondamentale de Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Ecole fondamentale de Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Ecole fondamentale de Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Ecole fondamentale de Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ouattagouna | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Ecole de Seyna | Seyna | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Enseignant | Ecole de Seyna | Seyna | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Ecole de Seyna | Seyna | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | 65-52-20-91/92-34-17-51 |
| Masculin | Ménages | Ecole de Seyna | Seyna | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Ecole de Seyna | Seyna | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Ecole de Seyna | Seyna | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Ecole de Seyna | Seyna | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Ecole de Seyna | Seyna | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Ecole de Seyna | Seyna | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Ecole de Seyna | Seyna | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Ecole de Seyna | Seyna | Ansongo | Ansongo | Gao | |

| | | | | | | | |
|----------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------|--------|---------|-----|-------------|
| Masculin | Enseignant | Tannal | Tannal | Bara | Ansongo | Gao | 82083328 |
| Féminin | Directeur d'école | Tannal | Tannal | Bara | Ansongo | Gao | 72304997 |
| Masculin | CGS | Tannal | Tannal | Bara | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Tannal | Tannal | Bara | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Tannal | Tannal | Bara | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Tannal | Tannal | Bara | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | AME | Tannal | Tannal | Bara | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | APE | Tannal | Tannal | Bara | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | AME | Tannal | Tannal | Bara | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Tannal | Tannal | Bara | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Tannal | Tannal | Bara | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Tannal | Tannal | Bara | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Tannal | Tannal | Bara | Ansongo | Gao | |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Ecole Sahanou Abouba | Bourem Djindo | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Masculin | Enseignant | Ecole Sahanou Abouba | Bourem Djindo | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | 73 37 00 28 |
| Masculin | CGS | Ecole Sahanou Abouba | Bourem Djindo | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Féminin | Ménages | Ecole Sahanou Abouba | Bourem Djindo | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Ecole Sahanou Abouba | Bourem Djindo | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Bourem IV Plateau | Bourem Foghas | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | 75 26 10 44 |
| Masculin | Ménages | Bourem IV Plateau | Bourem Foghas | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Masculin | Enseignant | Bourem IV Plateau | Bourem Foghas | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | 75261048 |
| Féminin | CGS | Bourem IV Plateau | Bourem Foghas | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | 75185297 |
| Masculin | Elève | Bourem IV Plateau | Bourem Foghas | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Bourem IV Plateau | Bourem Foghas | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Bourem IV Plateau | Bourem Foghas | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Bourem IV Plateau | Bourem Foghas | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Féminin | Directeur d'école | Chabaria | Chabaria | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | 73 18 56 19 |

| | | | | | | | |
|----------|-------------------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|--------|-----|-------------|
| Masculin | Enseignant | Chabaria | Chabaria | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | 77 78 23 48 |
| Féminin | Ménages | Chabaria | Chabaria | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Chabaria | Chabaria | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Chabaria | Chabaria | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Chabaria | Chabaria | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Chabaria | Chabaria | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Chabaria | Chabaria | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Chabaria | Chabaria | Bourem | Bourem | Gao | 73-33-14-30 |
| Masculin | Elève | Ecole de Gangabera | Gangabera | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Ecole de Gangabera | Gangabera | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | 78-08-78-94 |
| Masculin | CGS | Ecole de Gangabera | Gangabera | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Féminin | Ménages | Ecole de Gangabera | Gangabera | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | Enseignant | Ecole de Gangabera | Gangabera | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Ecole de Tamagaste | Tamagaste | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Ecole de Tamagaste | Tamagaste | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Ecole de Tamagaste | Tamagaste | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Ecole de Gangabera | Gangabera | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Ecole de Gangabera | Gangabera | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Ecole de Gangabera | Gangabera | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Féminin | AME | Ecole de Gangabera | Gangabera | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | APE | Ecole de Gangabera | Gangabera | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | APE | Ecole de Tamagaste | Tamagaste | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | AME | Ecole de Tamagaste | Tamagaste | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | APE | Ecole de Tamagaste | Tamagaste | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | AME | Ecole de Tamagaste | Tamagaste | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Ecole de Tamagaste | Tamagaste | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Gangabera | Gangabera | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |

| | | | | | | | |
|----------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------|-----|-------------|
| Féminin | Elève | Gangabera | Gangabera | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Gangabera | Gangabera | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Gangabera | Gangabera | Anchawadj | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Intibakatene | Intibakatene | Menaka | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Intibakatene | Intibakatene | Menaka | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Berrah | Berrah | Soni Aliber | Gao | Gao | 64-47-42-53 |
| Masculin | CGS | Berrah | Berrah | Soni Aliber | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Zindiga | Zindiga | Soni Aliber | Gao | Gao | 63-38-75-65 |
| Masculin | CGS | Zindiga | Zindiga | Soni Aliber | Gao | Gao | 77-75-50-27 |
| Masculin | Enseignant | Berrah | Berrah | Sonni Ali Ber | Gao | Gao | 66263378 |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Berrah | Berrah | Sonni Ali Ber | Gao | Gao | 75323869 |
| Masculin | CGS | Berrah | Berrah | Sonni Ali Ber | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Zindiga | Zindiga | Sonni Ali Ber | Gao | Gao | 77755027 |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Zindiga | Zindiga | Sonni Ali Ber | Gao | Gao | 79169411 |
| Masculin | Enseignant | Zindiga | Zindiga | Sonni Ali Ber | Gao | Gao | |
| Féminin | Elève | Berrah | Berrah | Sonni Ali Ber | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Berrah | Berrah | Sonni Ali Ber | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | Elève | Berrah | Berrah | Sonni Ali Ber | Gao | Gao | |
| Masculin | CGS | Menaka 3 | Menaka | Menaka | Menaka | Gao | |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Intibakatene | Intibakatene | Menaka | Menaka | Gao | 79425283 |
| Masculin | Directeur d'école | Menaka 3 | Menaka | Menaka | Menaka | Gao | |

4.4 Security Incidents in EESA intervention areas

| Date for FY2018 Q4 | | | | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Source | Type of attack | Date and Place | Location and description of attack | Summary Damages | Summary Victims |
| AMC | Jihadist attack | 03 July 2018 | Segou: A power tiller exploded on a mine between Sokolo and Singindara, 7 km from Sokolo. The Malian armed forces located 13 explosives on the site, and they were able to remove 8 explosives and 5 remain untouched. | | Two dead and one seriously injured. |
| AMC Agent ACTED | Supposed jihadist attack | 08 July 2018 | Gao: At around 10 a.m., an ACTED vehicle leaving Bamba was attacked by two armed men between Hamakouladji and Tondibi. | | No loss of human life. |
| AMC (Journal (Alhabar) | Supposed jihadist attack | 08 July 2018 | Timbuktu : Three people were murdered by two unidentified armed individuals. The two assailants were on board of two SANILY motorcycles. During the attack three other people were injured and admitted to the emergency room. After their attack, one of the three assailants left his motorcycle on the site. The events took place in Sankoré. The victims are from the Arab community. | | Three dead and three wounded. |
| AMC (School Director) | Jihadist attack | 09/July/2018 | Mopti : Gaku was attacked by unidentified armed individuals in the commune of Koro,. The school administration, school store and teachers' accommodation were burned down. No loss casualty but a few wounded. | The school store and teachers' accommodation burned down. | Some wounded |
| AMC | supposed jihadist attack | July 20, 2018 | Segou / Mopti: Between Macina and Tenekou, there was a clash between the Malian armed forces and unidentified armed individuals. | | One Lieutenant killed and 5 soldiers wounded. |

