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EVALUATION REPORT

OTI NORTHERN CAMEROON INITIATIVE CLUSTER EVALUATION

April 2020

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OTI NORTHERN CAMEROON INITIATIVE CLUSTER EVALUATION

EVALUATION REPORT

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ACRONYMS

Acronym	Definition
ADS	Automated Directives System
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DEC	Development Experience Clearinghouse
DO	Direct Observation
EQ	Evaluation Question
EU	European Union
FER	Final Evaluation Report
GPS	Global Positioning System
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IP	Implementing Partner
LOE	Level of Effort
NCI	Northern Cameroon Initiative
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PAIC	Programme d'Appui à l'Initiative Communautaire
PDO	Program Development Officer
SOW	Statement of Work
SRS	Strategy Review Sessions
TOCOR	Task Order Contracting Officer's Representative
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
VEO	Violent Extremist Organizations

ABSTRACT

This evaluation focuses on the 2018-2020 stabilization portion of the Northern Cameroon Initiative (NCI), a program with the goal of helping communities in Cameroon near the Nigerian border withstand and counter violent extremism. The purpose of the evaluation is to inform the strategies of other intervening actors in Cameroon, as well as OTI programs addressing related issues elsewhere. The evaluation team conducted 14 key informant interviews, seven focus group discussions with 24 program beneficiaries, 92 field interviews in beneficiary communities, and a detailed document review. The evaluation finds that the geographic clustering strategy of NCI helped achieve stabilization objectives by enabling program staff to effectively design and target activities in ways that accommodated for different initial conditions and animated different theories of change that were most appropriate to achieve desired outcomes in each cluster. NCI encouraged stabilization in target villages by encouraging formerly displaced people to remain in their home villages and reinforcing social cohesion among residents who were there. The program's activities with women precipitated durable changes in perceptions of gender roles among both men and women, in addition to improving women's autonomy and voice in decision-making and empowering nascent women's organizations to substantively build communities' resilience to security challenges. The program's activities with youth built cohesion across social cleavages and contributed to a sense of security in villages.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PROGRAM BACKGROUND

This evaluation focuses on the stabilization portion of the Northern Cameroon Initiative (NCI), a program with the goal of helping Cameroonian communities near the Nigerian border withstand and counter violent extremism. This portion of NCI began in early 2018, with a geographic focus on the Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga departments. NCI, implemented by Creative Associates, and known locally by its French name Programme d'Appui à l'Initiative Communautaire (PAIC), implemented a total of 73 activities, most of which were delivered as in-kind grants to local civil society organizations.

The targeted villages had been hit hard by the Boko Haram conflict, and many had been largely abandoned by their residents at the peak of the conflict. When perceptions of security improved and residents started to return, NCI activities aimed to enable and encourage those who had returned home to remain there by helping them build community resilience in the face of extremism. The theory of change behind the set of activities was that the consolidation of community resilience would stabilize communities. This theory assumes that violent extremist organizations will not be able to thrive if formerly displaced people return home and stay, especially to strategically important communities. The theory further assumes that the program will properly account for local stability factors and be able to influence people to return or stay via small, timely activities.

EVALUATION PURPOSE

The purpose of this evaluation is to independently assess the extent to which NCI's strategies and activities have effectively promoted stability in the targeted villages of the Mayo-Sava and Mayo-Tsanaga departments. This evaluation aims to be useful to three target audiences: 1) Regional OTI programs working to counter violent extremism; 2) USAID and U.S. Embassy counterparts who implement U.S. foreign policy and assistance in Cameroon; and 3) Other stakeholders in Cameroon such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). Findings and recommendations may be useful to assist organizations remaining active in northern Cameroon, as well as those involved in policy decisions about northern Cameroon. Furthermore, the findings and recommendations from this context may be useful to other OTI programs working to counter violent extremism.

EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This evaluation is based on 92 field interviews in NCI's targeted beneficiary communities, 14 key informant interviews, seven focus group discussions with 24 program beneficiaries, and a review of program documents. Interviews with beneficiaries were conducted by Evaluation Team members of the same gender as the respondent.

The 92 field interviews were conducted with people from villages where NCI has targeted its stabilization activities. The sample of respondents was identified through a variety of strategies. Most respondents were not members of NCI grantees or direct beneficiaries of NCI activities. Some were local religious leaders, traditional leaders, or members of local associations.

Eleven key informant interviews were with representatives of NCI grantee organizations. Two interviews were with representatives of UN agencies. A final interview was with a local subject matter expert.

The evaluation team conducted three focus group discussions with male program beneficiaries and four focus group discussions with female program beneficiaries, for a total of seven focus group discussions.

Field interviews and focus group discussions were coded by village, gender, religion, ethnicity, and age of respondent(s). This allowed comparisons across all these cleavages and within all these subgroups.

The main limitations and biases in this evaluation are the results of the difficult and deteriorating security situation in the region. These challenges limited the sampling strategies that could be used and the time available to conduct interviews. Security issues also prevented the team from visiting some of the villages where program activities had been undertaken.

FINDINGS

EQ 1. DID DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING ACTIVITIES ON A CLUSTERED BASIS HELP ACHIEVE STABILIZATION OBJECTIVES?

Designing and implementing activities on a geographically clustered basis helped achieve cumulative stabilization outcomes in the two departments for three reasons. First, it allowed NCI staff, particularly each program development officer (PDO), to develop a nuanced understanding of the area in which s/he was assigned to focus his/her effort, including contextual factors deriving from historical variations in culture, religion, economic practices, etc., that vary among geographic areas. Second, it enabled the development of geographically tailored theories of change to drive a well-nuanced approach to designing, layering, and sequencing activities that foster resilience and stability. Third, it enabled geographically specialized program staff members to maintain relationships in the communities in which they worked.

EQ 1A. DID EFFECTS VARY BY CLUSTER?

Outcomes did differ by cluster, with a much greater difference between outcomes for the Mayo Sava cluster as compared to the other two clusters (Mokolo and Moskota). More details about variation by cluster follow in subsequent evaluation questions.

EQ 1B. DID CLUSTERING AFFECT HOW IMPLEMENTING TEAMS LAYERED, SEQUENCED, AND PRIORITIZED ACTIVITIES?

Implementing teams did layer, sequence, and prioritize activities based on the differing background conditions by cluster. In many cases, such a series of activities in a cluster cumulatively produced outcomes that were greater than if each activity had been implemented independently and/or simultaneously, according to grantees and beneficiaries. According to NCI staff, the division of the program's targeted locations into clusters also enabled PDOs to layer, sequence, and prioritize activities in manners that made most sense, given variations among the clusters' defining cultures, intercommunal histories, political structures, and initial challenges, resources, and resiliencies.

EQ 2. OF THE ACTIVITIES AND APPROACHES UNDERTAKEN, WHICH WERE MOST SUCCESSFUL AT FURTHERING PROGRAM GOALS AND OBJECTIVES?

Different types of activities were to different extents successful in contributing to NCI's stabilization objective. It is useful to examine the sequencing of activities that were implemented to pursue this objective. Initial activities aimed to enable people who had returned to their villages to stay, for example by supporting sustainable livelihoods and access to basic social services.

In the first wave of activities, intended to help people to resettle in their communities, the most effective approaches were cash-for-work activities and the rehabilitation and basic equipping of key infrastructure, especially schools, health centers, and basic market facilities. Many of these activities had spillover benefits that strengthened the resilience of social service and commodity consumers, as well as commodity vendors, in nearby indirect beneficiary communities. Residents from these communities reported that they traveled to nearby villages to access improved health and market facilities, economic opportunities, and the security fostered by nighttime lighting by solar lamps.

Subsequent activities focused on providing economic opportunities and strengthening social cohesion in villages by additionally supporting associations, cooperatives, and other groups. When activities were timed correctly and land was available, agricultural activities paid big dividends by providing stable income, improving food security, and reinforcing village stability by improving social cohesion and cooperation with and between communities. Investments in women's associations, in particular, seemed to contribute to durable improvements to women's status and village social structures.

EQ 3A. WHAT WERE THE PRIMARY OUTCOMES OF ACTIVITIES FOCUSED ON YOUTH ENGAGEMENT?

In all clusters, beneficiary youth (ages 18-35) and some other youth from target communities reported greater social cohesion, improved perceptions of youth among some elders in their communities, and improved beneficiaries' self-esteem. Many also gained opportunities to earn money. For some, income from participating in NCI activities was only a short-term help. Others, however, invested their income into their own small businesses in commerce or agriculture, enabling a continuous income stream. Activities like cash-for-work also had additional social benefits, as diverse groups of participating youths built social rapport and camaraderie over the course of the activities. Some of these groups of youth then participated in later activities. The durability of youth associations was mixed; those that focused on pursuit of commercially sustainable enterprises, skill-building, and sports, for example, stayed active more-so than those created specifically to pursue collective action around more abstract goals like youth empowerment. Additionally, while some people in Moskota and Mokolo reported that elder leaders and decision-makers increasingly consult and include youth, this result was inconsistent and observed less in Mayo Sava, where social and political hierarchies tend to be more rigid.

EQ 3B. WHAT WERE THE PRIMARY OUTCOMES OF ACTIVITIES FOCUSED ON WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT?

NCI's activities led to greater solidarity among women, improved social standing for women in their communities, and new economic opportunities for some women. By investing in schools, roads, and the Amchidé health center in the first wave of activities, NCI's activities improved women's comfort with returning to and staying in many communities in Mayo Sava. Some cash-for-work activities furthermore changed community perceptions of what is "women's work," as women also contributed labor and earned money. NCI further availed new economic opportunities to demographically mixed groups of women and helped them build formal associations, cooperatives, and networks that amplified their economic success and promoted the development of collective economic safety nets in many communities.

EQ 3C. WHAT WERE THE PRIMARY OUTCOMES OF ACTIVITIES FOCUSED ON COMMUNITY ACTION TO COUNTER EXTREMISM?

Community resilience to extremism has been a cumulative outcome of the range of different activities organized by NCI. In some places where NCI worked extensively with youth, young men subsequently

participated in village-led security efforts, monitoring the entrances and exits of the village, and alerting authorities to potential threats. Interviewees reported that stronger social cohesion among young people promotes safety and a sense of security. However, many residents still see a military presence as essential.

EQ 4. WHAT WERE THE MORE LASTING EFFECTS, IF ANY, OF THE PROGRAM'S EFFORTS TO CHANGE ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS?

Attitudes about the capabilities and value of youth and women's community contributions improved most significantly in the Mokolo and Moskota clusters, compared to the Mayo Sava cluster, although improvements across the board were evident. In Mayo Sava, youth more frequently than women reported reluctance among elder men to accept young people's community contributions as evidence of their durable commitment to their villages. Cross-ethnic and cross-religious social-cohesion outcomes of cash-for-work seem to be enduring among youth, and among women in all clusters; individuals reported that NCI's consistent integration of cohesion-building processes into its activities, for example by convening transparent and inclusive beneficiary selection processes for each activity, profoundly affected perceptions of the overall importance of inclusivity and the acceptability of marginalized groups' claims to empowerment in community affairs. Women and youth especially reported that this had seeped into life and discourse in their villages.

EQ 5. WHAT WERE THE PRIMARY OUTCOMES OF THE PROGRAM IN PROMOTING STABILIZATION?

NCI's first wave of stabilization activities brought people back to their communities to stay permanently. Women's and youth associations gained strength and status, promoting economic growth, and reducing social tensions in their villages. Women used their newfound voices and incomes to benefit children, schools, food security, and other community-wide improvements. Villages that were relatively empty now have bustling social lives in the evenings, and previously empty schools are now packed with children.

SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS

A) Logistical implementation challenges rather than activity design hindered some activities' outcomes. Procurement, and delivery delays are common in northern Cameroon, but some activity timelines did not build in sufficient time to accommodate for such issues, grantees said, e.g., leading to missed harvests.

B) In contexts where gender divisions are highly salient, female staff members were able to build relationships with female residents of target communities that male staff members could not. The Moskota cluster's female PDO (other clusters' PDOs were male) significantly helped create outcomes for women.

C) The theory behind this stabilization phase of NCI's programming was that interventions in strategically important targeted villages would have beneficial spillover effects on neighboring areas. Our interviews showed that residents from smaller villages often utilized services in targeted villages. However, not all nearby villages and populations benefited. Some geographically concentrated social groups had limited connections to targeted villages, and thus did not get any spillover benefits.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following conclusions and recommendations are based on the findings above. In cases where the NCI's approaches were effective, other programs in comparable environments utilize similar strategies.

CLUSTERING

- Geographic clustering is most useful and should be employed when baseline conditions or mechanisms of achieving program objectives differ by geographic sub-region, as in NCI's target areas.
- Organizing implementing teams geographically, as NCI did via clusters, is advantageous when access depends on personal networking among highly diverse demographic groups.

STABILIZATION

- Offering cash-for-work activities, reopening schools, and revitalizing health centers and markets, as NCI did, encourages returnees to stay in their communities.
- Simultaneously supporting a wide range of associations, cooperatives, and other committees, as NCI did, builds social resilience for the whole community.

