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UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND PEACEBUILDING IN THE PEOPLE- TO-PEOPLE RECONCILIATION FUND PROGRAM

END OF PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT

Contract No. AID-OAA-I-13-00044/Order No. AID-OAA-TO-15-00056

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Submitted to:
USAID/DCHA/CMM

Prepared by:
Coeli Barry, PhD, Evaluation Team Leader
Hippolyt Pul, PhD, Senior Conflict/Subject Matter Specialist

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Contractor:
Democracy International, Inc.
7600 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 1010
Bethesda, MD 20814
Tel: 301-961-1660

www.democracyinternational.com

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ACRONYMS

AFPC	Association of Women Communications Professionals
ASPIRE	Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement
BIRP	Bouar Inter-Religious Platform
CAR	Central African Republic
CMM	Conflict Management and Mitigation
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DCHA	Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
DNH	Do No Harm
EI	External Informants
ET	Evaluation Team
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
IP	Implementing Partner
KIA	Kenan Institute Asia
KII	Key Informant Interview
LIP	Local Implementing Partner
PPST	Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SME	Subject Matter Expert
TAF	The Asia Foundation
TOC	Theory of Change
USG	United States Government
ZKZ	Zo Kwe Zo

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) undertook a thematic evaluation of four people-to-people (P2P) peacebuilding activities that engaged conflicting groups whose differences include religious identity in order to contribute to the limited body of knowledge on the nexus of religion, conflict, and peacebuilding relevant to development programming. USAID's Global Reconciliation Fund supports the four peacebuilding activities, two in Central African Republic (CAR) and two in Thailand's Deep South, that provide the basis of this learning evaluation.

This learning evaluation examined the ways in which the inclusion or non-inclusion of religion affect the implementation, effectiveness, and sustainability of activities in which religious identities are part of the conflict and peace dynamics. The evaluation does not measure specific outcomes or results associated with the goals, objectives, and indicators of the case study activities. Instead, it seeks to establish how well the implementation, effectiveness, and sustainability of CMM activities are or can be affected when they are aligned with the inclusion of religion or not. It aims to establish key findings that can inform best practices in the design and implementation of Global Reconciliation Fund activities in other contexts where religion is a factor in peace and conflict dynamics. The evaluation is relevant to improving the operational frame of the Global Reconciliation Fund, as well as other programming. For this learning evaluation, USAID chose the four selected activities because context analysis indicated that religious identities were factors in the conflicts the activities were seeking to address, although they were not necessarily designed to directly address religion as part of the dynamics of conflict or peacebuilding.

As this is not a performance evaluation, the evaluation did not focus directly on the effectiveness of the outcomes of the activities, but rather on how the inclusion or non-inclusion of religion in the design of interventions affected activity outcomes. USAID did not request and DI did not design the evaluation to assess overall performance of the activities. Because some Implementing Partner (IP) staff, local IP (LIP) staff, and many of the beneficiaries were more comfortable, and familiar, with performance evaluations, the Evaluation Team (ET) often needed to spend additional time communicating what was different about this approach.

Given the ways in which both conflict parties and the state have instrumentalized religion, and that some have incorrectly characterized religion as the cause of the conflict, respondents were reluctant to put too much emphasis on religion. It was generally thought that by doing so they would be buying in to the (mis)reading and (mis)interpretation of the role of religion in the conflict. The baseline analysis drew attention to this issue and the endline ET observations reinforce that line of analysis to some degree. When the respondents felt more comfortable with their understanding of a learning evaluation and trusted that it aims to convey a nuanced and more accurate rendering of the role of religion in activity implementation and results, they were more comfortable taking part.

This endline evaluation aims to address gaps in knowledge about religion, peacebuilding, and conflict, and the report includes recommendations for different stakeholders. Religion is defined broadly in terms of different religious traditions and their leaders, actors, and institutions. The evaluation is structured on questions large enough to accommodate responses that capture the ways IPs, LIPs, participants, and advisors came to understand whether religion can be part of the effort to find peaceful solutions to conflicts. The learning evaluation method is particularly useful in eliciting findings on how religion could

be vital in the implementation or effectiveness of activity results, without implying that religion may play a role in the conflict. This evaluation method also allows for an assessment of the responses of participants in relation to the effect of religion on the reported outcomes of the activity.

The evaluation aims to contribute to potential learning opportunities afforded by the study of USAID/CMM's four selected P2P Reconciliation Fund activities, including, for example, the unexpected findings. The findings section of the report highlights key findings and the conclusions section presents analysis of patterns and their significance. This report includes recommendations in order to support learning that informs program design, planning, and implementation in contexts in which religious aspects of conflict are significant.

BACKGROUND OF THE ACTIVITIES BEING EVALUATED:

Religious identities and religious institutions have been implicated in protracted conflict in both the Deep South of Thailand and CAR, although in different ways. With the persistence of identity-based inequity, tensions between people of different religions have increased. Conflicting parties and governments frequently try to appropriate religion in order to garner support for their political positions. The four activities selected for support from CMM in these countries promoted peace in contexts where religion and religious identities of conflicting parties are part of either the dynamics of conflict or the search for peace.

1. Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand (PPST): Implemented by The Asia Foundation (TAF) and its seven local partners in the three provinces and border districts of the Deep South of Thailand over a three-year period, from 2015-2018.
2. Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement for Youth in Yala (HOPE Yala): Implemented in Yala province in the Deep South of Thailand by the Kenan Institute Asia (KIA) and its two local university partners over a three-year period, from 2015-2018.
3. Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement (ASPIRE): Implemented by Mercy Corps and its local partner, the Bouar Inter-Religious Platform in CAR, over a two-year period, from 2015-2017.
4. Zo Kwe Zo: Implemented by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and its local partner, Association of Women Communications Professionals (AFPC), in Bossangoa, Bangassou, and Bangui in CAR over a two-year period, from 2015-2017.

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS:

1. Implementation: What are the critical implementation activities and strategies for activities working in settings where parties are mobilized around religious identities?
2. Effectiveness: How does the inclusion of religious dimensions affect the activities' intended or unintended results?
3. Sustainability (refers to the ability of project participants and partners to continue with or expand on project interventions after donor funding ends): How does the inclusion of religious dimensions affect the sustainability of project results?

METHODOLOGY:

This learning evaluation examined intended and unintended results at the implementation, effectiveness, and sustainability levels for the four CMM P2P activities in which religion formed part of the conflict and peace dynamics. It is a two-step process in which DI conducted an entry point assessment in 2016 in both CAR and the Deep South of Thailand to determine what, if any, role religion played in the design and implementation of the activities. CMM and external Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) reviewed the entry point study report independently and in a roundtable discussion to provide input into the refinement of the tools for the endline study. Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), and a mini-survey were the main data collection instruments for the entry point study. However, in the endline study carried out in CAR in August 2017 and in the Deep South of Thailand in August 2018, the mini-surveys were dropped because the very small sample sizes, coupled with the fact that the same persons participating in the KIIs and FGDs formed the sample frame for the survey. This severely limited the added value of the mini survey to the findings of the survey. Responses from the mini-surveys lacked added depth or variation from those provided in the other data collection segments in which respondents participated. Hence, KIIs and FGDs constituted the main primary data collection tools for the endline study.

In both baseline and endline studies, the team carried out in-brief and outbrief engagements, where possible, with USAID Mission and senior IP staff. Interviewees for the KIIs comprised IP staff, SMEs, government officials, key religious actors, and male and female community leaders. Participants for the FGDs were members of groups participating directly in the implementation of the activities under study, including adult and youth Peace Committees, women's groups, teachers and students in schools participating in the activities, among others. The Evaluation Team coded, sorted, and analyzed data from both the baseline and endline studies in Excel. For the endline, the team used an additional data collation tool, the Findings, Comments, and Recommendations aide memoire, to capture emerging strong views from respondents prior to coding. Data analysis consisted of pooling and triangulating data from the baseline and endline studies to generate themes and categories that emerged from the four case activities in CAR and the Deep South of Thailand along the defined lines of enquiry for the study. This report presents the findings along the same model i.e. following the lines of enquiry.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. Religious leaders have symbolic and practical roles that allow them to play a very important part in peacebuilding. These roles are not mutually exclusive or independent of each other; practical functions are facilitated by their symbolic importance. Moreover, their symbolic role sets them apart from non-religious leaders.
2. Activities benefited from the involvement of religious leaders and religious institutions. Religious leaders suggested or took initiatives that worked with the activities. There are religious leaders who support peace generally, but there are also those who promote conflict.
3. Whether or not IPs intentionally incorporate consideration of religion in the design of their interventions, communities independently employ the convening, consoling, and cohering powers of religion, be it through its leaders, institutions, different religious traditions and values, or practices.

4. The different religious traditions, denominations, institutions and their leaders have different capacities for responding to conflict situations. Faith traditions that have longstanding social outreach programs tend to have the personnel, institutional spaces, and mandates in place to take lead roles. Others develop their capacities as they engage. Even for the older institutions, technical, logistical, and financial capacity deficits often constrain their ability to sustain or expand the scope of their engagements.
5. In the Deep South of Thailand and CAR, state actors and conflict parties mobilize people through identity-based fears, grievances, and prejudices to achieve political aims. Countering these practices by improving peacebuilding awareness and skills through intra-religious activities can serve as a vital alternative for communities and individuals affected by the conflicts. As communities and individuals become more confident, aware, and skilled, they are able to distinguish when religion is being instrumentalized.
6. Respondents noted drug and other substance abuse and addiction among youth as an issue both in the Deep South of Thailand and in CAR, a subject that is of particular concern to religious leaders in their role as moral leaders within their communities. In CAR particularly, it is a high-risk factor for intensification of the conflict as addicted and/or unemployed youth are co-opted into fighting.
7. The inclusion of religion in activity implementation, even when it was not included in activity design, contributes to overall effectiveness.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS:

IMPLEMENTATION

1. Engage with religion where it is important to the community. IPs should consciously explore and use opportunities that religion creates for reinforcing community participation and ownership of the processes and outcomes of peace initiatives.
2. Promote peace education in schools to create a movement for a culture of peace. Based on observed practices in CAR and Thailand, the evaluation recommends that to create larger movements for a culture of peace among the youth and across faiths, IPs should consider supporting the development of interfaith curricula and instructional materials for peace education in schools.
3. Develop sample peacebuilding indicators focusing on the role of religion in contexts where religion is a factor within conflict dynamics.

EFFECTIVENESS

1. Exercise caution and sensitivity in framing conflicts in which religion is involved. IPs should make the effort to understand the nature and the extent to which the media and elites capture and use religion in the labeling and framing of conflicts and conflict actors.

2. Engage with the community prior to final activity design to enhance participation and outcomes. Where the timeframe for proposal development and submission cannot be extended for pre-design assessments, CMM should encourage IPs to build time into approved activities to carry out community-level conflict assessments prior to finalizing their implementation designs and use the outcomes to fine-tune implementation plans.
3. Increase familiarity with the provisions of the Establishment Clause more broadly. USAID should work with its own staff and IPs to increase their literacy in the main provisions of the Establishment Clause and legal interpretations that delineate programming options. In doing so, it should allow USAID and IPs to adopt a more nuanced and therefore potentially more expansive understanding of the Establishment Clause rather than avoiding programming that touches on religion or work with religious actors, as sometimes happens.
4. Enhance women's participation in peacebuilding within patriarchal religious institutions, where appropriate. Given that women play important roles in peacebuilding within the patriarchal structures of their respective religious communities (Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam), even if not as frontline leaders, IPs should focus on strengthening the contribution of women to peace through conscious efforts that identify and build women's capacity to be more influential and effective in negotiating access to and participation in the peacebuilding processes.
5. Graft interventions on social capital of existing religious institutions. IPs will be well served if they identify and leverage or layer their interventions on the inherent strengths and legitimacies of religious leaders and institutions.
6. Understand the politics and economics of violent conflicts in local contexts. Violent conflicts thrive in contexts with high numbers of unemployed youth where war leaders are able to recruit young people into their fighting forces. Additionally, the use of drugs makes the youth vulnerable to recruitment as fighters. IPs should conduct rigorous analysis to establish the interplay between the use of religion and drugs to attract the youth into violent conflicts, especially in conflicts with religious dimensions.

SUSTAINABILITY

1. Take advantage of religion's permanency. Religious leaders and institutions have a permanency that often outlives their civilian counterparts in many communities. Therefore, they offer an institutional hook for sustaining peacebuilding initiatives that governments, civil society organizations, and international development agencies cannot provide. The beliefs, values, and practices of religion are also sustaining forces for believing communities, providing solace to the affected and spaces of encounter for dialogue, forgiveness, peace, and reconciliation.
2. Leverage the penetration that religion has in some communities. Religions often permeate different social fabrics and penetrate spatial distances that civil authorities often cannot reach. Therefore, religion can have a strong bridging power across multiple identity groups (ethnicity, political affiliation, social class, etc.) and spaces. Even when religious beliefs and identities contribute to conflict, common grounds often exist in the spectrums of values and practices that provide windows of opportunity for constructive engagement.

INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES IN THAILAND'S DEEP SOUTH¹

Program Name:	“Healing, Opportunity, Peace and Engagement for Youth in Yala (HOPE-Yala)”
Implementing Partner:	Kenan Institute Asia
Dates of Program Implementation:	September 18, 2015- September 17, 2018
Award Number:	Cooperative Agreement No. AID-486-A-15-00007
Total Award Amount:	\$490,000.00

Program Name:	“Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand”
Implementing Partner:	The Asia Foundation
Dates of Program Implementation:	September 15, 2015- September 14, 2018
Award Number:	Cooperative Agreement No. AID-486-A-15-00004
Total Award Amount:	\$1,085,000.00

Since 2004, the Deep South region of Thailand (Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani provinces, and neighboring districts of Songkhla province) has seen a resurgence of an ethno-nationalist conflict that dates back to the separatist movement of the early 1900s. Unlike the rest of Thailand, the region is predominantly Muslim and Malay-speaking but with a large Thai Buddhist minority. Key conflict drivers are grounded in long-standing center-periphery tensions rooted in Malay-Muslim grievances against the Thai state. Grievances include discrimination in local governance and social service delivery, political marginalization, and perceptions of injustice based on past human rights abuses and heavy-handed assimilation policies. Although religious identity is a characterization of the warring factions, the conflict

¹ Description of conflict dynamics and activities are attributable to The Asia Foundation and Kenan Institute Asia’s activity proposals, quarterly, and annual reports with updates based on evaluation team field work in 2016 and 2018.

is not driven by religious persecution, exclusion, or other religious-themed challenges. However, with conflicting parties trying to appropriate religion in order to garner support for their political positions and the persistence of identity-based inequity, tensions between Muslims and Buddhists in Thailand's Deep South have become more prominent with formerly peaceful social relations unraveling. The violence has contributed to increased displacement, separation, isolation, and withdrawal into distinct communities. In 2017 and 2018, Thai security forces implemented development programs aimed at creating non-violent communities, but efforts to restart formal peace talks between the Thai government and an umbrella group of rebels have faced multiple roadblocks.

There are two Reconciliation Fund activities in the Deep South of Thailand. The activity theories of change (TOCs) can be found in Annex I and both activities were implemented over a three-year period.

Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand (PPST): The Asia Foundation (TAF) and its seven local partners implemented PPST throughout the Deep South of Thailand over a three-year period. PPST's overarching goal was to increase trust and common understanding among conflicting groups at the community and local elite levels. PPST also aimed to improve the prospect of higher-level peace talks succeeding by helping to ameliorate day-to-day violence and building sustainable bottom-up support for peace. PPST capacity building activities had a strong focus on women community leaders and local elites, with a targeted strategy to enable effective bottom-up advocacy for national peace negotiations. While the activity considered religion of participants in several ways, it did not specifically seek to engage religious leaders. The activity included some religious leaders as members of local elites, but participants were selected on the basis of a variety of criteria, not simply because they were religious leaders. Local partners included civil society organizations (CSOs) that support intra-religious and inter-religious engagement, cross-identity mutual support, dialogue, and advocacy. The activity did not explicitly engage religious institutions, such as Buddhist temples, mosques, or formal religious hierarchies but rather worked at strengthening CSOs—including some that identify openly according to their faith—to strengthen norms that support peace.

Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement for Youth in Yala (HOPE Yala): The Kenan Institute Asia (KIA) and its two local university partners implemented the HOPE Yala activity over a three-year period. HOPE Yala's goal was to build trust between Muslims and Buddhists in six communities in Yala province by increasing inter-communal understanding that would change attitudes and increase cooperation within activity locations. Working through six partner schools and local communities, HOPE Yala engaged Muslim and Buddhist children (ages of about 12-15 years) to become young leaders among their peers, thereby resisting the use of violence and promoting social space for addressing grievances and development needs. Religious scholars served as activity advisors and validators and community religious leaders educated student participants on cultural and historical themes. Students engaged in inter-religious activities to enable cross-identity relationship building, cooperation, and trust-building to challenge stereotypes and ignorance.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC ²

² Description of conflict dynamics and activities are attributable to Mercy Corps and Search for Common Ground's activity proposals, work plans, quarterly and annual reports with updates based on evaluation team field work in 2016 and 2017.

Program Name:	Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement (ASPIRE)
Implementing Partner:	Mercy Corps
Dates of Program Implementation:	November 1, 2015-October 31, 2017
Award Number:	Cooperative Agreement No. AID-OAA-A-15-00063
Total Award Amount:	\$1,170,000

Program Name:	Zo Kwe Zo: All People Are People
Implementing Partner:	Search for Common Ground
Dates of Program Implementation:	October 15, 2015 – September 29, 2017
Award Number:	Cooperative Agreement No. AID-OAA-A-15-00074
Total Award Amount:	\$1,169,546.00

Political and economic exclusion, high levels of corruption and illiteracy, weak state capacity for governance and service delivery, high unemployment rates, and inequitable access to proceeds of natural resources have contributed to political instability in CAR since its independence in 1960. CAR’s current population of approximately four million includes about 80 percent Christians, 15 percent Muslims, and 5 percent practitioners of indigenous African religions and other faiths. In the most recent crisis, political actors mobilized and used the grievances of different identity groups to support their quests for power and control of resources. The Séléka coalition of loosely coordinated armed groups started as a regional assemblage fighting for political and economic justice and inclusion of the neglected northeastern part of the country. It rapidly acquired an Islamic label due to the Arabic-speaking Muslim militant factions within the coalition. Similarly, the crisis labeled the Anti Zaragina group—historically constituted in some parts of CAR to protect communities against armed robberies—as the Christian Anti-balaka militia when its Christian-majority fighters took up arms against the Séléka, even though some Anti-balaka militias have Muslims in their rank and file.

The two Reconciliation Fund activities in CAR were both implemented over a two-year period. The activity TOCs are included in Annex I:

Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement (ASPIRE):

Implemented by Mercy Corps and its local partner the Bouar Inter-Religious Platform (BIRP), ASPIRE “aim[ed] to enable community leaders of all faiths and disaffected youth to work together to peacefully manage inter-group tensions, rebuild community cohesion and strengthen pluralism in the strategic town

of Bouar.”³ The activity focused on building the capacity of faith and youth leaders in Bouar: (1) To promote inclusive community-led conflict resolution and prevention; (2) To support connector economic engagements between divided groups; and (3) To create positive attitudes for tolerance and nonviolent behaviors.

Religious leaders, individually and as part of BIRP organizationally, were key partners in activity implementation and in leading social cohesion activities. Additionally, inter-religious groups of community members worked collaboratively on joint economic efforts of mutual benefit.

Zo Kwe Zo: Implemented by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and its local partner the Association of Women Communications Professionals (*l'Association des Femmes Professionnelles de la Communication* or AFPC), Zo Kwe Zo (ZKZ) sought to prevent intercommunity violence and to support an inclusive national peacebuilding process. ZKZ's implementation took place in the towns of Bangui, Bangassou, and Bossangoa and their environs. The activity's three specific objectives were: (1) To increase the participation of young women and men from diverse identity groups in peacebuilding processes; (2) To amplify positive representations of nonviolent and collaborative voices in the media; and (3) To enhance the capacity of non-state institutions to support a credible, peaceful, inclusive, and transparent transition process.

Religious leaders were influential in supporting messages of nonviolence and inclusion. The activity created a platform for disseminating a diversity of voices in support of both community-based and national dialogues that promote the reintegration of divided communities.

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS

1. Implementation: What are the critical implementation activities and strategies for activities working in settings where parties are mobilized around religious identities?
2. Effectiveness: How does the inclusion of religious dimensions affect the activities' intended or unintended results?
3. Sustainability (refers to the ability of activity participants and partners to continue with or expand on interventions after donor funding ends): How does the inclusion of religious dimensions affect the sustainability of project results?

METHODOLOGY

The contract was awarded on September 29, 2015. The Thailand baseline data collection took place from March 7- March 25, 2016 and the CAR baseline data collection took place from May 8-May 26, 2016. CMM and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) reviewed the baseline report and held a roundtable discussion on May 25, 2017 to refine the data collection tools for use in the endline fieldwork in CAR, which took place from August 7- August 26, 2017.

³ Mercy Corps Award Excerpt, Attachment B Program Description, APS-OAA-14-00003.

Between the baseline and endline field data collection, the evaluation team monitored in-country contextual developments. The team read formal IP quarterly reports made available to it. The team drafted data collection tools for endline field data collection based on insights from these reports and input from DCHA/CMM. The endline fieldwork targeted the same categories of individuals as at baseline. The team also consulted with DCHA/CMM and IPs to confirm its approach in the field and ongoing utility of evaluation focus.

This learning evaluation looked at what changed over time in intended and unintended activity results at the implementation, effectiveness, and sustainability levels as a result of the inclusion of religious dimensions across activities. During the CAR endline fieldwork, the Evaluation Team spoke with 51 respondents in 25 KIIs and 45 participants in 12 FGDs. The Team Leader who completed the baseline data collection and endline data collection in CAR was unable to continue to fill that role for personal reasons, so DI replaced the Team Leader for the endline data collection in Thailand and the drafting of the final report. During the Deep South of Thailand endline fieldwork, which took place from July 23-August 10, 2018, the ET spoke with 36 key informant interview (KII) respondents in 18 interviews and 67 participants in 14 focus group discussion (FGD) sessions. The ET adjusted the tools used in the CAR endline fieldwork as necessary, since many of the questions could not be understood by some LIPs, activity advisors, and participants in the Deep South of Thailand. Similarly, the Deep South of Thailand endline fieldwork adapted the KII and FGD tools to fit different categories of respondents. The focus of these instruments was on: changes from baseline including an explanation of the changes, testing of the TOC, effective or ineffective implementation strategies, intended and unintended outcomes, as well as the sustainability of results and contributions to Peace Writ Large. For more detail on the evaluation design, please see Annex F: Evaluation Methodology.

The evaluation team conducted activities in the field for the endline similar to those performed for the baseline analysis. The team travelled to intervention sites to meet with local SMEs, IP and local partner staff, and beneficiaries to explore views on national dynamics or Peace Writ Large.

LIMITATIONS TO THE EVALUATION

The primary limitation of the evaluation is that the call for applications for the Global Reconciliation Fund did not direct applicants to explicitly focus on conflicts in which religious dynamics are important determinants of escalation or resolution. These activities were selected because they mentioned that religion plays a role in the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand and CAR, but the activities did not focus on engaging religion in their programming, as the learning evaluation seeks to study. Additionally, the call for applications directed applicants to focus on the P2P model of peacebuilding, which emphasizes rolling and nested community-managed "...conferences, consultations, dialogues, and mediation [...] embedded in larger peacebuilding processes." However, the time span of the activities did not align well with the slow evolving and long-term perspectives of P2P initiatives. Peacebuilders see conflicts as having very deep historical roots and with equally longer term implications for future generations. Such conflicts are not resolved with two- or three-year interventions; the healing of wounds and the rebuilding of relationships between feuding parties take longer than the lifespan of donor-sponsored activities.

The small sample size also limited the generalizability of the findings. First, the list of possible participants in the evaluations that the IPs determined focused largely on participants in their respective activities or

external subject matter specialists with whom they had worked. Second, some of the communities focused on in the study had overrepresentation of one religious group over the others. This limited the representativeness of the respondents across faith groups. In general, Christians were overrepresented compared to Muslims in CAR and Buddhists were under-represented compared to Muslims in the Deep South of Thailand.

Response bias was another challenge. Since the activities did not specifically target inclusion of religion in their design and implementation processes, participants had difficulty relating to the questions posed on the role of religion in activity design and implementation. Hence, responses tended to focus largely on tangential rather than direct experiences from participation in the activity. Hence, the findings may not be generalizable to all humanitarian, peacebuilding, or development interventions.

Another limitation of this evaluation comes from a divergence in findings owing to the different character and operating contexts of the activities within CAR and the Deep South of Thailand. Also, because the activities were not designed with religion in mind as a factor to be addressed, IPs often found the tools either too difficult or not applicable to their activities and partners. Additionally, since the term religion can be linked to teachings, practices, institutions, and leaders, participants were not always clear about what was meant by the term in a given context. As a variable, religion has many more overt, as well as subtle, dimensions in relation to conflict or peace than other variables such as ethnicity or political ideology. Different components of those dimensions, by themselves or in combination with others, can either cause conflict or, alternatively, be instruments for peacebuilding. People are also likely to emphasize different dimensions of the variable based on their lived experiences. Hence, the immediate reactions of respondents on hearing the phrase “role of religion in the conflict” was frequently to leap to an interpretive statement such as “religion is the cause” and respond by saying that “religion was not the cause” of the conflict. Often, as the interviews progressed, respondents would qualify their statements further and say that “religion was used” to fan the conflicts or to build peace.

In addition, similar to the challenges identified in the baseline study, the concepts addressed in the evaluation questions themselves were not well-understood, and especially in the case of the Thailand endline fieldwork, demanded nuanced translation. This may have had implications for the quality and completeness of the communication between the evaluators and the respondents.

FINDINGS BY EVALUATION QUESTION

IMPLEMENTATION

ROLE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS

Because religious leaders often enjoy a high amount of respect and trust, mobilizing them for peacebuilding may ensure an activity or program can gain a following and can connect various stakeholders, even armed groups, more fluidly. The symbolic value of religious leaders boosts their practical role for the community.

Religious leaders often have credibility and well-established relationships with local authorities, and the efficacy of religious leaders rests on the fact that religion plays a key role in people’s lives. Thus, most

respondents emphasized the positive role of religious leaders: they are trusted, respected, charismatic, listened to, can attract a following, and be connectors for peace.

Respondents in both CAR and the Deep South of Thailand note that the presence of religious leaders lends credibility to peacebuilding activities. They are influential; for example, “when they speak, people listen” (TH Deep South – TAF – KII). They are also regarded as moral guarantors and “when we consult with the imam and the imams understand us and our concept and then the imam supports us, the imam brings credibility to our activity. It means that we can do it, it is like the ‘green light,’ from the imam (CAR – MC – Bangui - IP).

“Religious leaders represent a group of people that have a common objective. People trust them more than they do civilian leaders.”