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|--------------------------|-----|--------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| AMCs / Local Authorities | AMC | Electoral incident | July 24, 2018 | Timbuktu : In the late afternoon, a campaign team of the opponent Soumaila Cissé was attacked in Fifo, the capital of the municipality of Haribomo in the district of Gourma Rharous. Armed men surrounded an election meeting of the platform. The delegation vehicle was seized with all personal belongings, including the telephones of the head of the delegation, Sidi Mohamed Adiawiakoye called Souédi. | | No loss of human life. |
| | AMC | Robbery | July 25, 2018 | Timbuktu : The young people of Timbuktu burned 3 vehicles of alleged Arab robbers. As a result, gunfire took place throughout the city as a reaction of the Arab community. | 3 vehicles burned. | No loss of human life |
| | AMC | Jihadist attack | | Timbuktu : Uncontrolled elements have infiltrated the traders in Yobo tao (Market) in Timbuktu. They took motorcyclists and vehicles away. This created a shutdown of activities in the city, (banking, market and economic activities suspended). Coinciding with the visit of the Minister of National Reconciliation Mohamed El Moctar to Timbuktu, a crisis meeting was held to calm down the situation. Later, the army was able to control the situation. | Vehicles burned | No loss of human life. |
| | | | Electoral incident | July 28, 2018 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timbuktu: In protest against the holding of the elections, at 2 p.m. in the villages of the Haoussa area (behind the river) in Rharous, armed men took election materials from 17 polling stations and kidnapped the election officials, who were later released; • Mopti: In the town of Diambakrou, not far from Konna, armed men destroyed the ballot boxes. Gunshots were heard; | |

AMCs / Local Authorities

Electoral incident

(First round)

- **Segou:** A polling station was attacked in the commune of Mariko, 45 km from Niono, by unidentified armed men;
- **Segou:** In the Dogofry commune, the Dounkara polling station where our teachers were assessors was attacked. The poll was taken away and three motorcycles belonging to two assessors and one voter were burned;
- **Segou:** In the commune of Dogofry, Darsalam, Massabougou, Dagabori, Tomoni Dounkala were attacked, electoral materials were taken away. An ADP party vehicle, the driver and voters on board were kidnapped. In addition, 5 motorcycles were damaged and one was taken away;
- **Timbuktu:** The Saourassane polling station in the Dianké commune, located about 50 km from Nianfunké, was burned down early in the morning by unidentified armed individuals transported on 12 motorcycles;
- **Timbuktu:** Unidentified armed individuals on motorcycles at 10 a.m. took away the poll in Tindandan, a locality located about 28 km from Timbuktu;
- **Mopti:** During the night, the Director of the only school in Ouro Nema, in the Kounary commune, was arrested and beaten up by jihadists.
- **Segou:** voters were unable to vote in four (4) villages in the commune of Sokolo (Singo, Rangabé, Famabougou and Massarala), at 6 am, armed bandits entered the polling stations and took the ballot boxes with them. In Diadjan, still in the same commune, the community refused to vote because no authority came to offer condolences following the deaths of their Imam and village chief.
- **Mopti :** The armed bandits took election materials from several villages of Douentza. Namely (Kerena, Kikra, Débélé, Drimbé). A teacher's motorcycle in an EESA school was also taken away.

AMC

Supposed
jihadist
attack

04/August/2018

- **Mopti :** a transport vehicle was attacked by unidentified armed men between Bambara-Maoudé and Sevaré. The passengers' belongings were taken away by the attackers.

No loss of human life..

| | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| AMCs / Local Authorities | Electoral incident | August 11, 2018 (second round) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timbuktu: In the Diré commune, election materials in Kirame were taken away in the evening by six (6) unidentified armed men on three (3) motorcycles. | |
| | | August 12, 2018 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timbuktu: In the district of Nianfunké , the president of the Fitouga polling station in the commune of Artoga was murdered at 1 p.m. by unidentified armed individuals. The panicked assessors, after being beaten, fled away; • Segou: For security reasons, the polling stations in Massabougou and Darsalam K2 were transferred to Dounkala. Despite being secured by the Malian armed forces, the two polling stations did not open until 4 p.m. | |
| AMC | Supposed jihadist attack | August 16, 2018 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mopti : Two SMCs members at the Neima school were robbed while on their way to Somadougou on a motorcycle. They were stripped of their belongings. No physical violence. | |
| AMC | Supposed jihadist attack | August 17, 2018 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timbuktu: A vehicle of RDC was kidnapped in Fifo, the capital of the commune of Bambara-Maoudé. The vehicle was later found. | No loss of human life. |
| AMC | Supposed jihadist attack | August 18, 2018 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timbuktu: At 10 a.m., passengers in a transport vehicle were stripped of their belongings by unidentified armed men between Bambara-Maoudé and N'gouma. | No loss of human life. |
| AMC | Jihadist attack | September 12, 2018 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mopti : In the night at 1 a.m., the youth centre in Hombori was attacked by unidentified armed bandits, travelling by motorcycle, shouting "Allahou Akbar". The attack was directed against a concert of local rappers. Slight injuries among the spectators. The attackers then disappeared into the wild. | Slightly injured |

| | | | | | |
|------------------------------------------|-----|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| AMC (1st Deputy Mayor of Bambara Maoudé) | AMC | Unidentified attack | September 22, 2018 | Kidal : Mohamed Ag Eljamat, Techrerat tribe leader and Said Ould Cheick Malouk were shot by unidentified armed individuals on a motorcycle. Said Ould Cheick died on the spot and shortly after Mohamed died in hospital. | 2 civilians killed |
| | AMC | Jihadist attack | September 26, 2018 | Kidal: This morning at 9:44am, a Barkane vehicle exploded on a mine west of Kidal in the Aliou district. | No loss of human life. |
| | | Jihadist attack | September 26, 2018 | Timbuktu: Between Bambara-Maoudé and Douentza a military convoy exploded on a mine killing 7 soldiers, 2 soldiers reported missing, 4 burned vehicles. | 4 vehicles burned. 7 soldiers killed |

4.5 Security Incidents in Mali

FY2018 Q1- Q3

SECURITY INCIDENTS REPORT FY 3 Quarter I

During this period and according to the latest UN quarterly report on the security situation in Mali, there were more terrorist attacks in the regions of Mopti and Ségou than all the northern regions combined. Over the past three months, terrorist groups perpetrated a total of 71 attacks in the country, including 20 attacks in the region of Mopti, 17 in Gao and 14 in Kidal. The UN report also states that 37 of these 71 attacks were perpetrated against the Malian security forces including 22 in the regions of Mopti and Ségou, 8 in Gao, 4 in Timbuktu, 2 in Koulikoro and 1 in Menaka. Attacks against senior State officials and institutions have also increased in central Mali, the document reports. In the region of Ségou, the Niono Court chairperson was kidnapped on November 16, 2017, less than a month after the deadly ambush on the convoy of the President of the High Court of Justice in the region of Mopti.

