



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

USAID/SOUTHERN AFRICA DEMOCRACY RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE PROJECT MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Contract No.: GS-10F-0188V, Task Order: AID-OAA-M-14-00018

July – August 2019

This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Dalberg Consulting U.S., LLC for the USAID Investment Support Program (ISP).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the findings and recommendations from the mid-term performance evaluation of the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Southern Africa Democracy, Rights and Governance (SA/DRG) project¹.

At the time of writing, the project consists of 10 active activities (5 bilateral and 5 regional), and 4 completed activities (1 bilateral and 3 regional). It draws on both supply-side approaches (working with government institutions) and demand-side approaches (working with civil society). The purpose of the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) is to insure that: “Democratic institutions and processes [are] strengthened for improved balance of power, accountability, and human rights protection” across the Southern Africa region.

This performance evaluation was commissioned by USAID/DRG as the project approaches the mid-term of the PAD. The aim is to surface common learnings and insights across the diverse set of activities. This will inform both course corrective actions within the remaining life of the PAD (particularly important, given that the PAD is likely to be extended), and future iterations of DRG programming in the region.

EVALUATIVE APPROACH

The Terms of Reference (ToR) sought a project-level evaluation. Therefore, the evaluative approach did not assess individual activities and their performance.

A qualitative approach drew heavily on **61** key informant interviews (KIIs). These interviews covered implementer staff, beneficiaries, US Government (USG) stakeholders, and ecosystem actors. Reviews of **79** documents complemented the KIIs, with these documents including activity-level mid-term evaluations, annual and quarterly reports, and the PAD itself.

The inception phase, during which the team defined the evaluative approach and tools, commenced in June 2019. The evaluative work itself took place between July and mid-August 2019. The remainder of August was dedicated to finalization of this report.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

CONTEXT INFORMING THE EVALUATIVE FINDINGS

The context within which the USAID Southern Africa Democracy, Rights and Governance (SA/DRG) project operates heavily influences the evaluative findings.

Within USAID, uncertain funding flows hinder the ability of the project to be fully strategic.

The project has received low levels of dedicated funding (in some years, zero, but, more recently, \$3 million in bilateral funding and \$3 million in regional funding per year, still short of the total cost of DRG programming in the project). With funding levels uncertain, the project cannot strategically shape a coherent set of activities from the outset.

To bolster funding levels, the DRG team has relied on cross-sectoral programming funds from other Offices, and global calls for proposals issued by USAID/D.C. Such funding brings with it additional

¹ Unless otherwise specified, “DRG project” refers to the USAID Southern Africa DRG project, consisting of all activities under the DRG PAD

objectives and is dependent on buy-in from outside the USAID/SA DRG team. This further limits the ability of DRG to pursue a deliberate strategy shaped at the start of the PAD, given that additional priorities are infused with injections of additional funding.

The ability to navigate an externality-rich environment is crucial to successful DRG programming. Externalities can create opportunities that activities can seize to increase momentum behind a specific issue. However, stakeholder resistance to certain interventions, or external events such as elections, can shape what will work at a given moment and can be difficult to plan around. These factors are beyond the control of the DRG team and the implementing partners. As such, any DRG evaluation must assess how effectively these dynamics were managed. The focus of this evaluation is, therefore, to explore the success of controllable responses rather than to critique the project for factors that are beyond its sphere of influence.

OVERALL FINDINGS

Despite and, at times, as a result of these dynamics, the DRG project is, overall, a commendable and high performing set of interventions.

The DRG team has effectively attracted and deployed DRG team funding along with funding from others in a way that maintains relevant programming. Both bilateral and regional programming have advanced DRG objectives as well as the objectives of other parts of USAID, and they have ultimately proven relevant and locally resonant. For example, SAPPD was able to progress political party strengthening while advancing the energy and water priorities of the Environment Office. The well-positioned nature of the project is not a given however. The risks to strategic coherence, created by of low levels of dedicated funding in addition to the priorities attached to funding from other sources, have been well mitigated in the project (outlined in further detail below).

On the bilateral level, the project has deeply engaged on relevant issues across multiple PADs. Using learnings from prior activities, it ensured that a continued set of relevant interventions address material challenges for South Africa. Among other things, this has involved progressing work on Gender Based Violence (GBV), using funds from global calls for proposals to manage the People to People dialogue work tackling xenophobia, and supporting Civil Society Organization (CSO) strengthening activities.

At the regional level, the project is well-positioned in that it adds distinct value beyond the bilateral missions. Actors note that it has been able to bring neutrality (enabling the regional mission to address issues that would be too sensitive for bilaterals to address), to foster regional networks and shared learnings, and to target spillover issues (e.g., its ability to drive change through a landmark issue in a single country or to tackle cross-border issues).

Adaptiveness, informed by learnings, has ensured the effectiveness of interventions. This adaptiveness has been pervasive across the project. It is rooted in flexible designs (setting clear activity goals, with flexibility on tactics), combined with a strong emphasis on learning, understanding and in turn adapting around local context. This has enabled activities to resonate with and better respond to local communities (reducing the resistance that can come with external interventions). It has created space for implementers to adjust programming based on political externalities and events. Furthermore, bilateral missions have been able to align regional interventions to other ongoing programming in country.

The technical design of interventions has also furthered efficiency, although with opportunities to build on strengths. The complementary nature of supply- and demand-side approaches applied to a single issue, building vertical coherence by leveraging national-level relationships

to connect local interventions into a wider national change agenda, and the depth of programming (at times prioritized over breadth) are all positive features identified in parts of the project that could be scaled further and should be actively considered in future project and activity design efforts.

Strong management has enabled this relevant and effective programming. The active engagement of the DRG team, a strong emphasis on learning, and the use of assistance mechanisms that enable flexibility have supported the adaptiveness that ensured relevant and effective activities.

In turn, this led to a project that yielded positive outcomes, illustrating its capacity to mitigate the effects of externalities on the potential of individual activities and the project as a whole. Recognizing that most if not all activities faced external challenges, they performed well overall in this context – often enabled by problem driven iterative adaptations (PDIA). Some activities have faced performance issues, although generally those issues have been well managed. Meanwhile, there are forward-looking risks the project needs to manage to ensure continued performance. Qualitative evidence suggests the project’s strong performance has yielded targeted and localized outcomes (in line with activity designs). Furthermore, the efforts that produced these outcomes were largely equitable. They directly engaged vulnerable populations (e.g., incorporating youth and women’s groups into political party strengthening activities) and indirectly brought forth the perspective of vulnerable groups as part of programming (e.g., educating the judiciary on topics that impact vulnerable groups, such as LGBTI+).

It is worth noting, however, that indicators, focused predominately on outputs, limited the capacity of evaluators to measure the ultimate success of outcomes. The indicator design itself reflected further challenges. Implementors generally had low levels of awareness of the project-level indicator framework, while the localized and highly targeted nature of interventions was not suited to being measured against macro-level indicators included in the project-level results framework (e.g., the Mo Ibrahim index).

The sustainability of outcomes was mixed, although success criteria emerged. The outcomes developed tended to exhibit positive sustainability given the focus on a capacity development approach (as compared to directly advancing specific priorities). This ensured that should an ultimate outcome be rolled back, capacity remains in the system to continue to counter such a backslide. The other aspect of sustainability considered is the ability for activities to continue beyond the LOP, both in their current form, and in evolved forms based on learnings acquired during the project). This is crucial given the nature of most DRG activities is that there is a continued need for further work, whether to provide an ongoing service or to ensure capacity developed by catalytic funding remains up to date. On the supply-side, this hinges on government buy-in. In a fiscally-constrained context, this is often difficult to build (and remains lacking in some cases). That said, some interventions did prove the potential for sustainable supply-side interventions; this was often linked to the prioritization of early buy-in. On the demand-side, capacity-building support from USAID, in several cases, led CSOs to enhance their managerial, financial, and fundraising capabilities, which, in turn, allowed them to secure further funding to sustain activities.

Although the management of the project has been well-commended (as outlined above), the evaluation team noted that current team capacity levels prevented the team from adding further value, and led to coordination gaps. The capacity of the DRG team was frequently cited as a constraining factor, with many identifying areas where additional DRG team capacity would add further value. This also manifested in coordination challenges. Despite the ability of the team to provide strong technical assistance (TA) to bilaterals, their ability to contribute was highly constrained. The evaluation team also identified challenges with coordination across USG actors. USG stakeholders can play a positive role in applying diplomatic pressure to advance DRG priorities (particularly evidenced in

the case of eSwatini), while misalignment within USG can lead to withdrawal of consent for some activities (with negative impacts on activities' legitimacy). Many of these dynamics are something USAID is uniquely positioned to manage; however current capacity levels constrain the extent to which this is possible. Implementors also noted the potential for collaboration and learning, with current levels of awareness of the project weak owing to the DRG team not being able to prioritize collaboration activities.

From an efficiency perspective, uncertain funding flows reduce the synergies that are available within the project. Given that money was obligated at different stages and often came with different objectives, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to consolidate spending into fewer activities. Even had funding been more predictable, there are signs that an alternative approach would not have been desirable. The relatively high number of mechanisms enables the project to draw on highly specialized skillsets and proprietary approaches from a suite of distinct implementors.

RECOMMENDATIONS

While recognizing the DRG project to be a generally well-performing suite of interventions, there are opportunities to enhance the impact of the project. These recommendations are summarized below:

Opportunities to expand DRG programming

1. **Expand cross-sectoral programming (CSP)** – recognizing the scarcity of dedicated DRG funding, the increasing drive for CSP within USAID, and the successes DRG has had in meeting its own objectives and those of other Offices, consider further prioritizing CSP in the next RDGS / CDCS. Create space for DRG to proactively and strategically engage other Offices on CSP
2. **Strengthen alignment with agency-wide priorities** – recognizing the successes of the DRG team's project, evaluators noted further opportunities to build on this by strengthening their alignment with the Journey to Self-Reliance (where strong governance is crucial in the ability for governments to deliver services without aid), and with PSE and Prosper Africa (with the need for a clear strategy around where the private sector can play a role in DRG work)

Scaling best practices

3. **Design with sustainability in mind** – ensuring that both USAID and implementers deliberately define the balance between activity delivery and activities that support sustainability, setting clear sustainability objectives with defined milestones to hold implementers to account
4. **Preserve flexibility and adaptability** – recognizing the crucial need for flexibility in DRG-type programming (although this may not translate to other more process-oriented programming areas), ensure this management philosophy is prioritized, particularly as staff rotate into new roles

Addressing identified shortcomings

5. **Improve project coordination** – given that there is weak coordination within the project and limited awareness amongst implementors of the project as a whole, while implementors desire to share and benefit from one another's knowledge, resume project-wide convenings (while giving partners a strong level of control over the agenda to ensure topicality and relevance)
6. **Enhance USG co-ordination** – in light of evidence that strong USG coordination can enable synergies across DRG programming and wider USG activities, strengthen processes for engagement between wider USG actors and the project. Consider the expansion of DRG staff resources and improve the onboarding of implementors to allow them to engage more effectively
7. **Improve indicator framework design** – given the mis-match between the localized, targeted interventions and the macro, project-level indicators, place greater emphasis on drawing and stress testing the logical linkages between outputs and outcomes to ensure robust Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL), while making a strategic choice on how much to invest in quantifying outcomes (recognizing this is often difficult to do in DRG programming)

CONTENTS

- Executive Summaryi**
- Acronymsviii**
- 1. Project Context 1**
 - 1.1 Objectives of the PAD 1
 - 1.2 Additional context for the evaluation 2
- 2. Evaluation approach 3**
 - 2.1 Evaluation purpose..... 3
 - 2.2 Evaluation design 3
 - 2.3 Methodology..... 4
 - 2.4 Limitations to the evaluation 4
- 3. Evaluative findings 5**
 - 3.1 Relevance..... 5
 - 3.2 Effectiveness..... 10
 - 3.2.1 Externalities..... 11
 - 3.2.2 Flexibility and learning 12
 - 3.2.3 Approach and intervention design..... 12
 - 3.3 Outcomes..... 14
 - 3.4 Efficiency 18
 - 3.5 Sustainability 19
 - 3.6 Management.....21
 - 3.6.1 Contracting22
 - 3.6.2 Implementer selection and key personnel.....22
 - 3.6.3 Coordination..... 24
 - 3.6.4 Monitoring, evaluation and learning 25
- 4. Recommendations 27**
 - 4.1 Opportunities to expand DRG programming.....27
 - 4.1.1 Expand cross-sectoral programming (CSP).....27
 - 4.1.2 Strengthen alignment with agency-wide priorities.....27
 - 4.2 Scaling best practices..... 28
 - 4.2.1 Preserve flexibility and adaptability..... 28
 - 4.2.2 Design with sustainability in mind..... 29
 - 4.3 Address identified shortcomings29

4.3.1	Improve project coordination	29
4.3.2	Enhance USG coordination	30
4.3.3	Improve indicator framework design.....	30
5.	Annex 1: Mapping of DRG activity Interventions to results framework.....	32
6.	Annex 2: List of activities under evaluation	33
7.	Annex 3: Breakdown of interviews conducted by stakeholder group	35
8.	Annex 4: List of documents reviewed by the evaluation team	36

