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STRENGTHENING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE AGAINST EXTREMISM (SCORE) MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FINAL REPORT

May 2019

This publication was prepared independently by Jean-Camille Kollmorgen, Mikewa Ogada, Selline Korir, and Elizabeth Dena of Social Impact, Inc. It was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development.

STRENGTHENING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE AGAINST EXTREMISM (SCORE) MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

FINAL REPORT

USAID Kenya and East Africa

Task Order No. AID-OAA-M-13-00011

Contract No. GS-10F-0294V

Prepared as part of the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance—Learning, Evaluation, and Research (DRG-LER) Activity

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ABSTRACT

This evaluation assessed the effectiveness of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)'s Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism (SCORE) program, which seeks to build the capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs) and communities to counter violent extremism (CVE) and mitigate conflict. It is implemented by Act! from October 2014-September 2019. The evaluation team (ET) completed a desk review and in-country data collection including key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and a mini survey. The evaluation concluded that SCORE approaches were correlated with observed changes in targeted communities (e.g., greater public awareness about CVE and conflict, decreased violent extremism (VE) recruitment, increased trust/tolerance between stakeholders, strengthened structures for responding to VE/conflict, etc.), though approaches varied in their success based on the operating context and how they were implemented by each sub-grantee. Several SCORE activities have the potential for scaling or replication based on cost-effectiveness, though some would benefit from improvements or more research before a scaling decision is made. SCORE partially achieved its outcome of quickly intervening to mitigate incidents of VE and conflict through the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRF) mechanism—the mechanism achieved mitigation, though not as quickly as designed. SCORE's capacity building approach has been effective at increasing the capacity of sub-grantees, though additional capacity building in one or more areas is still required for the majority of sub-grantees. A few SCORE-established and strengthened structures show evidence of beginning to be adopted or institutionalized by sub-grantees, national and county government entities, and communities, though future sustainability is not guaranteed beyond the short-term.

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ACRONYMS

Acronym	Definition
CAP	County Action Plan
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIDP	County Integrated Development Plan
CLA	Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting
CMM	Conflict Management and Mitigation
COEC	Coast Education Center
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
CWA	Community Wildlife Association
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DCMT	Diani Chale Management Trust
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DO	Development Objective
DQA	Data Quality Assessment
EQ	Evaluation Question
ET	Evaluation Team
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GOK	Government of Kenya
HURIA	Human Rights Agenda
IIP	Institutional Improvement Plan
IRB	Institutional Review Board
KEA	Kenya and East Africa
KEAP	Kenya Electoral Assistance Program
KECOSCE	Kenya Community Support Centre
KII	Key Informant Interview
KTI	Kenya Transition Initiative
KTU	Kenya Tuna Uwezo
KWS	Kenya Wildlife Service
K-YES	Kenya Youth Employment and Skills
KYBI	Kiunga Youth Bunge Initiative
LICODEP	Likoni Community Development Programme
LOP	Life of Project
MAZIDO	Management of Arid Zones Initiatives and Development Options
MERL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Research, and Learning
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya

NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIWETU	Kenya NiWajibu Wetu
OCA	Organizational Capacity Assessment
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PWD	Persons with Disabilities
RRF	Rapid Response Fund
SCORE	Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism
SDS	Sustainable Development Solutions
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
TOC	Theory of Change
TOT	Training of Trainers
TRPRD	Tana River Peace Reconciliation and Development
UIG	Ummah Initiative Group
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
VE	Violent Extremism
VET	Vocational Education and Training

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS

This evaluation assessed the effectiveness of the Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism (SCORE) program and is intended to inform the final year of the program's implementation and future countering violent extremism (CVE) programming. Primary audiences for the evaluation are Act Change Transform (Act!) as the SCORE implementing partner, its local sub-grantees, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Kenya and East Africa (KEA) mission. Evaluation results will be shared with USAID/Washington, Government of Kenya (GOK) agencies, county governments, and development partners. The key evaluation questions (EQs) addressed included:

- EQ1. How effective have the conflict mitigation and CVE approaches/tools (e.g. trauma therapy, radio programs, development of CVE County Action Plans (CAPs), community theater, sports for peace, etc.) adapted by the SCORE sub-grantees been in building community resilience to violent extremism (VE)?
- EQ2. To what extent was the intended outcome of quickly intervening to mitigate incidents of VE and conflict realized through the Rapid Response Fund? How relevant were the approaches used (how responsive were they to ongoing contextual changes related to conflict and VE)?
- EQ3. To what extent has the organizational and technical capacity-building approach used by SCORE been effective in developing a cadre of civil society organizations (CSOs) capable of responding to conflict and CVE?
- EQ4. To what extent are the structures, activities, and networks established by SCORE been adopted and institutionalized in order to allow them to sustainably respond to conflict and CVE in the short, medium, and long term?

BACKGROUND

Terrorism has become a major threat in Kenya, particularly the coastal and northeastern regions. In response, the GOK has prioritized CVE and developed the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (2016), which sets out a framework for efforts involving state and non-state actors. USAID has supported civil society in CVE and conflict management through the SCORE program. SCORE is a \$5 million, five-year program running from October 2014 to September 2019. Implemented by Act!, it seeks to build the capacity of CSOs and communities to effectively address VE and conflict in the six coastal counties of Kilifi, Kwale, Lamu, Mombasa, Taita Taveta, and Tana River. At the time of this evaluation, SCORE supported 14 CSOs to implement a variety of CVE/conflict mitigation activities.¹

EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

The evaluation employed a mixed-methods approach including a desk review of program and external documentation, 33 key informant interviews (KIs) with 82 respondents, 24 focus group discussions (FGDs) with 172 beneficiaries, and a quantitative mini survey administered to 241 respondents. The evaluation is subject to the following potential biases: selection bias for non-random samples, respondent

¹ The program initially worked with 17 organizations; however, after a year, Act! made a determination to cut three of the original groups and focus on those deemed more able to absorb capacity building and to have an impact in their communities.

recall and desirability biases, gender bias for mixed-gender FGDs with youth, and instrument bias within the mini survey. Other evaluation limitations include restricted generalizability of findings due to relatively small sample sizes, and availability constraints that limited the inclusion of certain stakeholders.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS BY EVALUATION QUESTION

EQ1: How effective have the conflict mitigation and CVE approaches/tools been in building community resilience to VE?

