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FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE COMBATING CORRUPTION AND STRENGTHENING INTEGRITY IN JAMAICA ACTIVITY

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ABSTRACT

The Final Performance Evaluation of the Combating Corruption and Strengthening Integrity in Jamaica (CCSIJ) Activity was commissioned by USAID/Jamaica to determine how the \$10.6 million, almost four-year activity, implemented by National Integrity Action (NIA), achieved its objectives and the conditions for it to influence long-term processes of change. The fieldwork for the evaluation was conducted during August and September 2019 and included document review, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, a beneficiary survey, and a population survey. The evaluation found that CCSIJ has built capacity for action against corruption by strengthening partner organizations, with attention to value for money. Broadening the anti-corruption work to disadvantaged communities through community-based organizations, reaching out to educational institutions, and partnering with government institutions were also considered very valuable. Benefits are likely to continue after the award ends in March 2020. However, NIA has anticipated that building public demand against corruption is a longer-term project. The evaluation found programs like CCSIJ can have a long-term influence on processes of change if, like CCSIJ, they are multi-faceted and engage with civil society, the media, the private sector, and government.

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ACRONYMS

Acronym	Description
ALAC	Advocacy and Legal Advice Center
CAPRI	Caribbean Policy Research Institute
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CBSI	Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
CCSIJ	Combating Corruption and Strengthening Integrity in Jamaica
CDC	Community Development Council
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
COMET	Community Empowerment and Transformation Project
CRP	Community Renewal Program
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVSS	Council of Voluntary Social Services
DO	Development Objective
ECJ	Electoral Commission of Jamaica
ED	Enumeration District
EQ	Evaluation Question
ET	Evaluation Team
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FY	Fiscal Year
GoJ	Government of Jamaica
IA	Integrity Ambassador
IC	Integrity Commission
INDECOM	Independent Commission of Investigations
IR	Intermediate Result
JADE	Jamaica Association of Debating and Empowerment
JAMP	Jamaica Accountability Meter Portal
JCF	Jamaica Constabulary Force
JET	Jamaica Environment Trust
JLP	Jamaica Labor Party
JP	Justice Program
KII	Key Informant Interview
KI	Key Informant
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDAs	Ministries, Departments, and Agencies
MOCA	Major Organized Crime & Anti-Corruption Agency
MoEYI	Ministry of Education, Youth, and Information
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MRSL	Market Research Services Limited
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIA	National Integrity Action

Acronym	Description
OCG	Office of the Contractor General
ODPP	Office of the Director of Public Prosecution
OGG	Office of the Governor General
OPO	Office of the Political Ombudsman
OSE	Office of Sustainable Enterprise
PNP	People's National Party
PSOJ	Private Sector Organization of Jamaica
SOW	Scope of Work
TI	Transparency International
ToT	Training of Trainers
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
UWI	University of the West Indies
WROC	Women's Resource and Outreach Center
YFC	Yutes For Change
YCWJ	Youth Crime Watch of Jamaica

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EVALUATION BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND QUESTIONS

The purpose of the Final Performance Evaluation of the Combating Corruption and Strengthening Integrity in Jamaica (CCSIJ) Activity, commissioned by USAID/Jamaica, was to examine 1) how the activity achieved its objectives and 2) the conditions under which anti-corruption programs, such as CCSIJ, may influence long-term processes of change. The evaluation was conducted between July and October 2019 by a team assembled by ME&A. USAID and the United States Government (USG) may use the evaluation results for broader Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) programming.

PROJECT BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Jamaica has longstanding challenges with corruption and violent crime. USAID has invested substantially in supporting Jamaican institutions in combating corruption and crime, including through the current Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS). In 2012, USAID provided the leading Jamaican non-governmental organization (NGO) in anti-corruption, National Integrity Action (NIA), two grants to increase public awareness and build support for countering corruption. USAID followed up with a three-year, \$2.9 million award to NIA in 2013, which was evaluated positively in 2015. In 2016, USAID solicited applications for CCSIJ, a new anti-corruption activity, to capitalize on existing USG and Government of Jamaica (GoJ) endeavors to promote community-based partnerships in building public demand against corruption. NIA was selected to implement CCSIJ, envisioned as a three-year, \$12 million, CBSI-funded award. Under the six components of the award, NIA worked to: Build citizen awareness and capacity for sustained action against corruption; Promote justice sector anti-corruption programs; Support public capacity to deal with corruption victimization; Develop and support networks of key anti-corruption stakeholders; Strengthen investigative journalism capabilities of media practitioners; and Promote effective enforcement of anti-corruption legislation. The project received a no-cost extension from USAID. CBSI funding over this almost four-year period (from April 26, 2016 to March 26, 2020) is expected to reach \$10.6 million.

KEY FINDINGS

CCSIJ has built a greater understanding of, and focus on, integrity and anti-corruption into partner organizations. The Activity has strengthened NIA's and partner organizations' capacity for outreach and advocacy and has focused this capacity on anti-corruption.

CCSIJ has raised awareness of integrity and the importance of countering corruption. The Activity has built more organizational capacity against corruption and for integrity in Jamaican institutions and has increased anti-corruption and integrity work among community-based organizations (CBOs) working in communities.

CCSIJ has employed a multi-pronged approach with a broad encompassing strategy, diverse strong partners, and different methods of operating to achieve its goals. CCSIJ has benefited from a strong leadership and team at NIA. The Activity has supported effective partner organizations. Changes in Jamaica over the life of the Activity may have also affected the level of CCSIJ results, but there were no major events in Jamaica that required NIA to radically rework their program or their plans.

CCSIJ partners view CCSIJ as having positive results but believe it is too early to see impact against corruption.

To ensure value for money, CCSIJ used resources consistently behind its strategy and leveraged resources by strengthening institutions and through training of trainers (ToT) to amplify program impact. NIA was disciplined in program implementation and sought implementation and correct use of resources with

partners. USAID was able to extend CCSIJ and its agreement with NIA for a year at no cost; CCSIJ thus supported NIA and other partners for four rather than three years as part of the long-term strategy to combat corruption.

CCSIJ has affected the enabling environment for combating corruption and fostering citizen security and safety through advocacy, raising awareness, and increasing the institutional capacity of government and civil society organization (CSO) partners.

CCSIJ's capacity building approaches are likely to continue because NIA has developed into an organization that can endure and CCSIJ's government partners will continue their capacity building approaches and have plans to expand. CCSIJ's strong Jamaican CSO partners that have benefitted from CCSIJ's capacity building will continue to use this capacity going forward.

A central assumption of CCSIJ has been that raising awareness is central to reducing corruption and crime. CCSIJ's causal pathway was that a multi-pronged approach was necessary because of the complexity of the corruption and integrity challenges in Jamaica. A key assumption of CCSIJ was that strengthening institutions was an essential part of fighting crime and corruption in Jamaica. The need to present issues around integrity effectively has been one of the major components of the CCSIJ's strategy. A central causal assumption of CCSIJ is that the struggle to reduce corruption requires a long timeframe.

Stakeholders identified gaps in Jamaica, including the lack of an effective single anti-corruption institution, as the Integrity Commission (IC) has yet to be seen as effective; the lack of community policing, which hinders the fight against corruption and violent crime; the limited work done in Jamaica's education system to combat corruption and improve citizen security and safety; and the lack of strong and consistent law enforcement and justice, especially in higher-level cases. There is only limited networking and coalition building around integrity issues in civil society. CCSIJ work in Jamaica's vulnerable, volatile communities was seen as important but limited.

The U.S. government is considered to be invested in Jamaica; thus, USAID is also considered to be sincere in its engagement. Jamaican stakeholders value USAID's track record of leadership, engagement, and support in anti-corruption and citizen security and safety.

CONCLUSIONS

CCSIJ has increased the capacity of partner organizations to build public demand for action against corruption through a multi-pronged effort to build capacity to raise awareness of corruption in the NIA, partner CSOs and CBOs, and partner GoJ ministries, departments and agencies, as well as raise awareness of the ways that Jamaicans can address corruption effectively and support integrity.

The key factors that affected CCSIJ's level of results positively included the multi-pronged approach of the activity and NIA; the strong leadership and team of NIA; CCSIJ's support through NIA subgrants and partnerships with effective partner organizations in civil society, the GoJ, and the judiciary; and changes in the overall environment in Jamaica.

Substantial evidence demonstrates that CCSIJ was developed and implemented with attention towards ensuring value for money.

CCSIJ has had positive effects on the enabling environment for combating corruption and fostering citizen security and safety in Jamaica.

Jamaican citizens and CSOs remain tremendously frustrated about corruption and are not satisfied with the enabling environment or action against corruption to date. Citizens find the performance of the IC, envisioned in its enabling legislation to be a strong, single anti-corruption institution for Jamaica, to date to be wanting.

The design and implementation of CCSIJ has supported capacity building approaches to anti-corruption and integrity that are likely to continue beyond the end of the CCSIJ Activity, albeit at lower levels with less or no funding from international development partners.

The causal pathways, assumptions, and influencing factors that link anti-corruption activities such as CCSIJ, stakeholder capacity development, and the enabling environment for combating corruption and fostering citizen security and safety in Jamaica are extensive.

Stakeholders in anti-corruption in the context of improving citizen security and safety identified several key gaps.

Stakeholders perceive that USAID has strategic advantages in anti-corruption, in the context of improving citizen security and safety, because of the USG's vested interest in countering corruption, crime, and violence in Jamaica and from USAID's long record of leadership engagement and support in anti-corruption and citizen security and safety.

MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

USAID should continue to invest in approaches that increase the capacity of advocacy organizations and selected government institutions to increase public demand for action against corruption and for government institutions to address corruption more effectively.

USAID should continue to liaise and network with other USG and international partners to enlist support for long-term anti-corruption approaches like CCSIJ and partners like NIA. USAID has made multi-year investments behind the long-term multi-pronged strategy of CCSIJ. Successful anti-corruption efforts under this strategy were expected to take years. Jamaica may be close to getting to success but is not there yet.

The GoJ should strengthen its anti-corruption institutions, particularly the IC. The GoJ should revise the Integrity Commission Act to enable the IC to provide more information to the public on its activities.

The IC should accelerate its change management process and explain its activities and limitations to Jamaicans in plain language through an outreach campaign.

USAID and USG should consider developing conditions-based assistance to support IC for reform and restructuring.

The GoJ should continue to empower the Major Organized Crime & Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA), which has had a longer process of development – including CCSIJ support - that may now be demonstrating important results against high-level corruption.

NIA should develop a sustainability plan that does not depend on future funding from USAID. NIA should develop a successor plan as part of thinking through the long-term strategic development of the organization.

NIA should augment the Integrity Ambassador (IA) program's ToT approach to provide additional support to networking and support the use of ToT after IA trainings.

NIA should work with other NGOs to reinvigorate an NGO network to work on shared issues, including anti-corruption and integrity.

USAID should consider reengaging in community policing and social interventions in volatile, vulnerable communities as part of plugging gaps and supporting citizen security and safety. USAID's work in many of these communities is still recognized by Jamaicans. However, absent sustained attention and long-term programming, both community policing approaches and social interventions in these communities seems to suffer.

USAID should work visibly with the USG towards ending perceptions of impunity in Jamaica for well-connected people in the country. Development support and diplomatic pressure together should be brought to bear on the Judiciary and GoJ to successfully prosecute high-level corruption cases.

I.0 EVALUATION BACKGROUND, PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS

I.1 EVALUATION BACKGROUND

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission in Jamaica commissioned the Final Performance Evaluation of the Combating Corruption and Strengthening Integrity in Jamaica (CCSIJ) Activity in 2019. CCSIJ is a \$10.6 million project implemented by the National Integrity Action (NIA) from April 2016-March 2020.

The evaluation of CCSIJ was conducted from July through October 2019 by an evaluation team (ET) assembled by ME&A based in Bethesda, Maryland. The team included a Team Leader, a Deputy Team Leader/Evaluation Expert, and a local Subject Matter Expert. In addition, the ET was supported by a Jamaican firm, Market Research Services Limited (MRSL), which conducted two surveys, one of Jamaican citizens and the other of CCSIJ beneficiaries.

I.2 EVALUATION PURPOSE

The purpose of the CCSIJ's evaluation was to examine: 1) how the activity achieved its objectives; and 2) the conditions under which anti-corruption programs, such as CCSIJ, may influence long-term processes of change.

Specifically, the evaluation assessed: 1) how CCSIJ affected the capacity of target organizations to build public demand for action against corruption; 2) the impact of the activity (if any) on the enabling environment for combating corruption and fostering citizen security in Jamaica; and 3) the sustainability of CCSIJ's capacity building approaches.

Evaluation results will be used for broader Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) programming considerations.

I.3 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

- I. In what ways did CCSIJ affect the capacity of target organizations to build public demand for action against corruption?
 - Ia. Considering available activity monitoring data, what results did CCSIJ achieve as of June 30, 2019?
 - Ib. What factors affected CCSIJ's level of results?
 - Ic. How do CCSIJ's partners and stakeholders perceive CCSIJ's results and their contribution to changes in target organizations' capacity to build demand for action against corruption?
2. Given the substantial increase in USAID funding for this activity (relative to prior activities funded by USAID), in what ways, if any, did CCSIJ seek to ensure value for money?
3. In what ways, if any, did CCSIJ affect the enabling environment for combating corruption and fostering citizen security and safety in Jamaica?
4. What evidence exists that CCSIJ's capacity building approaches are likely to continue—or be expanded—beyond the end of the activity?
5. What are the causal pathways, assumptions, and influencing factors among anti-corruption activities such as CCSIJ, stakeholder capacity development, and the enabling environment for combating corruption and fostering citizen security and safety in Jamaica?
 - 5a. What key gaps, if any, do stakeholders perceive in the area of anti-corruption in the context of improving citizen security and safety?

- 5b. What do stakeholders perceive to be USAID's strategic advantages (e.g., developing partnerships or coordinating stakeholders) in the area of anti-corruption in the context of improving citizen security and safety?

The evaluation has focused on gathering valid and reliable data to analyze and independently answer the above questions about the performance of CCSIJ for USAID.

2.0 PROJECT BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Jamaica has had longstanding challenges with corruption and violent crime. The high rate of violent crime, particularly homicide, has been considered a threat to security and development. The Jamaican National Security Policy identifies corruption as a high impact, clear and present danger, and one of the primary threats to the country's national security and economic prosperity. The United States Government (USG) has recognized these Jamaican challenges, and how combating crime and corruption in Jamaica is in the U.S. national interest. The CBSI is a part of the USG's response to help Jamaicans address crime and corruption.

USAID commissioned an assessment of corruption in 2008, which concluded that outwardly democratic forms as well as moderately strong political and economic institutions have become subordinate to formally competing but interlinked elites, who collude to preserve public-private sector relationships that are seriously contaminated by corruption. USAID and the Jamaican people recognize that the impact of this corruption undermines Jamaica's development. USAID thus built aspects of anti-corruption programming into democratic governance and justice programming to help Jamaicans understand and address corruption.

USAID/Jamaica's 2013-2019 Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) identified the goal of USAID programming as *"resiliency and social cohesion of targeted Jamaican communities improved."* The Mission then developed approaches to support community-based organizations (CBOs), non-government organizations (NGOs), and Jamaican government Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) towards this goal, including in Community Renewal Program (CRP) areas. The CDCS developed a single Development Objective (DO): *"threats to the environment and citizen vulnerabilities reduced."* CCSIJ contributes to Intermediate Result (IR) 2 towards this DO through three sub-IRs: 2.1 *"Cooperation between communities and law enforcement increased,"* 2.2 *"Security of CRP Communities and at-risk youth improved,"* and 2.3 *"Institutional capacity of CBOs, NGOs, and MDAs improved."*

In 2012, USAID provided two Fixed Obligation Grants to the leading Jamaican NGO in anti-corruption, NIA, to increase public awareness of corruption and ways to counter corruption and support broad-based action to combat the high levels of corruption in Jamaica. USAID followed these grants with a three-year non-competitive Cooperative Agreement of \$2,900,000 to NIA to implement the Combating Corruption in Jamaica (CCIJ) project from 2012-2016.

USAID/Jamaica commissioned an external performance evaluation of CCIJ in 2015. The evaluation found that NIA had succeeded in raising awareness about corruption and starting to foster a national dialogue around corruption and integrity. However, the gains to date were not seen as sufficient and additional support to combating corruption in Jamaica was considered imperative.

USAID thus solicited applications in 2016 for a new anti-corruption activity to capitalize on existing USG and Government of Jamaica (GoJ) endeavors, and create new opportunities for promoting community-based partnerships in building public demand that would combat corruption and strengthen integrity; raise the advocacy skills and overall capacity of investigative, prosecutorial, and enforcement professionals; and ensure that key anti-corruption legislations are neither stalled, gutted nor shelved.

The proposal submitted by NIA was selected by USAID for funding. USAID awarded the CCSIJ grant to NIA on April 26, 2016. The three-year Cooperative Agreement was expected to reach \$12,000,000. USAID agreed to a no-cost extension of the award, which is now planned to conclude March 26, 2020, after almost four years of implementation. The total expended is expected to reach \$10.6 million in CBSI funding.

Under the CCSIJ award, NIA committed to “*work closely with MDAs, local NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs), CBOs and youth, to promote good governance practices in the area of anti-corruption and to build the demand for change. The expected result of this approach is to increase the ability of individuals, groups, and agencies to effectively counter instances of and attitudes towards corruption in general, and political corruption in particular. By the end of the activity, the above targeted groups and beneficiaries should be better equipped to build public demand for more effective action against corruption. Public officials should also be trained in anti-corruption strategies.*” The award highlighted the “*particular importance is sustainability beyond the life of the program*” and the need for “*special emphasis on a ‘training-the-trainers’ methodology, the production of high-quality manuals and the formulation of MOUs with Jamaican organizations.*”

Six components were outlined in the CCSIJ award:

1. Build citizen awareness and capacity for sustained action against corruption;
2. Promote justice sector anti-corruption programs;
3. Support public capacity to deal with corruption victimization;
4. Develop and support networks of key anti-corruption stakeholders;
5. Strengthen investigative journalism capabilities of media practitioners; and
6. Promote effective enforcement of anti-corruption legislation.

3.0 EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

3.1 EVALUATION METHODS

The ET drafted a comprehensive Evaluation Design and Work Plan, which included methodological approaches and a schedule to provide a high-quality evaluation and deliverables. The ET revised and finalized the design after discussions with USAID, addressing all USAID’s comments. The design focused on independent collection of valid and reliable data directly relevant to answering the EQs posed by USAID in the scope of work (SOW). The analysis and triangulation of these qualitative and quantitative data are the basis of the team’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Qualitative data sources included review of Activity documents as well as documents from other sources, and fieldwork through site visits, key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) with USAID, NIA, and project partners and stakeholders. Quantitative data sources included existing survey data and two surveys: one of direct CCSIJ beneficiaries and a representative perception survey of the adult population of Jamaica.

3.1.1 Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis

Qualitative data was collected through the following methods:

- Structured desk review of documents;
- KIIs conducted with USAID, NIA, and partner management and staff as well as with CCSIJ beneficiaries and other project stakeholders, including national government officials and CSOs that were not supported directly by the project; and
- FGDs conducted with different homogeneous small groups of project beneficiaries.

Structured Desk Review

The ET obtained project documents from USAID/Jamaica prior to the fieldwork and supplemented these materials by gathering additional project-created and supported materials from USAID, NIA, and its partners during the fieldwork. The ET reviewed and coded the most relevant parts of these documents in a structured manner to provide a shared understanding of the project; guide the development of the instruments and surveys; and contribute data for analysis and triangulation. Documents reviewed included: the CCSIJ award and modifications, quarterly and annual progress reports from NIA, annual work plans, partner proposals and reports, and other project-developed materials (including surveys conducted by NIA in 2014 and 2016).

Key Informant Interviews

The ET interviewed a total of 94 KIs (45 women and 49 men) across four parishes of Jamaica (81 in Kingston, 7 in St. James, 5 in St. Catherine, and 1 in Clarendon). The interviews were conducted with a wide range of partners, direct and indirect beneficiaries, and stakeholders from the GoJ, international donor community, civil society, and private sector, as well as with USAID and the NIA itself. Some KIs engaged small groups of people from a single organization with common histories and experiences with CCSIJ. KIs used a semi-structured, open-ended interview guide that the ET tailored to the type of interviewee. The KI introduction and questionnaire are included in Annex 3. The KIs interviewed were from 20 CSOs, four international development partners, the two main political parties in Jamaica, and 10 GoJ MDAs.

Focus Group Discussions

The ET conducted four FGDs that engaged 26 CCSIJ beneficiaries (17 women and nine men) in structured discussions about CCSIJ's implementation. FGDs were conducted with the Council of Voluntary Social Services (CVSS) trainers, Women's Resource and Outreach Center (WROC) beneficiaries, Council of Voluntary Social Services (CVSS) training manual designers, and Youth Crime Watch of Jamaica (YCWJ)-trained Integrity Ambassadors (IAs). FGDs used semi-structured, open-ended interview guides and questions to stimulate discussion based on the types of beneficiaries in the group (included in Annex 3). FGDs were animated by team members with experience facilitating this type of discussion, which stimulated the conversation among participants.

Notes from KIs and FGDs were reviewed and cleaned by the ET. Analysis was conducted through comparing and contrasting the content of the notes systematically around the questions asked towards the goal of answering all of the EQs. The analysis also compared and contrasted information and responses from different types of informants as part of this process.

3.1.2 Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis

The ET commissioned two surveys: 1) a beneficiary survey and 2) a perception survey of the general population. Survey data is useful for demonstrating what Jamaicans know about corruption and anti-corruption; this data is less useful in explaining why they hold these perceptions, although in some cases the underlying reasoning can be inferred. Both surveys were conducted in September 2019 by Market Research Services Limited (MRSL), a local firm which had already done survey work for NIA and for another evaluation for ME&A. The ET designed the two surveys, which focused on using questions and instruments that had already been tested and used in NIA's prior surveys (in 2012, 2014, and 2016) and the 2015 evaluation conducted by USAID of NIA. This enabled the ET to compare surveys to explore the evolution of perceptions in the population. The ME&A surveys, like the prior surveys, ask similar questions in different ways to get data on Jamaican views. Having more than one way to examine a question helps the ET triangulate these data and can help towards explaining why Jamaicans hold some perceptions. With the ET's supervision, MRSL tested instruments and trained enumerators and then monitored fieldwork through experienced coordinators. Survey instruments are included in Annex 3. The surveys used several

different kinds of questions to learn about Jamaican and beneficiary knowledge, perceptions, and experiences.

Beneficiary Survey

The ET developed a survey of IAs trained through CCSIJ. The survey sampled from groups of IAs trained by CVSS and those trained by NIA itself. MRSL administered the beneficiary survey through Computer Aided Telephone Interviewing (CAPI), reaching 310 IAs who are direct beneficiaries of CCSIJ.

The survey provided quantitative data based on multiple choice, open-ended and scaled questions. The data was analyzed through descriptive statistics. Disaggregation and analysis considered sex, organization (whether NIA or CVSS trained the IAs), age, and type of beneficiary (whether they described themselves as key actors or community leaders). The size of the survey made it difficult to identify differences between categories that were statistically significant. The few differences that appear to be both statistically and substantively significant are discussed in the Findings section, when appropriate.

Perception Survey

The ET developed a perception survey, with a design and questions similar to the survey used by the 2015 USAID evaluation of NIA and NIA's own surveys. The representative 1,009-person survey was implemented by MRSL in-person at the residence of randomly selected Jamaican adults (18 years and older) across all parishes. Stratified sampling was used to select enumeration districts (EDs) based on geography (parishes) and demographic characteristics (socio-economic status, rural or urban, etc.). In each selected ED, a random walk was performed to selected households. In each household, only a single person was surveyed, and the selection was based on which adult had celebrated a birthday most recently (with no substitution allowed).

The survey provided additional quantitative data based on multiple choice, open-ended and scaled questions for analysis by the ET. The data was analyzed through descriptive statistics. Disaggregation and analysis considered sex, age, geographic location (parish, as well as urban or rural), and household socio-economic status (as observed by MRSL surveyors). The larger size of the survey made it more straightforward to identify differences in people's responses between categories. However, few differences appeared to be statistically or substantively significant. The few areas where differences were relevant and statistically significant are discussed as part of the Findings sections under various EQs.

The ET used the survey data and comparisons to the results of NIA's 2016 survey, as well as comparisons with survey findings from the 2015 evaluation, to examine the current views of Jamaicans and CCSIJ beneficiaries as well as how both groups felt Jamaica had changed "over the past two or three years."

3.2 LIMITATIONS

Several limitations were inherent to the design of this evaluation. The ET noted these limitations in the approved Evaluation Design and Work Plan and worked as planned to mitigate and minimize their effects. The ET does not believe that these limitations have had a substantial effect on the validity or reliability of the data used in the evaluation. Limitations identified and managed included:

1. Recall bias: Informants, perhaps because they had difficulties remembering details about the past, preferred to address more recent NIA and partner performance relative to 2016 and 2017. The ET specifically inquired about earlier CCSIJ activities to help stimulate the recall of informants.
2. Halo bias: Respondents may under-report socially undesirable views/behaviors. The ET used confidentiality and non-attribution to reduce this bias. Fieldwork was conducted with procedures and in settings that made respondents feel comfortable to reduce any bias. FGDs were conducted among peer groups to encourage the expression of ideas that may not be accepted outside of subgroups.