The following list summarizes major security incidents that took place during the reporting period:

October 2017

- October 10, 2017 around 8 pm at DOGOFRY. An armed group aboard a 4x4 vehicle attacked a phone sales shop and Orange money and took away money. The same group took the bike of a resident of the village of Djenne Coura and shot a resident (quack doctor) in the village of Goma COURA 4 km from Djenne COURA.
- October 9, 2017 in Niafunké, armed bandits chased an entrepreneur who was building at the GOUMAYIRA school behind the river and the SMC wrote to the SSD to decide not to let their children go to school under this threat.
- October 9, 2017 around 11am, a humanitarian worker from IEDA relief was dispossessed of all his property at home by bandits.
- October 9, 2017 around 11h30mn in Kidal, the Kidal SSD adviser, Mr Foussemi Sangaré who is also the focal point of the USAID / EESA project in Kidal, was victim of a robbery by armed men.
- October 8, 2017 in Kidal, the office International Solidarity was robbed by armed individuals.
- October 8, 2017, unidentified armed individuals attacked the house of the water and forest officer in Fangasso and killed the man and his friend.
- October 6, 2017, in KORO, commune of DJOUNGANI ; 8 jihadists burned a church and a bar causing significant material damage but no casualty.
- October 5, 2017 in Mopti ; The army repels an attack on the " boat Timbuktu" connecting Koulikoro to Mopti.
- October 4-5, 2017 in Kidal city. The MSF office in Kidal was robbed by armed individuals.
- October 3, 2017, some gunmen attacked a rental car carrying a patient, an ICRC agent and the head of village of BARIA between BOUREM and HAMAKOULADJI ; The bandits as usual stripped the passengers then abducted the vehicle.
- 02/10/2017: Clashes between members of the AZAWAD Salvation Movement (MSA) and unidentified gunmen killed and wounded 17 people in northern Mali with salvageable war material.
- 01/10/2017 (Douentza-HOMBORI road) : Four (4) buses robbed and large sums of money taken from the passengers. A nearly 30-year girl was publicly raped by one of the robbers and property carried away.
- October 1, 2017 in Kidal in the district of ETAMBAR at 2am ; BARKHAN burned two houses and four vehicles and arrested all the people inside two houses owned by AHMOUDOU AG RHISSA, which is a migrant transport unionist.

November 2017

- November 28, 2017 in Kidal, around 6 am: Several bombshells were fired against the military positions in Kidal. These attacks occurred some minutes after a shellfire operation in Aguelhok.
- November 27, 2017 in Kidal, the office Solidarity International was robbed by armed individuals.
- November 24, 2017 in Timbuktu, specifically in Bambara-Maoudé. A patrol of the Burkinabe battalion Badenya 5 (MINUSMA), was ambushed "improvised explosive device stretched by an armed terrorist group" while it was carrying out an escort mission between Douentza and Timbuktu. 11 soldiers killed 3 wounded.
- November 24 – 25 in Ménaka. Some attackers injured at least 2 IRC employees, but were eventually repulsed by security personnel. IRC evacuated all staff from Ménaka after the incident.
- November 23, 2017 in Timbuktu, a jihadist threat in ARSY, a USAID-EESA project target village in the commune of Bambara MAOUD. The Jihadists ordered the head of village not to celebrate a marriage.
- November 22, 2017 in Mopti, two water and forest officers were murdered at the fair of DIALLASSAGOU in the commune of BANKASS by armed men.
- November 22, 2017 in Timbuktu, at the fair of GARNATI, a village of Niafunke, 3 armed men killed a water and forest guide around 5 pm.
- November 19, 2017 in Mopti, twenty armed men came aboard SANILY motorcycles and suddenly fired on the Malian soldiers who were traveling on a Pick-up. According to the inhabitants, the shooting lasted at least 1 hour just two kilometers from DIOUNGANI in the District of KORO before the Malian army took over the armed bandits. 1 soldier killed, 1 wounded.
- November 16, 2017 the vehicle of the president of the High Court of Gao was abducted by three armed men.
- November 16, 2017 in Ségou, the president of the court of NIONO was kidnapped by a group of attackers on a vehicle around 8h30 pm in his house.
- November 10 - 11, 2017 in Gao, the FAMa checkpoint at the exit of Ansongo to LABBEZANGA, was attacked by terrorists around 8 pm. The French force (Barkhane) intervened with air strikes.

December 2017

- December 28, 2017 in Mopti, the FAMAs were victims of a mine explosion. This incident occurred in BULKESY (Mopti) on the border with Burkina Faso. 3 dead and wounded.
- December 27, 2017 in Mopti, in KORO more exactly, around 11 p.m. a clash between the army and the armed bandits, who were trying to loot some shops at the market and Ecobank, took place. The army repulsed them. There were no casualties or deaths.
- December 27, at 3 p.m. at the ZINDA weekly fair, located at 45 km from Gao in the commune of GABERO, was attacked by three attackers. According to a local source, the attackers belong to the IDNANE Touareg community from the commune of INTILIT. "They stripped traders of their money, fuels. The attackers were then neutralized by the Ganda IZO militia responsible for securing the fair.
- December 12, 2017, three (3) public transport vehicles were attacked between TIMBUKTU and BAMBARA-MAOUDÉ by armed men. No casualty or injury but many passengers were robbed, according to a passenger.
- December 10, 2017 in Timbuktu, a terrorist attack by AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) killed six people in northern Mali, according to concordant sources. The attack targeted a Tuareg group favorable to the peace agreement, said the president of the Congress for justice in AZAWAD (CJA) which represents the KEL ANSAR Tuareg community. At least six people including members of the group were killed during this surprise attack.
- December 8, 2017 in Timbuktu, armed men kidnapped and killed five (5) technicians from a company including three (3) Malians, a Togolese and an Ivorian who were repairing the optical fiber damaged by the terrorists between Niafunké and Léré

- December 07, 2017 in Kidal, a truck jumped on a mine in WAILALAM about 04 km southwest of ADIELHOC, one casualty and a civilian wounded
- December 06, 2017 Timbuktu, around 6 am, some peasants detected a 20l can containing an explosive device and alerted the users of the road. A few hours later the foreign forces removed it because the army has no right to access the area of Ber at 60Km from Timbuktu.
- December 5, 2017 in Timbuktu, armed men attacked the town of KOUMAIRA in the District of NIAFOUNKE. They burned all the Malian flags and ordered the Mayor to disappear all flags and they promised to return very soon.
- December 02, 2017 Kidal, IRC office in Kidal was burglarized
- December 3, 2017 in Mopti, the secretary-general of municipality of Djoungani, in the district KORO, was shot by attackers in his family.
- December 1, 2017 in Gao, a dozen Malian soldiers in civilian clothes wanting to join their base in BOUREM were abducted aboard a bus.

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JANUARY 2018

- Thursday, January 04, 2018, a vehicle leaving for Ansongo in the region of Gao was robbed in the commune of GABERO by unidentified armed men. The occupants were stripped of their belongings and the vehicle taken away.
- On Thursday, January 4, 2018, in Mopti, terrorists attacked the Malian Armed Forces station in SOMADOUYOU, a soldier was wounded.
- On Wednesday January 17, 2018 to protest against the growing insecurity in the region, the population of Timbuktu city decided to observe a "dead city" day
- On January 13, 2018, in Kidal, the explosion of a mine targeting a MINUSMA convoy early in the morning in EGHARGHAR, Aguelhok-Tessalit road. 2 Chadian soldiers wounded.
- Thursday, January 18, 2018, the gendarmerie of Bambara-MAOUE in the region of Timbuktu was attacked by unidentified armed men. No loss casualties.
- Saturday, January 20, 2018 in daylight, unidentified armed men attacked the transport vehicles of Timbuktu, between Bambara-MAOUE and N'GOUMA, leaving for SEVARE. The passengers were stripped of their belongings. No casualties
- On Saturday, 20 January 2017, during a patrol in Mopti, the Senegalese peacekeepers contingent of the Rapid Reaction Force foiled an improvised explosive device (IED) attack in the vicinity of Boni, region of Mopti.
- On Wednesday, January 24, 2017 at around 3am, a new Malian army base between Goma Coura and Nampala was attacked.
- On Thursday, January 25, 2018, at around 4 a.m., the FAMA were attacked in YOUWAROU by unidentified armed individuals, two FAMAs killed and five assailants shot dead.
- Thursday, January 25, 2017 around 8 am in Mopti a carnival vehicle leaving DJIBO for BONI jumped on a mine 3 km from BONI. All passengers on board lost their lives.
- Friday, January 26, 2018 in Timbuktu, early in the morning a terrorist attack targeted a Malian army base in SOUMPY in the District of Niafunké. An official assessment (according to the Directorate of Information and Public Relations of the Armed Forces), reports 14 Malian soldiers killed and 10 wounded, 17 dead on the side of the attackers and many wounded. Vehicles were seized or burned by the Armed and Security Forces of Mali.
- Friday, January 26, 2018 two vehicles of International Medical Corps (IMC) were the target of an attack between MADIKOYE and HAMZAKOMA, District of Gourma Rharous. One vehicle was taken away with boxes of medication, luggage of staff on board, equipment such as computer and mobile phone were also taken away, no loss casualties.