KII data suggests that SCORE contributed to several positive, higher level effects in targeted communities, including greater awareness and discussion about CVE and conflict, a decrease in VE recruitment, and greater resilience to VE. Both men and women were adequately included in activities, though respondents felt more can be done to better engage women, youth, and persons with disabilities (PWD). Some sub-grantees are combining SCORE activities in different ways to increase impact.

Interfaith dialogues and targeting of religious leaders: Respondents reported that sensitization of religious leaders and their constituencies produced positive results, including improved perceptions of followers of other religions and greater mutual respect and cohesion between religions. Respondents argued that this approach was ready for scaling up because religious leaders already have established structures they can use to promote peace messages.

Community policing and engagement with police: Respondents reported *Nyumba Kumi* (a government initiative for community-led security and policing) trainings increased members' understanding of their roles on security and CVE, resulting in improved trust between citizens and police, and increased reporting of crimes. Though effectiveness varied by county and the activity used, respondents reported that youth-police and community-police activities resulted in some improvement in police-citizen relations, and that youth have a better understanding of the judicial system and their rights. Respondents reported that *Nyumba Kumi* committees' training was ready for scaling because it had been effective and could be easily rolled out to other committees. Respondents recommended replicating youth-police and community-police engagements, though keeping participants number at each interaction low so as not to dilute impact.

Women-focused activities: Respondents reported that activities for women experiencing VE-related trauma, including the loss of family members to Al Shabaab, helped participants address their psychological distress, heal, and reintegrate into their communities. Of the women-focused activities, volunteer-led trauma counselling for women affected by VE and using women sensitizers to transmit "good parenting" messages related to CVE stood out as ready for scaling due to the cost effectiveness of these approaches.

Youth-focused and youth entrepreneurship activities: CVE clinics/peace clubs reportedly led to increased tolerance and behavior change amongst students in some schools, whereas camps were reportedly less successful and one-off in nature. Most youth entrepreneurship activities were not as effective as implemented by most sub-grantees due to ineffectual linkages with start-up capital. Respondents advised that CVE clinics/peace clubs in schools should be scaled up because they had been effective, have high potential to prevent VE, and yet had only reached a small number of youth and children. Peace clubs in particular were identified as key to sensitizing children on peace at an early age to reduce their risk of joining VE groups or criminal gangs.

Engaging government entities: CVE County Action Plans (CAPs) in Kilifi, Kwale, Mombasa, Lamu, and Tana River are in various stages of design and implementation. Respondents were as of yet unable to report concrete impacts, in part due to lack of national and county government funding for tasks outlined in these plans. In addition to CVE action plans, a few sub-grantees developed and submitted to government other policy documents, of which only the youth County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) memorandum in Kwale has so far shown evidence of affecting policy change. Respondents believed that CAPs could be scaled to other counties because lessons have been learned about how county governments and other stakeholders can collaborate to develop them.

Community engagement on conflict and CVE: Respondents reported that dialogues, *barazas* (public meetings), and other types of meetings contributed to the overall reduction of conflict, radicalization, or crime in targeted counties. Many respondents felt that community-based conflict management structures, peace dialogues, *barazas*, theatre, mini/dhow buzz (facilitated discussions on CVE on public transportation such as buses and boats), radio programs, and social media activities should be scaled to increase reach and potential impact, albeit with some modifications.

EQ 1 Conclusions

1. SCORE's approaches/tools were correlated with observed changes in targeted communities, including greater public awareness about CVE and conflict, decreased VE recruitment, increased trust between civil society and state actors, increased tolerance between different groups, and the establishment/strengthening of structures for responding to VE and conflict.
2. SCORE included gender and youth dynamics as part of its programming, but more can be done to ensure that gender, youth, and PWDs are meaningfully considered.
3. The six SCORE approaches on which this evaluation focused varied in their success based on the operating context and how they were implemented by each sub-grantee.
4. Several SCORE activities have the potential for scaling or replication based on cost-effectiveness, though some would benefit from improvements or more research before a scaling decision is made.

EQ2: To what extent was the intended outcome of quickly intervening to mitigate incidents of VE and conflict realized through the Rapid Response Fund?

Eight rapid response activities were funded under the Rapid Response Fund (RRF) across the six coastal counties in the period 2017-2018. Findings show that RRF activities were relevant in addressing emerging conflict and security issues. However, the RRF did not succeed in disbursing funds within 72 hours as planned. Disbursement timelines ranged from a week to several months. Despite delays, the majority of sub-grantees indicated that grants were “timely” in that they were still able to address the respective incident(s). While the life-of-project (LOP) target is 20 RRF interventions, some respondents are confident that SCORE will meet this target in 2019.

EQ 2 Conclusions

1. SCORE partially achieved its outcome of quickly intervening to mitigate incidents of VE and conflict through the RRF mechanism—the mechanism achieved mitigation, though not as quickly as designed.
2. Criteria/communication about the RRF review and approval processes were unclear to some sub-grantees.
3. Though it is realistic for SCORE to achieve its current RRF target, 20 RRF interventions over the life of the project, the chosen indicator for this objective is problematic.

4. As implemented thus far, the RRF could more realistically be defined as a flexible conflict mitigation facility, rather than a rapid response mechanism, given the challenges of transferring assistance as quickly as had been envisioned.

EQ3: To what extent has the organizational and technical capacity-building approach used by SCORE been effective in developing a cadre of CSOs capable of responding to conflict and CVE?

All the sub-grantees have made significant improvements to both organizational and technical capacity, particularly in (a) establishing and improving operational policies and governance structures, b) better financial management, internal controls and resource mobilization c) improved communication, d) better understanding, and use of Monitoring, Evaluation, Research, and Learning (MERL) frameworks and e) increase in CVE technical capacity. Findings show there is still room for more capacity building in the areas of resource mobilization, communication, advocacy, conflict mapping, and MERL. Most sub-grantees were optimistic about meeting their capacity building targets set in their Institutional Improvement Plans (IIPs) by SCORE's end, whereas others reported difficulty achieving their targets due to resource challenges.

EQ 3 Conclusions

1. SCORE's capacity building approach has been effective at increasing the capacity of sub-grantees.
2. Additional capacity building in one or more areas is still required for the majority of sub-grantees.
3. As a program, SCORE could have done a better job at establishing, tracking, and documenting capacity building requirements and sub-grantees' progress towards them.
4. SCORE is unlikely to achieve its LOP target for its indicator, although qualitative findings suggest SCORE succeeded in improving sub-grantee capacity. The chosen indicator and its associated data source (organizational capacity assessment (OCA) tool) to measure this objective are problematic.