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Mapping of activities to the areas of the SA/DRG results framework they work to address..... 1

Figure 2: Secondary literature review of the need to address issues covered by bilateral programming.. 6

Figure 3: Secondary literature review of the need to address issues covered by regional programming ... 8

Figure 4: Mapping of DRG project activities to results framework 32

Figure 5: List of activities under evaluation within the USAID/SA DRG PAD..... 33

Figure 6: List of interviewees by stakeholder group 35

Figure 7: List of documents reviewed by the evaluation team 36

ACRONYMS

ARISA	Advancing Rights in Southern Africa
CCI	Centre for Communication Impact
CSV	Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CLA	Collaboration, Learning and Adaptation
CMM	USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation
CSP	Cross-Sectoral Programming
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DOAG	Development Objectives Assistance Agreement
DfID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DRG	Democracy, Rights and Governance
DRG/SA	Democracy, Rights and Governance / Southern Africa
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
FSN	Foreign Service National
FSVC	Financial Services Volunteer Corps
FY	Fiscal/Financial Year
GIZ	German International Development Agency (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)
GSP	Governance Support Program II
GBV	Gender Based Violence
HRSM	Human Rights Support Mechanism Consortium
ISSSASA	Increasing Services for Survivors of Sexual Assault in South Africa
ICOP	Improving Case Outcomes for Gender Based Violence Project
IIAG	Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance
ISP	Investment Support Program
JARSA	Justice and Rights in Southern Africa
KII	Key Informant Interview
LGBTI+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex and additional sexual orientation and gender identity groups
LOP	Life of Project
MDEA	Managing Democratic Elections in Africa
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
NDI	National Democratic Institute

NPA	National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa
P2P	People to People Dialogue Project
PAD	Project Appraisal Document (2016)
PDIA	Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation
PSE	Private Sector Engagement
PEPFAR	United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
RDOAG	Regional Development Objectives Agreement
RDCS	Regional Development Cooperation Strategy
RJIP	Regional Judicial Independence Project
RVOT	Regional Victims of Torture project
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAPPD	Southern Africa Political Parties and Dialogue Program
SOCA	Sexual Offences and Community Action Unit
TA	Technical Assistance
TAP/Trilats	Trilateral Assistance Program
TOC	Theory of Change
TCC	Thuthuzela Care Centers
TEC	Total Estimated Cost
ToR	Terms of Reference
ToC	Theory of Change
USG	United States Government
UNISA	University of South Africa
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/SA	United States Agency for International Development’s South Africa Mission
USAID/D.C.	USAID’s Washington D.C. Headquarters
QR	Quarterly Report
WHO	World Health Organization

I. PROJECT CONTEXT

I.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE PAD


The DRG project within the current PAD (approved in 2016²) consists of both regional and bilateral programming. With this, it targets both: (1) the Southern Africa Regional Development Cooperation Strategy’s (RDCS) objective of “Improved rule of law and respect for human rights,” along with (2) the South Africa Country Development Cooperation Strategy’s (CDCS) intermediate aim to strengthen “Democratic governance and accountability.”

The project draws on two approaches, ‘supply-side’ and ‘demand-side’ programming. Supply-side programming focuses on ensuring independent, accountable, and responsive institutions (including the judiciary, legislative and executive branches of government, political parties, and electoral commissions). Meanwhile, demand-side programming focuses on enhancing civil society and their ability to advocate for democracy, human rights, and improved governance.

The PAD incorporates a wide-ranging set of programming across the themes of justice, democracy, human rights, and governance. This includes a total of 10 active activities, in addition to 4 completed activities, all detailed in “Annex 2: List of activities under evaluation”.

The programming under the PAD has been multi-faceted. Each activity has a primary objective but often targets secondary impacts in other aspects of the results framework. As illustrated in Figure 1, 11 of 14 activities touch on elements of the results framework beyond their core objective. For example, the SAPPD activity primarily focuses on political party strengthening, but also works directly with civil society to incorporate youth and women’s groups into discussions around energy and water related issues.

Figure 1: Mapping of activities to the areas of the SA/DRG results framework they work to address



See Annex I:
Mapping of DRG
activity
Interventions to
results framework
for full-page

² Although the PAD was approved for a 5-year duration from 2016-2021, the project has activities extending beyond the life of the PAD. At the time of this evaluation, a process was underway to extend the PAD.

I.2 ADDITIONAL CONTEXT FOR THE EVALUATION

Several factors shape the activities taken on under the DRG PAD. Notably, funding flows and political context changes. This section will provide further context and outline how they informed the evaluation.

Funding flows increased significantly over the course of the PAD, which saw an expansion in activities. The PAD originally limited its focus to South Africa and non-presence countries (eSwatini and Lesotho). During the life of the PAD, geographic coverage expanded. With Angola shifting from a “Mission” to an “Office,” responsibility for DRG programming (including anti-corruption programming taking place there) shifted to the USAID/SA DRG team. SAPPD and Advancing Rights In Southern Africa (ARISA) further expanded coverage to include programming in Botswana, Malawi, and most recently Zambia. Regional programming often extends across SADC (e.g., the Regional Judicial Independence Project (RJIP) works with judges from across the region, and ARISA intends to expand across the region).³

Low levels of dedicated DRG team funding at certain times created budget uncertainty in the PAD. The project has received low levels of dedicated funding (in some years, zero, but, more recently, \$3 million in bilateral funding and \$3 million in regional funding per year, still short of the total cost of DRG programming in the project) The uncertainty around funding levels means the project cannot strategically plan from the outset, reducing its ability to shape a coherent set of activities.

The uncertain DRG budget has been bolstered by funds from other Offices and from global calls for proposal, but such sources impose ‘funding externalities’ on the project. Funds from beyond the DRG core budget bring with them additional priorities and objectives. For example, work such as the People to People Dialogue Project arose through a global call for proposals from the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM); given that the DRG team did not play a significant role in the design of the activity, there was limited room for the DRG team to ensure alignment with the priorities of the PAD (although it does happen to align). Cross-sectoral programming (CSP) funding in conjunction with other Offices also brings additional objectives – for example, SAPPD reflected both the political party strengthening objectives of DRG and the energy and water priorities of the Environment Office. This adds complexity to the project and influences the work that is undertaken.

As is expected with DRG programming, political externalities exert a strong impact on programming. As the evaluation will explore further, these can be positive (e.g., political alignment that creates an opening to advance a particular DRG issue), or negative (e.g., political changes or events that make it more difficult to program, or that create a need to adjust existing plans). The extent of these externalities is too great to list in full, however the most notable change since the inception of the PAD was a shift on the bilateral level in South Africa’s administration that created a markedly different political context within which to program.

It is important to stress that, given the presence of these externalities, the evaluation approach focused on “controllable responses.” That is to say, the evaluation team looked at the extent to which the DRG project effectively managed the effects of these externalities, rather than to draw negative conclusions as a result of factors that were outside of the project’s control.

³ ARISA will eventually program in 9 countries - Angola, Botswana, eSwatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia

2. EVALUATION APPROACH

2.1 EVALUATION PURPOSE

USAID/SA procured the services of the Investment Support Program (ISP) to conduct an evaluation of the DRG project. This evaluation serves as the PAD's planned, mid-term performance evaluation.

As such, it aims to provide USAID and its partners with an independent assessment of the project's performance, highlighting successes and areas for improvement that can be applied to further bilateral and regional programming around Democracy, Rights, and Governance. The primary focus of this evaluation is to identify mid-course corrective actions possible within the life of the PAD (recognizing that it is likely to be extended) and to inform future DRG PAD(s).

In line with the ToR, this performance evaluation is designed as a project-level evaluation, intending to surface common learnings and insights across the project rather than to evaluate each activity independently. This complements the MEL approach outlined in the PAD wherein performance evaluations will be considered for each activity with a budget larger than the median total estimated cost (TEC) in the project.

2.2 EVALUATION DESIGN

During the inception phase of the evaluation, the evaluation team, together with USAID stakeholders, agreed to conduct the evaluation against the following six themes:

- **Relevance:** The extent to which objectives and interventions reflect ecosystem challenges
- **Outcomes:** The extent to which interventions contribute to objectives in an inclusive manner
- **Effectiveness:** The extent to which strategies and approaches are well-suited to address priorities and contribute to outcomes
- **Efficiency:** The extent to which the approach used is a cost-effective way of achieving desired results
- **Sustainability:** The extent to which the benefits of interventions are likely to continue should donor funding be withdrawn
- **Management:** The extent to which funding mechanisms and contract structures contributed to success

The inception report provides a more detailed set of evaluative questions that the team explored to ensure a rounded evaluation of these themes. This report presents the findings by theme, rather than by evaluative question. The evaluation team recognizes the highly interdependent nature of many of these themes and draws out some of the more prevalent connections in the Executive Summary.

2.3 METHODOLOGY

In alignment with the ToR, the evaluation team took a qualitative approach, combining:

- Desk reviews of documents and data related to the PAD and
- A purposely sampled qualitative study focused on Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)

The evaluation team conducted **61** Key Informant Interviews (see Annex 3: Breakdown of interviews conducted by stakeholder group). Given the focus on identifying project-level learnings rather than evaluating specific activities, there was a heavy emphasis placed on engaging implementers. The evaluation team tested their perspectives through further interviews with beneficiaries and USG stakeholders (including both USAID and the State Department). The evaluation team also consulted ecosystem actors, although this group was small. Many of the implementers were academics, CSO representatives, and other actors with strong ecosystem perspectives.

Interviews were complemented by reviews of **79** documents from across the project. This included activity-level annual and quarterly reporting, impact evaluations, performance evaluations, the PAD itself, indicator data tables, and research produced by the project. The extensive amount of prior evaluative work conducted at activity-level significantly informed the findings of this evaluation.

2.4 LIMITATIONS TO THE EVALUATION

The evaluation team identified a series of limitations during the inception phase, including: lack of or restricted access to quantitative data; difficulty attributing successes to the DRG project based on activity-level output indicators; sampling bias; stakeholder unavailability; non-exhaustive intervention mapping; and in-country engagement from only a sub-set of countries (Angola, Botswana, South Africa, Malawi, and Zambia).

The inception report also outlined mitigations to these limitations. The evaluation team is confident these mitigations sufficiently address all limitations identified, with the exception of data insufficiencies. Insufficient quantitative data did present a more significant issue than originally anticipated, along with the lack of standardized indicator reporting and weaknesses in the indicator framework itself (to be outlined in the full report). This hindered the ability of the team to conduct a robust analysis of outcomes.

The evaluation, by design, was short in duration (taking place between early July and mid-August 2019) and focused on the project-level rather than individual activities. Therefore, it provides limited ability to draw activity-level conclusions.

3. EVALUATIVE FINDINGS

This report now presents its findings by evaluative theme. As mentioned above, some prevalent interconnections between these themes are treated in the Executive Summary.

3.1 RELEVANCE

Relevance reflects the extent to which activities are suited to the priorities of target groups, recipients, and donors. Against this definition, the evaluation team assessed whether the issues tackled by the project represent significant bilateral or regional democracy, rights, and governance challenges, and whether USAID was well placed to tackle these issues based on its historical programming, relationships, and comparative advantages. The evaluation team recognized that bilateral and regional activities serve different roles. Bilateral programming has wide flexibility to address the full set of locally-grounded challenges and issues. The relevance of regional programming hinges on its ability to add value in a manner distinct from that of the bilateral missions. For this reason, the evaluation team assessed relevance differently for each of the two types of programming.

The evaluation team found that by anchoring on violence and, in particular, gender-based violence, bilateral programming tackled one of the most significant rights and governance issues facing South Africa. In collaboration with government initiatives and through strong emphasis on learning, it has consistently tackled pressing GBV issues across different levels of government.

The regional activities, meanwhile, add unique value relative to the bilateral missions. This value reflected the distinct neutrality of the regional portfolio that enabled it to develop regional support networks across officials and to transplant best practices and approaches throughout the region, while also addressing issues that are inherently cross-border in nature.






3.1.1.1 *Bilateral activities*

To what extent has bilateral programming addressed relevant issues in South Africa?