3. Absence of a counterfactual: Ideally, to measure the influence of CCSIJ, the ET would compare the situation with the program to the situation without the program. The lack of a counterfactual makes it impossible to attribute observed outcomes to activity interventions since the ET cannot compare CCSIJ outcomes to outcomes in a comparison group that has not benefitted from CCSIJ. Furthermore, CCSIJ is not the only activity that has influenced the development of anti-corruption and integrity in Jamaica over this period. The ET has thus assessed the contributions of CCSIJ to observed outcomes.
4. Evaluation findings based on the subjective perceptions of KIs: Interview and focus group data draw heavily on experiences, perceptions, and opinions that the ET cannot verify. Therefore, the ET has triangulated different data to accumulate findings and reach conclusions that do not depend on subjective perceptions of a few KIs.
5. Difficulty assessing sustainability and expansion prospects: CCSIJ interventions were ongoing in August 2019, which makes it difficult for the ET to determine whether outcomes are likely to continue or be expanded once the activity ends in March 2020. The ET asked informants in KIIs and FGDs about their expectations for sustainability and expansion after to address this problem.

4.0 FINDINGS

4.1 IN WHAT WAYS DID CCSIJ AFFECT THE CAPACITY OF TARGET ORGANIZATIONS TO BUILD PUBLIC DEMAND FOR ACTION AGAINST CORRUPTION?

CCSIJ has built a greater understanding of, and focus on, integrity and anti-corruption into partner organizations. Through CCSIJ, NIA worked with several partners such as CVSS, WROC, Jamaica Association of Debating and Empowerment (JADE) and YCWJ, as well as other CSOs such, as Yutes for Change (YFC), to craft programs that incorporated integrity related issues into partner programming. For example, NIA cooperated with WROC and a youth club to bring discussions of integrity and ways to fight corruption and crime into programs that were otherwise about parenting and job skills, respectively. By doing this, NIA not only helped increase awareness and capacity regarding integrity and corruption among participants in those programs, but also helped the partner organizations expand their emphasis on corruption and the relevance to the work they do. NIA was able to substantially increase the reach of the CCSIJ program by working with existing CSOs with relationships in different communities and with different demographic groups, notably young people.

One example was the work NIA did under CCSIJ with the Jamaica Association for Debating and Empowerment (JADE) in July 2017. This three-week program for youths between the ages of 8 and 18 was both a debate tournament of the kind JADE has conducted on several occasions, but also included a curriculum on corruption and integrity with topics such as “Improving awareness of the issues relating to corruption in Jamaica” and “Encouraging participants to become champions against corruption.”¹ The program also provided opportunities for youths to improve their debate skills and engage in actual debate. Thus, NIA was leveraging an existing event to reach more people in a context where they already had interest in the material.

In several KIIs, respondents described working with NIA on topics such as violence prevention, music and art therapy, and domestic violence that did not directly address issues of corruption or integrity but reported that they incorporated anti-corruption messages into their overall work and had sessions on anti-corruption at various workshops and trainings. Similarly, a focus group of participants in a program for women discussed how support from NIA through CCSIJ made it possible for them to get job skills

¹ NIA Quarterly Report, No. 4 FY 2017, p. 32.

and training as well as other forms of support that were very important to them, as well as discussed how they now had a better understanding of what corruption is and how they might be able to work to stop it because of their participation in the program.

CCSIJ has strengthened the capacity of partner organizations. Through CCSIJ, NIA helped build the capacity of a range of partner organizations in both government and civil society. One of the most significant government organizations with which the CCSIJ worked was the Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Organization (MOCA). Through CCSIJ, NIA helped MOCA by providing training for its staff. NIA's work with MOCA went beyond training to include a training of trainers (ToT) program and the development of manuals and other training related materials. CCSIJ, via NIA, helped partner NGOs increase their capacity; among the most significant partners noting improved capacity in anti-corruption were WROC, YCWJ and CVSS.

CCSIJ strengthened the capacity of organizations like WROC and CVSS by providing financial support for specific programs as well as by helping those organizations increase their training capacity. For example, CCSIJ's support for YCWJ allowed that organization to pursue projects like "Sports for Life" and "Integrity Pays," which allowed YCWJ to reach more people with an integrity-based message while simultaneously building the NIA network and improving the capacity of NIA's partners to effectively reach young people.

KIs explained the value of NIA's support under CCSIJ in building and strengthening their organization's capacity to build public demand for action against corruption. One noted that NIA's support allowed the organization to "deepen and expand" and to reach more communities and parishes. Another from a GoJ organization noted that NIA was extremely supportive in helping them inform the public about their mission and building public confidence in their organization.

CCSIJ has strengthened the capacity of NIA. One of the most important organizations that CCSIJ helped develop and strengthen has been NIA. NIA has established itself as a major and powerful NGO voice in the anti-corruption and anti-crime sectors; CCSIJ amplified the organization and its voice as it grew in size to administer the CCSIJ award, increased its network of partners, and increased its media campaign. Through its strong media presence, CCSIJ has consistently drawn attention to problems of corruption and crime, as well as to the connection between the two. For example, by framing corruption in the broader notion of integrity and describing how corrupt officials are in fact stealing money that could be used for other more productive purposes, NIA made this link clear to the Jamaican people. Through its programs and activities, it has created the beginnings of a societal infrastructure, as evidenced in programs like the IAs and the Integrity Clubs (ICs) to combat corruption. If not for the support of CCSIJ, NIA might still have existed but it would not be nearly as relevant, recognized or impactful as it is today.

The increased capacity of NIA can be seen in many ways. For example, according to NIA's 2019 monitoring and evaluation (M&E) report, they have trained over 1,000 government officials and over 200 NGO activists on anti-corruption topics since the current grant started.² NIA's reports highlight dozens of media appearances by NIA's Executive Director, Professor Trevor Munroe, and other NIA staff every quarter, suggesting that NIA has a strong presence in Jamaica's media landscape.

CCSIJ-funded outreach and public information campaigns raised the profile of NIA. KII respondents frequently described NIA in terms like *"the face of anti-corruption," "an important part of the public debate (on integrity issues),"* and *"if NIA didn't do this (work on corruption) what would happen?"* Thus, for a range of KII respondents, NIA is a critical part of Jamaica's anti-corruption infrastructure. While some respondents spoke of one specific NIA project, such as a training with their organization, NIA's media presence, or even NIA's billboards, many spoke of NIA as an institution that is at the center of anti-corruption. CCSIJ played an integral role in helping make that happen.

² NIA FY 2019 M&E Plan.

CCSIJ has built the outreach and advocacy capacity of NIA and partner organizations and focused this capacity on anti-corruption. NIA and partner organizations have increased their capacity to advocate on anti-corruption issues due to the work under CCSIJ. Programs like IAs and ICs increased the capacity of young Jamaicans to advocate for greater integrity in public life; CCSIJ's support to the Caribbean Policy Research Institute (CAPRI) produced research that can be used for advocacy work; and YCWJ and WROC built advocacy capacity in communities with support from NIA through CCSIJ.

In addition to creating and supporting ICs in secondary schools as part of the IAs program, NIA also supported the Integrity Action Movement at UWI-Mona, UTech and Church Teachers College. KIIs with USAID, CSOs and GoJ informants and FGDs with young people noted that these programs increased the capacity of young people, many of whom will be in positions of influence and leadership in the future, to advocate for integrity and less corruption. CVSS, a key partner in CCSIJ, had a major impact on capacity building to combat corruption as it had an extensive ToT program in which *“a total of 864 participants were trained at locations in the following parishes: St. Ann, St James, St. Catherine, Kingston and Saint Andrew...six hundred and nine (609) participants trained were Key Actors, and two hundred and fifty-five (255) Community Leaders were trained during the period.”*³

One respondent in a KII argued that CCSIJ had a major impact on the organizations' ability to advocate against corruption, pointing out that beneficiaries have gone on to train at least 1,000 more people on integrity. Several respondents concurred with this specific finding by saying that there is a greater sense among Jamaicans that corruption is no longer acceptable and should not be treated as business as usual. However, there has yet to be a groundswell of activism against corruption or anything that could be described as a social movement for greater integrity.

4.1.a Considering available activity monitoring data, what results did CCSIJ achieve as of June 30, 2019?

The CCSIJ award outlined six areas of work that are used to organize this section. Expected outputs were listed under each area. The ET has used activity monitoring data on the results of CCSIJ activities to answer this question. These data were reported on extensively in the narratives of NIA's quarterly reports to USAID and briefly summarized in NIA's annual M&E plan (the latest from September 2018).

I. Build citizen awareness and capacity for sustained action against corruption.

Two expected outputs were listed under build citizen awareness and capacity for sustained action against corruption:

- Design and implement a sustained campaign utilizing multi-media and grassroots engagement to show linkages between corruption and the development challenges facing the country: and
- Establish and/or support integrity movements to engage students in schools, tertiary institutions and communities, including support for a civics curriculum in the education system.

Coverage of NIA's work against corruption, NIA's media campaign to raise awareness, and NIA's activities at the grass roots with citizens and CSOs summarize CCSIJ's activities towards the first expected output in this area. NIA hired a consultant and developed a media strategy under CCSIJ to increase the coverage of corruption and links between corruption and development in the press and has sustained this campaign over the course of CCSIJ. NIA also engaged with other CSOs a grassroots campaign to link corruption and Jamaica's development challenges. NIA developed the media strategy in 2017 and has continued advertising through billboards and public service announcements. It also raised awareness of corruption and the links between corruption and development in its sustained campaign against corruption and by supporting anti-corruption institutions through public events, outreach to journalists and editors, and NIA's own press statements. NIA has had a robust presence in the press throughout the CCSIJ award.

³ CVSS, "End of Project Report," May 2019.

NIA continued its work to establish an integrity movement by building understanding of the importance of integrity and through the training of IAs who commit not only to uphold integrity themselves but also to training and leading others in support of integrity, including through Integrity Clubs in schools and universities/colleges. NIA also supported the civics curriculum of the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Information (MoEYI) by working with the Ministry to provide supplementary multi-media materials on Jamaican national heroes to accompany the civics curriculum and textbooks.

2. Promote justice sector anti-corruption programs.

CCSIJ outlined two expected outputs in this area:

- Provide technical assistance to selected jurisprudence institutions and actors in contemporary anti-corruption practices through a ToT methodology and advocate for a greater focus on anti-corruption within the Jamaican legal education architecture. The goal will be to shift responsibility for technical training back to the host-country (exact institution to assume training to be identified during initial project phase); and
- Conduct toolkit building seminars for officials in criminal justice system around new and under-utilized legislation.

CCSIJ has promoted justice sector anti-corruption programs. Under the award, NIA has worked with Jamaican justice sector partners to build their capacity to serve the public as well as prevent and prosecute corruption. NIA particularly collaborated and worked with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP), the Judiciary, and MOCA to strengthen the capacity of their staff, to make their operations more efficient, and to raise public awareness about this progress and potential to better combat corruption. NIA has used ToT methods to do so; that way partners have the capacity to train on their own going forward. CCSIJ has continued to make progress in developing and using the capacity of Jamaican organizations for training for justice sector partners. For example, NIA-supported training used JCF, MOCA, and Institute of Forensic Science and Legal Medicine trainers and ODPP leadership to present at the Expert Evidence Training Seminar for the Crown Counsel in November 2018. However, the ODPP noted that the MoJ had only a small training budget which handicapped the Ministry, which thus appreciated CCSIJ support for facilitating the training. Also, in November 2019, CCSIJ supported training using trainers from U.S. government agencies and Jamaican counterpart MDAs from the JCF, Financial Investigations Division (FID), Jamaica Customs Agency, ODPP, MOCA, Revenue Protection Division (RPD), Tax Administration Jamaica, Department of Correctional Services, and the Passport Immigration & Citizenship Agency (PICA) on integrity and international affairs. Benefits of the training were the integration of U.S. government trainers with Jamaican trainers with facilitation from CCSIJ. Even using largely GoJ trainers, CCSIJ support was still considered necessary to facilitate the training, even with the responsibility for the technical training shifted to Justice sector partners.

CCSIJ has supported NIA-led seminars to build the capacity of GoJ institutions in criminal justice to use new and under-utilized legislation. The Activity funded specialized consultants to provide this training when necessary. NIA reports on CCSIJ progress towards a standard USG program indicator, “The number of government officials receiving USG-supported anti-corruption training.” As of September 2018, NIA reported life of project (LOP) totals of 1,064, almost reaching the target of 1,200 for CCSIJ. NIA-led or sponsored seminars with GoJ officials in the criminal justice sector have continued since that time, and almost certainly exceed the target by now.

3. Support public capacity to deal with corruption victimization.

Three expected outputs were specified in the CCSIJ award:

- Pursue up to 12 cases over the period of the award;
- Refer at least 24 cases to relevant authorities over the period of the award; and

- Develop a Manual/Handbook to guide citizens in the identifying and responding to incidents of corruption.

CCSIJ has supported public capacity to address corruption victimization. NIA has provided direct legal assistance through its Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre (ALAC) to individuals that believe they have been victimized by corruption, and supported their efforts to report cases of suspected corruption. CCSIJ funding has enabled NIA to hire a lawyer and paralegals to staff ALAC and support individuals that bring cases to it. NIA has also used ALAC for outreach via its mobile ALAC program, which brought free legal assistance to different communities, most recently to Santa Cruz, St. Elizabeth in December of 2018 and Spanish Town, St. Catherine in May 2019. From the start of the CCSIJ award to the latest quarterly report ending June 2019, NIA reports quarterly on the number of persons receiving assistance through ALAC. The March-June 2019 quarterly report noted ALAC supported 58 people. Cumulatively, over the period since the start of CCSIJ, NIA reports assisting 566 people through ALAC. However, the 2019 M&E plan notes that as of end September 2018, proceedings were underway in five (5) cases, which NIA is pursuing in the courts. These cases came from requests/complaints by individuals or groups of individuals through ALAC. This suggests NIA may be challenged to meet the 12-case target.

NIA's 2019 M&E plan reports that through September of 2018 ALAC has referred 23 cases to relevant state bodies. This suggests that NIA is likely to exceed the 24-case target or has exceeded the target since that time.

One respondent affiliated with NIA noted that before ALAC, only plaintiffs in criminal cases had access to legal aid attorneys. Now ALAC made that assistance available to people who had been victims of corruption and were seeking civil redress. The respondent concluded that ALAC had helped give more people hope and faith in the legal system. NIA was not certain about their ability to continue the ALAC program after the end of CCSIJ. To support sustainability of NIA's work with victims, one of the expected outputs from the Cooperative Agreement under Component 3 was to develop a manual or handbook to guide citizens in identifying and responding to incidents of corruption. NIA M&E reports note that this manual was expected to be developed earlier. As of October 2019, NIA reports that a first draft of the manual is being finalized by a consultant. NIA expects to complete the manual early in 2020 and to distribute the completed manual to the public as a part of NIA's outreach activities.

4. Develop and support networks of key anti-corruption stakeholders.

The CCSIJ had three expected outputs in this area:

- Create a forum of anti-corruption champions to build momentum and action against corruption and provide quarterly briefing and updates on the progress of the anti-corruption agenda;
- Provide support to key public sector agencies and departments, as well as private sector, academic, clerical, youth and civil society actors to combat corruption and strengthen integrity systems within government and society; and
- Establish a sub-award mechanism which will make at a minimum of five awards during the life of project to support anti-corruption activities and expand the cadre of anti-corruption actors in Jamaica.

NIA, through CCSIJ, has worked towards creating a forum of anti-corruption champions by training IAs, creating and supporting Integrity Clubs, and by recruiting more members to NIA. These activities are part of the strategy of building momentum and action against corruption and to ensure that anti-corruption activists are networked. NIA has not made reporting on the number of IAs or Integrity Clubs a systematic part of its reporting to USAID. NIA reports in the September 2018-2019 M&E plan that NIA is currently looking to build the forum with strategic partnerships with youth and community groups, the Jamaica Umbrella Groups of Churches (JUGC), and elements of the private sector at its core. NIA has systematically provided quarterly briefings on progress in the anti-corruption agenda to USAID through its Quarterly Reports and via joint meetings with International Development Partners, held in most

quarters. NIA organized a workshop with the JUGC on November 2018, with 35 leaders and representatives from 6 of the 7 umbrella church organizations affiliated to the JUGC. NIA reported that there was a strong consensus among church leaders that they should play a more active role in raising standards of conduct and responsible behavior and reducing the gap between laws and codes and the actual behavior of Jamaican leaders. No further progress was reported on this initiative in the 2019 3rd or 2nd quarter reports, the last quarterly reports received by the ET,

CCSIJ has focused on supporting key government, private sector, and civil society activism against corruption and for integrity. NIA has used sub-awards with five key partners (WROC, CVSS, YCWJ, CAPRI and MOCA), provided technical and funding support to other partners, and participated in joint activities with Jamaican and international organizations to counter corruption and raise integrity over the period of the award. NIA has reported on these engagements in the narrative of all quarterly reports. It has collaborated with the key Jamaican government institutions in anti-corruption (MOCA, IC, the ODPP), businesses and the main private sector organization (the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica), and a wide range of CSOs (from the largest national organizations like CVSS) to small CBOs in volatile vulnerable communities (such as YFC). NIA's work has helped raise their profiles and capacity, increased their networks and members, and worked on building on their anti-corruption approaches or integrating anti-corruption and integrity into the core missions of these organizations.

NIA developed a sub-award mechanism under CCSIJ and provided awards to key partners to support anti-corruption activities and expand the cadre of anti-corruption actors in Jamaica. NIA reported on the active five main subawards that were made under CCSIJ in each quarterly report. These awards were with CaPRI, CVSS, YCWJ, MOCA, and WROC. NIA developed a planned sixth sub-award with the Jamaica Environment Trust (JET); however, KIs with JET and NIA revealed that ultimately, despite initially agreeing on a set of activities, JET management determined that their CSO should maintain its current focus, as the reporting requirements would challenge the small organization.

Through CCSIJ, NIA has developed and strengthened partnerships with other organizations in anti-corruption. These partnerships and shared interests, however, were not seen by KIs as networks of anti-corruption stakeholders. CCSIJ has enabled NIA to work with many CSO partners (whether subgrantees or more informal partners), building their capacity in anti-corruption and working together towards shared goals. However, these relationships, even when they involved NIA and more than one CSO, were not seen by CSO leaders in KIs as a CSO network or coalition. CSO interviewees contrasted this engagement with previous broader CSO networks like the Jamaican Civil Society Coalition, which they saw as very useful in pursuing shared sector interests.

5. Strengthen investigative journalism capabilities of media practitioners.

A single expected output was listed in this area:

- Support activities and initiatives to enhance and facilitate effective investigative journalism practices among media practitioners.

Activity monitoring data from NIA's reports on CCSIJ demonstrate how the project strengthened the investigative journalism capabilities of media practitioners. CCSIJ raised the profile of corruption issues and increased coverage of action against corruption in the Jamaican press, primarily through two different capacity building activities. Under CCSIJ, NIA trained community journalists through NIA staff and consultants in conjunction with the USAID-funded COMET II project. The goal of the trainings was to develop the ability of a set of well-prepared trained people from volatile, vulnerable communities to report positive stories as well as critical information about their communities to the rest of Jamaica through the media. NIA reports emphasized that training participants were supported after training through mentoring, as investigative journalism takes not only specialized skills but also substantial time and consistent effort. NIA reported that articles that use investigative journalism techniques developed by community journalists during the trainings were published in newspapers or covered by radio and cable

television. NIA reported training 114 community journalists in 2019 in four trainings and 68 in 2017 in two trainings. The ET spoke to one KII who participated in the Community Journalist training who reported that the skills have been used in various media to advocate for change.

NIA also partnered with the Media Institute of the Caribbean to train established journalists. The partnership first collaborated with the Association of Caribbean Media Workers for a Regional Investigative Journalism and Financial Reporting for Development Workshop in March 2017, which trained 25 senior journalists from the region. The partnership continued and held two Investigative Journalism Workshops for journalists, a weekend seminar for senior journalists, and a bootcamp for junior journalists. These four events reached another 77 journalists, all of whom were mobilized by the Press Association of Jamaica. These activities attracted journalists from the major electronic and print media outlets. NIA reported that these workshops were well received; the participation of journalists from the main media outlets in the country validated that the workshops were of interest to journalists and their managers/editors. NIA followed up on the first training by presenting an award for “Best Breaking News Coverage” in 2017 as part of National Press Week and presented awards at the annual event in 2018 as well. These activities continued to raise the profile of NIA coverage of corruption and anti-corruption actions, investigative journalism, and community journalism. NIA also made sure the activities themselves were covered by the press.

6. Promote effective enforcement of anti-corruption legislation.

CCSIJ had three expected outputs in this area:

- Continue to advocate for the passing of the Campaign Finance Regulation and Integrity Commission Act;
- Partner with the Electoral Commission of Jamaica (ECJ) to support the effective implementation and enforcement of Political Party Registration; and
- Continue monitoring the legislative landscape and making interventions to enhance Jamaica’s governance arrangement.

Activity monitoring data from NIA reports provide evidence that NIA advocated for the passage of the Integrity Commission Act, the development of Campaign Finance Regulations, and other revisions to the legal framework for anti-corruption, and engaged with partners, including the ECJ and the Office of the Political Ombudsman (OPO), on political party regulation. NIA also advocated for the passage of the MOCA Act in 2018, which made MOCA a statutory law-enforcement agency with operational independence and authority, and the development of regulations to put these aspects into effect in 2019. NIA also maintained a strong ongoing engagement with the “political directorate” that not only monitored the anti-corruption environment but also advocated for strengthening the legislative and institutional framework for anti-corruption in Jamaica.

NIA had long advocated for legislation that would create a single anti-corruption institution to focus government efforts on anti-corruption and address overlapping mandates of existing GoJ institutions in countering corruption. NIA was instrumental in the passage of the “long awaited” Integrity Commission Act on January 31, 2017 that created the IC.⁴ NIA has maintained a consistent advocacy campaign towards making the IC effective, and has expressed its frustration repeatedly in private and public about the slow processes of change management in the IC and the limited public information available about the IC’s work.

⁴ As characterized by the Observer (January 31, 2017), which noted that “Passage of the Bill today was an obvious response to the recent global corruption index report, which stated that Jamaica had fallen some 14 places in the index. Prime Minister Andrew Holness told the House that the fall in the index was primarily due to the failure to pass the Bill over the past five years.” The reference is to Transparency International’s Global Corruption Perceptions Index, which NIA as the TI chapter in Jamaica uses extensively in its advocacy. <http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/House-passes-Integrity-Commission-Act>

NIA has worked with the ECJ. The ECJ invited NIA to the official launch of Political Parties Registration, which commenced in January 2018—four years after the passage of the Political Party Registration Act. This invitation was seen as implicitly recognizing the contributions of NIA’s campaign for this regulation. Additionally, the ECJ has invited NIA to participate in electoral observation of all by-elections over the period of the CCSIJ award. ECJ professional staff interviewed noted that they had collaborated productively with NIA, largely on NIA’s initiative, to raise awareness and publicity of the importance of voting and electoral processes in the run-up to the last general election in February 2016 (prior to CCSIJ). Through CCSIJ, NIA has worked to support shared interests with the Political Ombudsman, including the implementation of campaign finance regulations. The last two quarterly reports note that NIA is in discussions with the OPO and other stakeholders towards collaborating to build public awareness on these new regulations.

CCSIJ supported the continuous work of NIA to monitor Jamaican governance to support more effective anti-corruption institutions and legislation. Through CCSIJ, NIA has promoted not only the development of new anti-corruption legislation but also the effective enforcement of new laws and regulations, and greater public awareness of the government’s efforts. NIA was described by KIs as instrumental in the development of the Integrity Commission Act that formed the IC, and has had a consistent, high profile role advocating for the IC to become a more effective institution, particularly by providing more public information about what the IC is doing about corruption to Jamaicans. NIA has had two strands to this advocacy: a public campaign through press statements, speeches, and the Jamaican media and quiet, personal meetings and telephone calls with key Jamaican government, political party, and international development partner leaders on anti-corruption. This included a 2019 meeting with the entire International Monetary Fund team. NIA notes that these two different approaches complement each other.

4.1.b What factors affected CCSIJ’s level of results?