ACTIVITIES AND APPROACHES

- NCI's installation of solar lamps increased perceptions of security, economic activity, students' educational activity, and village vitality, as well as deterring violent attacks.
- Cash-for-work activities should aim to: 1) Distribute resources to key beneficiaries, 2) Bring diverse groups of people together, and 3) Produce durable infrastructure. NCI's activities succeeded at the first two points. Success on the third point was mixed, details below marked with an ***.
- Grain storage facilities like those constructed by NCI are a good default construction project for cash-for-work activities because they are universally appreciated for their contributions to people's livelihoods and food security.***
- Road repair (without asphalt) should be limited to areas where such improvements can survive a rainy season (as in NCI's Moskota cluster); with that condition, road repair can build economic resilience and help vulnerable communities farm their land in daytime and sleep in a safe place.***
- Grinding mills and other similar equipment are only useful if there are already local repair people, as there were in some NCI intervention areas. If not, mechanics should be trained.
- Reopening shuttered schools, as NCI did, should be prioritized to encourage formerly displaced households to remain at home. Including kits of materials for children motivates parents.***
- Where health centers exist, improving and equipping them, as NCI did, builds resilience for whole subregions.***
- Employment training and providing start-up materials was highly effective in some NCI activities where there was demand for resulting items or services, and where continuity of inputs was secure.
- Agricultural support from some NCI activities, especially via cooperatives, significantly helped build community resilience. Other activities had limited effects because land was unavailable or schedules did not match growing seasons.
- Supporting the formation of cooperatives, as NCI did, can simultaneously improve livelihoods and social cohesion.
- Peace committees tended to be ineffective when they competed with existing social institutions. Social cohesion was more effectively enhanced by building opportunities for diverse community members to come together to pursue some concrete, tangible output or outcome, and to build peacebuilding or conflict mitigation discussions into these activities.

WORKING WITH YOUTH

- Building youth organizations requires consistent resource inputs; simply creating youth associations tends not to take off as independently as women's organizations. Some NCI youth associations succeeded, some did not. If successful, supporting social cohesion among youth has security benefits for whole communities.
- Assistance organizations should leverage the youth associations that NCI launched.

WORKING WITH WOMEN

- Donors and other actors in the region should continue to support women's associations and cooperatives, organizational networks, to enhance stability and resilience.
- Programs aiming to build community resilience to violent extremist organizations should consider forming and supporting women's organizations to build social cohesion, as NCI did.

EQUITABLE PARTICIPATION

- To promote inclusive participant recruitment efforts, publicize criteria for participation, and utilize or initiate community meetings to select participants, as NCI did by the end of the program.
- Donors and implementers should be conscious of perceptions of inequality across villages when targeting activity locations, particularly neighboring/competing villages. In some cases, NCI activities in one village raised jealousies in neighboring villages.
- Programs should not attempt to use both paid and volunteer labor in the same area. NCI's use of paid and volunteer labor at within the same communities raised some social tensions.
- Employing female program staff is critical to optimizing activities to empower women. Programs should aim to hire at least part-time PDO assistants from the demographic groups they aim to support or influence in a given geographical area.

CONTEXT-APPROPRIATE IMPLEMENTATION

- Include sufficient time in activity timelines to change plans early on, anticipate logistical issues, and allow appropriate time for follow-up.
- Include sufficient follow-up time and budget to support meaningful monitoring and evaluation activities by local partners.
- Seek information about local chiefs before beginning activities and evaluate if and how to engage them to maximize constructive support but minimize interference.
- Chiefs should always be informed of activities but should not always be involved.

INTRODUCTION

The Northern Cameroon Initiative (NCI) has been on the ground in Cameroon's Far North region since 2017 to help local communities respond to the Boko Haram crisis. Beginning around 2013, communities near the border with Nigeria in the Mayo-Sava and Mayo-Tsanaga departments became both active recruiting grounds and attack targets for Boko Haram, leading to a massive flight of civilians from their homes. This evaluation explores the extent to which a layered and sequenced set of 73 stabilization-focused activities implemented from early 2018 to early 2020 by Creative Associates' Programme d'Appui à l'Initiative Communautaire (PAIC) contributed to stability in these departments. The value of these activities, most of which were delivered as in-kind grants to local civil society organizations, totaled more than \$3.2 million. NCI complemented these activities with a related set of reintegration-focused activities in the same departments to help communities prepare for the likely eventual return of former Boko Haram affiliates. These activities were not the primary focus of this evaluation. NCI's aforementioned activities built on an earlier set of small projects that began in 2017 and focused on raising awareness of and curbing the success of Boko Haram's recruitment efforts. The overarching goal of the NCI program was to help communities withstand and counter threats from violent extremists.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The Far North region of Cameroon, home to approximately 3.5 million people, is one of the poorest regions of the country. The region is highly diverse, with residents from dozens of different ethnicities and substantial Muslim, Christian, and animist populations. The region's residents rely primarily on subsistence agriculture and face pressures related to limited available agricultural land and a changing climate.

Boko Haram originated in Nigeria around 2010 and gradually expanded to the other three countries bordering Lake Chad — Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Northern Cameroon received increasing refugee flows from Boko Haram's activities in Nigeria until it too became the direct target of a series of kidnappings and other attacks. The intensity of the violent conflict peaked in Cameroon around 2015, when three suicide bombings in Maroua killed dozens and caused many communities near the border with Nigeria to completely desert their villages. Their incursions led more than 460,000 people in Cameroon to flee their homes, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)'s displacement tracker for December 2019, with many seeking safety in population centers like Maroua. The fighting also shut down cross-border trade with Nigeria for five years, which had been one of the primary economic livelihood activities sustaining households and communities in the region, aside from agriculture and livestock herding.

The security situation improved in many areas after a coordinated response by the Cameroonian military, international partners, and the Multinational Joint Task Force comprised of militaries from neighboring countries. Cross-border trade with Nigeria reopened in early 2019, and some internally displaced people returned to their home villages. Nonetheless, sporadic attacks continued across the region.

Since late 2019, the security situation in some parts of the Far North has begun to deteriorate again. Some areas near the border with Nigeria that had previously been relatively safe have once again been partly abandoned by residents. One reason for this change, according to interview respondents, is the departure of many of the Cameroonian military forces that had been based in the area. Respondents told the Evaluation Team that military forces were being redeployed to the North-West and South-West Regions,

where a separate conflict is ongoing. Some of the areas witnessing renewed conflict — homes burned, supplies stolen, residents killed — are places where NCI had implemented many activities.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The goal of NCI was to help communities near the Cameroon/Nigerian border withstand and counter violent extremism. In service of this goal, the objective of the activities in the Mayo-Sava and Mayo-Tsanaga departments was to stabilize the villages which had been most affected by Boko Haram and its offshoot groups by building community resilience to threats from violent extremist organizations.

NCI established its stabilization objective in March 2018, when displaced people had begun to return to their communities. It defined indicators of "stability" as 1) the presence of residents throughout the year, 2) an ability of local leaders to manage conflicts, 3) the provision of basic services, and 4) a level of security that permits daily life to go on. Factors that contribute to these outcomes include, for example, the presence of active community organizations, the return of traditional leaders, and the resumption of economic activities. The program also particularly focused on women's empowerment, based on the idea that women can play a key role in resolving community disputes and countering extremism, but only if they are empowered to participate in decision-making.

At the same time that NCI was engaged in the activities discussed in this report, it also conducted a parallel set of activities focused on reintegration and creating inclusive space for dialogue around peace and reconciliation. While this evaluation did not focus on these activities, a separate evaluation of those activities was conducted (see reference in Annex B).

The development hypothesis behind the stabilization objective was that if community resilience is consolidated, then communities will be stabilized. The following assumptions underlie this hypothesis:

- Violent extremist organizations will be unable to thrive if formerly displaced people return home and re-claim contested spaces.
- The program's nuanced understanding of local stability factors will ensure appropriate interventions.
- People returning home to targeted, strategically important communities will have a multiplier effect on surrounding areas.
- Residents' decisions to return to or stay in their home villages can be affected by small, timely interventions.
- Area youth can either help consolidate stability or spoil it, so engaging them positively is key.

GEOGRAPHIC CLUSTERS

Prior to its strategic shift in 2018, NCI had applied a thematic clustering approach, with similar activities, implementation, and outcomes across the program's zone of intervention. During the program's pivot to stabilization, the revised strategy retained the program's emphasis on women, youth, and community resilience, recognizing their continued importance to stabilization and addressing the underlying root causes of extremism. After several months of implementation and learning in the new target communities, NCI began to develop unique strategies around three geographic groupings of target communities based on the varied pre-existing social structures and obstacles to resilience and stability in those places. The strategies for influencing each of the three "clusters" of target communities furthermore recognized that different activity-level outcomes were of varying importance and feasibility in order to strengthen

resilience and stability in one cluster compared with another. Therefore, NCI established three geographic clusters as its units of organization and analysis. The program pursued some similar and some different activity-level gender youth, social cohesion outcomes across these clusters, as well as some non-thematic outcomes of activities. The ultimate pursuit was to improve program-level resilience and stability outcomes in Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga.

Mayo Sava's villages were treated as one programmatic "cluster" area while Mayo Tsanaga was sorted into two such clusters, internally referred to as "Mokolo" and "Moskota," reflecting the arrondissements in which they were located. This approach allowed PDOs to build understandings of the particular issues facing a narrow geographic area within the complex, diverse Far North.

Populations across Cameroon's Far North are highly diverse in language, religion, culture, livelihood preferences, education levels, authority structures/political hierarchies, and access to resources. Historical interactions among these populations and foreign influences have shaped today's demographic landscape and power dynamics. Different initial conditions across the communities targeted by NCI meant that needs were different from one area to another, as were the potential approaches which might address those needs. For example, activities supporting youth and women in different areas required different approaches to promote participation and encountered different initial challenges that were inherent to the identities and histories of the varied groups in the varied areas.

WHO IS A "YOUTH"?

Many of the program's activities focused on engaging area "youth." NCI generally defined youth as being people between 18 and 35 years of age, and in this report, therefore, "youth" refers to this age group. Children under the age of 18 were beneficiaries of some activities, such as those which provided materials to primary schools. In this report, anyone under the age of 18 is referred to as a "child."

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS

EVALUATION PURPOSE

The purpose of this evaluation is to independently assess the extent to which NCI's strategies and activities have effectively promoted stability in the targeted villages of the Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga departments.

This evaluation aims to be useful to three target audiences: 1) regional OTI programs working to counter violent extremism, 2) USAID and U.S. Embassy counterparts who implement U.S. foreign policy and assistance in Cameroon, and 3) other stakeholders in Cameroon such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). First, ongoing OTI programs in the Sahel, the Middle East, and elsewhere may benefit from lessons learned countering violent extremists and mitigating their negative impact in the Lake Chad Basin. In particular, OTI representatives may be interested in the advantages and disadvantages of using a geographically clustered intervention strategy similar to what NCI undertook in the program's targeted departments. Second, given NCI's departure from Cameroon in Spring 2020, other assistance actors like UNDP and UNFPA might benefit from NCI's lessons learned and also might usefully leverage some of NCI's local partners' capabilities and achievements to continue promoting stability and countering violent extremism in Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga. This evaluation may be especially useful to donors and assistance implementers when they design and revisit their strategies and activities to maintain stability in the region. Third, this evaluation may help inform

regional USAID mission's learning agenda and program development to counter violent extremism, as well as informing the U.S. Embassy in Cameroon and both Department of State and its U.S. interagency partners' regional and technical bureaus about dynamics in the Far North.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

- 1) Did designing and implementing activities on a clustered basis help achieve stabilization objectives?
 - a) Did effects vary by cluster?
 - b) Did clustering affect how implementing teams layered, sequenced, and prioritized activities?
- 2) Of the activities and approaches undertaken, which were most successful at furthering program goals and objectives?
- 3) What were the primary outcomes of activities focused on the following themes?
 - a) Youth engagement?
 - b) Women's empowerment?
 - c) Community action to counter extremism?
- 4) What were the more lasting effects, if any, of the program's efforts to change attitudes and perceptions?
 - a) Did the program successfully identify negative attitude changes as they were occurring in order to counteract them and consolidate the program's legacy?
- 5) What were the primary outcomes of the program in promoting stabilization?

Note that the numerical order of these evaluation questions differs from that which appears in the SOW and the inception report. This change is not substantive — all questions were prioritized equally throughout the evaluation — it is simply a stylistic choice to most clearly present findings and conclusions.

EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND SAMPLING

DOCUMENT REVIEW

The main sources referenced for the document review were those recommended by OTI's NCI leadership personnel in Cameroon.

The Evaluation Team read Final Evaluation Reports (FERs) for all of the stabilization-focused activities conducted after the program's strategic shift in early 2018. These FERs were drafted by NCI monitoring and evaluation staff and reviewed by OTI in-country staff. From each FER, the team coded any information which responded to the five evaluation questions. Furthermore, the team coded the villages where the activities took place, a description of the activity, any linkages to other activities, any differential results between various demographic groups, any additional unexpected outcomes, the selection criteria used for participation, and any other issues. Furthermore, the team read the activity notes from one third of the activities (see Annex B). These documents were used to plan the evaluation team's research but were not

used in and of themselves to draw the findings or conclusions in this report. Any findings in FERs were triangulated with interview data.

The Evaluation Team also reviewed the most recent program document, the evaluation of the project's reintegration activities, the cluster backgrounds for each cluster, the Boko Haram influence mapping study for the region, and the snapshot reports for each cluster.

This document review was completed almost entirely before the team's field work, informing the questions asked during interviews.

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS (KIIS)

The team conducted 14 key informant interviews. Of these, 11 interviews were with representatives of grantee organizations that had received NCI-funded grants under contract. Two additional interviews were conducted with representatives of UN agencies that are also active in Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga, and another with a Cameroonian professor who is deeply familiar with local political dynamics and history in these departments and is knowledgeable of the national government's efforts to address the crisis there. These sources were primarily identified via the contact information given to the evaluation team by NCI's implementing personnel in Maroua.

The team received a list of 21 grantee organizations' contact information. The information was no longer current for six of those organizations, and they could not be reached. Of the remaining 15 grantee organizations, the team was able to organize interviews with representatives from 11 organizations.

The interviews with grantee representatives were loosely structured, beginning with general questions about conditions in the relevant villages where they had implemented activities and ending with specific questions about NCI's programmatic approach and contributions to changes in target communities. The questions followed the general rubric that was used for field interviews (see Annex C), although phrased to discuss the villages in which the grantee organization worked, rather than the source's village of residence. In some cases, grantees had knowledge of other relevant villages, in addition to those they had worked in for PAIC, either because of other work they had conducted or because they are from the area. In those interviews, interviewees were asked both about the areas where they had worked on NCI activities and those where they had not.