A focus on safety and security, local service delivery, and the empowerment of civil society reflects key South African DRG issues. As one of Africa’s most advanced democracies South Africa performs relatively strongly on governance indicators, ranking 7th out of 54 in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). However, crucial gaps combined with negative trends in some areas mean DRG interventions have continued relevance. Secondary literature reviews show that the project is addressing significant needs in South Africa (see Figure 2). It is also notable that significant amounts of the project address issues of safety and security (particularly in the gender-based violence context), wherein South Africa scores well-below the average of low- and middle-income countries in the USAID Journey to Self-Reliance roadmap.⁴

⁴USAID, Journey to Self-Reliance Roadmap, 2019

Figure 2: Secondary literature review of the need to address issues covered by bilateral programming⁵

Issue	Relevance of issue in South Africa	Projects
 Preventing and responding to violence and GBV	<p>Violence and Gender Based Violence in South Africa is recognized as one of the countries most pressing issue on both prevention and support</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 40,035 rapes reported in 2017/ 2018 – with survey data suggesting the actual number could be 6-50 times higher¹ - More than a third of men in Gauteng admit to having raped a women¹ - SA scores 0 out of 100 on EIU’s prevalence of violent crime measure (alongside Somalia and Sudan)² <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increasing Services for Survivors of Sexual Assault in South Africa (ISSSASA) - Improving Case Outcomes for Gender Based Violence (ICOP) - Strengthening Local Governance to Improve GBV Response (SLV) - Victims of Torture (VoT)
 Connecting people to tackle xenophobia	<p>Xenophobic violence has gained increasing prominence in the past two decades,</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There have been reported 529 cases of xenophobia in SA - resulting in 309 deaths, 901 physical assaults, 2193 shops looted, and over 100,000 people displaced³ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation Activities (CMRA)
 Strengthening local service delivery	<p>Local service delivery has had multiple challenges – reflected in high levels of failure to pass financial and service performance audits</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Only 6% of municipalities received a clean audit of financial and performance reports in 2017/ 2018⁴ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ISSSASA - ICOP - SLV - Governance Support Programme 2 (GSP2)
 Strengthening grassroots civil society	<p>Civil society is well recognized as a key component of a vibrant democracy, but has increasing sustainability risks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The financial viability of South African CSOs has decreased by 14% over the past 8 years⁵ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promoting Civic Education and Participation in SA (PCEP) - VOT - SLV
 Increasing citizen participation in democracy	<p>Voter turnout and citizen engagement is extremely low – in turn weakening oversight and accountability of government</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Just 65% of registered voters voted in the 2019 elections; and just 75% of eligible voters registered⁶ - 84% of the population have never approached a government agency to share views or about a serious problem⁶ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PCEP

Source: [1] Africa Check, Guide to Rape Statistics in South Africa, 2019; [2] 2018 Ibrahim Index of African Governance; [3] Xenowatch, 2019; [4] Mailovich, Only 18 municipalities got clean audits in 2017/2018, 2019; [5] USAID, CSO Sustainability Index, 2019; [6] Africacheck, Quick read: South Africa’s 2019 election in numbers, 2019

To what extent have interventions evolved to address relevant issues?

Gender-based violence (GBV) programming, which accounts for a large portion of current and historical bilateral work, has systematically integrated lessons from previous work to ensure relevance. Together GBV based programming accounts for ~80% of overall bilateral past and present spending.⁶ One of the defining features of this work has been the systematic approach USAID has taken to build off learnings and evidence from earlier programming to refocus future iterations. Pilot programs and the expansion of promising approaches in existing initiatives have contributed to important improvements in outcomes. For example, the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa (NPA)

⁵ The evaluation team included the Victims of Torture project in the bilateral literature review, based on the fact that the overwhelming majority of programming occurs in South Africa. It is noteworthy this reflects a positive integration of both the regional and bilateral aspects of the PAD, where South Africa as a destination country is able to respond to issues arising in other countries in the region

⁶ Calculation based on the TEC of the five ongoing bilateral activities and ISSSASA

attributes a significant increase in rape prosecutions to the specialized post sexual offence support centers supported by USAID programming, i.e., Thuthuzela Care Centers (TCCs). Still, there is a need for significant investment to meet the sheer scale of the challenge.

For example, in an early GBV activity, USAID partnered with the NPA to provide funding and support to establish and refurbish TCCs between approximately 2005 and 2010. When it was learned that poor awareness of TCCs was limiting uptake in the first iteration, a second round of work incorporated a strong focus on community awareness building (ISSSASA).

In the latest iteration of programming, Strengthening Local Governance to Improve GBV Response, findings from ISSSASA informed an even deeper focus and engagement with communities and engendered a much more multi-faceted role for USAID. Programming is directed toward the shaping of social norms and accountability around GBV while, at the same time, efforts are being made to improve the response to sexual offences by the health and justice system. This deeper focus on prevention (as opposed to just response) is recognized by leading actors as addressing a crucial gap in GBV efforts and further underscores its relevance.⁷

This focus on using an evidence base from historical programming has also shaped non-GBV activities. The Civic Education activity built off the work of Justice as a Right in Southern Africa (JARSA). JARSA's small-scale work on CSO strengthening was part of a wider activity, but it uncovered the ultimate need for the Civic Education activity. Similarly, the approach and the specific issues in the P2P dialogues activity were heavily shaped by the MEL work from a previous xenophobia activity. Learnings on the extent to which xenophobia issues were localized were embedded into the P2P dialogue activity and informed a highly targeted approach and a careful selection of which communities to engage and how to engage them. In each case, interviews highlighted the relevance of the activity's engagement.

3.1.1.2 Regional activities






As outlined at the beginning of the Relevance section, the evaluation team considered that the relevance of regional programming and the regional missions hinges not just on addressing relevant challenges, but in doing so in a manner that adds distinct value compared to the bilateral missions.

To what extent is regional programming addressing a relevant set of challenges?

Regional programming is addressing pressing constraints to functioning democracies. Although Southern Africa scores relatively strongly on the IIAG (with an average score of 57 out of 100, reflecting the highest regional score in Africa), this masks a range of relevant problem areas. There is significant variation in government performances across the region (e.g., Angola, Madagascar, and eSwatini are amongst the bottom half of performers on the continent), and even countries with stronger performance have significant room for improvement across key issues. Figure 3 reflects a review of literature on the relevance of issues currently address through the regional activities.

⁷ Gender Justice, National Strategic Plan Gender Based Violence Shadow Framework, 2017

Figure 3: Secondary literature review of the need to address issues covered by regional programming

Issue	Relevance of issue in South Africa	Projects
 Strengthening judiciaries in the region	<p>With a few exceptions, SADC countries score average or lower on judicial independence metrics – with declines in some notable former strong performers</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 6 of the 16 countries score at 0 or 1 out of a possible 4 in a measure of judges’ autonomy to interpret and review the law independently - Regional Judicial Independence Program
 Improving political party capacity	<p>SADC’s political party landscape is relatively uncompetitive, and has been for the past decade</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A measure capturing the freedom and competitiveness of political parties presents significant room for improvement with backsliding in the likes of Zambia and Lesotho - Southern African Political Parties Dialogue
 Increasing executive oversight	<p>Historically mixed oversight capabilities have seen a strong positive trend among previous poor performers – providing opportunity to build on and continue to strengthen</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - An indicator measuring the effectiveness of executive oversight saw historically low eSwatini and Angola improve by 6 and 8 percentage points respectively between 2008 and 2017 – providing momentum for further oversight strengthening work - Strengthening Anti Corruption Efforts and Procedures in Southern Africa
 Strengthening election administration	<p>There is a wide range in the capabilities of election monitoring agencies across the region – which underpins the potential for shared learnings across countries</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - An indicator measuring the autonomy and capacity of election monitoring agencies shows a wide range – with SA scoring above 90% on the one hand and 8 SADC countries scoring below 50% on the other - Regional Elections Training
 Advancing rights in Southern Africa	<p>There have been significant decreases in media freedoms, which, coupled with poor protection of civil rights in a number of countries emphasizes the potential for rights based programming in the region</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 11 of SADC’s 16 countries saw deterioration in freedom of speech between 2008 and 2017 - 8 of SADC’s 16 countries score 25% or less on an indicator measuring the protection of ethnic minorities from discrimination - Advancing Rights in Southern Africa (ARISA)

Source: For all datapoints 2018 Ibrahim Index of African Governance

Does regional programming add distinct value from the value bilateral missions can add?

Regional programming mechanisms proved relevant in adding distinct value versus the bilateral missions. Approximately 89% of interviewees with a perspective on the topic recognized that regional programming offered a unique value proposition⁸. Five distinct theoretical value-adds emerged during interviews, with the regional project drawing successfully on four of these in practice:

- Regional programming often benefits from greater neutrality when engaging on sensitive issues that bilateral missions may find politically difficult to address**
 RJIP, for example, outlined how their position as a distant and neutral party bolstered their ability to offer training and support to judges, who perceived the activity as protected from potentially negative national-level influence. The regional elections training team at UNISA identified similar benefits, while SAPPD implementers noted that the regional nature of the activity enabled them to convene a breadth of political parties. Similarly, ARISA beneficiaries

⁸ 89% of non-implementers recognized the strong value of regional programming, while 89% of overall respondents (including implementers) also recognized its value

highlighted the activity's ability to mobilize an array of actors with different viewpoints by virtue of its perceived neutrality.

2. Transplanting skills, approaches, and learnings

A defining feature of Southern Africa is the wide range of performance results exhibited by different countries on DRG indicators. This dynamic creates opportunities to export learnings and approaches across borders. This can occur through formalized trainings (e.g., those performed by RJIP and the Managing Democratic Elections in Africa (MDEA) activity). Linking civil society to share learnings also supports ARISA's broader mission. Such learnings help enhance the 'ripple effect' created by the landmark accomplishments of more amenable countries.

3. Developing cross-regional networks

Building off the shared approaches and learnings, regional programming can enable strong, informal, cross-border support and education networks. In both the Regional Elections Training and Regional Judicial Independence Project, implementers specified these networks as among the most important and enduring outcomes of their work. Informal WhatsApp groups serve as support and knowledge sharing platforms and, reportedly, are still highly active 2-3 years after initial activities. These networks often compound the ability to export the learnings and approaches referred to above.

4. Addressing issues that are inherently cross-border in nature

Some issues in the DRG space can require trans-national solutions. For example, activities such as Regional Victims of Torture and the People to People Dialogues activity recognize that, due to migration, issues that arise in one country often need to be addressed in another. This also draws out the intersection of the bilateral and regional PADs, where a regional issue can be addressed in a South African context. Furthermore, issues such as energy and water rights often have a transnational nature. For example, when water sources originate from various countries, no single country can resolve the pollution issues alone.

5. Working directly with regional bodies such as SADC (although, at present, this approach is not a major feature of the project)

There was the benefit identified of regional institutions being able to interface with a 'single face' rather than engaging with multiple bilateral missions. This is a role that the regional Mission is uniquely placed to undertake. That said, this project had low levels of engagement with SADC, although it has worked with other regional bodies (e.g., the Southern African Chief Justice Forum). Some stakeholders supported this limited level of engagement with SADC, recognizing the relatively slow nature of progress they perceive it possible to make relative to other approaches. This in part reflects the political nature of SADC's work, but is not to say there are not instances where SADC could be a logical partner for the project or its activities.

Programming generally reflected the comparative advantage of the regional Mission, but differing contexts made these advantages more or less valuable. For example, The Angolan bilateral Mission noted that the government was amenable to engaging with bilateral partners USAID/Angola on anti-corruption issues, suggesting the work did not necessitate the neutrality offered by the regional Mission and that the importance of such neutrality may depend on the context. Where there is strong local momentum, the regional benefits of neutrality could be less relevant. Given that Angola reflected an isolated example, with a unique context (with the limited DRG capacity in-country, there are other advantages to managing the activities from Pretoria), it is difficult to identify a wider pattern but does illustrate that the regional value add should be tested for each specific activity and is not a given.

3.2 EFFECTIVENESS

To assess effectiveness, the evaluation team set out to explore a range of factors that could have helped or hindered a relevant set of activities in delivering results – three broad themes emerge.

1. **Externalities:** In line with the externalities such as outside funding sources and changing political contexts (as outlined in Project Context, Section I), the evaluation team first sought to understand and assess the appropriateness of responses to these dynamics.
2. **Flexibility and learning:** During the inception, USAID identified the significance of flexibility as a feature of the project. This led the evaluation team to explore the role this played and test whether the level of flexibility exhibited was optimal.
3. **Approach and intervention design:** Finally, this theme explored the approaches used from a technical perspective and reviewed their appropriateness.

While political **externalities** have caused isolated challenges (largely to be expected in DRG programming), on the whole, they have been well managed. The project has innovatively handled funding externalities. This has contributed to its relevance while enabling a greater volume of resources to be mobilized in a manner that advances the objectives of both DRG and other Offices in the Mission. Furthermore, the DRG team has been sensitive to political externalities, although there are cases where implementers have not fully considered such dynamics (resulting in some activities that were not optimally timed).

A focus on **flexibility and learning** has been key to effectively maneuvering around externalities. The deliberate allowance for flexibility in setting clear goals with flexibility on tactics has permitted implementers to shape work-planning, shift programming to local contexts, and increase stakeholder buy-in. A significant emphasis on learning has ensured that flexibility is rooted in an evidence-based rationale (helping ensure focus), with a strong emphasis placed on Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). This has, in turn, enabled further learning and adaptiveness.