- On Sunday January 28, 2017 in Ménaka, the Menaka Guard Camp was attacked in the morning by a suicide bomber. 5 dead: 4 guards and 1 attacker.
- Monday, January 29, 2018, shooting in the town of Fatoma at 5 km from Sevare in the region of Mopti around 5 am was heard. No victims, but the authorities have requested the suspension of classes (schools) until a later date.
- January 30, 2018, around 12 h00 the jihadists were between Aglal and Madiakoye, Timbuktu. The objective was to remove all the checkpoints on the Aglal –Madiakoye road i.e. MAA, MNLA and others which for them are there only to loot the populations. The checkpoint is no longer controlled.
- Tuesday, January 30, 2018, in Ségou an attack from the tollbooth of San around 10 pm slightly wounded a gendarme. The attackers, who arrived on four motorcycles, fired warning shots scare the occupants away.
- Wednesday January 31, 2018 in Gao "an army mission jumped on a mine laid by terrorists between Tarkint and Bourem. Two soldiers were killed, according to a provisional assessment.

FEBRUARY 2018

- 2018/02/01 - the mayor of Tarkint, in the region of Gao, and former negotiator for the release of Europeans abducted by jihadist groups, Baba Ould Cheikh "was abducted between 21 and 23 January by six armed men," a member of his family told AFP on Wednesday, without giving details.
- On Saturday, February 3, 2018, at around 8 p.m. in Ségou, terrorists attacked the Mandiakuy-Tominian Gendarmerie station. They went towards Benena (Mali and Burkina-Faso border) on motorcycles and vehicles.
- Saturday, February 03, 2018 Gao after clashes, in INTANKOUFFARENE, INKATARANE, and Iwelane in the District of Ansongo, three terrorists were shot dead. Motorcycles, weapons and ammunition were also seized following the assassination in the said village of a prominent figure, Mr. TEDJITT Alassane, at his home by terrorists.
- Sunday February 04, 2018, in Mopti around 9 pm., ten armed men came to the school of GALLOU in the commune of HOMBORI, District of Douentza, according to testimonies. They broke the door of the store and took away all the materials (food, WASH materials etc.). And since then the school is temporarily closed.
- In the night from Sunday to Monday, February 05, 2018, in Gao two members of the National Guard, Souleymane Diallo and Adama Koné in Gossi were killed by alleged jihadists, where a gendarmerie station located at some 90 km south of Gossi was also attacked, according to military sources.
- Tuesday, February 06, 2017, in Mopti the Malian army announced the arrest of two suspects in Mondoro in the District of Douentza. Both persons were in possession of weapons and ammunition.
- Friday, February 9, 2018, in Mopti in the afternoon on the road between Dera and KONNA a mine exploded in the passage of a passenger vehicle, killing five and wounding 18 others.
- Monday, February 12, 2018, in Ségou the Malian armed forces have defused, a mine buried in the ground in NGOMA COURA, District of NIONO.
- Monday, February 12, 2017 Timbuktu, robbery of 2 trucks, 1B-J and 2 motorcycles on the Bambara MAOUDE ARSY and ARSY TOUNKAROU roads by armed men on motorcycles around 9 am and 1 pm. The property of the persons concerned was taken away and 2 persons were beaten by armed men. No serious injuries or loss of life
- Monday February 12 in the afternoon (17h to 18h) in Gao three vehicles from Goundam were attacked 15 km from Tonka, no casualties but two whipped apprentices, phones, money and other valuables. Passengers were carried away by these bandits.
- On February 15, 2018 at Iam in Timbuktu unidentified individuals came to MADIKOYE in a vehicle and dismantled the 48 solar panels of the city hall of MADIKOYE and took them away.

- On Thursday 15/2/2018 in Timbuktu an Arab's vehicle was stolen by unidentified persons in the area of DIDI 15 Km from MADI AKOYE during the night, in pursuit of the bandits the Arab and his companions came upon other people they thought were their target and killed them all. After realizing the mistake, it was too late and all night until the morning, there were shooting exchanges between the two sides. The school principal Ali G MAIGA and his deputies have already reached MADI AKOYE.
- Saturday, February 17, 2018, in Gao a dozen "armed bandits" were killed by fighters of the Self-Defense Group Touareg Imghad and Allies (GATIA) and the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) during a confrontation with the "thugs" in the region of Gao, announced a joint statement of these two groups.
- Monday, February 19, 2018 at 10:30 am on the Goundam – Timbuktu road, a GRAD worker on motorcycle was robbed. The officer was shot in the thigh. The attackers took away his belongings.
- On Wednesday, February 21, 2018, in Ménaka two French soldiers from Operation Barkhane in Mali were killed, and another wounded between Gao and Ménaka, announced a military source to Agence France-Presse. The soldiers were hit by an artisanal mine explosion as their armoured vehicle passed by.
- Timbuktu, during the night of February 21 in Bourem-Inaly, serious clashes took place between two armed movements. The armed station of the MAA Platform in the rural commune of Bourem-Inaly was targeted by an attack at around 8 p.m. by unidentified armed men.
- Tuesday, February 27, 2018, Mopti, the city of Douentza, a soldier was stabbed and died shortly after as a result of this injury at the market by individuals who took his gun away.
- On February 27, 2018, around 6.30 pm, a vehicle of the Joint Tactical Echelon of the Joint Battle Group "SIGUI" jumps on an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) about 7 km east of Dioura. The death toll is 6.
- On Saturday 24/02/2018, Kidal a civilian vehicle hit an improvised explosive device in the Aguelhoc area.
- On Monday February 26, 2018, Gao, the city of Gao, is worried about a possible response by the Arab community after discovering the bodies two Arab children by the river.
- Wednesday, February 28, 2018 Gao around 7:30pm, armed men with a 4x4 fired on an officer of the National Guard who succumbed a few minutes in the hospital. Then three young people received bullets. As a result, hundreds of young people marched in the streets of Gao to put an end to the killings. According to a local reporter, the Arabs opened fire again. He also said that already three dead bodies have been transported to the hospital in Gao.
- On Tuesday February 27, towards dusk, 10 heavily armed Tuareg attacked the village of Barissadji, in the rural commune of Sonny Ali Ber, Gao, without hesitation, they started shooting at the population, injuring three women and one dead, the wounded were evacuated to Gao, they burned huts and houses.
- In the week from 19 to 25 February 2018, Mopti about 9 motorcycles burned by the military in four days between Sévaré and Somadougou.
- About 2 months, Timbuktu, disruption of the two networks (Orange and Malitel) in Bambara-Maoudé, and this is showing fear and slowing business in the community.
- On Monday, 26 February 2018, Timbuktu at around 10 a.m., a Swedish armoured vehicle jumped on a mine in SOUMPI, in the District of Niafunké. Fortunately, no human lives were lost.
- Wednesday February 28, 2018, between Boni and Douentza in Mopti, 4 peacekeepers were killed by the explosion of a mine.