In our interviews with representatives from UNDP and UNFPA, we had two broad questions: 1) what did they know of NCI's activities, in terms of successes or failures, and 2) what information would be useful for them in the planning of their future engagement in the region?

The final key informant interview was with a noted expert on politics and society in the region who is on the faculty at the University of Maroua. He had also been involved in NCI activities, most of which fall outside the scope of this evaluation. This interview provided an opportunity for the evaluation team to learn about nuances in the social, cultural, and institutional contexts in the areas where PAIC's activities were located that might have influenced the extent to which certain types of approaches were successful.

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS (FGDs)

The evaluation team conducted seven focus group discussions with a combined total of 24 beneficiaries (16 women and 8 men) of NCI activities. Local social norms make many women hesitant to speak up in

the presence of men, so focus groups were organized to be either all-male or all-female, in order to encourage respondents to speak freely. Focus group discussions with men were conducted by male Evaluation Team members, while the focus group discussions with women were conducted by female members.

Focus group participants were recruited via contacts received from PAIC, aiming to constitute single-gender groups of participants drawn from the same village (or neighboring villages). We focused on villages where NCI had conducted a substantial number of activities. The goal of this strategy was to generate an animated discussion of the same sets of activities and their outcomes within specific villages. Annex D contains a detailed list of villages where participants in each focus group lived.

These focus group discussions were loosely structured, following the same general flow of questions as was set out in the rubric for field interviews (see Annex C), but with extra questions to better understand any variations of perspectives among members of the focus groups.

FIELD INTERVIEWS

Two enumerators, Bana Barka and Kaltoum Boucar Abba, conducted 92 interviews with respondents from villages where NCI has targeted its stabilization activities, following the interview rubric in Annex C. Enumerators were recruited based on their expertise via the Evaluation Team's contacts at the University of Maroua, and were interviewed by the Evaluation Team before being selected. They were trained in appropriate sampling strategies, interview protocols, and research ethics. The sample of respondents was identified through a variety of strategies. Some were local religious leaders, traditional leaders, or members of local associations. Some respondents were referred by these leaders, and some were people contacted in their residences or found in public spaces in villages. In some areas, local translators and resource people facilitated interviews and helped the enumerator team gain the trust of local respondents. Respondents in the field received a small hospitality gift (two bars of soap), in keeping with local customs of reciprocity.

For both the Mayo Sava and Mokolo clusters, enumerators visited the villages where the most NCI activities had been conducted — six villages in the Mayo Sava cluster, and five villages in the Mokolo cluster. These villages are depicted in Map 1 and listed in Annex E. These two clusters represented approximately two-thirds of the program activities for this evaluation, and the villages visited in each cluster represent the vast majority of activities there. Enumerators visited each village once.

Because of security issues (see the section below on limitations), enumerators were not able to visit villages in the Moskota cluster (see map), representing about one-third of program activities for this evaluation. Instead, enumerators interviewed residents of inaccessible villages in the more secure town of Mokolo. Some of these individuals were people who had recently fled their villages and had already temporarily relocated to Mokolo and were found by enumerators at the market in Mokolo. Other respondents traveled from their villages to be interviewed by the enumerators in Mokolo. Those individuals who traveled were initially contacted via phone with the help of local resource people, religious leaders, and traditional leaders.

DIRECT OBSERVATION (DO)

Because of security issues (see the section below on limitations), possibilities for direct observation were very limited. Where possible, enumerators visited project infrastructure in the villages where they

conducted interviews to see if the infrastructure, such as solar lamps and grinding mills, were still functional.

DATA ANALYSIS

Field interviews and focus group discussions were coded by village, gender, religion, ethnicity, and age of respondent(s). This allowed comparisons across all these cleavages and within all these subgroups. Given the programmatic focus on women and youth, the Evaluation Team paid particular attention to these subgroups while conducting the analysis.

BIASES AND LIMITATIONS

The main limitations and biases in this evaluation are the results of the difficult and deteriorating security situation in the region. Maintaining enumerator and participant safety required very careful planning for all travel to all villages, and enumerators needed to be back to district capital towns by sundown each night. These challenges limited the sampling strategies that could be used and the time available to conduct interviews. Local elections had been conducted in the region a few weeks before our work, but they had no discernable effect on the Evaluation Team's work.

Enumerators were not able to visit the villages of the Moskota cluster at all because of escalating violence in the area, as the frequency of attacks increased during the time period the Evaluation Team was in the field. The Moskota cluster represents approximately one-third of project villages and activities, and therefore one-third of the villages the evaluation team had hoped to have enumerators visit. During this time period, several of the villages targeted by NCI's program were attacked by Boko Haram, resulting in deaths, many homes burned, and substantial infrastructure destroyed. Furthermore, insurgents were leaving mines or improvised explosive devices (IED)s on roadways in the area. Since enumerators were prevented from visiting villages, they used the alternative strategies discussed above to conduct interviews in Mokolo.

These limitations in access and sampling strategies may contribute to some degree of bias in evaluation findings and conclusions. The Evaluation Team was not able to access a random sample of respondents. For field interviews and focus groups, the sampling strategies did depend on contacts availed by NCI's contracted implementer in Maroua, Creative Associates. Additionally, the sample of respondents who were amenable to participate in interviews conducted by the Evaluation Team's enumerators may reflect a degree of self-selection bias, and the enumerators' use of their local contacts to identify potential respondents may also carry a degree of bias. However, the Evaluation Team found that in general, the demographic attributes of respondents from each target village achieved the team's objective of being highly diverse and inclusive.

BACKGROUND CONDITIONS IN CLUSTERS

The three clusters of villages where NCI's interventions were focused can be seen in Map I, with the key villages of each of the three clusters marked by different symbols. (Circles are villages in the Mayo Sava cluster, Diamonds are villages in the Moskota cluster, and Triangles are villages in the Mokolo cluster.) In particular, the Mokolo and Moskota clusters share similarities in terms of history and culture, but the Mayo Sava cluster is systematically different.

The Mayo Sava cluster lies along the path of a long-established trade route between Maiduguri (Nigeria) and points to the southeast in what is now Cameroon and Chad. Long-distance trade is a defining feature of the area, both in terms of modern economy and in terms of residents' culture. Relatedly, Islam arrived in the area relatively early — many hundreds of years ago, and local interpretations of Islam are influenced heavily by practices in Maiduguri. Many of the ethnic groups in the area, notably the Kanuri, Arab-Choa, and Fulbe, have kin spanning large areas of the sub-region, helping individuals be quite mobile across larger areas. In this area, the dominant traditional authority figures are Fulbe Lamidos. Lamidats (the institutions led by Lamidos) are a highly structured, hierarchical, and relatively standardized type of institution across northern Cameroon. These traditional institutions play a highly influential role in the life of all residents, not just ethnic Fulbes.

These historical factors have led to a specific set of background conditions that still today differentiate most communities in Mayo Sava from those around Mokolo or Moskota. Trade and commerce are a focus of the cultural identity of residents, beyond just being their day-to-day income source. Long-distance travel, professional, social, and family links with distant people (particularly from around Maiduguri) are common. Traveling and spending long periods absent from home to earn money are seen as socially good choices. The Fulbe Lamidats exercise an outsized authority. And local interpretations of Islam are considered by many as “more conservative” than in other Muslim-populated areas of Cameroon, even those with Fulbe Lamidats. The level of formal education in Mayo Sava is also very low, possibly because of residents' predominant religious preferences and focus on trade. However, because of the persisting importance of the trade route (and the political ties of the area's traditional elites to Cameroon's formal government institutions), there was more infrastructure developed in Mayo Sava before the Boko Haram conflict began than in other parts of the Far North.

In contrast, villages in the Moskota and Mokolo areas do not lie along any historical trade routes. (There is extensive cross-border trade now, but it emerged in the post-colonial period and did not have such a significant impact on culture.) Conversions to Islam began much later here, in the nineteenth century, when the Fulbe conquered the majority of northern Cameroon. The area is still very religiously mixed, even within communities, with large numbers of Christians, Muslims, and animists. In these villages, there are fewer people who arrived from elsewhere. Therefore, informal associational life is more robust. Also, traditional chieftaincies vary widely, with each distinct ethnic group organizing its own chieftaincy based on its own traditions.


Thus, background conditions that shaped NCI's programming in and around Moskota and Mokolo are substantively different than in Mayo Sava. The economic and cultural focus in Moskota and Mokolo remains agriculture. Religious beliefs vary widely, and Muslims do not tend to have the “more conservative” attitudes and practices that are common in Mayo Sava. Traditional chieftaincies vary tremendously. And while the average level of formal education is higher than in Mayo Sava, the level of infrastructure investment by the Cameroonian state has been much lower.

Table 1: Background Conditions by Cluster

	Mayo Sava	Moskota and Mokolo
Cultural economic focus	Trade	Agriculture
Ethnicity and religion	Mixed	Mixed
Religious history	Islam arrived early	Islam arrived in the 19th century
Traditional authorities	Fulbe Lamidats	Idiosyncratic, varied

Social associations	Mostly absent	Present, informal
Average formal education	Lower	Higher
Pre-conflict infrastructure	More	Less

Map 1: Geographic Clusters and Historical Economic Focus



This map shows the main villages from the three clusters: Mayo Sava (circles), Moskota (diamonds), and Mokolo (triangles). Lists of included villages in Annex E. Map from Google; NCI village locations from program global positioning system (GPS) location data.

FINDINGS ON EVALUATION QUESTIONS

EVALUATION QUESTION I

DID DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING ACTIVITIES ON A CLUSTERED BASIS HELP ACHIEVE STABILIZATION OBJECTIVES?

Designing and implementing activities on a geographically clustered basis helped achieve stabilization outcomes for three reasons. First, it allowed NCI staff, particularly PDOs, to develop nuanced understandings of the area in which they were working, including contextual issues like those discussed in the previous section. Second, it allowed a more nuanced approach to activity design, layering, and sequencing based on that nuanced understanding. Third, it allowed individual program staff members to develop and maintain relationships in the communities in which they worked.¹

For example, in the Mayo Sava cluster, the PDO recognized the cultural importance of commerce, the social conservatism of the area, and the influence of the Lamidos. He then structured activities in the cluster accordingly. Targeted activities in the cluster included materials for the market in Doublé, the construction of the Kerawa market sheds, and the provision of sewing machines for young women to be seamstresses at the Amchidé market.

In the Moskota cluster, the PDO was able to build on the more robust associational life which already existed in the area. By working with informal youth associations, she was able to design activities to bring them together, eventually forming one overarching youth association for the area. This larger association then became an NCI grantee, building a youth center that helped consolidate their gains and launch new activities independent of NCI's involvement. These youth now report receiving greater respect from elders and helping to keep watch at night for community security. These activities were possible because the same PDO built relationships and maintained focused attention on a discrete cluster of villages, so she was able to shepherd nascent community organizations through stages of growth.

Grantees, project beneficiaries, and village residents said that activities seemed to be well-targeted to challenges that were specific to their villages. Several grantees also said, unprompted, that this portion of the NCI program (early 2018-onward) was much more effective and better-targeted than the earlier part of the program, before geographic clustering was instituted. Interviews with NCI implementing staff indicated that they shared this opinion. NCI staff were unanimous in saying that the geographic clusters helped them design and implement more effective activities. The only downside reported in interviews was that good ideas were not necessarily replicated outside their cluster. For example, some activities that were effective in the Moskota cluster could also have worked in the Mokolo cluster, according to some interviewees.

EVALUATION QUESTION IA

DID EFFECTS VARY BY CLUSTER?

Outcomes did differ by cluster, largely because initial conditions differed and—due to this—strategies also differed. However, initial conditions and activity development strategies in Mokolo and Moskota clusters were more similar to one another than they were to Mayo Sava, so unsurprisingly outcomes in Mayo Sava

¹ It is unclear to the Evaluation Team if this third benefit could also occur if program staff were assigned geographic focus areas within thematic clusters. They were not in NCI prior to the implementation of the most recent clusters.

were substantively different than outcomes in the other two areas. Differences between NCI's programmatic approaches in Mokolo and Moskota were more minor.

EVALUATION QUESTION 1B

DID CLUSTERING AFFECT HOW IMPLEMENTING TEAMS LAYERED, SEQUENCED, AND PRIORITIZED ACTIVITIES?

Implementing teams did layer, sequence, and prioritize activities based on the differing background conditions by cluster. In many cases, such series of activities cumulatively produced outcomes that were greater than if each activity had been implemented independently and/or simultaneously, according to grantees and beneficiaries. The division of the program's targeted locations into clusters also enabled PDOs to layer, sequence, and prioritize activities in manners that made most sense, given variations among the clusters' initial challenges, resources, and resiliencies, according to NCI staff. Initial conditions in each cluster shaped the types of activities that the NCI team believed would be most viable to implement and would be most important to creating resilience and stability in the area, according to NCI staff and grantees.

The example of the Moskota cluster from above (EQ1) illustrates the layering strategies that were possible because of the geographic clusters. The PDO for the Moskota cluster identified the vibrant but informal associational life in the area and worked to build a sequence of activities to reinforce it. By the end, the Association des Jeunes Solidaires de Moskota had become a formal association that had worked as an NCI grantee and built a youth center to serve as a base of operations. Had the development of the youth center been ongoing simultaneously to the organizational development and formalization of the association, the association would have lacked the capacity to take as much ownership of the concept development for the youth center as it ultimately did.

Additionally, this type of targeted layering and sequencing of activities depended on a pre-existing source of resilience (vibrant associational life) in the Moskota area. The Moskota PDO was able to notice and target this attribute because she was focused on a narrow geographic area — if she had been working across all three clusters, she may not have gained such a nuanced local perspective. Moreover, a youth center would not have contributed as well to desired stability outcomes in Mayo Sava as it did in Moskota. Therefore, the geographically clustered approach allowed the PDO to target her activities appropriately and efficiently.