EQ4: To what extent have the structures, activities, and networks established by SCORE been adopted and institutionalized in order to allow them to sustainably respond to conflict and CVE in the short, medium, and long term?

Sub-grantees, communities, and some county governments show some evidence of taking ownership of SCORE networks, structures, and activities. Manifestations of this include SCORE-driven community engagement activities, peace mechanisms, peace clubs in schools, women-focused activities, trauma healing, interfaith dialogues and support for CAPs that are operating on their own without support from SCORE. SCORE does not have a well-documented exit or sustainability plan, though sub-grantees are thinking about sustainability to varying degrees, such as pursuing additional funding to build on their SCORE activities or anchoring activities in existing government or community structures.

School peace clubs, *Nyumba Kumi* trainings, Community Wildlife Associations (CWAs), trauma counselling, 'good parenting' instruction, work with official peace committees and social media engagement will likely continue as the structures have grassroots ownership. In contrast, respondents said that radio-based interventions and the mini/dhow buzz approach are unlikely to continue as they cannot be sustained without intensive financial support. Youth-police and community-police activities also would not continue without continued funding and sub-grantee facilitation.

EQ 4 Conclusions

1. To some extent, a few SCORE built and strengthened structures show evidence of beginning to be adopted or institutionalized by sub-grantees, national and county government entities, and communities, though future sustainability is not guaranteed beyond the short-term.
2. Act! and sub-grantees are thinking about program exit and sustainability, although not in a systematized or well documented way.
3. SCORE activities that show evidence of community adoption or are low-cost, and/or informal/de-centralized in their implementation are most likely to continue. Activities that are resource intensive, are formal/centralized in their implementation, and require CSO mediation are unlikely to continue.

RECOMMENDATIONS

SHORT-TERM

1. SCORE should work with sub-grantees to make slight programming adjustments to more promising activities identified in this evaluation, with a focus on maximizing success factors.
2. SCORE should develop concise communication that explains how RRF grants are reviewed, processed, and approved/denied in order to manage applicant expectations.
3. For capacity building, SCORE should continue assisting sub-grantees on implementing their IIPs, with continued focus on MERL, resource mobilization, advocacy, and conflict analysis.
4. SCORE should assist sub-grantees with exit and sustainability plans in a more organized manner.
5. SCORE should intensify advocacy and relationship building with national/county governments to promote adoption/resourcing of SCORE activities supporting government structures.

LONG-TERM

1. USAID/KEA should consider ways to better link with other technical sectors and their programming to more holistically tackle VE. USAID or other development partners should do more research on promising activities for which impact is still unclear. Future CVE/conflict mitigation programming should be designed inclusively with potential beneficiaries, the GOK, and other stakeholders to ensure they are accessible, relevant, and maximize impact.
2. Future CVE programming could consider promoting and possibly scaling up: low-cost, decentralized community engagement activities including theater, dialogues/barazas; community-police and youth-police engagements with adjustments and careful contextualization; interfaith dialogues and work through religious leaders as long as engagement is focused and consistent; and sensitization through existing government and community structures. Implementers of such activities should first develop a sustainability and take-over plan with associated government agencies.
3. USAID should reflect on the purpose and definition of the RRF for future CVE programming and decide if flexibility should be built into the CVE program itself or a stand-alone response mechanism. If it is deemed that the facility should be responsive to urgent conflict/CVE issues, then the current contracting mechanism is inadequate and should be revised. USAID should revise the indicators for the RRF, moving away from a single output indicator to between 1-3 customized process and outcome indicators.
4. USAID should continue to provide capacity building opportunities for implementing partners. Future support should be strengthened in its approach and consider measuring capacity building using 1-3 indicators that assess multiple manifestations of capacity.

EVALUATION PURPOSE

The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the overall effectiveness to date of the Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism (SCORE) program and inform decision-making about future countering violent extremism (CVE) interventions. Toward these ends, the evaluation provides evidence about what kinds of CVE interventions are most effective, in what combinations, and in what contexts. To the extent possible, the evaluation will also serve to inform the final year of SCORE implementation with an eye towards sustainability.

The primary audiences for the evaluation are Act Change Transform (Act!), the SCORE implementing partner, and its local sub-grantees, who will use the findings as a basis for instituting corrective actions in the remaining year of the program; and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Kenya and East Africa (KEA), who will use the findings to inform ongoing and new programming to mitigate conflict and CVE. Evaluation results will also be shared with a secondary audience including USAID/Washington and other key stakeholders, including the Government of Kenya (GOK) — in particular, several offices within the Ministry of Interior, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)— relevant county governments, and development partners such as the European Union, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and the British Department for International Development, which have similar CVE programs in Kenya.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation addressed the following four evaluation questions (EQs) and associated sub-questions:

EQ1: How effective have the conflict mitigation and CVE approaches/tools (e.g. trauma therapy, radio programs, development of county CVE Action Plans, community theater, sports for peace, etc.) adapted by the SCORE sub-grantees been in building community resilience to violent extremism (VE)?

- 1.1 Which worked, which were less successful, and what can we learn from these experiences?
- 1.2 Which approaches could be taken to scale, either through this or other ongoing or future programs?

EQ2: To what extent was the intended outcome of quickly intervening to mitigate incidents of VE and conflict realized through the Rapid Response Fund? How relevant were the approaches used (how responsive were they to ongoing contextual changes related to conflict and VE)?

- 2.1 What is the likelihood of achieving intended output/result targets under this objective by the end of the activity in 2019?
- 2.2 Were the expected output/outcome targets under this objective realistic given the project timeframe and resources?

EQ3: To what extent has the organizational and technical capacity-building approach used by SCORE been effective in developing a cadre of civil society organizations (CSOs) capable of responding to conflict and CVE?

- 3.1 What is the likelihood of achieving intended output/result targets under this objective by the end of the activity in 2019?
- 3.2 Were expected output/outcome targets under this objective realistic given the project timeframe and resources?

EQ4: To what extent are the structures, activities, and networks established by SCORE been adopted and institutionalized in order to allow them to sustainably respond to conflict and CVE in the short, medium, and long term?

- 4.1 What evidence shows that the project is adequately considering exit strategies to ensure sustainability of results over time?
- 4.2 Which conditions and mechanisms are in place so that the benefits of the project interventions are sustained and owned by the beneficiaries after the project comes to an end?