Positive aspects emerged in the **approaches** used, which generally have been well-suited to the challenges at hand, although there are opportunities to scale up these learnings and deploy leading approaches more consistently across the project. Three distinct features emerge in this regard:

- **Depth vs. breadth:** The depth of programming undertaken by regional activities was generally a strong enabler of their work's success. Activities typically maintained a narrow focus involving deep engagement with key governmental, judicial and political institutions. Meanwhile, risks were identified where earlier stage regional programming took a broader and shallower approach.
- **Supply and demand:** The combination of supply-side and demand-side approaches to address a single issue generally enhanced effectiveness. Stakeholders noted the benefits of a civil society 'push' coinciding with capacity building to enable institutions to respond. Some activities did not pursue this two-pronged approach. This was, in part, a strategic decision by USAID (for example, to focus finite resources on a specific approach that will deliver greater return on investment, or to focus implementing partners on types of work they are best placed to deliver), but stakeholders did, at times, identify opportunities to expand into complementary areas.
- **Vertical coherence:** Finally, maintaining coherence between both local and national efforts was seen as an enabler of effectiveness. The use of relationships with national-level institutions helped ensure local-level changes feed into a national-level change agenda.

3.2.1 EXTERNALITIES

To what extent did ‘funding externalities’ help or hinder the effectiveness of the project?

The uncertainty and diversity of funding sources have shaped the project, with both USAID and implementing partners noting the added complexities of working within this context. As outlined in project context, most of the 14 activities in the project drew on funds outside of dedicated DRG Office funding. They did so either through cross-sectoral funding intended to advance both DRG objectives and those of other parts of USAID, or through USAID/D.C. (Washington D.C. Headquarters driven global calls for proposals. These dynamics have caused some challenges. For example, indicators attached to PEPFAR funding are often heavily output-focused (prioritizing a wide reach) and are not necessarily aligned with the depth of engagement required from DRG work (which can appear expensive per person reached). Similarly, implementers acknowledged encountering some additional complexity in needing to engage with both USAID/D.C teams and the regional Mission on USAID/D.C conceptualized activities (although management solutions from the DRG team mitigated this significantly). More broadly, the unpredictable, short term funding flows constrained the ability of the team to formulate long term strategies.

On balance, despite some operational challenges, the utilization of wider sources of funding produced broadly positive effects. It enabled more DRG work to take place than would have been directly funded, while also furthering objectives of other parts of USAID. For example, the infusion of energy and water issues into SAPPD was generally positive. Stakeholders noted these to be highly relevant issues, and this ultimately enabled more effective political party strengthening and furthered the objectives of the Environment Office. Similarly, despite challenges to the mobilization of USAID/D.C managed activities, both the Victims of Torture Project and the People to People Dialogues have proven relevant and delivered positive outcomes. Ultimately, the outcomes of these activities would not have been achieved without the use of funding beyond that available in the core DRG budget.

To what extent did political externalities help or hinder the effectiveness of the project?

DRG work often benefits from political will and momentum. Although there are times when donors may intentionally pursue topics critical of relevant stakeholders,⁹ the long-term sustainability of much of this work hinges on buy-in from local actors. Interviews and USAID’s Global DRG Strategy both emphasize the importance of local leadership buy-in in ensuring that the technical support offered by USAID gains traction.¹⁰ Political dynamics are ever evolving, and effectively managing them requires adaptability to the fluctuations in political appetite and will.

The DRG team’s careful consideration of political will helped them successfully build upon existing relationships and secure early buy-in. USAID cultivated a strong set of relationships (as commended in implementer conversations) and shaped activity designs to cater to the political dynamics and level of appetite present in the system at the time. Government programming has been strongly demand-driven, e.g., the Angola anti-corruption work originated at the time of a wider domestic drive to eliminate corruption. Similarly, ISSSASA was built upon a strong relationship with NPA’s Sexual Offences and Community Affairs (SOCA) unit. The attention paid to buy-in has been positive, although there may

⁹ The evaluation team cannot assess the effectiveness of such an approach given the absence of a counterfactual to the current approach in the project.

¹⁰ see e.g. USAID Strategy on Democracy, Rights, and Governance, 2013

be opportunities for USAID to consider the strategic choice of engaging on critical topics where there is not sufficient local openness.

Although macro-level political will and buy-in was well managed, successes managing political cycles and events were more mixed. This notably manifested in the case of election cycles, with SAPPD stakeholders often noting that elements of training topics were poorly timed given upcoming elections in both Malawi and Botswana. The DRG team designed the activity at a sufficiently high-level to allow implementers to adjust programming to these cycles, although in both cases beneficiaries noted challenges where activities had not been fully aligned with external political dynamics. This was in part given that learnings emerged during the project itself, although these learnings were not always fully translated from one country to another.

3.2.2 FLEXIBILITY AND LEARNING

To what extent did the flexibility of the activity help or hinder effectiveness?

An emphasis on balancing flexible activity design, setting clear high-level priorities with openness on tactics, underpins DRG programming and its ability to manage externalities. Implementers and bilaterals noted that the clear goals set by the DRG team ensure that the activities retain their original purpose. At the same time, the DRG team was not overly prescriptive on how goals are achieved. This provided space for implementers and bilaterals to shape the details of programming responsive to contextual realities, but based on technical expertise.

Repeatedly, implementers commented on their ability to shape programming in the face of learnings, which provided nuanced understanding of contextual issues. Within the Civic Education activity, programming shifted to take on more basic capacity-development tasks, reflecting a lower level of baseline CSO capacity than anticipated. Similarly, in the case of People to People Dialogues, although the design involved a standard four-dialogue process, additional dialogues were added as necessary to fully address issues that emerged during the sessions. This has been a significant contributor to managing around political externalities and ‘on-the-ground’ dynamics that were unknown to implementers until engagement began.

The space and time devoted to developing trust with relevant stakeholders complemented programming flexibility, and informed knowledge of on the ground context. Activities often embedded trust development into the design of interventions, whether in the form of a baselining phase, community engagement, or research. The insights gained from this consistently informed the tactics of the intervention, reflecting efforts to embed PDIA. Without a relative allowance for flexibility, implementers would, likely, not have been able to execute this level of responsiveness. This was enabled in many cases by both deliberate design and proposal selection decisions that recognized the need for this early phase of work, combined with a willingness for both the implementing partner and USAID to engage openly on the need for PDIA as new learnings and insights emerged in the process.

3.2.3 APPROACH AND INTERVENTION DESIGN

To what extent has the project optimized the balance between breadth/reach and depth of engagement?

Focused and deep engagement with specific institutions has improved the overall effectiveness of the regional project. Regional programming has worked in a focused way to

capacitate key institutions e.g., parliament, electoral bodies, and judiciaries. These deeper levels of engagement have been well received by stakeholders in their ability to advance material outcomes.

Conversely, stakeholders challenged the value of regional programming that brings a lighter-touch approach. DRG problems typically require deep, sustained, and focused engagement. Generally, the project has avoided light-touch work of this nature, but there are risks that regional programming could suffer from its broad remit. Where programming takes a relatively narrow and light-touch approach, it may deliver short-term outcomes but fail to address a number of wider systemic challenges to deliver a long-term sustained change. For example, although ARISA completed promising work around media freedom, actors who received support identified challenges to the sustainability of such solutions and the need for a more holistic intervention. The specific intervention in this case was a necessary but insufficient response to the problem. Training of journalists would deliver short-term benefits, but stakeholders noted that the wider challenges to press freedom, including the commercial structure of media in the country, were likely to limit the likelihood of such changes sustaining beyond the LOP. It is therefore crucial to either consider how the various parts of the intervention come together to provide a more systemic solution and response, or to ensure other actors are actively addressing the other aspects required to provide a sufficient solution.

What role have supply and demand approaches played in optimally addressing these issues?

The PAD orients around both supply-side and demand-side approaches and there are signs that activities are more effective when they combine both approaches on a single issue, bringing a holistic solution to address challenges. The majority of activities have taken a deliberate supply and demand approach to challenges. For example, ICOP, ISSSASA, anti-corruption work, and local governance work, all include elements of holistic supply and demand programming. This two-pronged approach has value. South African government stakeholders commented on the efficacy of increased social accountability coupled with targeted capacity-development assistance in driving results. Similarly, shared public financial management trainings in Angola and eSwatini have improved parliament and civil society dialogue on oversight. More broadly, the emphasis on strong civil society and community engagement, both as a tool to increase government accountability (as described above) and as a behavior change tool in GBV, is well recognized and supported in literature.¹¹

To what extent has vertical coherence (working at both national and local levels) enabled more effective programming?

Programming at the local level is more relevant when vertically integrated, i.e., it connects with and complements national-level efforts. Literature highlights that programming undertaken only at the local level (e.g., in a sub-set of municipalities), even when combined with supply-side and demand-side approaches, encounters systemic challenges that undermine relevance.¹² Broader national challenges often ground local issues. For example, national sentiment and education system design can inform community norms on gender roles. Similarly, municipal governance is shaped by the strength of national auditor accountability mechanisms.¹³ Local-level programming therefore risks insufficiency if it fails to align with and complement national programming.

¹¹ *Accountability*: Muchadenyika, Civil society, social accountability and service delivery in Zimbabwe, 2017; McNeil & Mumvuma, *Demanding Good Governance: A Stocktaking of Social Accountability Initiatives by Civil Society in Anglophone Africa*, 2006. *GBV behavior change*: WHO, *Changing cultural and social norms that support violence*, 2009; Care, *Approach to Social Norms Change* 2019

¹² Fox, *Scaling accountability through vertically integrated civil society policy monitoring and advocacy*, 2016

¹³ Auditor General South Africa press release, Auditor-general flags lack of accountability as the major cause of

Furthermore, national-level relationships and connectivity are crucial enablers in scaling local successes. A global review of social accountability programming found that even where there was robust evidence of impact at the local level, scaling it has been a challenge.¹⁴ Situating local programming within the role of existing institutional infrastructure (as GBV programming did with the National Prosecuting Authority) allows for more effective replication of successes and presents national bodies with an opportunity to scale.¹⁵

There have been positive examples of vertical integration in parts of the project. Historical GBV programming was undertaken in partnership with government initiatives and leading domestic GBV actors. In so doing, it sought to tackle local issues (e.g., capacity building for local sexual offence courts) while connecting with national systemic interventions (e.g., developing a national M&E framework for sexual offence courts). Similarly, the Governance Support Program is tasked with improving the efficacy of the performance management systems at the local level to improve the oversight capability of the National Public Accounts committee.

Despite strengths in parts of the project, there is opportunity to embed vertical links more deliberately into programming. Several bilateral activities, which, given the sphere of bilateral programming, have the opportunity to be more holistic than regional programming, do not have these vertical links. For example, the Civic Education work focuses strongly on local CSO strengthening, but could consider creating institutional spaces for CSO participation as part of national-level infrastructure. Although it may have been a strategic decision to focus on local-level CSO strengthening, implementers noted opportunities to deliberately consider incorporating complementary interventions.

3.3 OUTCOMES

To assess outcomes, the evaluation team set out to understand the extent to which the project had successfully delivered outputs and how these outputs ultimately translated into outcomes. In line with the intention of the PAD, the team primarily looked at improved capacity for accountability, transparency, and rule of law. Where possible, it also considered the tangible advances in DRG issues created through this capacity. In addition, it reviewed the inclusiveness of the outcomes delivered. Specifically, it considered the incorporation of vulnerable populations (e.g., women, youth, LGBTI+, and indigenous populations) in efforts both directly and as considerations to strengthen capacity building.

To date, the DRG project has performed well. That said, the ability to clearly see this strong performance is hindered at project-level by i) a bias towards output-oriented reporting at the activity-level, and ii) weak articulation of the link between outputs and outcomes (which would provide confidence that the outputs would indeed drive the intended outcomes). As such, indicator data largely reflects whether interventions were delivered in alignment with workplans but provides limited insights as to whether the interventions delivered activity-level or project-level outcomes.

In terms of the overall performance, as expected with DRG-sector programming the project faced externalities. These impacted outcomes but were solved for to varying degrees. In line with the evaluation approach, the evaluation team avoided criticizing the project for factors beyond its control, but instead looked at the extent to which the project effectively maneuvered around these challenges and mitigated their effect on programming. Against this, 10 activities either did not experience significant contextual

poor local government audit results, 2019

¹⁴ Fox, Scaling accountability through vertically integrated civil society policy monitoring and advocacy, 2016

¹⁵See e.g. UNDESA, Overview of institutional arrangements for implementing the 2030 Agenda at national level, 2016

challenges or effectively managed around them, and are either performing strongly or in a strong set-up phase. However, of these, four identify potential risks to future programming. A further three activities are currently (or have previously) encountered challenges, that have or likely will affect their ability to deliver strong outcomes.

Overall, numerous positive examples of outcomes were cited to the evaluation team including, among other things, local-level changes in community attitudes towards migrants and the increased capability of judges to write quality judgements. Moreover, the nature of the outcomes delivered were notably inclusive. Where possible, activities employed an equitable approach that directly incorporated vulnerable communities, e.g., through the direct provision of psychosocial support to victims of torture or through the incorporation of women and youth movements into political party strengthening work. In other activities, issues relevant to vulnerable communities were incorporated into wider capacity building efforts, e.g., by addressing indigenous rights through media training in ARISA or by educating judges around LGBTI+ issues.