EVALUATION QUESTION 2

OF THE ACTIVITIES AND APPROACHES UNDERTAKEN, WHICH WERE MOST SUCCESSFUL AT FURTHERING PROGRAM GOALS AND OBJECTIVES?

Different types of activities were to different extents successful in contributing to NCI's stabilization objective. It is useful to temporally break down the sequences in which many of the activities were implemented to pursue this objective. Initial activities needed to help people return to their villages. Then activities needed to help enable people to stay, with sustainable livelihoods, access to basic social services like education and healthcare, and the ability to withstand or directly counter Boko Haram's activities.

In the first wave of activities, intended to enable people to resettle in their communities, the most effective approaches were cash-for-work activities which directly pushed people to stay so they could benefit, and

the rehabilitation and basic equipping of key infrastructure, especially schools, health centers, and basic market infrastructure. Residents of Mayo Sava and grantees who worked there reported that rehabilitation of the health center in Amchidé and the installation of solar lamps encouraged people to remain in their villages. In Mokolo and Moskota clusters, solar lights were also installed, but primarily the rehabilitation and equipping of schools caused families to report that life there was somewhat “returning to normal”. Many of these activities had spillover community resilience benefits for nearby indirect beneficiary communities. For example, some families felt safe to return to their fields only during the day but slept in communities where solar lamps helped vigilance committees guard against attacks by Boko Haram. Additionally, people with limited health care needs could now travel the short distance to Amchidé or Ldoubam rather than to Mora or Maroua.

Subsequent activities focused on providing economic opportunities and strengthening social cohesion in villages by supporting associations, cooperatives, and other groups. When activities were timed correctly, and land was available, agricultural activities paid big dividends by providing stable income and reinforcing village stability. Investments in women’s associations, in particular, seemed to contribute to durable improvements to women’s status and village social structures. Grain storage buildings were universally appreciated and well-known, increasing villagers’ incomes by allowing them to safely store their harvest until a time of year when prices are higher. Activities also helped women collectively manage storage.

Table 2: Activities and Findings

Approach	Moskota	Mokolo	Mayo Sava
Solar lamps (often with public benches)	Many respondents reported that solar lights brought increased feelings of security, allowed people to work later in the fields, encouraged more evening business activity, gave students a place to study, and led to additional socializing in villages. The public benches also contributed to communities’ perceptions that normalcy was returning. People reported that they were no longer simply staying in their homes in the evenings.		
Cash-for-work (all) ***	Cash-for-work programs, in general, directly encouraged people to stay in villages they had once deserted. The fact that the groups of workers were mixed gender, ethnicity, and religion forged links across social cleavages and improved social dynamics. In some cases, community perceptions of young men improved and of young women largely improved (with some resistance among more conservative residents). The value of the completed projects themselves — e.g., roads, health and education facilities, etc., --varied (see below). These findings apply for all types of cash-for-work activities, in general. Such activities are marked below with a *** and shaded grey. The subsection on each type of cash-for-work activity concerns only specific work produced by the activity, since the outcomes and benefits discussed above were common across all types.		
Road repair***	Repairs were durable because of soil and rock types in the area. Respondents reported better access from home villages to markets and health centers.		Repairs were not durable because of the soil type, so community benefits were limited.
Schools***	Opening up schools by rebuilding classrooms and providing materials if necessary encouraged people to return to their villages. Open schools are considered by many families a minimum level of infrastructure to support return. Materials for children motivated families to return home and send their children to school.		

Health centers***	(n/a)	Improvements to the Ldoubam health center increased residents' willingness to return to and stay in the village.	The rehabilitation of the Amchidé health center increased population returns and retention in Amchide and nearby villages, and it revitalized economic activity near the center.
Grain storage***	Grain storage facilities were among the most commonly mentioned types of activity during field interviews. Residents universally reported that they were a source of economic and food security for many. Creating diverse management committees which cut across social cleavages (gender, ethnicity, religion) additionally contributed to community cohesion and resilience to challenges.		
Grinding mills	Grinding mills reduced burden for women and brought in revenue for cooperatives that managed them. Previous donor-funded activities in the area had trained repair people who kept machines running nearly all day, every day.		Grinding mills broke down frequently, and people to repair them were lacking.
Employment training	(n/a)	Youth center trainings drew many interested participants from nearby villages.	NCI's training and equipment for sewing and peanut oil extraction provided visible, sustainable jobs for women.
Agricultural programs (e.g. community fields, committees for cowpeas)	(n/a)	People were aware of NCI-supported income-generating activities but knew little else.	Many villagers reported benefiting from large community fields and agricultural equipment. Participants are on their third black-eyed-pea harvest.
Market infrastructure (sheds; tables in Doublé)	New sheds drew additional vendors at markets, such as at the Nguetchéwé market	(n/a)	Tables and wheelbarrows for the market in Doublé (on the main highway) were very effective at providing jobs.
Cooperatives	Cooperatives helped people earn more income. Including women in leadership roles improved their general social position and generated income that women used to improve health, nutrition, and education outcomes that are central to building community resilience. Benefits of cooperatives stem from the benefits associated with their legal status, such as access to bank credit. A cooperative in Limani (Mayo Sava) benefitted from further engagement with UNDP, while an association in Nguetchéwé (Moskota) organized a training delivered by the Ministry of Agriculture.		
Associations (women)	Improved women's status and leverage in villages (see below in EQ3). These associations also often took on other activities in villages, like managing a grinding mill, providing food at a school, advocating for child vaccinations and against early marriage, with broader community resilience benefits. When associations were affiliated with a school, they had important benefits: In conservative parts of Mayo Sava, girls returned to schools where such associations existed; now as mothers, in addition to or instead of fathers, made decisions about their children's education.		

Associations (youth)	Informal youth associations consolidated into active association(s), giving them more voice and status in their communities. Respondents indicated this helped social cohesion and, in some cases, improved elders' perceptions of young people as viable leaders for the future.	Some youth associations still exist, but there has been little change in their status with respect to entrenched traditional institutions.
Community development committees	After the initial activity to restart community development committees, many kept operating independently and helped resolve issues in their villages. They provided space for community dialogue.	
Peace committees	Two respondents were familiar with them, one reported that they resolved some fights.	No one mentioned them.

EVALUATION QUESTION 3A

WHAT WERE THE PRIMARY OUTCOMES OF ACTIVITIES FOCUSED ON YOUTH ENGAGEMENT?

Across the board, beneficiary youth and some other youth from their communities reported greater social cohesion. Many youths also gained much-needed opportunities to earn money. For some, income from participating in NCI activities was only a short-term help. Others, however, were able to invest the income they made into their own small businesses in commerce or agriculture, allowing them to continue to earn income. The availability of vocational or business-related training opportunities encouraged and helped some individuals or groups to invest in productive items or activities. Activities like cash-for-work also had additional social benefits, as diverse groups of participating youths built social rapport and camaraderie over the course of the activities. Some of these groups of youth then participated in later activities.

Young men used earnings from NCI's economic empowerment activities for a variety of purposes. Many were proud to give the money to their parents to support household necessities. Some directly purchased needed food or other items for their households. Interviews suggest that far fewer young men invested the money in ways that would support a future income stream. However, those who did invest money did so by, for example, purchasing goods in Nigeria for resale in Cameroon, or vice versa. Others purchased agricultural inputs or sewing machines or other tools.

The success of youth associations was mixed; some survived, some did not. Successful ones, like the one in Moskota, appeared to be durable, using their new legal status to seek other sources of revenue. The youth ministry office helped register a Mokolo association so that it could use its legal status to hold official meetings and leave literature about their group and activities at the prefecture, Lamido, and town hall offices. Cooperatives in other villages secured a contract for cleaning, which is used to finance scholarships. However, other youth organizations have not fared as well. A Ldamang sewing cooperative failed to continue paying the minimal rent for the workspace that had been initially funded via NCI support to a local cooperative development organization. An association in Kolofata stopped functioning pursuant to worsening insecurity. The president of the Limani association took the group's computer to another town and has not returned it.

Details of youth outcomes varied by cluster, as illustrated in the table above. In the Mokolo and Moskota clusters, youth and elders both reported that elders now hold improved perceptions of youth, and that youth themselves are more confident and have more self-esteem among their peers, even if elders

inadequately recognize their capabilities and contributions to the community. In the Mayo Sava cluster, however, both youth and elders reported only limited change in elders' perceptions of youth; improvements furthermore tended to favor individual young men, not youth as a whole.

In the Mokolo and Moskota clusters, youth-targeted activities reportedly improved social cohesion among ethnicities and religions, and across villages. In the Mokolo cluster, the rehabilitation of a cultural center and “peaceball” (soccer matches that included pre-game discussions supporting social cohesion) seemed especially successful because they initially brought youth together to pursue activities that were not explicitly or preeminently the resolution of long-standing hostilities. Young people said they believe that the likelihood of conflict between the youth of different villages was substantially lower than it had been, and that elders' perceptions of youth had improved.

In the Moskota cluster, outcomes of youth activities included improvements in relationships between young men and community elders, with the latter increasingly including the former in problem-solving. Now in Talakachi, youth groups approach elders to ask permission to do cleaning activities or caring for the fields — communication they previously did not even attempt to have with the elders. In Nguetchéwé, youth associations simply hold meetings to plan what they want to do and then just do it, and the elders now “see young people differently. In Talakachi and Nguetchéwé, focus group respondents said that young people now have positions of responsibility and assumed new roles. In Moskota, a youth organization started going around to make sure that kids are in school; if they are not, the young people inquire with the parents and then go to the chief to try to get the kid in school. The youth also started vigilance committees, which older residents have now joined.” This gives young men more confidence and better self-esteem in the community.

In Tourou (Mokolo cluster), where relationships between youth and traditional leaders have historically been strained, the youth now even hold positions within the local development committees in and around Tourou. In Mayo Sava, most interviewees believed that youth had still not penetrated the political and decision-making structures that governed the area. Many young people felt better about themselves and their organizations, and some who had participated in income-generating activities had earned some money. Nonetheless, their grievances with the prevailing cultural institutions and traditional power structures had remained more-or-less unchanged. Across all three clusters, youths' ability to earn money remains difficult, especially where being in fields outside the central village has again become dangerous due to VEO attacks.

EVALUATION QUESTION 3B

WHAT WERE THE PRIMARY OUTCOMES OF ACTIVITIES FOCUSED ON WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT?

NCI's activities led to greater solidarity among women, improved social standing for women in their communities, and new economic opportunities for some women. By investing in schools, roads, and the Amchidé health center in a first wave of activities, NCI's activities improved women's comfort with returning to and staying in many communities in Mayo Sava. Some of these cash-for-work activities furthermore changed community perceptions of what is “women's work,” as women also contributed labor and earned money. NCI built on this momentum by inviting demographically mixed groups of women to access new economic opportunities, and furthermore helped them build formal cooperatives and networks that amplified their economic opportunities and promoted the development of collective economic safety nets in many communities.

Agricultural cooperatives involving women were particularly successful. Women in many communities reported that during downswings in security, women who were members of cooperatives and associations tended to remain in the community rather than flee like many others. Despite VEO attacks in Dзамadzaf that caused women’s cooperative members to leave town, the members who stay nights in the mountains and Koza still go to the fields during the daytime, organize meetings, and have identified a new storage place for new crops and the crops that were not stolen from the ransacked and destroyed store in Dзамadzaf. A cooperative in Nguetchéwé managed to stock 150 bags of millet and was pursuing credit to buy a bigger field for both millet and onions.

Forming cooperatives not only raised their visibility and influence as contributors to their communities, but it offered justification for women of different religions or ethnicities to socialize and build relationships that their families might otherwise have discouraged or actively prevented them from forming. Women’s associations provided a forum for women from different ethnic and religious backgrounds to gather and resolve community issues. In general, women’s associations proved more durable than youth associations — interviews did not reveal any women’s associations which had quit functioning, a contrast with youth associations.

Both men and women in NCI’s targeted villages said that the development and formalization of both women’s cooperatives and women’s associations have contributed to women’s increased abilities to influence local affairs — forcing decision-makers to consider issues they previously hadn’t considered or prioritized. While results in each village varied, interview data suggested that male leaders in some villages now proactively seek the views of women on issues upon which women formerly did not opine. In some villages where women have formed a students’ mothers association, the chief now knows he can or should consult the head of the association — privately and quietly, if not visibly at community meetings. Where chiefs are less proactive, female leaders often ask or demand to speak at community meetings and are more frequently granted the floor than they were in the past.

The specific mechanism by which this increased influence was exercised varied by cluster. In the Mokolo and Moskota clusters, women and men reported that women can talk more openly. A woman in a Moskota association, for example, gained confidence to speak in front of the chief against husbands harming their wives, successfully changing the outcome of that marital dispute. In the Mayo Sava cluster, however, men did not believe that women’s status had changed. Women, however, perceived that they had gained new influence. In that conservative environment with strong traditional authorities, women’s influence was behind the scenes. Chiefs now quietly ask the heads of women’s associations for their opinions. Women’s associations would then convey their opinion to the chief, who would take it into account — but not publicly acknowledge the women’s role. In this way in Mayo Sava, women gained new influence despite the persistent patriarchal attitudes of most men. For example, in Limani (Mayo Sava), women successfully pushed the Lamido to overrule a chief (who first wanted to favor his own tribe and himself) in order to ensure a new grain-storage facility was located in a place that was equally accessible to all tribes. Notably, women in the Limani focus group expressed cynicism about the value that men put on women’s and girls’ value, adding that although girls do better than boys in school, men’s view of women is “archaic”.

EVALUATION QUESTION 3C

WHAT WERE THE PRIMARY OUTCOMES OF ACTIVITIES FOCUSED ON COMMUNITY ACTION TO COUNTER EXTREMISM?

Community actions against extremism have been a cumulative outcome of the range of different activities organized by NCI. The active involvement of youth has had an important effect on social cohesion in all three clusters and has strengthened the coordination of security in the villages. Since NCI's original creation and mobilization of youth associations, they have contributed to the organization of night-watch and surveillance by monitoring the entrances and exits of the village and alerting authorities to potential threats. This security vanguard role gave them the opportunity to work together, to develop a class consciousness that made them aware of the need to ensure their collective security. Interviewees reported that stronger social cohesion among young people promotes safety and a sense of security.