BACKGROUND

Kenya has been targeted by terrorism since the 1998 Al-Qaeda bombing of the United States Embassy in Nairobi. In recent years, terrorism has become one of the biggest threats facing the nation, particularly the coastal and northeastern parts of the country. In particular, Kenya has become a target for al-Shabaab, which seeks to ensure a constant supply of manpower through radicalization and recruitment of vulnerable Kenyan youth.

Violent Extremism (VE) in Kenya is sustained and driven by both push and pull factors that reflect complicated structural problems and dysfunctional social dynamics. Broadly, push factors, as outlined in USAID's *Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency* are important in creating the conditions that favor the rise or spread in appeal of VE or insurgency.² Globally, the most consistent push factors are perceptions of marginalization and injustice, exposure to violence, and feelings of isolation. Within the Kenyan coastal region context, the push factors have included a perception that government is against the Muslim community. This is evidenced for some in the region by difficulties in obtaining national identity cards, travel documents like passports, and land ownership documents. More significantly, counterterrorism initiatives by the GOK are seen as collectively criminalizing the Muslim community. This includes security sweeps that target Muslim youth and the extra-judicial killings of Muslim clerics and other citizens suspected of being involved with VE groups.³

Pull factors include the personal rewards that membership in a group or movement and participation in its activities may confer. This may include “the belief that joining a violent movement or gang holds the best prospects of achieving justice or purpose.”⁴ The pull factors in the coastal region include perceived and real economic and financial incentives offered by al-Shabaab, opportunity for remedial justice, fulfilment of religious duty to defend Islam and fellow Muslims, and peer pressure amongst the youth that it is “cool” to be an al-Shabaab militant who is feared and respected. The presence of an organized recruitment network associated with al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) has contributed to increased recruitment across the country. Subsequently there has been an increase of homegrown violent extremists who have spearheaded attacks that have led to the death of hundreds of innocent Kenyans.⁵ Aside from the pull factors, the enabling environment is characterized by the presence of radical preachers in mosques, al-Shabaab cells and/or sympathizers and proximity of the coastal region to Somalia. Local al-Shabaab bases are located in the expansive Boni forest that straddles the Kenya (Lamu) and Somalia (Ras Kamboni) border.

VE will continue to be a dynamic phenomenon and will continue to pose real danger, not only in Kenya but also within the region, as the threat evolves and adapts to counter measures.⁶ For instance, until recently, VE acts had disproportionately featured men of various ages, class, ethnicity, and religious profiling. However, a woman can be both “a mother of peace” and “a mother of war,” and it is with that in mind that recent CVE projects have now sought quality engagement with women to thwart certain

² USAID Policy / The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency, 2011

³ USAID/SCORE Local Needs Assessment: Conflict and Violent Extremism in Coastal Region of Kenya

⁴ USAID Policy / The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency, 2011

⁵ USAID/NiWajibu Wetu Actors and Opportunities Mapping report, 2016

⁶ USAID/KTI Qualitative Study on Countering Violent Extremism Programming

pressures and vulnerabilities.⁷ Consequently, CVE interventions have increasingly acknowledged the role women can play as disruptors and connectors in a conflict situation. Women have been identified as being best placed to reach out to youth, to bridge the gap between youth and communities, and to disseminate CVE information to a larger number of people.⁸

The GOK has thus made CVE a priority. It established an NCTC, issued an amnesty for al-Shabaab fighters, and promulgated a National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in 2016. The National Strategy highlights the importance of evidence-based efforts and sets out multiple pillars/areas of intervention. The strategy also defines a clear role for Kenyan civil society in CVE.⁹

USAID has supported both the GOK and civil society in the fight against VE. Under the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) program, USAID supported CVE interventions in an informal settlement in Nairobi (Eastleigh) and its environs, and in 2012 it expanded to the coastal counties of Lamu, Kilifi, Kwale, Malindi, and Mombasa.¹⁰ In 2014, USAID supported an Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) integrated approach to conflict mitigation and CVE through Kenya Tuna Uwezo (KTU), with interventions in Eastleigh and four additional informal settlements in Nairobi.¹¹ Both KTI and KTU programs were essentially pilots of a new CVE approach that operated through flexible funding mechanisms that supported individuals, networks, and organizations, often with small grants implemented over a short duration. Currently, USAID supports three activities in Kenya with components directly addressing CVE: SCORE, Peace III, and Kenya NiWajibu Wetu (NIWETU). These activities focus on youth empowerment, social and economic inclusion and opportunities, alternative messaging, local governance, enhancing knowledge and skills, trauma healing, and social cohesion.¹²

PROGRAM BACKGROUND

SCORE is a five-year program seeking to build the capacity of CSOs and communities to address root causes of conflicts and VE. SCORE is implemented by Act!, with an award value of \$4,999,999 and a period of performance of October 2014-September 2019. It covers the six counties of the coastal region of Kenya: Mombasa, Kilifi, Kwale, Taita Taveta, Tana River, and Lamu. By mid-2018, SCORE was supporting 14 CSOs with subgrants and technical assistance to implement a variety of activities aimed at addressing push and pull factors, building community resilience, and countering VE.¹³ Activities are diverse and include interfaith dialogues, fostering entrepreneurship, improving relations between the police and citizens, working with county governments to develop and implement county CVE CAPs, outreach to youth, and social media, among others. Through continuous institutional and technical capacity building, SCORE seeks to create an empowered cohort of local CSOs to counter VE and mitigate conflict. SCORE established a

⁷ UNDP/International Alert Improving the Impact of Preventing Violent Extremism Programming

⁸ USAID/SCORE Local Needs Assessment: Conflict and Violent Extremism in Coastal Region of Kenya

⁹ GOK, National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, 2015

¹⁰ USAID Mid-Term Evaluation of Three CVE Projects, 2013

¹¹ USAID/Kenya Tuna Uwezo: Final Performance Evaluation, 2016

¹² USAID CVE Fact Sheet, 2017


¹³ The program initially worked with 17 organizations; however, after a year, Act! made a determination to cut three of the original groups and focus on those deemed more able to absorb capacity building and to have an impact in their communities. According to the FY18Q3: SCORE Quarterly Report (April-June, 2018) although SCORE is technically supporting 14 CSOs, only 13 are being supported as sub-grantee SDS has not been able to attract and retain qualified staff and effectively administer the program, a situation that has forced Act! to suspend its sub-award. The program also supports Rapid Response Fund initiatives that are open to “pre-qualified” organizations including the initial 17 sub-grantees and a number of other groups. The pre-qualification was done during the first Request for Application (RFA) window in 2015. The program is also flexible in terms of adding additional sub-grantees as the need arises. to include KYBI which is now the 14th subgrantee, replacing SDS.