Factors influencing the assessment of project performance

As outlined further in Management (Section 3.6), indicator design suffered from a number of shortcomings that influenced the ability to clearly evaluate the project's outcomes. Although the "Outcomes" evaluative theme does not set out to conduct a full assessment of the indicator framework itself, this section will highlight the key issues that hindered the team's ability to assess outcomes sufficiently.

At activity-level, indicators focus mainly on outputs with very few outcome indicators. Across the project, there is often weak articulation of the degree to which these outputs fed outcomes. This limited the ability of the evaluation team to quantitatively assess performance. Furthermore, the difficulty sourcing disaggregated target data (broken down by year, and at times LOP targets) hindered the ability to identify whether implementers in all 14 activity cases were on track to meet targeted outcomes.

The ability to aggregate a view of performance at the project level is weakened by the lack of articulated causal linkages between activity-level outputs and project-level outcomes. Implementers often had limited awareness of the project-level indicator framework. Furthermore, the framework often used macro-level global indices such as the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) and the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), amongst others. Changes in these high-level indicators are often challenging to attribute to USAID work. This is particularly true given that interventions often drove localized and targeted changes which would not directly feed into such indices.

Externalities have also impacted the performance of the project, in turn, weakening the ability to rely on a purely quantitative analysis. As outlined in Project Context (Section I), this is to be expected of DRG programming, but, in line with the evaluation approach, there may be aspects of quantitative non-performance that are justifiable, i.e., wherein externalities beyond the control of the project hindered performance, despite good DRG and implementer management.

In light of contextual factors, to what extent did the DRG project perform well – as evidenced across various pieces of available data?

Reflecting on various data sources, including quantitative output and outcome data, qualitative assessments and interviews, 10 out of 13¹⁶ activities are generally performing well. This is inclusive of interventions where no concerns arose, or where concerns did not have material effect on performance. Performing well in this instance reflects a balance of positive feedback from stakeholders on performance and that the activity is either hitting – or close to hitting - output goals or, alternatively, has managed unexpected externalities effectively.

Within this set, several activities adapted effectively to on the ground contextualities. The Strengthening Local Governance Responses to GBV, for example, redefined its MEL framework to better reflect on the ground needs. Similarly, the Civic Education and Participation activity shifted approach upon realization that beneficiary CSOs were at a different level of capacity than originally anticipated. A failure to mitigate the need for additional support could have weakened the activities' ability to implement successfully. Both activities adapted in the face of new challenges – reflecting broader USAID best practice in Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA).

Strong performance should not be counted on given the risks inherent in DRG programming, with specific risks being elevated in four of the ten activities currently performing well:

- **GSP II has thus far delivered a strong performance, however the lack of political buy-in from municipal beneficiaries presents a risk to sustained impact.** The prior assessment conducted by Department for International Development (DfID) on the activity noted poor engagement and low/inconsistent attendance from municipal leadership at trainings as a recurring challenge to the activity. Though the activity has not missed targets yet, the difficulties in fostering buy-in could risk the impact of capacity development programming in future. Should these risks manifest, the activity may find itself unable to implement successfully or translate individual capacity building interventions into sustainable and impactful institutional capacity.
- **ARISA's broad mandate across multiple countries will need coordination and discipline to ensure traction on issues.** Though it is noted that the activity is in an early stage, there is a risk that the activity's breadth could dilute its impact. Specifically, ARISA's ability to make tangible impact in its four chosen rights areas, namely, women's customary land rights, indigenous rights, media freedom, and the protection of human rights defenders, will require significant focused efforts and resources. Considering the activity currently aims to operate with four implementers in nine countries across the SADC region, there is considerable need to align and be disciplined in order to ensure outcomes are yielded.
- **ICOP has sufficiently delivered support to court systems but low engagement from government may undermine policy aims.** The activity notes having drafted an M&E framework for sexual offences courts' GBV response that has gained limited traction with relevant personnel in the Department of Justice. Continued lack of traction will undermine the activity's more systemic efforts to improve the efficacy of sexual offences courts.

¹⁶ Excluding the 14th DRG activity – Labor Support Program in eSwatini – where no reporting data was available to feed into this assessment.

- **The Strengthening Anti-Corruption activity has made significant in-roads in Angola, but stakeholder buy-in in eSwatini risks overall impact.** The activity has made strides in Angola, securing commitments to increased budgetary transparency from the Ministry of Finance. While eSwatini has made some progress – e.g. the Minister of Finance shared a citizen’s budget. However, relatively less engagement and traction with parliament suggests a risk to longer term impact in the country.

Finally, there are two activities that have faced challenges in performance. Although issues arose and performance is not as anticipated, these activities appear to be well managed and despite challenges continue to move towards positive outcomes. They are outlined in further detail below:

- **Regional Victims of Torture (RVOT), despite having performed well on some output indicators, still faces top-level challenges that threaten ongoing programming.** The activity has faced significant challenges sourcing suitably trained clinicians to implement its psychosocial support interventions. Outside of these interventions, RVOT continued programming by front-ending outreach efforts that do not require clinicians, however, on current progress it appears unlikely that targets for psychosocial support will be hit.
- **SAPPD has begun programming after various delays, these may spillover to affect the ability to achieve overall activity outcomes.** A number of internal and external challenges occurred in the first year of programming. Challenges contributing to this included i) requirements to replace Country Directors in Malawi and Botswana, which necessitated downtime from programming, ii) delays in securing per-country registration and conducting validation workshops in Botswana, eSwatini, and Zambia, which pushed back programming, and iii) challenges with the financial management of subgrantees and with accountability systems that requiring intervention and mitigation of damages by DW. These challenges have put significant delays on programming and meant the activity just launched interventions as late as July 2019 in some countries – too late to meet its YI targets. Despite this, the activity has shown a commitment to mitigation and has consulted DRG management to co-create mitigation approaches.

The evaluation team also noted that ISSASA performed well generally against indicators, although some challenges were identified during an impact evaluation with the results of community awareness work. With regards to awareness raising activities it found no significant differences in awareness across treatment and control groups. That said, the approach to the impact evaluation was to test community dialogues in isolation, while the implementers and the original USAID design emphasized the importance of a holistic set of interventions to advance community awareness. As such, it is difficult to conclude the extent of these issues, although these learnings were incorporated into future programming – specifically Strengthening Local Governance to Improve GBV Response activity, which incorporates a holistic solution to the challenge.

To what extent did the activities deliver outcomes?

Qualitative evidence supports the view that the DRG project is delivering positive outcomes on a targeted and localized scale. Numerous examples of outcomes the programs had yielded were provided. These were predominately localized and targeted but highly impactful, in line with the nature of the interventions. For example:

- Two **RJIP** respondents reported improvement in “quality and consistency”¹⁷ of jurisprudence – noting that 2/3 of judgements were shaped by the content of the training provided through the activity
- In Malawi, **SAPPD** was commended for its “train the trainer” approach, which yielded improvement in the effectiveness of 22,000 poll monitors in one political party. This was notably helpful to parties in preparation for Malawi’s May 2019 democratic elections
- In **People-to-People Dialogues**, ALPS workshop facilitators noted positive differences between pre- and post-workshop perceptions of foreign nations by locals who began the workshops with highly negative sentiments and concluding with more trusting attitudes
- In **Local Responses to GBV**, efforts to provide support to existing GBV response partners so as to decrease GBV prevalence and increase stage-to-stage support through a network of “safe hands” is now more capacitated and contextually relevant. The network, named “Masiphephe,” has grown as a forum for locally-based, customized sets of primary and secondary respondents to GBV and now includes various NGOs, local political leaders, and faith-based organizations.

To what extent did the project deliver outcomes in an equitable and inclusive manner?

Across the project, a concerted effort towards inclusion was evident. This was evident both in direct and indirect attempts to incorporate vulnerable groups.

Strong examples of direct inclusion of vulnerable populations exist. This is natural in some activities, such as the Victims of Torture and ISSSASA where ‘response’ work requires working closely and directly with victims. There were also examples where steps had been taken to incorporate vulnerable groups into longer-term capacity development work. For example, in SAPPD youth and women’s groups were directly incorporated into policy dialogues.

Additionally, there were noted examples wherein activities indirectly incorporated the perspectives of vulnerable populations. This was natural across the project given that many of the activities involved better equipping institutions to serve their needs. In one strong example, issues such as those affecting the LGBTI+ population were incorporated into RJIP programming to provide practical knowledge on how to approach these issues in court. Similarly, ARISA placed a strong emphasis on the rights of disadvantaged groups and, for example, educated the media about how they could better represent indigenous rights issues.

3.4 EFFICIENCY

To assess efficiency, the evaluation team sought to understand whether the project had worked in the most cost-effective manner – i.e., would have been unable to deliver the same level of outcomes with fewer resources.

With this, the evaluation team noted that the uncertainty of funding flows (as outlined in Section I, Project Context) limits the scope for efficiencies in the DRG project. Because project design cannot be planned

¹⁷ Interview with RJIP in-country coordinator

fully from the start of the PAD its ability to consider extensive synergies such as merging activities (which would reduce management overhead and effort) is reduced. That said, even had it been possible to design in this way, it does not appear desirable to do so. The potential for efficiency through consolidation may not have outweighed the potential loss of focus and effectiveness provided by specialized implementers (the benefits of which are highlighted in Section 3.6.2). Such implementers often bring their own proprietary tools and approaches and, thus, likely deliver greater outcomes, albeit with higher management overhead (associated with managing a large number of implementers and activities) for USAID.

To what extent is the project structured and delivered in an efficient manner?

Much of the complexity associated with the project stems from a high number of individual agreements and associated implementers. This in turn leads to greater management complexity for USAID associated with activity design, acquisition and assistance, reporting, and the ongoing management of implementers.

Funding flows have limited the extent to which the project can realize efficiencies. Potential efficiencies could be realized through either consolidation of the project (reducing management overhead), or through closer alignment between parts of the project (e.g., having implementers work on common initiatives or at shared sites). That said, as outlined in Section I (Project Context), funding flows were often uncertain and therefore it was not possible to plan the PAD up front as a series of known activities. As one implementer noted, “Our timeframe is so tight, it is very hard to do things like common site selection. All awards start at different times.”

Evidence suggests even had it been possible to consolidate the project further, this would not have been desirable, and could have deteriorated the ability to drive outcomes. Rather than enabling the project through one or a small number of larger contracts and implementers, the project has drawn on a range of predominately local partners, each bringing expertise in their own areas. As outlined in Section 3.6 (Management), the use of a number of smaller mechanisms to bring in specialized implementers added value that likely outweighs any potential synergies through consolidation.

There are areas of the project where bright spots exist with regards to efficiencies. Implementers noted the benefits of using academic institutions to conduct research and training, as was the case in both RJIP and the Improving Case Outcomes for Gender Based Violence Project (ICOP) which were implemented through institutions at the University of Cape Town. In such cases, the activities benefit from access to quality teachers and researchers and existing university management structures, whereas commercial implementing partners would likely need to source expertise and create management processes from scratch.

3.5 SUSTAINABILITY

To assess sustainability, the evaluation team set out to understand the extent to which activity successes would continue in the absence of USAID funding. This involved considering sustainability both in terms of whether the activities would continue to deliver similar activities in the absence of USAID funding and whether the improved capacity and the advancements that capacity yields would continue beyond the LOP.

Overall, levels of sustainability vary across the project. The findings indicate the existence of critical success factors in some areas, specific to the type of programming, that have potential to inform future programming. Demand-side programming hinges on the ability of CSOs to attract further funding, which

USAID's funding has often catalyzed. Supply-side interventions require government buy-in and future funding, which can be challenging in a fiscally constrained context. Still, there are bright spots within the project. In terms of outcomes, ongoing capacity-building that uses a compounding approach creates more sustainable prospects for DRG improvement. However, there are risks that staff turnover could erode capacity, meanwhile even where early capacity development plays a catalytic role in embedding capacity there is typically a continued need to refresh this learning, and offset effects of staff turnover. In turn, this underscores the importance of activities themselves being sustained through other funding sources.

To what extent do the activity interventions have potential to be continued beyond the LOP?

Much of the work undertaken by DRG activities requires continued effort. The nature of this ongoing need varies. Civil society organizations have an ongoing need to engage with government and continually move the agenda forward. Many issues addressed are dynamic and systemic and therefore require continued effort beyond the life of PAD to fully resolve. Even where initial capacity has been introduced into the system, issues evolve in a manner that requires further investment to refresh that capacity, or to counter the effects of capacity leaving the system as a result of turnover. In an ideal context, domestic organizations would develop the capacity to sustainably fulfil these needs without outside intervention. This in turn requires further funding, whether that be for ongoing government service delivery on the supply-side, or CSO capacity on the demand-side.

As outlined in Section I (Project Context), the DRG project is split between supply-side programming and demand-side programming. Sustainability, in terms of the ability of activities to continue beyond the LOP, varies based on the type of programming conducted.