(CAR - SFCG - Bangui - SME19)

Religious leaders take on practical roles; they can be connectors, mediators, and unifiers among various actors – including individuals, inter- or intra-religious groups, and the state. “Religious leaders are the gatekeepers to their communities, as they leverage their authority, legitimacy, and knowledge of the structures and functioning of their communities to create and manage access for external actors who need to engage with or in the communities” (CAR – MC – Bangui - IP). They also play the role of advisor, counselor, and educator, as substantiated by a respondent in CAR who felt that “religious leaders have a strengthened capacity to share positive messages with each other. Their messages have started to disarm people’s mentality, disarm their hearts” (CAR - SFCG - Bossangoa – SME).

However, religious leaders function more as persuaders than enforcers. They can also be seen as subservient to state power and control, as in the case of some Muslim religious leaders in the Deep South of Thailand, who often choose to play low-key roles because of perceived safety and security concerns.

Respondents in both CAR and the Deep South of Thailand also mentioned cases where religious leaders instigated or supported conflict. “There were some extremist religious leaders on both sides that wanted the conflict to continue who said bad things” (CAR - SFCG - Bangui - FGD). They actively get people to participate in conflict. “Religious leaders are actors in the violence, some *ustaz*⁴ teach students to be part of the violence” (TH Deep South - EI – KII) They can also be detached from the problems of the community. “For example, the Friday sermons, or teachings, we have problems because the one who gives the teaching doesn’t look at the problems in the community. It is one-way communication” (TH Deep South – TAF - FGD). The same respondents argued that religious leaders, Buddhist and Muslim alike, have the capacity and ability to build peace and create conflict, in which case it becomes important to “change the mindsets of the religious leaders, both Muslim and Buddhist. It is time to do something.” (TH Deep South – TAF – FGD)

WOMEN AS RELIGIOUS ACTORS & LEADERS IN INFORMAL & FORMAL SETTINGS

⁴ An *ustaz* is a religious teacher or scholar, derived from an Arabic/Persian term: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ustad>.

This learning evaluation also looked at the ways women occupied informal as well as formal leadership roles. Given the patriarchal nature of the religions included in the activities —Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam—most of the leadership spaces women claimed are informal. In the informal realm, many opportunities open up in conflict and post-conflict situations for women who are respected within their faith group or their wider community to move into leadership roles. Echoing the findings of the baseline fieldwork, the endline fieldwork found that, as religious actors, women find roles through faith-based organizations within civil society and as individuals in CAR - for example, as members of groups in the churches (ZKZ) and as wives of male churchgoers (SFCG).

Women hold influential roles, garnering respect earned from exhibiting behavior deemed exemplary of religious values. Additionally, in both CAR and the Deep South of Thailand, women were more effective in certain aspects of peacebuilding than men, including promoting inter-religious trust-building and forgiveness. Women leaders can also talk about sensitive subjects more openly than men. In the view of a Deep South of Thailand respondent, in some situations, if men had said the same thing as women, they would be labelled as extremists, while women would not (TH Deep South – EI - KII). In CAR, “Women tend to speak directly to the problem when sometimes the men skirt the issues” (CAR - SFCG - Bossangoa – SME - KII).

Women were sometimes regarded as religious leaders in Christian and some Muslim cases, although in the latter case the term religious leader was not used. Women have an important role within the Muslim community, but there is not a name for Muslim religious women leaders. However, according to a CAR respondent, there is an association of Muslim women as appointed and elected leaders (CAR - SFCG - Bangui - FGD). In the Deep South of Thailand, some Malay-Muslims were reluctant to even acknowledge the term “women religious leaders” and that it could be used at all. “Muslim women leaders are hardly found [although] Christian women leaders can cross faith lines” (CAR – MC – Bangui – SME - KII).

When men religious leaders speak, they are angry and at the end of their talk, speak of forgiveness. Women speak directly about forgiveness without anger and from the beginning.

(CAR - SFCG - Bangui - FGD)

ROLE OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN CONFLICT AND PEACE DYNAMICS

Even though religion is not perceived as the cause of the conflict in CAR and the Deep South of Thailand, religious identities, beliefs, and practices contribute to the dividing lines between the parties involved in the conflict and also define possible solutions to conflict. In the case of the Deep South of Thailand, the conflict pits Buddhists against Muslims; in CAR, Christians against Muslims.

For example, respondents reported that religion supported the achievement of the objectives of the activities evaluated because “everyone is connected to a religion” (CAR – MC – Bouar - 08-HP) and participation in religious ceremonies provided a captive audience as “churches and mosques [were] used to pass on information about various activities” (CAR – MC – Bouar - 07-HP). In another example, respondents acknowledged that religion can “spur and increase the violence if you don’t stop it because each side uses religion to support their main goal” (TH Deep South –TAF- EI - KII).

Institutionally, in the Deep South of Thailand, religious institutions and affiliates tend to operate in silos - that is vertically within a religion, and seldom horizontally with other religious groups. Religious

institutions such as mosques and temples were not involved in the activities. Overall, there were more institutional cross-faith engagements in CAR than in Thailand. In contrast to religious institutions, secular institutions are often regarded with mistrust and are seen as either divisive or doing little for their communities.

The SFCG activity offers examples of ways that participants invoked their religious identities, beliefs, values, and practices in the activity implementation process. In cases where IPs may not have intended it, participants found and took advantage of the intersections between religious identities and divides to build bridges of their own. As a respondent in CAR noted, “in our ZKZ training, I met an anti-Balaka leader. I have worked with him a lot. Also the General Secretary of anti-Balaka movement. I also met the president of the organization of young fighters in Séléka. We met with them during the training. They worked as the link between Séléka and Anti-Balaka” (CAR – SFCG- Bangui - FGD).

The activities stimulated interfaith collaboration, bringing together Christians and Muslims in CAR and Buddhists and Muslims in the Deep South of Thailand, who in the past worked independently and through their respective networks. A local IP in the Deep South of Thailand noted that they did not separate Muslims and Buddhists for program activities, rather the participants did things together and “there was collaboration between Buddhists and Muslims” (TH Deep South – TAF – FGD).

Hence, the activities were successful in reducing religion-based prejudices and strengthening trust. The participants in Deep South Thailand schools talked about the benefits of bringing Muslim and Buddhist children together, helping them overcome prejudices and stereotypes about the other religion and their adherents. Parents of the youth participants from schools involved in the HOPE Yala activity recalled that seeing their children work together in cross-faith settings helped them recognize the artificiality of the barriers of religion and appreciate people of other religions more. Buddhist youth participants, for example, overcame religious barriers by involving Islamic experts in their community activities to help them achieve their activities’ aims. By working together, Buddhist students became “more reasonable” (TH Deep South – KIA - FGD) in reacting to seeing a Muslim imam, for example. Previously, the students would have tended to associate this person with negative stereotypes and assumptions such as the association of Muslims with terrorism. Because of HOPE Yala they learned that this perception was “not reasonable.”

ASPIRE was the one activity that considered religion in its design and implementation. However, even in the case of the three other activities that did not specifically target the inclusion of religion in the design and implementation processes, the ET still heard how the participants, with or without the active support of their IPs, used and found meaning in their religious beliefs, identities, and values within the activity implementation. In some settings in CAR, the respondents called for the IP to more intentionally include religion in subsequent interventions. SFCG had not expressly targeted the inclusion of religion or religious actors in its activity design and implementation, and respondents recommended that “in the future, SFCG and USAID should support religious institutions and leaders directly because these actors are the most listened to by the people.” (CAR - SFCG - Bossangoa – SME - KII) Another respondent advised that activities should directly involve religious leaders in the activity implementation because they are “in regular contact with many people and they are the best people to be heard,” and a third respondent concurred that they wished SFCG would continue to involve religious leaders in activity activities (CAR - SFCG - Bossangoa – SME - KII).

RELIGIOUS MESSAGES

Religious messages refer to both official teachings as well as values associated with religious ideals. Respondents mentioned that religious messages were helpful when they came from scriptural sources and when they reinforced values such as responsibility, tolerance, and forgiveness. Religious teachings “heal their heart,” as a Thai respondent noted, and also said that both Islam and Buddhism could be dually used “to evoke the sentiment of peace or be used to justify violence” (TH Deep South – KIA - KII).

In CAR, respondents cited examples of the use of scriptures and other religious texts for peace messaging in both Islam and Christianity, but in the Deep South of Thailand, only Islam cited religious texts for messaging; there was little evidence of the use of Buddhist texts.

Respondents in CAR noted that religious messages can be more effective than government messages, especially when they are delivered by religious leaders. A government representative observed that it was helpful to have religious leaders offer messages of peace and coexistence in cases of misunderstandings between the government and the people. An imam, meanwhile, reported that even if the religious leader’s message is similar to what the government wants to communicate, the delivery is more effective because the imam can “support the message with verses” (CAR-MC-Bouar-FGD). Messages of peace can be instrumental: “[T]he only ‘weapon’ religious leaders have is their words” (CAR - SFCG - Bossangoa – SME - KII).

“You have to love your neighbor as yourself. All are children of God. This message is a common language, no matter your religion”

(CAR – SFCG – Bangui – SMEI6 – Mayor)

While religious messages can promote peace, they can also be a source of conflict. While the ET did not widely hear that religious messaging was used to justify violence, one religious leader stated that “Islam is the religion of peace. And when the others are deprived or have taken the rights of Muslims, as long as the right has been deprived, they have to get it back. After getting it back then the peace will exist according to the ideology. Peace means confronting the situation; non-confrontation is surrender, which is different from peace” (TH Deep South – TAF – EI - KII).

UNEXPECTED FINDINGS

In the course of the endline fieldwork, some findings emerged which were outside the scope of the evaluation but which the ET judged to be significant because they indicated a trend that could influence the shape of the conflict in the future. As this is a learning evaluation, such findings have been captured in this report. Drug abuse and addiction among youth was raised as a high-risk factor for intensification of the conflict in both CAR and the Deep South of Thailand as addicted youth can be co-opted into groups engaged in conflict. In the Deep South of Thailand, religious and community leaders alike acknowledged the problem of youth drug use. Respondents mentioned the role religious leaders play in addressing their concerns and offering guidance to families (TH Deep South-KIA-FGD). Some respondents believed that drug addiction was a way to prevent youth from engaging in education or other non-conflict activities and instead become involved in conflict. In CAR the use of tramadol among both the Anti-Balaka (who are mainly Christian) and the Seleka (who are predominantly Muslim) was reported. Respondents reported that tramadol was used more by Muslims than Christians. Christian, it

was explained, had access to other drug substitutes such as alcohol. CAR respondents mentioned that youth behave more violently under the effects of drugs (CAR – SFCG – Bousangoa –IP -KII).

The second issue pertains to the place of educational institutions in peacebuilding activities. In the Deep South of Thailand, segregation of the educational system along religious lines reinforced identity isolations and hardens religious positions. Both adult and student interviewees reported that being able to meet and work with their peers from other faiths through the HOPE Yala activity helped them to overcome stereotypes they had held about people of the other faith. Additionally, school-based peace education activities can serve as an entry point for drawing the broader community into peacebuilding engagements. In CAR, even though schools were not specifically targeted, Mercy Corps reported that they organized meetings and sensitization sessions in schools. When the religious leaders decided to engage in peacebuilding in Bouar, one of the first things they did was to get schools back to work because it was the surest way to demonstrate the return of peace. There were also other efforts in CAR to target school-aged youth, including a peace education program for youth, reported by a member of the National Interreligious Platform, and a curriculum that the interreligious committee was working on for all children.

EFFECTIVENESS

INVOLVING RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN PEACEBUILDING

Religious leaders were motivated to participate in the activities evaluated, their participation helped unlock barriers between IPs and religious groups, and the program implementation benefited from their involvement. The findings from both CAR and the Deep South of Thailand strongly indicate that religious leaders can model values of peace and compassion while offering assistance to those in need. When religious leaders lend support to activities, there is a much greater likelihood that they will be successful. The ET found, for instance, that beneficiaries described religious leaders as “credible and trusted,” (TH Deep South – TAF - FGD.) and that their “presence... lends credibility to peacebuilding activities of the partners” (TH Deep South – TAF - FGD). In the Thanto district of the Deep South of Thailand, “both Muslim and Buddhist communities listen to one monk leader” (TH Deep South – KIA-KII). In CAR, all the organizations working in social cohesion and peacebuilding are looking to include religious leaders to maximize reach to the community for their social cohesion goals (CAR - SFCG - Bossangoa – SME -KII). A respondent in CAR noted that “the religious leaders have a great influence in the implementation of such projects as ZKZ. If they are involved in social cohesion activities, I think we can have a good result” (CAR - SFCG - Bossangoa – SME - KII).

Respondents noted changes that speak to the efficacy of the involvement of religious leaders and institutions in program implementation. One Muslim religious leader noted that before the start of activities, he felt insecure taking Muslim students to a Buddhist village. (TH Deep South – KIA – FGD) But the activity provided him with the opportunity to overcome that apprehension and bridge the divide between the religions. One participant in the Deep South of Thailand observed that Muslims were more courageous to speak about the conflict, euphemistically referred to as “the situation.” (TH Deep South – TAF - FGD) Under Martial Law in the Deep South of Thailand, people do not feel comfortable talking about “the [political] situation,” but the activity established a level of trust between the religious leaders and the participants, encouraging people to be more vocal and willing to speak up.

Additionally, there can be positive spillover effects for women when religious leaders take part in activities in some villages. An LIP in the Deep South of Thailand reported that in the family, men felt it was not proper for women to work outside the home and would worry that women were learning things that went against Islamic teachings. But if the religious leader spoke in support of an activity, it was a guarantee for it (TH Deep South – TAF - KII). Similarly, sometimes the presence of religious leaders encouraged women to participate in programs where they otherwise would not have necessarily felt comfortable. In some villages of the Deep South of Thailand, societal norms limit the role of women within the community, but the participation of religious leaders facilitated women’s participation (TH Deep South – TAF – EI - KII).

However, the efficacy of involving religious leaders in the activities is limited in some ways as well. Some findings suggest that religious leaders are not uniformly qualified to play a positive role in activity activities, nor do all religious leaders approach peacebuilding in the same way. Religious leaders take part in the peace process when invited as participants but, in the Deep South of Thailand, they do not initiate peacebuilding activities (TH Deep South-TAF-EI-KII). In CAR, however, findings show that they do. Their ability to take part in local issues can be constrained by the fact that they may not be from the conflict areas (Buddhist monks move from other parts of the country to the Deep South of Thailand, for example) or they may have spent long periods of time away studying. Without skills to manage conflict, they can leave themselves open to manipulation by members of their community, either fellow monks or community members (TH Deep South – TAF – FGD).

Religious leaders can also lack secular knowledge, limiting their effective involvement in peacebuilding. A respondent in the Deep South of Thailand reported feeling frustrated when talking to religious teachers, because “they know about religious subject matters, but they don’t know about secular subjects.” Secular subjects, as referenced by this respondent, include general politics as well as everyday issues that ordinary people face (TH Deep South – TAF - FGD).

Involving religious leaders affected the way the youth engaged with the programs in some instances. A CAR respondent observed that some youth participation was constrained because “the religious leaders are our fathers, we respect them,” and if the leaders said there was something the youth should not do, they did not do it (CAR - SFCG - Bangui - FGD).

SUSTAINABILITY

The evaluation assessed sustainability at both individual and institutional levels from the standpoint of resiliency, adaptability, institutionalization, and participant capacity building. Across the four activities, efforts supporting sustainability ranged from improving capabilities of key stakeholders, institutionalizing nonviolent conflict resolution processes and mechanisms, and creating new or strengthening existing relationships that can support the continuation and/or expansion of interventions beyond the cessation of donor funding. The permanence of religious relationships mirrors the extent to which resiliency, institutional renewal, and growth are criteria for peacebuilding. The endline evaluation sought to establish how the involvement of religion ensures participants remain committed to faith-based relationships in times of crisis as an instrument for building peace (*resilience of relationships*) and remain committed to using faith-based mechanisms (actors, process, spaces, etc.) as the means for restoring or enhancing peace in times of crisis (*resilience of faith-based peacebuilding mechanisms*). The inquiry also assessed the extent to which the involvement of religion in peacebuilding ensures that the participating institutions have the capacity to sustain engagement in peacebuilding through internal renewal of their

commitments, continuation of actors, processes and/or the stimulation of the emergence, and/or engagement of other newer groups and networks that support the peacebuilding process. In CAR, findings indicate that the Catholic Church in Bouar led the Interreligious Peacebuilding Platform (IRP) initiative which the national hierarchy embraced and championed; hence there was internal affirmation and growth.

The activities provided opportunities for capacity building that empower individuals and communities to sustain peacebuilding initiatives. One CAR respondent noted that they will use the knowledge that they gained from their involvement with the SFCG program to continue “efforts for peaceful coexistence” (CAR - SFCG - Bossangoa – SME - KII). Respondents in both CAR and the Deep South of Thailand highlighted that the activities incited individuals to engage with peacebuilding efforts and cultivated enthusiasm and skills that will continue beyond the end of the activities.

The importance for sustainability of both older networks and emergent ones is apparent. The IRP initiative gradually grew beyond Bouar into a national initiative, thus evidencing the growth of a network that incorporated more faith-based groups across different religious traditions and their leaders, (*network expansion*). Respondents affirmed that they would continue to spread the peacebuilding efforts, even after the end of the two activities in CAR because it is their calling (*mission permanence*); they were doing that work before the activity (*pre-existing knowledge, commitment, and practice*), and they will continue to exist in CAR long after the activity ends (*institutional permanence*).

In the Deep South of Thailand respondents noted that newly formed networks can allow individuals to remain in contact and serve as a means by which people can continue to work together beyond the activity lifetime. The activity provided respondents with opportunities to connect and work with monks in different districts who they otherwise would not have access to. One respondent noted that these relationships will continue as the monks stay engaged with the work of the communities (TH Deep South – TAF - FGD).

Similarly, the inclusion of religious leaders is instrumental to the sustainability of program objectives. The activity was credited with creating awareness among some Buddhist monks who became very receptive to the need to engage in peacebuilding (TH Deep South – TAF - FGD). The enthusiasm of these monks, along with the relationships they have established with IPs, can be harnessed to sustain their engagements. In CAR, respondents indicated that because religious leaders were already in the communities and working on peace issues before the activity interventions, “they will find a way to continue to work together, even if it is on a smaller scale” (CAR-MC-Bouar-FGD). In the view of another respondent “IRP/B started before ASPIRE and so they will continue after ASPIRE ends. They already know ASPIRE will come to an end and they know what to do and how to do that. They will continue” (CAR – MC – Bouar – SME -KII). Even for the ZKZ activity in which religion was not intentionally used in interventions, one CAR respondent said that “religious leaders can help keep the ZKZ results sustained” (CAR - SFCG - Bangui - FGD). The program allowed him to meet both Séléka and anti-Zaragina on issues of peacebuilding and conflict resolution beyond the life of the activity.

CONCLUSIONS

IMPLEMENTATION

ROLE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

Where religion is an integral component of conflict, there are many ways that religious leaders can have a role in advancing peace agendas and mitigating conflict. People who identify strongly with their faith look up to and are more apt to listen to religious leaders over other community leaders. While this reverence is unexceptional in situations of stability, in conflict conditions the symbolic role of religious leaders can take on greater significance. In conflict environments, communities often lose faith in their government officials and politicians; consequently the symbolic space occupied by religious leaders can expand in reaction. The findings indicate that there are numerous ways the symbolic role of religious leaders is enhanced by their practical roles. Because religious leaders' credibility within and sometimes across religious groups tends to be high, they can make a difference in activity outcomes. In CAR and in the Deep South of Thailand, religious leaders can mediate conflict and connect with individuals within and across communities. Partly due to the involvement of religious leaders, program activities were able to reach more people and be more effectively implemented. Religious leaders can fill vacuums created by a weak or absent governing structure.

Nevertheless, these opportunities are not uniformly embraced. Evidence (particularly from the Deep South of Thailand) suggests that religious leaders can be reluctant to openly take part in activities that conflict parties may construe as pro-government or favoring another conflict party, thus suggesting that when religious leaders keep their distance from the activities, they do so for concerns over personal safety rather than due to disagreement with the activity goals. Given the generally positive contributions of religious leaders to the activity results, it is important to explore ways to include religious leaders in program implementation and address any potential security concerns. These measures will help activities benefit from the potential increased participation, activity effectiveness, and cooperation among participants that religious leader involvement can promote.

Implementation benefits when religious institutions are open to the objectives of peacebuilding and provide spaces for participation. Based on positive outcomes in terms of increased trust between members of different faiths, as well as skills developed through USAID-sponsored interventions—such as the youth leadership skills in peacebuilding—the evidence indicates that the inclusion of religion in activity implementation, even when it was not included in activity design, contributes to overall effectiveness. This learning evaluation format allowed the ET to hear how participants, with or without the support of their IPs, found meaning and ways to use their religious beliefs, identities, and values in activity implementation. Through taking part in interfaith peacebuilding activities, participants recognized the artificiality of the barriers of religion, allowing them to further engage in the peacebuilding process.

ROLE OF WOMEN RELIGIOUS LEADERS

The role of women religious leaders is context-specific, as social and cultural norms shape, as well as constrain, their full, open participation in roles regarded as the purview of men. Women have either no role or only a limited role within institutionalized religions of Buddhism and Islam. In Catholicism, to take one example from the Christian faith, lay women have space to participate, from the parish level through diocesan, national, and even international levels. However, lay leadership does not mean institutional authority. The ways women can inhabit leadership roles in peacebuilding and conflict mitigation are determined by pre-existing operating environments and by the peacebuilding activities themselves. Well-designed interventions can have a positive impact on the existing operating

environments, such as when IPs explicitly designed activities to encourage the participation of women in leadership roles.

Conflict environments can reinforce or disrupt gender-based norms. Even though women tend to have less visible roles as religious leaders, findings indicate that conflict situations may create openings for women to assume greater leadership roles in their religious and community settings. Additionally, the findings indicate that some peacebuilding activities were designed with women's economic capacity building as an important component. The evidence from CAR in particular shows that when IPs are well-positioned to respond to the opportunities, the activities can benefit most if they include women even as informal religious leaders. In particular, IPs who recognize and address women's social and economic needs in post-conflict situations can leverage that to promote women's engagement in peacebuilding.

EFFECTIVENESS

Even when IPs did not focus on religion as a core component in activity design, participants used religious identities, beliefs, values, and practices in the implementation process. As noted in the findings, in the case of SFCG in CAR, participants encouraged the IP to more intentionally include religion in subsequent interventions. In the HOPE Yala activity in the Deep South of Thailand, students reported that activities that brought together Muslims and Buddhists helped them overcome prejudices about the other religion. As activities benefited from the inclusion of religious leaders and religious institutions (even if or when IPs did not intend this), findings suggest that drawing upon the symbolic value and positioning of religious leaders enhances outcomes by supporting opportunities for religious leaders to inspire greater openness and inter-religious cooperation among individuals. In CAR citizens looked to religious leaders to step in to fill the political vacuum that the conflict left. As one such leader recalled "... there was a huge political vacuum when the *prefet*⁵ left. So I had to step in to engage the Séléka and other armed groups. I extended the engagement of religious actors to the imams and pastors who responded and engaged quickly and actively" (CAR – MC – Bouar – LIP -KII). Because religion is such an integral part of people's everyday lives, messages delivered by religious leaders can reach a wide audience. Additionally, there is a distinct advantage to working with older religious leaders on peacebuilding initiatives, as they bring both experience and influence. Such religious leaders have a strengthened capacity to share positive messages with each other. Besides, "older leaders are more influential and have more power;" when they ask implementers to do something, the implementers feel compelled to do so (TH Deep South – TAF-KII).

Religious messages are not uniformly effective, and in some cases, religious messages promoted violence. However, when used in the most contextually-appropriate ways, religious messages that support cooperation contribute to more positive outcomes. Religious messages can also reinforce positive reception of the concepts of peace and forgiveness. Particularly in cases where government messages in support of peace were not welcome, embraced, or were not reaching communities embroiled in the conflict, religious messages were perceived as more effective. Even though religious and civil leaders may give the same "...message of peace, whether it is said by religious leaders or by government leaders" (CAR - SFCG - Bangui - FGD), the messages of religious leaders are more listened to because "people trust them more than they do civilian leaders" (CAR - SFCG - Bangui – SME - KII). When religious

⁵ A government official responsible for a region, or prefecture, in CAR.

leaders disseminate the message of peacebuilding and multiculturalism (TH Deep South – TAF-KII), their messages are founded on scriptures. Hence, “there are no differences in messages between the religious leaders” (CAR - SFCG - Bangui - FGD), as “the messages of Christians and Muslims are the same because they have the same source. We can find the same phrases in the Bible as in the Koran” (CAR - SFCG - Bangui – SME -KII). Besides, communities perceive religious leaders to be more honest brokers of peace than civil leaders. In the Deep South of Thailand, “whenever the local people have a problem, they rarely go to see the head of the village, but they would go directly to the Imam with their problems” (TH Deep South – KIA -FGD. In CAR, people trust religious leaders more than they do civilian leaders (CAR - SFCG - Bangui – SME - KII). Even in the ZKZ activity where the inclusion of religion was never formally considered, respondents in field interviews observed that “... the imams are considered the most important person in the village. If they speak, everyone will follow them. [Hence] We pass messages through them to the Séléka” (CAR - SFCG - Bossangoa – SME - KII). Besides, the peace messages from religious leaders “...are inspired by the Bible. The Koran also. They are inspired by certain verses: do not be divided, we need to have love for our neighbors” (CAR - SFCG - Bossangoa – SME - KII). Cross-faith collaboration between different religions can be achieved at the community level through activities that facilitate changes in practices. Working with youth was especially successful, as the youth were found to be more open to diversity and gender equality and could take what they learned to their parents. Individuals and groups that work primarily within existing networks with others sharing their own religious beliefs can have positive experiences as a result of coming together with people from another faith. When members of one religious group become more knowledgeable and familiar with the practices and beliefs of another religion, they can build trust and reduce their established prejudices. Community level interaction can also shift perceptions that one group holds about the other side in a conflict. P2P peacebuilding is effective at the community level when interventions dissipate negative feelings which, if unchecked, can lead people to choose violence.

SUSTAINABILITY

Incorporating religious aspects into the program design and implementation, whether intentional or unintentional, contributes to the activities’ sustainable efforts towards peacebuilding. Across the activity beneficiary communities, participants and leaders expressed that even without USAID-funded activities, discussions would continue across the religious divide. Additionally, religious leaders can be catalysts of change that can sustain the activity results due to their influence and reputation in their communities as respected and trustworthy leaders.