CCSIJ has employed a multi-pronged approach, with a broad encompassing strategy, diverse strong partners, and different methods of operating to achieve its goals. This included awareness raising through media and paid advertisements training for community and professional journalists to increase their capacity to report on corruption, pressuring and informal lobbying of government decision makers by NIA leadership, training and capacity building through programs like the IAs and Integrity Club, and partnerships with government institutions like MOCA and the ODPP to build awareness and capacity. Notably, although NIA’s activities included efforts to train investigative journalists, this was not cited as a core approach by representatives of NIA. Through CCSIJ, NIA offered capacity and training workshops to government officials at many different nodes of the justice system while partnering with NGOs to change government policy around issues like sentencing for youth, while also working with NGOs like WROC to reach people who were in a position of critical need. However, this holistic approach also led to NIA sometimes seeming to be trying to do too many things while some respondents questioned the relevance of some individual activities like sports events, suggesting the approach was occasionally too indirect.

The breadth of NIA’s work through CCSIJ is apparent from the quarterly reports, which have sections on “youth and member engagement,” “grassroots community engagement,” “speaking engagements and invitations,” “engagement with the political directorate,” “support to victims of corruption and justice,” and “media campaign.”

Another way the diversity of NIA’s approaches in CCSIJ became clear in KIs was that different respondents cited very different aspects of NIA as most important. For some, although not for partners in the NGO or government sector, NIA was most known for its media presence, usually on television and in the newspapers, but one or two respondents focused more on the billboards. For some of the respondents who cited NIA’s media presence, Professor Munroe was explicitly mentioned, but others said Professor Munroe and other NIA staff had media visibility. Other respondents, particularly in the government sector, mentioned NIA’s work training government officials as being the primary activity of

CCSIJ, but were much less aware of NIA's work in the communities, while several NGO activists, particularly in the communities, were less aware of NIA's work with government officials.

Another way NIA sought to have effects via CCSIJ was through IAs, individuals with whom NIA worked closely who then took action against corruption. IAs surveyed asserted that they had taken action to fight or reduce corruption; 68 percent of beneficiaries reported taking individual action in the survey, compared to 24 percent of Jamaicans from the general survey of the population. This shows that IAs are more active than the general population.

The "inclusive approach" taken by NIA to work with people from all levels of communities was seen by 8 percent of beneficiaries as a key factor "that affected the level of success NIA has had in its work with other organizations and citizens." Another 10 percent of beneficiaries felt "trying their best in education and awareness" was why the NIA approach was working.

NIA has benefited from a strong leadership and team. NIA has been led by a dedicated, competent, well-connected, and media savvy executive director. Professor Munroe has emerged as a media figure who frequently speaks out against corruption and crime and is a voice calling for greater integrity in Jamaica. He is clearly the face of NIA. Professor Munroe was also described as a thoughtful leader by most NIA staff while several beneficiaries and partners commented that they were inspired by hearing him speak at various benefits. However, NIA was greater than just Professor Munroe. The staff with whom the ET spoke clearly were committed to the mission of CCSIJ and very well qualified for what they were doing.

All political party leaders and some business leaders interviewed raised concerns about Professor Munroe's background and felt that background made NIA seem like it had a political and partisan agenda. They raised these concerns not in response to a specific question about Professor Munroe, but in response to more general questions about NIA or its work. Other KIs did not share that view and noted the NIA and Professor Munroe personally both publicly and privately criticized organizations, institutions, and individuals without regard to partisan party politics.

NIA's quarterly reports detail the myriad media appearances by NIA staff, particularly Professor Munroe. These are evidence of the extent of NIA's visibility campaign, but they also reflect that NIA is now seen by the media as a very important voice on matters of integrity and that its senior staff are seen as experts on the topic. If that were not the case, Professor Munroe would not be able to continue to land these media opportunities.

The ET interviewed almost all of NIA's senior staff. They evinced a deep understanding of and commitment to NIA's goals and work. This impression was reinforced by several interviewees who represented NGOs as they remarked that they could always contact their NIA liaisons, or in some cases Professor Munroe, if they had a question or comment about their projects. This latter sentiment was not as universal as some, but fewer partners indicated they would have appreciated more support from NIA.

When asked, the public volunteered a large number of different ideas about *"ways ... the NIA could be more effective or make a bigger difference in the fight against corruption and for greater integrity in public life."* Two-thirds of Jamaicans surveyed volunteered ideas. The ideas with significant levels of support were more public education/awareness (8 percent), being more efficient/forceful and vigilant in their operations (7 percent), and conducting investigations that could be used in judicial processes (7 percent). To make the NIA more effective, beneficiaries surveyed also favored more education (19 percent), public awareness of NIA (8 percent), training (9 percent), enlisting more people in NIA (9 percent), and increasing the ability of NIA to investigate corruption in order to join judicial processes (8 percent).

CCSIJ has supported effective partner organizations. NIA's primary partner organizations in CCSIJ, CAPRI, CVSS, YCWJ and WROC, as well as its major governmental partners, MOCA, ODPP, and the judiciary, were all strong organizations with both the capacity to absorb CCSIJ's assistance through NIA and use resources efficiently. Throughout the program, NIA maintained good relationships with CCSIJ partners. Despite this, NIA was unable to develop their relationships with these partners into a network

or coalition of NGOs, or NGOs and government entities that together could combat corruption more effectively.

CVSS's program to train key actors and community leaders, which reached more than 850 people, is an example of NIA's strategic choice in partners. CVSS's reach and relationships, most notably with the 4H Clubs, allowed CCSIJ to work with community leaders throughout Jamaica who were provided with high quality training materials produced by CVSS in cooperation with NIA. Similarly, YCWJ's Sports for Life, Integrity Pays, Change Through Arts, and School Implementation Program reached young Jamaicans in numerous communities.

In KIs with partners, respondents made it clear that they valued NIA's support through CCSIJ, but also that they approached their own work with professionalism and competence. This was particularly evident in the training materials the ET was shown by some partners and reinforced by the discussions the ET had with the people who produced those materials.

Fifteen (15) percent of beneficiaries surveyed noted that partnerships with other organizations were "factors that affected the level of success NIA has had in its work with other organizations and citizens." This was the largest category beneficiaries identified, suggesting that they viewed partnerships as the most successful NIA method.

Changes in Jamaica over the life of the project may have also affected the level of CCSIJ results. CCSIJ did not occur in a vacuum or a stagnant political and economic environment, but there were no major events in Jamaica that required NIA to radically rework their program or their plans. In this regard, there were no major unanticipated challenges that created major obstacles or problems for NIA. The growing awareness of corruption as a problem and the corresponding increase in demand – although not always explicitly expressed – for greater integrity in public life and the business sector was likely in part due to the work of CCSIJ, but that was not the only factor driving this. Austerity through two successive International Monetary Fund programs since 2013 has reduced government debt and inflation rates, in part by reducing government spending which also cut growth rates. These and other reforms have reportedly changed the environment for doing business and, according to one respondent working in the private sector, led newer businesses to eschew corruption and support efforts to curtail it. Economic growth rates have increased in the past two years and unemployment rates have fallen. This stronger macro-economic performance, however, has not been felt in all parts of the country, and poverty rates have grown. KIs noted that international pressure on the Jamaican government has contributed to instances of the GoJ taking a tougher stand against corruption. NIA had the relationships and exhibited the capability to advocate successfully under two different governments, one People's National Party (PNP) and one Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) administration, over the period of the award, that had different platforms.


As an example of the changing environment and its effects on CCSIJ, one KI noted that while many older business owners do not see corruption as a major problem facing Jamaica, younger business people feel differently. The reasons for this, as the respondent explained, are that the older businesses have figured out, in many cases, how to make corruption work for them, while the younger people want a new way of doing business and have been trained in modern business methods. Additionally, the younger business people are more concerned about Jamaica's overall fiscal health and standing internationally, subjects that can be helped by limiting corruption. In general, this contributed to an environment where it was easier for CCSIJ to build support in the business community for integrity related work, because at least some business leaders, more than in the past, understand the importance of combating corruption.

Activities like the one that CCSIJ sponsored in May of 2017 on anti-gang tactics brought in experts from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), who shared their expertise and knowledge about combating gang violence with the DPP and the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) and helping equip Jamaican security and judicial forces with skills and relationships that can

help reduce crime, but they also reflect Jamaica’s changing status in the global context as this kind of cooperation relies on a functioning bilateral relationship and a substantial state capacity on the part of both countries.

CCSIJ has also continued focused “work with the political directorate,” as noted by NIA in all quarterly reporting. This approach is particularly important because Jamaicans identify politicians as the most involved in corruption. Of Jamaicans surveyed, 70 percent felt big businesses were somewhat or very involved in corruption, as were 75 percent of big business persons, 69 percent of top civil servants, 68 percent of public sector workers in general, and 86 percent of politicians.

Figure 1: Public Perception of Involvement of Key Groups in Corruption



NIA has also worked with leaders of key business sector organizations (like the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica) and with the leading civil servants in a number of government ministries. These views suggest CCSIJ, through NIA, has targeted the people Jamaicans believe are the key ones to influence addressing corruption.

4.1c HOW DO CCSIJ’S PARTNERS AND STAKEHOLDERS PERCEIVE CCSIJ’S RESULTS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGES IN TARGET ORGANIZATIONS’ CAPACITY TO BUILD DEMAND FOR ACTION AGAINST CORRUPTION?

CCSIJ partners view CCSIJ as having positive results, but believe it is too early to see impact against corruption. Program partners in both civil society and the government indicated they believed CCSIJ had been successful, but that it was too early for those successes to have a major impact on integrity issues in Jamaica. The work that NIA did to draw attention to corruption and integrity, whether through billboards, media appearances or, in partnership with other organizations, trainings and workshops throughout Jamaica, was positive, but in some respects has not yet borne fruit. Similarly, the work CCSIJ did, through NIA, in helping existing government organizations like the ODPP and the court system, as well as newer institutions like MOCA, to function better, was meaningful but has not had enough time to reach the level of impact sought by KIs.

MOCA’s final project report reflected the general sense among partners that CCSIJ was future oriented. *“The Subject Matter Experts who conducted the workshops during the project saw the interaction as an opportunity to forge relationships with MOCA. They were enthused about the chance to have worked with MOCA and are keen to collaborate on training opportunities with the independent MOCA in the future. This will not only continue to improve the skill sets of MOCA staff but also increase the ability to achieve MOCA’s strategic objectives.”*⁵

⁵ “MOCA Development Project Final Report,” March 2019, p. 19, italics not in original.

Kills noted that CCSIJ was making progress in raising awareness. One CSO leader remarked that “NIA has embedded in the national thought process that governance is a good thing,” but added that has not yet led to meaningful change and that Jamaican society still must “get up on its hind legs and say no mas.” A Kill respondent from the government also indicated that NIA, through its range of programs, is slowly changing attitudes, but that it will not happen quickly. “(NIA) are ultimately chipping away from a cultural norm that has existed for some time, which will make our jobs easier.” Another respondent cautioned “to expect to move to the next step within this timeline would be unreasonable... You don’t change a subculture that’s been there before independence overnight.”

CCSIJ has strengthened NIA as a major player in the field of integrity. CCSIJ’s partners and stakeholders recognize NIA as the leading civil society actor in integrity and anti-corruption. Thus, the creation and institutionalization of NIA in civil society generally and anti-corruption work is seen by many partners and others as one of CCSIJ’s major accomplishments. Partners indicated that NIA is sufficiently influential that they can draw attention to issues of corruption that arise and have contributed to a growing awareness of integrity related issues. A small minority of stakeholders, but not partners, indicated that they believe NIA has sometimes misused their influence by misidentifying and “sensationalizing” corruption when it may not be present—where poor performance from low capacity or other challenges may be misattributed to corruption.

NIA’s influence and presence in the anti-corruption sector can be seen in quarterly reports. For example, third quarter of FY 2019 reporting includes dozens of trainings and other activities, speaking engagements for NIA personnel in front of different groups, and over 40 instances where NIA is noted in the mass media. This reflects the reach and presence of NIA in the anti-corruption sector.

One Kill respondent who worked in the civil society sector stated that “NIA has been the pioneering civic organization focusing on public corruption.” A second stated explicitly “I think of NIA as a brand, as an anti-corruption brand.” Another respondent added that there is “broad acceptance that they (NIA) are the number one NGO speaking on difficult issues, speaking truth to power...helped the media to understand some issues that they did not understand before.” Even prosecutors in the DPP’s office said understanding of corruption is enhanced by work of NIA. “NIA has been pretty successful in creating a band of young people who don’t want to take foolishness.” These are just a few examples, but dozens of Kill respondents from all different sectors noted, in one way or another, that NIA had become the preeminent actor in the integrity sector, while others indicated that, to them, anti-corruption was NIA and NIA was the face of anti-corruption.

4.2 GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN USAID FUNDING FOR THIS ACTIVITY (RELATIVE TO PRIOR ACTIVITIES FUNDED BY USAID), IN WHAT WAYS, IF ANY, DID CCSIJ SEEK TO ENSURE VALUE FOR MONEY?

USAID, through CCSIJ, provided a large multi-year grant to a local organization. One of the biggest and most important decisions regarding use of resources for the CCSIJ project was to make the primary partner a Jamaican NGO, rather than a U.S. contractor or NGO, to increase the likelihood that gains would be sustained after USAID funding ended and increase local ownership. This was an important financial decision as well as an important programmatic decision to expand direct work with NIA based on the strength of the organization, particularly influential, professional senior staff who were well connected in, and deeply knowledgeable about, Jamaica.

Kills with USAID noted that this approach was in accord with USAID Forward and Agency approaches that prioritized working with local organizations. One USAID Kill expressed concern that the size of the CCSIJ grant was particularly large and highlighted the challenges and benefits related to the grant going to a local organization. All USAID Kills, however, noted that NIA was a strong organization that was well positioned to effectively pursue the goals of CCSIJ. NIA’s successful management of two Fixed Obligation Grants in 2012 and their management of a three-year, \$3 million cooperative agreement from 2013-2016, which was underway during the CCSIJ award process and had a favorable independent evaluation,

provided USAID confidence that NIA would be able to manage USG funds and had a strong comparative advantage in anti-corruption and integrity that would benefit USAID. These reasons led to a decision that had a significant positive impact on the proportion of CCSIJ's finance that was allocated to programmatic rather than administrative costs and overhead.

USAID financial management of the cooperative agreement, particularly the negotiations at the outset, was noted in USAID and NIA KII as strict and focused on efficiency and value for money. USAID's financial management was consistent with the roles of the agency under a cooperative agreement, which once awarded, limits USAID's substantial involvement. In the award process, USAID limited the salaries to senior NIA staff consistent with USAID regulations, which again resulted in more resources devoted to programming rather than administration and staffing.

CCSIJ has used resources consistently behind its broad strategy. CCSIJ has a strategy and follows it towards results in promoting integrity and countering corruption. The program strategy rests on a synergy between building demand and awareness around corruption and crime issues while also strengthening civic and governmental organizations involved in fighting corruption and crime, or which could be brought into that fight. Some KII respondents questioned why NIA was spending money on some activities, such as sports, or probed the value of expensive billboards and media consultants. However, these expenditures were consistent with the strategy, and were promising ways to reach the youth or raise a general awareness around corruption. Partners and others were not always clear on the strategy, so more transparency could ameliorate some of these concerns. For example, several KII respondents who indicated that spending large amounts of money on billboards was not an efficient use of resources stated this simply as an observation, but others presented it as part of a critique of NIA.

The cooperative agreement between USAID and NIA for CCSIJ explains the breadth of the strategies and activities. NIA was to

“create new opportunities for promoting community-based partnerships in building public demand that will combat corruption and strengthen integrity; raise the advocacy skills and overall capacity of investigative, prosecutorial and enforcement professionals; and to ensure that key anti-corruption legislations are neither stalled, gutted nor shelved. The new anti-corruption activity will also be innovative as it aims to: engage youth in a more robust manner including use of media which is more class and youth sensitive; build the capacity of the GoJ Judiciary and other systems to assume technical training responsibility; strengthen media on their reporting of the issues; build a cadre of other anti-corruption advocates; and focus on key additional political codes of conduct. Integrated approaches will respond to the needs of victims and witnesses of corruption; establish mechanisms that will widen the anti-corruption network and encourage sustainable interventions; and support activities that seek to respond to emerging issues in the anticorruption landscape, including but not limited to economic and fiscal oversight programs through the use of sub-awards.”⁶

Many KII respondents only were aware of some of NIA's activities under CCSIJ because few interacted with NIA on all their different dimensions. Therefore, these respondents did not have a strong sense of NIA's overall strategy. For example, some only saw NIA as focused on raising awareness, while others only saw them as involved in training. Nonetheless, senior NIA personnel clearly understood the bigger picture strategy and were able to explain NIA's use of resources in that context.

CCSIJ has leveraged its resources by strengthening institutions and through ToT. Much of NIA's training and related work through CCSIJ sought to create a multiplier effect by working with organizations through an institutional approach that recognizes that these partners have an extensive reach in Jamaica and will continue to work on their core missions as well as on integrity or anti-corruption

⁶ Cooperative Agreement No. AID-532-A-16-00001, April 26, 2016, p.13.

going forward. NIA has chosen to work with high-profile institutions in the integrity sector, and through this work has made them stronger. NIA has worked through CCSIJ to strengthen an institutional anti-corruption infrastructure that goes beyond NIA.

ToT methods were at the core of many NIA activities in CCSIJ, including its work with partners like CVSS who focused on community leaders and key actors, as well as through NIA training programs for IAs. IAs were tasked with going back to their communities to establish programs and activities. NIA and their partners developed manuals to guide trainers and grantees that will be useful for trainers in the future. The flaw in this approach was that trainers who were trained, such as IAs, did not always go back to their communities and lead trainings, NIA, CSOs, and IAs. KIs and FGDs found that IAs lacked the resources – like funds for refreshments – to train others and that NIA and its partners had limited methods to follow up and encourage people trained as trainers to organize and implement the training on their own, as envisioned under their training.

The partnership between CVSS and NIA in CCSIJ demonstrates the utility and the limits of the ToT approach. For example, in the fourth quarter of FY 2017, CVSS trained 207 potential trainers in Linstead, St. Catherine and Montego Bay, St. James, demonstrating the value of that partnership in getting CCSIJ into communities. The two organizations also conducted a town hall meeting at the International University of the Caribbean in St. James as an addendum to one of the trainings that was attended by over 100 community residents. However, only half (51.7 percent) of all CVSS-trained IAs surveyed in the MRSL survey report having conducted a training for others based on their training; almost two-thirds (65.5 percent) of NIA-trained IAs reported in the beneficiary survey that they had conducted a training to date.

Focus groups with IAs, as well as with facility advisors to Integrity Clubs, demonstrated that in school (in these cases secondary schools), people who directly interacted with NIA through various trainings were able to bring that information and belief in integrity back to school and build clubs that brought in other students who had not attended NIA trainings. Thus, the ToT approach reached secondary students, through either peers or teachers, that did not have the opportunity to participate directly in NIA events, and therefore increased the number of people engaging in anti-corruption work and activities. Having the school as an institutional base enabled inspired IAs to train others and lead in anti-corruption and integrity.

NIA was disciplined regarding program implementation with partners in CCSIJ. NIA staff reported focused work to ensure that grantees used money appropriately. NIA began this focus in its initial work with prospective partners prior to CCSIJ being awarded. NIA held sessions with partners to build capacity to implement CCSIJ sub-grants; these sessions included both financial and narrative reporting and results-based management. Partner KIs noted constant guidance and encouragement from NIA staff to use money wisely and to find ways to get the most out of these expenditures.

Several KI respondents discussed the NIA's approach to resources when implementing programs like the YCWJ's summer camps in July and August of 2008, or WROC's work in various communities. They all stressed that NIA encouraged them not only to use resources carefully, but to find ways to both save money and build relationships in the communities. One example of this is when NIA encouraged partners to use local vendors for things like food. One NIA respondent described NIA as having to occasionally act as a brake on partner's spending.

Two KIs questioned the value of the CCSIJ-funded NIA media strategy and the merits of components of that strategy, particularly the design and placement of billboards.⁷


Beneficiaries surveyed felt that NIA was doing a good job (60 percent) or very good job (26 percent) in project implementation. The most common explanation from few beneficiaries (4 percent or 10 people)

⁷ NIA reported that the consultant that had designed the media strategy had passed away—and that the consultant had done this work with minimal participation from the rest of the media firm; the ET was thus not able to follow up on these questions.

that specified information about why they felt NIA was not doing a good job were CVSS-trained IAs, who felt that NIA should have been present as well in their trainings.

Eighty-five (85) percent of beneficiaries asserted that “NIA has sought to ensure that money is used efficiently.” When asked specifically in a follow up, “What has NIA done in its strategies, in designing its programs, and in implementing its activities that shows attention to the efficient use of money?” more than a third of beneficiaries felt NIA spent according to plan, 18 percent of beneficiaries noted NIA’s efficient and accountable practices, 12 percent praised the public awareness work (including billboards), and 7 percent noted solid recordkeeping by NIA. Twenty-two (22) percent of beneficiaries asked this question were not able to identify specific practices that they characterized as efficient.

Figure 2: What Has NIA Done to Show Efficient Use of Money?



USAID extended CCSIJ at NIA’s request beyond the initial period of program implementation at no cost. The initial CCSIJ agreement between NIA and USAID was from April 27, 2017 to April 26, 2019. NIA requested and USAID agreed to a no-cost extension of the award through March 26, 2020. This extension gave NIA and its partners almost a year more of program implementation towards the long-term strategy and goals of CCSIJ.

4.3 IN WHAT WAYS, IF ANY, DID CCSIJ AFFECT THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR COMBATING CORRUPTION AND FOSTERING CITIZEN SECURITY AND SAFETY IN JAMAICA?

CCSIJ has contributed to stronger advocacy on integrity issues. The environment for combating corruption has improved because there is more and stronger advocacy around these issues, much of which can be traced directly to CCSIJ. This has made the environment in Jamaica less hospitable to corruption and crime at the grassroots and elite levels. CCSIJ-funded NIA and partner trainings and workshops have created a greater demand for action against corruption as well as a corresponding decrease in tolerance for corruption at all levels. NIA has consistently advocated among elites, through political relationships and contact with parliament and the media, for action against corruption.

NIA has pursued this latter strategy through constant communication and advocacy with influential decisionmakers and organizations under CCSIJ. For example, in the fourth quarter of FY 2018, NIA leadership met with the Prime Minister, the leader of the opposition, and the Jamaican Umbrella Group of Churches on corruption. The meetings with the political leadership resulted from a letter NIA had co-written with Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ) and other influential civic organizations. NIA’s work to build relationships with church and business organizations has contributed to their ability to be more influential in the political realm.

One KII respondent who works in the field of ethics and integrity remarked on NIA's ability to bring together different stakeholders and on the letters produced by NIA as contributing to an improved environment for advocacy. Other KII respondents remarked that grassroots advocacy is stronger than before but has still not reached its full strength or coalesced around a single campaign. A few said that given the right spark, perhaps another high-level corruption scandal, a major advocacy campaign could be created. Several attributed this claim on the environment at the grassroots level to NIA's media campaign, particularly the documentaries.

The public survey and survey of beneficiaries demonstrated that citizens and IAs both saw greater awareness and understanding of corruption, the need for activism, and more advocacy against corruption in Jamaica. These specific data are reported on in other areas of findings in this report.

CCSIJ has raised awareness of integrity and anti-corruption, including how corruption and integrity are related to crime and violence. CCSIJ has increased awareness around the importance of combating corruption. Raising awareness was a central part of CCSIJ that can be seen in many different NIA activities from billboards, documentaries, and advertisements to frequent media appearances and grassroots-level training and education around these issues. NIA and its partner's messaging contributed to this change in the environment. By going to communities and explaining corruption, and its costs, in ways that were relevant to their audience, or by defining integrity in ways that were clear and broad, NIA made it easier for people to see the corruption that is too frequently around them and how integrity can help them and their communities or organizations.

In its quarterly reports and other documents, NIA describes its mission under CCSIJ as, in part, to *"increase the levels of popular awareness and broad-based action to achieve more significant outcomes in the combat of the high levels of corruption in Jamaica."* Awareness raising is expected to help NIA change the enabling environment for corruption in Jamaica. An August 2017 event in West Kingston demonstrates the importance of raising awareness. The event was a football derby that drew over 300 participants, most of whom were young males. NIA and its partners used football and other related activities to deliver and popularize integrity and anti-corruption messages in an environment that attracted this key audience. The fourth FY 2018 Quarterly Report describes how, *"community members spoke to the need for strong action against the corrupt in the country, especially those who felt they were untouchable or above the law."* These kinds of events help raise awareness and make it less likely corruption will go unnoticed or unremarked upon.⁸

One KII respondent explained this increased awareness by stating that people who come into his/her CSO to discuss their problems now connect them to corruption in a way that they did not in the past. One focus group participant who interacted with secondary school students expressed a similar sentiment, telling the ET that students are not aware of integrity and corruption issues until they encounter the ICs. One KII respondent who worked in the government indicated that he thought NIA's awareness raising had made it easier for people inside government to draw attention to corruption and indicated that some of these people had provided information that led to investigations. Moreover, many KII respondents indicated that the climate around corruption in Jamaica was changing as awareness about the different dynamics and impact of corruption grows, and that much of that is due to CCSIJ.