On the demand-side, there have been positive examples of the catalytic role played by capacity building in improving the fundability of civil society organizations. This, in turn, ensures these organizations are able to sustain similar activities in the absence of USAID support. Capacity developed within demand-side programming leads to the institutionalization of skills and systems that strengthen the sustainability of the organization. Effective organizational capacity building is seen in the form of improved financial reporting and budgeting systems, more effective activity management, and strategic planning. This in turn has allowed CSOs to build an institutional knowledge base from which to deliver more effectively on future work. For example, Soul City and Sonke have benefited from the experience of the USAID grant and, having gained the skills to attract more donor funding and deliver more effective activities, continue to function as CSOs.

There have also been examples where organizations have continued to advance the goals of the activity, while evolving how they deliver this beyond the LOP (incorporating learnings and insights gathered through the period of USAID support). This illustrates that the activity does not need to continue in its exact form to be sustainable. For example, through the MDEA project UNISA recognized a need for more enduring training offerings that embed electoral administration skills. In light of this, UNISA are in the process of adapting and further developing the course to create a postgraduate degree that will ensure the training itself can continue beyond the LOP.

Supply-side programming is often reduced by fiscal constraints that prevent governments from taking ownership beyond the life of the PAD, although there are signs that encouraging early buy-in has, in places, mitigated this risk. The ability of governments to adopt programming beyond the LOP has been shown to be variable, particularly considering fiscal constraints. Municipalities and government departments are underfunded and face staffing constraints. Thus, they have struggled to maintain programming. For example, under ISSSASA the NPA has found it difficult to continue operation

of the TCCs due to budget constraints and an inability to fill vacant positions. Success can be achieved, but relies heavily on government buy-in and identified champions to provide continued leadership and to fund ongoing capacity building. For example, the ICOP has effectively leveraged USAID's government network to build government buy-in and extend the longevity of teaching and training elements.

To what extent will activity outcomes be sustained beyond the LOP?

The capacity building approach helps sustain programming beyond the life of the PAD, in embedding capability that continues to advance outcomes. At an individual level, capacity building activities amongst CSOs and beneficiaries allows smaller parties to build networks and institutionalize skills beyond a grant. For example, MDEA indicated strong evidence that recipients are still engaged and using knowledge. Furthermore, the “train the trainer” model has been successful in creating a network of institutional knowledge. This is significant in that when capacity is built at a system level, even if political advances are eroded, it generally remains to counter potential democratic backsliding.

There are limits to this in that knowledge requires refreshing, and staff turnover can require further injections of initially catalytic capacity; this in turn underscores the importance of sustaining the activities themselves (as outlined above). One risk to organizational sustainability is employee turnover due to the promotion of individuals within the organization or the movement of individuals to more established organizations. However, this risk is partially mitigated in that capacity generally stays within the system and continues to produce sustainable learning outcomes. That said, this combined with the need to refresh knowledge as issues evolve, does create the need for further training beyond once-off interventions.

3.6 MANAGEMENT

To assess management, the evaluation team looked at how the project was run, exploring the role of contracting and funding mechanisms, key personnel, coordination, and MEL. It sought to understand the role this had on performance, recognizing that management is often an explanatory factor behind other evaluative findings. The evaluation team found that strong management enabled the strong overall performance of the project.

The team found adept utilization of assistance mechanisms, skilled DRG management, and suitable implementing partners; this, in turn, played a significant role in enabling flexibility.

Coordination was mixed across the project. The DRG has had limited capacity to drive better coordination and sharing of learnings across implementers in the project. They have been effective in managing elements of coordination both with bilaterals, although with opportunities to be more proactive and to add further value through sharing of learnings and best practice. Furthermore, the political nature of programming has led to wider USG involvement; This has been both positive and detrimental to regional programming activities, with opportunities identified to improve coordination. These coordination issues relate in part to the capacity constraints of the DRG team. With this, coordination was one area identified where further DRG team capacity could add greater value, along with several other areas.

From a MEL perspective, the project has embedded a strong learning element into programming. The effectiveness evaluation theme explored the role of these learnings in informing better project design, and this ultimately reflects that learning was embedded into key processes (from project design, activity design, work planning processes, and PDIA). Despite the strengths in learning, other aspects of MEL were found lacking (although while recognizing that inherent challenges to quantifying the nature of DRG programming). Implementers had low levels of awareness of the project indicator framework, which also

failed to sufficiently capture the aggregate impact of localized, highly targeted interventions (given the use of macro-level indicators beyond the direct influence of the project). Furthermore, at the activity-level there was insufficient quantification of outcomes with a focus on output indicators, while the logical linkages between outputs and outcomes were often unclear.

3.6.1 CONTRACTING

To what extent have contracting mechanisms and A&A approaches helped or hindered the performance of the project?

The use of assistance mechanisms facilitated course correction after activity initiation. DRG's assistance mechanisms, which make use of a combination of cooperative agreements and grant awards, provide sufficient levels of flexibility to adjust workplans post inception. Whereas acquisition-style contracts would require greater levels of workplan sign-off from the Contracting Officer (CO), the use of assistance agreements gives more power to the technical team to adjust course before requiring formal modifications. Furthermore, fixed amount awards, which provide USAID a lower level of control, have often been used to forge agreements on broad milestones (e.g., number of trainings delivered) in a manner that allows for significant flexibility in how those milestones are met (e.g., the training topics selected). Such agreements enable USAID and implementers to adjust to realities on the ground.

Co-operative agreements provide USAID with less contractual control, but effective DRG team management has mitigated these risks and enabled the team to hold implementers to account against initial goals. Strong relationships between implementers and the DRG team (as outlined in Section 3.6, Management) have built additional informal levels of influence that extend beyond the letter of the agreement. As prior sections have outlined, this has been crucial to the success of the project.

Implementers also recognize the benefits of using agreement structures. The decreased levels of administrative and reporting requirements were well-recognized. Many praised the ease of working with the DRG team compared to other donors. This reflects both the flexibility inherent in the agreement structure and the strengths of the DRG team (outlined in Section 3.6.1.2).

The use of a Development Objective Assistance Agreement (DOAG) with National Treasury provided further flexibility beyond the activity-level agreement structures, enabling the DRG to obligate funds received on short-notice before expiration. Funding is often allocated towards the end of the fiscal year (FY) with an end of FY expiration date. DOAGs proved crucial to the DRG's ability to deploy unpredictable funding. The flexibility of this tool has had limits, however, given the difficulties of using the DOAG to fund regional work. The bilateral DOAG allows for allocation of funds to regional programming provided that at least 50% of work completed focuses on South Africa. With this constraint, and in the absence of a Regional Development Objective Agreement (RDOAG), DOAGs do not provide the full flexibility possible. That said, the evaluation team note that in the absence of a strong partnership with SADC, as the natural organization to forge a RDOAG with, establishment of such an instrument is challenging.

3.6.2 IMPLEMENTER SELECTION AND KEY PERSONNEL

DRG has benefited from strong implementing partners, however, decreases in the use of local implementers are attributed to the differing speeds of various contracting mechanisms. The overall success of the project is due, in great part, to the use of highly specialized implementing

partners who often bring deep subject area knowledge and proprietary approaches. Furthermore, local implementing partners have been preferred in that they (1) have a stronger incentive to see the effects of the activity grow beyond the life of the grant, aiding sustainability, and (2) often bring strong levels of local legitimacy and credibility. Ultimately however, contracting locally is often slower relative to drawing on global frameworks (e.g., the Human Rights Support Mechanism (HRSM)). With this, there has been an increase in the use of international implementing partners in subsequent funding rounds due to the difficulties with procuring locally under short notice, combined with often constrained timeframes to obligate funding.

Implementers have consistently complimented DRG management, citing their strong communication, technical knowledge, and experience. Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) have developed a management style based on open lines of communication combined with continuous engagement and collaboration with implementing partners. All 14 implementers interviewed were broadly complimentary of the team recognizing them as valuable thought partners who contributed to discussions on substantive issues. One implementer noted that, “It’s refreshing and exciting to work with the DRG team – a frank and open relationship. They are very interested in the project – engaged. We can build on their relationships.”

Quality staff selection and appropriate team set-up enables the DRG team to conduct effective oversight. Since the PAD’s inception, FSOs who have been involved possess a humility and openness that contributed to the relationship the DRG team has with implementers, while also enabling the local resonance of their programming. FSOs have also often played to their strengths in operating effective conduits between wider USG stakeholders. FSNs have brought crucial local context that implementers recognize and appreciate. Furthermore, FSNs report a strong ability to provide input regarding both the selection of FSOs and the tone set by the team. This has ensured preservation of flexibility and responsiveness to local context, and has enabled the project to build off its history and prior learnings.

However, staffing constraints have resulted in missed opportunities to add further value.¹⁸ Stakeholders often cited opportunities to add greater value – this includes both expanding their wider contribution beyond immediate programming, and addressing coordination issues (both outlined below). This ultimately reflects a strategic resource allocation decision, but there is evidence that additional capacity could go well used.

In considering the capacity of the DRG team, it is crucial to recognize the many wider roles that the team absorbs within the Mission. The DRG team handles a significant volume of smaller work beyond the PAD and beyond individual activities (for example, work with the South African DoJ to score private sector engagement opportunities). At the same time, they often play a crucial role in wider Mission work, including participation in government-to-government (G2G) programming committees, and the ongoing landscape assessment for the upcoming RDCS. These efforts and contributions bolster the reputation of the DRG team internally but do cause other tasks to be deprioritized.

¹⁸ An additional FSO post has been approved, however evidence suggests that the this will not be sufficient to address current capacity challenges both at a regional and bilateral level

3.6.3 COORDINATION

In assessing coordination, the evaluation team looked at coordination within the project's implementer set, coordination within USAID (typically between the regional Mission and bilaterals), and coordination across USG (focused mostly on interactions between the project and State Department / Embassies).

Within the project

Despite a strong desire to improve networking and knowledge sharing, implementers indicated low levels of awareness of other activities within the project. Due to the diversity of DRG programming and to budgetary and capacity constraints, the DRG team ended quarterly partner meetings two years ago. Subsequently, there has been little interaction between implementers, often resulting in implementers only possessing a high-level understanding of select other activities within the project. There is however, a desire from implementers to reintroduce networking sessions. One implementer noted that, "Bringing partners together was so valuable. All partners communicated. We could understand our role in the project, and it helped establish partnerships outside our project."

Within USAID

The design of regional programming combined with a strong input role for bilaterals has allowed regional activities the flexibility to align with local goals. This design has been relatively non-prescriptive. It has set clear goals while providing flexibility around the tactics used to achieve those goals. This ensures the activities stay true to their intended purpose while empowering the Activity Manager to tailor regional programming objectives to compliment bilateral programming. For example, in one bilateral Mission, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) was delivering additional programming that risked conflict with SAPPD. However, owing to this flexibility, the Activity Manager was able to shape the activities of SAPPD to ensure complementarity.

Bilaterals noted the need for greater forward visibility of regional programming plans. They highlighted the importance of early engagement with proposed programming to reduce the risks of local externalities creating delays. Bilaterals often understand both the local challenges and the organizational landscape and so could assist DRG in the design of activities and the selection of local partners.

Across USG

USG involvement is inevitable in DRG programming and has shown both positive and negative impacts on the project. The political nature of activities within the DRG project has resulted in the involvement of USG stakeholders at a country level. Alignment across USG on Democracy, Rights, and Governance has shown potential to be a mutually beneficial relationship – with DRG programming advancing diplomatic priorities, and vice-versa. For example, Labor Support cited the U.S. Ambassador to eSwatini as an integral contact point in building a relationship with the union and the Ambassador continues to act as a point of contact for the federation in eSwatini. Conversely, USG responses to programming can be unpredictable, leading to the enforcement of changes to activity interventions without prior notice to the implementer. For example, in the case of SAPPD, certain political parties were excluded from the activity on the directive of USG while Civic Education activities were stopped due to a high-level official visit. Implementers noted that these changes detracted from the perceived independence of implementers from the USG and put the legitimacy of DRG programming at risk.

The DRG team proactively managed those dynamics where possible, but capacity constrained their ability to better prepare implementers to expect and manage the changes.

On occasions, the short-notice, response nature of interventions on the part of an Embassy or State Department is unavoidable. That said, interviewees also revealed challenging dynamics that were linked to longer-term policy positions of the agency involved and could have been better pre-empted. For example, in some countries, implementers noted a challenging working environment where there were reservations within the US Embassy around conducting political party strengthening activities, and in working with some political parties. With this, the FSO and the bilaterals have interfaced between implementers and USG to manage this dynamic, although limited capacity constraints how much engagement the USAID team are able to conduct. In addition, the implementers often faced a steep learning curve on working in a highly political context, particularly given some of the implementers did not bring extensive experience working with USAID and within the USG system. Some stakeholders indicated there were opportunities to better onboard and equip implementers to both be aware of these dynamics, and proactively escalate and potentially even engage with wider USG stakeholders to ensure programming proceeds smoothly.