The precise ways these actions played out differed from one place to another, and they were often not strictly the result of a single activity. The variation in these outcomes tended to reflect the character of the local context. For example, in Amchidé — along a major transit route — controlling entrance and exit is not plausible, even at night. There, youth (young men and women, generally aged 18-35) were involved in keeping tabs on people who arrived and reporting anyone with suspected extremist ties to military authorities. In Moskota, which is not on such a major route, the chief asked local youth (men aged 18-35, in this case) to encircle the village at night to keep it secure. This watch system is separate from the local vigilance committee. In both cases, the "youth" in question are a set of young adults who had participated in multiple NCI activities, although the actions to keep villages secure occurred outside the formal context of an NCI activity.

EVALUATION QUESTION 4

WHAT WERE THE MORE LASTING EFFECTS, IF ANY, OF THE PROGRAM'S EFFORTS TO CHANGE ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS?

As discussed in the sections above on women and youth, attitudes about both changed as a result of NCI activities. Changes varied by cluster, with more substantial effects in the Moskota and Mokolo clusters. In the Mayo Sava cluster, women and youth gained significant new leverage via their associations and economic activities, but resistance among older men remains.

Cross-ethnic and cross-religious social-cohesion effects of cash-for-work seem to be enduring. Grantee interviews reported that in Mokolo and Moskota clusters, young Christians, Muslims, and animists worked alongside one another for what most people remember to be the first time. In the Mayo Sava cluster, women's associations bridged longstanding divides between Kanuri and Mafa women.

In interviews across the board, individuals reported that NCI's consistent integration of cohesion-building processes into its activities, for example by convening transparent and inclusive beneficiary selection processes for each activity, profoundly affected perceptions of the overall importance of inclusivity and the acceptability of marginalized groups' claims to empowerment in community affairs. Women and youth especially reported that this had seeped into life and discourse in their villages." NCI's activities that brought people together across social cleavages, including gender, religion, and ethnicity, to complete practical projects also used those gatherings as a springboard to create an atmosphere for new discussions of social cohesion. Facilitators from grantee organizations then utilized these diverse spaces to encourage villagers to think about social cohesion in their own contexts.

EVALUATION QUESTION 4A

DID THE PROGRAM SUCCESSFULLY IDENTIFY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE CHANGES AS THEY WERE OCCURRING IN ORDER TO COUNTERACT THEM AND CONSOLIDATE THE PROGRAM'S LEGACY?

In all three clusters, the program has successfully alleviated activity participant selection problems within communities. In some initial activities, selection of participants was skewed by traditional chiefs (who put "their own people" on lists of beneficiaries) or based on the religion or ethnicity of the local contacts who were initially guiding selection processes. The NCI team identified these issues early and altered their beneficiary selection process to resolve these issues. The updated procedures included a focus on formally codifying selection processes for each activity, and for holding inclusive community meetings to discuss these processes. Interviewees reported that after the changes, NCI's selection processes for participants within villages were fairer than for many other donor organizations.

Difficulties with jealousies between communities, especially neighboring villages, when an activity occurred in one village but not another, were more persistent. In some locations, the arrival of NCI activities further aggravated pre-existing tensions between the villages, but not to the extent that these dynamics substantively affected activity outcomes or overall stability in the area. For example, the villages of Amchidé and Limani are located immediately adjacent to each other, but are considered socially distinct by their residents, and the populations informally compete with one another. The presence of some activities in Amchidé and not in Limani led some residents of Limani to express annoyance at NCI and jealousy of Amchidé. These tensions did not become violent, but such escalation is possible in the region.

Another persistent issue that remained unresolved was the question of paid versus volunteer manual labor. In many areas, cash-for-work activities hired manual labor at a daily wage — and then a subsequent activity solicited volunteer labor, seemingly intending to leverage the consolidation of team spirit and positive community perceptions experienced by previous participants during the previous activities. Sometimes, single activities paid only supervisors, and not the manual laborers they supervised. These differences led to conflicts, jealousies, and misunderstandings between community members on the topic of who was paid and who was not and caused some ill will toward local organizations leading the activities.

One additional issue that respondents voiced was a sense among older men that they had been left out of all the new investment in their communities. Given the program's focus on women and youth, some older men saw numerous activities in their villages targeted at others and wondered: "When is our turn?"

EVALUATION QUESTION 5

WHAT WERE THE PRIMARY OUTCOMES OF THE PROGRAM IN PROMOTING STABILIZATION?

NCI's activities had several outcomes which promoted stabilization at different phases in the program and from different types of activities. The first wave of stabilization activities brought people back to their communities. Women's and youth associations gained strength and status, promoting economic growth, and reducing social tensions in their villages. And the mix of forms of structured engagement from NCI activities has helped communities build trust.

The first wave of stabilization activities was directly responsible for encouraging formerly-displaced people to remain in their home villages to stay throughout the year, one of NCI's targeted contributors to improved stability. Infrastructure rehabilitation, including schools and the Amchidé health center, allowed social services to begin again in villages, encouraging people to stay. Cash-for-work programs induced individuals to remain in their villages in the hopes of benefiting. And solar lamps provided a better sense

of security in many places, particularly in the evenings. Villages which had been relatively empty now have bustling social lives in the evenings, and schools which were empty are now packed with children. This return of basic services represents a second of NCI's targeted contributors to improved stability.

In sum, all of the forms of structured engagement induced by NCI's activities have strengthened social cohesion in the villages where the program worked, leading to greater stability in those villages. The numerous activities with women's associations, youth associations, and cooperatives have strengthened those social organizations, reduced tensions in villages, and provided some new avenues for people to earn incomes. These associations and cooperatives have provided venues for people to discuss issues across social cleavages and added reasons for people to stay in their villages. Groups including women's associations, youth associations, cooperatives, community development committees, grain-storage management committees, and other social organizations now exist and cut across ethnic, religious, and gender cleavages. All of these venues provide a space for community discussion and mechanisms to resolve local tensions. These new social developments would add to another of NCI's targeted contributors to improved stability, “an ability of local leaders to manage conflicts.”

The remaining element of stability that the Evaluation Team found NCI's strategy and activities were only marginally able to influence is “a level of security that permits daily life to go on.” NCI's support to youth organizations without a doubt contributed to youth's greater capacity and initiatives in some villages to mitigate potential for further intercommunal clashes and to support community efforts to withstand and counter Boko Haram attacks. However, respondents generally said the presence of Cameroonian military forces had been pivotal in sustaining a sense of security, until many units' recent departure. Many respondents cited nervousness that forces who had previously stationed themselves alongside or nearby schools, for example, were no longer in range to protect the village or the schools. Their fears appear well-founded, as an uptick in attacks on villages near Cameroon's borders with Nigeria, especially in the Moskota area, has correlated with the re-assignment of military units to other regions of Cameroon. To some extent, this observation challenges one of NCI's central assumptions to its theory of change: “Violent extremist organizations will be unable to thrive if formerly displaced people return home and re-claim contested spaces.” Indeed, many of the program's intermediary results contributed, mostly indirectly, to enhanced abilities of communities to avoid intercommunal, interfaith, and interethnic conflict, and to better collaborate in support of collective security against Boko Haram. However, this alone appears to not always be sufficient to provide a level of security that permits daily life to go on.

SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS

IMPLEMENTATION AND LOGISTICS

Some activities' limited impact stemmed from logistical issues related to implementation rather than their design. Grantee organizations reported delayed delivery of supplies that were being provided by the implementing partner, low quality materials, and mismatches between the planned materials and the actual materials received. Some of these problems resulted from miscommunications between people in the field and staff with the capacity (e.g. Excel skills) to write up procurement details for supplies. These are all common issues in northern Cameroon — the problem was that activity timelines sometimes were too short to resolve such issues, grantees said—but this improved over the course of the program.

STAFF DEMOGRAPHICS

In contexts where gender divisions are highly salient, female staff members are able to build relationships in ways that male staff members cannot. This difference was evident between the Moskota cluster, where the PDO was female, with the other two clusters, where the PDOs were male. Although NCI worked with women's associations in all three clusters, the social gains made by women were most prominent in the Moskota cluster. There, women have been able to speak out in front of chiefs on issues like marital disputes in ways that they previously had not. It should be noted, however, that cultural resistance to expanding women's autonomy or changes in their roles is also stronger among some populations in Mayo Sava than is generally the case in the other cluster areas. Additionally, whether related to the PDO's gender or not, fewer activities in Mokolo area targeted women than in either of the other clusters.

TARGET VILLAGE SELECTION


The theory behind this stabilization phase of NCI's programming was that interventions in strategically important targeted villages would additionally benefit neighboring areas or areas that were socially, economically, and politically networked with targeted communities. Our interviews showed that this was true: residents from smaller villages utilized services in targeted villages. Residents from smaller villages also flocked to stay semi-permanently in the larger villages where NCI worked, both revitalizing communities and creating new questions of land access. Given that many NCI-targeted villages were also home to Cameroonian military posts, it is difficult to parse out what factor drew people to those areas. Respondents from these areas reported that NCI-targeted villages were important community hubs.

However, not all nearby villages and populations benefited. Some geographically concentrated social groups had limited connections to targeted villages, and thus did not get any spillover benefits. One illustrative example is the population of the village of Makoulahé, shown in Map 2 in relation to NCI-targeted villages only a few miles away. The residents of Makoulahé are Christian, ethnic Podoko, and traditionally lived among mountains (falling into a category sometimes referred to as *montagnards*). Many of them had previously been living on the plains below, interspersed with other populations. When Boko Haram arrived, rather than fleeing to towns with other groups, they fled into the mountains to small villages of their kin. Makoulahé is one of the largest of such villages. Its residents are thus systematically quite different than residents of other parts of Mayo Sava. It also did not meet the village-selection criteria used by NCI, because it was not a central hub of any obvious strategic importance.

Interviews in Makoulahé showed that people there were unfamiliar with NCI activities that had taken place only a few miles away. Their security situation was worsening, in contrast to other nearby NCI-targeted villages in Mayo Sava where security had improved. Boko Haram raids there are more frequent even than other villages closer to the Nigerian border, to the extent that much of the population sleeps in the mountains and only comes down to the village during the day.

The case of Makoulahé shows the limits of the potential for neighboring areas to benefit from activities in target villages. Despite proximity to NCI activities, there were no apparent spillovers to Makoulahé.

Map 2: NCI Clusters and Makoulahé



This map shows the three OTI clusters (circles, diamonds, and triangles), with the addition of Makoulahé (square). Map and Makoulahé location from Google; NCI village locations from program GPS location data.

CONCLUSIONS

NCI helped communities that were hit hard by the Boko Haram conflict to recover, stabilize, and build resilience against violent extremism. One factor leading to successful program outcomes was NCI's choice to undertake somewhat different strategic approaches in three distinct geographic clusters. Recognizing systematic differences between sub-regions along the Nigerian border enabled the NCI team to design activities that were tailored to address some of each village's primary obstacles to resilience and stability, and to foster durable resilience and stability. NCI activities helped people build more resilient communities when they returned to their homes. In particular, in many places activities focused on empowering youth (18-35 years old) and women drove durable changes to these groups' abilities to influence their communities and contribute to resilience. The inclusive selection of beneficiaries across ethnic and religious lines was important to ensuring that program activities helped bridge social cleavages rather than deepen them. Many of the strategies undertaken by NCI would likely continue to bear fruit if continued in the region by other actors, or if implemented to achieve resilience outcomes in similarly crisis-affected areas of the Sahel and beyond.

CLUSTERING

Dividing NCI into geographic clusters was advantageous because of the differing baseline conditions between different areas where the program was working. Relatedly, different approaches were appropriate to achieve stabilization objectives in some places rather than others. For this program, the main distinction was between the Mayo Sava cluster and the two other clusters; differences between the Mokolo and Moskota clusters were less pronounced.

- Geographic clustering was effective for NCI because baseline conditions or mechanisms of achieving program objectives differed by geographic sub-region.

An additional important benefit of dividing clusters geographically was to enable program staff (PDOs especially) to build personal relationships with key influencers like chiefs, administrators, and resource people in a manageably allocated cluster of communities — rather than requiring thematically-focused staff to each develop activities tailored to diverse communities across both Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga.

- Organizing implementing teams geographically, as NCI did via clusters, was advantageous because access depended on personal networking among highly diverse demographic groups.

STABILIZATION

The first phase of the stabilization program, with cash-for-work activities and the rehabilitation of key community infrastructure, was effective at spurring people to remain in communities they had at one point fled. To many families, functioning schools are an indicator of security and recovery, so rebuilding and reopening schools can have a big effect on displaced populations' willingness to return. Key health centers are also important. Cash-for-work activities encouraged people to stay so they could directly benefit.

- NCI's cash-for-work activities, reopening schools, and revitalizing health centers and markets, encouraged returnees to stay in their communities.

The lasting effects of NCI's activities are likely to be those based on durable social changes, such as the empowerment of women and youth through formalization of organizational life and availing sustainable livelihood opportunities. The two often come together. For example, supporting the creation of diverse agricultural cooperatives increases the income that people can earn from farming, while also bringing together a group of people across social cleavages to pursue common interests. Similarly, cash-for-work activities convene participants in a shared experience to accomplish a shared objective, and also provide opportunities for participants to save money to invest. All these efforts, on balance, increased social cohesion, although some jealousies emerged among people the program's activities couldn't include. The improved social cohesion reduced some tensions within villages and made them more resilient in the face of violent extremism.

- NCI's support for targeted associations, cooperatives, and other committees built social resilience for whole communities.

APPROACHES AND ACTIVITIES

Some types of NCI activities were particularly effective and should be considered for further implementation in northern Cameroon or in other similar areas of the Sahel and perhaps beyond.