Peacebuilding goals can be sustained through the continued maintenance and access to networks that the activities created. With the establishment of sound structures, knowledge and skills development, high motivation, and commitment, activity successes are more likely to continue, even if on a reduced scale. Faith-based organizations and networks, which are more prevalent in CAR than in the Deep South of Thailand, persist longer than CSO-based ones because they have institutional permanence and long-standing missions. This is because, unlike the CSOs whose presence and functioning depends on donor priorities, funding, and agency policies, the local church or mosque is “an institution that never disappears. It is an institution that will be there forever. People will continue to be believers; therefore, they will be a sustainable source of peacebuilding” (CAR-MC-Bouar-FGD). Compared to governments, “religious institutions are permanent. Politicians come and go, and the activities they start or support may change over time. However, religious institutions have a permanent mission, duty, and presence. They stay when the secular institutions are not able to stay and operate” (CAR-MC-Bouar-FGD). While

the extent of their engagement may fluctuate due to resource limitations or changes in the conflict context, their engagement is constant.

In the Deep South of Thailand, where engagement of religious leaders in peacebuilding is much more limited, it was nonetheless observed that the P2P activities have allowed for the formation of networks that can allow individuals to remain in contact and continue to work together beyond the activity lifetime (TH - Deep South -TAF - KII). This is because “the project has created awareness among some monks on the need to engage in peacebuilding. The enthusiasm of these monks and the relationships they have established with the partners can be harnessed to sustain their engagements.” (TH - Deep South -TAF- FGD.). The presence and engagement of religious institutions and actors is particularly important in this area because “not too many NGOs work with people on the ground” (TH - Deep South -TAF - EI-KII). In CAR, respondents observed that “...during the conflicts, state institutions reduced their visibility, presence, and influence but religious institutions continued to operate [...] So religious leaders had a leverage/entry point [for engagement] with the fighters” (CAR – MC – Bangui – SME -KII). Besides, “the local church or mosque is an institution that never disappears. It is an institution that will be there forever. People will continue to be believers; therefore, they will be a sustainable source of peacebuilding” (CAR – MC – Bouar – IP - KII). Additionally, faith-based organizations have the potential to have a wider reach and faster response than secular organizations, due to their ease of access and availability of staff. In CAR, faith-based organizations exist in areas that government agencies and CSOs do not necessarily reach.

Sustainability hinges on the continuing functions of networks and the application of imparted knowledge. Certain mechanisms, such as platforms and committees that are more inclusive of women and other religions, should be maintained for continued peacebuilding. Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism employ traditional male-dominated hierarchies that are not likely to be influenced by USAID programming. However, we find that women are still under-represented in the Interreligious Platform for Peace in CAR, for example, though it is not a theologically-mandated structure. Similarly, efforts to create separate platforms for women likely not only maintain segregation but also add to their marginalization.

FINDINGS

1. Implementation

- Religious leaders have symbolic and practical roles that allow them to play a very important part in peacebuilding. These roles are not mutually exclusive or independent of each other; practical functions are facilitated by their symbolic importance. Moreover, their symbolic role sets them apart from non-religious leaders.

2. Effectiveness

- Activities benefited from the involvement of religious leaders and religious institutions. Religious leaders suggested or took initiatives that worked with the activity. Through religious leaders who generally support peace (although there are also those who promote conflict), beneficiaries heard activity messages reinforced.

- Some religious leaders and institutions are better prepared and positioned to respond to conflict situations than others. Faith traditions that have long standing social outreach programs tend to have the personnel, institutional spaces, and mandates in place to take lead roles. Others develop their capacities as they engage. Even for the older institutions, technical, logistical, and financial capacity deficits often constrain their ability to sustain or expand the scope of their engagements.
- Physical encounter of the other is an important step to dismantling cultural and psychosocial barriers that create and maintain stereotypes, biases, and attitudes that perpetuate conflict mindsets. In the Deep South of Thailand, for instance, segregation of the educational system along religious lines is reinforcing identity isolation and hardening religious position, a negative consequence of an approach intended to allow identity groups to know and work with each other for peace. The use of schools as the entry point for cross-faith peacebuilding allowed the students, and subsequently some parents to encounter people of other faiths; helping them to demystify long held stereotypes of the other.

3. Sustainability

- In the Deep South of Thailand and CAR, state actors and conflict parties mobilize people through identity-based fears, grievances, and prejudices to achieve political aims. Countering these practices by improving peacebuilding awareness and skills through intra-religious activities can serve as a vital alternative for communities and individuals affected by the conflicts. As communities and individuals become more confident, aware, and skilled, they are able to distinguish when religion is being instrumentalized.
- Respondents noted drug and other substance abuse and addiction among youth as an issue both in the Deep South of Thailand and in CAR, a subject that is of particular concern to religious leaders in their role as moral leaders within their communities. In CAR particularly, it is a high-risk factor for intensification of the conflict as addicted and/or unemployed youth are co-opted into fighting.
- While religion helped activities gain acceptance and participation (making implementation more effective), the activities also helped religious groups through the creation of spaces and opportunities of cross-faith engagements. This helped to create bridges of cross-faith engagements in ways that did not exist before. Critically, newer platforms of inter-faith engagements for peace outside of the formal hierarchical structure of religious institutions have emerged to create opportunities for broader groups of people to be active leaders in the peace processes. In CAR, a new platform of middle level religious leaders of Priests and Pastors is critical to sustainability “...because most senior religious leaders don’t have time to really do the work. And there can be opposition against them because of their inter-religious work [as in the case of] Imam Kobine is not welcome in the Muslim community” (CAR - SFCG - Bangui - IP - KII). Elsewhere “.. new relationships built through the activities [include] a committee of young Christians and Muslims and Anti-Balaka and Seleka Koran (CAR - SFCG - Bangui - FGD). In the Deep South of Thailand, an increased realization that Muslims and Buddhists have been living together peacefully [means] “...we can continue to do the same” (TH - Deep South TAF -FGD). In the long run, these possibilities of working together that activities introduced, can foster peace among local groups and sustain activities objectives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations here derive from the findings above.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

This section comes in two parts. Part I, focuses on general recommendations, draws on the findings from the current study to provide guidance on how to address some of the identified gaps in the recommendations of the Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding toolkit on building peace in conflict settings where religious identities are involved. Part II provides more specific analysis of the identified gaps in the current set of nine key principles in the USAID Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding toolkit, which provide guidance to intervention planners and implementers on how to engage religion and religious actors on conflict issues in the design and implementation of peacebuilding activities. The section points out additional issues or actions that, in the light of findings from this study, need to be addressed to promote more comprehensive, and plausibly effective, ways of promoting peace in contexts where religious identities underwrite the conflict and peace dynamics.

GENERAL

The recommendations offered below are arranged in accordance with the lines of enquiries of the study to better indicate at what point in the intervention design and execution cycle they are applicable. They provide guidance how to deepen the analysis of the role of religion in all phases of conflict dynamics in order to illustrate how to enhance the role of religion in promoting peace.

Implementation

- Engage with religion where it is important to the community. IPs should consciously explore and use opportunities that religion creates for reinforcing community participation and ownership of the processes and outcomes of peace initiatives.
- Promote peace education in schools to create a movement for a culture of peace. Based on observed practices in CAR and Thailand, the evaluation recommends that to create larger movements for a culture of peace among the youth and across faiths, IPs should consider supporting the development of interfaith curricula and instructional materials for peace education in the schools.
- Recognize and account for capacity differences between religious groups. Not all religious groups are skilled in interreligious dialogue, social justice, and peacebuilding. IPs should recognize and look out for these capacity differences so that they can better leverage the capabilities of the forerunners to bring on board and carry along the late starters.
- Develop sample peacebuilding indicators focusing on the role of religion in contexts where religion is a factor within conflict dynamics. A tentative sample of indicators may include but is not limited to the following:

Social Interaction, Inclusion, and Cross-faith Actions for Peace

- Membership in (and frequency of involvement in) of people of different faiths in community-wide post-conflict recovery, rehabilitation, reintegration, and reconciliation initiatives
- Number of cross-faith sporting, friendship, and social groups that have maintained contact with members of different faith groups during and after incidents of violence
- Frequency of contact between members of religious traditions purported to be in conflict (disaggregated by gender, age, occupation, etc.)
- Number of reported cases of cross-faith participation in social events (celebrations of births, deaths, weddings, etc.) of members of other faiths purported to be in conflict (disaggregated by gender, age, type of location, etc.)

Community resilience through cross-faith actions for peace

- Actions taken by cross-faith groups to rebuild community infrastructure after the incidents of violence
- Number and types of faith-based actions (healing ceremonies, reconciliation encounters, etc.) held to rebuild broken relationships
- Percentage of members of post-conflict social networks that report taking cross-faith actions to promote peace
- Percentage of respondents who report taking action to protect life and property of members of other faiths because their own faith inspired them to act

Faith-Inspired Resilience of Social and Economic networks

- Assets protection: number of people of different faiths who protected the assets (houses, shops, other business interests) of persons of opposing religions during the conflict
- Number of cross-faith economic groups that continue to engage and support each other before, during, and after incidents of violent conflicts

Effectiveness

- Exercise caution and sensitivity in framing conflicts in which religion is involved. IPs should make the effort to understand the nature and the extent to which the media and elites capture and use religion in the labeling and framing of conflicts and conflict actors
- Engage with the community prior to final activity design to enhance participation and outcomes. Where the timeframe for proposal development and submission cannot be extended for pre-design assessments, CMM should encourage IPs to build time into approved activities to carry out community-level conflict assessments prior to finalizing their implementation designs and use the outcomes to fine-tune implementation plans.

- Broaden familiarity with and understanding of the provisions of the Establishment Clause: USAID should work with its own staff and IPs to increase their literacy in the main provisions of the Establishment Clause and legal interpretations that delineate programming options. In doing so, it should allow USAID and IPs to adopt a more nuanced and therefore potentially expansive understanding of the Establishment Clause rather than avoiding programming that touches on religion or work with religious actors, as sometimes happens. Incorporating specific and clearer guidance on such broader interpretations of the Establishment Clause in calls for applications would encourage IPs to more intentionally and legally explore and engage religion and religious actors in peacebuilding efforts for greater effectiveness, impact, and sustainability.
- Enhance women’s participation in peacebuilding: Women play important roles in peacebuilding within the patriarchal structures of their respective religious communities (Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam), even if not as frontline leaders, using both formal but peripheral and informal spaces and opportunities. However, a focus on seeing women’s role in peacebuilding within the formal religious institutional arrangements of their faith traditions often miss the contributions that enhanced capacities for women’s in such roles can make to the peacebuilding effort. To leverage these potentials, IPs should more creatively explore ways to identify and strengthen the capacities of women to be more influential and effective in negotiating access to and participation in the peacebuilding processes.
- Graft interventions on social capital of existing religious institutions. IPs will be well served if they identify and leverage inherent legitimacies in working with religious leaders and institutions that come with such recognition and acceptance across faith lines.
- Understand and harness the power of media in defining conflicts. External interveners, including the international peacebuilding community – donors, IPs, and service providers such as consultants, etc. – need to pay particular attention to the role of the media in the (mis)definition and (mis)representation of the issues in the conflicts and support interventions that track and counter the role of social media in peddling rumors that create deliberate misinformation, disaffections, that incense passions, and help mobilize camps for violence.
- Understand the politics and economics of violent conflicts in local contexts. Violent conflicts thrive in contexts with high numbers of unemployed youth where war leaders are able to recruit young people into their fighting forces. Additionally, the use of drugs makes the youth vulnerable to recruitment as fighters. IPs should conduct rigorous analysis to establish the interplay between the use of religion and drugs to attract the youth into violent conflicts, especially in conflicts with religious dimensions.
- Appreciate the value of religion in the lives of communities. For some communities, religion is not just a set of beliefs and practices; it is a way of life that drives everything the community does. Hence, religion cannot be excluded from how people see and engage with the world.

Sustainability

- Take advantage of religion’s permanency. Religious leaders and institutions have a permanency that often outlives their civilian counterparts in most communities. Therefore, they offer an institutional hook for sustaining peacebuilding initiatives that governments, civil society organizations, and international development agencies may not provide. The beliefs, values, and practices of religion are also sustaining forces for believing communities, providing solace to the affected and spaces of encounter for dialogue, forgiveness, peace, and reconciliation.
- Leverage the penetration that religion has in some communities. Religions often permeate different social fabrics and penetrate spatial distances that civil authorities often cannot reach. Therefore, religion can have a strong bridging power across multiple identity groups (ethnicity, political affiliation, social class, etc.) and spaces. Even when religious beliefs and identifies contribute to conflict, common grounds often exist in the spectrums of values and practices that provide windows of opportunity for constructive engagement.
- Work with religious leaders to more swiftly build lasting legitimacy and credibility. Religious leaders often have greater respect within and across different ethnic, faith, political, and social strata. Therefore, they are important gatekeepers that must be recognized and harnessed to promote peace. In contexts where religion is a factor in the conflict being addressed, intervention planners should tap into the moral authority of the religious leaders to promote engagements with the communities, governments destabilization, and other parties.
- At the same time, be cognizant of the risk of religious attachments. In some contexts, strong religious attachments can be sources of conflict when left unchecked. A failure to recognize the role of religion as a factor in the conflict dynamics could result in religion-inspired animosities that threaten peace. Implementers should pay particular attention to isolating the role of religion in conflict and peace dynamics in order to be better positioned to provide the appropriate responses.

ANALYSIS OF CONFORMITY AND GAPS WITH EXISTING RECOMMENDATIONS IN IN RELIGION, CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING TOOLKIT

A review of the nine recommendations show that they are focused more on conflict than on peacebuilding. Table I below offers summary highlights of the gaps in the toolkit that findings in the current study may help to fill.

TABLE I: GAP ANALYSIS OF NINE RECOMMENDATIONS IN RELIGION, CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING TOOLKIT

No	Principle	Summary of Focus/Observed Gaps in Current Toolkit	Implications from Evaluation Findings	Recommended Actions/Additions to Toolkit
I	NATURE OF THE CONFLICT	In both CAR and Thailand, religious leaders were not involved in instigating conflicts. Rather, they were the agents of peace. Guidance on contextual analysis based on a reading of the current statement of the principle alone does not provide adequate instruction to intervention planners to explore the role of religion in peace dynamics.	This tool guides programming covering “religion, conflict, and peacebuilding.” However, the current statement of the principle recommends analysis of role of religious identities and actors in conflict dynamics. It does not call for similar analysis for the actual and/or potential role of religion and religious actors in peace dynamics.	Either i) the statement of the principle is revised to include consideration of the religious dimensions building resiliencies for peace or ii) a separate principle is created to direct intervention planners to focus on identifying possible ways in which religion (beliefs, values, institutions, and actors) are or can be used as instruments of peacebuilding
		<i>Culture and religion may be inseparable:</i> Principle focuses on the influence of culture on the practice of religion. In most cases, however, religion and culture are inextricably intertwined, as people don’t see culture as separate from religion; religion is a way of life, just as culture is a way of life. In such contexts, it is a false dichotomy to separate religion and culture as independent causal factors for peace or conflict.	The use of culture as distinct from religion can be misleading in contexts where indigenous or even foreign religions are so assimilated into the way of life of people as to make it indistinguishable from the culture.	It might be more appropriate for the toolkit to provide guidance that focuses on worldviews encompassing beliefs, values, and practices, rather than a distinction between religion and culture. In both CAR and Deep South of Thailand where community members did not agree that religion was a factor in the conflicts they experienced, a worldview approach allows for a cross-faith examination of the factors that create and sustain the conflict or peace.

2	CULTURE	<p><u>Culture may not be homogenous even in the same community:</u> The statement of principle assumes a homogenous and static view of culture even for specific identity groups. However, different categories of people in any one community may have experienced the conflict differently. Women and young people tend to have different experiences. This affects their perceptions, beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviors towards the conflict and peace dynamics.</p>	<p>Reaching down to subcultural levels of analysis is often crucial to identifying key but hidden groups/issues in conflict or peace dynamics. In CAR and Deep South Thailand where the conflicts have mutated over several generations, it is not enough to know how culture influences religion; it is essential to understand how the conflict narratives are transmitted inter-generationally as a prelude to designing strategies that break the loop. For instance factors that perpetuate hyper-masculinity and a culture of violence among unemployed young ex-combatants hustling in streets or seeking refuge in drugs and substance abuse, as in CAR and Deep South of Thailand, will be more crucial in determining a society's movement towards violence or peace than the larger regional or national cultural outlooks alone as movements in the macro-level dynamics rely on mobilizing and exploiting the unseen and unheard grievances and vulnerabilities of the micro-levels.</p>	<p>Provide guidance to intervention planners and implementers to go beyond monolithic views of culture, and religion to identify the multiple layers of cultures and/or subcultures in society and how they contribute to or impact on the conflict and peace dynamics. Special guidance on how culture impacts on the conflict and peace dynamics for the youth and women should receive greater attention.</p> <p>Also, provide clearer guidance on subcultural analysis that captures the impact of conflicts on peripheral and/or hard to reach groups such as youth who are involved with drugs (either as users or taking part in trade of drugs).)</p>
		<p><u>Intergenerational Differences:</u> In today's globalized world, local cultures may not be the only determinants of perceptions of individuals or groups on the dynamics of conflict or peace in their locality. Expanded access to information has not only expanded the range and multiplicity</p>	<p>There are intergenerational differences between and within population subgroups as well. Younger generations with no direct experience of the original causes of conflict would have different approaches to the conflict and</p>	<p>Religious beliefs, perceptions, values, and practices that promote or hinder peace are products of culture. Since culture itself is learned or acquired through socialization, breaking intergenerational narratives that sustain cycles of violence requires that communities in</p>

		<p>of layered cultures and subcultures, it also significantly affects the pace and scale of cultural change beyond the physical boundaries of identity groups. Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim youth in one country do not necessarily share the same views on the influence of culture and religion on their lives and the conflict with elders of their respective communities.</p>	<p>peace dynamics. For instance, young people in both CAR and Thailand, both in and out of school, showed more openness to embracing diversity than adults. In Thailand, in particular, school kids participating in one of the activities showed great enthusiasm in learning about other religions and cultures and embracing their diversities. In particular, the findings from the Deep South of Thailand suggest that schools provide important spaces for sowing the seeds for sustainable intergenerational peace, as they offer spaces that enable young people to confront and break down prejudices, stereotypes and other isolationist perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors that create and sustain conflicts. School-based peace activities also have the potential to draw in adults (teachers, parents, community leaders such as monks and Imams, government officials, etc) across identity lines, as when Buddhists and Muslim parents, teachers, and community leaders worked together with their school children on their peace activities .</p>	<p>conflict create opportunities for the construction more inclusive narratives for the younger generations.</p> <p>School systems provide one such potentially high impact opportunities for the narrative reconstruction. They provide a window for mobilizing more people and key people across generations and identity lines.</p> <p>To leverage this, however, the toolkit needs to provide guidance to intervention designers and implementers on how to harness the socializing power of schools to create or reinforce a culture of peace through peace education programs in schools.</p>
3	GENDER	<p>Avoidance: Understand and respect local customs in respect of gender issues – avoid</p>	<p>Buddhists and Muslim women in both CAR and Deep South of Thailand had no name for “women religious leaders” though admitting some women do play</p>	<p>Also, provide guidance on how the embrasure of existing cultural norms on gender differences in leadership for peace could create alternate niches for</p>

		interventions targeting only women that are considered threatening.	key roles in the peace process. Christian women religious leaders were however acknowledged as a reality.	better understanding and harnessing of the power of women for peacebuilding.
4	NATURE OF HIERARCHY AND STRUCTURE	Calls for respect for hierarchical (vertical) orders in religious organizations and to engage religious leaders at the onset of interventions. The Toolkit already provides guidance that in the spirit of Do No Harm (DNH) peace actors should not push for the inclusion of women at all levels in peace processes. Horizontal (peer) relationships across religious lines are not discussed.	While respecting DNH, efforts must be made to have a better understanding of the contextual nuances around women's engagement in religion (formal/ informal roles) in order to explore more culturally acceptable ways to promote women's engagement while respecting and DNH. This study, however, found that peer to peer relationships among religious leaders built effective bridges of engagement for peace.	Need to include guidance for instances where some religious leaders are non-responsive to peace overtures. This would include how to identify, analyze, and leverage horizontal (peer to peer) relationships across hierarchies to stimulate actions, as in the case of the BIRP in CAR – Christian leaders led the charge and brought along some Muslim leaders.
5	GROUP DYNAMICS	The principle calls for intervention planners and implementers to pay attention to intra- and inter-group dynamics to avoid exacerbating negative power dynamics or imbalances.	Religious institutions and actors have different institutional and individual pre-existing and predisposing capabilities (theological foundations, knowledge banks to tap into, collective and individual expertise and prior experience, etc) for rapid engagement in peacebuilding. In CAR, Christian groups, especially the Catholic Church, were more prepared than Muslim ones to initiate and sustain peacebuilding efforts. In Deep South of Thailand, Buddhists monks seemed more organized and more ready to engage in	It is essential to provide guidance on analysis of capacity differentials in peacebuilding between religious institutions and actors to determine targeted capacity development needs of different religious groups. In particular guidance on assessment tools that help unearth the peacebuilding interactive capacities and networks and/or limitations thereof of different categories of religious actors (men, women, youth, etc) will be most helpful in guiding intervention designers and implementers. Assessment of religious institutions should go beyond the churches, mosques, temples, synagogues, etc to include religiously inclined ones such as broadcast houses.

			peacebuilding, albeit among themselves, than Muslim ones.	
6	LANGUAGE	Request interveners to be sensitive to the use of language to avoid offending others or creating suspicions of intent.	Use of language is also important in how outsiders, especially the media and development actors, frame conflicts. Need to emphasize the need to use the lenses of the people in describing their conflicts.	Provide guidance to intervention planners and designers to go beyond how the mainstream media captures and discusses issues surrounding the conflicts to better reflect the views and voices of those affected in the analysis.
7	RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT	Requests interveners to be attentive to the nature of relationships between religious groups and the government to explore and harness partnership and leverage opportunities.	In CAR, government was largely absent and religious leaders filled the void in providing stability. And in CAR, at least the legitimacy of one Islamic religious leader was questioned by followers of another leader who was less reluctant to engage in the Interreligious Platform processes. In South Thailand Deep South of Thailand, some religious leaders were viewed as co-opted by the government when they collaborated with the latter on peace moves that the government initiated and directed.	Guidance on how to ensure support to religious leaders that does not inadvertently undermine their legitimacy, especially from rival factions is essential. Also, guidance is needed on how to ensure that working with religious institutions and actors may enhance government and/or USAID legitimacy, while also ensuring that the communities they represent do not see them as captured or coopted and therefore illegitimate.
8	KEY HISTORICAL EVENTS	Toolkit guidance requires interveners to be sensitive to key historical events that shape and direct relationships or the conflict.	Historical events define conflict narratives of the victors and the victims and often inform revisionists' reconstruction of the narratives to sustain intergenerational recurrence of the conflicts. In interventions that involve truth-telling as a precondition for promoting reconciliation, historical	Beyond mere recall of the historical events, there should be guidance on how to promote joint reassessments and reconstruction of common narratives by conflicting groups and in ways that embrace different views as a step to peace and reconciliation. This will squarely fit into a P2P approach to peacebuilding.

			facts have to be confronted, albeit in non-inflammatory ways.	
9	CURRENT US FOREIGN POLICY	Be aware of current US foreign policies and how they affect religious institutions' and actors' ability to act in the name of the US or with USG resources.	No specific field level encounters on perceptions of US Government policy on conflict and peace dynamics. However, the policy influences of other governments in both CAR (France) and Deep South of Thailand (Malaysia) were cited as sustaining the conflicts and/or brokering peace.	<p>Analysis of US government policy impacts should include locals' perception of past US presence and interventions as well, as experiences of the past policies may be stronger than the current level of analysis required.</p> <p>In the spirit of DNH, guidance on how to frame and phrase issues in which policies and programs of other governments are raised might be necessary.</p>

ANNEX A: EVALUATION SOW

AID-OAA-TO-15-00056

SECTION C - DESCRIPTION / SPECIFICATIONS / STATEMENT OF WORK

C.1 OVERVIEW

This Task Order is estimated to be a five-year contract with two distinct Tasks:

Task One – Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in the People-to-People (P2P) Reconciliation Fund Program

Task Two – Impact Evaluation of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Learning Program

The statement of work (SOW) describes the general framework of each task with sufficient detail for initial planning purposes. Due to the collaborative nature of the evaluation work involving field Missions and several implementing partners, detailed work plans will be developed after the Task Order is awarded based on technical direction provided by the Task Order Contracting Officer's Representative (TOCOR).

C.2 TASK ONE – UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND PEACEBUILDING IN THE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RECONCILIATION FUND PROGRAM

C.2.1 Purpose

Following on previous work,¹ DCHA/CMM is embarking on a second phase to evaluate Reconciliation Fund activities entitled “Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in the People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program.”

The contractor will evaluate the outcomes of Reconciliation Fund peacebuilding programs working through different theories of change to address grievances manifested as inter-religious tensions in two study countries to (a) determine to what extent religious identity and work with religious actors factored into program design, including theories of change,² implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and results achieved, and (b) validate and/or revise the nine “Lessons Learned” as published in USAID’s “Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Toolkit,”³ and (c) contribute to the body of evidence regarding which inter-religious, peacebuilding programming strategies are effective and potentially replicable.

The results of the evaluation will be used to (a) update guidance⁴ for USAID field staff and implementing partners for lessons learned and best practices for peacebuilding programs in inter-religious conflict contexts, (b) inform design of future year Reconciliation Fund programs and DCHA/CMM’s new training course for “Advanced Conflict-Related Program Design, Monitoring and Evaluation” for USAID staff, and (c) publish and support adoption of lessons learned and best practices in the broader development and peacebuilding communities, including the United States Government (USG) interagency.

C.2. 2 Background

DCHA/CMM Mission Statement

USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) strives to create programming that effectively prevents, mitigates, and

¹ “Evaluative Learning Review Synthesis Report: USAID/CMM’s People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Annual Program Statement (APS)” at pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaaa370.pdf

² “Theories of Change and Indicator (THINC) Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation” at pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADS460.pdf

³ “Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding: An Introductory Programming Guide” at pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADR501.pdf

⁴ Such as the Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding Programming Guide; DCHA/CMM’s THINC work; and the “USAID Guide to Best Practices for People to People Programming” at <http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CMM2PGuidelines2010-01-19.pdf>

manages the causes and consequences of violent conflict, fragility, and extremism. DCHA/CMM leads USAID's efforts to identify and analyze sources of fragility and conflict, supports early responses to address the causes and consequences of fragility and conflict, and seeks to integrate conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding approaches into USAID's analyses, strategies, and programs.

Reconciliation Fund

Since 2004, USAID has managed the Reconciliation Fund program in accordance with a Congressional appropriation to provide a central source of funding for reconciliation-related programming. Section 7060(f) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76, Division K), includes the following language:

“(f) RECONCILIATION PROGRAMS.—Of the funds appropriated by this Act under the headings “Economic Support Fund” and “Development Assistance”, \$26,000,000 shall be made available to support people-to-people reconciliation programs which bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds from areas of civil strife and war: *Provided*, That the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall consult with the Committees on Appropriations, prior to the initial obligation of funds, on the uses of such funds...”