Rapid Response Fund (RRF) to provide these and other CSOs with resources to quickly intervene to mitigate incidents of VE and conflict while also enabling them to “learn by doing.”

THEORY OF CHANGE AND INTENDED RESULTS

Within the USAID Kenya Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) 2014-18 Results Framework, SCORE contributes to Development Objective (DO) 1, “Devolution effectively implemented,” by directly working towards Intermediate Result 1.3, “Informed and empowered citizens will participate in county affairs.” SCORE’s development hypothesis is summarized in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1: Development hypothesis



In order to achieve the goal of an informed and empowered citizenry in county affairs related to CVE, the program works towards three interrelated objectives:

1. Strengthen community resilience against conflict and VE;
2. Enhance institutional functionality and technical capacity of targeted CSOs to address conflict mitigation and CVE in the context of devolution; and
3. Establish a fund that can rapidly and effectively respond to incidents of violence, be it from community conflict or VE.

EVALUATION METHODS & LIMITATIONS

This mixed-methods evaluation included the following data collection methods: 1) a **desk review** of program documents; 2) 33 **key informant interviews** (KIIs) including 82 respondents; 3) 24 **focus group discussions** (FGDs) including 172 beneficiaries of SCORE activities; and 4) a quantitative **mini survey administered** in person to 241 respondents during the KII/FGDs (see Table I for a gender breakdown of respondents). Following the desk review, the evaluation team (ET), composed of four members, conducted three weeks of field work in early September 2018 within the six program counties in Kenya. Fieldwork began with an in-brief meeting held with USAID and Act! staff on September 10th. The ET conducted primary data collection in Nairobi and the first day in Mombasa as one team, then split into sub-teams for the remainder of fieldwork. The team concluded the field work in Nairobi with preliminary analysis and an out briefing presentation to USAID and Act! on September 28th. See **Annex B** for all data collection protocol(s) and **Annex C** for a list of evaluation respondents.

Table I: KIIs, FGDs, and mini surveys completed

33 KIIs (82 individuals)	
54 Male	28 Female
24 FGDs (172 individuals)	
61 Male	111 Female
Mini Survey (241 individuals¹⁴)	
105 Male	127 Female

DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND SOURCES

DESK REVIEW AND SELECTION OF CVE/CONFLICT MITIGATION APPROACHES

Prior to and throughout field work, the ET conducted a desk review of available programmatic documentation, including Act! reporting, sub-grantee reporting, RRF proposals, Monitoring, Evaluation, Research, and Learning (MERL) data, and other white papers or lessons learned documents. The ET extracted relevant findings from the documents and used contextual information to inform the evaluation design. Based on the desk review, the ET grouped SCORE's diverse activities into six main CVE and conflict mitigation approaches on which to focus the evaluation for EQs 1 and 4: (1) Interfaith dialogues and targeting religious leaders, (2) Community policing, (3) Women-focused activities, (4) Youth-focused and youth entrepreneurship activities, (5) Engaging government entities, and (6) Community engagement.

To examine effectiveness, the ET used reporting documentation and available MERL data to understand sub-grantees' expected outcomes and compare indicator actuals to targets to determine whether the intervention is on track to achieve these outcomes by the end of SCORE. To help assess sustainability, the ET mined documents for sub-grantees' proposed sustainability strategies, if available. For EQ 2, the ET compared the RRF proposal submission date to the funding and implementation dates to assess the timeliness of the RRF mechanism. For EQ 3, the ET examined organizational capacity assessment (OCA) scores and Institutional Improvement Plan (IIP) narratives over time. Desk review findings for sub-grantees were documented in excel tables (see **Annex D**) and triangulated with KII/FGD and mini survey data.

¹⁴ Nine mini survey respondents did not indicate their gender

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

The ET conducted KIs either with individuals or small groups of key informants to gather findings for all EQs. Key informants and their sub-groupings (as referred to in this report¹⁵) included:

- USAID/Act! (USAID/KEA staff; Act! staff)
- Sub-grantee
- GOK/Security (National and county government officials [NCTC or Deputy/Assistant Commissioners], Security officials [police commanders and constables])
- CVE Expert

Sampling for KIs: Key informants were purposively sampled based on their role and the nature of their engagement with SCORE. Act!, sub-grantee, and USAID helped to inform the ET's selection of key informants. In the majority of cases the ET's logisticians invited key informants to participate. For certain respondent types (e.g., GOK/Security), an USAID, Act!, or sub-grantee representative made initial contact with the participants and the ET followed up.

FOCUS GROUPS DISCUSSIONS

The ET conducted FGDs with a subset of beneficiaries in order to contribute findings for EQ 1 and 4. FGD respondent groups aligned with the evaluation's focus on the six approaches and a subset of their beneficiaries: youth who participated in youth-focused and youth entrepreneurship activities, women who participated in women-focused activities, community members who participated in community engagement activities, and religious leaders who participated in interfaith dialogues. FGDs were guided by a semi-structured FGD protocol, included six to ten individuals, and lasted approximately two hours. All FGDs with community members, all FGDs with women, and select FGDs with youth were gender segregated to better elicit gender-specific perspectives and provide a comfortable environment for more open discussion among participants.

Sampling for FGDs: The ET sampled FGD participants using a combination of stratified and convenience sampling. Sub-grantees provided the ET with participant lists or attendance sheets from SCORE activities. The ET randomly selected primary and alternate candidates from the list. In some cases, FGD beneficiary lists were so small that random sampling was not feasible, and therefore participants were invited and confirmed based on their availability to attend. In certain cases (FGDs with religious leaders and FGDs with women who experienced trauma), the sub-grantee preferred to select and invite FGD participants.

MINI SURVEY

KIs and FGDs began with a very short written mini survey, slightly tailored for different respondent groups. This allowed for some common questions to be asked of all respondents. Each respondent took five to ten minutes to fill out the mini survey before the interview. The mini survey was based on a structured paper-based questionnaire and provided in English and Kiswahili. If the respondent was not

¹⁵ To protect respondent confidentiality the ET refers to respondent groups rather than individual respondents throughout the report. The ET combined sub-groups with small sample sizes into larger respondent groups as another strategy for maintaining confidentiality.

literate, then a member of the ET read aloud the survey form to the respondent in a private location and recorded the respondent's answers.