SOLAR LAMPS

If there is no electricity in an area, or if electricity is limited to only a few wealthy households, solar lamps offer a multitude of benefits. The light in the evenings increases perceptions of security, and some residents believed it reduced the likelihood of attack by insurgents. The light also gives students a place to study their lessons after dark. When public benches were installed along with the lamps, the social impact was greater still. The lamps then become a social and economic hub, revitalizing communities. The increased security and evening community activity the lamps enabled led small businesses — like tea stands or food sellers — to stay open in the evenings.

- NCI's installation of solar lamps increased perceptions of security, economic activity, students' educational activity, and village vitality, as well as deterring violent attacks.

CASH-FOR-WORK

Cash-for-work programs should be designed with three parallel goals in mind: First, the main purpose is to distribute resources to people in communities. The second goal is to bring a diverse group of participants together to counter distrust and ideally build solidarity. Both of these aspects, which NCI did, require careful participant selection in order to ensure that all social groups are included in the activity. The benefits from distributing resources could have been multiplied by including some job-training or investment support activity along with the distribution of resources. The third goal is to produce a tangible benefit for the community. In this regard, NCI's program demonstrated that cash-for-work programs that create a lasting impact, like the construction of grain storage facilities, the rehabilitation of a school, or the rehabilitation of a durable road are preferable.

- NCI's cash-for-work activities distributed resources to key beneficiaries and brought diverse groups of people together. In some cases, they also produced durable infrastructure — details on this point are below marked with an ***.

GRAIN STORAGE

New grain storage facilities are a straightforward and promising type of intervention and might represent a good default cash-for-work activity in agricultural areas. Grain storage buildings built with NCI's support were universally known, appreciated, and in actuality used to store a multitude of crops. Even with the new storage facilities, the demand for storage space seemed to exceed capacity across the board. They increased villagers' income by allowing people to safely store their harvest for consumption and for surplus sale throughout the year. Year-round salability generates more and more consistent revenue compared to the imperative without a storage facility to sell everything immediately after harvest before spoilage begins. Storage facilities also increase security in a village by deterring violent extremists' invasion of communities to steal food. Grain storage facilities were widely cited by respondents as being beneficial, while some roads fell again into disrepair, new health centers can't be inexpensively built, and schools serve only a portion of the population that use them. Grain storage facilities also help increase the incomes of the very large portion of the population engaged in agriculture by allowing them to sell their goods when prices are high.

- Grain storage facilities improved resilience in all villages where they were built through their contributions to people's livelihoods and food security.***

ROAD REHABILITATION

NCI's cash-for-work road-rehabilitation activities were very successful in areas where the soil and rocks allowed improved — but unpaved — roads to survive the rainy season. In other places, where the soil turns to mud in the rain, the short duration of rehabilitation benefits meant that such activities did not appear as worthwhile as the construction of other infrastructure might have been.

- Road repair in the Moskota cluster, where road improvements survived the rainy season, built economic resilience and helped vulnerable communities farm their land in daytime and sleep in a safe place.***

GRINDING MILLS

Mills to grind grain substantially reduce women's workload and provide a source of income for the organization that operates them — so long as they work. Breakdowns occur regularly. In some places — in the Mokolo and Moskota clusters — NCI-supported grinding mills, they kept functioning well and were widely appreciated. Those were places where earlier, unrelated programs had trained mechanics. In other places, in the Mayo Sava cluster, the Evaluation Team found that almost all of the NCI-supported grinding mills had broken down and not been fixed. In these contexts, a broken mill can be seen as an extra problem.

- Grinding mills and other similar equipment provided economic opportunities for women in the Mokolo and Moskota clusters, where there were repair people. In Mayo Sava, their effects were limited due to breakdowns and lack of repair people.

SCHOOLS

Reopening schools should be a high priority for any program that aims to induce displaced people to return to their home villages. For many people, functioning schools represent a minimum level of services that they expect before they will return. In some cases, rehabilitating school structures and providing materials induced the return of government-funded teachers. Parents particularly appreciated the combination of school-building repair and the provision of individual kits of materials for children.

- Reopening shuttered schools, as NCI did, encouraged formerly displaced households to remain at home. Including kits of materials for children motivated parents.***

HEALTH CENTERS

Reopening the Amchidé health center was often cited as the most important activity completed in the village. It had an outsized effect on revitalizing that community, as vendors sprung up around it. It also provides services to people far outside Amchidé proper, providing spillover effects for neighboring communities and reassuring returning households that they can access healthcare. Improvements to the Ldoubam health center had similar effects, though on a smaller scale.

- Where health centers exist, improving and equipping them, as NCI did, built resilience in whole subregions.

EMPLOYMENT TRAINING AND SUPPORT

Activities like NCI's training of seamstresses and provision of sewing machines in Amchidé offer a model of how to provide sustainable employment opportunities. The key to this activity's success was that there was an existing market and unmet demand for the seamstress services and products, so the intervention

produced sustainable employment. It also enabled women to gain economic autonomy, setting examples for others in the village. The training and equipment for peanut-oil extraction in the Mayo Sava cluster was successful for similar reasons. Employment training programs at the youth center in Ldoubam did not seem to have as much of an effect, likely because there is not such a market for services in the vicinity of Ldoubam.

- Employment training and providing start-up materials was highly effective in some NCI activities where there was demand for resulting items or services, and where continuity of inputs was secure.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SUPPORT

Activities to support agricultural production and increase farmers' profits are highly effective if implemented appropriately — but such implementation can be a challenge. Agriculture represents one of the few sustainable ways to earn an income in many villages. Many people employ agricultural practices that are inefficient or lack inputs (like plows) to increase output. Providing minimal inputs (like plows) and training on planting procedures, fertilizer use, and other techniques substantially increased production. Supporting the organization of community fields also increased production and provided income for more people. Two main potential challenges are lack of land availability and difficulty ensuring activity schedules to match with growing seasons.

One other way NCI supported agriculture was by helping people form cooperatives, a type of organization with specific rights under Cameroonian law. Forming cooperatives allowed people to access bank credit, among other benefits. Furthermore, organizing cooperatives that are diverse and cut across social cleavages (e.g. gender, ethnicity, and religion) contributed positively to social cohesion.

- Agricultural support from some NCI activities, especially via cooperatives, significantly helped build community resilience. Other activities had limited effects because land was unavailable, or schedules did not match growing seasons.
- NCI's support for the formation of cooperatives simultaneously improved livelihoods and social cohesion.

PEACE COMMITTEES

Forming "peace committees" was one type of NCI activity which did not leave a substantial effect. Peace committees often ended up being ineffective or simply not meeting at all. Interview respondents were not generally familiar with them. One problem was the inclusion of traditional leaders on the committees — which then prevented other committee members from organizing meetings or speaking against the chief, because of social norms about chiefs' power. NCI realized this issue and resolved it in some places. The broader issue is that such committees compete with existing structures, like traditional chieftaincies and administrative authorities, which already claim the right to resolve disputes.

- Peace committees tended to be ineffective when they competed with existing social institutions. Social cohesion was more effectively enhanced by building opportunities for diverse community members to come together to pursue some concrete, tangible output or outcome, and to build peacebuilding or conflict mitigation discussions into these activities.

WORKING WITH YOUTH

Youth, meaning individuals 18-35 years old, are key targets for stabilization programming in contexts like northern Cameroon. They represent a large fraction of the growing population, as well as potential recruits for extremist organizations. NCI's program showed that building social cohesion among youth can promote perceptions of security among all residents, in addition to providing valuable collaborators and information sources for government and security officials.

Convening youth tends to require material incentives. Activities like cash-for-work for youth provided opportunities to build social cohesion across social cleavages. Building youth organizations around the discussion and direct promotion of abstract objectives, like peacebuilding, was less successful than building social cohesion through activities aiming for concrete outcomes like community infrastructure improvements (preferably with paid labor) or livelihood generation. Support for youth associations can be most effective when there is a source of revenue, either from other program activities, government sources, or local elites. NCI has left a strong base of youth associations in the subregion. However, many are likely not to survive without further sources of revenue, training, and other support.

- Building youth organizations requires consistent resource inputs; simply creating youth associations tends not to take off as independently as women's organizations. Some NCI youth associations succeeded, some did not. If successful, supporting social cohesion among youth has security benefits for whole communities.

WORKING WITH WOMEN

Empowering women builds momentum that has beneficial effects for children, local economies, community decision-making, and social cohesion. Women often use new livelihood earnings to send children (especially girls) to school, to improve household nutrition, and to gain greater decision-making capabilities in their households.

Women's associations seemed to be much more durable than youth associations. Even without external sources of financing, the women's associations launched and supported by NCI appear to be continuing to operate, meet, and provide benefits in their communities. These associations also improved women's status in their communities, giving them additional leverage in local decision-making. Women who were engaged in these associations, cooperatives, or other structured groups said they were more likely to stay in their villages and support one another through difficult times.

Forming, formalizing, and legalizing women's cooperatives and associations had multiple benefits. It increased cooperative members' self-confidence and willingness to contribute their voices to important community discussions and decisions. It allowed them to access grants, partnerships, and trainings from donors and government sources that can improve women's and their communities' resilience to destabilizing conditions/events. Furthermore, convening women across ethnicities and religions to pursue shared interests to some extent had spill-over benefits for overall community cohesion. Some of these benefits arose because formal associations provided women leverage to win over husbands and fathers who would otherwise prevent their wives and daughters from interacting with women of a different religion or ethnic group. Official support from local chiefs also helped overcome resistance from conservative men.

- NCI's support for women's associations built community resilience to violent extremism by contributing to social cohesion.

INCLUSIVE PARTICIPATION

Many of NCI's successes resulted from its strategies to ensure inclusive implementation of its activities, drawing participation across social cleavages including gender, ethnicity, and religion. The program had some challenges with participant selection in early activities, as local chiefs or power brokers utilized their influence to put "their people" on lists of participants. NCI staff recognized this problem and shifted to more consciously inclusive methods of selecting participants, in which criteria were discussed along with activity design, and inclusive community meetings were held to discuss selection. Community members were impressed by NCI's insistence, even when it meant engaging local decision-makers in difficult discussions, on inclusive participation. This built trust between NCI and communities, and some residents reported that the value attached to inclusivity lived on beyond NCI's specific activities.

- NCI countered negative attitude about participant selection by publicizing selection criteria and holding community meetings, after learning from early missteps where chiefs exerted influence.

Issues of equity across villages can also be challenging to manage, especially in cases when a village is targeted for an intervention and neighboring village(s) is not. Such jealousies can reignite or exacerbate existing tensions between villages.

- In some cases, NCI activities in one village raised jealousies in a neighboring village.

Another issue that arose across the NCI intervention area was confusion and jealousy over the mix of paid and volunteer manual labor. Some NCI activities were cash-for-work approaches where manual laborers were paid. For other activities, volunteer labor was solicited for community projects. Despite implementers' best efforts to explain the differences between the two, confusion and jealousy remained over the question of who was paid and who was not. These issues were especially pronounced when there were divisions within the same activity, such as when supervisors were paid but other laborers were not. The question of volunteer labor is always sensitive — many people think that programs should always pay for labor — but it becomes especially problematic when paid and unpaid labor are mixed within an area.

- NCI's use of paid and volunteer labor within the same communities raised some social tensions.

Some of NCI's successful work with women, particularly in the Moskota cluster, appeared to be linked to the assignment of a female PDO to lead activity development in that area. She served as a role model for local women and had easier access to women's meetings and local female influencers than male NCI staff had in other areas.

- Employing female program staff significantly helped with design and implementation of activities aiming to empower women.

CONTEXT-APPROPRIATE IMPLEMENTATION

In the Far North of Cameroon and in other similar environments, appropriate timelines for implementation are much longer than elsewhere, even compared with some other developing country contexts. Rushed timelines, broken schedules, and logistical obstacles can prevent even the best-designed activities from being successful. Issues with timelines came up at three stages: 1) in activity design, when not enough time was allocated for back-and-forth discussions with on-the-ground implementers; 2) in procurement and transport, when delays often derailed activities regardless of theoretically binding

contracts with vendors of goods and services; and 3) in follow-up, when local partners had too little time to evaluate the extent to which an activity had produced intended outcomes or to resolve issues. Local implementers struggled to provide the evaluation feedback required by NCI shortly after an activity had been “completed” — after procured items were delivered and any events or engagements occurred. NCI’s local grantees also lacked resources to travel far for evaluation purposes after an activity was complete, and often they complained that not enough time had passed to realistically assess the extent to which an activity produced intended outcomes.

- Some activities’ effectiveness was limited by late arrivals of materials due to logistical hurdles, as well as limited monitoring and evaluation time for local partners.

Traditional chieftaincies play important socio-political roles in these regions, but tremendous variation exists among them. Chiefs can be important facilitators to support activity implementation, roadblocks to block activities, or biased power brokers who attempt to steer implementation toward a specific subgroup of the population. Traditional institutions differ substantially in the degree to which they are hierarchical (are there “lower” chiefs subordinate to “higher” chiefs?), which specific administrative functions they claim authority over (e.g. who has authority over land?), and whether they represent the entirety of a population. (Is there one chief for all religions and ethnicities? Or does each group have its own chief?) In general, chiefs always need to be informed about activities, but seeking their active involvement may harm or help implementation depending on the context. NCI’s relationships with chiefs varied from place to place and over time, with a greater reliance on chiefs earlier in the program. Different approaches to engaging chiefs did not appear to have been systematically discussed by NCI staff.

- Chiefs sometimes attempt to exercise undue influence on activities and beneficiary selection

RECOMMENDATIONS

This evaluation aimed to collect findings and draw conclusions to provide useful insights for other OTI programs in similar locations, U.S. government representatives in Cameroon, and other organizations continuing to work in Cameroon. The findings and conclusions described above, enriched by both evaluators’ and informants’ regional and subject-matter expertise, lead to the following recommendations. These recommendations are intended to help donors and partners who aim to strengthen resilience and stability in Cameroon, West Africa, the Sahel, and other similar areas facing complex crises related to violent extremism.