To meet Congressional intent, USAID has issued annual solicitations for applications to support “people-to-people” (P2P) conflict mitigation and reconciliation programs and activities.

The objective of the Reconciliation Fund is to make significant strides in the overall goal of conflict mitigation, peace, and reconciliation through the implementation of people-to-people (P2P) activities in selected eligible conflict-affected countries.

People-to-People Programming

P2P programs offer one approach among many to conflict prevention, mitigation, and management. While a range of programs and approaches may be considered P2P in nature, most entail bringing together representatives of conflict-affected groups to interact purposefully in a safe space. This type of work can address divisions within a community that may be rooted in group differences such as ethnicity, religion, status, class, or political affiliation. P2P programs generally address patterns of prejudice and demonizing that reinforce the perceived differences between groups and hinder the development of relationships among parties to a conflict. The aim is to create opportunities for a series of interactions between conflicting groups in the community or broader society to promote mutual understanding, trust, empathy, and resilient social ties.

Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding

Conflict is an inherent and legitimate part of social and political life, but in many places conflict turns violent, inflicting grave costs in terms of lost lives, degraded governance, and destroyed livelihoods. The costs and consequences of conflict, crisis, and state failure are high. Violent conflict disrupts traditional development and can spill over borders and reduce growth and prosperity across entire regions.

Religious identities can be important factors in conflict dynamics. These identities can be manipulated to drive violence, but can also contribute meaningfully to peacebuilding and reconciliation processes. Development assistance and conflict mitigation programming does not always consider this linkage, nor does it fully address the complexity of the relationship between religion and conflict. As a main mobilizing force in many societies, proper engagement of religion and its leaders is crucial. In many cases, peacebuilding, reconciliation and conflict mitigation activities may delineate a theory or theories of change aimed to engage inter-religious peacebuilding strategies in order to foster peace and/or mitigate violence or potential violence.

To help Missions, and the broader peacebuilding community, program more effectively in contexts where inter-religious grievances are an integral part of conflict dynamics, USAID published the "Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Toolkit" in 2009. Based on analysis of several case studies, the Toolkit defined nine "Lessons Learned":

- 1- Understand religious Dimensions
- 2- Engage all relevant faith communities
- 3- Get buy-in from religious leaders
- 4- Pay attention to intra- and inter-group dynamics
- 5- Frame program in appropriate language
- 6- Allot time to build trust
- 7- Expand the programming repertoire
- 8- Invest in monitoring and evaluation
- 9- Establish institutional capacity.

While the importance of understanding the nexus of religion, conflict, and peacebuilding is widely acknowledged, very little evaluation reporting is available in this field. DCHA/CMM has a unique opportunity to contribute to the body of knowledge in this area by conducting a targeted evaluation of approximately four FY2014 (or FY2015) Global Reconciliation Fund programs (for planning purposes, two in Asia and two in Africa) that seek to apply people-to-people peacebuilding interventions between conflicting groups whose differences include religious affiliation. Using these programs as important learning opportunities, DCHA/CMM seeks to better understand how religious differences can define or shape conflict dynamics as conflict drivers and/or as mitigating factors, how these dynamics affect the implementation of and results from P2P peacebuilding activities, and how engaging in inter-religious P2P programming can affect the efficacy of the program and its effect on peacebuilding.

C.2.3 Program Information

Up to four Reconciliation Fund programs from the FY2014 and/or FY2015 Global Reconciliation Fund cycle will be identified for evaluation under Task One. DCHA/CMM will identify up to four projects for evaluation in consultation with USAID Missions and field-based implementing partners. It is anticipated that two projects will be identified in an Asian country and two in an African country where religious identity and/or mobilization along religious lines plays an important role in conflict dynamics. For planning purposes, the contractor can use Thailand and Central African Republic as illustrative countries. The illustrative projects are described below:

Asia Projects	
Project Name	<i>Project A</i>
Implementing Partner	U.S. NGO
Award Number	TBD
Estimated duration	3 years (o/a September 2015 – August 2018)
Estimated budget	\$1,000,000

Geographic areas	TBD
Project Name	<i>Project B</i>
Implementing Partner	Local NGO
Award Number	TBD
Estimated duration	3 years (o/a September 2015 – August 2018)
Estimated budget	\$500,000
Geographic area	TBD
Africa Projects	
Project Name	<i>Project C</i>
Implementing Partner	U.S. NGO
Award Number	TBD
Estimated duration	2 years (o/a August 2015 – July 2017)
Estimated budget	\$1,000,000
Geographic Area	TBD
Project Name	<i>Project D</i>
Implementing Partner	U.S. NGO
Award Number	TBD
Estimated duration	2 years (o/a August 2015 – July 2017)
Estimated budget	\$1,000,000
Geographic Area	TBD

C.2.4 Illustrative Evaluation Questions

This evaluation seeks to address the following questions:

- What are the roles and impact (both positive and negative) of religious leaders from different faith communities in project implementation and how are these similar to, and different

from, other types of community leaders (traditional chiefs, civil society representatives, business leaders, government officials, etc.)?

- How does incorporating activities with religious leaders or engaging religious identities influence the participation of women and of youth in specific people-to-people peacebuilding activities?
- Do program interventions specifically address religious identity differences? If so, how?
- How, and to what extent, were the theory of change and associated program activities initially tailored to different religious identities? Was the theory of change and/or activities modified during program implementation due to engagement with religious identity communities playing out differently than anticipated? If so, in what ways?
- To what extent are there similarities/differences among the program's proposed units of change (attitudes, behaviors or institution) and are interreligious peacebuilding approaches more likely to be successful based on the unit of change proposed?
- To what extent, if any, were religious identity/community differences integrated into the program's monitoring and evaluation plan (i.e. indicators, data collection methodologies, results reporting, etc.) and how were results used for project management?
- To what extent did the peacebuilding approach contribute to "peace writ small"? to "peace writ large"?⁵
- Which of the outcome or impact results reported at the conclusion of project implementation were sustained one year later?

Based on the results of this evaluation, the contractor will provide recommendations for:

- Best practices --- while also highlighting ineffective practices --- for designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating (i.e. suggested indicators, data collection methods, etc.) peacebuilding projects in contexts where inter-religious grievances are an integral part of conflict dynamics and/or where inter-religious peacebuilding approaches are being applied.
- Revising/Updating the Lessons Learned section of the "Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Toolkit".
- Provide suggestions for new topics/content related to inter-religious grievances and/or inter-religious peacebuilding approaches for inclusion in other DCHA/CMM products, specifically, the People-to-People Program Guide and the "Theories of Change and Indicator (THINC) Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation" guidance.

⁵ See "USAID Guide to Best Practices for People to People Programming" at <http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CMMP2PGuidelines2010-01-19.pdf> for more information.

In developing its work plan and preparing recommendations, the contractor should be cognizant that the Establishment Clause (separation of church and state) limits USAID's engagement in religious communities to supporting only activities and programs that have a secular purpose and which do not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Accordingly, USAID-financed activities and programs may not (i) result in government indoctrination of religion, (ii) define its recipients by reference to religion, or (iii) create an excessive entanglement with religion. USAID implementers must allocate assistance on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and such assistance must be made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.

C.2.5 Evaluation Design and Methodology

The design and methodology for this evaluation must generate the highest quality and most credible evidence that corresponds to the evaluation questions. Evaluation work is expected to be conducted in four phases:

Phase 1 – Collaborative Design of the Religious Identity and Peacebuilding Evaluation

The Task Order Contracting Officer's Representative (TOCOR) will provide the evaluation contractor with country-specific technical requirements including:

A. Project Information

- Name of project, implementing partner, award number, total estimated cost, project start and end dates, detailed description of activities including geographic scope

B. Country-Specific Aspects of the Evaluation Methodology

- Country-specific issues (e.g. security considerations, language requirements, etc.)
- Illustrative list of documents for use in evaluation

The final evaluation approach will be developed in close consultation with USAID (the TOCOR, other DCHA/CMM staff, and Mission personnel) and with the implementing partners managing the projects to be evaluated. The Reconciliation Fund evaluation must be designed to avoid duplication of routine monitoring and evaluation activities to be conducted by the project partners and must not place an undue burden on project participants. During consultations, the evaluation team may also be asked to suggest key indicators that could be collected by the implementing partners across the four projects. Copies of the approved project work plans, Monitoring and Evaluation plans, quarterly and annual progress reports, and evaluation reports produced by the implementing partners will be provided to the evaluation team.

Data collection methods may include focus group discussions, group interviews, key informant interviews, and possibly small-scale, targeted surveys. The methodology should also optimize evaluation design for more valid and reliable data through innovative approaches such as gathering additional baseline data from existing sources, including perspectives of community members/leaders who were not direct participants in project activities, and integrating mixed methods or other ways to measure change

such as, but not limited to, contribution analysis, Most Significant Change (MSC) studies and outcome mapping. The methodology should include an approach to validate results.

The evaluation design must include a detailed explanation of how “Do No Harm” principles will be effectively integrated into all stages of the work, including recruitment of participants, data collection and management, and reporting.

To augment the information provided by the TOCOR, the evaluation contractor will conduct a review of existing literature and information regarding current state-of-the-art knowledge about the nexus of religious identity, conflict, and peacebuilding. In addition, the evaluation contractor will convene at least four meetings/conference calls with DCHA/CMM, the relevant USAID Missions, and the field-based implementing partners to discuss the purpose and design of the evaluation.

The literature review and consultative process will inform the contractor’s development of a detailed evaluation package comprised of a final staffing plan (including local consultants), evaluation design, work plan, budget (including level of effort), and literature review (as an annex) for Task One. The evaluation package will be submitted to the TOCOR for review, comment, and approval.

Phase 2 – Baseline Data Collection and Analysis

Phase 2 activities will be conducted sequentially, that is, baseline data collection in one of the target countries will be completed before proceeding to the second. This approach will allow for lessons learned from the initial field work to inform modifications of the evaluation tools or approach for use in baseline data collection in the second target country.

Phase 2 also includes periodic evaluation team engagement in reviewing quarterly and annual progress reports from the implementing partners as well as other routine monitoring and evaluation reports from the implementing partners or from Mission staff. In addition, the evaluation team leader will participate in quarterly conference calls with DCHA/CMM, the relevant USAID Missions, and implementing partners, if requested by the TOCOR, to periodically discuss progress, challenges, monitoring and evaluation results, etc.

Phase 3 – End-of-Project Data Collection and Analysis

Phase 3 data collection will take place within approximately four months prior to the conclusion of project activities. Some flexibility will be required as the end dates of the field-based projects may be extended by USAID due to programmatic considerations during implementation.

Note: Depending on technical considerations and available resources, USAID may seek to fund an additional set of field visits to be conducted approximately 12 months after the conclusion of the Reconciliation Fund programs. The purpose this data collection would be to determine which results noted at the end of each project were sustained and to determine, to the extent feasible, how and why achievements were sustainable (or not). While this subsequent data collection stage is not part of this contract, the offeror is expected to take into consideration this potential while developing evaluation instruments and indicators.

C.2.6 Evaluation Team Composition

The Contractor will furnish an adequate mix of experts and support staff with the appropriate education, skills, experience, and roles to produce a high quality evaluation. USAID has identified the following two Key Personnel for Task One: The Evaluation Team Leader and Senior Conflict/Subject Matter Specialist #1.

Use of highly skilled local consultants is encouraged for field work in each target country. The contractor will propose other members of the evaluation team consistent with its technical and management approach. The evaluation team must have a thorough understanding of the conflict dynamics in the target countries relevant to this statement of work. The overall team composition must include relevant subject matter expertise, skills, and experience. The key personnel must meet the following requirements:

Evaluation Team Leader

The Evaluation Team Leader will have overall responsibility for all aspects of the study. S/he will be primarily responsible for communicating technical issues with the USAID TOCOR, developing and implementing the detailed evaluation methodology, managing and implementing the work plan and all related evaluation team activities, leading the literature review, conducting interviews, and writing technical products (draft and final evaluation reports, Technical Briefs, PowerPoint presentations). S/he shall also be responsible for presenting findings during in-briefings, out-briefings, and dissemination events.

Minimum requirements:

- Masters or PhD in international development, conflict and peacebuilding, sociology, evaluation, or related area
- Experience in conducting and leading field-based development project evaluations related to conflict, peacebuilding, democracy and governance, or a related field; prior experience related to evaluating conflict and peacebuilding in an inter-religious context highly desirable. A candidate with a PhD must have a minimum of four (4) years of relevant experience whereas a candidate with a Masters degree must have a minimum of six (6) years of relevant experience.
- Relevant subject matter expertise as demonstrated by published evaluations or peer-reviewed articles
- Strong analytic skills related to conflict, peacebuilding, and conflict dynamics; experience with religious dimensions of conflict and peacebuilding desired
- Excellent written and oral communication skills in English
- Strong organizational and team management skills

Senior Conflict/Subject Matter Specialist #1

In addition, the Senior Conflict/Subject Matter Specialist #1 will be designated as a Key Personnel position and must meet the specified criteria below.

Minimum requirements:

- At least five (5) years' relevant experience working for a university, development agency, or non-governmental organization, preferably engaged in development or humanitarian assistance
- Some relevant expertise and experience conducting program evaluation or similar research and analytical work
- Working-level written and verbal communication skills in English
- Fluency in relevant local languages desirable but not required.

At least one senior-level conflict/subject matter specialist for each target country will serve on the evaluation team and will support the Evaluation Team Leader with research, data collection, analysis, and

writing. The contractor should compose a team with complementary expertise and experience to support learning across different country contexts. Identification of highly qualified local expertise is encouraged.

USAID expects that the evaluation team will have other, non-Key Personnel members including, but not limited to:

Senior Conflict/Subject Matter Specialist #2

This second Senior Conflict/Subject Matter Specialist should meet the same criteria as listed above.

**Logistician #1 and
Logistician #2**

A logistics/management/administrative specialist for each target country can provide administrative and logistical support to the assessment, including arranging for transportation, communication, purchase of materials, completion of paperwork, and similar tasks. This individual may be required to provide services prior to the expatriate team's departure and during the length of the data collection process.

Suggested qualification requirements:

- Understanding of the local country context and systems
- Excellent organizational skills
- Excellent communication skills in English
- Fluency in local language(s), if appropriate

All team members will be required to provide a signed statement attesting to a lack of conflict of interest or describing an existing conflict of interest. In addition, members will sign non-disclosure statements limiting the use of project materials, as provided to the team, to purposes of conducting the evaluation.

C.2.7 Illustrative Evaluation Schedule

The following illustrative schedule is provided for planning purposes and may be adjusted accordingly. The schedule is based on the assumption that all four projects selected for evaluation will be awarded by the end of Fiscal Year 2015.

Date	Action
September 29, 2015	Evaluation Task Order Award
October 2015	TOCOR provides country-specific technical information
October/November 2015	Phase 1 - Literature review and consultations ⁶ with USAID and implementing partners
November/December 2015	Phase 1 - Draft Evaluation Package due to TOCOR USAID comments provided

⁶ Consultations may be conducted in Washington DC with DCHA/CMM staff and/or by conference call with individuals in the field.

December 2015/January 2016	Phase 1 - Final Evaluation Package approved by TOCOR
January/February 2016	Phase 2 – Baseline field visits completed in first target country
February/March 2016	Phase 2 – Baseline field visits completed in second target country
April 2016	Phase 2 - Draft baseline report completed
May 2016	Phase 2 - Final baseline report completed
May/June 2016	Phase 2 – Baseline data briefings
July 2016 – March 2017	Phase 2 – Interim meetings/conference calls
March/April 2017	Phase 3 – Preparation for end-of-project field work
April/May 2017	Phase 3 – end-of-project field visit in Africa completed
June 2017	Phase 3 – end-of-project field visit in Asia completed
July 2017	Phase 3 - Draft end-of-project evaluation report
July/August 2017	Phase 3 - Draft Technical Briefs (2)
August 2017	Phase 3 - Final end-of-project evaluation report
August/September 2017	Phase 3 - Final Technical Briefs
September/October 2017	Phase 3 – USG presentations and Dissemination workshop

C.3 TASK TWO – IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE) LEARNING PROGRAM

C.3.1 Purpose

As part of its broader technical learning agenda, DCHA/CMM seeks to partner with other USAID offices and Missions to implement a Learning Program in conflict management and mitigation. A Learning Program will be designed to meet the technical field objectives of a Mission, capture best practices and lessons learned from the field, and inform future practice in conflict-related programming around the world. DCHA/CMM will provide technical support services for analysis, design, project facilitation, monitoring, evaluation, and knowledge sharing in support of a USAID Mission’s Learning Program.

Thus, the “CVE Learning Program” has two components --- (1) a field-based program (managed by a USAID Mission) to implement CVE interventions, and (2) an impact evaluation (managed by DCHA/CMM) of the field-based program.

The contractor will address the second component, the design and implementation of a baseline, a mid-term and end-line impact evaluation.

Improving the effectiveness of USAID's development tools in responding to violent extremism and insurgency, as well as strengthening USAID's capacity to interact constructively with the interagency and other partners in these challenging environments, requires sound theoretical and analytical approaches to identify, measure, and disseminate best practices and lessons learned. A renewed focus on targeted capacity building and sustainability in USAID CVE programming is critical to supporting long-term USG security and development goals.

The Contractor will evaluate the impact of a field-based Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program in order to test specific theories of change and assess the effectiveness of USAID interventions by measuring results attributable to CVE programming.

The results will be used to (a) update guidance for USAID field staff and implementing partners for effective development programming in response to violent extremism, and (b) publish, disseminate and support the uptake of lessons learned and best practices in CVE programming to the broader development and peacebuilding communities, including the USG interagency.

C.3.2 Background

Countering Violent Extremism

USAID defines "violent extremism" as "advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and political objectives."

Countering violent extremism through *prevention* is a growing USG policy priority. The 2015 National Security Strategy⁷ underscores the importance of prevention, stating that U.S. "efforts to work with other countries to counter the ideology and root causes of violent extremism will be more important than our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield." The 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)⁸ highlights three priorities for USG engagement: (1) strengthen efforts to counter and prevent violent extremism, (2) expand analytics, and (3) enhance USAID's role through creation of a CVE Secretariat.

USAID has been a thought leader in linking development assistance programming to respond to violent extremism and has published several important documents for policymakers, field-based professionals, and other implementing partners. The "USAID Guide to Drivers of Violent Extremism"⁹ emphasizes the importance of avoiding broad generalizations across regions, countries, and time periods regarding the "underlying conditions" that give rise to violent extremist organizations, since extremist organizations have emerged in radically different social, political and economic environments. While such contextual factors do matter — they may create grievances and opportunities for violence — the grievances and opportunities in question may not actually lead to violence in the absence of political entrepreneurs, ideologues, and/or organizations that can frame and channel the relevant grievances in violent directions, and that can make the most of the opportunities for violence with which a particular setting presents them. Extremist movements typically appear to be more concerned with issues of identity, existential threats, perceived humiliation, cultural domination and oppression.

Effective CVE programming should neither overemphasize the role of "push factors" (conditions that favor the spread and appeal of violent extremism, i.e. social marginalization) nor underestimate the critical role played by "pull factors" (factors that make joining a violent extremist group potentially attractive to an individual) such as the appeal of a particular leader or inspirational figure, or the material,

⁷ https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf

⁸ <http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/>

⁹ USAID Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADT978.pdf

emotional or spiritual benefits (i.e. prospect of glory or fame, access to material resources, social status, sense of belonging, self-esteem, personal empowerment) which affiliation with a group may confer.

USAID has also published "Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming" to provide development professional and implementing partners with a six-step process for designing CVE interventions tailored to the unique country context in which they are working.

CVE Learning Program

The two components of the CVE Learning Program – (1) the field-based program and (2) the impact evaluation - will be designed and implemented in parallel. DCHA/CMM and the relevant Regional Bureau will provide technical assistance to a Mission to design a field-based CVE prevention and mitigation program based on a well-crafted set of theories of change,¹⁰ best practices, and state-of-the-art inputs.

Through the Evaluation Task Order, DCHA/CMM will ensure a rigorous approach to learning by supporting an impact evaluation of the field-based program. This challenging effort will require close collaboration between DCHA/CMM and other USAID/Washington offices, the field Mission, the evaluation team, and the partner subsequently identified to implement the field-based program.

The impact evaluation is one of several approaches which DCHA/CMM will support to ensure robust dissemination and discussion of best practices regarding CVE programming. Part of the evaluation activities will include: (1) feature CVE as a theme at two Knowledge Management meetings among the PEACE IQC holders¹¹, (2) conduct two workshops (one in the field; one in the U.S.) to share final evaluation results with implementing partners, donors, academics and experts, among others, (3) draft two Technical Briefs highlighting key findings from the impact evaluation, (4) present the findings of the impact evaluation to USAID's global Evaluation Interest Group (EIG), and (5) develop and implement a supplemental communications and outreach plan around the U.S.-based workshop. Further details about these activities and the expected role of the evaluation contractor are presented in F.

C.3.3 Program Information

One field-based CVE Learning Program in Africa or Asia will be identified for evaluation under Task Two. For planning purposes, an illustrative project is described below:

Project Name	<i>Field-Based CVE Learning Program</i>
Implementing Partner	TBD
Award Number	TBD
Estimated duration	5 years (beginning in FY2016)
Estimated budget	\$20 - \$30 million, pending funds availability
Geographic areas	TBD

C.3.4 Illustrative Evaluation Questions

¹⁰ USAID Theories and Indicators of Change: Concepts and Primers for Conflict Management and Mitigation, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAED180.pdf

¹¹ See IQC awards, section F.4(c).

As the field-based Task of the CVE Learning Program has yet to be designed, the specific theories of change, interventions, and geographic areas are not defined. For planning purposes, DCHA/CMM is providing two illustrative evaluation questions highlighting potential areas of inquiry:

- What combination of CVE interventions is most effective at producing changes in knowledge, attitudes, skills, and behaviors that foster resilience and reduce the risk of individuals engaging in violent extremism?

Much of the literature on violent extremism suggests that pull factors often trump push factors, however, this has not been well tested programmatically. One area of study could include a comparison of targeting interventions to address pull factors vs targeting push factors vs a combination of both. Does the quality of interventions (fidelity of implementation according to project standards, guidelines, plans or according to USAID CVE programming guidelines) influence the results achieved? The specific combinations to be tested will be determined in consultation with stakeholders at the USAID Mission, DCHA/CMM, and the relevant Regional Bureau as well as the implementing partner selected to carry out the field-based interventions.

- For which target group(s) are the various interventions most effective?

The evaluation should address gender differences. Other areas to examine may include analysis according to age level (while most programs target 14-25 year olds, it could be that at-risk youth should be reached at an earlier age) or other demographic indicators.

These questions are illustrative and will be further refined once the objectives of the field-based program are defined.

Based on the results of this evaluation, the contractor will also provide recommendations for lessons learned and best practices for:

- designing theories of change for CVE programs
- measuring CVE “pull” factors

C.3.5 Evaluation Design and Methodology

After award of the Evaluation Task Order, DCHA/CMM will identify a field-based CVE program to be evaluated. The design and methodology for this impact evaluation must generate the highest quality and most credible evidence that corresponds to the evaluation questions. The contractor will engage with DCHA/CMM and the field Mission during four phases of the impact evaluation as follows:

Phase 1 – Design of the Field-Based CVE Learning Program

The impact evaluation team leader (the Principal Investigator (PI), see section C.3.6) will serve as a subject matter expert to provide technical consultation to DCHA/CMM and the field Mission in the design of the field-based CVE Learning Program. Illustrative tasks for the PI during Phase 1 may include:

- providing technical input towards the formulation of a well-crafted theory /sub-theories of change to effectively balance effective CVE programming needs and priorities on the ground as well as guiding project design so that an impact evaluation can be performed

- providing technical input for illustrative performance indicators for the field-based CVE Learning Program
- providing technical input for instructions and evaluation criteria to help USAID assess the quality of offeror proposals for CVE program monitoring and evaluation

Because of the nature of this engagement during the pre-solicitation phase of the field-based CVE Learning Program, the PI must not have a conflict of interest and must sign a non-disclosure agreement.

Phase 2 – Collaborative Design of the CVE Learning Program Impact Evaluation

As soon as possible following award of the Mission's field-based CVE program, the PI will travel to the field to (a) facilitate planning meetings to bring USAID and the field-based implementing partner together to collaboratively design the impact evaluation to optimize learning opportunities, and (b) to conduct site visits to begin scoping geographic areas for comparison, interview key stakeholders, and collect secondary data already available in-country for purposes of preparing a evaluability assessment which will eventually inform the evaluation design and work plan.

The evaluation contractor will provide logistical support to convene two, one-day field-based evaluation planning meetings for approximately 15 – 20 participants each. The first evaluation planning meeting will be convened prior to the scoping site visits. The PI will play a pivotal role in preparing the agenda and materials for this meeting and for facilitating discussion.

The PI will then conduct scoping site visits to inform the preparation of the evaluability assessment to analyze the extent to which a project can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion, including a review of program objectives and activities to determine whether these are sufficiently defined and results are verifiable. Typical questions to be addressed in an evaluability assessment include:

- Does the quality of the design of the program allow for the evaluation?
 - Is the justification of the intervention realistic?
 - Are the objectives of the program clear, realistic and understood by stakeholders?
 - Are there SMART performance indicators?
 - Is the logframe flexible and responsive to external factors?
- Are the results of the program verifiable based on the planned collection systems?
 - Will baseline data be available to track change?
 - Is monitoring data planned to be collected on a regular basis against performance indicators?
- Would the evaluation be feasible, credible and useful?
 - Does the timing of the evaluation fit into the program cycle?
 - Have the building blocks of the program, if any, been previously evaluated?
 - Can external factors (political, climatic, security etc.) hamper the evaluation?
 - What is the budget needed for conducting the evaluation exercise?

Following the scoping site visits, the evaluation contractor will convene the second evaluation planning meeting to debrief on findings and to revise and refine a potential evaluation framework.

Within two weeks after the PI's return from the field, the evaluation contractor will submit an evaluability

analysis which must include options for: evaluation questions, evaluation methodology (including sample size calculations, geographic areas target groups for sampling frame, etc.), and cost estimates for evaluation options.

Note: While it is DCHA/CMM's intention to support an impact evaluation for the CVE Learning Program, if the evaluability assessment indicates that a high-quality impact evaluation cannot be implemented (and if USAID accepts this conclusion), the evaluation contractor will include recommendations for a robust performance and/or formative evaluation as a viable alternative. Accordingly, the description of Phase 3 in this Task is intended to be illustrative, based on the goal of conducting an impact evaluation. Recognizing that flexibility is essential for success, USAID and the evaluation contractor may need to revise the specific elements of Phase 3 based on the results of the Phase 2 analysis.

Based on USAID review and feedback, the contractor will then prepare an Evaluation Design and Work Plan for USAID technical approval. The design and work plan must include a detailed explanation of how "Do No Harm" principles will be effectively integrated into all stages of the work, including recruitment of participants, data collection and management, and reporting.