POTENTIAL BIASES AND LIMITATIONS

Potential Biases: There is the possibility of selection bias on the part of the ET for non-random samples, especially those for which USAID, Act!, or a sub-grantee were involved. Respondent answers may be subject to recall bias related to past experiences, as well as response/desirability biases whereby respondents may alter their answers due to explicit or implicit expectations. The ET attempted to mitigate recall and desirability biases by asking respondents the same question using multiple phrasings in order to internally triangulate for consistency in responses. Gender bias could be present for mixed-gender FGDs with youth, although the ET mitigated against this by trying to probe for responses from each gender throughout the discussion. Lastly, it is possible that wording of the mini survey could have provoked misunderstanding in certain instances.

Generalizability: Sample sizes for each respondent type and for each approach are relatively small. Evaluation results may therefore be indicative of those who participated but cannot be generalized to the rest of SCORE stakeholders or the general public.

Scheduling limitations: The ET made several attempts to speak with as many stakeholders as possible within the available fieldwork period, including proposing phone interviews with respondents who were not available for in-person interviews. Nevertheless, due to availability constraints the ET was unable to speak to some key informants such as Sustainable Development Solutions (SDS), meaning that this sub-grantee's perspective is not included in the report. Similarly, the ET only succeeded in speaking with one CVE expert. As the evaluation timeline only allowed for an average of one to two days with each sub-grantee, the ET was limited in the number of FGDs they were able to hold with beneficiaries per sub-grantee and approach.

See **Annex A** for a full description of the evaluation methodology.

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

EVALUATION QUESTION I: FINDINGS

EQ I. How effective have the conflict mitigation and CVE approaches/tools adapted by the SCORE sub-grantees been in building community resilience to VE?

Quantitative data, document review, and qualitative interviews with respondents across all types and counties all indicate that SCORE is having several positive, higher level effects in targeted communities. Reported benefits include, (a) greater awareness and discussion about CVE and conflict, (b) a decrease in VE recruitment, and (c) greater resilience to VE and conflict, such as increased mechanisms to reduce conflict, and greater trust between groups. We begin by providing summary results from the mini-survey and then discuss each of these advances in turn. Full summary tables for each mini-survey question broken out by gender and type of respondent can be found in **Annex F**.

Mini-survey results show that 57 percent of respondents (133 out of 234 respondents) believed that Kenya's coastal communities are either "more able" (40 percent) or "much more able" (17 percent) to counter VE than they were two years ago, and 60 percent of respondents (142 out of 237 respondents) believed that coastal communities are either "more able" (46 percent) or "much more able" (14 percent) to respond to conflict than they were two years ago.

Figure 2: Percent of respondents who believe that Kenya's coastal communities are able to counter violent extremism





Figure 3: Percent of respondents who believe that Kenya's coastal communities are able to respond to conflict



A larger percentage believed that SCORE had a positive impact on communities' ability to respond to VE and conflict. Approximately 84 percent of respondents believed that SCORE has been "effective" or "very effective" at helping Kenya's coastal communities to counter VE (197 out of 234 respondents), and 83 percent believed that SCORE has been "effective" or "very effective" at helping them respond to conflict (199 out of 239 respondents).¹⁶

¹⁶ It is perhaps surprising that a higher percentage of respondents rate SCORE as having an impact than view a positive change. This could be because respondents have a natural bias to praise SCORE, because other factors also affect community resilience, or because some respondents might have misunderstood the first set of questions, thinking they were being asked to rate community resilience in the past rather than now.

Figure 4: Percent of respondents who believe that SCORE has been effective at helping Kenya's coastal communities counter violent extremism





Figure 5: Percent of respondents who believe that SCORE has been effective at helping Kenya's coastal communities respond to conflict



Qualitative interviews confirm these mini survey findings and shed light on specific results. One of the most prominent results reported in qualitative interviews with USAID/Act! sub-grantee staff, FGD beneficiaries, and GOK/Security respondents is that communities are more knowledgeable about VE or conflict and their role in preventing it. These sources suggest that community members are talking more openly about VE than they were four years ago when SCORE first started. According to various respondents, there is a better understanding of rights, an improved ability to identify signs of radicalization, and a better understanding when religion or politics are being misused to spur conflict or VE. Many respondents tied awareness and other results to specific SCORE activities. This is explained more in the findings for EQ 1.1. Yet some respondents were careful to note that a general increase in awareness could not be attributed to SCORE alone, given the number of other stakeholders working on CVE issues in Kenya.

Another salient result reported in KIs and FGDs in all counties was a decrease in recruitment into VE groups and criminal gangs. In different KIs with sub-grantees and GOK/Security, as well as FGDs with women, religious leaders, and youth, respondents stated that they observed or heard about fewer community members going to Somalia to join al-Shabaab. Respondents connected falls in recruitment, in part, to preventative efforts of programs like SCORE. For example, a KI respondent noted, “People have been sensitized...of the dangers of involvement in extremism. Projects like SCORE contributed to showing young people and communities that there are people who are misusing Islam and these people cannot be defended. People now know that extremists peddle falsehoods about violence and Islam.” Similar to awareness, some respondents, including sub-grantees and GOK/Security were cognizant that these results cannot be solely attributed to SCORE. For example, the negative experiences with VE groups of disillusioned returnees (with whom SCORE does not work) or gang members have also played a role.

Although many respondents agreed that communities are less susceptible to VE messages and recruitment, some respondents noted evolving changes in the VE landscape. These include extremists going “underground” and using new recruitment tactics (e.g., no longer targeting individuals in mosques), individuals now turning to gangs and drugs instead of al-Shabaab, and women being recruited to al-Shabaab as wives using deceptive tactics. Respondents believed that SCORE and other programs need to pivot to address these emerging threats.

Respondents reported three other indicators of resilience: increased trust between civil society and state actors, increased tolerance between different groups, and the establishment or strengthening of structures

for responding to VE and conflict (see EQ 4 findings for details about sustainability of these structures). For increased trust between civil society and state actors, respondents gave examples of better working relationships with county and national government representatives, community members no longer running away from police, police having a better understanding of community needs, and examples in all counties of increased reporting to authorities of VE or conflict related activity. Respondents directly attributed these results to SCORE's work to engage security actors (e.g., youth-police dialogues and community policing). Respondents linked interfaith dialogues, peace clubs, cultural extravaganzas in Taita Taveta, and peace committee work in Tana River to an observed increase in tolerance between different ethnic or religious groups, which, according to respondents, contributed to peaceful elections in 2017. Lastly, respondents identified community-based structures taking a more active role in leading peace and security efforts (e.g., *Nyumba Kumi*,¹⁷ trauma support groups, CVE multi-stakeholder forums) as indicators of SCORE's effectiveness.