- OTI should consider employing geographic clustering when: 1) baseline conditions by geographic sub-region, OR 2) approaches to achieving objectives differ by sub-region, OR 3) gaining access to communities requires personal networking.
- Help returnees to stay in their communities by offering cash-for-work activities, reopening schools, and revitalizing health centers and markets.
- Use support to targeted associations, cooperatives, and other committees to build whole communities’ social and economic resilience, and their abilities to counter violent extremism.
- Plans to support youth organizations should assume that most will require ongoing resources and support if they are to produce enduring outcomes and impact.
- Assistance organizations should build on the youth and women’s associations that NCI has launched.

- Support women’s associations and cooperatives, which appear to be more independently sustainable than youth organizations, but often require more support to overcome legal hurdles.
- Use the following types of activities to rally community members to build resilience: 1) skill-building and vocational investments for women, 2) inclusive cash and vocational investments for youth, and 3) key community infrastructure improvements.
- For cash-for-work, use inclusive consultation with community members to identify infrastructure that would best support resilience, and to identify and pay an inclusive group of youth to do the work. Failing consultation, grain storage seems to be a good default.
- Provide agricultural support and equipment, but only if it is certain that growing season schedules can be met.
- Invest in grain mills and train technicians to repair them.
- Consider the following implementation measures, to address contextual considerations: 1) avoid using paid and volunteer labor in the same areas, 2) always inform, but do not always involve, chiefs, 3) include sufficient (extra) time in activity timelines for logistical issues and evaluation of outcomes, 4) increase the ability of programs to empower women by hiring female staff, 5) to promote inclusive participant recruitment, publicize criteria for participation, and utilize or initiate community meetings to select participants, as NCI learned to do during its program.

ANNEXES

ANNEX A: EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

OTI Cameroon Final Evaluation Scope of Work

Period of Performance: August 28, 2019 - March 20, 2020

BACKGROUND

OTI has been conducting activities in Cameroon since early 2017. Initially working to address drivers of extremism and interrupt recruitment and support for Boko Haram, in early 2018 the program revised its strategy to reflect the two main trends affecting the Far North: security gains against the sect opened new areas closer to the border and internally displaced persons began to return home; and the prospect of reintegrating ex-combatants and ex-affiliates became a reality for many communities. NCI has been programming towards stabilizing these affected border communities and supporting reintegration work since 2018.

Because we have already done some evaluation work on our program objective relating to reintegration, this evaluation will focus on our stabilization objective, which encompassed the predominant part of our programming beginning officially in March 2018 (72 activities to date, totaling \$3.2 million). It also builds on the foundation of initial program efforts on curbing recruitment, counter-messaging, awareness-raising, etc. (87 activities across two objectives, \$4.2 million). An important unit of analysis will be our four outcome-focused geographic clusters, which evolved out of an iterative strategic targeting exercise. This evaluation will only focus on the three clusters in Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga,² covering approximately 25-30 villages and towns.

The program's official end date is May 31, 2020. The last activities will launch in December or January, leaving ample time for final implementation and closeout. When OTI leaves Cameroon, there is no direct follow-on USAID or other donor program to fill the void. Thus, a significant part of our final stage of programming is focused on learning and sharing with the other donors and partners who are interested in our approaches and findings.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this activity is to conduct an independent performance evaluation of USAID/OTI's Northern Cameroon Initiative (NCI).

LINES OF INQUIRY

1. Did geographic clustering of expected outcomes prove to be useful for stabilization work, and did we achieve aggregate effects as a result? Did the aggregate effects vary by region?
 - a. How well did the geographic clusters approach work to focus the team on layering, sequencing and prioritizing activities to achieve aggregate outcomes?
2. What were the primary outcomes of the program in promoting stabilization?
3. What seem to be the more lasting effects, if any, of the program's efforts to change attitudes and perceptions?
 - a. Did the program successfully identify changes that were happening, in order to program against them and consolidate the program's legacy?

² Our work in Logone et Chari has primarily followed a different strategy due to the shorter time frame of our interventions and the different problem set.

4. What did the program learn with regard to youth engagement, women’s empowerment, and community action to counter extremism?
 - a. What were the primary outcomes with regard to these themes?
5. Were the approaches appropriate to the intended results? What approaches were the most successful?

AUDIENCE

There are three main audiences for this report, in priority order. The first is OTI. The learning from this program will inform regional OTI programs working on violent extremism (including ongoing Sahel programs such as Burkina Faso), provide a regional (Lake Chad Basin) comparison that would be useful to the office, and hopefully expand OTI’s evidence base for stabilization programming as well as outcome-based geographic clustering. Second, as mentioned above, is the need to share our programmatic learning - both on drivers of VE and instability, as well as effective approaches and strategies - with other practitioners in Cameroon. This includes UNDP, the EU, and the French, all of whom have been working in Cameroon but also have new funding to continue stabilization and preventing of violent extremism programming in the coming years. The final audience will be USAID and US Embassy counterparts in Cameroon - the Regional USAID Mission in Accra has a research platform focused on violent extremism and this will inform their learning agenda. Existing and near-future Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programming for Cameroon will also benefit from this evaluation, in particular, Voices for Peace which addresses community level root causes of extremism through dialogue. And the US Embassy in Cameroon will benefit from a greater understanding of what has been accomplished to date.

METHODOLOGY

This evaluation will be non-experimental and largely qualitative in nature, but mixed methods may be used as appropriate. In answering the evaluation questions, the contractor shall utilize data that is disaggregated and analyzed by sex, age, ethnicity, and location, whenever such data is available. Methodological specifics will be agreed upon among the evaluators and OTI/Cameroon, and the evaluators are encouraged to suggest creative approaches. OTI’s activity database is a rich source of information on individual activities and should be utilized by the Evaluation Team. Full program documentation will be provided to the Evaluation Team during the Inception Phase.

This evaluation will only focus on the three clusters in Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga,³ covering approximately 25-30 villages and towns. All relevant activity locations are accessible within a short day’s drive from the Maroua office. Other than 1-2 days spent with OTI and IP staff in Yaoundé, all fieldwork should be based from Maroua, where Creative has a field office.

Possible methods for the evaluation include:

- Facilitated workshop with key program staff (OTI and Creative) to reflect on program implementation, challenges and successes;
- Interviews/focus group discussions with key program stakeholders, including U.S. Embassy and USAID staff, Creative staff, civic society partners, and beneficiaries;
- Site visits to ongoing activities;
- Surveys/questionnaires conducted by hotline operators;
- Document review (e.g. OTI’s Activity Database; hotline data; program documents; strategic frameworks; cluster evaluations, program performance management documents, such as

³ Our work in Logone et Chari has primarily followed a different strategy due to the shorter time frame of our interventions and the different problem set.

Strategy Review Sessions (SRSs), Rolling Assessments, and Program Performance Reviews (PPRs); site visit reports; grantee weekly and monthly reports; maps or other programmatic data visualizations; and other existing data produced by the program or other third parties)

TEAM COMPOSITION

The Evaluation Team should be comprised per the specifications described below. Social Impact, in consultation with the team members, should propose the final makeup of the team and the division of roles and responsibilities and LOE among them. The positions to be filled by Social Impact require USAID/OTI concurrence of the proposed candidates. The Evaluation Team shall be comprised of two evaluation experts, reflecting the following range of skill sets and background:

Language Skills: All members of the evaluation team must be able to speak, read, write and facilitate interviews and/or focus group discussions in fluent or very advanced French without need of an interpreter. They should also have strong English writing, reading and speaking skills.

Regional Context: Members of the Evaluation Team should have current knowledge and background in the region, preferably in Cameroon. Awareness of the operational environment, political dynamics, and local actors is preferred.

Anthropology/Sociology: The Team Leader should have a background in anthropology and/or sociology and possess strong research skills.

Stabilization / CVE Technical Expertise: At least one, but preferably both, members of the Evaluation Team should have a strong background in stabilization and CVE programming.

OTI Evaluator: In addition to the evaluators hired by Social Impact, OTI intends to field a consultant to serve as a member of the evaluation team. The consultant identified for this role has worked closely with NCI over the past year and has had involvement in designing the current monitoring and evaluation system. She can help the Evaluation Team better understand the OTI model as well as NCI's history and current strategy and programming approach. Likewise, she will have useful inputs on evaluation design and approach. As possible, the OTI-hired consultant will participate in all fieldwork and data-analysis and will be available for regularly scheduled check-ins through the evaluation period. She will *not* take a primary role in drafting deliverables, however, should review and contribute as able.

TIMELINE/LOE

Relevant dates

- October 29-31: SRS
- November-December: Amalia unavailable for fieldwork
- November 18-22: DCR meeting (Mary out)
- End of Nov 28: CR out of country
- December: Country rep in DC
- January: Likely the best time for fieldwork. Only 2 days in Yaoundé needed, the remainder of the time in Maroua.
- February/March: Most activities will be closed
- May: Program closes

DELIVERABLES

The Evaluation Team, under the direction of the Team Leader, is responsible for completing the following Tasks and submitting the following Deliverables:

TASKS AND DELIVERABLES:

- Refined or clarified evaluation questions (in collaboration with USAID/OTI);
- Evaluation Inception Report, to include the following:
 - Summary of proposed data collection methods and analytical framework;
 - Draft data collection tools;
 - Management framework, including divisions of roles and responsibilities among the Evaluation Team members and points of contact for liaising with OTI, and Creative;
 - Updated timeline with applicable LOE;
 - Initial interviewee list (to be developed in collaboration with USAID/OTI and Creative); and
 - Utilization plan for evaluation findings, based on initial conversations with OTI Washington and OTI Cameroon staff;
- Materials and written summary of out-briefing to USAID/OTI and Creative before departing Cameroon;
- Draft Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations matrix;
- Draft evaluation report for comments (content and structure);
- Materials for final debriefs (handout or presentation) and participation in debrief(s) with USAID/OTI, Creative, USG interagency, and other Washington stakeholders as determined by OTI; and
- Final evaluation report. Final report will be limited to 25-30 pages total, excluding annexes and the executive summary.

All deliverables will require USAID/OTI concurrence prior to their finalization.

The final evaluation report will be posted on USAID's Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) website by Social Impact.

Social Impact will be responsible for the following logistical matters with respect to the Evaluation Team members hired through this activity:

- Social Impact is responsible for all scheduling, arranging meeting locations, and confirming times/dates/locations with the team and interviewees and grantees. OTI and Creative will provide references, contact information, and can assist with scheduling as needed. While the evaluators are in country, OTI's partner, Creative, will make available a conference room in its offices for the evaluators to use in Yaoundé and Maroua. However, meetings in partner offices and coffee shops are sometimes preferable and convenient. USAID/OTI will facilitate access to the U.S. Embassy for meetings with other USAID and Embassy officials and arrange conference rooms in the Embassy;
- Social Impact shall arrange and purchase all international and U.S. travel for the Evaluation Team. Task Order Contracting Officer's Representative (TOCOR) concurrence is required for all international travel not included in the original activity budget;
- Social Impact shall provide per diem (lodging and M&IE) for the Evaluation Team in Cameroon and in the U.S. (based on each member's travel status);
- Social Impact shall fund in-country ground transportation;
- Social Impact and the Evaluation Team will work with OTI and Creative to arrange interviews in Washington, D.C. and in Cameroon; and
- USAID/OTI will arrange international travel, provide per diem, and secure lodging for the OTI-hired consultant. Social Impact will, however, be responsible for including this individual when making ground transportation arrangements for the team while in Cameroon in consultation with Creative.

REPORT STRUCTURE

The evaluation report (25-30 pages excluding annexes and the executive summary) should adhere to USAID guidelines and be structured as follows:

- Cover Page with photo.
- List of Acronyms.
- Table of Contents, which identifies page numbers for the major content areas of the report.
- Executive Summary (3 to 5 pages): should be a clear and concise stand-alone document that gives readers the essential content of the evaluation report, previewing the main points in order to enable readers to build a mental framework for organizing and understanding the detailed information within the report. Thus, the Executive Summary should include maximum of two paragraphs describing the program; summary of objectives and intended outcomes; and key findings including those related to meaningful under- or over-achievement.
- Methodology: Describe the data collection methods used including strengths and weaknesses, inclusion of stakeholders and staff, rough schedule of activities, description of any statistical analysis undertaken. This section should also address constraints and limitations of the evaluation process and rigor, including what can and cannot be concluded from the evaluation. All actual or potential conflicts of interests among members of the Evaluation Team should be noted in this section. In accordance with ADS 203, the report should also state why a performance evaluation was conducted in lieu of an impact evaluation.
- Findings: The Evaluation Team should determine how best to organize this section based on the evaluation questions, in consultation with OTI.
- Synthesis, Recommendations, and Lessons Learned: This is space for the Evaluation Team to discuss the data and results, and make concrete recommendations for project improvements/changes, pull out organizational lessons learned (both positive and negative), and generally comment on data and results.
- Annexes: List of stakeholders interviewed with number and type of interactions; interview data on evaluation questions, the scope of work; qualitative protocols developed and used; any data sets can be provided in electronic format; other special documentation needed.

POINTS OF CONTACT

Leia Reisner (lreisner@usaid.gov) will serve as point of contact for overall evaluation administration and coordination, and will ensure the appropriate OTI staff are included on correspondence.

The OTI Cameroon field team (dcha.oticameroonfieldlist@usaid.gov) and the OTI Consultant (amaliapradom@gmail.com) will be on point for all technical evaluation matters, and should be the main counterparts for the Evaluation Team. They will coordinate, or identify another person to coordinate, with the Evaluation Team on all in-country logistics and scheduling.

The Program Manager (dcha.oticameroodclist@usaid.gov) in Washington will serve as the point of contact for coordination of the Washington meetings. There will be some occasions when the Program Manager arranges the meeting and location and others where he/she may provide contact information for the consultants to arrange their own logistics.