Phase 3 – Conducting the CVE Learning Program Impact Evaluation

The CVE Learning Program Impact Evaluation will consist of a baseline, mid-term, and end-of-project evaluation within intervention and comparison areas.

Data collection methods may include focus group discussions, group interviews, key informant interviews, and individual surveys. The evaluation should also use secondary data if available. Use of local expertise, when available and of high technical quality, is strongly encouraged for data collection purposes.

During the course of field program implementation, copies of the approved field project work plan, Monitoring and Evaluation plan, quarterly and annual progress reports, and evaluation reports produced by the implementing partner will be provided to the evaluation team. Maintaining a strong partnership among the field-based implementing partner, USAID in Washington and in the field, and the evaluation contractor is essential. The PI will actively participate in regular video/conference calls with USAID and implementing partner representatives to discuss progress on the ground, discuss overall implementation achievements and challenges, and prepare for baseline, mid-term, and final evaluations.

Phase 4 – Sharing Knowledge from the CVE Learning Program

To ensure broad dissemination of knowledge gained from the CVE Learning Program, the evaluation contractor will provide the following support:

- *Knowledge Management Meetings* - The Evaluation Team Leader will attend two, half-day PEACE IQC Knowledge Management meetings in the Washington DC metro area to (a) present preliminary results of the mid-term evaluation, and (b) participate in a panel discussion on CVE activities.
- *Best Practices and Lessons Learned Dissemination Workshops* - The evaluation contractor will convene two invitational dissemination workshops to share final evaluation results with a broad range of stakeholders including USAID staff, other representatives from the USG interagency, NGOs, academics, donors, and host country officials. One one-day meeting will be convened in

the field for approximately 50 participants. The second, one-day meeting will be convened in the Washington DC metro area for approximately 100 participants.

- *Presentation at USAID's global Evaluation Interest Group* – The PI will present the findings from the final impact evaluation report at an EIG meeting in Washington, DC.
- *Technical Briefs* – In addition to the baseline and final evaluation reports, the contractor will produce two Technical Briefs highlighting key findings from the impact evaluation.

DCHA/CMM will, in consultation with the evaluation contractor, develop and implement a supplemental communications and outreach plan around the U.S.-based best practices and lessons learned dissemination meeting. The evaluation contractor will *not* be responsible for implementing the supplemental communications and outreach plan.

C.3.6 Impact Evaluation Team Composition

The contractor is expected to propose an evaluation team with the appropriate education, skills, experience, and roles which will produce a high quality impact evaluation in the challenging context of CVE programming. USAID has defined the Principal Investigator (PI), the Senior Impact Evaluation Methodologist, and the Senior Technical Position as three Key Personnel under Task Two. The overall team composition must include relevant subject matter expertise, skills, and experience. Use of highly skilled local consultants is encouraged. The key personnel must meet the following requirements:

Principal Investigator

The PI will have overall responsibility for all aspects of the study. S/he will be primarily responsible for communicating technical issues with the USAID TOCOR, developing and implementing the detailed impact evaluation methodology and tools, managing and implementing the work plan and all related evaluation team activities, conducting interviews, actively engaging in data analysis, and writing technical products (draft and final evaluation reports, Technical Briefs, PowerPoint presentations, etc.). S/he shall also be responsible for presenting findings during in-briefings, out-briefings, and dissemination events.

Minimum requirements:

- PhD in political science, sociology, international development, conflict and peacebuilding, or related area
- Demonstrated experience and expertise designing and implementing rigorous project evaluations or similar analyses using randomized or mixed-method research approaches
- Relevant subject matter expertise in violent extremism studies or a related field as demonstrated by professional publications, research, and/or peer-reviewed articles
- Strong analytic skills related to conflict, peacebuilding, and conflict dynamics
- Strong background in understanding how to assess conflict dynamics. Knowledge and application USAID's Conflict Assessment Framework as well as USAID's Drivers of Violent Extremism is desirable but not required
- Excellent written and oral communication skills in English
- Strong organizational and team management skills

Senior Impact Evaluation Methodologist

The Senior Impact Evaluation Methodologist will provide expertise in the design of a high quality, practical impact evaluation for the CVE Learning Program. The Senior Methodologist will work closely with the PI to prepare the evaluability assessment and subsequent evaluation design and work plan, including but not limited to identifying comparison and intervention areas, establishing a sampling frame and size, developing data collection tools and protocols, ensuring data quality, preparing training materials for field surveyors, etc. The Senior Methodologist will provide significant support for data analysis and synthesis.

Minimum requirements:

- Master's level degree or equivalent in relevant field, such as political science, sociology, statistics, economics, or similar field.
- Senior-level expertise in evaluating impact analysis methodology as demonstrated by at least five years of work experience and professional publications, research, and/or peer-reviewed articles, preferably in peace and governance foreign assistance programs.
- Excellent writing and editorial skills in English.
- Relevant subject matter expertise in violent extremism studies or a related field

Senior Technical Position

The contractor will define the title, roles and responsibilities, and qualifications for this position, along with a suitable candidate, upon submission of the evaluation design and work plan. This will enable the contractor to craft this position and identify a candidate best suited to the needs of the approved evaluation design and approach.

USAID expects that the evaluation team will have other, non-Key Personnel members including, but not limited to:

Associate Research Coordinator

The Associate Research Coordinator can support and assist the PI in all aspects of the project (data collection, analysis, document preparation, and logistics). Excellent written and verbal communication skills, along with exceptional attention to detail and strong organizational skills, would be essential.

Suggested qualifications:

- Masters in political science, economics, conflict and peacebuilding or similar field.
- Demonstrated knowledge of and experience using statistics, qualitative and quantitative data analysis methods.
- Skills in STATA or comparable statistical software, database management/utilization, and Microsoft Office.
- Experience managing research or evaluation projects in developing countries is highly desirable.
- Skills in administration, accounting/budgeting,
- Excellent written/verbal communication, with demonstrated experience in drafting research protocols, papers, and reports for USG and/or international audiences.

The contractor will propose other members of the evaluation team consistent with its technical and management approach.

The contractor is encouraged to identify a local research organization (if applicable) capable of conducting high quality qualitative and quantitative data in support of baseline field research, including

the evaluability assessment, baseline, mid-term, and end-of-project assessments.

All team members will be required to provide a signed statement attesting to a lack of conflict of interest or describing an existing conflict of interest. In addition, members will sign non-disclosure statements limiting the use of project materials, as provided to the team, to purposes of conducting the evaluation.

C.3.8 Evaluation Schedule

The following illustrative schedule is provided for planning purposes and assumes that the field-based CVE Learning Program will be four to five years in duration, and will be awarded and begin implementation in FY2016 (= Year One in the table below).

Date	Action
September 29, 2015	Evaluation Task Order Award
Year One	Phase 1 – Technical input
Year One	Phase 2 – Impact Evaluation Planning Workshop Phase 2 – Preparatory Field Visit
Year One	Phase 2 – Evaluability Assessment Phase 2 – Evaluation Design and Work Plan
Year One	Phase 3 – Baseline Field Work
Year One/Year Two	Phase 3 – Baseline Evaluation Report
Year Two	Phase 3 – Baseline Evaluation Briefing
Year Three	Phase 3 – Mid-Term Evaluation Field Work
Year Four	Phase 3 – Mid-Term Evaluation Report Phase 3 – Mid-Term Evaluation Briefing Phase 4 – Knowledge Management Meeting #1 Phase 4 – Technical Brief #1
Year Five	Phase 3 – Final Evaluation Field Work Phase 3 – Final Evaluation Report Phase 4 – Knowledge Management Meeting #2 Phase 4 – Technical Brief #2 Phase 3 – Final Evaluation Briefing Phase 4 – Field-based Dissemination Workshop Phase 4 – WDC-based Dissemination Workshop Phase 4 – EIG presentation

C.4 ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

C.4.1 Gender Analysis

USAID policy requires that gender issues be addressed as appropriate in all USAID-funded activities. All USAID funded programs require that the different roles of men and women, the relationship between and among men and women be taken into account into the entire activity cycle, from design and implementation to monitoring and evaluation.

Religious identity, like conflict dynamics, engages men and women in different ways and often defines different gender-specific roles. To help USAID understand the gendered aspects of the interrelationships between religious identity (as part of other identity groups), conflict dynamics, and peacebuilding/resilience, the Contractor must address the following question: How does incorporating activities with

religious leaders or engaging religious identities influence the participation of women and of youth in specific people-to-people peacebuilding activities?

Violent extremism impacts women and men differently. Whereas men, including boys of younger ages, may be at greater risk for recruitment into extremist groups, women can play a dual role in either supporting or discouraging participation. Women can also play a support role for extremist groups. Under Task Two, the evaluation should address gender differences and determine how gender relations have affected the achievement of results. The contractor is also expected to determine for which target group(s) the various interventions were most effective.

Data disaggregation and analysis by sex is anticipated under both Tasks.

C.4.2 Criteria to Ensure the Quality of the Evaluation Reports

Per the USAID Evaluation Policy, draft and final evaluation reports will be evaluated against the following criteria to ensure the quality of the evaluation report:

- The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well-researched, and well-organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the project, what did not, and why.
- Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the SOW.
- The evaluation report should include the SOW as an annex. All modifications to the SOW—whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology, or timeline—need to be agreed upon in writing by the AOR/COR.
- The evaluation methodology shall be explained in detail. All tools used in conducting the evaluation—such as questionnaires, checklists, and discussion guides—will be included in an annex in the final report.
- Evaluation findings will assess outcomes and impact on males and females.
- Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).
- Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence, and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay, or the compilation of people's opinions. Findings should be specific, concise, and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.
- Sources of information need to be properly identified and listed in an annex.
- Recommendations need to be supported by a specific set of findings.
- Recommendations should be action-oriented, practical, and specific, with defined responsibility for the action.

C.4.3 Other Requirements

All quantitative data collected by the evaluation team must be provided in an electronic file in easily readable format agreed upon with the TOCOR. The data should be organized and fully documented for use by those not fully familiar with the project or the evaluation. USAID will retain ownership of the survey and all datasets developed.

C.4.4 Logistics

The contractor will recruit and hire the evaluation team members, coordinate and manage the evaluation team. The contractor will also make logistical arrangements for the evaluation team, including travel and transportation, country travel clearance, lodging, and communications. This also includes arranging for working/office space, computers, printing and photocopying.

[END OF SECTION C]

ANNEX B: EVALUATION TOOLS (ENDLINE)

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

Implementing Partners, Local Project Partners, Individual Project Participants

Interviewer:

Interpreter:

Date:

Location:

Notetaker [*if different from Interviewer*]:

Info for each respondent [*can attach a sign-in sheet*]:

Respondent Name:

Title:

Organization:

Respondent Type:

Sex:

Religion:

Youth / Adult (over 35 years):

Location of work/residence:

Others attending interview: [*non-respondent attendants in interview*]

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. [*Introduce team members.*]

- We are a research team studying religion and peacebuilding (édification de la paix) in international development programs.
- As part of this study, we are focusing on examples from South Thailand and the Central African Republic.
- The research will be used to help organizations to improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is a part of the operating environment.
- Although religion is the main theme for our research, we understand that the analysis of conflict in the Central African Republic is more complex than our narrow focus on religion.
- Your insight will help us to better understand the ways in which religion is and is not a part of the conflict or in efforts to support peace.
- This interview is a follow-up on our Baseline field work conducted in May 2016.

Your participation is voluntary and you can end this interview at any time. Any quotations from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name or your organization.

IC1. Do you have any questions about this interview process?

If “ yes” what is the question?

IC2. We usually list the names of the people we have interviewed for this research in an annex of the report. Would you feel comfortable being included in this list of interviewees?

IC3. Do you willingly agree to participate in this evaluation?

OPENING

1. Organizational Role/Role de l'organisation

IP/Local Partner: What is your organization's role in the implementation of the P2P project?

Quelle est le rôle de votre organisation dans la réalisation du projet?

Participant: How is your organization involved with the P2P project?

De quelle manière êtes vous impliqué dans le projet?

Subject matter Expert: How are you or your organization aware of the P2P project?

2. Personal role/Role personnel

IP/Local Partner: What are your main duties and responsibilities for the P2P Project?

Quel sont vos devoirs et responsabilités vis-a-vis le projet personne à personne?

Participant: How did you personally participate in the P2P Project?

De quelle manière avez-vous participé personnellement au projet?

Subject matter Expert: How are you personally involved with the P2P project, if at all?

3. Duration/Duree

IP/Local Partner: How long have you been in this role?

Pendant combien de temps êtes-vous dans ce rôle?

Participant: When did you first begin participating in the project?

Quand avez-vous commence à participer à ce projet?

Subject matter Expert: When did you first become familiar with the P2P project?

ROLES AND EFFICACY OF PARTICIPATING RELIGIOUS LEADERS [I-A]

NOTE: If respondent is a religious leader project participant, rephrase the question in terms of his/her personal experience.

4. What if any **roles did participating religious leaders [you]** play in the P2P project?

Quel rôle les leaders religieux ont-ils joués dans le projet?

5. What **motivated** the religious leaders involved to pursue this project? (EIPP Table 10 Evaluation Criteria)

qu'est-ce qui à motiver les leaders religieux pour s'impliquer dans le projet?

6. How did religious leaders' [your] **role in the project change** since the project started in 2015?

Depuis le commencement du projet en 2015, de quelle manière ont-ils changés les rôles des leaders religieux?

7. How were the roles that religious leaders played in this project the **same or different from those of secular leaders?** What, if any, difference was there in the level of effectiveness?

De quelle manière le rôle des leaders religieux dans le projet est-il différent de celui des leaders séculiers? Est-ce qu'il y a une différence au niveau de l'efficacité?

8. How were the roles of male religious leaders in this project the same or different for **women religious**

leaders? What, if any, difference was there in the level of effectiveness?

De quelle manière le rôle des leaders hommes dans ce projet est-il différent de celui des femmes leaders? Est-ce qu'il y a une différence au niveau de l'efficacité?

9. How were the roles of adult religious leaders in this project the same or different from the roles of youth religious leaders (35 years and under)? What, if any, difference was there in the level of effectiveness?

De quelle manière sont les rôles des jeunes leaders religieux même que ou différent de ceux des leaders adultes ? Est-ce qu'il y a une différence au niveau de l'efficacité?

10. How different or the same were the roles of religious leaders of different faiths in the implementation of the project? What, if any, difference was there in the level of effectiveness?

De quelle manière diffèrent les rôles des leaders religieux des différentes confessions? Est-ce qu'il y a une différence au niveau de l'efficacité ?

EFFICACY OF PARTICIPATING RELIGIOUS LEADERS [2-B]

11. How has the participation of religious leaders affected project outcomes?

De quelle manière la participation des leaders religieux ont influencé les résultats des projets?

Probe: What contributions, if any, did religious leaders who participated in the project make to the outcomes of the project?

Quelles étaient les contributions de ces leaders religieux envers les résultats des projets?

Probe: If participating religious leaders made strong contributions to the project outcomes, what helped them to be effective?

Qu'est-ce qui a rendu le rôle des leaders religieux plus efficace dans la réalisation des résultats des projets?

Probe: If participating religious leaders did not make strong contributions to the project outcomes, what made their roles less effective?

Qu'est-ce qui a rendu le rôle des acteurs religieux moins efficace dans la réalisation du projet?

NON-PARTICIPATING RELIGIOUS LEADERS [1-A]

12. Why did some religious leaders not participate in the project?

Pourquoi certains leaders religieux n'ont pas voulu participer au projet?

13. What were the **results of non-participation** of these religious leaders on project outcomes?

Losque les leaders religieux refusent de participer au projet quels étaient les résultats?

ROLES OF PARTICIPATING RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS [I-A]

Examples of religious institutions: AEC, FATEB, Apostolic Churches, Baptist Churches, Caritas, Union des Soeurs, Legion de Marie, Islamic Council, Madrasta, Saint Charles, Lycee PIXII

14. What if any **roles did participating religious institutions [your institution]** play in the P2P project?

Quel rôle las institutions religieuses ont-ils joués dans le projet?

15. What **motivated** the religious institutions to get involved in this project? (EIPP Table 10 Evaluation Criteria)

Qu'est-ce qui à motiver las institutions religieuses pour s'impliquer dans le projet?

16. How did the role of [your] religious institutions' **in the project change** since the project started in 2015?

Depuis le commencement du projet en 2015, de quelle manière ont-ils changés les rôles de las institutions religieuses?

17. How were the roles that religious institutions played in this project the **same or different from those of secular institutions**? What, if any, difference was there in the level of effectiveness? ⁶

De quelle manière le rôle de las institutions religieuses dans le projet est-il différent de celui de las institutions séculiers? Est-ce qu'il y a une différence au niveau de l'efficacité?

18. How different or the same were the roles of religious institutions of different faiths in the implementation of the project? What, if any, difference was there in the level of effectiveness?

De quelle manière différent les rôles de las institutions religieuses des différentes confessions? Est-ce qu'il y a une différence au niveau de l'efficacité?

⁶ Linked to EIPP Table 10 Evaluation Criteria: Where appropriate, how well have inter-religious actors collaborated with secular initiatives?

EFFICACY OF PARTICIPATING RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS [2-B]

19. How has the participation of religious institutions affected project outcomes?

De quelle maniere la participation de las institutions religieuses ont influence les resultats des projet?

Probe: What contributions, if any, did religious institutions make to the outcomes of the project?

Quelles étaient les contributions de cetttes institutions religieuses envers les résultats des projets?

Probe: If participating religious institutions made strong contributions to the project outcomes, what helped them to be effective?

Qu'est-ce a rendu le rôle de las institutions religieuses plus efficace dans la réalisation des résultats des projets?

Probe: If participating religious institutions did not make strong contributions to the project outcomes, what made their roles less effective?

Qu'est-ce qui a rendu le rôle de las institutions religieuses moins efficace dans la réalisation du projet?

NON-PARTICIPATING RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS [1-A]

20. Why did some religious institutions not participate in the project?

Pourquoi certains institutions religieuses n'ont pas voulu participer au projet?

21. What were the results of non-participation of these religious institutions on project outcomes?

Losque las institutions religieuses refusent de participer au projet quels étaient les résultats?

INCLUSION OF RELIGION IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION [1-B]

NOTE: Skip this section for project participants and Subject Matter Experts.

22. How did the project recognize and address key conflict drivers and aspects of peace factors that are

related to religion?⁷ (conflict assessment / context assessment)

De quelle manière avez-vous tenu compte des causes/sources des conflits et les aspects des facteurs de paix qui sont liés à la religion?

23. How is religious identity taken into account when hiring and training project staff?

De quelle manière avez-vous considéré l'identité religieuse de candidats dans les processus de recrutement et de formation des personnels du projet?

24. How is the religion of vendors considered when purchasing supplies or services (procurement)?

De quelle manière la religion est-elle prise en compte quant à l'achat des fournitures ou des services?

25. How does the project's monitoring and evaluation design take into account religion (e.g., religious identity of participants; changes in attitudes/behaviors, knowledge related to religion; use of religious messaging; religious institutional partnerships)?

De quelle manière la religion prend en compte le suivi et l'évaluation du projet?

26. How was religion a factor in the selection of participants in the P2P project?

De quelle manière le choix des participants au projet personne a personne a pris en compte aspect religieux?
?

Probe: How did the project include participants with different religious backgrounds?

Comment est-ce que le projet a assuré l'inclusion des participants des différentes 'identités religieuses.

Probe: What, if any, differences were there in the motivations of participants based on their religious identity or beliefs?

Motivation des participants

[NOTE: *Comments regarding selection might include outreach strategies, selection criteria, identity characteristics, willingness to participate, etc.*]

⁷ Linked to EIPP Table 10 Evaluation Criteria: Which of the key conflict drivers and peace factors have aspects that are related to religion? How does the initiative recognize and address them? Does the initiative align with the contextual understanding of the faith groups involved? Does it meet their felt needs with regards to the issue being addressed?

27. For each of these (conflict/context assessments, staffing, procurement, participant selection), what were the **challenges** faced in terms of taking religion into account?

Pour tous les facteurs qui suit (études des conflits et du contexte ; recrutement des personnels ; approvisionnement ; sélection des participants, etc) quels étaient les défis/difficultés rencontrés en ce qui concerne la religion?

28. For each of these (conflict/context assessments, staffing, procurement, participant selection), what were the **opportunities** presented in terms of taking religion into account?

Pour tous les facteurs qui suit (études des conflits et du contexte ; recrutement des personnels ; approvisionnement ; sélection des participants, etc.) quels étaient les opportunités qui se sont présentées à vous en ce qui concerne la religion?

INTRA-/INTER-RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES [I-C]

29. How did the project conduct **intra-religious activities** and what were the Lessons Learned?⁸

Quelles sont les activités intra religieuses du projet et quelles sont les leçons apprises?

30. How did the project conduct **inter-religious activities** and what were the Lessons Learned?

Quelles sont les activités inter-religieuses du projet et quelles sont les leçons apprises?

31. What are Lessons Learned in terms of **sequencing** inter-religious activities and inter-religious activities?

Quelles sont les leçons apprises concernant le séquençage des activités inter-religieuses et intra-religieuses?

DO NO HARM [I-D]

32. What are Lessons Learned in terms of **precautions or risks of taking religion into account** in the design and implementation of the project?

Quelles sont les leçons retenues en ce qui concerne les précautions ou les risques de prendre en compte la

⁸ Linked to EIPP Table 10 Evaluation Criteria: In inter-faith initiatives, are intra-faith relations also being adequately addressed?

religion dans la planification et la réalisation du projet?

OUTCOME HARVESTING [2-A] & THEORIES OF CHANGE [2-E]

33. What were the **outcomes** of the project, both positive and negative?

Quels sont les résultats accomplis? (positifs ou négatives)?

34. What is **evidence** that these outcomes were achieved?

Quelles sont les preuves des résultats obtenus?

35. What have you noticed as changes in **nature and quality of the communication and coordination among religious groups** working together to implement this initiative?⁹

Quels sont les changements remarqués au niveau de coopération, de communication et de relation entre les groupes religieux qui se sont produits durant l'exécution de ce projet ?

36. How did inclusion of religion in design and implementation **prevent or support** outcomes from being achieved?

Dans quelle manière est-ce que l'inclusion de la religion dans la planification et la réalisation du projet a empêché ou soutenu les résultats du projet?

37. **DO NOT ASK PARTICIPANTS OR SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS:** What if any **key assumptions** changed over the course of implementation?

Que se passerait-il si les présuppositions changent au moment de la réalisation?

DISPARATE RESULTS [2D]

38. How did involvement of religion in project implementation lead to different outcomes for **male and female**

⁹ Linked to EIPP Table 10 Evaluation Criteria: What is the nature and quality of the communication and coordination among religious groups working together to implement this initiative?

project participants?

De quelle manière l'implication de la religion a-t-il produit des résultats différents en les participants hommes et femmes?

39. How did involvement of religion in the project implementation lead to different outcomes for **adult and youth** (<35 years) project participants?

De quelle manière l'implication de la religion a-t-il produit des résultats différents pour les adultes et les jeunes?

40. How did involvement of religion in project implementation lead to different outcomes based on **religious identity** of project participants?

Comment est-ce l'implication de la religion dans le projet a produit des résultats différents a base l' d'identité religieuse des participants au projet?

EXTERNAL FACTORS [2F]

41. What external factors **contributed to achieving** project results (both positive and negative)? [e.g., status of political transitions / peace negotiations, changes in levels of violence, regional dynamics, policies to address identity-based economic and social disparities, outcomes of other implementer activities]

Quels sont les facteurs externes qui ont contribué a la production des résultats (positifs ou négatifs)?

42. What external factors **prevented expected outcomes** from being achieved? [e.g., activities not implemented as planned, assumptions didn't hold, faulty logic, insufficient resources, changes in external conditions, action taken/not taken by key stakeholder]

Quels sont les facteurs qui ont empêché la réalisation des résultats escomptés du projet?

RELIGIOUS MESSAGING [2-C]

43. What were the **religious messages** disseminated by the project?

Quels sont les messages religieux utilisés par le projet?

44. How were these religious messages **disseminated**?

De quelle manière ces messages religieux sont utilisés?

45. What were the **results of these messages**?

Quels étaient les résultats de ces messages?

46. How are results from dissemination of religious messaging **different from non-religious messaging**?

De quelle manière les résultats de la diffusion des messages religieux sont-ils différents des messages non-religieux?

SUSTAINABILITY [3]

47. How does involving religion in the project **support the sustainability/continuation** of its outcomes after the end of the grant period?¹⁰

De quelle manière l'implication de la religion peut contribuer à la pérennisation des résultats du projet?

Probe: What are examples that project participants/partners will remain committed to **faith-based relationships and actions** (inter- or intra-) even in moments of crisis (resiliency)? [Adapted From EIPP Table 10 Evaluation Criteria]

Probe: What are examples that project participants/partners will remain committed to **faith-based mechanisms** already being used and/or relationships being tapped in moments of crisis? [From EIPP Table 10 Evaluation Criteria]

Probe: What are examples of **new groups, organizations, or institutions** that now work to support project outcomes as a result of including religion in the project?

48. How will involving religion **undermine sustainability** of project results after the end of the project period?

De quelle manière l'implication de la religion peut porter préjudice aux résultats du projet à la fin du projet?

CLOSING

49. Do you have any final observations or Lesson Learned related to religion and the implementation and

¹⁰ Examples of project activities may support sustainability could include improved capabilities of key stakeholders, institutionalized nonviolent conflict resolution processes and mechanisms, new or strengthened relationships that are likely to support ongoing sustainability of achieved results, etc.

results of the project?

Avez-vous quelque a ajouter sur la religion et le projet?

Thank you for taking the time to meet with our team as part of this study on the relationship between religion, peacebuilding and conflict. As next steps, we will aggregate the information from the CAR-based field work. We will then this integrate analysis with Thailand-based field work data next year. The final report that includes all four projects is expected to be completed by the end of 2018 and will be made publicly available online.

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE PROJECT PARTICIPANTS

Facilitator:

Interpreter:

Notetaker:

Location:

Date:

Implementing Partner: SFCG: _____ Mercy Corps: _____

Type of Participant: _____

Number of Men: Total: _____ Youth: _____ Adults: _____

Number of Women: Total: _____ Youth: _____ Adults: _____

Religious identity: Christian: _____ Muslim: _____ Other: _____

Unknown: _____

Attach attendance sheet with signatures indicating receipt of transportation costs reimbursement.

INTRODUCTION AND INFORMED CONSENT

[NOTE TO DATA COLLECTORS: *Be sure to write down everyone's first name and where they are sitting before you begin discussion.*]

INTRODUCTION: *Hello. My name is [YOUR NAME] and I am part of a research team that is studying the connection between religion and peacebuilding in international development. With me is [NAME OF INTERPRETER] who will be helping us with translation today.*

As part of this research, we are focusing on projects from South Thailand and the Central African Republic. The research will be used to help organizations improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is an important consideration for the project's success. Although religion is the main theme for our research, we understand that the analysis of conflict in the Central African Republic is more complex than our narrow focus on religion. Over the next three weeks, we are meeting with people who have participated or will participate in a [Mercy Corps or Search for Common Ground] activity.