MARCH 2018

- Thursday, March 01, 2018 at 7:05 am, in Kidal a Minusma vehicle hit an IED (Improvised Explosive Device) 200 m from the school of Aliou target (USAID EESA project school)

- Thursday, March 1, 2018, in Talataye, in the region of Ménaka, an officer of MSA, named Alhader Ag Aguidid was murdered by unidentified armed individuals. The events occurred when the person concerned was buying provisions at the market.
- On Sunday March 04, 2018 in Mopti, a military vehicle (FAMA) jumped on an explosive device at noon between Boron and KONNA, 04 soldiers were wounded and exchanges of fire followed the explosion.
- On Sunday March 04, 2018 in Timbuktu, truck leaving for Bamako from LERE was attacked by bandits between tonka and Niafunké around 11h 20mins, the passengers were robbed (money and property) no loss in lives.
- Sunday March 04, 2018, in Bourem unidentified armed men attacked the population of the village of BARIA. No loss in lives.
- In the night of Monday March 5, 2018 in Ségou, around 3 am the jihadists tried to put a mine on the road between Kokoni station and Dogofrybah, which exploded by killing 2 jihadists according to the PCEC of Dogofry.
- Tuesday March 06, 2018, Mopti, following the non-respect of the instructions given by the chief of staff of the army (prohibition to ride any kind of motorbikes 24h/24h), the military burned 3 motorbikes around 11H00 between SEVARE and FATOMA in the District of Mopti.
- Timbuktu: a public transport vehicle and its passengers disappeared: Since Wednesday morning March 07, a 4x4 DH vehicle with 13 passengers left Mopti for Diré. During the journey, the vehicle was deviated from its destination by hooded men. 5 of the passengers were released because of the local language and the others are still in the hands of their kidnapers. The driver Jibba, the owner of the vehicle, and his apprentice are among the hostages. From the latest information it seems that military personnel in civilian clothes were on board.
- Mopti: destruction of a dam construction site near Djenné on Thursday March 8, alleged armed jihadists attacked and fired the construction site of a dam near the town of Djenné, in the region of Mopti. According to one witness, they were about 30 armed men, presumed jihadists, on motorcycles.
- March 8, 2018 in Soala, Mopti at night, well-armed unidentified individuals attacked the base of the Chinese dam construction company commonly called the "Djenne Threshold". Soala is located at some 07 km from the town of Djenné. The attackers fired all the construction company's materials and equipment. They tied up, threatened and threw the company's guards and agents (Malian and Chinese) into the canals.
- On the night of March 8 to 9 in Molodo, Ségou 6km from Niono the bandits shot a shopkeeper. He was evacuated to hospital and died after.
- On Friday March 09 in Mopti following the confrontation between Fulanis and Dogons in the District of KORO, SOBERE a village 3km from Bondo in the commune of djougani was burned by the unidentified Peulh killing 3 people.
- On Friday 09 March 2018 Mopti around evening unidentified individuals slit a Peulh's throat in the town of Koro near the IFM and removed his genitals
- Saturday, March 09, 2018, Mopti, in the morning in Koro, a bus carrying Fulanis to Jungani was stopped by two dozogs (hunters) who got two old Fulanis off the bus to kill them.
- From March 11 to 12, 2018, Menaka, during two days of clashes between the MSA-GATIA coalition and armed bandits at 45 kilometers southwest of Menaka in the area of TABARDÉ which resulted in the death of Almahmoud Ag Iddar Alias Mokossi the No. 3 criminal organization operating in the area, as well as 6 other bandits killed, 3 bandits arrested, 4 vehicles recovered, 13 motorcycles and important war material seized including rockets.
- On Tuesday, March 13, 2018, Kidal, a mechanic named Hassan and known as ZARMA was shot dead by unidentified individuals around 6 p.m. in the ANGAMALI neighbourhood.
- Between Tuesday 13 and Wednesday 14 March 2018, Ménaka, during a bloody confrontation in the Tinzouragan areas, the fighters of the Tuareg Imghad and Allied Self-Defense Group (GATIA)

and those of the Azawad Salvation Movement (MSA) dismantled a terrorist base affiliated with Adnan Abu Walid. Five terrorists have been killed, including the infamous Djibo Hamma, alias Abu Razak.

- March 14, 2018 at about 5h20 in Gao in the area of Chateau not far from the camp of MOC, a building was attacked by a rocket
- March 15, 2018 armed bandits just shot a Social Development driver and drove off to Gao. The driver was injured in the right foot. It happened in the street facing the CAP of Gao
- March 15, 2018 around 01 o'clock in the morning in Mopti, assassination of the head of the hunters of NOUHOUUM-bozo, commune of KOUAKOUROU in the District of DJENNE. Risk of imminent confrontation between hunters and jihadists disguised as shepherds.
- On March 15 2018, a donkey cart, in Mopti, carrying two civilians, jumped on a terrorist Improvised Explosive Device (IED). It was at 3 km north of TOGREKOUUMBE. One dead, one injured. The IED targeted GATIA members that conduct operations to secure people and their property in the area. This incident occurred after the defeat of Amadou KOUFA's terrorists in the area.
- On Monday March 19, 2018, at about 9 :30, Mopti, the Somadougou security station, located 30 km south of Sévaré, was attacked by unidentified armed individuals. Although no human lives were lost, the station was unfortunately destroyed.
- On Monday March 19, 2018, in Mondoro, Mopti, an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) exploded. This occurred at the passage of a cart killing 3 people. Not far from there, a second mine was discovered and destroyed by the FAMA.
- Mopti March 19, 2018, the joint patrol of the 52nd Army Rapid Intervention Company in Sévaré destroyed a Mossi camp transformed by terrorists into a base next to a dune between Sabéré and Yorou. The death toll is one terrorist killed and another taken prisoner. 3 motorcycles, 2 Baikals rifles and mobile phones were also recovered. The arrested terrorist named Ali Amadoun Barry was the N°2 of GATIA of the Koro sector, his war name is Ali Bongo Barry.
- On Monday March 19, 2018, Mopti, between Hombori and Gossi, the FAMA also discovered and destroyed another IED.

SECURITY INCIDENTS REPORT FY 3 Quarter 3

April 2018:

- Tuesday, April 04, 2018 Arson in the office and a house of the Office du Niger in Macina, following a disagreement between a farmer and the Office du Niger staff.
- On Saturday, April 14, 2018 in Timbuktu, mortar fire coupled with vehicle bomb explosions on the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) super camp in Timbuktu around 2 p.m.
- On Wednesday April 25, 2018 in the District of Douentza, the sub-prefect of Hombory was kidnapped at 1 kilometer from Doumbara. He was on his way to Mopti on a mission. According to the witnesses, the assailants disembarked the other passengers before taking with them the sub-prefect.

May 2018:

- On Wednesday, May 02, 2018 the sub-prefect of Ouinerden was murdered in his house, he was also acting sub-prefect of the commune of Gossi in the Gao region.
- On Thursday, May 03, 2018, in Douentza around 8 pm two armed men on a motorcycle hijacked the vehicle of the Director of the School District (academie) at his residence.
- On Saturday, May 12, 2018, the mayor of the rural commune of Inadjatafane, the former Mayor of Boni, the educational advisor at the AE of Douentza were abducted between Douentza and Boré on the road to Gao.

- On Sunday May 13, 2018, in Douentza, Mercy Corps staff members were robbed in their house. No casualties or injured, but important materials were taken away.

June 2018:

- On June 2, 2018, in Kidal the MISNUSMA super camp was attacked. A total of 8 shells were launched at around 05h30 causing significant material damage in the Guinean contingent camp based at Kidal.
- On Saturday June 16, 2018, unidentified armed individuals broke into the village of Drimbé at around 8pm to abduct the son of the president of the CGS and the son of an advisor. They were released the next day. Subsequently the school management committee was burgled but no equipment was taken away.
- On Monday June 25, 2018, an attack by Donzos (traditional hunters) in the village of Koumaga reportedly killed 48 people. Among the victims were women and children who died from stray bullets. This attack was allegedly perpetrated by the Donzos, of the area who decided to end the threats of the Fulanis. According to the Donzos, Koumaga is the fiefdom of the jihadists and their protagonists.
- On Friday, June 29, 2018, the G5 Sahel force Office was the target of a suicide car bomb attack. The official death toll is three people, two military and one civilian. The attack was claimed by the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM).