The IAs polled asserted that reducing corruption can reduce crime and violence in Jamaica; 46 percent of IAs said this was the case because corruption is a component of crime. Thus, if you get rid of corruption, crime will be reduced. This was how beneficiaries described how the two go hand in hand.

CCSIJ has increased the institutional capacity of key state and civic institutions, which has altered the enabling environment for corruption and crime. Through NIA, the CCSIJ worked with state institutions to help make them more adept at investigative procedures, sharpen prosecutorial skills, and increase the justice system's capacity to process criminal cases. This work meant that it will be

⁸ NIA Quarterly Report, FY 2018, No. 4, p. 50.

more likely that those who commit crimes and acts of corruption are held responsible for their actions. NIA's work with civic organizations helped them increase their capacity both to advocate against corruption and to reach more people with information about corruption and crime and help those people understand these issues better.

NIA programs in July 2018 that trained 84 senior court staff and sought to “assist staff who are tasked with leadership responsibilities in our courts to use the tools they acquire to govern more effectively, holding themselves and others more accountable for their actions or inactions, strengthen relationships, sustain positive change, and increase effectiveness while eliminating corruption and opportunities for same;” and, later that month, trained 20 police officers on how to use cyber techniques to help prevent child trafficking, child pornography, and other crimes against children, are examples of how the environment for corruption and crime is being changed by CCSIJ.⁹

In a KII with a respondent from the government, it was explained to the ET that the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) has benefitted from NIA's assistance in ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution); child diversion, which gets children who have committed minor crimes out of the criminal justice system; and restorative justice, as well as in training for justice programs (JPs) on subjects like mediation. This helps make the MoJ and judiciary more efficient by reducing the case load. Similarly, NGO activists said that NIA's support for programs like summer camps for girls, outreach in difficult communities, or work in the schools helped strengthen their organizations and allowed them to create a stronger climate for action against corruption.

4.4 WHAT EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT CCSIJ'S CAPACITY BUILDING APPROACHES ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE—OR BE EXPANDED—BEYOND THE END OF THE ACTIVITY?

NIA has developed, through CCSIJ, into an organization that is positioned to endure. NIA has developed a well-respected brand and reputation, and has an affiliation with Transparency International (TI) that brings them additional credibility, particularly with international donors and organizations. NIA, although relatively small, has built organizational capacity in its people and resources through ToT techniques and the development of manuals and other resources. NIA's record of receiving some funding from donors other than USAID also suggests that it can endure. However, while NIA can endure, if it receives significantly less funding from USAID, that would reduce the reach and effectiveness of NIA, as the organization needs long-term support. USAID invested heavily and successfully in building this brand and organization, but although a reduction or hiatus in funding from USAID would not destroy NIA, it would set it back quite a bit. Institutional strength like that of NIA can take a few years to build up and can be substantially reduced in a few months if it has little public presence.

Quarterly reports throughout the project show NIA integrating itself, not just into the political and governance of Jamaica by becoming the preeminent organization in the integrity sector, but also into a global anti-corruption framework. This has occurred primarily through NIA's affiliation with TI, but also through Professor Munroe and other staff speaking at and funding regional conferences and events on integrity and anti-corruption. Although some observers questioned whether this was the best use of NIA's resources, this allowed them to deepen their institutional strength and begin to develop relationships that could be very useful when USAID funding changes. NIA was working to diversify its donor funding during the fieldwork and anticipated a new award from the European Union, albeit one smaller than CCSIJ. NIA launched the EU-funded project, Combating Corruption in Jamaica: Improving Citizens' Access to Justice through Accountability, Transparency and Access to Information, in October 2019.


In KIIs, some respondents argued that USAID support for NIA is particularly important because, if NIA receives money from Jamaican sources, it would compromise perceptions of NIA's mission, as virtually every Jamaican donor has an interest or tie, or a perceived interest or tie, to corruption. However, many

⁹ NIA Quarterly Report, FY 2018, No. 4, pp. 139-141.

respondents, particularly those close to NIA, believed that NIA's legacy through resources like manuals, as well as the capacity it has built in the communities through trainings and programs like IAs, would endure even if NIA were to go away entirely. One respondent modified this by saying that NIA needed a "strategic approach" to what happens after USAID funding, but indicated that, while that approach could be developed, there was no evidence that it has yet happened.

A plurality of beneficiaries surveyed did not have evidence about how these approaches are likely to continue (42 percent). However, 13 percent asserted as evidence that NIA would continue by "Seeking sources of funding/fund raisers/and partnering with PSOJ." Another 13 percent felt "communities [are] now more aware of the NIA and its purpose," and 12 percent noted that "people who have been trained will keep spreading the word."

Figure 3: How/Why Will NIA's Legacy Endure?



NIA's government institution partners will continue their capacity building approaches and have plans to expand their work. Much of the capacity building activities of CCSIJ were focused on various government bodies. These included MOCA, the ODPP, and the MoJ. The capacity that these bodies have developed with support from CCSIJ, such as trained trainers, training methods, and material resources such as manuals, has been incorporated into these institutions; the continued use does not depend on NIA. Moreover, many of these government institutions can now leverage their greater capacity to build relationships with other donors who can continue to support them.

As of the end of FY 2018, more than 1,000 officials of the GoJ had received training from CCSIJ. This one CCSIJ indicator demonstrates the scope of the work NIA did with government bodies, as these officials include people from several different parts of the GoJ, including prosecutors, JPs, court personnel, investigators from MOCA, and others. Those people will bring their new skills and knowledge to their jobs and will have the capacity, because of ToT programs, to pass that knowledge on to others in their organizations.

Several KII respondents who worked in the law enforcement sector noted that NIA trainings in 2017 had helped them increase their capacity to address crime, but added that NIA support for facilitators for a week-long conference on issues like use of evidence, criminal investigations, and cybersecurity with representatives from United States (U.S.) law enforcement agencies, was even more impactful. Another discussed how NIA had been extremely helpful in providing trainings for staff on how to examine, cross examine, enter things into evidence, and put things into evidence. These respondents valued their interactions with NIA, but do not see themselves as dependent on NIA to further build their capacity.

Rather, they were very clear that they intend to build on the support NIA provided them, whether or not NIA can continue to assist them.

CCSIJ's strong Jamaican CSO partners that have benefitted from CCSIJ capacity building will continue to use this capacity going forward. Through CCSIJ, NIA has partnered and helped develop capacity with CSOs that have a track record and are, in many cases, mainstays of the Jamaican NGO sector. These partners have now built integrity and anti-corruption into their approaches and work, which they will continue to use towards their missions through their own organizations and members. However, these organizations are project-based and thus dependent on funding that is highly variable. CCSIJ support allowed them to pursue integrity-related projects but, without more funding in that area, they will struggle to continue those specific programs.

Through September of 2018, NIA had trained over 220 people from the NGO sector on anti-corruption issues. Those people have brought those skills and knowledge back to their organizations and have helped bring integrity-related issues, and awareness, into their organizations. The impact of this, or of similar programs to incorporate integrity issues into the knowledge base of NGOs, are not dependent on NIA receiving money from USAID, or even of NIA continuing at all.

KII respondents from both influential NGOs and religious groups discussed how NIA has helped them get a message regarding corruption to their members and to other parts of Jamaican society. These respondents indicated that combating corruption and crime is now an important part of their mission and attributed some of that to NIA and CCSIJ. This is significant because these types of influential NGOs will continue to play a role in Jamaica's civic and political life. Thus, the increased ability and capacity to address these issues, which have been the fruits of NIA's work, will persist.

4.5 WHAT ARE THE CAUSAL PATHWAYS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND INFLUENCING FACTORS AMONG ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIVITIES SUCH AS CCSIJ, STAKEHOLDER CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT, AND THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR COMBATING CORRUPTION AND FOSTERING CITIZEN SECURITY AND SAFETY IN JAMAICA?

This question solicits exploration through evaluation methodologies of the conditions under which anti-corruption programs, such as CCSIJ, may influence long-term processes of change.

CCSIJ's causal pathway employed a multi-pronged approach that was necessary because of the complexity of the corruption challenges in Jamaica and their relationships to crime. Corruption was recognized as a cross cutting problem that affects everything from public security, the business climate, and the education system to the strength of civil society, the political system, and service delivery. USAID sought to broaden approaches to anti-corruption through CCSIJ; NIA proposed approaches and activities and was awarded the CCSIJ cooperative agreement based on the capacity of the organization and proposal to work in all six areas identified in the award that were seen as essential in anti-corruption. The proposal and award pursued several different strategies towards expected results in these areas: expanded outreach by NIA and partners to raise awareness of corruption and integrity, capacity building to support judicial and anti-corruption institutions, legal assistance to corruption victims through NIA, partnerships with CSOs and selected executive branch agencies against corruption, support for investigative journalism, and NIA advocacy for legislation and its implementation. Just as raising awareness alone was not going to substantially reduce corruption, neither was simply training prosecutors or strengthening government and civic institutions. Rather, all of these things had to be done. Central to CCSIJ's approach was a shared assumption that all of these strategies needed to be pursued simultaneously to be effective.

When asked to explain the key to NIA's success, one respondent affiliated with NIA noted NIA's non-partisan political approach, broad range of partnerships, leadership, and effective communications tactics. This also reflects the belief that a breadth of strategies was central to NIA's effectiveness. Another respondent with more distance from NIA observed the media presence of NIA's Executive Director was

an important component of their success, but only had an impact because NIA was also programmatically strong, again demonstrating the importance of a multi-vectored strategic approach.

CCSIJ was developed based on assumptions and evidence that corruption was connected to crime. Jamaica has had longstanding problems with high rates of violent crime, especially homicide in volatile, vulnerable communities. Violent crime, often linked to gangs, has proven difficult to address through the police, the judiciary, and community development approaches. Violent crime has not been only a problem in these communities, but has spread to affect citizen security and safety across the island, with detrimental effects on the economy, society, and politics. Beliefs about corruption was identified as one of the impediments to enlisting more community support against crime. Perceptions that the JCF and Jamaican justice institutions were corrupt has contributed to creating a culture against “informers,” as have fears for personal safety if seen as cooperating with the police.

A central assumption of CCSIJ has been that raising awareness of corruption and integrity is central to reducing corruption. This assumption has led to several foci in CCSIJ awareness raising. First, there was a major effort to draw more attention to the problems of corruption and explain to Jamaicans how corruption effected their everyday lives. Second, CCSIJ raised awareness of NIA, thus positioning NIA to be the lead organization on anti-corruption and integrity in Jamaica. Third, CCSIJ supported capacity building in institutions against corruption—and awareness raising around this improved capacity—to demonstrate that progress was possible against corruption.

An implicit assumption was that corruption thrives in Jamaica in part because people did not see corruption as having a negative impact on them. Evidence from earlier surveys—and from scamming behaviors—showed some Jamaicans believed corruption was essentially a victimless crime, rather than one that both robs all Jamaicans of shared resources and services and contributes directly to violent crime. The CCSIJ project sought to change these perceptions.

Incidence data on corruption does not find corruption to be widespread in Jamaica compared to other countries. The 2017 LAPOP survey found *“one in ten Jamaicans reported that they have been subjected to one or more corrupt deal within the past 12 months. The study also finds no change in rate of corruption victimization when results of the 2017 survey are compared with those of the 2014 round.”*¹⁰ The ME&A survey using a different question suggests growing levels of victimization over people’s lifetimes. The NIA’s 2016 survey found 25 percent of Jamaicans surveyed agreed they had personally been victims of corruption. The 2019 ME&A survey found 31 percent of Jamaicans surveyed agreed completely or somewhat that they had “personally been exposed to and been a victim of corruption.”

However, Jamaicans surveyed did not view “reducing corruption at the level of daily life” as a way the citizenry can know that significant successes against corruption are made. Only 6 percent of the population suggested using the metric of “getting a driver’s license, vehicle inspection, TCC, passport, or other service quickly without having to give a ‘bribe’ to somebody” in the 2015 evaluation’s survey to know if Jamaica was making headway against corruption; only 4 percent suggested this measure in the 2019 ME&A survey (and only 2 percent of CCSIJ beneficiaries).

A key assumption of CCSIJ was that strengthening institutions was an essential part of fighting crime and corruption in Jamaica. Corruption has weakened institutions, particularly government institutions, in Jamaica. Law enforcement agencies and institutions that make up the judicial system and are essential for successfully combating crime and corruption have themselves had both capacity problems and issues with corruption for decades. Thus, strengthening these institutions so that they can function more competently, while also rooting out their own corruption, was an integral part of the CCSIJ strategy. Additionally, public awareness that these institutions had built their capacity and were

¹⁰ Anthony Harriott et. al. “The Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica and the Americas, 2016/17,” 2018, p. 61.

working to address corruption, was critical to addressing the lack of trust evinced by many Jamaicans in these institutions.

CCSIJ also advocated for legal reform and the implementation of new legislation against corruption. The design of CCSIJ recognized that the legal framework for combating corruption was problematic. NIA thus argued for the creation of a single anti-corruption institution in Jamaica. NIA's work *"in relation to advancing the debate and passage of the Integrity Commission Act and the regulations necessary to give effect to the already-passed amendments to the law to facilitate Political Party Registration and Campaign Finance Reform"*¹¹ demonstrates how institution building has been part of CCSIJ's strategic approach. The Integrity Commission Act was indeed passed by the Jamaican parliament, creating the IC. Since that time, concerns have been raised about the impact and strength of the IC, but NIA's effort to help create the Commission demonstrates how institution building and strengthening was part of the strategy of CCSIJ. The Chair of IC resigned in early September 2019, following dissatisfaction with the level of openness and transparency in the Commission and increased pressure on the Commission in August over their handling of integrity declarations and deadlines, including the declaration and process for the Prime Minister. Another commissioner, the acting director of corruption prosecutions and former Contractor General, preceded the chair in resigning from the IC. IC commissioners and senior staff interviewed noted that the IC has an ambitious mandate and has made progress with the difficult tasks of merging three preexisting institutions into a robust IC with its own investigative arm. They indicated that the IC would be effective, but it would take some time before results could be seen. The IC sought revisions to the law to enable the IC to release more information to the public on its activities, as well as expressed an interest in exploring more cooperation with NIA.


Several KII respondents from civic and governmental institutions spoke of the value of NIA's CCSIJ support; one respondent, who was not from an institution supported by CCSIJ, argued that NIA's work with stakeholders should be continued as a way to ameliorate the very low trust in government institutions in Jamaica, especially the lack of trust in the police, which leads to underreporting crime.

Beneficiaries surveyed, when asked in an open-ended way, "What else in your view could be done to help reduce the level of corruption in Jamaica?" provided a diverse set of ideas focused directly on anti-corruption. The most popular ideas were for proper investigations/jail time for corruption (21 percent), people to have integrity (9 percent), citizens to become more involved in anti-corruption (9 percent), and early education and socialization of the youth (8 percent). Citizens surveyed had an even wider range of views; the most popular perception, held by 11 percent in the survey, was that employment and jobs were needed to fight corruption. Nine (9) percent sought to remove corrupt politicians. No other single idea got more than 6 percent support when asked in this open-ended way.

When asked instead "What do you think are the best ways to address problems of corruption and foster citizen security and safety in Jamaica?" and provided a list of options, citizens more strongly came out in favor of providing jobs (57 percent), reducing corruption in politics (50 percent), reducing corruption in government institutions (42 percent), strict enforcement of the law (50 percent), harsher penalties for corruption and criminal offenses (47 percent), reforming the JCF into a more effective police force (40 percent), and stronger campaigns among the public to stamp out corruption (32 percent).

¹¹ NIA Quarterly Report, FY 2017, No. 1, p. 94.

Figure 4: Best Ways to Address Problems of Corruption and Foster Citizen Security and Safety (Public)



The need to present issues around integrity effectively has been one of the major components of the CCSIJ strategy. Although it is easy to explain what crime is, particularly violent crime, and how it is damaging for any country, the same is not true of the ideas of integrity and corruption. Corruption has proven a confoundingly difficult problem to solve in Jamaica and elsewhere both because it is difficult to definitively identify and because, while everybody loses in a corrupt society, acts of corruption or lack of integrity are frequently necessary, or very helpful, in navigating everyday life in a corrupt context. Thus, NIA's public awareness work rested on effectively communicating a nuanced and broad understanding of corruption and integrity, as well as on dissuading Jamaicans from the notion that corruption is a victimless crime.

One of the key ways that NIA presented issues of integrity effectively through CCSIJ was to make the issue accessible to different groups. One example of this was in May 2018 when Deputy Executive Director Patrice Charles spoke to students at Wolmers Boys School about integrity. Because of the context, Charles used bullying as a way to get at the bigger picture issues of integrity. She *“defined bullying giving examples and shared with the students how to recognize it and how to prevent it...The boys participated in the discussion and reacted with empathy to several videos that were shown depicting bullying. NIA paraphernalia was distributed to the boys, which was greatly appreciated.”*¹² This was a thoughtful way to focus the youths on integrity in a way that was immediately recognizable to them.

On balance, NIA presented a broad understanding of corruption through CCSIJ that included things like allowing a friend to cut in line, known in Jamaican slang as a “skippy.” During an FGD with teachers who advised ICs in secondary school, one of the teachers remarked that NIA had helped her understand that, when former students recognize her and offer her favors, that too is a form of corruption. To some extent, these are examples of grey area corruption, but NIA employed these definitions because, according to KII respondents, it helped them understand the breadth of corruption in Jamaica and that almost everybody plays a role in it. NIA was notably effective in building a consensus around a broad, useful, and concise definition of integrity. Many KII respondents repeated to the ET the NIA slogan that “integrity is what you do when nobody is watching.” Building a consensus around this definition demonstrated how effective KIIs' communication was, but also as a foundation from which to combat corruption.

¹² NIA Quarterly Report, FY 2018, No. 3, p. 39.

A central causal assumption of CCSIJ is that the struggle to reduce corruption requires a long-term time frame. Several of the components of the CCSIJ program implicitly assumed a longer-term time frame than a few years. For example, much of CCSIJ's work with secondary and post-secondary students is geared towards the future and may be more likely to bear fruit in decades rather than years. Similarly, the work to support the Integrity Commissions Act also rested upon a projected time frame of more than a few years, as commissions of that kind often take several years before they even begin to have an impact. Even the awareness raising that was at the core of the CCSIJ project will not lead to immediate results because changing awareness is almost always a first step in a process that leads to social change. These points seemed broadly understood by all of the major stakeholders.

The work NIA did with Integrity Clubs is an example of how a long-term time frame was a central causal assumption of CCSIJ. The clubs' program began with three schools and has expanded consistently since. At a training for club facilitators or faculty advisors, NIA's ED spoke of the need to retrain and re-socialize our young people, with the message that is being carried manifesting in the wider society. It makes no sense that we are telling students that "*crime does not pay because in their communities they are seeing that it does.*"¹³ This approach of investing in raising awareness and changing behavior of young people reflects CCSIJ's assumption that a longer time frame is the appropriate way to make meaningful improvements regarding integrity.

One KII respondent argued that "*advocacy around corruption is needed but it does not provide immediate returns.*" Another NGO partner who worked with NIA said that their program engages children as young as 5 years of age, a longer-term framework for addressing corruption. Another respondent said that the IAs "*will become leaders in the country.*" Recurrent metaphors of laying a foundation or planting seeds were used to describe NIA's work via CCSIJ. The understanding that a long-term approach was necessary was widely understood among CCSIJ stakeholders.


4.5.a What key gaps, if any, do stakeholders perceive in the area of anti-corruption in the context of improving citizen security and safety?

Sixty-three (63) percent of beneficiaries surveyed asserted that there were "*gaps in the frameworks and activities to counter corruption and increase citizen security and safety in Jamaica.*" However, there was no consensus among IAs about what these gaps were. The most identified gaps were "Law enforcement/the security forces—not doing enough to stem corruption" and "Mistrust between citizens and the security forces," which together were identified by 20 percent of beneficiaries that noted gaps.

Among all Jamaicans surveyed, 22 percent identified gaps, with 47 percent being unsure. The population surveyed also did not have a consensus view on what these gaps were. The two main gaps identified were: laws not being enforced/people not going to jail/people not being convicted (noted by 20 percent of those that identified gaps) and lack of trust in the security forces (12 percent). Another 9 percent identified the "lack of equity and how law applies differently depending on who you are," and 8 percent the "fear of coming forward in terms of reprisals, including even being killed."


¹³ NIA Quarterly Report, FY 2018, No. 2, p. 21.

Figure 5: Identified Gaps in Frameworks and Activities to Counter Corruption and Increase Citizen Security and Safety (Public, Minimum 6 Percent)



Jamaican views on government performance against corruption overall were mixed. Although 12 percent of Jamaicans completely agreed and 24 percent somewhat agreed that “government as the leader in the anti-corruption drive is doing enough to reduce corruption,” 40 percent disagreed completely and 14 percent disagreed somewhat. Beneficiaries’ perspectives were quite similar. These views may be driven by partisan sentiment, which is very strong in Jamaica.

Figure 6: Is the Government Doing Enough to Reduce Corruption?



Jamaica still needs an effective single anti-corruption institution. Jamaica decided to amalgamate anti-corruption institutions; the law creating the IC came into force and the organization was created in March 2018, but it is not positively viewed by many stakeholders. Criticism of the IC ranges from its initial lack of prosecutorial powers to its unwillingness, or inability, to release information about, for example, the financial disclosures of government officials, in a timely way. Some attributed to flaws, major and minor, in legislation that created the IC; other stakeholders drew attention to minutia in the act that created it. One example that was cited a few times was that office holders are required to declare how much they paid for real estate rather than its current assessed value.

Most respondents agreed that there was a need for something like the IC where anti-corruption work could be centralized, but also indicated they did not think the IC was up to the job. Some respondents believed that, through improved legislation and changes in leadership, the IC could be improved, while some believed it would be better to start over. A minority of respondents argued that people needed to be more patient, as the IC was new and needed time before it would begin to start showing results.

Jamaicans are divided about whether a “single Anti-Corruption agency with powers to prosecute would be more effective in fighting corruption” in Jamaica. The 2019 survey found 37 percent of Jamaicans felt it would not be more effective, with 32 percent suggesting it would be more effective and 31 percent uncertain. Men had more confidence than women, and women were more unsure and did not know. The IAs surveyed were more optimistic about this concept, with 59 percent expecting positive results, a third expecting less, and only 7 percent uncertain.

Not many Jamaicans, either IAs or the population as a whole, were looking at a single anti-corruption agency as an indicator of progress. Ten (10) percent of beneficiaries and the population surveyed identified “having new laws that create an independent anti-corruption agency” as “the most significant sign” looking ahead to see if the country was on track or not in the fight against corruption and for increasing citizen safety and security. The beneficiary and population surveys demonstrated low awareness of and low satisfaction with the work of the IC to date. Only 21 percent of the public said they had some or a great deal of knowledge of the IC and 15 percent were “somewhat” or “very satisfied” with the way the IC has dealt with corruption in society in the survey. Beneficiaries expressed much higher awareness (51 percent) and satisfaction (57 percent) with the IC than the population as a whole.

The lack of effective, JCF-wide community policing hinders the fight against corruption and violent crime. Current policing strategies through State of Emergency declarations and increasing the police and Jamaican Defense Force presence in many communities throughout Jamaica have not included community policing as a major part of the strategy. Interviews with NGOs and community members noted that of the JCF at present does not do enough in implementing community policing throughout the JCF. USAID and other partners have supported efforts to encourage the JCF walk beats, interact with residents, and learn more about the communities they police in ways that can reduce tensions between the JCF and residents of these communities and reduce crime. However, KIs suggested that when this occurs, it is due to the initiative of individual officers and commanders rather than as a structured policy prioritized by the JCF and Ministry of National Security. Instead of community policing, most community leaders that the ET met described the JCF as corrupt, arbitrary, and acting like an occupied army in communities, which hinders their collaboration with the JCF.

Representatives of an NGO that works in a tough community described how their programs seek to build better relations between police and the youth in the community and how, by deescalating the existing tension, they make people less afraid of the police and the police more effective. However, these representatives, when asked about gaps in Jamaica’s overall anti-crime and anti-corruption strategies, immediately mentioned that more community policing would be very helpful. Other KI respondents also mentioned that police community relations are an ongoing and deep problem and that community policing would help address this.

The limited amount of work done to date in Jamaica’s education system to combat corruption and improve citizen security and safety is seen as a gap. CCSIJ is involved in education in several ways. NIA has trained IAs, supported integrity clubs, and worked with the MoEYI to support the return of civics to the curriculum through the creation of educational tools like documentaries about Jamaican national heroes in ways that were appreciated by the MoEYI. Nonetheless, there was a strong sense in KIs, including within the education sector and the MoEYI, that more could be done in the schools in partnership with the Ministry to help raise awareness and provide alternatives to crime and corruption to young Jamaicans. MoEYI representatives interviewed did not see gaps in this education, but rather saw NIA’s engagement and partnership as supplements to the existing curriculum and educational structure.