At the end of this time, we will aggregate all the information from CAR and Thailand in a public report. None of your names will be in this report and all your comments will be anonymous.

I will ask you about 10 questions regarding the relationship between religion and peacebuilding. Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to answer any questions you do not want to answer and you can leave the discussion at any time. Any information from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name. It is important to give everyone an

opportunity to speak about his or her experience, so I will do my best to be sure everyone has a chance to participate.

Do you have any questions about this process before we begin?

1. **ROLES:** In what ways have religious leaders or institutions been involved in the implementation of the P2P project?

De quelles maniere les leaders religieux ou les institutions religieuses sont impliquees dans le projet?

2. **POSITIVE OUTCOMES:** How has the involvement of religious leaders and institutions contributed to positive results of project?

De quelle maniere les leaders religieux et les institutions religieuses ont contribue positivement aux resultats du projet?

3. **NEGATIVE OUTCOMES:** How has the involvement of religious leaders and institutions contributed to negative results of the project?

De quelle maniere les leaders religieux et les institutions religieuses ont contribue negativement aux resultats au projet?

4. **IMPACT ON OUTCOMES:** How different would the results of the project have been without the involvement of religious leaders and institutions?

Si les leaders religieux et les institutions religieuses n'avaient pas participes quels seraient les resultats du projet? Est-ce que les resultats seraient differents?

5. **DISPARITIES (leaders):** How did including religious leaders in the project affect the project results differently for different groups, for example, were there different results for male and female participants, youth and adults, people from different religions, etc.?

De quelle maniere l'introduction des leaders religieux dans le projet a affecte les homes et les femmes differemment?

6. **MESSAGING:**

7a. In what ways did the P2P project use religious scriptures, texts, and teachings?

De quelle maniere le projet a utilise les ecrits, textes et enseignements religieux?

7b. What were the outcomes of the project's use of these messages?

Quels ont ete les resultats de l'utilisation de ces messages?

7. **DISPARITIES (messaging):** How did including religious messages in the project affect the project results differently for different groups, for example, were there different results for male and female participants, youth and adults, people from different religions, etc.?

De quelle maniere l'introduction des messages religieux dans le project a affect les homes et les femmes differemment?

8. **INTRA-RELIGIOUS OUTCOMES:** Can you provide an example of how the project strengthened the capacity or willingness of people from the same religion be more supportive of nonviolent conflict resolution?

Pouvez-vous nous donner un exemple de la maniere dont le projet a renforce la capacite ou la volonte des gens d'une meme religion a soutenir la resolution des conflit d'une maniere non violente?

9. **INTRA-RELIGIOUS OUTCOMES:** Can you provide an example of how the project strengthened the capacity and willingness of people from different religions to support nonviolent conflict resolution?

Pouvez-vous nous donner nn exemple de la maniere dont le projet a renforce la capacite des gens de religion differente a soutenir la resolution des conflits d'une maniere no violente?

10. **SUSTAINABILITY:** How will the inclusion of religious leaders and institutions help your community to continue the project results after it ends?

De quelle maniere l'introduction de leaders religieux et des institutions religieuses aide votre communaute a continuer avec les resultats du projet?

11. **CONCLUSION:** Do you have any final comments regarding religion and the P2P project?

Avez quelque chose a ajouter qui a trait a la religion et le projet?

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this discussion. If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to talk with me after this discussion.

SURVEY

Implementing Partners, Local Project Partners, Individual Project Participants, External Subject Matter Experts

Enumerator:

Interpreter:

Date:

Location:

Recorder [*if different from Enumerator*]:

Respondent Name:

NOTE: *Survey Respondent's name links to KII notes for independent characteristics.*

INTRODUCTION AND INFORMED CONSENT

NOTE TO RECORDER: *Be sure to write down full name of Respondent in order to match independent variables for data entry.*

INTRODUCTION TO SURVEY: *The final step in the interview is a brief questionnaire that will only take about 5 minutes to complete. As explained at the beginning of the interview, your answers will be aggregated with all other questionnaire responses and the analysis will be anonymous in the written report. You may skip any questions you do not want to answer and end the survey at any time.*

Do you have any questions about the survey before we begin?

1. To what extent did the project take into account religious dynamics of conflict in the project area? (choose one)

[Implementation I-B – conflict/context assessment]

Large extent

None

Some extent

Don't know

Little extent

2. Which religious group's values, beliefs, symbols or scripture did you see used as part of the project's messages? (e.g, posters, radio, preaching, songs, drama performances, quizzes) (choose all that apply)

[Efficacy 2-C – messaging]

Christian

Indigenouse religion

Muslim

Don't know

Other religion

Please
specify_____

3. Which religious group's practices or rituals were used as part of the project implementation? *(choose all that apply)*

Christian

Indigenouse religion

Muslim

Don't know

Other religion

Please
specify_____

4. Which practices or rituals were used as part of the project implementation? *(choose all that apply)*

Prayers

Confessions

Fasting

Sacrifice

Ceremonies

Don't know

Other

Please specify_____

5. What was the religious identity of project participants? *(choose all that apply)*

[Implementation I-B – participant recruitment]

Christian

Indigenouse religion

Muslim

Don't know

Other religion

Please
specify_____

6. What was the affiliation of religious leaders involved in the project? *(choose all that apply)*

[Implementation I-B – participant recruitment]

Christian

Indigenouse religion

Muslim

Don't know

Other religion

Please
specify _____

7. Since the project started in 2015, how effective was the project in improving relationships between groups that were in conflict? (*choose one*)

[Effectiveness 2-A – results]

- Very effective
 Somewhat effective
 Not effective
 Made worse
 Don't Know

8. To what extent has the project increased the effectiveness of religious leaders resolving conflict peacefully? (*choose one*)

[Implementation I-A – roles / Effectiveness 2-B – religious actors]

- Large extent
 Some extent
 Little extent
 None
 Don't know

9. To what extent has the project increased the effectiveness of religious leaders in improving relationships with people from their own religion? (*choose one*)

[Implementation I-A – roles, I-C – intra/inter-religion / Effectiveness 2-B – religious actors]

- Large extent
 Some extent
 Little extent
 None
 Don't know

10. To what extent has the project increased the effectiveness of religious leaders in improving relationships with people from a religion different from their own religion? (*choose one*)

- Large extent

- Some extent
- Little extent
- None
- Don't know

Indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements (*choose one*)

11. The inclusion of religious leaders in the implementation of this project has contributed to important project results.

[Effectiveness 2A – results]

- Very strongly agree Strongly agree Agree
- Disagree Strongly disagree Very strongly disagree
- No opinion

12. The inclusion of religious institutions in the implementation of this project has contributed to important project results.

[Effectiveness 2A – results]

- Very strongly agree Strongly agree Agree
- Disagree Strongly disagree Very strongly disagree
- No opinion

13. The inclusion of religious values in the implementation of this project has contributed to important project results.

[Effectiveness 2A – results]

- Very strongly agree Strongly agree Agree
- Disagree Strongly disagree Very strongly disagree
- No opinion

14. The inclusion of religious leaders in the implementation of this project makes it harder for girls and women to participate equally with male participants in the project.

[Effectiveness 2D – disparities]

- Very strongly agree Strongly agree Agree
- Disagree Strongly disagree Very strongly disagree
- No opinion

15. The inclusion of religious leaders in the implementation of this project makes it harder for youth (35 years and younger) to participate in the project?

[Effectiveness 2D – disparities]

Very strongly agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

Very strongly disagree

No opinion

FINAL – Overall, how satisfied are you with the project’s results?

Very satisfied

Somewhat satisfied

Somewhat unsatisfied

Not satisfied

Don’t know

THAILAND

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

Implementing Partners, Local Project Partners, Individual Project Participants

Interviewer:

Interpreter:

Date:

Location:

Notetaker [*if different from Interviewer*]:

Info for each respondent [*can attach a sign-in sheet*]:

Respondent Name:

Title:

Organization:

Respondent Type:

Sex:

Religion:

Youth / Adult (over 15-24 years):¹¹

Location of work/residence:

Others attending interview:

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. [*Introduce team members.*]

- We are a research team studying religion and peacebuilding in international development programs.
- As part of this study, we are focusing on examples from Southern Thailand and the Central African Republic.

¹¹For the young leaders in Kenan's projects, ET will use the term 'young leaders'.

- The research will be used to help organizations to improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is a part of the operating environment.
- Although religion is the main theme for our research, we understand that the analysis of conflict in Thailand is more complex than our narrow focus on religion.
- Your insight will help us to better understand the ways in which religion is and is not a part of the conflict or in efforts to support peace.
- This interview is a follow-up on our Baseline field work conducted in 2016.

Your participation is voluntary and you can end this interview at any time. If you choose not to participate or to end your participation before the end of the interview, your decision will not affect your ability to participate in the project or to access funding or other services from USAID. Any quotations from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name or your organization. Please be aware non-participation and/or terminating the interview will not affect their access to USAID support/services

IC1. Do you have any questions about this interview process?

If “yes” what is the question?

IC2. Do you willingly agree to participate in this evaluation?

OPENING

1. Organizational Role

IP/Local Partner: What is your organization’s role in the implementation of the PPST (FOR TAF) HAKAM (FOR KENAN) project?

Participant: How is your organization involved with the PPST (for TAF) HAKAM (for Kenan) project?

Subject matter Expert: Are you or your organization aware of the PPST (for TAF) HAKAM (for Kenan) project? How have you/your organization become aware of the project?

2. Personal role

IP/Local Partner: What are your main duties and responsibilities for the PPST (for TAF) HAKAM (for Kenan)) Project?

Participant: How did you personally participate in the PPST (for TAF) HAKAM (for Kenan)Project?

Subject matter Expert: How are you personally involved with the PPST (for TAF) HAKAM (for Kenan) project, if at all?

3. Duration/

IP/Local Partner: How long have you been in this role?

Participant: When did you first begin participating in the project?

Subject matter Expert: When did you first become aware of the PPST (for TAF) HAKAM (for Kenan) project?

INCLUSION OF RELIGION IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

NOTE: Skip this section for project participants and Subject Matter Experts. This section can be answered by staff of Kenan or TAF, ie implementing partners (IPs), by local staff of IPs, and representatives of religion institutions

4. How did the project recognize and/or address key conflict drivers and/or aspects of peace factors that are related to religion? (conflict assessment / context assessment)

5. How is religious identity taken into account when hiring and training project staff?

6. How is the religion of vendors considered when purchasing supplies or services (procurement)?

7. How does the project's monitoring and evaluation design take into account religion (e.g., religious identity of participants; changes in attitudes/behaviors, knowledge related to religion; use of religious messaging; religious institutional partnerships)?

8. How was religion a factor in the selection of participants in the PPST (for TAF) HAKAM (for Kenan) PPST (FOR TAF) HAKAM (FOR KENAN) project?

Probe: What, if any, differences were there in the motivations of participants based on their religious identity or beliefs?

Motivation of the participants?

[NOTE: *Comments regarding selection might include outreach strategies, selection criteria, identity characteristics, willingness to participate, etc.*]

9. For each of these (conflict/context assessments, staffing, procurement, participant selection), what were the challenges faced in terms of taking religion into account? (*Interviewer: please probe for responses on each dimension*).

10. For each of these (conflict/context assessments, staffing, procurement, participant selection), what were the opportunities presented in terms of taking religion into account?? (*Interviewer: please probe for responses on each dimension*).

INTRA-/INTER-RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

11. How did the project conduct intra-religious activities and what were the Lessons Learned? (Please note: this question may not be applicable for HAKAM (Yala))

12. How did the project conduct inter-religious activities and what were the Lessons Learned?

13. What are Lessons Learned in terms of sequencing intra-religious activities and inter-religious activities?

OUTCOME & THEORIES OF CHANGE

14. What were the results of the project, both positive and negative?

15. What is the evidence that these results were achieved?

16. What have you noticed as changes in nature and quality of the communication and coordination among religious groups working together to implement this initiative?

17. How did inclusion of religion in the design and implementation of the project prevent or support results from being achieved?

Note: Question is for IPs and local partners. **DO NOT ASK PARTICIPANTS OR SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS:**

18. What, if any, key assumptions have changed over the course of implementation?

DO NO HARM

19. What are Lessons Learned in terms of precautions or risks of taking religion into account in the design and implementation of the project?

DISPARATE RESULTS

20. How did involvement of religion in project implementation lead to different results for male and female project participants?

21. How did involvement of religion in the project implementation lead to different results for adult and youth (<24 years) project participants?

22. How did involvement of religion in project implementation lead to different results based on religious identity of project participants?

ROLES OF PARTICIPATING RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

Religious institutions can be either Buddhist or Islamic or other religious institutions and the term institution does NOT refer to authorities based in Bangkok or major cities in the South, such as Patani and Yala

23. What if any roles did participating religious institutions [your institution] play in the PPST (for TAF) HAKAM (for Kenan) project?

24. What motivated the religious institutions to get involved in this project?

25. How did the role of [your] religious institutions in peacebuilding change since the project started in 2015?

26. How were the roles that religious institutions played in this project the **same or different from those of secular institutions?** What, if any, difference was there in the level of effectiveness?

27. How different or the same were the roles of religious institutions of different faiths in the implementation of the project? What, if any, difference was there in the level of effectiveness?

EFFICACY OF PARTICIPATING RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

28. How has the participation of religious institutions **affected project results?**

Probe: If participating religious institutions made strong contributions to the project results, what helped them to be effective?

Probe: For participating religious institutions that made small or limited contributions to the project results, what made their roles **less effective?**

NON-PARTICIPATING RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS Religious institutions can be either Buddhist or Islamic or other religious institutions and the term institution does NOT refer to authorities based in Bangkok or major cities in the South, such as Patani and Yala

29. Were there any religious institutions that opted out of involvement in the project?

30. What factors hinder some **religious institutions from participating** in the project?

31. What were the **results of non-participation** of these religious institutions on project results?

ROLES OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS

NOTE: If respondent is a religious leader project participant, rephrase the question in terms of his/her personal experience.

32. What if any **roles did participating religious leaders [you]** play in the PPST (for TAF) HAKAM (for Kenan) project?

33. What **motivated** the religious leaders involved to pursue in the peacebuilding process?

34. How did religious leaders' [your] **role in peacebuilding change** since the PPST (for TAF)HAKAM (for Kenan) project started in 2015?

35. How were the roles that religious leaders played in this project the **same or different from those of secular leaders?** What, if any, difference was there in the level of effectiveness?

36. How were the roles of male leader in Islam in this project the same or different for **women leader in Islam?** *When we use the term leaders, please note this can apply to a woman with an informal leadership role rather than holding an official position. What, if any, difference was there in the level of effectiveness?*

37. How were the roles of adult religious leaders in this project the same or different from the roles

of youth religious leaders (24 years and under)?¹² What, if any, difference was there in the level of effectiveness?

38. How different or the same were the roles of religious leaders of different faiths in the implementation of the project in any phase? What, if any, difference was there in the level of effectiveness?

EFFICACY OF PARTICIPATING RELIGIOUS LEADERS

39. How has the participation of religious leaders affected project results?

Probe: What contributions, if any, did religious leaders who participated in the project make to the results of the project?

Probe: If participating religious leaders made strong contributions to the project results, what helped them to be effective?

Probe: For participating religious leaders who made small or limited contributions to the project results, what made their roles less effective?

NON-PARTICIPATING RELIGIOUS LEADERS

40. Why did some religious leaders not participate in the project?

41. What were the results of non-participation of these religious leaders on project results?

EXTERNAL FACTORS

42. What external factors contributed to achieving project results (both positive and negative)? [e.g., status of political transitions / peace negotiations, changes in levels of violence, regional dynamics, policies to address identity-based economic and social disparities, results of other implementer activities]

43. What external factors prevented expected results from being achieved?[e.g., activities not implemented as planned, assumptions didn't hold, faulty logic, insufficient resources, changes in external conditions, action taken/not taken by key stakeholder]

RELIGIOUS MESSAGES¹³

44. What were the religious messages disseminated by the project?

45. How were these religious messages disseminated?

¹² This age is the cut-off of for the definition of Youth used in CAR Final Evaluation.

¹³ET fully recognizes that USAID does not engage in religious messaging.

46. What were the results of these messages?

47. How are results from dissemination of religious messages different from non-religious messages?

SUSTAINABILITY

48. Does involving religion in the project support or undermine sustainability?

49. How does involving religion in the project support the sustainability/continuation of its results after the end of the grant period?¹⁴

Probe: What are examples that project participants/partners will likely remain committed to faith-based relationships and actions (inter- or intra-) even in moments of crisis (resiliency)?

Probe: What are examples that project participants/partners will likely remain committed to faith-based mechanisms already being used in moments of crisis?

Probe: What are examples of **new groups, organizations, or institutions** that now work to support project results as a result of including religion in the project?

50. How will involving religion undermine sustainability of project results after the end of the project period?

CLOSING

51. Do you have any final observations or Lesson Learned related to religion and the implementation and results of the project that you would like to share?

Thank you for taking the time to meet with our team as part of this study on the relationship between religion, peacebuilding and conflict. As next steps, we will aggregate the information from the CAR-based field work with Thailand-based field work data. The final report that includes all four projects is expected to be completed by the end of 2018 and will be made publicly available online.

EXTERNAL EXPERTS/TAF PARTNERS

¹⁴Examples of project activities that may support sustainability could include improved capabilities of key stakeholders, institutionalized nonviolent conflict resolution processes and mechanisms, new or strengthened relationships that are likely to support ongoing sustainability of achieved results, etc.

Facilitator:

Interpreter:

Notetaker:

Location:

Date:

Implementing Partner: Kenan: _____ TAF: _____

Type of Participant: _____

Number of Men: Total: _____ Youth: _____ Adults: _____

Number of Women: Total: _____ Youth: _____ Adults: _____

Others attending interview:

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. [*Introduce team members.*]

- We are a research team studying religion and peacebuilding in international development programs.
- As part of this study, we are focusing on examples from Southern Thailand and the Central African Republic.
- The research will be used to help organizations to improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is a part of the operating environment.
- Although religion is the main theme for our research, we understand that the analysis of conflict in Thailand is more complex than our narrow focus on religion.
- Your insight will help us to better understand the ways in which religion is and is not a part of the conflict or in efforts to support peace.
- This interview is a follow-up on our Baseline field work conducted in 2016.

Your participation is voluntary and you can end this interview at any time. If you choose not to participate or to end your participation before the end of the interview, your decision will not affect your ability to participate in the project or to access funding or other services from USAID. Any quotations from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name or your organization. Please be aware non-participation and/or terminating the interview will not affect their access to USAID support/services.

ICI. Do you have any questions about this interview process?

If “ yes” what is the question?

IC2. Do you willingly agree to participate in this evaluation?

1. Were you or your organization familiar with the PPST (for TAF) HAKAM (for Kenan) project? How have you/your organization become familiar with the project?

If yes, then first probe for a description of their familiarity with the projects. If it is very extensive you can use the KII tool, otherwise please continue with these questions.

2. Are you part of any peacebuilding work where religion is involved?
3. Have you observed any intra-religious conflicts? What were the issues and how were they addressed?
4. Have you observed any inter-religious conflicts? What were the issues and how were they addressed?
5. To what extent is religion a part of the conflict in South Thailand? (If response is “religion is **not** a part”, skip to Probe #6).

Probe 1: To the extent that religion is a factor in the conflict, what aspects of religion are part of the conflict system? (Give examples: religious actors, institutions, beliefs?)

Probe 2: Can you give some examples of how religion is a part of the conflict?

Probe 3: Can you give some examples of how religious leaders are part of the conflict?

Probe 4: Can you give some examples of how religious institutions are part of the conflict?

Probe 5: Can you give some examples of how messages based on religion affect the conflict?

Probe 6: If this conflict does not have a religious aspect, how did this conflict be come to be named as a religious conflict?

6. If religious leaders were involved in the conflict, what roles did they play?

Probe: How significant was their role?

7. To what extent is religion a part of peacebuilding in Southern Thailand?

Probe: Can you give some examples of how religion is a part of peacebuilding?

Probe: Can you give some examples of how religious leaders are part of peacebuilding ?

Probe: Can you give some examples of how religious institutions are part of peacebuilding?

Probe: Can you give some examples of how messages based on religion affect peacebuilding?
The messages can be from scripture or from preaching.

8. If religious leaders were involved in peacebuilding, what roles did they play?

Probe: How significant was their role?

9. How are women contributing to peacebuilding or exacerbating conflict? Is there a difference in how men are contributing to peacebuilding or exacerbating conflict?

Probe: Can you give examples of how women in positions of leadership in the community or schools contribute to peacebuilding or exacerbating conflict?

Probe: Is there a difference in how young women (below the age of 24) and older women contribute to peacebuilding or exacerbating conflict?

10. To what extent would the involvement of religious leaders in peacebuilding encourage the search for peace?
11. To what extent would the involvement of women leaders in community or school settings peacebuilding encourage the search for peace?
12. Is there anything else you would like to tell us about the role of religion in the conflicts in Southern Thailand?

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE

PROJECT PARTICIPANTS

Facilitator:

Interpreter:

Notetaker:

Location:

Date:

Implementing Partner: Kenan: _____ TAF: _____

Type of Participant: _____

Number of Men: Total: _____ Youth: _____ Adults: _____

Number of Women: Total: _____ Youth: _____ Adults: _____

Religious identity: Buddhist: _____ Muslim: _____ Christian: _____
Unknown: _____ Other: _____

Attach attendance sheet with signatures indicating receipt of transportation costs reimbursement.

INTRODUCTION AND INFORMED CONSENT

[NOTE TO DATA COLLECTORS: *Be sure to write down everyone's first name and where they are sitting before you begin discussion.*]

INTRODUCTION: *Hello. My name is [YOUR NAME] and I am part of a research team that is studying the connection between religion and peacebuilding in international development. With me is [NAME OF INTERPRETER] who will be helping us with translation today.*

As part of this research, we are focusing on projects from South Thailand and the Central African Republic. The research will be used to help organizations improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is an important consideration for the project's success. Although religion is the main theme for our research, we understand that the analysis of conflict in Thailand is more complex than our narrow focus on religion. Over the next three weeks, we are meeting with people who have participated in a [Kenan Foundation or Asia Foundation] activity.

At the end of this time, we will aggregate all the information from Central African Republic and Thailand in a public report. None of your names will be in this report and all your comments will be anonymous.

I will ask you about 10 questions regarding the relationship between religion and peacebuilding. Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to answer any questions you do not want to answer and you can leave the discussion at any time. Please be aware non-participation and/or terminating the interview will not affect their access to USAID support/services. Any information from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name. It is important to give everyone an opportunity to speak about his or her experience, so I will do my best to be sure everyone has a chance to participate.

Do you have any questions about this process before we begin?

1. **ROLES:** In what ways have religious leaders or institutions been involved in the implementation of the PPST (FOR TAF) HAKAM (FOR KENAN) project?
2. **RESULTS:** Has the involvement of religious leaders and institutions contributed to the positive or negative results of the project?
3. **POSITIVE RESULTS:** How has the involvement of religious leaders and institutions contributed to positive results of project?
4. **NEGATIVE RESULTS:** How has the involvement of religious leaders and institutions contributed to negative results of the project?
5. **IMPACT ON RESULTS:** How different would the results of the project have been without the involvement of religious leaders and institutions?
6. **DISPARITIES (leaders):** How did including religious leaders and institutions in the project affect the project results differently for different groups, for example, were there different results for male and female participants, youth and adults, people from different religions, etc.?
7. **MESSAGES:**
 - 7a. In what ways did the PPST (FOR TAF) HAKAM (FOR KENAN) project use religious scriptures, texts, and teachings?
 - 7b. What were the results of the project's use of these messages?
8. **DISPARITIES (messaging):** How did including religious messages in the project affect the project results differently for different groups, for example, were there different results for male and female participants, youth and adults, people from different religions, etc.?
9. **INTRA-RELIGIOUS RESULTS:** Can you provide an example of how the project strengthened the capacity or willingness of people from the same religion to be more supportive of nonviolent conflict resolution?
10. **INTER-RELIGIOUS RESULTS:** Can you provide an example of how the project strengthened the capacity and willingness of people from different religions to support nonviolent conflict resolution?
11. **SUSTAINABILITY:** How will the inclusion of religious leaders and institutions help your community to continue the project results after it ends?
12. **CONCLUSION:** Do you have any final comments regarding religion and the PPST (FOR TAF) HAKAM (FOR KENAN) project?

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this discussion. If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to talk with me after this discussion.

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE 2

PROJECT PARTICIPANTS

Facilitator:

Interpreter:

Notetaker:

Location:

Date:

Implementing Partner: Kenan: _____ TAF: _____

Type of Participant:

Number of Men: Total: _____ Youth: _____ Adults: _____

Number of Women: Total: _____ Youth: _____ Adults: _____

Religious identity: Buddhist: _____ Muslim: _____ Christian: _____

Unknown: _____ Other: _____

Attach attendance sheet with signatures indicating receipt of transportation costs reimbursement.

INTRODUCTION AND INFORMED CONSENT

[NOTE TO DATA COLLECTORS: *Be sure to write down everyone's first name and where they are sitting before you begin discussion.*]

INTRODUCTION: *Hello. My name is [YOUR NAME] and I am part of a research team that is studying the connection between religion and peacebuilding in international development. With me is [NAME OF INTERPRETER] who will be helping us with translation today.*

As part of this research, we are focusing on projects from South Thailand and the Central African Republic. The research will be used to help organizations improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is an important consideration for the project's success. Although religion is the main theme for our research, we understand that the analysis of conflict in Thailand is more complex than our narrow focus on religion. Over the next three weeks, we are meeting with people who have participated in a [Kenan Foundation or Asia Foundation] activity.

At the end of this time, we will aggregate all the information from Central African Republic and Thailand in a public report. None of your names will be in this report and all your comments will be anonymous.

I will ask you about 10 questions regarding the relationship between religion and peacebuilding. Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to answer any questions you do not want to answer and you can leave the discussion at any time. Please be aware non-participation and/or terminating the

interview will not affect their access to USAID support/services. Any information from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name. It is important to give everyone an opportunity to speak about his or her experience, so I will do my best to be sure everyone has a chance to participate.

Do you have any questions about this process before we begin?

1. Tell us about your projects. What did you enjoy the most? What did you find hardest to do?
2. What were some positive and negative results from your activities?
3. Did having imams and monks involved help make things better or did they make it harder to do? (Please remember that we want to hear what you think and we do not tell teachers or people from Kenan anything that you say in this discussion)
4. Would the project (or activities) have been different if there were no imams or monks involved?
5. In what ways did the PPST (FOR TAF) HAKAM (FOR KENAN) project use religious scriptures, texts, and teachings?
6. What were the results of the project's use of these messages?
7. What did your families get from this project?
8. Was it different for Buddhist and Muslim families?
9. Did your classmates who are girls/boys use religious teachings when they designed/planned their projects? And when they ran the projects, did they use religious teachings?
10. Can you provide an example of how the project strengthened the capacity and willingness of people from different religions to support nonviolent conflict resolution?
11. How will the inclusion of religious leaders and institutions help your community to continue the project results after it ends?
12. Do you have any final comments regarding religion and the PPST (FOR TAF) HAKAM (FOR KENAN) project?