INCLUSIVITY CONCERNS

Gender: When asked, the majority of respondents across all respondent types in KIs and FGDs felt that both men and women were adequately included in SCORE activities, though this inclusion manifested in different ways. For example, some respondents spoke about SCORE activities targeting both men and women for the same activities (i.e., youth entrepreneurship, youth-police dialogues), whereas other activities were designed to attract one gender more than the other (e.g., community policing having a higher target for male participants). Respondents reported an understanding of meeting gender quotas. They were also able to articulate why including participants of both genders was important, and what value add women or men's inclusions brought to an intervention given their social roles in private and public spaces, and the perspectives they bring as a result.

Respondents offered several examples of how including different genders impacted activity implementation or outcomes. In KIs with sub-grantees and FGDs with youth and women, respondents noted that—within Kenya's cultural context—some male youth listen more to older men, so engaging men gave at-risk male youth role models. In Kwale, involving older men (as wardens of public spaces) allowed the sub-grantee to conduct activities in VE hotspots. Respondents in KIs and FGDs with women, men, religious leaders, and youth spoke about how involving women had a positive impact on engaging youth and community members; women's role in Kenya as primary caretakers meant that they could see and address early signs of radicalization amongst children and youth, that youth confide more in women, and that women are good at mobilizing youth and community members for CVE sensitization events. In Mombasa, sub-grantee KI respondents believed that having both male and female actors in community theater performances allowed for characters that both genders could relate to and stated that female actors receive questions from the community after the performance. A few sub-grantee and FGD respondents noted as well how including both genders in larger forums gave the impression that CVE is an issue for everyone (not something for which one gender should be singled out), and that reaching out to both male and female gang members ensured a better understanding of the push/pull factors for each gender joining gangs. At the same time, sub-grantees that had women-focused targeting noted how working with one gender alone is also important so

¹⁷ *Nyumba Kumi* is a government initiative introduced in Kenyan communities by presidential order in 2013 with the purpose of anchoring community policing at the household level. See the presidential order online here: http://kenyalaw.org/kenya_gazette/gazette/volume/NjgI/Vol.%20CXV-No.%20159

as to design gender-sensitive programming (e.g., working with women traumatized by VE events) and to not drown one gender's voice in a group (e.g., working with women leaders in Tana River).

A few respondents, however, did report gender disparities or other mixed results regarding participation and higher-level outcomes. Respondents noted an overall increase in women's participation—in some cases this participation was higher than men's, especially regarding community sensitization efforts. For example, in Mombasa a sub-grantee reported more women attending theater outreaches because many women are not allowed to go out in public and theatre performances occur in women-friendly spaces within neighborhoods rather than in public meeting halls; in Kwale a sub-grantee respondent reported female youth being more active and reaping more benefits in a business plan competition for youth entrepreneurs; and in Taita Taveta and Tana River, FGD and KII respondents reported women proactively organizing peaceful demonstrations. In Taita Taveta, male and female community members noted in FGDs that because most development programs target women and *"women are at the forefront of development issues and have to drag men along,"* it took some time for male community members to understand that they could also participate in development activities, but now men are both participating more in CVE and allowing women to do the same.

KII data suggests that more can be done to engage both women and men. Respondents in KIIs and FGDs across counties reported how men, more so than women, expect remuneration for attending activities or meetings, and thus are harder to mobilize to participate. In Kilifi, FGD respondents reported that women's participation was strong, but some felt women's voices were still overshadowed by men's, thus the need for concentrated work with women: *"In [our] culture, women do not participate in public issues but [SCORE] stressed the presence of women. [SCORE's] work has helped women to learn to express themselves publicly, but it will take time"* (FGD youth). In Kwale and Mombasa, respondents noted that young women's needs and their recruitment into VE is not well understood, and that different strategies to engage them are necessary. On the other hand, a few respondents felt that some interventions overly focused on one gender and should be more impartial—one respondent suggested that CVE clinics and peace clubs should target both parents (as opposed to only targeting mothers), and other respondents noted that many community members are affected by VE related trauma and are in need of counselling, not just women.

"The strategies we are using are designed for young men because they were the most effective. This involvement of girls is a new trend we are struggling with. For girls we were focusing on early marriages, early pregnancies, but now with CVE there is need to come up with strategies that would either prevent or curb VE amongst girls." – FGD with women

Youth: Findings were generally positive regarding youth (ages 18-34 years) inclusion and engagement in SCORE activities, though a few sub-grantees thought that more could be done to: 1) increase the reach and relevance of activity design for youth, and 2) target and contextualize programming for younger children. The majority of respondents reported that activities adequately encouraged youth participation, including a few reported cases of increased youth participation in venues from which they were previously absent (e.g., county budget development processes or *barazas* [public meetings] called by village chiefs). A few sub-grantees and FGD respondents, however, felt that more could be done to engage youth more regularly, promote economic empowerment (especially in situations where entrepreneurship training

occurred but was not successfully followed with start-up funding), and to include youth in the design of youth activities (e.g., youth camps). Different FGD respondent types also brought up independently that SCORE's CVE clinics in peace clubs or other school-based activities should target even younger children in classes 4-5 (approximately ages 7-13 years), who did not yet fall into the youth category, as VE and gang recruitment is affecting younger children these days.

Persons with disabilities (PWDs): Some respondents independently brought up that SCORE did not adequately engage PWDs, but that this was important to promote inclusivity and because all community members have a role to play with regards to CVE and conflict mitigation.

COMBINING ACTIVITIES

Both KII and FGD respondents believed that CVE activities do not work best in isolation or as one-off events, as beneficiaries need sustained or multiple types of support for results to mature and take root. Sub-grantees have tried in different ways to combine activities, including (a) integrating activities so that they feed into other activities, (b) attempting to have the same individuals participate in multiple activities, and (c) partnering with other CSOs (SCORE and non-Score partners) or entities to link beneficiaries to other activities from which they can benefit.