As a consequence of these attacks, there is an increase of fear and distrust between populations themselves and between the populations and the government/administration which is absent in these communities in the center and north of Mali. These violent attacks coupled with the restriction of movement led to the lack of economic opportunities and social basic services (health, water and education).

ANNEX V: KEY PERSONNEL

Team Leader: Dr. Emmanuel M. David-Gnahoui brings over 20 years of experience evaluating public policies, programs and projects for NGOs, bilateral & multilateral organizations in Afghanistan and over 11 African countries many of which are in conflict and post-conflict settings. He has over 35 years working in the education sector including teaching graduate level courses in qualitative and quantitative mixed methods. In addition to his long-term work directing MIS divisions for agencies and organizations, he was the TL for multi-country project evaluations for the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA), ILO/IPEC, and the French Agency for Development (AFD). He holds a Ph.D. in Cultural and Educational Leadership and Policy Studies and is fluent in French and English.

Senior Evaluation Expert: Mr. Joseph Kotun brings more than 25 years' experience in international development and over 15 years of experience conducting evaluations using mixed methods. In addition to his work on over 30 evaluations with the US Department of State, USDA, NGOs, multi-laterals and other bi-lateral agencies, he has been a Team Leader, Evaluation Methods Specialist or technical expert on more than 10 USAID evaluations in Africa, and MENA regions. His experience includes leading evaluations in conflict-affected areas. He served as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Mali and has extensive West Africa work experience in neighboring countries. Mr. Kotun holds a master's degree in International and Intercultural Management and speaks English and French.

Specialist of Conflict & Crisis in Education: Ms. Kourakoro Bagayogo holds a master's degree in Science of Education from the Higher Institute of Training and Applied Research in Bamako. She was also trained, inter alia, in the development and utilization of EGRA and EGMA tools in the evaluation of learning in reading and writing and in mathematics; educational program design and evaluation; the development of teacher training modules and result-based management at the Commission des Grandes Seigneuries in Montreal, CA back in 2004. She was in Lyon, France for her training in data collection and analysis in the process of testing Level I Basic education curriculum. Altogether, she is an experienced education professional with over 35 years' experience in teaching, training of trainers, curriculum design and evaluation, and educational policies, programs/projects monitoring and evaluation. She served as the Head of the M&E unit of the Harmonized Support Program for Strengthening Education, USAID/PHARE project, March 2009 – July 2013; the Head of the Educational Research and Evaluation Division at the National Directorate of Pedagogy and also as the Head of Initial Training at the National Directorate of Normal Education Aug 2016 – Dec 2018. Since she retired in January 2019, she has been active as a consultant in educational project design, monitoring and evaluation.

WASH specialist: Mr. Birama Bagayogo holds a Master's in Public Health with a specialization in International Health. Mr. Bagayogo has proven report writing skills and has carried out studies in the fields of WASH, community health, primary education, gender-based violence, and conflict management. Furthermore, he has conducted several studies on the Mali educational system, particularly in crisis and post-crisis areas. In October 2019, he participated in a baseline study for the Stromme Foundation office in West Africa to identify the strengths and weaknesses of primary education in Mali (Sikasso, Segou and Timbuktu). Moreover, with 10 years of experience in project monitoring and evaluation, Mr. Bagayogo has gained the requisite expertise in the design, planning and implementation of qualitative and quantitative assessments. He is skilled in developing data collection tools and in training of data collection supervisors and investigators. Further, Mr. Bagayogo has worked with several donor agencies that intervene in the EESA programmatic areas, including Stromme Foundation, Plan Mali, Save The Children, UNICEF, and AMSS. Mr. Bagayogo is Bambara and speaks the language with native fluency.

School Construction Specialist: Mr. Alenou Marc Dara holds a civil engineering degree with a specialization in public works and in buildings. Mr. Dara has worked on school construction programs for over 15 years. Recently, he participated in the design and implementation of the PROJES project in the

Segou region. By December 5, 2019, this basic school building project rehabilitated 21 classrooms. Moreover, Mr. Dara has solid report writing experience in the field of school infrastructures as evidenced through, inter alia: the reports on the construction of Ouelessebougou and Koumantou high schools and the reports on the construction of various basic schools in the regions of Ségou (30 classrooms), Sikasso (40 classrooms), Kayes (27 classrooms). Since 2005, Mr. Dara has gained vast experiences in Education projects implementation and evaluation. Mr. Dara was the coordinator of the BUILDON-MVP (Millennium Village Project) partnership with his responsibilities ranging from planning and procurement to monitoring and evaluation. MVP was a major school construction program in eight regions of Mali. Furthermore, Mr. Dara has proven expertise in the use of both qualitative and quantitative data collection including, individual and group discussions, especially in terms of community-based data collection. Mr. Dara fluently speaks Bambara and Dogon.

Gender Specialist: With an MA in Psychopedagogy, Ms. Fatoumata Keita brings over 30 years working in gender, women's empowerment, and the promotion of women, children and families. During her Mali MOE, she coordinated the counselling program for school-aged girls and women. She has consulted with UNESCO and UNDP in her work on gender and the rights of the child. She speaks Bambara, English and French.

ANNEX VI: EESA'S 2018 PMP REPORT

Progress against PMP Indicators

| INDICATORS | | Baseline | Results Achieved Y2 | Results Achieved Y3 Q1 | Results Achieved Y3 Q2 | Results Achieved Y3 Q3 | Results Achieved Y3 Q4 | Results Achieved to Date | Year 3 Targets | Total Targets | Comments | met | exceed | not met |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|--------|---------|
| Project Objective | OG :OG: Total number of students entrants | 12,667 | 17787 | 22903 | 0 | 1716 | 12667 | 55,073 | 50,000 | 80,000 | The newly enrolled students from Q1 (October-Nov-Dec) for fiscal year 2017 were counted, which corresponds to the Baseline data, i.e. 12667 students. The target is met at 69%, with 55,073 students, 29,106 boys and 25,967 girls enrolled in school as a result of the project's intervention. | 69% | | I |
| | Number of Boys | | 9442 | 11994 | 0 | 916 | 6754 | 29,106 | | | | | | |
| | Number of Girls | | 8345 | 10909 | 0 | 800 | 5913 | 25,967 | | | | | | |
| | Number of learners in primary schools or equivalent non-school based settings reached with USG education assistance | 36,985 | 61548 | 36209 | 0 | 4847 | 0 | 102,604 | 18,452 | 80,000 | The target was exceeded. A total of 102,604 students (53,127 boys and 49,477 girls) were reached out by the project | 128% | | I |
| Number of Boys | 31844 | | 18792 | 0 | 2491 | 0 | 53,127 | | | | | | | |
| Number of Girls | 29704 | | 17417 | 0 | 2356 | 0 | 49,477 | | | | | | | |
| | Baseline | Results Achieved Y2 | Results Achieved Y3 Q1 | Results Achieved Y3 Q2 | Results Achieved Y3 Q3 | Results Achieved Y3 Q4 | Results Achieved to Date | Year 3 Targets | Total Targets | Comments | Baseline | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|---|------|-----|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|---|---|
| OUTCOME I | OC 1.1: Total number of new students entrants | 6,223 | 13554 | 19862 | 0 | 1025 | 0 | 34,441 | 14,000 | 28,000 | The target was exceeded. A total of 34,441 students (18,057 boys and 16,384 girls) were reached out by the project | 12 3% | I | |
| | Number of Boys | | 7210 | 10325 | 0 | 522 | 0 | 18,057 | | | | | | |
| | Number of Girls | | 6344 | 9537 | 0 | 503 | 0 | 16,384 | | | | | | |
| | OC 1.2: Total number of learners entering entry grade | 9,312 | 15262 | 22548 | 0 | 1042 | 0 | 38,852 | 11,000 | 22,000 | The target was exceeded. A total of 38,852 students (20,390 boys and 18,462 girls) were reached by the project | 17 7% | I | |
| | Number of Boys | | 8063 | 11794 | 0 | 533 | 0 | 20,390 | | | | | | |
| | Number of Girls | | 7199 | 10754 | 0 | 509 | 0 | 18,462 | | | | | | |
| | OC 1.3: Total number of learners who drop out | 2010 | 2393 | 3110 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3,110 | 1846 | 1846 | Target met at 59%. There were 3110 dropout cases in schools (1503 boys and 1607 girls) | 59 % | | I |
| | Number of Boys | | 1151 | 1503 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,503 | | | | | | |
| | Number of Girls | | 1242 | 1607 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,607 | | | | | | |
| | OC 1.4: Number of USG supported schools or learning spaces meeting criteria for safe school program | 10 | 52 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 182 | 250 | 250 | 250 | Target met at 100%. All schools have developed an emergency plan which are being analyzed by the EESA project. Some of these plans need to be reviewed. The COP recommended supervisory missions by the SIP and financial staff. | 10 0% | I | |
| | OC 1.5: Number of schools with approved school improvement plans (SIP) | 78 | 250 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 250 | 0 | 250 | Target met. All the schools, 250/250 have developed and have their SIPs approved by the municipalities and CAPs. To date 132 SMCs have received grants to implement their SAP. | 10 0% | I | |