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this discussion. If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to talk with me after this discussion.

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE 3

PROJECT PARTICIPANTS

Facilitator:

Interpreter:

Notetaker:

Location:

Date:

Implementing Partner: Kenan: _____ TAF: _____

Type of Participant: _____

Number of Men: Total: _____ Youth: _____ Adults: _____

Number of Women: Total: _____ Youth: _____ Adults: _____

Religious identity: Buddhist: _____ Muslim: _____ Christian: _____

Unknown: _____ Other: _____

Attach attendance sheet with signatures indicating receipt of transportation costs reimbursement.

INTRODUCTION AND INFORMED CONSENT

[NOTE TO DATA COLLECTORS: *Be sure to write down everyone's first name and where they are sitting before you begin discussion.*]

INTRODUCTION: *Hello. My name is [YOUR NAME] and I am part of a research team that is studying the connection between religion and peacebuilding in international development. With me is [NAME OF INTERPRETER] who will be helping us with translation today.*

As part of this research, we are focusing on projects from South Thailand and the Central African Republic. The research will be used to help organizations improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is an important consideration for the project's success. Although religion is the main theme for our research, we understand that the analysis of conflict in Thailand is more complex than our narrow focus on religion. Over the next three weeks, we are meeting with people who have participated in a [Kenan Foundation or Asia Foundation] activity.

At the end of this time, we will aggregate all the information from Central African Republic and Thailand in a public report. None of your names will be in this report and all your comments will be anonymous.

I will ask you about 10 questions regarding the relationship between religion and peacebuilding. Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to answer any questions you do not want to answer and you can leave the discussion at any time. Please be aware non-participation and/or terminating the interview will not affect their access to USAID

support/services. Any information from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name. It is important to give everyone an opportunity to speak about his or her experience, so I will do my best to be sure everyone has a chance to participate.

Do you have any questions about this process before we begin?

1. Tell us about your role in the projects.
2. What were some positive and negative results from the activities that you took part in?
3. How was the involvement of religious leaders and institutions contributed to the results to the project?
4. Would the project (or activities) have been different if there were no imams or monks involved?
5. In what ways did the HAKAM project use religious scriptures, texts, and teachings?
6. Was it different for Buddhist and Muslim families?
7. Did the students use religious teachings when they designed/planned their projects? And when they ran their projects, did they use religious teachings?
8. Can you provide an example of how the project strengthened the capacity and willingness of people from different religions to support nonviolent conflict resolution?

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this discussion. If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to talk with me after this discussion.

ANNEX C: SOURCES OF INFORMATION

USAID Documents

People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide. USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. January 2011.

Religion, Conflict & Peacebuilding: An Introductory Programming Guide. USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. September 2009.

SOL-OAA-15-000138 - Task One Statement of Work

Solicitation for Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation Programs and Activities. No. USAID/DCHACMM-APS-OAA-14-000003. Issued February 24, 2014

USAID Reconciliation Fund - RFA-OAA-15-000007 FY2015.

Reconciliation Fund Project Documents

Central African Republic Projects

Mercy Corps: Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement (ASPIRE) Program documents

- Reconciliation Fund Application Excerpt: Attachment B – Program Description. P. 13-25.
- ASPIRE Work Plan and M&E Plan spreadsheet (undated)
- Andras Beszterczey, Social Cohesion and Governance Programme Manager, Mercy Corps Lebanon. Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement Guidelines and Recommendations Early Warning Early Response System. December 2015.
- Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement (ASPIRE) Quarterly Report FY15 Q4 Report: November 1 – December 31, 2015. Submitted: January 29, 2016
- ASPIRE program Consultant Scope of Work for Mediation Training (undated).

Search for Common Ground: “ZO KWE ZO: All People are People”

- Reconciliation Fund Application Excerpt: Attachment B – Program Description. P. 14-35.
- Proposal in Response to APS-OAA- 14-00003ZO KWE ZO : “All People are People.” Submitted July 3, 2015.
- Monitoring & Evaluation Plan. 1 December 2016 to 30 September 2017 (undated).
- Work Plan. Oct 15, 2015 to September 30, 2016. Submitted November 30, 2015.
- Project Summary (undated).

Search for Common Ground: “Better Together” – Supporting Community Empowerment and Non-Violence in the Central African Republic

- Project Summary and PMP. January 17, 2014 – October 12, 2015.
- First Quarterly Report. January 1, 2014 to March 31, 2014. Submitted April 30, 2014.
- Second Quarterly Report. April 1, 2014 to June 30, 2014. AID-OAA-A-14-00023. Submitted: July 30, 2014
- Third Quarterly Report, October 1 to December 31, 2014. Submitted: January 31, 2015.
- Third Quarterly Report and Annual Review. July 1 to September 30, 2014. Submitted: October 30th, 2014.
- Fourth Quarterly Report. January 1 to March 30, 2015, Submitted: April 30, 2015.
- Sixth Quarterly Report, April 1 to June 30 2015, Submitted: July 31, 2015.
- Seventh Quarterly Report (July 1 to September 30, 2015) and Annual Report. (October 1, 2014 to September 30, 2015), Submitted: November 11, 2015.
- Final Report. 17 January 2014 – 16 October 2015. Submitted: January 25, 2016.

South Thailand Projects

The Asia Foundation

- Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand - Year 1 Work Plan: September 15, 2015 – September 14, 2016.
- USAID/Asia Cooperative Agreement No. AID-486-A-15-00004
- Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand - Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Plan
- Democracy and Conflict in Southern Thailand – A Survey of the Thai Electorate in Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani.
- Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand Quarterly Report - FY2016 1st Quarter: October 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015.
- Performance Indicator Reference Sheet, February 19th, 2016.
- PITT, February 19th, 2016

The Kenan Institute

- Healing, Opportunity, Peace and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity - First Year Annual Work Plan: 18 September 2015 – 17 September 2016.
- USAID/Asia Cooperative Agreement No. AID-486-A-15-00007

- Healing, Opportunity, Peace and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity Quarterly Report: 1st Quarter – 1 October 2015 to 31 December 2015.
- Healing, Opportunity, Peace and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Plan - Activity Start Date and End Date: September 18, 2015 to September 17, 2018. AID-486- A-15- 00007

Country-Specific Background Documents

Central African Republic

Alexis Arieff and Tomas F. Hustad. Crisis in the Central African Republic. Congressional Research Service. August 17, 2015

Central African Republic: Better Late Than Never. International Crisis Group. Central African Republic Background Documents, Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing N°96. Nairobi/Brussels, 2 December 2013.

Central African Republic: The Roots of Violence. The International Crisis Group. Crisis Group Africa Report N°230, 21 September 2015.

Central African Republic. USCIRF Annual Report 2015. Pages 84-87.

Rebekka Fiedler. The contribution of the interfaith platform to the reconciliation process in the Central African Republic The Henri Dunant Human Rights Series. Geneva Liaison Office of the World Evangelical Alliance. June 2014.

Michael J. Brown and Marie-Joëlle Zahar (2015) Social Cohesion as Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic and Beyond, *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 10:1, 10-24, DOI: 10.1080/15423166.2015.1008349

South Thailand

Alexander Horstmann. Approaching peace in Patani, Southern Thailand—some anthropological considerations. December 12, 2007

May Tan-Mullins. Armed Conflict and Resolutions in Southern Thailand. Division of International Studies, The University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China. September 9, 2008.

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
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
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ANNEX D: CONFLICT OF INTEREST FORMS


Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Coeli Barry
Title	Evaluation Team Leader
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	
<p>I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.</p>	
Signature	
Date	9/6/18

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Abigail Cohen
Title	Program Assistant
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
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Signature	
Date	8/28/2018


Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Phaison Da-Oh
Title	Local Conflict Specialist
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
I have real or potential conflict of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
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I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.	
Signature	
Date	8/28/2018

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Shintaro Hara
Title	Interpreter
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number <i>(contract or other instrument)</i>	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated <i>(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)</i>	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
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I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	6 September 2018

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Richard Iserman
Title	Senior Program Officer
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
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
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Signature	<i>Richard Iserman</i>
Date	<i>Aug. 28, 2018</i>

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Muhammادتolan Kaemah
Title	Interpreter
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
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
Signature	
Date	31 August 2018

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Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Jennifer Kuiper
Title	Evaluation Team Leader
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	


I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	Sept. 14, 2018

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Bertrand Ngama
Title	Logistician
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number <i>(contract or other instrument)</i>	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated <i>(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)</i>	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	Yes No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	

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Signature	
Date	August 29, 2018


Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Hippolyt Pul
Title	Senior Conflict/Subject Matter Specialist
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number <i>(contract or other instrument)</i>	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated <i>(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)</i>	Evaluation of “Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program” activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, “Zo Kwe Zo”: All People are People.
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
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Signature	
Date	28 August 2018


Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Wimonrat Rattanayat
Title	Interpreter
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
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Signature	
Date	06/26/2018

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Mark Rogers
Title	Senior Conflict/Subject Matter Specialist
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number <i>(contract or other instrument)</i>	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated <i>(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)</i>	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
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Signature	
Date	30 Aug 2018


Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Paul Sandoua
Title	Logistician
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number <i>(contract or other instrument)</i>	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated <i>(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)</i>	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
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Signature	
Date	09/08/2018

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Yolande Sandoua
Title	Interpreter, Logistician
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
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Signature	Yolande A. Sandoua 
Date	8/28/2018


Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Vasapa Wanichwethin
Title	Logistician
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
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
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Signature	Vasapa W.
Date	29 August, 2018

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Hasan Yamadibu
Title	Logistician
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number <i>(contract or other instrument)</i>	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated <i>(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)</i>	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
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Signature	
Date	15/9/2018

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Francis Zaze
Title	Interpreter
Organization	Democracy International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	AID-OAA-I-13-00044/AID-OAA-TO-15-00056
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Evaluation of "Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program" activities: AID-486-A-15-0007, Kenan Institute Asia, Healing, Opportunity, Peace, and Engagement (HOPE) for Youth in Yala, Thailand Activity; AID-486-A-15-00004, The Asia Foundation, Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand; AID-OAA-A-15-00063, Mercy Corps, Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement; AID-OAA-A-15-00074, Search for Common Ground, "Zo Kwe Zo": All People are People.
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	
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Signature	
Date	September 8th, 2018

ANNEX E: ILLUSTRATIVE SET OF INDICATORS

Variable 1: Community perceptions of the religious nature of the violent conflicts they have witnessed

Definition: Extent to which community level people attribute the violence they have witnessed to differences in religious beliefs, values, and practices of community members.

Suggested indicators	Data collection Methods	Phase of Assessment			
		Design	Implementing	Monitoring	Evaluation
% of community level interviewees who believe that the violence they have witnessed is as a result differences in religious beliefs, values, and practices between the parties in conflict.	Surveys, KIIs, FGDs	X	X	X	X
% of respondents who believe that religious leaders have played active roles in inciting people to fight in defense of their faith in the conflict.	Surveys, KIIs, FGDs	X	X	X	X

Variable 2: Influence of religious leaders in the public space in support of peacebuilding

Definition: Extent to which people of different faiths act in accordance with the views, advice, guidance, or instructions a religious leader gives?

Suggested indicators	Data collection Methods	Phase of Assessment			
		Design	Implementing	Monitoring	Evaluation

<p>i) # of people (disaggregated by gender, age, level of education, and religious affiliation) who report listening to radio programs, attending conferences or meetings where the religious leader is scheduled to speak or reading speeches or other literature the religious leaders puts out.</p>	<p>Survey</p>	<p>X</p>	<p>X</p>		<p>X</p>
<p>ii) Number of people, disaggregated as above who report changing their perceptions, attitudes, behaviors, or practices related to the conflict as a result of what they have learned from the religious leader.</p>	<p>KIIs, FGDs</p>		<p>X</p>		<p>X</p>
<p>iii) Number of times respondents report seeing a religious leader invited to participate in peace negotiation or mediation processes at local, regional, or national levels.</p>	<p>Survey</p>		<p>X</p>		<p>X</p>
<p>iv) Extent to which public officials, civil society leaders, and international actors consult the religious leader in matters related to peacebuilding.</p>	<p>KII</p>				

Variable 3 (set): Contribution of Women Leaders on peacebuilding in religious settings

Definition	Suggested indicators	Data collection Methods	Phase of Assessment			
			Design	Implementing	Monitoring	Evaluation
The types of spaces of influence available to women in religious settings to lead processes in peacebuilding	Type of spaces of influence disaggregated by location i.e. community, institutional (church, mosque or temple level), and nationally (e.g. platforms, associations, networks) that are available to women in different religious settings to access and use to contribute to peacebuilding	Survey, KIIs	X	X	X	X
Negotiation of new spaces in religious settings for peacebuilding	Extent to which women are successful in negotiating new spaces of influence in religious settings to contribute to peacebuilding	Surveys, KIIs		X	X	X

Usage of existing spaces in religious settings for peacebuilding	Extent to which women use existing spaces of influence in their religious settings to contribute to peacebuilding	Surveys, KIs		X	X	X
Women's engagement the public space	Extent to which women use these opportunities they have in religious settings to influence policy on peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives	Surveys, KIs		X	X	X

ANNEX F: EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

EVALUATION PURPOSE

To contribute to the limited body of knowledge on the nexus of religion, conflict, and peacebuilding relevant to development programming, USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) initiated a thematic evaluation of four Global Reconciliation Fund¹⁵ projects. These projects, which are located in the Deep South of Thailand and the Central African Republic (CAR), seek to apply people-to-people (P2P) to support peacebuilding. The projects were chosen because they cited religion in their conflict analysis as one of the issues involved in the conflict between the feuding groups. The TOR of this learning evaluation (reference Section C) set out the objectives of this evaluation as follows:

- To determine to what extent religious identity and work with religious actors factored into program design, including theories of change, implementation, monitoring and evaluation and results achieved.
- To validate and/or revise the nine "Lessons Learned" as published in USAID's "Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding Toolkit."
- To contribute to the body of evidence regarding which inter-religious, peacebuilding programming strategies are effective and potentially replicable.

The evaluation findings and recommendations are intended to be used for the following:

- To update guidance for USAID field staff and implementing partners on lessons learned and best practices for peacebuilding programs in inter-religious conflict contexts.
- To inform design of future year Reconciliation Fund programs.
- To inform DCHA/CMM's new training course for "Advanced Conflict-Related Program Design, Monitoring and Evaluation" for USAID staff.
- To publish and support adoption of lessons learned and best practices in the broader development and peacebuilding communities, including the United States Government (USG) interagency.

APPROACH & AUDIENCE

¹⁵ Since 2004, USAID has managed the Global Reconciliation Fund program in accordance with a Congressional appropriation to provide funding for reconciliation-related programming (Section 7060(f) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76, Division K). The objective of the Global Reconciliation Fund is "to make significant strides in the overall goal of conflict mitigation, peace, and reconciliation through the implementation of people-to-people (P2P) activities in selected eligible conflict-affected countries." (SOL-OAA-15-000138 - Task One Statement of Work, p. 6.) USAID administers these funds through an annual grants program. These grants support projects that bring together people of different ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds from areas of unrest and war in order to promote conflict prevention, mitigation, and management.

The overall approach to this evaluation is grounded in Utilization-Focused Evaluation (UFE). UFE is based on the principle that an evaluation should be designed to address the intended uses of the evaluation’s targeted audience. This approach invites active engagement of intended users in evaluation design and implementation throughout the evaluation process. This evaluation is intended to be useful to a community of practice that includes audiences within and outside of U.S. government agencies. Specifically, DCHA/CMM seeks to apply learning to support its guidance, training and dissemination activities to improve peacebuilding and development objectives. USAID Mission staff from the Regional Development Mission for Asia (RDMA) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) oversee the selected Global Reconciliation Fund programs. They will prioritize learning objectives useful for ongoing oversight of program activities and future planning related to peacebuilding programming. The USG interagency audience includes agencies that apply a conflict lens in better understanding operational environments and developing effective programming responsive to local dynamics. The four implementing partners as well as their local partners are also key evaluation audiences, both to support their own assessment of the grant-funded projects but also to apply to future engagement in analogous contexts. More broadly, the evaluation results are intended to support the international community of practice of donors, implementers, evaluators, and researchers interested in having insights into the nexus of religion, conflict, and peacebuilding.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

In consultation with DCHA/CMM, the evaluation team developed three primary research questions relevant to this evaluation. (For a list of primary and sub-questions, please see Table B-I: *Evaluation Matrix*.) The evaluation is not designed to assess overall performance of the participating grant recipient projects. Nor are these questions considered to be exhaustive of all lines of inquiry related to religious dynamics in peacebuilding and international development. They are intended to support learning that informs improved program design, planning, and implementation in situations in which religious aspects of operational contexts, identities, grievances, norms and institutions are relevant. The three primary questions are:

1. **Implementation** – What are the critical implementation activities and strategies needed to respond effectively to conflict where parties are mobilized around religious identities?
2. **Effectiveness**¹⁶ – In what ways did religious dynamics affect intended, unintended and actual project results?
3. **Sustainability** – How are any changes in attitudes, knowledge and behaviors related to dynamics between religious groups likely to continue after the projects’ conclusions?

Table B-I Overall and Baseline Evaluation Questions and Sub-Questions

OVERALL	BASELINE
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¹⁶ For the purposes of the thematic evaluation, effectiveness is defined consistent with OECD DAC evaluation criteria report (2007) on adaptations for peacebuilding: assessment of whether a program (1) Achieves or can be reasonably expected to achieve its stated or implicit objectives, and (2) Remains relevant to the issues of division or conflict (i.e., core grievances, contributions to peace). [K. Van Brabant. *Peacebuilding How? Criteria to Assess and Evaluate Peacebuilding*. Interpeace—International Peacebuilding Alliance. (2010)]

1. <u>Implementation</u> – What are the critical implementation activities and strategies needed to respond effectively to conflict where parties are mobilized around religious identities?	1. <u>Implementation</u> – At start-up, what implementation activities and strategies were designed to respond effectively to conflict where parties are mobilized around religious identities?
1A. How were <i>religious actors (i.e., individuals and institutions)</i> engaged as key stakeholders, partners and beneficiaries in program activities to support peacebuilding objectives? How did this engagement vary from secular actors?	1a. At project start-up, what were the roles of <i>religious actors (i.e., individuals and institutions)</i> in project activities? How did these roles vary from secular actors?
1B. What were the expected and unexpected implementation <i>challenges, facilitators and opportunities</i> related to religious dynamics? What were project responses?	1b. What were the expected implementation <i>challenges, facilitators and opportunities</i> related to religious dynamics? How did the project take these into account at start-up?
1C. Over the course of implementation, in what ways did the program participants and beneficiaries find the religious dimensions of the program to be <i>relevant</i> to the conflict?	1c. At project start-up, in what ways did the program participants (including project staff) and beneficiaries consider the religious dimensions of the project to be <i>relevant</i> to the conflict?
2. <u>Effectiveness</u> – In what ways did religious dynamics affect intended, unintended and actual project results?	2. <u>Effectiveness</u> – At start-up, in what ways were religious dynamics expected to affect intended project results?
2A. What, if any, contributions were made by the projects toward changes in <i>attitudes, knowledge and behaviors</i> toward, within and among religious actors as well as secular actors?	2a. At project start-up, what were the <i>attitudes, knowledge and behaviors</i> of religious actors as well as secular actors that the projects seek to change or influence?
2B. What were the <i>roles of religious actors (i.e., individuals and institutions)</i> and how effective were they in mitigating conflict and peacebuilding? How did this differ from and interact with related secular leaders or institutional structures?	2b. At project start-up, how <i>effective are the targeted religious actors (i.e., individuals and institutions)</i> in mitigating conflict and peacebuilding [NOTE: relevant to project’s peacebuilding objectives]? How did this differ from and interact with related secular leaders or institutional structures?
2C. How did <i>messaging</i> by religious actors referencing religious practices, beliefs and values affect program outcomes?	2c. At project start-up, what <i>messaging</i> was articulated by religious actors (i.e., individuals and institutions) in reference to religious practices, beliefs and values as they relate to the project’s intended outcomes?
2D. To what extent did engaging religious components of the program affect intended results? How did these results vary by <i>religious identity and for men, women, youth and minority groups</i> ?	2d. At project start-up, what are the religious considerations for project components?

2E. To what extent did program results validate <i>theories of change</i> related to intra- and inter-religious conflict and peacebuilding? Did these Theories of Change related to religious dynamics need to be revised through the course of implementation? If so, in what ways and around what issues?	2e. What were the initial project <i>theories of change</i> related to intra- and inter-religious conflict and peacebuilding?
2F. How did the projects' efforts to address intra- and inter-religious dynamics contribute to " <i>peace writ large</i> "?	2f. At project start-up, how did the project define the intended contributions of intra- and inter-religious dynamics to " <i>peace writ large</i> "?
<u>3. Sustainability</u> – How are any changes in attitudes, knowledge and behaviors related to dynamics between religious groups likely to continue after the projects' conclusions?	<u>3. Sustainability</u> – How are any changes in attitudes, knowledge and behaviors related to dynamics between religious groups expected to continue after the projects' conclusions?
3A. What capabilities, processes, institutions or relationships were established or enhanced that are likely to support ongoing adaptability of achieved results? What else might contribute to sustainability?	3a. What aspects of the planned project design and activities related to religion are intended to support adaptability of expected results?
3B. What external conditions are likely to support or undermine sustainability?	3b. At project start-up, what are the foreseeable factors that are likely to support or undermine sustainability?

REVISED EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The following evaluation questions are based on expert written and verbal feedback on the PEACE Task One Baseline Report. Experts included evaluators, researchers and academics (some with implementation experience), including representatives from USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) and the U.S. Department of State. Reviewers were asked to support refinement of the evaluation questions based on: (1) Potential learning opportunities afforded by the study of USAID/CMM's four selected P2P Reconciliation Fund projects, and (2) Gaps in knowledge pertaining to religion, peacebuilding and conflict amongst the international development community of practice. Following the external review process. The evaluation team incorporated feedback through an iterative process that included: definition of terminology; relevancy of the final report's use by USAID and implementers; opportunity for baseline and endline comparisons; and feasibility of useable data resulting from endline activities.

These revised evaluation questions take into account the following parameters:

- (1) Completion of baseline data collection, analysis and reporting based on original evaluation questions.
- (2) Selection of four P2P Reconciliation Fund projects in Central African Republic and South Thailand.
- (3) Lack of explicit religious identity and dynamics in selected projects' design and implementation.

Requirements of the U.S. Establishment Clause,¹⁷ which require all USG-funded projects to have a secular purpose that does not advance or inhibit religion and does not favor or discriminate against beneficiaries based on religious identity.

The footnotes attached to the below evaluation questions are intended to facilitate the internal process of review and are not intended to be considered attached to the finalized version. Footnoted definitions developed for the purposes of this evaluation will be included in a glossary of terms for the final report.

¹⁷ Text of establishment clause as stated in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is stated as follows (emphasis added): "**Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;** or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

Table of Baseline and Endline Evaluation Questions

ENDLINE

REFERENCE TO BASELINE ANALYSIS

IMPLEMENTATION

IMPLEMENTATION: What are the critical implementation activities and strategies for projects working in settings where parties are mobilized around religious identities?

I.A. How are religious actors¹⁸ engaged to support project objectives?

1. Religious Actors
2. *Religious Roles*
3. *Motivations*

I.B. How is religion taken into consideration in project implementation?

- Conflict Assessment
- Staffing
- Procurement
- M&E

I.C. How did projects design, conduct, and sequence intra-religious and inter-religious activities?

- Intra-religious
- Inter-religious
- Sequencing

¹⁸ The evaluation team defines *religious actors* as individuals, institutions, or identity groups that engage in conflict or peacebuilding because of the inspirations, motivations, beliefs, or values derived from their faith. They can include actors in formal leadership positions affiliated with religious institutions, unofficial actors whose influence is grounded in religious identity, and non-religious (secular) actors that are motivated by religious values, preferences, biases or messages.

ENDLINE

REFERENCE TO BASELINE ANALYSIS

1D. What are the *Do No Harm* considerations arising from the implementation experiences of these projects?¹⁹

Preparation or capacitation of staff;
Locations and safe spaces of project activities;
Accommodation for religious practices, rites and traditions;
Instrumentalization of religion;
Threats to legitimacy,
Status, safety, or efficacy of project participants;
In appropriate exclusion or inclusion

EFFECTIVENESS

2. EFFECTIVENESS: How does inclusion of religious dimensions affect the project's intended or unintended results?²⁰

2A. How does attention or lack of attention to religious dimensions impact results?

social cohesion;
attitudes of enmity;
resiliency; or
resistance to violence
how religious dimensions supported or undermined results.

¹⁹ Possible *Do No Harm* considerations might relate to preparation or capacitation of staff; locations and safe spaces of project activities; accommodation for religious practices, rites and traditions; instrumentalization of religion; threats to legitimacy, status, safety, or efficacy of project participants; in appropriate exclusion or inclusion. For a summary of the types of Do No Harm considerations identified at project start-up, refer to the Baseline Report, Table 3: *Plans for Inclusion of Religious Considerations in Project Components*.

²⁰ Possible project results may include changes in social cohesion; attitudes of enmity; resiliency or resistance to violence. For a summary of each project's expected results at start-up, refer to the Baseline Report, Table 2: *Expected Changes in Attitudes, Knowledge and Behavior*; Table 5: *Approaches and Activities Leading to Expected Change*.