3.6.4 MONITORING, EVALUATION AND LEARNING

3.6.4.1 *Learning emphasis*

Both the DRG team and implementers place significant emphasis on the importance of MEL and incorporate learning into key processes. Previous sections have outlined the role that learning, combined with flexibility, played in ensuring that the project responded well to on-the-ground challenges. The incorporation of prior learnings was embedded in management processes, work planning processes, activity design, and decisions to adjust course. Furthermore, capacity and investment were made available for research-related interventions, and at times learning was a significant part of the activity objective itself (with some activities viewed as pilots designed to test out a particular approach).

3.6.4.2 *Theory of Change*

The high-level results framework (i.e., the portfolio’s “Theory of Change”) is a useful vehicle for managing unpredictable funding flows. DRG funding is received from various sources and at various times. This means that the broad set of goals underlying the Theory of Change allow the DRG team to adequately direct additional funding as received towards DRG programming.

Furthermore, the set of objectives in the Theory of Change all contribute to the project goal, while are sufficiently broad to ensure no crucial intervention areas are excluded from the theory of change. At the activity level, all activities are coherent with the Theory of Change itself, as outlined in the Project Context section (where Figure 1 illustrates how each activity contribute to one or more aspects of the results framework). In totality, the objectives also reflect a coherent response to DRG challenges in the region.

3.6.4.3 *Indicator Framework*

The project-level indicator framework itself has been insufficient as a tool to manage project-level MEL. The use of macro-level indicators is not suited to the localized and targeted nature of many of the interventions, which do not significant shift those indicators. Furthermore, the logical links between project-level indicators and activity-level indicators were often unclear. This in part reflects the complexity of designing a project-level indicator framework at the start of the PAD, which was never able to pre-empt the types of programming (and therefore outcomes) it would deliver.

Many implementers expressed limited awareness of the project-level results framework. This hindered implementers from being able to express the full logical linkages from their outputs, to activity outcomes, through to activity level changes.

Challenges also exist with activity-level MEL processes – including inconsistency of reporting, and the bias towards output indicators. Although standardization of reporting is not a requirement under assistance mechanisms, it would be beneficial if implementers consistently reported data – including breaking down indicator data and LOP targets against standard time intervals (e.g., by year). Furthermore, there was a significant bias towards quantitative output reporting; although implementers were able to tell many qualitative stories of outcomes, they did not consistently follow up with and survey participants on an ex-post basis (even in a semi-structured manner) to quantify these outcomes. This has prevented the project from being able to tell a full story of its performance.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

Given its overall positive findings, the evaluation team's recommendations focus on (1) seizing further opportunities to expand DRG programming and (2) seeking opportunities to extend best practices, while also (3) correcting less successful aspects of the project. The section below sets out these recommendations for consideration by USAID. Note that because this is a project-level evaluation, recommendations are predominately addressed to USAID rather than implementing partners.

4.1 OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPAND DRG PROGRAMMING

In light of the strong performance of the DRG project in USAID/SA, the Mission stands to gain significantly from opportunities to expand DRG programming. Recognizing the limited dedicated budget available to DRG in the past, the evaluation team makes two recommendations.

4.1.1 EXPAND CROSS-SECTORAL PROGRAMMING (CSP)

The DRG team has been able to effectively draw on CSP to mobilize funding for DRG programming while also advancing other USAID priorities. In light of this success, there is a strong base from which to expand the use of CSP.

The evaluation team also noted that levels of CSP investment have been low compared to some other Missions. For example, within USAID/Malawi, a major governance initiative draws from all Offices across the Mission for funding and in turn advances the objectives of the entire Mission.

Given this potential and in light of the revision of the CDCS and RDCS, the evaluation team recommends that the DRG team, along with USAID/SA Front Office leadership, considers the appetite to expand DRG-related CSP. This could create a greater mandate for the DRG team to advance development objectives by proactively engaging other parts of the Mission to identify CSP opportunities and to infuse DRG into other Offices.

4.1.2 STRENGTHEN ALIGNMENT WITH AGENCY-WIDE PRIORITIES

The evaluation team recognized the project's alignment with agency-wide priorities and identified further opportunities to reinforce these links. By taking advantage of these opportunities, USAID can better leverage the DRG project in a manner that could further advance both the DRG agenda and agency-wide priorities. These opportunities include:

PSE and Prosper Africa

There was limited evidence that PSE approaches were incorporated into the PAD, although it is of note that work has been done in this space (e.g., the DRG worked with the South African Department of Justice to explore approaches for private sector engagement).

Given the agency's increasing emphasis on Private Sector Engagement, and the introduction of the Prosper Africa initiative, the evaluation team recommends that the DRG team deliberately considers incorporating

private sector approaches into its programming and prioritizes possible strategies. This could include the following (noting that not all scenarios are equally viable or desirable):

1. Leverage the private sector as a powerful advocate, given their interest in democracy and rule of law (as an enabler of the ease of doing business)
2. Work with the private sector to drive responsible business practices (e.g., in alignment with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights)
3. Seek opportunities to leverage private sector capital to fund DRG-related activities (although opportunities may be limited in this space with significant funding demands already being made on the private sector)

Journey to Self-Reliance

The activities in the project reflect a strong alignment with the Journey to Self-Reliance in that good governance is essential to the ability of governments to deliver in the absence of donor support.

There are still further opportunities to better communicate and align activities with this priority. For example, the next PAD could make explicit links to the Journey to Self-Reliance and Journey to Self-Reliance country roadmaps could be used to inform the prioritization of its activities.

4.2 SCALING BEST PRACTICES

Aspects of the DRG project reflect strong best practices within USAID. In light of this, the evaluation team recommends preserving this success as the team's set-up evolves while seeking opportunities to expand best practice within the DRG project, and, where applicable, into other parts of USAID.

4.2.1 PRESERVE FLEXIBILITY AND ADAPTABILITY

The evaluative findings noted that the flexibility and adaptability embedded within the activities have been crucial to their success. This has ensured that activities are able to respond to dynamics on the ground, remain relevant and effective, and, in turn, deliver outcomes. It is therefore of significant importance that the team continues to emphasize skillsets and behavioral attributes that emphasize learning and a sensitivity to local contexts and knowledge.

Although this flexibility may not translate into process-oriented programming areas, it has applicability in areas that are less focused on delivering quantitative and volume-based results. There are significant opportunities to reflect on these learnings and consider how the DRG team has managed these dynamics as a means of informing wider Collaboration, Learning and Adaptation (CLA) efforts.

The empowered role FSNs have played in the project also underpins its flexibility, a dynamic other parts of the USAID system could seek to replicate. FSNs have brought continuity to implementer relationships, and access to crucial local knowledge. Furthermore, through their valued input into staff selection, they have helped set the teams tone and culture.

Similarly, FSOs have brought an openness and humility to the DRG project, drawing heavily on the local context that FSNs bring. This has been crucial to success and is worth preserving given the anticipated FSO turnover – both in proactively preserving these strengths, and considering these attributes in FSO selection decisions.

4.2.2 DESIGN WITH SUSTAINABILITY IN MIND

As noted in the evaluation, much of the work that USAID is tackling requires continued effort (e.g. continued expansion of local level governance support). The evaluation team noted that there were bright spots within the project where initiatives achieved a reasonable level of sustainability in terms of their ability to attract further funding, although it also flagged inconsistencies within the project and cases where sustainability had been more difficult to secure. In addition, the evaluation surfaced the importance gaining early buy-in from governments on supply-side interventions and building management capacity that enables CSOs to secure further funding on the demand-side.

The evaluation team recommends that USAID deliberately consider the level of resource and effort they wish to dedicate to the sustainability of initiatives post-USAID funding. Pursuing sustainability requires efforts beyond those required to deliver core programming. This reflects a trade-off between the focus on core activities, and the creation of space for sustainability. This trade-off is particularly relevant to USAID activities intended to act as proofs-of-concept (e.g., awareness of TCCs). In this case, failing to deliberately plan for sustainability may undermine the overall purpose of the activity.

Generally, the DRG team has placed emphasis on embedding sustainability into activities. There are, however, further opportunities to consider, particularly with regard to building government buy-in. The DRG team has benefitted, in some cases, from the use of impact evaluations to identify whether interventions work. Looking to the future, greater focus could be placed on pulling out top level insights in an easy to engage way to gain political buy-in. Recognizing many challenges in DRG require both political and technical solutions, such insights should address both impact and value for money. This could also be combined with deliberate efforts to introduce potential activities to partners and other funders. Implementers can be incentivized to undertake a more active approach to sustainability by embedding it into activity objectives and indicators.

Beyond the DRG team, there are opportunities for other parts of USAID to build off this best practice. Expanding the capacity of organizations and their management systems can pay dividends with regard to their ability to fundraise and sustain further activities. This could then also aid sustainability in other activities. There are opportunities to deliberately consider this approach beyond the DRG project where there is a need to build capacity for sustainability. However, this must be weighed carefully against the trade-off that, assuming the same volume of funding, increased capacity to advance sustainability will likely lead to a reduced focus on intervention delivery.

4.3 ADDRESS IDENTIFIED SHORTCOMINGS

Although the project generally performed well, the evaluation did encounter some issues that could be resolved to improve performance.

4.3.1 IMPROVE PROJECT COORDINATION

Recognizing the limited awareness implementers have of parts of the project they are not involved in (as outlined in Section 3.6, Management), the evaluation team recommends that USAID strengthen coordination within the project by, among other possible efforts, hosting regular convenings of implementing partners wherein they can share learnings and best practices with one another.

Implementers recognized value in these events, with some noting they would be prepared to support coordination and preparation. The evaluation team also recommends that sufficient flexibility be given to implementers to shape and co-design the agenda with USAID to ensure it remains relevant while still reflecting USAID priorities.

Should USAID capacity remain constrained, there are also opportunities to embed these activities into workplans. This would allow USAID to draw on implementer capacity to support the coordination and budgeting for these events.

4.3.2 ENHANCE USG COORDINATION

Both the positive and negative potential of wider USG involvement surfaced in the evaluative findings. Positively, USAID’s programming has the ability to complement the policies and diplomatic efforts of other arms of the USG, and USG diplomatic efforts can strengthen USAID/DRG programming. Nonetheless, misalignment between USAID programming and other diplomatic priorities has, at times, resulted in such drawbacks. For example, by cancelling project events USG can detract from the project’s legitimacy (where implementers benefit from a perceived independence from USG actors).

There are several steps that USAID could consider to bolster USG coordination:

- Bring additional USAID staff onboard to allow for more frequent engagement with Embassy officials
- Strengthen the incorporation of State Department officials into project planning processes – both to ensure issues are identified up front and to proactively identify opportunities for diplomatic efforts to complement USAID programming
- Better train implementers on the role of USG stakeholders, equipping them to proactively engage with diplomatic Missions as required

These recommendations reflect strategic decisions for USAID to consider, but would likely need to be aligned with State Department counterparts.

4.3.3 IMPROVE INDICATOR FRAMEWORK DESIGN

The evaluation identified several challenges associated with the indicator framework reflected in the difficulty of illustrating performance outcomes at the project-level.

The evaluation team recommends the following steps to bolster MEL, while noting the strategic trade-offs inherent to these decisions for USAID. Some of these recommendations require dedicated resources and would therefore necessitate more total funding or a draw from funding currently dedicated to the delivery of activities. This recommendation also acknowledges that the nature of DRG programming limits the extent to which outcomes can be quantified because the data in some contexts is hard to source or because existing quantitative data only reflects part of the success.

This recommendation has two components.

One aspect of these recommendations looks at the possibility of using the indicator framework along with MEL approaches to enable activities to surface better learnings and provide confidence that interventions will work effectively, even in the absence of quality outcome data, specifically, by:

- **Reinforcing the need for implementers to articulate clearer relationships between outputs and outcomes** in their theories of change. This would in turn clarify the assumptions that underpin the ability of an output to yield a desired outcome
- **Stress-testing these assumptions** to provide greater confidence that these outputs ultimately yield outcomes:
 - Testing the assumptions in an easily observable context provides initial indications of whether the logic will hold true in any context, e.g., testing the effectiveness of judiciary interventions in a country with a smaller judiciary where changes are more easily observable or drawing on existing impact evaluations where the same tool has been used in different contexts
 - If the underpinning assumption stands up, the next step is to identify factors that could break this logical link in a different context (e.g., differences in the set-up of a particular institution) and to test the role of these contextual factors where possible

Although this may not be a perfect science, embedding this reflective process systematically as a deliberate consideration provides greater assurance that outputs will drive desired outcomes.