Several respondents posited that, because so many learn behaviors that lead to corruption at young ages, NIA should also work in primary schools as well. Some argued that these programs should begin with very young children. These respondents argued that it is never too young for people to learn what integrity is and that once people learn bad habits, changing behavior becomes more difficult. Additionally, participants in clubs valued those programs and suggested that NIA should create more of them. Several participants in FGDs said that the clubs played an instrumental role in helping them focus on education, grades, and getting into college and wanted more of their fellow young Jamaicans to have that opportunity as well.

The lack of strong and consistent law enforcement and justice—especially in higher-level cases—was identified as a gap in the anti-crime and anti-corruption architecture. Corruption exists at all levels of Jamaican society. Although acts of violent crime may be more evident primarily in lower income communities and contexts, many respondents argued that there was a link between violence and those in positions of power benefiting from corruption. However, these respondents also pointed out that, while law enforcement against low-level crime often committed out of desperation is strong, high-level officials who in some cases steal large sums of money rarely face meaningful criminal prosecution. Therefore, many expressed a desire for stronger enforcement of laws against high-level officials. Some were explicit, stating that only when a government minister ends up in prison will Jamaicans believe that corruption is really no longer tolerated. One KII respondent noted that there have been investigations of the MoEYI and MSET which have, thus far, led to no convictions, and remarked that this *“makes people more frustrated and hopeless about corruption.”* The high-profile October 2019 arrest of the former minister implicated in these cases is encouraging and could be followed up with conviction and imprisonment; other high-level cases could also be followed through on.

The IC is designed to be able to prosecute corruption on its own but has not yet achieved this. NIA awareness raising work has drawn attention to crime and corruption throughout Jamaica, and the critical importance of law enforcement, especially ending impunity in particularly well-known, high-level cases where the public believes the evidence of malfeasance is strong. The conviction of one or more high level corrupt officials would also increase confidence in rule of law among the Jamaican people. However, one KII respondent viewed this somewhat differently, arguing that more patience with the relatively new MOCA and IC is needed, and that NIA should call for that. This respondent also took the position that reducing confidence in those organizations, as this respondent suggested that NIA has been doing, is damaging because it makes people more distrustful of government.

The most significant sign that the country is finally on the right track with regard to fighting corruption and increasing citizen safety and security identified in the beneficiary survey and the survey of Jamaicans was “seeing ‘big fish’ successfully prosecuted and their assets confiscated”—sought by 33 percent of beneficiaries and 38 percent of the population. “Having a ‘clean’ police force that doesn’t abuse its authority and respects people” was seen as the most significant sign by 16 percent of beneficiaries and 21 percent of the population, followed by having “a government that helps the country to grow economically more employment and business investment in the country as a result” (14 percent of beneficiaries and 15 percent of citizens) and “having new laws that create an independent anti-corruption agency” (10 percent of both groups). Another signifier of the influence of NIA training was the substantial proportion of beneficiaries (22 percent) that saw “a more moral society where personal integrity and high ethical standards are increasingly valued,” a position taken by 10 percent of the population. This area is a focus of the NIA and a point emphasized in IA training.

Figure 7: Most Significant Sign That Country Is on the Right Track Regarding Fighting Corruption and Increasing Citizen Safety and Security (Public and Beneficiaries, Minimum 4 Percent)



There is only limited networking and coalition building around integrity issues by organizations in civil society. According to one KII respondent active in the civil society sector, in previous years the Civil Society Coalition played a key role in organizing civil society. According to this respondent the Civil Society Coalition held monthly meetings and included prominent civil society figures, including Professor Munroe, as well as representatives of major CSOs, and primarily discussed issues related to governance. However, this coalition no longer meets, meaning that there is insufficient communication between civil society actors. The CCSIJ award identified this problem and area as a priority and committed NIA to work to “develop and support networks of key anti-corruption stakeholders.” Through subgrants, partnerships, and joint activities, NIA broadened the number of organizations in civil society working on anti-corruption and integrity. NIA implemented many activities together with partners. Moreover, NIA sometimes worked with several partners simultaneously. However, this joint work, set of bilateral relationships with partners, and broader joint activities has not been used to create an active institutionalized network or coalition around anti-corruption integrity issues.

The absence of this network makes it difficult for CCSIJ to build on the awareness raising that has successfully occurred and move from there to more direct advocacy through a coalition of CSOs. An advocacy campaign is stronger if it is supported by a national network that can communicate, craft strategy, and mobilize citizens in a coordinated manner. NIA’s activity creating a forum of anti-corruption champions by networking IAs, creating Integrity Clubs, and building NIA’s membership does not fill this identified gap. Some NIA activities, such as IAs, potentially lend themselves relatively clearly to networking, but this had not yet come to fruition. We were told that communication between IAs and among NIA members is largely through group WhatsApp chats. This is positive, but also falls short of effective coalition building or networking.

CCSIJ would benefit from a stronger presence in communities. CCSIJ has a presence in many communities through NIA’s partners that worked under the activity. The ET visited Flanker, Barrett Town, Cambridge, and Gregory Park and spoke with local activists working with NIA in various capacities. However, there are many communities in Jamaica with high crime rates and corruption and integrity problems that have not been reached by the program but could benefit from CCSIJ interventions.

This was a theme to which many KII respondents returned. Some spoke of the need for “community mobilization,” or “community engagement.” Another respondent told the ET that although his NGO works with boys from high crime communities, it is important to offer them something concrete, such as a workshop on writing a resume or something else of immediate practical importance, because when they go back to their communities, they have so little. Importantly, many, but not all, of the respondents who raised the issue of the need for a larger CCSIJ presence in communities had worked with NIA in their communities. Thus, identifying this gap was not always a criticism of NIA, but a recognition of the depth of the problems facing many communities and the need for more engagement by partners in volatile, vulnerable communities.

4.5.b What do stakeholders perceive to be USAID’s strategic advantages (e.g., developing partnerships or coordinating stakeholders) in the area of anti-corruption in the context of improving citizen security and safety?

The USG is seen as invested in Jamaica. Stakeholders understood USAID to be part of the USG and were not deeply aware of the distinctions and relationships between the State Department, USAID, and the USG more broadly. Therefore, they frequently saw USAID’s strategic advantages, but also its goals and motivations in Jamaica, through the general lens of USG interests. KII respondents said that, because Jamaica is so close physically, economically, and politically to the United States, the U.S. commitment to reducing crime in Jamaica is of mutual interest. These respondents posited that crime in Jamaica has a negative impact on the U.S., so USAID has a strong motivation to address it. The most glaring example of this, raised by several respondents, was scamming, as many of the victims of scamming are elderly Americans. This was not the only example given by respondents who believed that organized crime and drug dealing are among other problems in Jamaica that have an impact on the U.S. One KII respondent from the security sector said that because Jamaica is a major tourist destination for Americans, the U.S. is interested in working with Jamaican security forces to ensure that “a Bali type event” does not occur in Jamaica.

For these reasons, respondents believe that USAID is sincere in its efforts to reduce crime and corruption.

Stakeholders value USAID’s track record of leadership, engagement, and support in anti-corruption and citizen security and safety. KII respondents from government institutions and CSOs are aware and appreciative of USAID’s history of leadership in development approaches to citizen security and safety as well as anti-corruption. USAID was noted as having invested in citizen security and safety through successive large, multi-year projects in community policing and community development over more than a decade (Police Executive Research Forum [PERF], Community Empowerment and Transformation Project [COMET] I, COMET II) as well as having supported NIA through previous grants to work on integrity and anti-corruption. KII informants felt that USAID understood the nature of the problems of corruption and crime as well as the relevant individual and institutional actors in the Jamaican landscape. This, in their view, made USAID a good partner for government institutions and NGOs working in anti-corruption and integrity or citizen security and safety.

Additionally, several respondents believed that only international donors could support work in the integrity field because their motivations were not tied to financial interests in Jamaica. These respondents recognized that there are other international donors, such as the European Union (EU) or the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID), that are active in Jamaica, but also saw USAID as the most significant international donor.

Different respondents spoke to different strengths and opportunities offered by USAID, again often conflating it with the USG more generally. This included USAID’s deep knowledge of civil society and government in Jamaica, but also of the opportunities to work with other branches of the USG such as the Department of Justice (DoJ) or FBI on anti-crime and corruption measures and investigations.

Beneficiaries in the survey identified USAID advantages; this recognition was greatest in funding (69 percent). However, the IAs trained by the project also agreed that USAID had other advantages in convening key stakeholders (38 percent), coordinating stakeholders (40 percent), developing partnerships (60 percent), developing ideas on combating corruption in Jamaica (50 percent), and monitoring program implementation (54 percent).

5.0 CONCLUSIONS

The CCSIJ Activity has increased the capacity of partner organizations to build public demand for action against corruption through a multi-pronged effort to build capacity to raise awareness of corruption in NIA, partner CSOs and CBOs, and partner GoJ MDAs, as well as raise awareness of the ways that Jamaicans can address corruption effectively and support integrity. CCSIJ has strengthened the capacity of NIA to build public demand for action against corruption; NIA has used this increased capacity to work with partner organizations to spread this capacity and increased NIA's direct outreach to the Jamaican public to build demand for action against corruption. NIA has built a greater understanding of, and focus on, integrity and anti-corruption into partner organizations, which has then informed their work. NIA has strengthened the capacity of a wide range of civil society and government partner organizations to reach the public and their beneficiaries, as well as stakeholders on anti-corruption and integrity. This capacity building has led to partner approaches that raise anti-corruption and integrity relevant to, and integrated into, working towards their own core missions (e.g., ending violence in disadvantaged communities for YFC, better public outreach capacity and its use for awareness raising for MOCA). Jamaican citizens—and particularly beneficiaries of the CCSIJ activity—have more awareness about not only the problems and issues of corruption but also the landscape for anti-corruption in the country and how to address corruption.

Activity monitoring data as of June 30, 2019 documents significant CCSIJ results. Activity monitoring data from NIA's quarterly reports and M&E plans cover the six areas under which CCSIJ was to work and explain progress or its limits towards the expected outputs under each area. CCSIJ built citizen awareness and capacity for sustained action against corruption through getting extensive coverage in the press of NIA's work against corruption, NIA's own media campaign to raise awareness, and NIA's activities at the grass roots with citizens and CSOs. In this area, NIA continued its work to establish an integrity movement by building understanding of the importance of integrity and through the training of IAs, forming of ICs, and networking. In area 2, to promote justice sector anti-corruption programs, NIA has worked with Jamaican justice sector partners to build their capacity to serve the public as well as prevent and prosecute corruption, particularly collaborating and working with the ODDP, the Judiciary, and MOCA. CCSIJ has supported NIA-led seminars to build the capacity of GoJ institutions in criminal justice to use new and under-utilized legislation and funded specialized consultants to provide this training when necessary. In area 3, support public capacity to deal with corruption victimization, NIA committed itself to targets and processes in addressing individual cases. These numerical targets have not yet been met in some cases, and NIA has not yet completed one output, the development of a Manual/Handbook to guide citizens in the identifying and responding to incidents of corruption. Under area 4, develop and support networks of key anti-corruption stakeholders, NIA has worked towards creating a forum of anti-corruption champions by training IAs, creating and supporting Integrity Clubs, and recruiting more members to NIA. Through CCSIJ, NIA has aided many partners, including through five sub-awards as set in the award. Through CCSIJ, NIA has strengthened investigative journalism (area 5); this work has been with both established journalists and with community members. Finally, CCSIJ has promoted the effective enforcement of anti-corruption legislation through NIA's work to support the strengthening and passage of the Integrity Commission Act and campaign finance regulations. NIA has been able to work with the ECJ, albeit in a limited way, and has continuously engaged with the political directorate to monitor and advocate for stronger governance and a more effective struggle against corruption.

The key factors that affected CCSIJ's level of results positively included: the multi-pronged approach of the activity and NIA; the strong leadership and team of NIA; CCSIJ support through NIA subgrants and partnerships with effective partner organizations in civil society, the GoJ, and the Judiciary; and the program's ability to continue working despite changes in the overall environment in Jamaica. The many different approaches taken under CCSIJ contributed to results. These approaches include support for investigative journalism, assistance to key GoJ partners, broadening civil society partnerships and training around integrity and anti-corruption, and sustained, focused work with political and business leaders on anti-corruption. There are more people throughout Jamaica with knowledge of what integrity is and what constitutes corrupt practices; however, no one is satisfied with the results in tackling corruption in Jamaica to date. This is a by-product of both the persistence of corruption and of the increased efforts to combat corruption which, naturally and inevitably, draw attention to corruption. Increased awareness and strengthened capacity have led to some more public advocacy against corruption but have not led to improvement in the country's ranking on the TI Global Corruption Index or provided confidence to Jamaicans that the country has begun to make significant headway against corruption. KIs demonstrated great frustrations that *"corruption is killing this country"* and that the size of some corruption scandals has reached unprecedented heights. However, some KI respondents noted that this increased concern about corruption is due to CCSIJ's awareness raising, rather than to a sharp increase in corruption. A significant proportion of citizens recognize NIA's contributions to raising awareness and action against corruption. These two findings are not consistent and underscore a central paradox of fighting corruption: efforts to raise awareness about the problem of corruption lead people to see it in places where they previously had not recognized corruption.

CCSIJ partners and stakeholders perceive CCSIJ's results and their contribution to changes in target organizations' capacity to build demand for action against corruption positively. All CCSIJ partners lauded the approaches of the activity and appreciated how CCSIJ support had increased their activity, capacity, and/or outreach. However, all partners and stakeholders seek larger, longer programmatic support for their core activities, which now include work on anti-corruption and integrity or focus on anti-corruption and integrity (for partners like NIA and MOCA). The almost four-year CCSIJ activity has strengthened NIA and made the organization recognized even more as a leader in the field of anti-corruption in Jamaica and the region. Polling citizens (who are stakeholders) and beneficiaries showed appreciation for NIA's work to build capacity and demand for action against corruption.

Substantial evidence demonstrates that CCSIJ was developed and implemented with attention towards ensuring value for money. The USAID decision to award a three-year cooperative agreement to NIA supported a value-for-money approach in significant part by maximizing the amount of resources that go to program implementation through a local organization, as well as through supporting an organization with the capacity and connections to be extremely effective in action against corruption. USAID, within the substantial involvement parameters of a cooperative agreement, worked in implementation to maximize outputs and focused on reasonable costs in activities. CCSIJ has maintained the multi-pronged strategy of the design and used resources in consistent ways behind this strategy—which has presumed progress against corruption will take a multi-year effort (beyond the life of the CCSIJ activity). The design and implementation of CCSIJ leverages resources, which also supports value for money, through an institutional approach, as NIA developed its partnerships with other government and civil society partners that have and use organizational capacity and relationships in communities beyond what is supported through CCSIJ. CCSIJ infused anti-corruption into the broader, longer-term approaches of these CSOs, CBOs, MDAs, and the Judiciary. Under CCSIJ, NIA and its partners in CSOs, the GoJ, and the Judiciary also employed ToT approaches to create multiplier effects of training. However, NIA's ToT approach has not led to continued trainings, leading to a diminished CCSIJ impact in some areas. This has led to limited training through ToT methods in some areas. When probed about this in KIs, representatives of both NIA and their partner organization recognized this was

an area in which they needed to improve. Some indicated that the trained trainers would have benefited from more support from NIA or the partner organizations to help them set up more trainings or other related activities. NIA also successfully focused on and implemented approaches to ensure that grantees used money appropriately and engaged with partners to ensure USAID policies and procedures were followed. These approaches support value for money. USAID's granting a no-cost extension of CCSIJ that led to a three-year activity extending to almost four years provided value, as the long-term multipronged approaches thus had more time to work.

CCSIJ has had positive effects on the enabling environment for combating corruption and fostering citizen security and safety in Jamaica. CCSIJ has contributed to stronger advocacy against corruption in Jamaica, by building CSO, CBO, GoJ, and Judiciary capacity to combat corruption and operate more efficiently and effectively. NIA has broadened the exposure of Jamaicans to integrity and its importance. CCSIJ interventions and partners have raised awareness and focus on the connections between corruption and crime and violence through work with institutional partners and outreach to the public. NIA has consistently used advocacy through private communications with political and business leaders, as well as international development partners, to place political pressure on leaders at the highest levels not to tolerate, and to take action against, corruption. NIA has also been able to support individual Jamaicans victimized by corruption by providing legal assistance.

However, Jamaican citizens and CSOs remain tremendously frustrated about corruption and are not satisfied with the enabling environment or action against corruption to date. Advocacy from NIA prior to CCSIJ was instrumental in the creation of a single-anti-corruption agency for Jamaica, the IC, which was intended to bring together and strengthen Jamaica's anti-corruption institutions. The IC was also given the power and capacity to bring its own prosecutions. All KII respondents with whom the ET discussed the IC, other than those who worked at the IC, evinced disappointment in that body. Citizens and beneficiaries are also far from satisfied with the IC, which they know little about. One of the major reasons this dissatisfaction was so widespread in KIIs and the surveys was that no high-level officials credibly implicated in large-scale corruption have yet been convicted of a crime – only forced to resign – over the past two years. The respondents from the IC indicated that it would take some time before results of the IC's work would be evident, but they expressed a belief that the IC had investigative abilities and resources and were seeking to identify financial, political and other forms of corruption.

The design and implementation of CCSIJ has supported capacity building approaches to anti-corruption and integrity that are likely to continue beyond the end of the CCSIJ activity, albeit at lower levels with less or no funding. CCSIJ has operated through NIA, a strong, well-connected CSO that can and does receive funding from other donors. A focused NIA with continued support is poised to become an anti-corruption institution in Jamaica and the region. NIA can also continue aspects of its activity, although not all aspects of the multi-pronged approach of CCSIJ, for a time even without international support. CCSIJ's government partners have the institutional capacity that KIIs expect will allow them to retain the anti-corruption and integrity approaches that implementing CCSIJ has infused into their organizations, particularly their training capacity. The CSO partners that NIA has worked with will also continue to operate, now in ways that have picked up and integrated aspects of integrity and anti-corruption into their other work. Beneficiaries surveyed expected that NIA would be able to carry on. The NIA brand has benefited from the respect and stature of its leader, Professor Munroe, who has been the face of the organization. The emergence of potential leaders within the organization augurs well for the prospect of its existence beyond Professor Munroe, whose historical political associations have the potential to undermine the organization's profile as a non-partisan advocate for anti-corruption and integrity. While NIA has not yet developed a concrete plan for sustainability and financial support after USAID, they have laid the foundation for that through building relationships with other donors. NIA announced the start of a new EU-funded program, Combating Corruption in Jamaica: Improving Citizens' Access to Justice through Accountability, Transparency and Access to Information, in October. NIA has

earned the reputation as the preeminent anti-corruption NGO in the region and strengthened their ties to TI, thus making them an attractive target for donors.

The causal pathways, assumptions, and influencing factors that link anti-corruption activities such as CCSIJ, stakeholder capacity development, and the enabling environment for combating corruption and fostering citizen security and safety in Jamaica are outlined in the CCSIJ award. The award outlined a plan for how anti-corruption programs such as CCSIJ may influence long-term processes of change in Jamaican conditions. CCSIJ has consistently operated in ways compatible with the broad strategies that link corruption with crime and violence and integrity and countering corruption with citizen security and safety. Raising awareness of corruption and the potential for integrity and anti-corruption among the public and at key institutions has been central, as has explaining the causal pathways that link corruption and crime, through the media as part of raising awareness and with GoJ and CSOs through trainings and workshops. Integrity and anti-corruption approaches are not only seen as needed to combat corruption but also to combat crime and violence; CCSIJ partners understood and used these links and strategies towards these goals in research and awareness raising, institutional capacity development, and lobbying. Corruption is embedded in Jamaican culture and institutions; changing culture is a long-term process that requires, among other strategies, educating the next generation to acceptable societal values. The assumption has been that reducing corruption will continue to be a long-term struggle that will take many years. The trajectory, it was often assumed, was to first build awareness and capacity against corruption which will later lead to action. While limited results are visible now in terms of reduced corruption, the assumption behind this approach are that eventually awareness raising and capacity building efforts will jointly break through and turn the tide against corruption, which can then turn to a flood and rout corruption.

Stakeholders in anti-corruption in the context of improving citizen security and safety identified several key gaps. Identified gaps included 1) the need for an effective single anti-corruption institution, with the IC seen as ineffective and not able to provide the public with adequate information about combating corruption; 2) the limited understanding, use, and capacity of community policing and social interventions in volatile, vulnerable communities in Jamaica; 3) limited capacity and programming against corruption and crime and for integrity in the education system; 4) impunity and the lack of justice, especially in higher-level cases; and 5) the limited nature and extent of networking and coalition-building among CSOs. Additionally, while CCSIJ enabled NIA to bring anti-corruption and integrity approaches to communities, this engagement has been limited relative to the number of communities and the depth of the problems within them.

Stakeholders perceive that USAID has strategic advantages in anti-corruption in the context of improving citizen security and safety because of the USG's vested interest in countering corruption, crime, and violence in Jamaica and from USAID's long record of leadership, engagement, and support in anti-corruption and citizen security and safety. That the national interests of the USG are involved in the fight against crime and corruption is recognized and seen as a positive thing by Jamaicans; this self-interest means that the USG is serious in its attention to issues of corruption, crime, and violence. GoJ institutions, Jamaican CSOs, and CBOs in Jamaican communities appreciate the past support from USAID initiatives against corruption and support for community-based policing and community development to reduce crime and violence through activities such as COMET, COMET II, and CCSIJ, which they associate with NIA and its partners.

6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

USAID should continue to invest in approaches that increase the capacity of advocacy organizations and selected government institutions to increase public demand for action against corruption and for government institutions to address corruption more effectively.

USAID should continue to liaise and network with other USG and international partners to enlist support for long-term anti-corruption approaches like CCSIJ and partners like NIA. USAID has made multi-year investments behind the long-term multi-pronged strategy of CCSIJ. Successful anti-corruption efforts under this strategy were expected to take years. Jamaica may be close to getting to success, but is not there yet

The GoJ should strengthen its anti-corruption institutions, particularly the IC. The GoJ should revise the IC Act to enable the IC to provide more information to the public on its activities.

The IC should accelerate its change management process and explain its activities and limitations to Jamaicans in plain language through an outreach campaign. The IC has had limited time to develop and has not yet developed an effective single anti-corruption institution able to combat corruption and support integrity. The IC has correspondingly not earned the confidence and trust of the Jamaican people, and needs to in order to successfully fulfill its mandate.

USAID and the USG should consider a conditions-based approach to supporting reform and restructuring of the IC to address a key gap in Jamaica, the lack of effective anti-corruption institutions. This assistance should be conditioned on changes to the law to make the IC more transparent and able to provide more information to the public on corruption and efforts to combat corruption.

The GoJ should continue to empower MOCA, which has had a longer process of development that may now be demonstrating important results against high-level corruption. MOCA has had a substantial period of time to develop and benefitted from CCSIJ and other assistance. MOCA's achievements and potential are recognized by the Jamaican public and key actors. MOCA may be on the verge of key high-level arrests and prosecutions that can demonstrate successes against the "big fish" that Jamaican people see as key metrics of success in anti-corruption.

NIA should develop a sustainability plan that does not depend on future funding from USAID. USAID funding for NIA under CCSIJ will end March 26, 2020. NIA should develop a plan for future funding and organizational development and clarify priorities to sustain and build upon the foundation they have already created with substantial USAID support. This should be a top priority for NIA and needs to begin immediately. NIA should develop a successor plan as part of thinking through the long-term strategic development of the organization. NIA recognizes that the most successful mark of organizational leadership is how an organization operates under new leadership. As NIA develops, the organization needs to have a plan for leadership succession. This plan should be developed as part of the organization's strategic plan for the next few years.

NIA should augment the IA program's ToT approach to include networking and support after trainings. ToT is generally a good sustainability strategy that can have a multiplier effect on the work of an organization. KII respondents noted that people who participated in ToT programs had challenges using their newly gained knowledge to train more people in their communities or otherwise raise awareness about integrity related issues. NIA and its partner organizations should not only work to ensure that people who have been trained as trainers continue to work on these issues in their communities, but also provide technical and other support to help them organize training and related events. Creating a network of IAs that can support each other can reinforce their efforts and create momentum for training others.

NIA should also work with other NGOs to reinvigorate an NGO network to work on shared issues, including anti-corruption and integrity. Through its work throughout Jamaica, NIA has built relationships with major national NGOs like CVSS and YCWJ, as well as smaller local CSOs; these partnerships will weaken without CCSIJ support. NIA should work with partners in the sector to network organizations along the lines of the Jamaican Civil Society Forum to restore the capacity and practice of civil society, attempting to speak with a more unified voice, including on anti-corruption and integrity.

USAID should work visibly with the USG towards ending perceptions of impunity in Jamaica for well-connected people in the country. Development support and diplomatic pressure together should be brought to bear on the Judiciary and GoJ to successfully prosecute high-level corruption cases. The public needs to see GoJ anti-corruption initiatives as credible; convictions in prominent cases and carrying out sentences against high-level people found guilty of corruption is what the people of Jamaica most seek as evidence of a credible anti-corruption approach. The USG and USAID comparative advantages in anti-corruption may help get results and demonstrate the shared interests of the American and Jamaican people in anti-corruption results.