ENDLINE

REFERENCE TO BASELINE ANALYSIS

ENDLINE	REFERENCE TO BASELINE ANALYSIS
	<i>Expected Changes in Attitudes, Knowledge and Behavior; Table 5: Approaches and Activities Leading to Expected Change.</i>
2B. How effective are the projects' religious actors in their project roles? What factors supported or worked against their efficacy?	differentiation or similarities of these actors from secular actor counterparts. government officials may be motivated by personal religious beliefs.
2C. What were the religious messages used by the projects, how were they disseminated, and to what effect?	Messages by religious actors Religious messages by secular actors Modes of dissemination
2D. How does involvement of religious dimensions lead to disparate results based on identity of project participants?	Youth v. adult Male v. Female Minority v. majority Christian v. Muslim
2E. What were the religious dimensions of Theories of Change in use by the projects and corresponding assumptions?	TOC Assumptions Expected Results PWL
2F. What external factors affected the projects' outcomes and how did each respond?	External factors supportive of objectives. External factors undermining objectives

SUSTAINABILITY

3. SUSTAINABILITY: How does inclusion of religious dimensions affect the project's sustainability of results?	capabilities, processes,
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ENDLINE

REFERENCE TO BASELINE ANALYSIS

institutions or

relationships

EVALUATION DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

The evaluation had three phases: collaborative design (January-February, April 2016), baseline data collection and analysis (March, May-August 2016), and end of project data collection and analysis (March 2017, June 2018, and August 2018). Democracy International's evaluation team was responsible for design, implementation and management of the overall evaluation. The DI team members included DI home office staff (Director of Analytical Services, Senior Program Manager, Program Officer and Program Assistant), Evaluation Team Leader, Senior Conflict Specialist, two Local Conflict Specialists, two Logisticians, and five Interpreters. USAID evaluation team members provided technical input and guidance on issues of contract adherence and evaluation implementation. In Thailand, USAID personnel (DCHA/CMM Contracting Officer's Representative, DCHA/CMM Conflict Analyst, USAID/RDMA Project Management Specialist) participated in some interviews and preliminary analysis and provided real-time guidance on adapting the evaluation design to the local context. When involving USAID personnel in the field data collection in Thailand, careful attention was made to Do No Harm concerns with respect to both IPs' USAID branding waivers. Specifically, IPs indicated that the evaluation team was not to identify the evaluation or Reconciliation Fund projects with the U.S. government when meeting with project beneficiaries or other community members. This created some ethical tension for the evaluation team between "informed consent" and Do No Harm considerations, as at IPs' request some participants were intentionally not informed that the project itself and DI's work were commissioned by USG.

Phase 1: Collaborative Design

During Phase 1 (Thailand prep: January to February, 2016; CAR prep: April 2016), the evaluation team finalized evaluation design and prepared for Baseline data collection. The team consulted with key evaluation end users; reviewed background materials on the two geographic locations and four grant-supported projects; prepared a thematic study on current research related to the nexus of religion, conflict and peacebuilding; designed evaluation activities and tools; and worked with projects' Implementing Partners to schedule field activities.

Prior to field departure to Thailand, the evaluation team developed KII guides to ensure consistent collection of data across sites and respondents and customized collection for respondents with unique perspectives. Although the team did not pilot the tools, they underwent a process of data simulation to assure the tools were likely to lead to useable data responsive to evaluation questions. An essential step in Utilization-Focused Evaluation, data simulation is a process in which the evaluation team constructed likely findings based on the data collection tools. Based on this process as well as input from DCHA/CMM and IP staff, the team amended the tools prior to field work in Thailand. To respond to issues arising from actual use of tools, the team re-examined all data collection instruments mid-way through data collection in Thailand and prior to data collection in CAR. To ensure both continuity of use combined with flexibility and responsiveness to field conditions, the evaluation team stayed true to the intent of the evaluation questions but applied a collaborative process with IP and Mission staffs for adapting the form and sequence of the interview instruments. Once finalized, to support accurate interpretation in the field, the evaluation team also identified key concepts and terminology for translation.

Phase 2: Baseline Data Collection and Analysis

During Phase 2, the evaluation team conducted Baseline data collection and analysis activities in both Thailand (March 2016) and CAR (May 2016) for all four IP projects. The team conducted field work

over a three-week period in each country with site visits to all activity locations.²¹ Field-based activities included the in-briefs with both USAID Missions, IP staffs and local project partners; semi-structured Key Informant Interviews (KII) in Thailand and CAR with IP staff and local partners and subject matter experts (1 hour); Focus Group Discussions (FGD) in CAR with likely beneficiaries (1 hour); written surveys of a sample of Mor I students in Thailand (10 minutes); written surveys of FGD participants in CAR (10 minutes); Participatory Workshops in Thailand with IP and local partner staff (3 hours); and outbriefs with Thailand Mission personnel and IP staff.

In consultation with evaluation team members, IP project staff recommended and recruited **KII and FGD participants** based on criteria defined by the evaluation team, including diversity of representation based on sex, religion, age and location. In Thailand, the evaluation team conducted KIIs with 91 respondents, of whom 40 percent (36 of 91) were female. Respondents types included IP staff and local partners; project advisor; government and private Islamic school principals, teachers and students; Muslim and Buddhist religious leaders; government officials; CSO leaders; and subject matter experts that included academics and journalists. In CAR, the field team met with 181 respondents, 36 percent of whom were female (66 of 181), 75 percent Christian (135 of 181), 25% Muslim (46 of 181), 91 percent over the age of 25 years (164 of 177 respondents stating their age), and 9 percent 18 to 25 years of age (13 of 177 respondents stating their age). Types of respondents included IPs and local partners; prior or potential project participants (e.g., women group members, youth leaders, peer educators, Committee for Peace & Mediation members and awareness workshop participants), key stakeholders (e.g., religious leaders, government leaders and officials, journalists), and key subject-matter experts. The team conducted interviews and focus groups in English, Thai, Malay, French or Sango, depending on the preference of the respondents and with the support of local interpreters.

FGDs were typically four to six individuals that included both men and women together, with the exception of some FGDs with women leaders only. FGDs included both Muslim and Christian participants except in Bossangoa where all Muslims had left or been evacuated from the area. Youth were defined as 18-25 years and adults above 25 years. Upon return from the field, the team post-coded written notes from both KII and FGD in order to identify baseline measures for the evaluation questions. Although the evaluation is an aggregate evaluation across the two countries, the baseline analysis highlights specific examples from the four projects whenever there was notable variation from a dominant pattern.

Joint field-based workshops in Thailand among evaluation team members and USAID/RDMA and DCHA/CMM team members provided an opportunity for mid-course review and corrections. Following completion of data collection activities focused on the KIA project, the teams met in Songkhla (South Thailand) to reflect on progress to date. This half-day discussion included review of the evaluation questions, emergent themes, gaps in understanding, and minor adjustments in data collection. The evaluation team with DCHA/CMM and RDMA evaluation participants conducted a similar review in Bangkok after completing all Deep Southern Thailand data collection with the

²¹ South Thailand site visits included activities in Bangkok, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat provinces and border districts of Songkhla province. CAR site visits were in Bouar, Bangassou, Bossangoa and Bangui as well as nearby villages surrounding these principle towns.

added focus on lessons learned and priorities for data collection in the upcoming field work in the Central African Republic.

Written survey respondents in the Deep South of Thailand were Mor 1 students (i.e., aged 12 and 13 year olds) divided into two main groups. The first group was 42 students (64% girls, 36% boys, 69% Buddhist, 31% Muslim) from three (of six) HOPE Yala project participant schools that were government schools still in session during the field work period (i.e., the other three schools were on academic breaks so students were unavailable). The second group was comprised of 77 private Islamic school Mor 1 students (72% girls, 28% boys, all Muslim). The Local Conflict Specialist identified two private schools²² based on being (1) in session at the time of the field work, and (2) located in the same community as the selected HOPE Yala participant school. At each of the non-participant school, the school administration selected a class of boys and a class of girls to be surveyed. The Local Conflict Specialist conducted the survey and read each question in Thai as well as providing clarification in local Malay, if needed. Respondent rates were 100 percent; however, the evaluation team logistician entered all data into Survey Monkey; the Evaluation Leader exported data into Excel for analysis.

Written survey respondents in CAR included all Focus Group Discussion participants. Of the 116 respondents, 69 percent were from Zo Kwe Zo (77 or 116) and 34% were from ASPIRE (39 or 116). Respondents were distributed somewhat evenly across Bangui (23%, 27 of 116 respondents), Bangassou (20%, 23 of 116) and Bossangoa (23%, 27 of 116) with the majority conducted in and around Bouar (34%, 39 or 116). The larger proportion is explained by a particularly large focus group of 17 women in that location. Of those the 112 respondents providing their gender, 60% were men (67) and 40% were women (45). Of the 111 respondents providing religious identity information, 71 percent were Christian (79) and 29% were Muslim (32).

Evaluation team interpreters conducted the surveys, which were written in French but were also verbally translated into local language Sango, which is not a written language. The response rate was 100 percent; however, some surveys were not completed correctly so were not included in the data analysis. The Local Conflict Specialist entered data into SPSS and conducted analysis.

In Thailand's Deep South, the evaluation team with DCHA/CMM and USAID/RDMA conducted an individualized three-hour **participatory workshop** with each project to discuss the project design at the baseline phase related to religious aspects of the operating environment, theories of change and project design. The HOPE Yala workshop included the KIA project manager and two project advisors. It focused on identification of key religious actors involved in project implementation, religious actor roles, and the baseline logic model that diagrammed expected change pathways and project results. The PPST workshop included the two TAF local project managers and representatives of six of the eight local partner organizations (attended: B4P, MAC, Patani Forum, PAW, SPAN, WePeace; did not attend: ISTF, Saiburi Looker). The first part of the workshop focused on proposed PPST activities related to religion, with the understanding that specific activities had not yet been finalized. The second half focused on targeted attitudes, knowledge and behaviors related to religion that PPST expects to shift from baseline. In turn, these changes were linked to

²² There were no private Islamic schools in session in the location where the third HOPE Yala participant school was located.

Peace Writ Large objectives related to the negotiations with the Government of Thailand and community-based dispute resolution mechanisms. No workshops were conducted in CAR due to limitations on travel for evaluation team members and key IP personnel.²³

PHASE 3 END OF PROJECT DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS FOR ENDLINE EVALUATION

Between the baseline and endline field data collection, the evaluation team monitored in-country contextual developments. The team read formal IP quarterly reports made available to it. The team drafted data collection tools for endline field data collection based on insights from these reports and input from DCHA/CMM. The baseline field work targeted the same categories of individuals as at Baseline. The team also consulted with DCHA/CMM and IPs to confirm approach in the field and ongoing utility of evaluation focus.

The evaluation team planned to conduct activities in the field for the endline similar to those performed for the baseline analysis. The team travelled to intervention sites to meet with local SMEs, IP and local partner staff, and beneficiaries and met with Subject-Matter Experts (SMEs) to explore views on national dynamics or Peace Writ Large, . In the main, the team used KII protocols, FGD guides, and written surveys in CAR. The KIIs and FGD protocols were adopted for use in the Deep Southern Thailand endline study. The focus of these instruments was on changes from baseline and explanation of these changes focusing on testing of the TOC, effective or ineffective implementation strategies, intended and unintended outcomes, as well as the sustainability of results and contributions to Peace Writ Large.

²³ Travel between Bangui and implementation sites are via small United Nation humanitarian flights with limited itineraries, which restrict reservations to two organization members per flight.

ANNEX G: DEMOGRAPHICS OF RESPONDENTS

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

48 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), 51 KII Respondents

41 Christian, 9 Muslim, 1 Other

38 Adult, 13 Youth

10 Female, 41 Male

13 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), 44 FGD Respondents

38 Christian, 6 Muslim

6 Adult, 38 Youth

19 Female, 25 male

THAILAND

18 KIIs, 36 KII Respondents

5 Buddhist, 31 Muslim

25 Adult, 11 Youth

19 Female, 17 Male

14 FGDs, 67 FGD Respondents

27 Buddhist, 40 Muslim

30 Adult, 37 Youth

34 Female, 33 Male

ANNEX H: EVALUATION TEAM MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES

COELI BARRY, EVALUATION TEAM LEADER (PHASE 3 THAILAND)

Ms. Coeli Barry has over 15 years of experience leading the design and implementation of international social development programs. She has extensive experience in program evaluation in Thailand, having worked on various peace building, conflict management and governance, and political conflict and reconciliation projects. She is an experienced methodologist with expertise working with religious and ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia, including inter-faith dialogue trainings. She has proven research excellence and project direction in human rights, democracy, and religious and ethnic conflict. She has worked as the Team Leader and Technical Specialist for a USAID-funded conflict and governance project in Thailand, the lead evaluator for the Supporting Peace Building in Southern Thailand program implemented by The Asia Foundation, and the Senior Researcher for a UNDP government reconciliation program in Bangkok. She has also designed and implemented performance and program impact measurements for international academic programs and for externally funded projects on human rights education and improving research competencies on peacebuilding and conflict resolution for the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies at Mahidol University. She has a strong record of writing about religious and ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia, having published various works. Additionally, she speaks proficient Thai.

HIPPOLYT PUL, LOCAL CONFLICT SPECIALIST (CAR) AND SENIOR CONFLICT/SUBJECT MATTER SPECIALIST (PHASE 3 THAILAND)

Dr. Pul has 25+ years of experience in local and international development planning and management; governance and civic engagement initiatives; peacebuilding and conflict transformation programming; and research, monitoring, and evaluation. He has proven experience in the design, delivery, monitoring, and evaluation of multi-disciplinary, multi-sectoral, and integrated interventions, especially in economic and social sector interventions in agriculture, education, health, and humanitarian assistance. He has extensive expertise and experience working with faith-based organizations. Additionally, he has great facilitation and training expertise in conflict analysis, transformation, and peacebuilding. He has a deep, lifelong involvement with religious peacebuilding, working primarily in Africa but also globally on peacebuilding efforts. He is currently the executive director of the Institute of Peace and Development in Tamale, Ghana, carrying out independent research on peace, governance, and development issues in Africa and providing consultancy services in conflict assessments, peacebuilding, governance, and socioeconomic development. He has also worked as the Coordinator of the Africa Justice and Peace Working Group, and he has held various positions with Catholic Relief Services, including serving as the Deputy Regional Director for Program Quality and Regional Advisor on Governance, Global Solidarity, Advocacy, and Partnerships for the Catholic Relief Services West and Central Africa Regions and Deputy Country Representative and Head of Programming for Ghana. Dr. Pul has a PhD in International Conflict Analysis and Resolution.

JENNIFER KUIPER, EVALUATION TEAM LEADER (PHASE 1, PHASE 2, AND PHASE 3 CAR)

Jennifer Kuiper has over 15 years' experience leading, managing, and designing evaluations, programs, projects, and budgets in diverse policy arenas with a focus on fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS). Kuiper has served as Team Lead on USAID performance evaluations, been a part of USAID/CMM conflict assessments, and holds certifications in Gender & Conflict and Advanced Conflict Assessment. She has been the primary author on evaluation and assessment reports and briefed DC and Mission staff on key findings and recommendations. She has also supported USAID

implementing partners in establishing monitoring, evaluation, and learning systems, including development of indicators, benchmarks, targets, and data collection instruments. Kuiper has worked on peacebuilding issues on several levels, including at the grassroots with Israeli/Palestinian nonviolent movements, organizationally in support of field assessments for the Nonviolent Peaceforce (unarmed civilian protection), institutional policy in supporting the World Bank's development of approaches to trauma sensitive programming in FCS, program evaluation of USIP's work with ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq, and evaluation practices in serving on the Peacebuilding Evaluation Project working group (sponsored by USIP and the Alliance for Peacebuilding). She has interviewed and coordinated with religious stakeholders in past evaluations and field research, including imams, rabbis, priests, ministers, traditional leaders, and heads of religious institutions.

MARK ROGERS, SENIOR CONFLICT/SUBJECT MATTER SPECIALIST (PHASE I, PHASE 2, AND PHASE 3 CAR)

Mark Rogers is a peacebuilding and community development expert with over 25 years of experience consulting on peacebuilding design and implementation. He has led external evaluations of peacebuilding programs that address capacity building in Southern Nations Nationalities and People Region (SNNPR) Ethiopia for Mercy Corps, community stabilization in Gambella Region, Ethiopia for Pact, internal evaluations of faith-based peacebuilding in Burundi for Catholic Relief Services, and peace media and conflict resolution training in the Democratic Republic of Congo for Search for Common Ground. Under the auspices of MSI, Mr. Rogers led an assessment team contracted by USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation to explore the relationship between development, conflict, instability, and the potential for terrorism in Niger, Chad, and Mauritania. Mr. Rogers has published numerous works on capacity building and program design and evaluation including *Designing for Results- Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs*, a manual for peacebuilding field practitioners. As Country Director in Burundi for Search for Common Ground, Mr. Rogers was responsible for the overall direction and management of a large multi-faceted peacebuilding program, including strategic planning, program development, fundraising, finance, host government relations, and representational duties. As Program Director for the Life & Peace Institute in Sweden, Mr. Rogers provided technical assistance and quality oversight to the programs in the DRC, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, and the region. As Program Director, he also led development of a handbook on Participatory Action Research for Conflict Transformation. Mr. Rogers has designed and implemented numerous workshops for peacebuilding practitioners, covering topics such as needs assessments, de-briefing, lesson planning, monitoring, and adult learning.

PHAISON DA-OH, LOCAL CONFLICT SPECIALIST (THAILAND)

Phaison Da-oh is an accomplished Thai academic with nearly a decade of experience conducting research on conflict and peacebuilding, with a particular focus on inter-religious peacebuilding and religious identity. He has worked extensively in the Deep South Thailand to examine and analyze peacebuilding efforts and investigate drivers of conflict. Mr. Da-oh conducted a public opinion survey on the incidence of violence, peacebuilding efforts, and the current political situation in the Deep South. He is also engaged in research on the role of local administration in supporting the peacebuilding process in the Deep South. In 2014, Mr. Da-oh conducted a situational assessment in the Deep South, during which he conducted in-depth interviews and focus groups with at-risk men and youth to determine their motivations and means of engagement in violent conflict. Mr. Da-oh has presented and written extensively on issues of peacebuilding and conflict, focusing on the roles of democracy, religion, and local leadership in the peacebuilding process. In addition to his work in Southern Thailand, Mr. Da-oh has conducted research on conflict and civil society in Indonesia and

Malaysia. He received his Bachelor's degree in Political Science from the Aligarh Muslim University in India and his Master's degree in Political Science from the Jamia Milia Islamiah University in India. Mr. Da-oh is currently pursuing his doctorate in Peace Studies from the Universiti Sains Malaysia. He is fluent in Thai, Malay, and English.

ANNEX I: PROGRAM THEORIES OF CHANGE

KENAN INSTITUTE ASIA: HEALING, OPPORTUNITY, PEACE AND ENGAGEMENT FOR YOUTH IN YALA (HOPE-YALA)

To address the lack of trust between Muslims and Buddhists in six communities in Yala, the project's theory of change draws heavily from the attitudinal theory of change and holds that "If youth (students in 7th-9th grade, boys and girls, Muslim and Buddhist) are used as an important connector to create social space where people can interact naturally, then people will address their grievances through non-violent political discourse, because their attitudes toward those they are in conflict with will change to be more accepting, as barriers are broken down, trust is established, and links to the home, community and future are enhanced." The project goal in support of peace writ-large is: Build trust between Muslim and Buddhists in six communities in Yala by changing the attitudes of individuals and groups. The Healing, Opportunity, Peace and Engagement for Youth in Yala (HOPE-Yala), Thailand Project is designed with a significant amount of input from local leaders and experts working in the deep South and draws heavily on lessons learned from the HOPE-Pattani project. For example, key to the success of HOPE-Pattani was carefully structured interactions with community and religious leaders by using trusted members of society (such as the project advisors and partners from the deep South) to explain project details, and then having the leaders present the project at community meetings. Another key lesson learned was carefully structuring community meetings to ensure meetings remained positive and focused and did no harm – for instance, meeting times were much longer than originally planned to ensure all participants had a chance to be heard. Additionally, it became apparent quickly under HOPE-Pattani that even though a "go slow" approach has been utilized, even the original estimates were optimistic and quickly changed to meet local cultural expectations and ensure buy-in. All of these techniques will be utilized in HOPE-Yala.

In support of the project goal, three intermediate results have been identified that when achieved will mean the project goal has been achieved:

I.R.1: Creating Social Space: Social space where people of different religious beliefs can interact naturally and discuss community needs, centered on youth and community development, is created.

This IR is based on the sub-theory of change that "If the important connectors are used to create social space where people can interact naturally, then people will address their grievances through non-violent discourse, because their attitudes toward those they are in conflict with will change to be more accepting."

It is premised on two important assumptions: 1. Connectors are important enough to participants to overcome currently held attitudes about others. 2. The attitude change will extend beyond the connector to understanding of conflict grievances.

These activities take place in safe locations and are run with the presence of project advisors, partners and/or local community and religious leaders.

I.R.2: Building Youth Leaders: Youth leaders use their leadership skills to settle grievances and build trust. This IR is based on the sub-theory of change that "If opportunities are provided for youth to interact with youth from the other conflict groups using interesting connectors, improve links to the home, community and future by giving them important leadership skills to help organize community members for positive change, then trust between Buddhist and Muslim students can be increased."

It is premised on four important assumptions: 1. Youth are willing to join a project that has interaction with others of a different religious group. 2. The target is on the appropriate "Good

Youth” youth leaders. 3. Connectors are strong enough to bring youth from different religious backgrounds together for a common purpose.

I.R.3: Building Key Actors: Civil society leaders are confident to lead activities in support of community needs. This IR is based on the sub-theory of change that “If the capacities are built on key actors to communicate and work with others effectively in meeting community needs in support of youth, then they will have more success in influencing each other’s actions, because they will have the skills and experience to engage in dialogue.”

It is premised on two important assumptions: Training is relevant and participants choose to apply the methodologies in their work and to assist youth. 2. The skills and experience gained are sufficient to influence key actors.

Key to this approach is the use of respect community members and leaders who have been recruited to support the project, such as the project advisors and the local partners. Utilizing these key people as advisors helps project credibility and ensures community expectations are met and do no harm.

THE ASIA FOUNDATION: PROMOTING PEACE IN SOUTHERN THAILAND

The protracted subnational conflict in southern Thailand is rooted in the *vertical* cleavages that divide the Malay-Muslim population and the failure of the central government to address the grievances of that community. Ongoing conflict has accentuated *horizontal* cleavages that, as symptoms of the conflict, reflect the complex dynamics of elite relations and the impact of violence on secular relations between Malay-Muslims and Thai-Buddhists. While high-level negotiations such as those briefly transacted in 2013 are critical, other interventions are required to mitigate contests among local elite actors and rising inter-communal tensions that could undermine high-level initiatives. They are necessary to limit day-to-day violence, enhance community and local elite support for future peace efforts, and to bolster resuming high-level talks. To this end, civil society organizations (CSOs), in particular women’s organizations, and trusted community-based religious and secular leaders are well- placed to act as conveners of secular people-to-people (P2P) engagement to facilitate dialogue and build trust amongst conflicting groups at the community and local elite levels—a critical step in addressing horizontal societal cleavages. Improvements in these horizontal relationships will contribute to an enabling environment for the State and insurgent groups to resume peace talks. To this end, the project’s **theory of change** posits that *if trust and common understanding among conflicting groups at the community and local elite levels are increased, it will help ameliorate day-to-day violence and will result in bottom-up pressure in support of peace that will improve the likelihood of higher-level peace talks succeeding in future.* This will also include *top-down* elements in that trusted leaders whose capacity and confidence are developed will be positioned to serve as conduits of information and understanding of high-level conflict-related events and other developments associated with senior government leaders and other stakeholders back to their communities. The trust and common understanding building that guides the theory of change and project plan is for the secular purpose of ending conflict and promoting peaceful relations among all community groups in the South.

MERCY CORPS: ADVANCING SOLUTIONS FOR PEACE THROUGH INTERCOMMUNITY RECONCILIATION AND ENGAGEMENT (ASPIRE)

Mercy Corps recognizes that until the above-mentioned sources of grievance, particularly inter- group tensions and the lack of economic opportunities, are addressed, the population of Bouar will remain vulnerable to violence and conflict. Therefore, ASPIRE aims to support the Bouar Inter-religious Platform in building and strengthening community-based Peace

Committees comprised of leaders of all faiths as well as women and youth. The goals of these Peace Committees are to manage inter-group tensions, rebuild community cohesion, and strengthen pluralism. To achieve these goals, ASPIRE is built on three theories of change:

- Theory of Change 1: If community leaders and disaffected youth from across lines of division collaborate to monitor and peacefully respond to conflicts, then they will be better able to help their communities resolve disputes and mitigate rising tensions, and violence will be reduced in targeted areas. Amidst sporadic lootings, killings, and attacks against civilians, community leaders of all faiths have come together as the Bonar Inter- Religious Platform to mitigate conflict. The Platform has potential to play a much greater role in establishing community-based mechanisms to successfully resolve disputes. At the same time, disaffected youth and women remain critically on the margins. Mercy Corps believes that by building the conflict mitigation skills of influential community leaders, women, and disaffected youth in Bonar, there is a greater chance of effectively resolving disputes and rebuilding social cohesion.
- Theory of Change 2: If community leaders and disaffected youth identify and implement inter-group social and economic development projects, then they can have a direct impact on inter-group tensions and social cohesion at the community level. Conflict destroys economic infrastructure, disrupts trade, and distorts markets. It also leads to a winner- take-all mentality that destroys the trust necessary for business to flourish. When communities are trapped in cycles of violence, it is often hard to imagine that cooperation with an adversary can lead to economic or social benefits. Mercy Corps has implemented programs that integrate peacebuilding and economic development in a wide range of conflict and post-conflict contexts. Using market development tools to rebuild economic ties that have been severed, we work to create economic incentives for peace. Projects that bring together different groups will help people earn income as well as respect within communities, thereby promoting them as agents of peace.
- Theory of Change 3: If community leaders and disaffected youth speak out in favor of peace, then community members will be less likely to view violence as a legitimate way to resolve differences, and strong constituencies for peace will connect with national decision-makers. Mercy Corps' experience has shown that working with local stakeholders to resolve disputes and promote economic cooperation enables them to promote peace locally but also contribute to national conflict mitigation efforts. Mercy Corps will train and mentor the most influential leaders to speak out in favor of peace and present a positive vision for the future to their peers. Young people can take on more prominent role in promoting pluralist youth voices in support of peace both in their community and beyond.

SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND: ZO KWE ZO: ALL PEOPLE ARE PEOPLE

This project is underpinned by three theories of change, closely tied to the conflict dynamics within CAR. The first is within the 'Changing Institutions' family, and is based on the analysis of CAR as historically lacking functioning formal and informal institutions that could meet the basic needs of

the population. The absence of such mechanisms has meant that citizens have often turned to violence or criminality as a solution to their grievances. This project thus posits that the transitional structures in place in CAR must be supported to be able to respond to popular expectations; otherwise a return to violence is highly likely. The “transitional institutions” theory of change is thus:

- If capacity and strategic support is provided to civil society to participate in transitional processes, then both civil society and transitional institutions will be better equipped to design and implement durable peace strategies.

The other two theories are within the family of ‘Shifting Attitudes’, focusing on changing perceptions about the perceived enemy and about the value of peace versus violence:

- If conflicting parties engage collaboratively and constructively in their community through joint learning and action, then they will become less distrustful, more understanding of each other, and more resistant to violent mobilization.
- If women and men are exposed to non-violent voices and to messaging that promotes inclusive community-building, then they will be better able to accept and peacefully coexist with individuals from different identity groups.

These theories tackle the relationship between conflicting parties, positing that social contact, combined with public normative messaging on inclusivity, enables the breaking down of stereotypes and the humanizing the “Other”. This then has the effect of discouraging violence as a solution to conflict. It is a process that is critical to CAR, not only to restore peaceful cohabitation between currently segregated communities, but also to lay the foundation for a peaceful return and reintegration of displaced people.