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|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---|-----|
| OUTCOME 2 | OC 2.1: Percent of school directors who report observed change in gender-sensitive methods or skills in at least 50% of teachers (disaggregated by sex) | 44% | 100% | 58% | 94% | 95% | 95% | 100% | 100% | Target met at 95%. The assessment of teachers' pedagogical practices by principals was carried out in 30% of the schools (96 out of 250). The results show that 95% of principals (91% men and 5% women) or 81 out of 85 who have received gender training attest that 50% of the teachers assessed demonstrate gender-sensitive practices. | 95% | I | |
| | Number of Males | | 88% | 58% | 90% | 91% | | | | | | | 91% |
| | Number of Females | | 12% | 53% | 5% | 5% | | | | | | | 5% |
| | OC 2.2: Percent of school directors who report observed change in conflict-sensitive methods or skills in at least 50% of teachers (disaggregated by sex) | 37% | 63% | 39% | 0% | 95% | 95% | 100% | 100% | Target met at 95%. The assessment of teachers' pedagogical practices by principals was carried out in 30% of the schools (96 out of 250). The results show that 95% of principals (91% men and 5% women) or 62 out of 65 who have received gender training attest that 50% of the teachers assessed demonstrate gender-sensitive practices. | 95% | I | |
| | Number of Males | | 55% | 40% | 0% | 91% | | | | | | | 91% |
| | Number of Females | | 8% | 35% | 0% | 5% | | | | | | | 5% |
| | OC 2.3: Percent of teachers who report greater confidence using conflict-sensitive methods or skills (disaggregated by sex) | 37% | 58% | 79% | 0% | 94% | 94% | 100% | 100% | The target met at 94%. The assessment of teachers' pedagogical practices by principals was carried out in 30% of the schools (96 out of 250). Results show that 94% of teachers (61% male and 33% female) or 209 out of 222 who received training on conflict management report greater confidence in using conflict-sensitive methods or skills | 94% | I | |
| | Number of Males | | 61% | 82% | 0% | 61% | | | | | | | 61% |
| | Number of Females | | 51% | 75% | 0% | 33% | | | | | | | 33% |
| | OC 2.4: Percentage of out-of-school children newly enrolled (disaggregated by sex) | TBD | 58% | 61% | 0% | 12% | 60% | 36% | 86% | Target met at 70%. In total, the project target schools have a 60% dropout rate, including 65% B and 55% G over the 2017-2018 school year. | 70% | I | |
| | Number of Boys | | 62% | 66% | 0% | 13% | | | | | | | 65% |

| Number of Girls | | 54% | 56% | 0% | 11% | | 55% | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|--|--|
| OC 2.5: Number of schools that have approved codes of conduct | 86 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 250 | | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | Target met. The project developed a code of conduct with the participation of all community-based school stakeholders and school administrative authorities (CAP / AE). The Code of conduct is being introduced in schools. 142 out of 250 have their code of conduct and as of writing of this report 250/250 schools have code of conduct. | 100% | | |
| OC 2.6: Number of school-based associations engaged to support primary education with USG assistance | 566 | 750 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 750 | 0 | 750 | 750 | 250 CGSs, 250 APE and 250 AME were trained over Y2 | 100% | | |
| Number of parent teacher associations (PTAs) or community-based school governance structures engaged in primary or secondary education supported with USG assistance | 566 | 750 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 750 | 0 | 750 | 750 | Target met. 750 school associations (250 SMCs, 250 SPAs and 250 SMAs) were trained over Y2 | 100% | | |
| GNDR-5 Number of legal instruments drafted, proposed, or adopted with USG assistance designed to improve prevention of or response to sexual and gender based violence at the national or sub-national level | ND | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | The actions carried out under this heading are: the dissemination of the codes of conduct in the project 250 schools, community dialogues to promote girls' schooling, and contributions to drafting the PRODEC2 document of the recommendations of the gender study. | 300% | | |
| OC 2.7: Percentage of schools equipped with improved sanitary installations | 0% | 33% | 2% | 11% | 22% | 32% | 1 | 100% | 100% | 100% | Target met at 100%. To date, 36 schools are equipped with latrines out of a total of 36 planned. | 100% | | |

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|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|-------|-------|-----|-------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|--|--|--|
| OUTCOME 3 | OC 3.1: Number of institutions with improved EMIS as a result of USG assistance* (CAPs and AEs) | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | The AEs and CAPs were equipped with desktop computers and accessories for data processing. The CAP and AE focal points are equipped with telephones. 26 representatives of CAPs and AEs (CO, CDPEC) were trained on EMIS, and equipped with computers and telephones for the operationalization of the EMIS. | 100% | | | |
| OUTPUT 1 | OP 1.1: Number of classrooms constructed* | 0 | 30 | 12 | 0 | 15 | 3 | 60 | 30 | 60 | Target met at 100%, and will be exceeded before the end of the year. Indeed, 3 classrooms are being built in Ansongo and 1 classroom in Ntillit. | 100% | | | |
| | OP 1.2: Number of schools rehabilitated* | 0 | 3 | 35 | 50 | 147 | 14 | 249 | 248 | 250 | Target met at 99%. 14 schools were rehabilitated during this quarter. | 99.6% | | | |
| | ES.1-14 Number of primary or secondary classrooms built or repaired with USG assistance | 0 | 30 | 41 | 50 | 127 | 4 | 252 | 170 | 200 | A total of 252 classrooms were repaired or built for on a forecast of 200 classrooms, or 126% of completion rate. | 126% | | | |
| OUTPUT 2 | OP 2.1: Number of teachers receiving in-service training on gender-sensitive methods and skills* | 306 | 726 | 621 | 0 | 164 | | 1,511 | 774 | 1,500 | The target was exceeded for this indicator. 164 teachers (84 M, 80F) were trained over the quarter. A total of 1511 teachers (1076 M and 435F) were trained on gender by the project. The project identified 22 schools whose teachers were trained to replace the Bourem SSD teachers in the Gao region who had not participated because the director of SSD had refused. | 101% | | | |
| | Number of Males | | 523 | 469 | 0 | 84 | 1,076 | | | | | | | | |
| | Number of Females | | 203 | 152 | 0 | 80 | 435 | | | | | | | | |