USAID should consider reengaging in community policing and social interventions in volatile, vulnerable communities as part of plugging gaps and supporting citizen security and safety. USAID's work in many of these communities is still recognized by Jamaicans. However, absent sustained attention and long-term programming, both community policing approaches and social interventions in these communities seems to suffer.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I: STATEMENT OF WORK

SECTION C – STATEMENT OF WORK

C.1 PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

USAID’s Automated Directives System (ADS) Chapter 201¹⁴ establishes Agency Program Cycle guidance and procedures, including those for learning from performance monitoring, evaluations, and other relevant sources of information to make course corrections as needed and inform future programming. . . According to the policy, “[e]valuation is the systematic collection and analysis of information about the characteristics and outcomes of strategies, projects, and activities conducted as a basis for judgments to improve effectiveness, and timed to inform decisions about current and future programming. Evaluation is distinct from assessment or an informal review of projects.” Further, “[t]he purpose of evaluations is twofold: to ensure accountability to stakeholders and to learn how to improve development outcomes.”

The purpose of this performance evaluation is twofold: (1) to examine how the CCSIJ activity achieved its objectives; and (2) to articulate how and under what conditions anti-corruption programs such as CCSIJ may influence long-term processes of change. Findings and recommendations from the evaluation will be instructive for broader Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) programming considerations (see Section C.3 for more information).

Audience and Intended Uses

The primary evaluation stakeholders are:

- USAID/Jamaica;
- Ministry of Justice as well as its subsidiaries, namely the Justice Training Institute and the Legal Aid Council;
- Ministry of National Security, in particular the Jamaica Constabulary Force;
- Major Organized Crime and Anti-corruption Agency (MOCA);
- Office of the Chief Justice and the Court Management Services;
- Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions;
- Integrity Commission;
- Ministry of Education, Youth and Information;
- Electoral Commission of Jamaica;
- Press Association of Jamaica;
- Private Sector Organization of Jamaica;
- Umbrella Group of Churches as well as a range of other civic-focused community groups and engaged citizens island-wide.

CCSIJ is an activity under the broader CBSI of the U.S. Department of State and USAID in Washington. Both agencies will take a particular interest in any lessons for CBSI success. INL and DOD in particular will find the results and recommendations instructive.

USAID/Jamaica will disseminate evaluation findings to secondary audiences, such as LAC missions with similar programs and to USAID’s Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Office (DRG) and Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Human Assistance (DCHA) for sharing in other regions. The Mission will use the findings of the evaluation report to inform the development of future anti-corruption programming. Other Donor Partners such as the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the European Union—who have supported NIA programming in the past—would also be interested in the findings. Multilateral organizations that have begun to attach governance-related conditionalities to their financing arrangements with Jamaica and other countries—such as the World Bank, the Inter-

¹⁴ ADS 201 can be found at <https://www.usaid.gov/ads/policy/200/201>.

American Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund would also benefit from reviewing the evaluation results.

C.2 SUMMARY INFORMATION

Strategy/Project/Activity Name	Combating Corruption and Strengthening Integrity in Jamaica Project
USAID Office	Office of Program, Policy, and Management, USAID/Jamaica
Implementer(s)	National Integrity Action
Cooperative Agreement #	AID-532-A-16-00001
Total Estimated Ceiling of the Evaluated Activity(TEC)	\$12,000,000 (Amount disbursed to date: \$8,800,000)
Life of Activity	April 2016 – March 2020
Active Geographic Regions	Island-wide interventions. See Table I in Section III. B
Development Objective(s) (DOs)	DO: Threats to the Environment and Citizen Vulnerability Reduced
Required evaluation?	Yes
External or internal evaluation?	External

C.3 BACKGROUND

A. Description of the Problem and Context

Jamaica's National Security Policy identifies corruption as a high impact, clear and present danger and one of the primary threats to the country's national security and economic prosperity. According to the Department of State (State) 2018 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Jamaican law penalizes corruption, but in practice, corruption remains entrenched and widespread, and the judicial system has a poor record of prosecuting corruption cases against law enforcement and government officials.

A USAID-commissioned 2008 assessment identified a special corruption syndrome in Jamaica: one in which outwardly democratic forms, as well as moderately strong political and economic institutions have become subordinate to formally competing but interlinked elites, which collude to preserve public-private sector relationships seriously contaminated by corruption.¹⁵ The impact of corruption on undermining Jamaica's development is irrefutable and manifests itself in a number of ways. Inter alia, corruption leads to an erosion of the general quality of life of the populace; widens the level of social inequality; leads to human rights violations; results in the sub-standard execution of government contracts; endangers public health and safety; steals customs revenues; adulterates ethical standards in the society; undermines free and fair elections; distorts financial markets; as well as provides an enabling environment for organized crime, terrorism, and other threats to human and national security to flourish.

Although citizen awareness of corruption has grown within recent years, challenges have arisen due to increasing preoccupation with survival issues as the vulnerable and disadvantaged sectors experience sustained difficulty in "making two ends meet" in the context of high unemployment, increasing poverty, and widening income gaps. Moreover, relatively low levels of organization at the community level as well as in various sectors of the society, with the possible exception of big business, weaken the voice of the citizenry and undermine the capacity to hold authorities accountable. High levels of party political partisanship within the political community, alongside apathy amongst the non-voting population, further fracture citizen impact on public policy outcomes.

¹⁵ See Corruption Assessment for Jamaica, September 11, 2008, available at https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADU835.pdf

The figures from successive Latin America Opinion Project (LAPOP) studies indicate that high levels of corruption also erode confidence in critical institutions of governance, fuel growing dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy, and erode support for democracy itself. The converse of this is a worrying tendency towards support for authoritarian solutions and even a military coup as democratic governance continues to fail in coming to grips with economic distress, criminal violence and political corruption.¹⁶

In 2012, USAID supported the work of the National Integrity Action (NIA) through two Fixed Obligation Grants to increase the levels of popular awareness and broad-based action to achieve more significant outcomes in the combat of high levels of corruption in Jamaica. NIA worked to enhance public probity, facilitate public engagement, and build public demand for appropriate legislation to strengthen transparency and accountability in governance and the enforcement of law against the perpetrators of corruption. NIA also worked to facilitate the proper and effective functioning of anti-corruption agencies, as well as forming stronger ties with national and international partners in order to achieve more meaningful results towards a corruption-free Jamaica.

NIA's work throughout this period with the JCF Anti-Corruption Branch, and the newly formed Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Taskforce, along with the professionalism and efforts of bodies such as the Office of the Contractor General, the Accountant General's Department and the Auditor General's Department to increase public awareness of the cost of corruption to Jamaica's development.

Understanding that the gains made remained fragile and reversible, USAID awarded NIA a three (3) years non-competitive Cooperative Agreement for an amount of US\$2,900,000 to implement the "Combating Corruption in Jamaica Project" from 2012-2016. This activity sought to ensure that the current national ineffectiveness in controlling corruption, particularly of a political nature, is challenged and public demand for action against corruption is deepened. UK-DFID also funded NIA's "Combating Corruption in Jamaica Project" under its Accountable Grant mechanism.

In 2015, USAID/Jamaica commissioned an external performance evaluation of the "Combating Corruption in Jamaica Project."¹⁷ The evaluation found strong internal evidence that the Combating Corruption in Jamaica Project succeeded in raising Jamaican awareness and fostering a national dialogue around corruption and integrity issues. However, increased awareness also seemed to come with a cost, raising levels of dissatisfaction with the performance of Jamaica's statutory bodies including the nation's political parties charged with fighting corruption. Some key lessons for a follow-up Project included the need to increasingly differentiate public campaigns and enter into more formalized relationships with potential grantees to assist the process of moving from policy advocacy to forming a broad-based "social movement" against corruption. In addition, adapting a targeted outreach to schools, communities, churches, universities, and youth groups, would also help to recruit and train the next generation of anti-corruption champions.

In 2016, USAID solicited applications for a new anti-corruption activity to capitalize on existing U.S. Government and Government of Jamaica endeavors and create new opportunities for promoting community-based partnerships in building public demand that would combat corruption and strengthen integrity; raise the advocacy skills and overall capacity of investigative, prosecutorial, and enforcement professionals; and to ensure that key anti-corruption legislations are neither stalled, gutted, nor shelved. More specifically the new anti-corruption activity should be innovative and aim to: (1) engage youth in a more robust manner including use of media which is more class and youth sensitive; (2) build the capacity of the Government of Jamaica Judiciary and other systems to assume technical training responsibility; (3) strengthen media on their reporting of the issues; (4) build a cadre of other anti-corruption advocates; and (5) focus on key additional political codes of conduct. Integrated approaches should also respond to

¹⁶ LAPOP survey questionnaires, analysis, and studies can be found at <https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/jamaica.php>

¹⁷ See *Final Report: Combatting Corruption in Jamaica Final Performance Evaluation*, October 2, 2015, available at https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KRJ6.pdf


the needs of victims and witnesses of corruption; establish mechanisms that will widen the anti-corruption network and encourage sustainable interventions; and support activities that seek to respond to emerging issues in the anti-corruption landscape.

NIA competed and was selected for continued USAID support. This facilitated the implementation of the “Combating Corruption and Strengthening Integrity in Jamaica” (CCSIJ) activity to run from April 2016 to April 2019.

Links to Jamaica CDCS and Caribbean Basin Security Initiative

The CCSIJ activity directly contributes to achieving the USAID/Jamaica Development Objective “Threats to the Environment and Citizen Vulnerability Reduced” through Intermediate Result (IR) 2: Violence in Community Renewal Program (CRP) Communities Reduced and Sub IR 2.3: Institutional Capacity of Community Based Organizations (CBOs), Civil Society Organizations (CSO), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Ministries, Department, and Agencies (MDAs) Improved.

Figure 1: USAID/Jamaica’s Results Framework (Source: Jamaica CDCS 2013-2019)



The “Combating Corruption and Strengthening Integrity in Jamaica” activity also supports CBSI’s Social Justice pillar, which is to “promote social justice through crime prevention activities in targeted communities, police and justice sector reform, anti- corruption programs, and increased educational,

economic, and social opportunities for at-risk youth.¹⁸

CBSI—which was launched after the 5th Summit of the Americas in April 2009 in response to rising crime (high homicide rates),¹⁹ the security threat posed by Transnational Organized Crime, and the need to secure the U.S.’ third border—brings together members of the Caribbean Community and the Dominican Republic to collaborate on regional security with the United States as a partner.

Almost ten years later, Caribbean homicide rates have come down some but continue to be high (average of 16 per 100,000 vs. a global average of 6.2).²⁰ Violence remains at epidemic levels as eight CARICOM countries plus the Dominican Republic all figure in World Atlas’ top 20 countries for homicides. CARICOM estimates that gang-related crime costs up to four percent of gross domestic product. As such, USAID’s CBSI programming supports critical U.S. Government national security priorities. USAID’s CBSI-funded programs supports the President’s E.O. 13773 on “Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking” and supports the National Security Strategy Pillar I: “Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life.” USAID’s CBSI efforts will seek improve the Safety and Security of the region.

CBSI has been codified under the Caribbean-United States Framework for Security Cooperation, the Caribbean-United States Declaration of Principles, and the Caribbean-United States Plan of Action. When the Framework was updated in November 2017, it emphasized that improving citizen security requires a coordinated multi-national and multi-sector approach including prevention, institutional reforms, and information sharing. When the Plan of Action was also updated in November 2017, the governments committed to implementing and strengthening the collection and use of reliable data as a basis for policies and decision-making.

Given these developments, CBSI programs will continue to tackle macro-level enabling environment and governance issues, such as corruption or rule of law institution building, because these issues are necessary complements to front-line community-level crime and violence prevention efforts. For example, weaknesses in justice institutions leads to a high rate of impunity, while government corruption contributes to biased and compromised decision-making processes and high levels of public distrust in government officials. Moreover, transnational organized crime can drive increased levels of corruption. Going forward, USAID expects to use ongoing and future enabling environment programs to flesh out and more clearly articulate how these programs support and complement CBSI’s focus on crime and violence prevention.

Links to USAID’s Journey to Self-Reliance

Recent USAID policy guidance states that programs should look forward to the day when foreign assistance is no longer necessary and measure our work by how far every investment moves us closer to that day. USAID is reorienting the way it does business to focus on supporting our partner countries on the Journey to Self-Reliance—that is, their ability to solve their own development challenges. This approach to development, which prioritizes fostering stable, resilient, prosperous, inclusive, and self-reliant countries, is good for our partners around the world, our nation’s security, and the American taxpayer.

Self-reliance is driven by two closely related elements: capacity and commitment. Commitment is defined as how well a country’s laws, policies, actions, and informal governance mechanisms—such as cultures and norms—support progress toward self-reliance. Capacity is defined as how far the country has come in its journey across the dimensions of political, social, and economic development, including the ability to

¹⁸ For more information, see the Department of State CBSI website, available at <https://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cbsi/> 6 UNDOC reported that the Caribbean had the highest homicide rate of any other region in the world (30 per 100,000, 2007).

¹⁹ (UNODC 2014) Homicide rates above 10 per 100,000 are considered to have reached epidemic levels.

²⁰ <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/murder-rates-by-country.html>.

work across these sectors. For USAID this means that, as a country's commitment and capacity to plan, finance, and implement solutions to solve its own development challenges strengthens, our partnership should also evolve—ensuring that the programs we implement are best-supporting a country's journey to self-reliance.

To facilitate this shift, to understand how self-reliant partner countries are, and to reorient our partnerships accordingly, USAID has developed an analytical tool for assessing country self-reliance called a Country Roadmap. The Roadmaps use 17 publicly-available, third-party metrics examining areas such as open and accountable governance, inclusive development, economic policy, and the relative capacities of the government, civil society, citizens, and the economy—all key elements of self-reliance.²¹

Safety and Security are top regional priorities and areas of need highlighted for many Caribbean partners, including Jamaica, in their individual Journey to Self-Reliance Road Maps. For example, Jamaica scores below just below the average score for safety and security for low- and middle-income countries.

B. Description of the Intervention to be Evaluated and Theory of Change

CCSIJ's overall approach is to work closely with MDAs, local NGOs and CSOs, CBOs, and youth, to promote good governance practices in the area of anti-corruption and to build the demand for change. The expected result of this approach is to increase the ability of individuals, groups, and agencies to effectively counter instances of and attitudes towards corruption in general, and political corruption in particular. By the end of the activity, the above targeted groups and beneficiaries should be better equipped to build public demand for more effective action against corruption. Public officials should also be trained in anti-corruption strategies.

Overall, the activity should contribute to the improvement of Jamaica's position on the international anti-corruption index.

In these anti-corruption activities, of particular importance is sustainability beyond the life of the program. This requires special emphasis on a "training-the-trainers" methodology, the production of high-quality manuals, and the formulation of MOUs with Jamaican organizations, such as the proposed Judicial Education Institute, to take over responsibility for housing key products.

Component 1: Build citizen awareness and capacity for sustained action against corruption

Component 1 consists of a sustained campaign utilizing multi-media and grassroots engagement to show linkages between corruption and the development challenges facing the country. Media campaigns engage youth as appropriate, for example utilizing venues such as popular cultural, sporting, and recreational spaces. The component also established and/or supported integrity movements to engage students in schools, tertiary institutions, and communities, including support for a Civics curriculum in the education system.

Component 2: Promote justice sector anti-corruption programs

Component 2 consists of technical assistance to selected jurisprudence institutions and actors in contemporary anti-corruption practices through a trainer-of-trainers methodology, as well as advocacy for a greater focus on anti-corruption within the Jamaican legal education architecture.

Component 3: Support public capacity to deal with corruption victimization

Component 3 centers on a model for legal advice and support to persons experiencing injustice, in particular of a corruption-related nature. In addition to supporting individuals or groups with cases, CCSIJ conducts systematic collection and analysis of citizen complaints of corruption victimization, to highlight priority areas in need of reform, which also help guide advocacy and provide insights to various anti-

²¹ See the Journey to Self-Reliance Country Roadmaps Portal, available at <https://selfreliance.usaid.gov/>

corruption authorities. A key output of this component is the development of a Manual/Handbook to guide citizens in the identifying and responding to incidents of corruption.

Component 4: Develop and support networks of key anti-corruption stakeholders

Component 4 includes a sub-award mechanism for other local organizations, which seeks to broaden the anti-corruption base and strengthen the selected entities to better meet the needs of the constituents. The sub-award mechanism targets state agencies and departments as well as civil society, academic, clerical, youth, or other organizations that have a clear, articulated interest to respond to the current and emerging issues in the anti-corruption landscape.

Component 5: Strengthen investigative journalism capabilities of media practitioners

Component 5 supports activities and initiatives to enhance and facilitate effective investigative journalism practices among media practitioners. Journalists provide a public service keeping governments and organizations in check, and investigative journalism requires considerable research and evidential backing especially in revealing corruption practices.

Component 6: Promote effective enforcement of anti-corruption legislation

Component 6 advocates for the passage of relevant anti-corruption legislations; creates partnerships with relevant authorities to support the effective implementation and enforcement of Political Party Registration and Campaign Finance Regulations; and monitors the legislative landscape in order to enhance Jamaica's governance arrangement.

Target Areas and Groups

While the initiative is geared toward the entire country, much of the activities are focused in the CRP communities as identified by the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ). These communities are located primarily in the parishes of Kingston, St. Andrew, St. Catherine, Clarendon, and St. James. It is also important to note that many of the events take place in Capital City Kingston because government, private sector, media and most other sectors are significantly slanted towards Kingston. See Table I for a sample of NIA activities and their locations.

Table 1: Sample of NIA Activities with Partners, Beneficiaries, and Stakeholders, Listed by Location

Component²²	Activities	Stakeholder(s)	Geographic Reach
1	Member-Oriented Activities	NIA Members and Partner Organizations	Island-wide
1	10,000 Men and Families Against violence	Lighthouse Assembly Ministries	St. Catherine and West Kingston (CRP communities)
1	I Believe Initiative – Youth Initiative	Office of the Governor General	Island-wide
1	Integrity Ambassador Program (Clubs, and Facilitators)	Ministry of Education, Youth and Information, NIA Members, and Engaged Citizens	Island-wide
1	Integrity Action Movement	UWI, UTECH, Churches Teachers College	Selected parishes
2	Training & sensitization seminars for the JCF, prosecutors and members of the Judiciary	Jamaica Constabulary Force, Justice Training Institute, Court Management Services, Justice Training Institute, Office of the Chief Justice, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, INL, DHS/ICE	Island-wide
3	ALAC (Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre)	NIA & Several Government Agencies	Targeted communities and vulnerable populations
4	Sub-Awardee	CVSS, YCWJ, CAPRI, WROC, MOCA	CRP communities and selected parishes
4	Justice of the Peace Training	Ministry of Justice and Justice Training Institute	Island-wide
4	Integrity Champions and Community Journalism Program	USAID COMET-II, NIA Members and Engaged Citizens	CRP communities and selected parishes
5	Investigative Journalism	Media Institute of the Caribbean, Press Association of Jamaica, CARIMAC (UWI)	Selected parishes
6	Legislative Advocacy	Selected Parliamentary Committees, Ministry of Justice, Media, Engaged Citizens	Island-wide

²² Components listed and defined under Approaches and Intended Results.

Activity Implementation

In the approximately two and a half years since award signing, there have been two modifications to incrementally fund the Cooperative Agreement (provided in Section J of the RFTOP). As at September 2017, NIA was asked to slow implementation due to a delay in the second incremental funding action that was forecasted. In June 2018, NIA received its second incremental funding which accelerated implementation pursuant to its work plan. Generally, the activity continues to be implemented based on the objectives outlined in the program description and the concomitant expected results.

C. Activity Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) Plan

The Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan was provided in Section J of the RFTOP.

The evaluation team shall review all activity documents made available by USAID or NIA, as well as any other sources relevant to the evaluation, such as government or international data. USAID will provide the evaluation team with the following list of available information sources to be examined by the evaluation team:

- Cooperative agreement
- CCSIJ progress reports
- Annual work plans
- CCSIJ Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) Plan
- Studies or assessment completed or commissioned by NIA or its sub-partners

Prior to conducting field work, the evaluation team will review existing literature and data, including the documents provided by USAID.

C.4 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

In keeping with the evaluation purpose described in Section I, USAID/Jamaica, in consultation with USAID/Washington, has selected the questions listed below. The questions below are listed in order of priority and take into account CCSIJ's objectives within the context of USAID/Jamaica's CDCS, CBSI goals, and agency priorities (see Section C.3). The sub-questions elaborate on the main questions; answering them should assist with, and provide support for, answering the top-level questions.

1. In what ways did CCSIJ affect the capacity of target organizations to build public demand for action against corruption?
 - a. Considering available activity monitoring data, what results did CCSIJ achieve as of September 30, 2018?
 - b. What factors affected CCSIJ's level of results?
 - c. How do CCSIJ's partners and stakeholders perceive CCSIJ's results and their contribution to changes in target organizations' capacity to build demand for action against corruption?
2. Given the substantial increase in USAID funding for this activity (relative to prior activities funded by USAID), in what ways, if any, did CCSIJ seek to ensure value for money?
3. In what ways, if any, did CCSIJ affect the enabling environment for combating corruption and fostering citizen security and safety in Jamaica?
4. What evidence exists that CCSIJ's capacity building approaches are likely to continue—or be expanded—beyond the end of the activity?
5. What are the causal pathways, assumptions, and influencing factors among anti-corruption activities such as CCSIJ, stakeholder capacity development, and the enabling environment for combating corruption and fostering citizen security and safety in Jamaica?

- a. What key gaps, if any, do stakeholders perceive in the area of anti-corruption in the context of improving citizen security and safety?
- b. What do stakeholders perceive to be USAID's strategic advantages (e.g., developing partnerships or coordinating stakeholders) in the area of anti-corruption in the context of improving citizen security and safety?

In answering these questions, the evaluator shall explicitly discuss the unexpected conditions or challenges that were experienced by the activity during implementation and how the implementing partner adapted to or resolved those challenges. The Evaluation contractor shall incorporate gender concerns in the evaluation methodology (including data collection and analysis) and disaggregate data by sex, age, and geographic location (for example, rural vs. urban). The evaluation team must integrate this analysis into the evaluation's overall findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

C.5 EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

A. Evaluation Design

The evaluation contractor is required to read and comply with USAID's Evaluation Policy (<http://www.usaid.gov/evaluation/policy>) and the guidance in ADS 201 (including references therein).²³ As noted in the guidance, evaluations should use methods that generate the highest quality and most credible evidence that corresponds to the questions being asked, taking into consideration time, budget, and other practical considerations. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods applied in a systematic and structured way yields valuable findings and is often optimal regardless of evaluation design.

For the CCSIJ performance evaluation, a non-experimental mixed-methods design that combines a comprehensive, rigorous analysis of existing quantitative and qualitative data with customized qualitative techniques designed to elicit primary data from a wide range of counterparts, partners, beneficiaries, and stakeholders is envisioned. This approach would allow for triangulation of complementary data to elucidate linkages between activity inputs, outputs, and outcomes—and to fulfill the twofold purpose of the evaluation (see Section I).

For the evaluation, the Contractor's independent external consultants must work in conjunction with other team members to plan and implement the proposed evaluation. USAID, NIA staff, and the full evaluation team will need to be involved with design, planning, and logistics, but the evaluation team must provide significant and overall leadership and direction, as well as full responsibility for the evaluation duties and deliverables.

In keeping with USAID policy and guidance, the evaluation team is asked to take special note of the difference between anecdotes and empirically based findings. Evaluation findings must be presented as analyzed facts, evidence, and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay, or simply the compilation of people's opinions. Findings should be specific, concise, and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.

This SOW sets out evaluation questions and recommended methods. It is expected that the precise evaluation methods will be further developed by the evaluation contractor in consultation and with the agreement of the evaluation COR at USAID/Jamaica, including sharing any draft data collection instruments. Such revisions to the evaluation design and USAID approval must be appropriately documented.

The evaluation team should consider a range of possible methods and approaches for collecting and analyzing information and data to answer each of the evaluation questions thoroughly. The use of

²³ For additional information and guidance, the evaluation contractor should refer to the Evaluation Toolkit, which is available at <https://usaidearninglab.org/evaluation>.

participatory methods to enhance collaboration and dialogue among counterparts is highly recommended. Further, data collection and analysis methods should be sensitive to possible differences related to sex and/or social status and should ensure safety and confidentiality of all individuals providing data or information for the purposes of the evaluation.

The Contractor's conceptual approach to answering these questions will start with analysis of the CCSIJ activity monitoring data and other data tracked by the implementing partner, as well as a review of relevant documents, such as cooperative agreements, work plans, existing evaluations, assessments, and studies. It will be complemented with analysis of original data collected during field work. Original data collection may involve key informant interviews, perception surveys, observations from site visits, focus group discussions, consultations with relevant stakeholders, and other data gathering methods proposed by the evaluation team in its Evaluation Design.