The TOCOR will remain the point of contact for all technical direction requiring formal concurrence.

ANNEX B: DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

The Evaluation Team also reviewed:

Program documents (September 2018, September 2019)

The evaluation of the project's reintegration activities (Amalia Prado, October 2019)

The cluster backgrounds for each cluster (OTI Database)

The Boko Haram influence mapping study for the region (CMC / ELVA / CERASS for OTI, Aug. 2019)

The snapshot reports for each cluster. (Program files)

All Final Evaluation Reports

Activity notes from the following activities: MARI28, MARI31, MARI38, MARI40, MARI45, MARI48, MARI52, MARI54, MARI64, MARI71, MARI78, MARI80, MARI82, MARI83, MARI85, MARI92, MARI96, MARI97, MAR201, MAR209, MAR210, MAR217, MAR221, MAR224, MAR229

ANNEX C: SURVEY INSTRUMENT

CONSENTEMENT

VERSION AUTORITES

Bonjour, je m'appelle _____ et je travaille pour Social Impact, une société américaine qui mène des recherches pour le compte du Bureau des initiatives de transition (OTI) de l'Agence des États-Unis pour le développement international (USAID).

Nous ne sommes pas ici pour fournir nous-mêmes une aide quelconque, et la façon dont vous répondrez n'affectera en rien le fait que vous ou votre village recevez quelque chose à l'avenir. Nous évaluons l'efficacité des programmes des activités regroupées dans les départements de Mayo-Sava et Mayo-Tsanaga.

Nous voulons comprendre comment la programmation a fonctionné et ce qui pourrait être amélioré pour les activités futures dans la région. Vous avez été sélectionnés pour participer à cette recherche parce que nous pensons que vous pouvez apporter un point de vue unique sur les progrès de l'OTI jusqu'à présent. Nous pensons que les informations que vous pourrez nous fournir seront très utiles pour notre recherche.

Votre participation à cet entretien est entièrement volontaire et peut être interrompue à tout moment. Vous ne recevrez aucun paiement ou avantage direct pour votre participation, [pour les entretiens sur le terrain: à l'exception de ce petit cadeau symbolique savon, qui ne dépend pas de vos réponses à nos questions].

Nous ne discuterons de vos réponses avec personne, et votre nom n'apparaîtra pas en relation avec les informations que vous nous donnez. L'entretien durera environ 1 heure.

Comprenez-vous que votre participation à cet entretien est volontaire, non rémunérée, enregistrée, que vous pouvez refuser de répondre à toute question et que vous pouvez mettre fin à l'entretien à tout moment? Êtes-vous disposé à y participer?

VERSION DES COMMUNAUTES

Bonjour, je m'appelle _____ et je travaille pour Social Impact, une société américaine qui mène des recherches pour le développement partout dans le monde. Nous ne sommes pas un projet et les réponses que vous apporterez n'auront aucun impact sur les projets à mener dans votre localité.

Nous sommes ici pour collecter des informations sur l'efficacité des projets qui ont été menés dans votre localité.

Vous avez été sélectionnés pour participer à cette recherche parce que nous pensons que votre point de vue nous aidera à mesurer les progrès des projets réalisés depuis deux ans.

Sachez que vous êtes libres de répondre à nos questions et d'arrêter la discussion à tout moment. Sachez aussi que vos réponses seront notées mais elles resteront confidentielles et notre entretien vous prendra une heure maximum.

Nous n'avons pas d'argent à vous donner; juste ce petit cadeau symbolique.

Interview #

Date
 Sexe
 Religion
 Ethnie
 Langue
 Age
 Village
 (métier? Si important?)

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Est-ce que la vie a changé dans votre village ces deux dernières années? A-t-elle changé en bien ou en mal?

Nder dubbii didi Sali di do, wodi ko sandji ha djowndé mon do na? (wooday sam, wonni, koko ou wala ko sandji, Bodoum, boddoum sossay) Ko ni ?

- **Pire** /Woday sam
- **Mauvais** / Woday
- **Idem**/ wala ko sandji
- **Bien**/ bodum
- **Meilleur**/ bodum sosay

2. (Le cas échéant, si c'est différent) Comment la vie des personnes de votre organisation/église a-t-elle changé au cours des deux dernières années ? Est-elle meilleure ou pire ?

Noy jondé himbé kawtal mo'don/ko église mo'don sandjiri nder doubi didi do ?

- **Pire** /Woday sam
- **Mauvais** / Woday
- **Idem**/ wala ko sandji
- **Bien**/ bodum
- **Meilleur**/ bodum sosay

3. Y a-t-il plus ou moins de gens qui restent chez eux dans ce village qu'il y a deux ans ?

Nder doubi didi tcha'lidi do himbé djour ko sedda don yeni/djoodi ha wouro modon do?

- **Beaucoup moins** /him'be ngala
- **Un peu moins** / him'be sedda
- **La même chose**/wala ko sanji
- **Un peu plus**/ him'be besdi
- **Beaucoup plus**/ besdi djour

4. Est-ce possible que les gens qui sont partis puissent revenir?

Foti himbe dje dili ndo lor-ra?

- **Beaucoup moins** /*him'be ngala*
- **Un peu moins** / *him'be sedda*
- **La même chose**/*wala ko sanji*
- **Un peu plus**/ *him'be besdi*
- **Beaucoup plus**/ *besdi djour*

5. Comment appréciez-vous le niveau de sécurité dans votre village par rapport à il y a deux ans?
Ko Sali nder dubi didi be njonta do, noy dé endé man woni ?

- **Pire** /*Woday sam*
- **Mauvais** / *Woday*
- **Idem**/ *wala ko sandji*
- **Bien**/ *bodum*
- **Meilleur**/ *bodum sosay*

6. Par rapport à il y a deux ans, y a-t-il plus ou moins des risques d'affrontements entre les communautés?

Nder dubi didi Sali do, foti wodi sadir madji laati hakunde haslidji na ?

- **Beaucoup moins** /*him'be ngala*
- **Un peu moins** / *him'be sedda*
- **La même chose**/*wala ko sanji*
- **Un peu plus**/ *him'be besdi*
- **Beaucoup plus**/ *besdi djour*

7. La situation des femmes dans cette communauté a-t-elle changé au cours des deux dernières années? [Des suivis potentiels comme: les femmes ont-elles assumé de nouveaux rôles, ou ont-elles gagné une plus grande voix dans la prise de décision? Est-il plus ou moins facile aujourd'hui pour les femmes de gagner de l'argent qu'il y a deux ans?]. *Noy yakédji rewbe woni jonta be ko Sali nder dubi didi?*

- **Beaucoup moins** /*him'be ngala*
- **Un peu moins** / *him'be sedda*
- **La même chose**/*wala ko sanji*
- **Un peu plus**/ *him'be besdi*
- **Beaucoup plus**/ *besdi djour*

7a. *Wodi hounde kessoum dje be don wada na ?*

7b. *Be don ema be fodoko mbe wada hounde, na mali be wala kalima ?*

8. La situation des jeunes dans cette communauté a-t-elle changé au cours des deux dernières années ? [Suivis potentiels tels que: Ont-ils assumé de nouveaux rôles, ou se sont-ils fait davantage entendre dans la prise de décision ?]

Yakédji derke'en nder dubi didi do, wodi ko sandji na

- **Beaucoup moins** /*him'be ngala*

- **Un peu moins** / *him'be sedda*
- **La même chose**/*wala ko sanji*
- **Un peu plus**/ *him'be besdi*
- **Beaucoup plus**/ *besdi djour*

8a. Wodi hounde kessoum dje be don wada na ?

8b. Be don ema be fodeko mbe wada hounde, na mali be wala kalima ?

8c. Nder dubi didi Sali do be jonta do, hebgu dala ha rewbe do sadi na, saday ? koydoum na , tchadoum ?

9. Par rapport à il y a deux ans, est-ce que plus ou moins d'enfants vont-ils à l'école ? Pourquoi?

Bé Nder dubi didi Sali do bikon don yaha lekol na ? Ngam dum'e

- **Beaucoup moins** /*bikon ngala*
- **Un peu moins** / *bikon sedda*
- **La même chose**/*wala ko sanji*
- **Un peu plus**/ *bikon besdi*
- **Beaucoup plus**/ *bikon besdi djour*

10. Suivez-vous des émissions radios sur la paix?

On do nanan radio to bé don wolwa hala djonde djam be de'ende ?

- **Jamais** /*sam*
- **Rarement** / *ndego*
- **Parfois**/*yake fere*
- **Souvent**/ *toum toum*
- **Beaucoup** / *djour*

11. Comment ont évolué vos rapports avec les Boko Haram ?

No jonde mon be Boko Haram woni

- **Pire** /*Woday sam*
- **Mauvais** / *Woday*
- **Idem**/ *wala ko sandji*
- **Bien**/ *bodum*
- **Meilleur**/ *bodum sosay*

12. Comment vous êtes-vous organisés face à Boko Haram?

Nder wouro mon do ban noy on don fada hore mon bé Boko Haram?

13. Quelles organisations ont été actives pour aider ce village ? (Nommez-les toutes.) Qu'ont-elles fait ? Est-ce que cela a fonctionné ?

Kawtal dje toy do habda be waluugo wouro do ? (Limté fu). Dumé bé wadi ? Ko be wadi man do yaha na ?

14. Y a-t-il de nouveaux problèmes depuis deux ans?

Wodi sadirmadji kessi hebi mon nder dubi didi do?

(Pour les répondants des régions où PAIC a travaillé)

- I. Avez-vous entendu parler du PAIC ? Étiez-vous au courant de leurs activités? Ont-elles eu des résultats? Est-ce que ces résultats ont aidé votre communauté? Ces activités vous ont-elles procuré un meilleur sentiment de sécurité?

[Les questions de suivi ici dépendront des activités spécifiques dans le domaine du répondant]

(Si les gens n'étaient pas au courant, l'enquêteur leur demandera de décrire les activités de la PAIC dans ce pays).

ANNEX D: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS:

Grantee interviews: CLIRA, AJSM, RCMEEF, APDC, Public Concern, CADEPI, APPIC, AJED-MR, ALDEPA, FADEC, ADED

Other: UNDP representative, UNFPA representative, context expert from the University of Maroua

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:

Amchidé men (4)

Ldamang men (2)

Moskota men (2; 1 from Talakashi, 1 from Nguetchéwé)

Moskota women (4; 3 from Nguetchéwé, 1 from Talakashi)

Amchidé women (6)

Limani women (4)

Zelevet women (2)

VILLAGES VISITED BY FIELD TEAM:

Mayo Sava: Amchidé, Doublé, Gansé, Kerawa, Kolofata, Limani

Moskota: Ldoubam, Ldamang, Maxi, Mabass, Tourou

ANNEX E: VILLAGES IN MAP

Mayo Sava: Amchidé, Doublé, Gansé, Kerawa, Kolofata, Limani

Mokolo: Ldoubam, Ldamang, Maxi, Mabass, Tourou

Moskota: Dzamadzaf, Goldavi, Moskota, Nguetchéwé, Talakashi, Zelevet

ANNEX F: DATA COLLECTION SCHEDULE, FEBRUARY-MARCH 2020

Feb. 20-24: Enumerator training, initial logistics

Feb. 25-March 4: Grantee interviews

Feb. 25-28: Mayo Sava field interviews

March 1-March 5: Mokolo, Moskota field interviews

March 5: Focus group discussions, men

March 6: Focus group discussions, women

March 9: Follow-up NCI staff interviews, UNDP interview

ANNEX G: OTHER ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN PROGRAM AREAS

Many international and domestic assistance organizations work throughout Cameroon's Far North, supporting activities that directly or indirectly promote stability. On the following two pages are the organizations that interviewees, when asked, mentioned as doing work in their villages.

Some organizations were not mentioned at all, and it might be reasonable to infer that the mentioned organizations did work that was more visible and possibly perceived as more valuable than those not mentioned. The local organizations in bold received funding from NCI during 2018-2020.

Donors and implementing partners who are interested in partnering with organizations already working in these communities, or simply learning more about the communities and factors to consider during program/project design might consider consulting these organizations that have already worked there.

Specific recommendations for types of activities that assistance actors should immediately consider promoting resilience and stability in Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga are detailed in the "Conclusions and Recommendations" section in the main body of the evaluation report.

Organization	Intl/Cameroon	Amchide	Limani	Ganse	Kolofata	Kerawa	Double	Zelevet	Ngetchewe	Dzamadzaf	Talakachi	Moskota	Goldavi	Mabas	Maxi	Ldamang	Ldoubam	Tourou	Yakawa	Activities
BMI (PMI?)	i	x	x			x									x	x				Children, nutrition, birth certificates, women
CARITAS	i			x				x	X			X		X	x					Food, WASH, agriculture
Community Humanitarian Emergency Board (COHEB)	i																	x		Children, education, health, food, early recovery
International Medical Corps (IMC)	i	x			x	x								X		x				WASH, health, VGB, child protection
INTERSOS	i	x			x	x	x							X	x	x		x		Agriculture, WASH, NFIs, Trauma - women/kids
International Rescue Committee (IRC)	i	x	x	x	x			x					x							WASH, NFIs, VBG, IDs, cash, protection, livelihoods for youth & women
Lutheran World Federation (LWF)	i							x												WASH, social cohesion, food
Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF)	i	x			x															Health, WASH
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)	i	x	x		x	x														Home rehabilitation, livestock, birth certificate
PLAN International	i	x	x		x		x					x			x	x				Cash, small businesses
Public Concern	i	x	x											x	x		x			Education & training
RED CROSS	i			x	x	x	x	x											x	Cash; first aid, NFIs
UNDP	i	x	x	x												x				CASH FOR WORK
UNHCR	i																		x	Various, via implementers
UNICEF	i	x	x		x			x				x			x		x			Orphans, classrooms, boreholes
WFP	i		x	x	x	x	x		x										x	Motor pumps, school canteens, food

U.S. Agency for International Development
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20523