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|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-------------------|-----|-----|-------|-----|-------|-------|-------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|--|--|-------|
| OP 2.2: Number of teachers receiving in-service training on conflict-sensitive methods and skills* | 140 | 203 | 0 | 458 | 1,190 | | 1,851 | 1,500 | 1,500 | Target exceeded. 1093 teachers (833 M and 260 F) were trained over quarter 3 on conflict management. A total of 1551 teachers (1110 M and 441 F) were trained on conflict management. | 123% | | | |
| | | Number of Males | 134 | 0 | 277 | 909 | | | | | | | | 1,320 |
| | | Number of Females | 69 | 0 | 181 | 281 | | | | | | | | 531 |
| OP 2.3: Number of teachers receiving gender-related equipment* | 110 | 375 | 0 | 534 | 0 | 591 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | Target met at 100%. 1500 teachers were trained on gender and GBV in the 250 schools, all of which were equipped with gender and GBV modules | 100% | | | |
| OP 2.4: Number of teachers in USG supported programs trained on how to support learners' psychosocial well-being* | 91 | 1,040 | 638 | 0 | 0 | | 1,678 | 460 | 1,500 | Target exceeded. A total of 1678 teachers (1244 M and 434 F) out of 1500 expected were trained on psychosocial support. Exceeding the target is justified by the training of teachers in 74 satellite schools | 112% | | | |
| | | Number of Males | 766 | 478 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | 1,244 |
| | | Number of Females | 274 | 160 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | 434 |
| OP 2.5: Number of school-based associations trained (disaggregated by type of training received)* | 119 | 750 | 0 | 0 | 41 | | 791 | 750 | 750 | Target met. 750 school associations (250 SMCs, 250 SPAs and 250 SMAs) were trained on their roles and responsibilities over year 2 . 745 associations(250 CGS, 248 APE et 247 AME) trained during the quarter on GBV prevention, including 27 school associations in satellite schools 993 school associations trained on good water, hygiene and sanitation practices (250 CGE, 250 CGS, 245 APE et 248 AME) The training on local prevention of GBV and water, hygiene and sanitation practices concerned the same 750 associations trained in year 2, except that 14 | 105% | | | |

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|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|--------|--------|-----|-------|--|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|--|--|
| | | | | | | | | | | new schools selected to replace the closed schools of Mopti were trained on WASH and local prevention of GBV and 27 school associations of satellite schools in Gao region benefited from GBV local prevention training during this quarter. Which makes 41 new associations trained this year | | | |
| OP 2.6: Number of kits distributed (disaggregated by children and teachers) | 3,534 | 54,676 | 24,169 | 462 | 1,275 | | 80,582 | 25,324 | 80,000 | Target met. Of the 80,000 kits planned for students, 25906 students (13886 B and 12020 G) have been distributed since the start of the school year out of an expected target of 25324. A total of 80582 students (42134 B and 38448 G) have been provided with school kits by the project to date. | 10 1% | | |
| Number of Boys | | 28,248 | 13,003 | 237 | 646 | | 42,134 | | | | | | |
| Number of Girls | | 26,428 | 11,166 | 225 | 629 | | 38,448 | | | | | | |
| Number of primary or secondary textbooks and other teaching and learning materials (TLM) provided with USG assistance | 3,534 | 54,676 | 24,169 | 463 | 1,275 | | 80,583 | 25,324 | 80,000 | Target met. 1275 notebooks were distributed to schools during this quarter. A total of 80583 notebooks were distributed to students | 10 1% | | |
| Number of Children reached with the remedial course programs | ND | 4,685 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 4,685 | 1,815 | 6,500 | The target met at 72%. The remedial classes were delayed and could not be completed during this school year. Le reste doit être réalisé en octobre 2018 | 72 % | | |
| Number of Boys | | 2,441 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 2,441 | | | | | | |
| Number of Girls | | 2,244 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 2,244 | | | | | | |

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|--|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-------|-----|-----|-------|----|-------|-------|-------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|--|--|--|
| | OP 2.8: Number of basic sanitation facilities provided in schools with USG assistances | 127 | 60 | 16 | 18 | 16 | 50 | 160 | 30 | 150 | 107% completion rate on the revised target of 150 latrines (120 latrines in 20 schools built plus 30 rehabilitated latrines). A total of 160 latrines were built or rehabilitated in schools | 107% | | | |
| | OP 2.9: Number of schools gaining access to basic drinking water services due to USG assistance | 46 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 35 | 11 | 48 | 48 | 48 | Target met 100% | 100% | | | |
| | OP2,10: Number of information and sensitization session on hygien and Sanitation in school | ND | 0 | 2 | 162 | 177 | | 341 | 250 | 500 | | 68% | | | |
| | OP2,11: Number of teachers trained on hygiene and sanitation(disaggregated by type of training received) | ND | 969 | 681 | 0 | 0 | | 1,650 | 531 | 1,500 | Target exceeded. To date, 1650 teachers (1235 M and 415 F) have been trained on WASH; exceeding the target of 1500 teachers is justified by the training of teachers in the 74 satellite schools. | 110% | | | |
| | Number of Males | | 725 | 510 | 0 | 0 | | 1,235 | | | | | | | |
| | Number of Females | | 244 | 171 | 0 | 0 | | 415 | | | | | | | |
| | Number of primary or secondary school educators who complete professional development activities on peace education, conflict sensitivity, or conflict transformation with USG assistance | ND | 0 | 0 | 458 | 1,190 | | 1,648 | 1,500 | 1,500 | Target exceeded. Teacher training reached out 1093 teachers (833 M and 260 F) during this quarter. A total of 1551 teachers (1110 M and 441 F) were trained on conflict management. | 110% | | | |
| | Number of Males | | 0 | 0 | 277 | 909 | | 1,186 | | | | | | | |
| | Number of Females | | 0 | 0 | 181 | 281 | | 462 | | | | | | | |
| | Number of primary or secondary school educators who complete professional development activities with USG assistance | ND | 1,040 | 636 | 0 | 0 | | 1,676 | 460 | 1,500 | Target exceeded. In total, the project has trained 1,676 teachers, 1,228 men and 448 women to date. Training of satellite school teachers | 112% | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|-----|-----|----|---|--|-------|----|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|----|----|---|
| OUTPUT 3 | Number of Males | | 766 | 462 | 0 | 0 | | 1,228 | | | contributed to exceeding the target | | | | |
| | Number of Females | | 274 | 174 | 0 | 0 | | 448 | | | | | | | |
| | OP 3.1: Number of AE supplied with equipment and basic data processing | 5 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 0 | | 6 | 4 | 6 | Target met. All AE have been equipped with computers (1 desktop with accessories) | 100% | 1 | | |
| | OP 3.2: Number of CAPs supplied with equipment and basic data processing | 6 | 2 | 6 | 12 | 0 | | 20 | 18 | 20 | Target met. All CAP have been equipped with computers (1 desktop with accessories) | 100% | 1 | | |
| | OP 3.3: Number of AE and CAP officials trained to manage EMIS (education management information system) (disaggregated by sex and institution)* | ND | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 25 | 0 | 19 | Target exceeded. 25 school administrators (22 men and 3 women) including 5CDPEC and 20 orientation advisors were trained on EMIS in December 2016. | 132% | | 1 | |
| | Number of education administrators and officials who complete professional development activities with USG assistance | ND | 55 | 0 | 26 | 0 | | 81 | 60 | 60 | Target exceeded. A total of 55 school administrators (50 men and 5 women) were trained through the project support, including 25 school administrators on EMIS management in December 2016 and 30 administrators on education in conflict situations in Year 2 | 135% | | | |
| | Number of Males | | 50 | 0 | 25 | 0 | | 75 | | | | | | | |
| | Number of Females | | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | | 6 | | | | | | | 1 |
| | Number of innovations supported through USG assistance | ND | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 2 | 2 | 2 | Target met. The DataWinners system and the 321 platform areUSG-supported innovations the project is using. The PUSH service is the new technology that HNI is putting to use on the project | 100% | 1 | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | 13 | 17 | 9 |

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