USAID expects both qualitative and quantitative data to be collected; and the results will be coded, triangulated, and analyzed for content. The evaluation team is encouraged to propose additional/alternate data collection and analysis methods in the Evaluation Design that it considers can yield stimulating, robust evidence in answering each of the evaluation questions.

The Evaluation Design must identify any known limitations to the data to be collected and/or analysis methods.

If the evaluation team plans to interview stakeholders and conduct key informant interviews, group interviews, short surveys, and/or focus groups, these interviews should provide an evaluative judgment on CCSIJ results in its different dimensions, making it necessary to identify a priori methodological considerations regarding use of structured, semi-structured, or unstructured interview and focus group techniques using question guides and/or questionnaires with optional prompts of follow-up questions. As such, the interviewer will not have a directive role but will always guide the interview using these tools. The question guides or questionnaires will be developed by the evaluation team with USAID input and are intended to provide consistency and coherence in interviews while allowing for a degree of flexibility to add or adapt specific elements as needed. Interviews should take place in a mutually agreed upon locale, typically the interviewee's office. Issues such as interviewer and participant safety, comfort and convenience, participant confidentiality, and background noise should be considered in selecting the interview site.

Key informant and focus group member sampling

USAID expects that key informants will be selected using purposive sampling; this involves selecting participants on the basis of their characteristics, roles or experiences in order to shed light on a range of issues relevant to the evaluation questions. The aim is to interview as diverse a range of individuals as possible. The evaluation team may suggest, if appropriate, additional key informant sampling techniques (e.g., snowball sampling) if needed. In any case, application of sampling or selection criteria, transparency about how sampling criteria were used to arrive at the sample of key informants, and consistent use of question guides and questionnaires will help ensure rigorous use of these methods for data collection and analysis. The final key informant sampling plan must be included in the Evaluation Design and Final Evaluation Report.

Because the sampling plan will seek to include diverse views or opinions, the evaluation team should use a strategy of maximum variation throughout the study to appropriately collect, analyze, and present the various viewpoints. This strategy will be successful if the sample of key informants includes people with different expertise, specialization, and possible points of view on key areas of decentralized management.

The evaluation team is responsible for maintaining a matrix of the key informants to be interviewed to ensure an adequate sample to answer each evaluation question. At minimum, the evaluation team will interview USAID staff; personnel from NIA and its sub-grantees; relevant government officials; and participants in CCSIJ activities (i.e., beneficiaries). USAID or CCSIJ will provide a general list of

stakeholders and key informant contact information once the evaluation begins.

Data collection shall be systematic and data must comply with the five data quality standards of validity, integrity, precision, reliability, and timeliness. Specific interview, survey, and/or focus groups protocols will be appended to the Evaluation Work Plan and/or Evaluation Design and finalized with approval from USAID; the questions should be used to answer each of the evaluation questions listed in this document and addresses the purpose of this evaluation.

All data collected in response to the evaluation questions must have as much disaggregation as possible. At minimum, per USAID Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy, all data must be disaggregated and analyzed by sex, as well as analyzed for any difference between the effects on girls and boys and men and women or male and female participation. Where possible, data should be disaggregated by educational region or municipality.

Ethical considerations

This performance evaluation will include the following considerations during the data collection phases:

Informed consent. Individuals, authorities, officials, ministries, and organizations that participate in this evaluation will do so voluntarily. Prior to each interview, interviewers will inform participants of the nature of the evaluation, the level of confidentiality being maintained, information regarding how interview material will be used, and their rights as participants to end the interview at any time without consequences. Interviewers will obtain written consent from each participant; follow-up interviewees will be asked again for their consent.

Confidentiality. Participants will be advised about the confidentiality of their interviews. Information about ministries, organizations, and individual participants is kept confidential, unless appropriate permission was previously given for its release. The interview data will be stored in secure locations that will be protected from unauthorized access.

Permission to Quote. The evaluation will not attribute quotes to specific individuals; when quotes are used, they should be attributed in such manner that readers cannot identify the speaker.

It is expected that all updates and revisions to the evaluation design will be made in consultation and with the agreement of the evaluation COR at USAID/Jamaica. The evaluation contractor is responsible for documenting such revisions to the evaluation design. USAID expects that the evaluation team will answer the questions thoroughly and present this information in the final evaluation report.

B. Data Collection and Analysis Methods

The evaluation team will start by analyzing the monitoring data collected by CCSIJ and identifying any information gaps to guide additional data collection required as part of the evaluation. Data requirements, collection methods, and required analyses will be explicitly defined in the Evaluation Design and Work Plan.

USAID recommends that the evaluation team utilize a design matrix or similar tool to outline data sources and data collection and analysis methods for each of the evaluation questions.²⁴ The selected tool will be accompanied by narrative describing its content and the rationale behind the intended approach. Written evaluation COR approval of the Evaluation Design and Work Plan is a prerequisite for field work, and as with all deliverables, the first drafts may receive comments and requests for revision before COR approval is provided.

Interviews with NIA staff cannot be the sole source of information collected by the evaluation team to complement monitoring data and answer the evaluation questions. Documentary evidence and discussions

²⁴ Examples of design matrixes can be found at <https://usaidlearninglab.org/library/evaluation-design-matrix-templates>.

with community and other stakeholders will be important, among other sources the evaluation team may propose.

Consistent with the Principles of Evaluation outlined in ADS 201.3.5.10, a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in data collection and analysis should be employed by the evaluation team in the process.

Communities to Visit for Site Visits and Data Collection

The CCSIJ activity supports efforts in a number of communities island-wide and the evaluation team is anticipated to visit some of these. The number of sites to be visited, the criteria or considerations for their purposeful selection, and the advantages and limitations of said selection, needs to be determined in consultation with USAID/Jamaica.

The contractor will submit the preliminary evaluation design in response to the Request for Task Order Proposal for review by USAID. The evaluation Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) will approve the final evaluation design prior to the team's arrival in country.

C.6 EVALUATION MANAGEMENT

The USAID/Jamaica Evaluation COR will supervise the evaluation at all stages of implementation, working directly with the Team Leader. The COR will provide strategic direction and guidance throughout the evaluation process, including the development of the work plan, the data collection tools, and the evaluation report outline, approach, and content.

The evaluation team will receive support from USAID/Jamaica in selecting priority communities and places to visit during the evaluation, facilitating contacts with implementing partners and evaluation participants, gaining required country clearance, and obtaining access to Mission facilities for meetings as necessary. The evaluation team is expected to schedule interviews or other modes of data collection with key stakeholders and beneficiaries, though USAID and some implementing and partnering organizations can provide contact information.

All evaluation team members are responsible for their own workspaces, computers, and travel arrangements. The Contractor's evaluation team must make their own hotel, air travel, and local transportation arrangements in accordance with U.S. requirements for allowable carriers and per diems.

The contractor shall be required to obtain approvals from the COR for the following:

- Approval of a final work plan and any modifications thereof.
- Approval and acceptance of all reports.
- Approval of extension of deadlines for submission of reports and deliverables due to unavoidable delays. However, such delays cannot exceed the performance period for the contract.

Additional Information

1. **Post:** Field work under the activity will be performed in Jamaica.
2. **Documents:** In the course of implementation, the contractor will produce documentation and guidelines that may be replicated or used by USAID/Jamaica or other institutions.
3. **Confidentiality Agreements:** The advisors will sign confidentiality agreements with the counterpart institutions and USAID/Jamaica, if requested.

C.7 EVALUATION SCHEDULE

An illustrative schedule for the evaluation is provided in Table 2.

Table 2: Illustrative Evaluation Schedule

TASK/DELIVERABLE	WEEKS												
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Work Plan and Evaluation Design	x	x	w										
In-Briefing					v								
Fieldwork					x	x	x	x					
Final Exit Brief								v					
Data Analysis								x	x				
Draft Evaluation Report									x	1/2 x	1/2 v	w	1/2 w
Revisions to Draft Evaluation Report											x	x	
Final Evaluation Report													
Presentation of Evaluation Findings													1/2 w
Submit Evaluation Materials (Final Report to DEC and Data Sets to DDL). Timeline as stipulated in contract.													1/2 v

Task x	Deliverable v	USAID Review w
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ANNEX 2: LIST OF MEETINGS AND INTERVIEWS

Kingston & St. Andrew

1. Jason Fraser, Country Rep. USAID
2. Dacia Samuels, COR, USAID
3. Andrea Plunkett, CO, USAID
4. Shannon Stone, OCS, USAID
5. Kenneth Williams, AOR, USAID
6. Jordan McDonald, NIA
7. Hezekiah Hall, NIA
8. Lannie Burke, NIA, Attorney
9. Julian Robinson, General Secretary, People's National Party
10. Oral Shaw- Project Manager, CVSS
11. Rev. Henley Morgan, Director AIR
12. Winsome Wilkins, President, Council of Voluntary Social Services (CVSS)
13. Dirk Harrison, Former Contractor General
14. Marlon Moore, Monitoring and Evaluation, NIA
15. Professor Trevor Munroe, Executive Director, NIA
16. Dr. K'adamawe K'nfe, Department of Management Studies, UWI
17. Prof. Anthony Harriott, Institute of Criminal Justice and Security, University of the West Indies
18. Kethania Griffiths, Youth Crime Watch Jamaica (YCWJ)
19. Clifton Campbell, Junior Debate International
20. Col. Daniel Pryce, Integrity Commission
21. Maurice Barrett, Senior Director, IC
22. David Gray, Director of Investigations, IC
23. Sashine Wright Chin, Chief Investigator, IC
24. Jamie-Ann Chevannes, Youth Outreach Officer
25. Francis Burak, Pan American Development Foundation
26. Gavin Myers, Outreach Officer, NIA
27. Edward Dixon, Civil Society Coordinator, NIA
28. Macrena Benett, Finance & Administration Manager, NIA
29. Tijani Christian, Events Coordinator/Justice Sector, NIA
30. Ricardo Burke, Yutes 4 Change
31. Mr. Francesco DeSimones, Inter-American Development Bank
32. Jerome Palmer, Youth Adolescent and Policy Division, National Youth Council of Jamaica (NYCJ)
33. Howard Mitchell, President, Private Sector Organization of Jamaica
34. Margot Francis, Acquisition Officer, USAID
35. Rohan Reid, Superintendent, MOCA
36. Latanya Tomlinson, Sgt. MOCA
37. Jerome Palmer, Chair, National Youth Service
38. Keisha Raymond, Grants Manager, NIA
39. Dr. Shazeeda Ali, Acting Dean, UWI Faculty of Law
40. Germaine Barrett, Executive Director, JADE
41. Valerie Juggan-Brown, Hope Zoo Preservation Program
42. Lois Taylor Bloomfield, Hope Zoo
43. Andre Smart, Hope Zoo

44. Sean Davis, Caribbean Regional Youth Council
45. Therese Turner- Jones, General Manager of Country Department Caribbean Group, Inter-American Development Bank
46. Sonja Simms, Press Secretary, Office of the Governor General
47. Andwayne, Davis, Press Officer OGG
48. Stacey Ann Barnes, INL
49. Charmaine Creary-Beckford, Director, MOJ
50. Doreen Prendergast, Chief Technical Officer, Minister of Justice
51. Jaevion Nelson, Equality Youth Jamaica
52. Nadene Spence, I'm Glad I'm a Girl
53. Marsha Grant, Project Coordinator, NIA
54. Hon. Donna Parchment-Brown, Political Ombudsman
55. Jeanette Calder, Executive Director, JAMP
56. Sen. Matthew Samuda, Designate of Mr. Montague, Chairman, JLP
57. Joanna Callen, Researcher on Security, CAPRI
58. Nicole Walker, Director of Programs, CAPRI
59. Hon Dr. Horace Chang, General Secretary, Jamaica Labor Party
60. Gillian Gewah, MNS
61. Tania Edwards, MNS
62. Rohan Richards, Chief Technical Director, MNS
63. Dr. Patrece Charles-Freeman, Former Deputy Executive Director, NIA
64. Dr. Grace Mclean, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education
65. Marcia Phillips-Dawkins, MOE&I
66. Winnie Berry, Actg. CSO, MO&I
67. Dorothy Pine, McLarty, Chair, Electoral Commission of Jamaica
68. Andre Franklyn, Electoral Commission of Jamaica
69. Tom Tavares, Finson Electoral Commission of Jamaica
70. Glaspole Brown, Electoral Commission of Jamaica
71. Colleen Warren, Electoral Commission of Jamaica
72. Prof. Alvin Wint, Electoral Commission of Jamaica
73. Sophia Thomas, Council, Office of the DPP
74. Deputy Director, ODDP
75. Suzanne Stanley, Jamaica Environment Trust
76. ACP. Clinton Laing, JCF
77. SSP. Karl Bowen, JCF
78. Gary Hendrickson, Continental Baking Company, NIA Board Member
79. Hamish Campbell, INDECOM
80. Danyelle Anderson, IDECOM
81. Col. Desmond Edwards, Executive Director, MOCA

St James

1. Hon. Bishop Conrad Pitkin, Custos of St. James
2. Alicia Spence, Centre Coordinator, Flanker Peace & Justice Centre
3. Clifton Bernard, Barrett Town CDC
4. Dr. Beverly Scott, Family and Parenting Center
5. Elmogene Madourie, Barrett Town CDC
6. Oneil Gordon, President, Cambridge Tri-Star YC

7. Tevaughn Fabingo, Vice President, Cambridge Tri-Star YC

St. Catherine

1. Latoya Frye, Forward Step Foundation
2. Halova Stubbs-Jones, 4 H Club
3. Charlene Edwards, Regional Coordinator, 4 H Club
4. Bishop Rowan Edwards, 10,000 Men March/ Light House Assembly
5. Fitz A. Jackson, Chair, PNP

Clarendon

Hon. William Shagoury CD, Custos of Clarendon

IC Club Trainers FGD St. James

1. Angela Findlater
2. Novia Davis
3. Devon Hayle

WROC – FGD Kingston

1. Nickeisha Sewell-Lewis
2. Danelle Fraser
3. Doreen Knight
4. Nikita Dutchie
5. Mansfield Green
6. Sakia Ennis
7. Dorothy Whyte
8. Lorna Lee

FGD Integrity Ambassador – St. Andrew

1. Niyoka Blackwood
2. Janique Coke
3. Shaqueen Reid
4. Shanice Simms
5. Ashanti Jones
6. Reign Salmon

FGD CVSS Trainers – Kingston

1. Winsome Wilkins
2. Dr. Hopeton Morrison
3. Horace Williams

ANNEX 3: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

KII PROTOCOL AND QUESTIONS

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. Our team of Lawrence Robertson, Lincoln Mitchell, and Sharene McKenzie have been contracted by USAID to conduct a Final Evaluation of the work of National Integrity Action or NIA to combat corruption in Jamaica over the past three years. We will write a report for USAID on our findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

We look forward to learning from your experiences working with NIA, your knowledge of NIA's work, and experience in countering corruption.

We will take notes on this conversation and your name will be listed in an appendix of the report, but you will not be quoted by name, nor will your words be attributed to you in way that makes it possible for readers of the report to determine the source of this information.

Do you agree to participate in our meeting today under these conditions? [MAKE SURE TO GET EXPLICIT CONSENT]

Do you have any questions for us before we ask a set of questions for the evaluation?

1. How long have you been working with _____ [Name of Organization]?
2. How have you and your organization interacted with NIA over the past three years? [follow up to get list of areas and engagements]
3. How has your work with NIA over the last three years affected the capacity of your organization to build public demand for action against corruption?
4. What do you see as the main results of NIA activities over the last three years with you and your organization?
5. What results of NIA's activities with other organizations or citizens to combat corruption in Jamaica over the past three years do you see as significant?
6. What would you say are the factors that affected the level of success NIA has had in working with you and your organization?
7. What would you say are the factors that affected the level of success NIA has had in its work with other organizations and citizens?
8. What has NIA done in its strategies, in designing its programs, and in implementing its activities that shows attention to the efficient use of money?
9. Over the last three years, in what ways has NIA affected the environment for combating corruption in Jamaica?
10. What evidence exists that NIA's capacity-building approaches are likely to continue or be expanded after USAID's support under its current award ends in September?
11. What do you think are the best ways to address problems of corruption and foster citizen security and safety in Jamaica?
12. How do you think addressing corruption can reduce crime and violence in Jamaica, if at all?
13. Do you see any gaps in the frameworks and activities to counter corruption and increase citizen security and safety in Jamaica? If so, what are these gaps?
14. What do you see as USAID's strategic advantages in the area of anti-corruption in the context of improving citizen security and safety?

Thank you for all of your work countering corruption and for sharing your experience with us today.

FGD PROTOCOL AND QUESTIONS

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this discussion. Our team of Lawrence Robertson, Lincoln Mitchell, and Sharene McKenzie have been contracted by USAID to conduct a Final Evaluation of the work of National Integrity Action or NIA to combat corruption in Jamaica over the past three years. We look forward to learning from your experiences working with NIA, your knowledge of NIA's work, and experience in countering corruption for the evaluation.

We will write a report for USAID on our findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We will take notes on this discussion and your name will be listed in an appendix of the report, but you will not be quoted by name, nor will your words be attributed to you in way that makes it possible for readers of the report to determine the source of this information.

Do you agree to participate in our discussion today under these conditions? [GO AROUND THE ROOM TO MAKE SURE EVERYONE PROVIDES EXPLICIT CONSENT]

Do you have any questions for us before we ask a set of questions to spark a discussion for the evaluation?

1. One anti-corruption approach is to build public demand for action against corruption. What would you say have been the most effective approaches of NIA over the last three years in building your capacity and the capacity of your organizations to build public demand for action against corruption? In what ways has NIA's work been more or less effective in building capacity?
2. What has NIA done in its strategies, in designing its programs, and in implementing its activities that shows attention to the efficient use of money?
3. Over the last three years, what would you say are the main ways has NIA affected the environment for combating corruption in Jamaica?
4. What evidence exists that NIA's capacity-building approaches are likely to continue or be expanded in your organizations or in Jamaica as a whole after USAID's support under its current award to NIA ends in September?
5. What do you think are the best ways to address problems of corruption and foster citizen security and safety in Jamaica?
6. How do you think reducing corruption can reduce crime and violence in Jamaica, if at all?
7. Do you see any gaps in the frameworks and activities to counter corruption and increase citizen security and safety in Jamaica? If so, what are these gaps?
8. What do you see as USAID's strategic advantages in the area of anti-corruption in the context of improving citizen security and safety?

Thank you for all of your work countering corruption and for sharing your experience with us today.

BENEFICIARY SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

N.I.A.	Interviewer ID#:
Resp. ID #:	Team Leader ID#:
Coder ID#:	Start time: End time:
Enterer ID#:	Date: dd/ mm/ yy/

Consider including:

Gender of beneficiaries

Type of beneficiaries (gov, CSO)

Organization:

Category of Beneficiary

Introduction: Good day, I am from Market Research Services Ltd., an independent marketing research firm. Today we are conducting a survey of beneficiaries among Jamaican adults that have worked with National Integrity Action or NIA over the last three years. You have been randomly selected to participate in the brief survey. The purpose of the survey is to find out about your experience with NIA and perceptions of corruption in Jamaica. Are you willing to participate in our survey? **If yes:** Continue to questionnaire.

How much would you say you know about the following institutions in Jamaica?

DEGREE OF AWARENESS				
Knowledge areas	A great deal of knowledge	Some knowledge	Not very much knowledge	No knowledge
Office of Contractor General (OCG)	4	3	2	1
Office of Director of Public Prosecution (DPP)	4	3	2	1
The Auditor General Department	4	3	2	1
Major Organised Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA)	4	3	2	1
The Commissioner of Customs	4	3	2	1
The Commission for the Prevention of Corruption	4	3	2	1
Parliamentary Integrity Commission	4	3	2	1
Integrity Commission (since March 2018)	4	3	2	1

Q1. How satisfied are you with how the following entities have dealt with the problem of corruption within the society? **(READ OUT, ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT)**

DEGREE OF SATISFACTION					
Fulfilment areas	Satisfied		-	Dissatisfied	
	Very	Somewhat	Neutral	Somewhat	Very
Office of Contractor General (OCG)	5	4	3	2	1
Office of Director of Public Prosecution (DPP)	5	4	3	2	1
The Auditor General Department	5	4	3	2	1
Major Organised Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA)	5	4	3	2	1
The Commissioner of Customs	5	4	3	2	1

DEGREE OF SATISFACTION					
Fulfilment areas	Satisfied		-	Dissatisfied	
	Very	Somewhat	Neutral	Somewhat	Very
The Commission for the Prevention of Corruption	5	4	3	2	1
Parliamentary Integrity Commission	5	4	3	2	1
Integrity Commission (since March 2018)	5	4	3	2	1

Thinking back over the last three years, do you think you have become:

More aware of corruption than you were before? 3

Less aware of corruption than you were before? 1

My awareness of corruption has not changed much one way or the other. 2

With regard to levels of corruption you know of or have heard about, would you say that the country's situation overall is:

Getting worse – that is corruption has been increasing over the past three years? 3

Getting better – that is corruption has been decreasing over the past three years? 1

Staying about the same, not much change one way or the other? 2

What do you feel has influenced your perceptions about corruption most during the last three years?

How the media (TV, radio, newspapers, Internet sites, blogs) covers these issues

My own discussion with friends, church/community members, school, and workmates about these issues

Official statements and platforms of political leaders and parties, whether national, parish, or local

My personal experience dealing with statutory agencies (police, courts, vehicle licensing/inspection facilities, getting business permits, tax compliance, etc.)

How Jamaican civil society and human rights groups cover these issues

Other _____

Looking at all government and state institutions right now, would you say that in the next 2-3 years you expect to have:

More confidence in their ability and willingness to combat corruption than in the recent past? 3

Less confidence in their ability and willingness to combat corruption than in the recent past? 1

I don't expect my opinion of the ability and willingness of government or state institutions to change much one way or the other over the next few years. 2

And if I asked you the same question—but looking at the country's non-governmental civil society, human rights and anti-corruption organizations—would you say you have

More confidence in their ability and willingness to monitor state and government efforts to combat corruption over the next few years? 3

Less confidence in their ability and willingness to monitor state and government efforts to combat corruption over the next few years? 1

I don't expect my opinion of the ability of civil society groups to monitor state and government efforts to combat corruption will change much one way or the other. 2

Q3. To what extent do you feel the following groups are involved in corruption?

DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT IN CORRUPTION					
Levels of involvement	Very Involved	Somewhat Involved	Neutral	Not really involved	Definitely Not involved
Big Businesses	5	4	3	2	1
Big business persons	5	4	3	2	1
Top public servants	5	4	3	2	1
Public sector workers in general	5	4	3	2	1
Politicians	5	4	3	2	1

- Q4. In which of the following areas do you feel the highest level of corruption exists? **DO NOT PROMPT OR READ OUT/SHOW CARD, ONE ANSWER**

Amongst the politicians	1
Amongst senior public sector workers	2
Amongst the public sector workers in general	3
Amongst the Police	4
Amongst senior people in the private sector	5
Amongst junior and senior persons in the private sector	6
Amongst manufacturers and importers	7

- Q5. Do you feel that a single Anti-Corruption agency with powers to prosecute would be more effective in fighting corruption in this country?

Yes, A single agency would be more effective	1
No, I do not think a single agency would be more effective	2
Not sure about this/don't know	3

- Q6. Here are some statements that people have made about corruption and Integrity issues in Jamaica. As I read each one please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the statement. Do you agree completely or somewhat or do you disagree somewhat or completely?

---	AGREE COMPLETELY	AGREE SOMEWHAT	DISAGREE SOMEWHAT	DISAGREE COMPLETELY	NOT SURE
All elected Parliamentarians should be made to disclose their assets to the public each year	5	4	3	2	99
The media in Jamaica is playing an important role in helping to combat corruption	5	4	3	2	99
I am more aware of corruption issues nowadays	5	4	3	2	99
There are more approaches available nowadays to deal with corruption than previously	5	4	3	2	99
I have personally been exposed to and been a victim of corruption	5	4	3	2	99
Government as the leader in the Anti-Corruption drive is doing enough to reduce corruption	5	4	3	2	99
I have personally reported an incident of corruption and am awaiting a response to this	5	4	3	2	99
I can help reduce corruption in Jamaica through my own behavior and decisions	5	4	3	2	99

- Q9. **ASK ALL:** National Integrity Action (NIA) is the non-governmental organization that has been set up to monitor Integrity issues in the society. How aware were you of this organization before now?

AWARENESS OF NIA BEFORE NOW	
Very aware	5
Somewhat aware	4
Not very aware	3
Not at all aware	2
NOT SURE	1

- Q11. What actions have you seen or heard that you associate with the NIA?

ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH NIA	
Building public awareness of corruption through the media	1
Working with professionals	2
Engaging communities	3
Combat corruption and build integrity in Jamaica	4
Engaging youth and students against corruption	5
Other (write in)	6

- Q12. The NIA has as its goal **“COMBATING CORRUPTION AND BUILDING INTEGRITY ON A NON-PARTISAN BASIS IN JAMAICA.”** To what extent do you feel it is carrying out this mandate?