The second aspect of these recommendations focusses on increasing the volume of outcome data produced in the project. The options for this include:

- **Request implementers to set up monitoring databases and conduct more systemic follow-up with activity participants to track successes.** The evaluation team noted many cases where there were rich anecdotal answers of how the project had influenced a particular outcome. Implementers could set up monitoring databases to systematically log such examples and corresponding evidence in a manner that allows them to be quantified and verified. In addition, more systematic follow-up with activity participants (e.g., short semi-structured phone conversations) would ensure data on outcomes is gathered in a structured manner, in a way that could be conducted by the implementers themselves (without requiring outside evaluators)
- **Widen the framing of the project's impact narrative.** Because DRG programming often focuses on empowering those in crucial roles in democratic systems (e.g., judges), the number of individuals reached directly may not be high. However, the project's indirect reach (e.g., large numbers of citizens securing access to justice through the judges that were reached) could be better quantified to create a more compelling story
- **Increase investment in impact evaluations and ask implementers to implement more robust MEL tools (recognizing that the effort expended on tracking could detract from the delivery of the interventions themselves).** For example:
 - Track changes in attitudes by issuing pre-surveys, post-surveys, and ex post facto surveys
 - Invest further in conducting contribution analysis to gain a better understanding of whether observed outcomes are the consequence of specific interventions .
 - Bring in external impact evaluators to conduct more rigorous studies where there is significant need for independent verification in pursuit of learnings (recognizing this will not be possible in some cases where the original design of the activity has shifted significantly in response to changing contexts)

5. ANNEX I: MAPPING OF DRG ACTIVITY INTERVENTIONS TO RESULTS FRAMEWORK

Figure 4: Mapping of DRG project activities to results framework

	Sub-purpose 1: Targeted Democratic Institutions Strengthened for Inclusive				Sub-purpose 2: Civil Society's engagement for inclusive human rights protection and			
	Regional capacity for <i>judicial independence</i> strengthened	Oversight and constituency engagement of <i>legislative branch</i> strengthened	Internal democracy in <i>political parties</i> improved	<i>Election administration</i> improved	Govt. responsiveness to citizen needs on the local and national levels enhanced	Civil society networks addressing civic, economic and social rights strengthened	Civil society's ability to engage with legislatures and political parties improved	Civil society's ability to promote peaceful demands for improved svcs. strengthened
Strengthening Local Governance to Improve GBV Response (\$10 000 000)								
Civic Education and Participation in South Africa (\$4 500 000)								
Improving Case Outcomes for Gender-based Violence Pilot (\$1 300 000)								
Governance Support Program II (\$500 000)								
People to People Dialogues: Social Cohesion (\$376 376)								
Southern Africa Human Rights Program (\$10 000 000)								
Regional Victims of Torture Program (\$5 000 000)								
Southern Africa Political Parties and Dialogue program (\$4 500 000)								
Strengthening Anti-Corruption efforts and processes in Southern Africa (\$1 250 000)								
Regional Judicial Independence (\$1 000 000)								
Increasing Services for Survivors of Sexual Assault in South Africa (\$9000 000)								
Labour Support (Swaziland Labor Rights Program) (\$-)								
Regional Elections Training Program (\$4 600 000)								
Trilateral Assistance Program (TAP) (\$36 000 000)*								

*The nature of the Trilateral Assistance Program, which is characteristically a funding mechanism for work across the region, meant the evaluation team focused on its effectiveness as a funding mechanism, rather than evaluating the 20+ projects undertaken through this mechanism

6. ANNEX 2: LIST OF ACTIVITIES UNDER EVALUATION

The full list of activities considered for evaluation is set out below. Please note this includes both bilateral and regional programming run from USAID/SA under the PAD. Global programs coordination from USAID/D.C. were deemed out of scope for the evaluation given the limited control that the regional Mission have over the management and ultimate outcomes of these activities.

Figure 5: List of activities under evaluation within the USAID/SA DRG PAD

Activities in the USAID/SA DRG Project under Evaluation		
Activity Name	Prime Implementor	Description
Bilateral Programming in South Africa		
Strengthening Local Governance to Improve GBV Response	Centre for Communication Impact (CCI)	Improving responses to GBV through coordination of role players including CSOs, municipal representatives, educators and civil society
Civic Education and Participation in South Africa	Freedom House	Strengthen the ability of CSOs to deliver civic education and training to improve political participation for improved governance at a municipal level
Improving Case Outcomes for Gender-based Violence Pilot	University of Cape Town/ Gender, Health and Justice Research Unit	Training of criminal justice and civil society organizations around the management of GBV cases including capacity building around psycho-social management of sexual offence cases
Governance Support Program II	GIZ (Donor to Donor)	Use organizational improvement methods to capacitate 8 partner municipalities in the areas of budgeting, leadership and improved service delivery
Increasing Services for Survivors of Sexual Assault in South Africa	Foundation for Professional Development	Facilitate the popularization of the TCCs including creation of awareness around access to legal, medical and psychological counseling services as well as the provision of four additional TCCs.
People to People Dialogues: Social Cohesion	ALPS	Reducing violence against resident migrants through dialogue focused on generating empathy and understanding between participants to reach collaborative outcomes

Regional Programming in Southern Africa		
Regional Judicial Independence	University of Cape Town/ Democratic Governance and Rights Unit	Strengthen capacity, integrity and independence of regional judicial systems through the training of judges in ethical decision making and improve ability in handing out judgements
Strengthening Anti-Corruption efforts and processes in Southern Africa	FSVC	Improving transparency on financial management systems in Angola and Eswatini from a supply and demand side with a focus on health and education spend
Increasing Services for Survivors of Sexual Assault in South Africa	Foundation for Professional Development	Facilitate the popularization of the TCCs including creation of awareness around access to legal, medical and psychological counseling services as well as the provision of four additional TCCs.
Labour Support (Swaziland Labor Rights Program)	Solidarity	Improved labor union representation in Eswatini through the strengthening of the federation as well as the textile and agricultural unions
Regional Elections Training Program	UNISA	Focused on training independent electoral officers across the region to build capacity for effective and responsible management of elections across Africa
Southern Africa Political Parties and Dialogue Program	Democracy Works Foundation	Build the skills of political parties to in campaigning and policy development while capacitating them to engage in ethical strategic planning and increase political party commitment to internal democracy.
Regional Victims of Torture Program	Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation	Facilitate the treatment and rehabilitation of victims of torture while capacitating mental health practitioners and creating a model for best practice across the region
Southern Africa Human Rights Program	Freedom House	Improve the recognition, awareness, and enforcement of human rights in Southern Africa with a focus on media freedom indigenous peoples' rights, women's land rights and general human rights

7. ANNEX 3: BREAKDOWN OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY STAKEHOLDER GROUP

The Key Informant Interviews conducted by the evaluation team for this evaluation are broken down below, covering:

- **Beneficiaries** – recipients of project / activity support, which included both those who received support from the implementer (often CSO organizations) and
- **Ecosystem actors** – who were not directly involved in programming but had a strong wider perspective on the programmatic area
- **Implementers** – including staff from both prime and sub-contractors involved in implementation
- **USG** – covering USAID bilaterals, the USAID/DRG team, members of the USAID/SA Program Office and Office of Acquisition and Assistance, and State Department representatives

Figure 6: List of interviewees by stakeholder group

Program	Beneficiary	Ecosystem actor	Implementer	USG	Total
Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation Activities			1		1
Governance Support Programme II			1		1
Improving Case Outcomes for Gender Based Violence (ICOP)	1				1
Increasing Services for Survivors of Sexual Assault in South Africa (ISSASA)		1	1		2
Labour Support (Swaziland Labor Rights Program)			1		1
Project		2		9	11
Promoting Civic Education and Participation	2		3		5
Regional Elections Training Program			1		1
Regional Judicial Independence Project	2		1		3
Regional Victims of Torture Program			1		1
Southern Africa Human Rights Program	9		4		13
Southern Africa Political Parties and Dialogue program	9		3		12
Strengthening Anti-Corruption efforts and processes in Southern Africa	3		2		5
Strengthening Local Governance to improve GBV response		2	1		3
Trilateral Assistance Program (TAP)			1		1
Grand Total	26	5	21	9	61

8. ANNEX 4: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED BY THE EVALUATION TEAM

Figure 7: List of documents reviewed by the evaluation team

In addition to primary data gathered through interviews, and publicly available secondary literature, the following documents were made available to the evaluation team to support this work.

Democracy Rights and Governance Project (Activity-level documents only)
DRG documents assessed
DRG Transitional Project Appraisal Document (PAD) May 2019 Redacted Version
Project Appraisal Document (PAD) Logical Framework
USAID South Africa DRG Completed vs Active Project List
USAID DRG Project Summary Sheet
DRG Transitional Project Appraisal Document (PAD) Annexes A-H
Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation Activities
Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation Activities documents assessed
Mitigating Xenophobia Program Fact Sheet – July 2017
ALPS Monitoring and Evaluation Plan 2019
USAID 1 st Quarter Progress Report 2018
USAID 2 nd Quarter Progress Report 2019
Governance Support Programme II
Governance Support Programme II documents assessed
USAID – GIZ Grant Agreement Final Report and Financial Statement
GSP II Annual Review Document 2018
Improving Case Outcomes for Gender Based Violence (ICOP)
Improving Case Outcomes for Gender Based Violence (ICOP) documents assessed
ICOP Fact Sheet 2019
ICOP Pilot Study Baseline Executive Summary Document
ICOP Annual Report and M&E Plan 2016
ICOP Annual Report 2017
ICOP M&E Report 2017
ICOP Annual Report and M&E Plan 2018
ICOP Annual Report and M&E Plan 2019 Q1
ICOP Annual Report and M&E Plan 2019 Q2
Donor Coordination Annual Report 2018-2019

Promoting Civic Education and Participation
Promoting Civic Education and Participation documents assessed
Civic Education SA Fact Sheet 2018
HRSM Civic Ed 1.1a Performance Indicator Reference Sheet (PIRS)
HRSM Civic Ed 2.1a Performance Indicator Reference Sheet (PIRS)
HRSM Civic Ed 3.1a Performance Indicator Reference Sheet (PIRS)
HRSM Civic Ed 3.2a Performance Indicator Reference Sheet (PIRS)
Applied Political Economy Analysis September 2018
Applied Political Economy Analysis May 2019
Applied Political Economy Analysis July 2019
Freedom House 1 st Quarterly Narrative Report 2017
Freedom House 2 nd Quarterly Narrative Report 2018
Freedom House 3 rd Quarterly Narrative Report 2018
Freedom House 4 th Quarterly Narrative Report 2018
Freedom House 3 rd Quarterly Narrative Report 2019

Regional Elections Training Program
Regional Elections Training Program documents assessed
Performance Report 2011 June – 2018 December 31

Regional Judicial Independence Project
Regional Judicial Independence Project documents assessed
RJIP Fact Sheet 2017
Judicial Institute for Africa (JIFA) Mid-Term Evaluation, March 2019
Project Milestone report 2017
Project Milestone report 2018

Regional Victims of Torture Program
Regional Victims of Torture Program documents assessed
Victims of Torture Fact Sheet July 2017
CSVr Year 2 Annual Report
CSVr Year 3 Annual Report
CSVr 2 nd Quarter Year 1 Narrative Report
CSVr 3 rd Quarter Year 1 Narrative Report
CSVr 4 th Quarter Year 1 Narrative Report
CSVr 1 st Quarter Year 2 Narrative Report
CSVr 2 nd Quarter Year 2 Narrative Report
CSVr 3 rd Quarter Year 2 Narrative Report
CSVr 4 th Quarter Year 2 Narrative Report
CSVr 1 st Quarter Year 3 Narrative Report

CSV 2 nd Quarter Year 3 Narrative Report
CSV 3 rd Quarter Year 3 Narrative Report
CSV 4 th Quarter Year 3 Narrative Report
CSV 3 rd Quarter Year 4 Narrative Report
CSV 1 st Quarter Year 5 Narrative Report
CSV 2 nd Quarter Year 5 Narrative Report
CSV Indicator Target Plan Year 1 – Year 5
CSV Implementation Plan year 3

Southern Africa Human Rights Program
Southern Africa Human Rights Program documents assessed
ARISA Monthly Report February 2019
ARISA Monthly Report March 2019
ARISA Monthly Report April 2019
ARISA Monthly Report May 2019
ARISA Monthly Report June 2019
ARISA 1 st Quarter Year 1 Narrative Report
ARISA 3 rd Quarter Year 2 Narrative Report

Southern Africa Political Parties and Dialogue Program
Southern Africa Political Parties and Dialogue Program documents assessed
SAPPD Fact Sheet 2018
DWF Annual Narrative Report Year 1
DWF Annual Implementation Plan Year 2

Strengthening Anti-Corruption Efforts and Processes in Southern Africa
Strengthening Anti-Corruption Efforts and Processes in Southern Africa Documents Assessed
Anti-Corruption Fact Sheet 2018
FSVC 2 nd Quarter Year 2 Narrative Report
FSVC 4 th Quarter Year 2 Narrative Report
FSVC 1 st Quarter Year 3 Narrative Report
FSVC 2 nd Quarter Year 3 Narrative Report

Strengthening Local Governance to improve GBV response
Strengthening Local Governance to improve GBV response documents assessed
Strengthening local governance to improve response to GBV Fact Sheet 2018
Annual Implementation Plan and Activity Monitoring & Evaluation Plan 2018
Activity Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Plan 2019
CCI GBV 3 rd Quarter Year 1 Progress Report
CCI GBV 1 st Quarter Year 2 Progress Report

Trilateral Assistance Program (TAP)
Trilateral Assistance Program (TAP) documents assessed
Trilats fact sheet 2017
Final Assessment of the USAID Development Support to South Africa 2005 – 2009