EXTENT TO WHICH MANDATE BEING CARRIED OUT	
Completely	5
Somewhat	4
Not really	3
Not at all	2
NOT SURE	1

- Q13. Taking everything into consideration, how would you rate the work that the NIA is carrying out in Jamaica?

RATING OF NIA	
Doing a very good job	5
Doing a good job	4
Not sure how well they are doing	3
Not doing such a good job	2
Doing a bad job	1

- Q14. **ASK ALL:** Why do you say so? (REFER TO ANSWER GIVEN ABOVE)

--

Over the last three years, in what ways has NIA affected the environment for combating corruption in Jamaica?

--

What do you see as the main results of NIA activities over the last three years with you and your organization?

--

What would you say are the factors that affected the level of success NIA has had in its work with you and your organization?

What results of NIA's activities with other organizations or citizens to combat corruption in Jamaica over the past three years do you see as significant?

What would you say are the factors that affected the level of success NIA has had in its work with other organizations and citizens?

Based on your experience, would you say that NIA has sought to ensure that money is used efficiently?

Yes
No

What has NIA done in its strategies, in designing its programs, and in implementing its activities that shows attention to the efficient use of money?

Q15. In what ways do you feel the NIA could be more effective or make a bigger difference in the fight against corruption and for greater integrity in public life here in Jamaica?

What evidence exists that NIA's capacity building approaches are likely to continue or be expanded after USAID's support under its current award ends in September?

Q16. What else in your view could be done to help reduce the level of corruption in Jamaica?

What do you think are the best ways to address problems of corruption and foster citizen security and safety in Jamaica?

Provide more jobs
 Reduce corruption in politics
 Reduce corruption in government institutions
 Strict enforcement of the law that convicts more corrupt people and criminals
 Harsher penalties for corruption and criminal offenses
 Reform the JCF into a more effective police service
 Stronger campaigns among the public to stamp out corruption
 Other _____

How do you think reducing corruption can reduce crime and violence in Jamaica, if at all?

Do you see any gaps in the frameworks and activities to counter corruption and increase citizen security and safety in Jamaica?

Yes
 No

If Yes, what are these gaps?

Q17. Would you yourself be prepared to help in the fight to reduce corruption and increase levels of integrity within the society?

EXTENT OF LIKELY SUPPORT	
Yes, would help	1
No, would not be prepared to help	2
Not sure about this	3

Q18. If person says they would help ask, which of the following would you be prepared to do?

EXTENT OF LIKELY SUPPORT	YES	NO	NOT SURE
Call a talk show	1	2	3
Write a letter to a newspaper	1	2	3
Post an entry on social media	1	2	3
Sign a petition	1	2	3
Join a peaceful protest	1	2	3
Donate to the NIA	1	2	3
Join the NIA	1	2	3
Take the NIA pledge to never take or offer a bribe	1	2	3

Q19. Have you personally taken any action to help fight or reduce corruption in Jamaica?

INCIDENCE OF PERSON TAKING ACTION	
Yes, have taken action	1
No, have not taken any action	2

What do you see as USAID's strategic advantages in the area of anti-corruption in the context of improving citizen security and safety?

Convening key stakeholders
 Coordinating stakeholders
 Developing partnerships
 Developing ideas on combating corruption in Jamaica
 Providing funding
 Monitoring program implementation
 Other _____

Looking ahead, what for you would be the most significant sign that the country is finally on the right track with regard to fighting corruption and increasing citizen safety and security?

Seeing "big fish" successfully prosecuted, their assets confiscated, or even being sent to jail
 Getting a driver's license, vehicle inspection, TCC, passport or other service quickly without having to give a "bribe" to somebody
 Having a "clean" police force that doesn't abuse its authority and respects people
 New laws that will create an independent anti-corruption agency with the power to prosecute wrong-doers
 A government that helps the country to grow economically with more employment and business investment in the country as a result
 A more moral society where personal integrity and high ethical standards are increasingly valued
 Other _____

CLASSIFICATION:

Sex

Male

Female

Age:

C2d. What is the highest level of education that you have personally completed? **(Read Out)**

Level of Education	Points	Code DP Only
Primary/Prep School	1	1
Secondary/High – up to 5 th form	1	2
Secondary/High – up to 6 th form	1	3
Vocational/Technical	1	4
College/University Certificate	2	5
College/University Diploma/Associate Degree	2	6
Bachelor's Degree	3	7
Professional Certification, e.g., ACCA, CFA	4	8
Master's Degree	4	9
Doctoral Degree	5	10
Professional Degree (Law, Medical)	5	11
No formal education	0	12
Refused/Don't Know	0	13
No Response	0	14

Parish:

KSA	1	St. Elizabeth	5	Trelawny	9	St. Thomas	13
St. Catherine	2	Hanover	6	St. Ann	10	-	-
Clarendon	3	Westmoreland	7	St. Mary	11	-	-
Manchester	4	St. James	8	Portland	12	-	-

My supervisor needs to be able to validate that this interview is true, I will not ask for your name but please give me an alias or a code so that you may be identified when contacted. You can choose to give either your mother's maiden name, or the name of your favorite place to go or the name of the first school you attended.

NAME OF RESPONDENT _____

Tele #: _____ ED Name: _____ ED#: _____

Address: _____

Date of Interview: _____ Date of validation: _____

NAME OF INTERVIEWER: _____ SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER: _____

Internal Validation: Y [] No []

Internal Validator: _____

Special Comments: _____

RECONTACT

Thank you very much for your help. Sometimes we like to contact people more than once. You can be assured that this contact will never result in anyone trying to sell you anything. It's entirely your decision to take part. Would you be willing to be contacted again for another research or by the company carrying out this study?

Yes 1 No 2

NAME OF FIELDWORK COORDINATOR: _____

SIGNATURE OF FIELDWORK COORDINATOR: _____

PERCEPTION SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

You N.I.A.	Interviewer ID#:
Resp. ID #:	Team Leader ID#:
Coder ID#:	Start time: End time:
Enterer ID#:	Date: dd/ mm/ yy/

Introduction: Good day, I am from Market Research Services Ltd., an independent marketing research firm. Today we are conducting a survey among adults living across the island and have been randomly selected to participate. The purpose of the survey is to find out about your opinions and experiences about specific issues facing the country. Could you give me a few moments of your time to answer this brief questionnaire? **If yes:** Continue to main questionnaire.

How much would you say you know about the following institutions in Jamaica?

DEGREE OF AWARENESS				
Knowledge areas	A great deal of knowledge	Some knowledge	Not very much knowledge	No knowledge
Office of Contractor General (OCG)	4	3	2	1
Office of Director of Public Prosecution (DPP)	4	3	2	1
The Auditor General Department	4	3	2	1
Major Organized Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA)	4	3	2	1
The Commissioner of Customs	4	3	2	1
The Commission for the Prevention of Corruption	4	3	2	1
Parliamentary Integrity Commission	4	3	2	1
Integrity Commission (since March 2018)	4	3	2	1

Q1. How satisfied are you with how the following entities have dealt with the problem of corruption within the society? **(READ OUT, ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT)**

DEGREE OF SATISFACTION					
Fulfilment areas	Satisfied		--	Dissatisfied	
	Very	Somewhat	Neutral	Somewhat	Very
Office of Contractor General (OCG)	5	4	3	2	1
Office of Director of Public Prosecution (DPP)	5	4	3	2	1
The Auditor General Department	5	4	3	2	1
Major Organized Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA)	5	4	3	2	1
The Commissioner of Customs	5	4	3	2	1
The Commission for the Prevention of Corruption	5	4	3	2	1
Parliamentary Integrity Commission	5	4	3	2	1
Integrity Commission (since March 2018)	5	4	3	2	1

Thinking back over the last three years, do you think you have become

More aware of corruption than you were before? 3

Less aware of corruption than you were before 1

My awareness of corruption has not changed much one way or the other 2

With regard to levels of corruption you know of or have heard about, would you say that the country's situation overall is:

Getting worse – that is corruption has been increasing over the past three years? 3

Getting better – that is corruption has been decreasing over the past three years? 1

Staying about the same, not much change one way or the other? 2

What do you feel has influenced your perceptions about corruption most during the last three years?

How the media (TV, radio, newspapers, internet sites, blogs) cover these issues

My own discussion with friends, church/community members, school and workmates about these issues

Official statements and platforms of political leaders and parties, whether national, parish or local

My personal experience dealing with statutory agencies (police, courts, vehicle licensing/inspection facilities, getting business permits, tax compliance, ect.)

How Jamaican civil society and human rights groups cover these issues

Other _____

Looking at all government and state institutions right now, would you say that in the next 2-3 years you expect to have:

More confidence in their ability and willingness to combat corruption than in the recent past? 3

Less confidence in their ability and willingness to combat corruption than in the recent past? 1

I don't expect my opinion of the ability and willingness of government or state institutions to change much one way or the other over the next few years. 2

And if I asked you the same question—but looking at the country's non-governmental civil society, human rights, and anti-corruption organizations, would you say you have

More confidence in their ability and willingness to monitor state and government efforts to combat corruption over the next few years? 3

Less confidence in their ability and willingness to monitor state and government efforts to combat corruption over the next few years? 1

I don't expect my opinion of the ability of civil society groups to monitor state and government efforts to combat corruption will change much one way or the other. 2

Q3. To what extent do you feel the following groups are involved in corruption?

DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT IN CORRUPTION					
Levels of involvement	Very Involved	Somewhat Involved	Neutral	Not really involved	Definitely Not involved
Big Businesses	5	4	3	2	1
Big business persons	5	4	3	2	1
Top public servants	5	4	3	2	1
Public sector workers in general	5	4	3	2	1
Politicians	5	4	3	2	1

Q4. In which of the following areas do you feel the highest level of corruption exists? **DO NOT PROMPT OR READ OUT/SHOW CARD, ONE ANSWER**

Among the politicians	1
Among senior public sector workers	2
Among the Public sector workers in general	3
Among the Police	4
Among senior people in the private sector	5
Among junior and senior persons in the private sector	6
Among manufacturers and importers	7

Q5. Do you feel that a single Anti-Corruption agency with powers to prosecute would be more effective in fighting corruption in this country?

Yes, A single agency would be more effective	1
No, I do not think a single agency would be more effective	2
Not sure about this/don't know	3

Q6. Here are some statements that people have made about corruption and Integrity issues in Jamaica. As I read each one please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the statement. Do you agree completely or somewhat or do you disagree somewhat or completely?

---	AGREE COMPLETELY	AGREE SOMEWHAT	DISAGREE SOMEWHAT	DISAGREE COMPLETELY	NOT SURE
All elected Parliamentarians should be made to disclose their assets to the public each year	5	4	3	2	99
The media in Jamaica is playing an important role in helping to combat corruption	5	4	3	2	99
I am more aware of corruption issues nowadays	5	4	3	2	99
There are more approaches available nowadays to deal with corruption than previously	5	4	3	2	99
I have personally been exposed to and been a victim of corruption	5	4	3	2	99
Government as the leader in the Anti-Corruption drive is doing enough to reduce corruption	5	4	3	2	99
I have personally reported an incident of corruption and am awaiting a response to this	5	4	3	2	99

---	AGREE COMPLETELY	AGREE SOMEWHAT	DISAGREE SOMEWHAT	DISAGREE COMPLETELY	NOT SURE
I can help reduce corruption in Jamaica through my own behavior and decisions	5	4	3	2	99

Q7. How aware are you of any Non-Government Organization that has been set up to monitor and deal with issues to do with Integrity within the society?

AWARENESS LEVEL	
Very aware	4→Q8
Somewhat aware	3→Q8
Not very aware	2→Q9
Not at all aware	1→Q9

Q8. Can you tell me the name of this Non-Government Organization set up to monitor and deal with integrity within the society? **(ONE ANSWER)**

Q9. **ASK ALL:** National Integrity Action (NIA) is the Non-Government Organization that has been set up to monitor Integrity issues in the society. How aware were you of this organization before now?

AWARENESS OF NIA BEFORE NOW	
Very aware	5
Somewhat aware	4
Not very aware	3
Not at all aware	2
NOT SURE	1

Q10. Please tell me all you know about the NIA from what you have heard and seen.

Q11. What actions have you seen or heard that you associate with the NIA?

ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH NIA	
Building public awareness of corruption through the media	1
Working with professionals	2
Engaging communities	3
To combat corruption and build integrity in Jamaica	4
Engaging youth and students against corruption	5
Other (write in)	6

Q12. The NIA has as its goal “**COMBATING CORRUPTION AND BUILDING INTEGRITY ON A NON- PARTISAN BASIS IN JAMAICA,**” To what extent do you feel it is carrying out this mandate?

EXTENT TO WHICH MANDATE BEING CARRIED OUT	
Completely	5
Somewhat	4
Not really	3
Not at all	2
NOT SURE	1

Q13. Taking everything into consideration, how would you rate the work that the NIA is carrying out in Jamaica?

RATING OF NIA	
Doing a very good job	5
Doing a good job	4
Not sure how well they are doing	3
Not doing such a good job	2
Doing a bad job	1

Q14. **ASK ALL:** Why do you say so? (REFER TO ANSWER GIVEN ABOVE)

Q15. In what ways do you feel the NIA could be more effective or make a bigger difference in the fight against corruption and for greater integrity in public life here in Jamaica?

Q16. What else in your view could be done to help reduce the level of corruption in Jamaica?

What do you think are the best ways to address problems of corruption and foster citizen security and safety in Jamaica?

Provide more jobs
 Reduce corruption in politics
 Reduce corruption in government institutions
 Strict enforcement of the law that thus captures more corrupt people and criminals
 Harsher penalties for corruption and criminal offenses
 Reform the JCF into a more effective police force
 Stronger campaigns among the public to stamp out corruption
 Other _____

Do you see any gaps in the frameworks and activities to counter corruption and increase citizen security and safety in Jamaica?

Yes
 No

If Yes, what are these gaps?

--

Q17. Would you yourself be prepared to help the fight to reduce corruption and increase levels of integrity within the society?

EXTENT OF LIKELY SUPPORT	
Yes, would help	1
No, would not be prepared to help	2
Not sure about this	3

Q18. If person says they would help ask, which of the following would you be prepared to do?

EXTENT OF LIKELY SUPPORT	YES	NO	NOT SURE
Call a talk show	1	2	3
Write a letter to a newspaper	1	2	3
Post an entry on social media	1	2	3
Sign a petition	1	2	3
Join a peaceful protest	1	2	3
Donate to the NIA	1	2	3
Join the NIA	1	2	3
Take the NIA pledge to never take or offer a bribe	1	2	3

Q19. Have you personally taken any action to help fight or reduce corruption in Jamaica?

INCIDENCE OF PERSON TAKING ACTION	
Yes, have taken action	1
No, have not taken any action	2

Looking ahead, what for you would be the most significant sign that the country is finally on the right track with regard to fighting corruption and increasing citizen safety and security?

- Seeing “big fish” successfully prosecuted, their assets confiscated, or even being sent to jail
- Getting a driver’s license, vehicle inspection, TCC, passport or other service quickly without having to give a “bribe” to somebody
- Having a “clean” police force that doesn’t abuse its authority and respects people
- New laws that will create an independent anti-corruption agency with the power to prosecute wrong-doers
- A government that helps the country to grow economically with more employment and business investment in the country as a result
- A more moral society where personal integrity and high ethical standards are increasingly valued
- Other _____

CLASSIFICATION:

C2a. Which of the following groups does your occupation fall into? **(Showcard OCC and Read Out)**

Groups	Points	Code DP Only
Service Worker/Operator/Laborer/Craftsman/Repairman (REFER TO OCC CARD)	1	1
Clerical/Junior Administrative (REFER TO OCC CARD)	2	2
Senior Administrative/Non-professional/Non-Technical Business Owners (REFER TO OCC CARD)	3	3
Small Business Owners/Professional/Technical Business Owners (REFER TO OCC CARD)	4	4
Proprietor/Manager of Corporations (REFER TO OCC CARD)	5	5

Groups	Points	Code DP Only
Professional/Technical (REFER TO OCC CARD)	5	6
Do not read: Company wife/Retired	0→C3a	7
Do not read: Unemployed	0→Q3a	8
Do not read: Student	0→C3a	9
Do not read: Don't Know/Refused	0	10
Do not read: No response	0	11

C2b. Could you kindly tell me your exact occupation, that is, what do you do for a living? (**Interviewer check for consistency with C2a**) _____

C2c. And where exactly do you work? (**Interviewer check for consistency with C2a**) _____

C2d. What is the highest level of education that you have personally completed? (**Read Out**)

Level of Education	Points	Code DP Only
Primary/Prep School	1	1
Secondary/High – up to 5 th form	1	2
Secondary/High – up to 6 th form	1	3
Vocational/Technical	1	4
College/University Certificate	2	5
College/University Diploma/Associate Degree	2	6
Bachelor's Degree	3	7
Professional Certification, e.g., ACCA, CFA	4	8
Master's Degree	4	9
Doctoral Degree	5	10
Professional Degree (Law, Medical)	5	11
No formal education	0	12
Refused / Don't Know	0	13
No Response	0	14

Interviewer now go to C4a

C3a. If unemployed/student/housewife/retired ask C3a to C3d, about the head of the Household, otherwise skip to C4a: Which of the following groups does the occupation (job title) of the head of your Household or the person whom you depend on for your income falls into? (**Showcard OCC and read out**)

Group	Points	Code DP Only
Service Worker/Operator/Laborer/Craftsman/Repairman (REFER TO OCC CARD)	1	1
Clerical/Junior Administrative (REFER TO OCC CARD)	2	2
Senior Administrative/Non-professional/Non-Technical Business Owners (REFER TO OCC CARD)	3	3
Small Business Owners/Professional/Technical Business Owners (REFER TO OCC CARD)	4	4
Proprietor/Manager of Corporations (REFER TO OCC CARD)	5	5
Professional/Technical (REFER TO OCC CARD)	5	6
Don't read: Housewife/Retired	0	7
Don't read: Unemployed	0	8
Don't read: Student	0	9
Don't read: Don't Know /Refused	0	10
Don't read: No response	0	11

C3b. Could you kindly tell me the exact occupation of the head of your Household or the person whom you depend on, that is, what does he/she do for a living? **(Interviewer check for consistency with C3a)**

C3c. And where exactly does he/she work? **(Interviewer check for consistency with C3a)**

C3d. What is the highest level of education attained/completed by the head of the Household? **(Read Out)**

Level of Education	Points	Code DP Only
Primary/Prep School	1	1
Secondary/High – up to 5 th form	1	2
Secondary/High – up to 6 th form	1	3
Vocational/Technical	1	4
College/University Certificate	2	5
College/University Diploma/Associate Degree	2	6
Bachelor's Degree	3	7
Professional Certification, e.g., ACCA, CFA	4	8
Master's Degree	4	9
Doctoral Degree	5	10
Professional Degree (Law, Medical)	5	11
No formal education	0	12
Refused/Don't Know	0	13
No Response	0	14

C4a. **ASK ALL: SHOW CARD SAL.** Using the scale on the card, can you tell me approximately: Which of the following options best represents the total monthly income after taxes of your HOUSEHOLD? Please include all income that your household receives on a monthly basis including any remittances, pension, etc. WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN INDIVIDUAL INCOME BUT TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME PLEASE.

READ OPTIONS:	Code DP Only	DO NOT READ (Average Monthly Income)
Less than \$20,000	1	Less than \$20,000
\$20,000-\$50,000	2	\$35,000
\$50,001-\$100,000	3	\$75,000
\$100,001-\$150,000	4	\$125,000
\$151,000-\$200,000	5	\$175,000
\$200,001-\$250,000	6	\$225,000
\$250,001-\$300,000	7	\$275,000
\$300,001 - \$350,000	8	\$325,000
\$350,001 - \$400,000	9	\$375,000
\$400,001 - \$450,000	10	\$425,000
\$450,001 - \$500,000	11	\$475,000
Over \$500,000 (specify) _____	12	Over \$475,000
Refused/Don't know	13	Refused/Don't know

C4b. How many different persons live in your household? Please include all adults and children that are not employed to your Household?

[] exact **number only not a range**

C4c. Interviewer: calculate income per person in household in order to determine the income score. That is, divide the average monthly income above in C5a by the number of persons in Household in C5b (e.g., \$175,000/4=\$43,750 per person). Look in the grid below where this number falls and derive the income score.

CALCULATE Income per person in Household per month	Points (Income Score)
Refused/cannot be determined	0
Less than \$50,000	1
\$51,000 – 100,000	2
\$101,000 – 160,000	3
\$161,000 – 200,000	4
Over 200,000	5

CALCULATE TOTAL POINTS:

Formulae: C2a OR C3a + C2d or C3d + C4c = Total Points obtained

TOTAL: _____

	Points	Code DP Only
Low and low middle (DE)	1-3	1
Middle (C SES)	4-9	2
High & Middle High (ABC I SES)	10+	3

Parish:

KSA	1	St. Elizabeth	5	Trelawny	9	St. Thomas	13
St. Catherine	2	Hanover	6	St. Ann	10	-	-
Clarendon	3	Westmoreland	7	St. Mary	11	-	-
Manchester	4	St. James	8	Portland	12	-	-

Sex

Male
Female

Area:

Urban 1 Rural 2

My supervisor needs to be able to validate that this interview is true, I will not ask for your name but please give me an alias or a code so that you may be identified when contacted. You can choose to give either your mother's maiden name, or the name of your favourite place to go or the name of the first school you attended.

NAME OF RESPONDENT _____

Tele #: _____ ED Name: _____ ED#: _____

Address: _____

Date of Interview: _____ Date of validation: _____

NAME OF INTERVIEWER: _____ SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER: _____

Internal Validation: Y [] No []

Internal Validator: _____

Special Comments: _____

RECONTACT

Thank you very much for your help. Sometimes we like to contact people more than once. You can be assured that this contact will never result in anyone trying to sell you anything. It's entirely your decision to take part. Would you be willing to be contacted again for another research or by the company carrying out this study?

Yes 1 No 2

NAME OF FIELDWORK COORDINATOR: _____

SIGNATURE OF FIELDWORK COORDINATOR: _____

ANNEX 4: NOTES ON ALL MEETINGS WITH USAID

In-brief with USAID, August 7

Attendees

- Jason Fraser – Country Representative
- Dacia Samuels – COR
- Andrea Plunkett – Contracting Officer
- Shannon Stone – OCS
- Margot Francis- Acquisition Specialist
- Lawrence Robertson
- Sharene McKenzie
- Lincoln Mitchell

The Evaluation Team (ET) presented a PowerPoint summarizing the Evaluation Design and Work Plan to structure a discussion of planned fieldwork and the ET's methods.

USAID clarified that it has provided US\$10.6 million from CBSI for CCSIJ out of a TEC of \$12 million.

USAID clarified that the results of the evaluation will be useful for CBSI, noting in particular that EQ5 came from CBSI because they would like more clarity about how working in the anti-corruption space leads to crime reduction.

USAID and the ET discussed key informants as part of ensuring that the fieldwork covered all key beneficiaries and stakeholders, both in and out of the GoJ. Discussion also covered how the ET will do its analysis. The ET clarified that based on the EQs, our evaluation design does not examine control groups, groups and areas that did not receive attention from NIA, as part of evaluating the impact of CCSIJ.

The Deliverable Schedule was outlined demonstrating a tight timeline between today's meeting and the presentation after the approval of the final Evaluation Report planned for October 10.

Individual follow up meetings were planned and scheduled with the USAID Mission.

ANNEX 5: SIGNED DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST FORMS

Name	Lawrence Robertson
Title	Team Leader
Organization	ME&A
Evaluation Position?	☒ Team Leader ☐ Team member
Evaluation Award Number (or RFTOP or other appropriate instrument number)	SOL-72053219R00001
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Combating Corruption and Strengthening Integrity in Jamaica (CCSIJ) Activity
I have real or potential conflict of interest to disclose.	☐ Yes ☒ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	----
Signature	
Date	11-4-2019

Name	Lincoln Mitchell
Title	Co-Team Leader
Organization	ME&A
Evaluation Position?	☐ Team Leader ☒ Team member
Evaluation Award Number (or RFTOP or other appropriate instrument number)	SOL-72053219R00001
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Combating Corruption and Strengthening Integrity in Jamaica (CCSIJ) Activity
I have real or potential conflict of interest to disclose.	☐ Yes ☒ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> 7. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 8. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 9. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 10. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 11. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 12. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	---
Signature	
Date	11-4-2019

Name	Sharene McKenzie
Title	Evaluation Subject Matter Specialist
Organization	ME&A
Evaluation Position?	☐ Team Leader ☒ Team member
Evaluation Award Number (or RFTOP or other appropriate instrument number)	SOL-72053219R00001
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Combating Corruption and Strengthening Integrity in Jamaica (CCSIJ) Activity
I have real or potential conflict of interest to disclose.	☐ Yes ☒ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> 13. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 14. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 15. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 16. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 17. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 18. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	---
Signature	
Date	11-4-2019