As an example of integrating activities, two sub-grantees in Mombasa gave examples of how they try to post content from certain activities (e.g., mini/dhow buzz content and community theater recordings) on social media in order to better understand the public's reaction to these activities and reach more beneficiaries. Public feedback on social media is then used to inform the next sensitization activity. Another sub-grantee in Kwale described how their youth entrepreneurship program was intentionally designed so that the same beneficiaries undergo a series of sequenced activities that lead from training to economic empowerment—each cohort receives CVE sensitization and computer training, are then encouraged to participate in a business plan competition for networking and potential funding by the private sector, are required to train new cohorts in business skills and contribute counter narratives against VE to an online portal, as well as other activities. In Kwale, Mombasa, Tana River, and Lamu, sub-grantees that have not been able to provide multiple activities to the same beneficiaries themselves reported that they try to link their beneficiaries to activities being conducted by other SCORE sub-grantees, other CSOs, as well as government programs. Indeed, respondents in a USAID/Act! KII noted that Act! encourages sub-grantees to plan activities together if they are working in the same county, although this collaboration has not been easy to achieve.

Although several KII and FGD respondents recognized the need to avoid isolated activities, some reported instances in which SCORE activities fell short by not adequately combining activities, which threatened to reduce impact. FGDs with youth, community members, and religious leaders complained that sensitization efforts to reform gang members or dissuade community members against extremist activities was not sufficient as implemented by SCORE, as these activities were not always combined with economic opportunities to keep reformed individuals from relapsing. One KII respondent similarly felt that economic opportunities are necessary for women affected by VE, but that SCORE was unable to provide this additional support. The main barrier to effective sequencing appeared to be funding, as these sub-grantees did not have adequate resources, either through SCORE or other programs, to offer follow-on activities to participants who were sensitized or just beginning to be engaged.

EQ 1.1 Which worked, which were less successful, and what can we learn from these experiences?

INTERFAITH DIALOGUES¹⁸

Three sub-grantees across four counties (Kikozi-Lamu, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM)-Kilifi/Kwale/Mombasa, National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK)-Kilifi/Kwale/Mombasa), brought together religious leaders or youth of different faiths (dialogues including Muslims, Christians, and adherents of Kaya [traditional spirituality practiced by Kaya forest inhabitants]) to talk about CVE. Religious leaders were asked to continue to sensitize their constituencies to CVE by disseminating CVE messages and encouraging peace.

In each of the KIs and FGDs with sub-grantees, religious leaders, and youth associated with this approach, respondents suggested that the dialogues and sensitization of constituencies produced positive results. These include (a) changing perceptions of followers of other religions, (b) promoting mutual respect between religions, and (c) contributing to a reduction in radicalization. In an FGD with Muslim youth, for example, respondents spoke about how people used to “*takes sides with their own religion*,” but have now learned that violence cannot be defended, even if it comes from one’s own religion. Similarly, an FGD with Christian religious leaders mentioned that people would previously vote along religious lines, but that people voted more freely in the 2017 election after sensitization. Respondents in two FGDs with Christian religious leaders reported that some Christian clerics used to profile all Muslims as extremists, but through the dialogues have been able to recognize that profiling is a driver of extremism, and that VE exists in other religions as well, including Christianity. In Kwale, religious leaders in an FGD reported examples of interfaith prayer rallies. They claimed that Christians and Muslims are more freely able to attend their own functions or participate in another religion’s functions without fear. Respondents noted that the peaceful nature of the 2017 elections was an indicator that sensitization through religious leaders had a positive effect.

Respondents believed that targeting religious leaders for interfaith dialogues was a success factor. Respondents noted that these leaders’ moral authority and large followings allowed them to reach many people and to show them how political leaders or extremists manipulate religion to incite discord. Having leaders demonstrate interfaith cohesion showed that if religious leaders can be united, then members of their faith could be too.

Though most respondents believed interfaith dialogue produced positive results, some noted challenges and limitations as well. First, respondents in one FGD with youth pointed out that interfaith dialogues among youth had only included a small number of youths, therefore its reach and impact was limited. Second, among religious leaders, respondents in one FGD reported that intra-faith dialogues

“We were made to understand we should support one another, and as leaders we realized we have responsibilities of leading the people in worship to advocate for peace.” – FGD with religious leaders

¹⁸ Although the ET spoke with Christian clerics and Muslim youth, the ET was not able to speak with clerics or youths of other faiths—Kaya members, Muslim clerics, Christian youth—associated with the activities and therefore these stakeholders’ perceptions of the approach is unknown.

within the Christian community were still needed as Christians are still divided and inciting violence along political lines. Third, respondents in this same FGD also noted that sensitization through religious leaders was not enough, and that economic drivers were still a factor for extremism: *“We sensitized, and people changed, but without opportunities and them being jobless makes them vulnerable to relapsing back to extremism.”* Fourth, one sub-grantee expressed uncertainty about the results, noting that religion is still misused and that it is hard to tell if people are changing.

One sub-grantee in Kwale worked with madrasas and Early Childhood Development (ECD) centers to establish a standardized madrasa curriculum. The purpose of the curriculum was to vet madrasa teachers and ensure consistent teaching. Respondents reported that this structure is now self-governing (see EQ 4 findings for more detail). The ET was unable to speak with any madrasa teachers or students involved in this effort, so more research is needed. However, sub-grantee KII and respondents in an FGD with women reported that there was an observed difference between madrasas who are part of the effort and those that are not; some respondents also asserted that they prefer to send their children to the madrasa who are part of the effort.

COMMUNITY POLICING

Nyumba Kumi Training: Three sub-grantees across three counties (Management of Arid Zones Initiatives and Development Options (MAZIDO)-Taita Taveta, Human Rights Agenda (HURIA)-Kwale, and Kikozi-Lamu) trained *Nyumba Kumi* (“ten houses”) committee members. Sub-grantee, GOK/Security, and FGD respondents associated with all three sub-grantees reported that this intervention was effective at increasing *Nyumba Kumi* committee members’ understanding of their roles and responsibilities with regards to community security and CVE, and how to discreetly report suspicious activity to appropriate authorities. Respondents cited instances of how, as a result of the training, participating *Nyumba Kumi* communities are more readily reporting information and taking a proactive role in solving threats to peace and security. One FGD participant stated that the training imparted, *“new skills to take care of our own security, even sometimes without involving the police, because sometimes it’s dangerous for us to involve the police.”* A GOK/Security respondent noted that in cases where *Nyumba Kumi* members may not feel comfortable reporting to police, members can report to the sub-grantee instead, and the sub-grantee would then report to the government. Some respondents noted the intervention’s targeting of an existing “grassroots” structure—the *Nyumba Kumi* committee—and use of the government’s own *Nyumba Kumi* policy to fill knowledge gaps as success factors. Another respondent noted that the training was successful because it was facilitated by the sub-grantee and included both community members and security agents as participants, allowing for the development of personal relationships between the community and security agents. These new relationships enabled community reporting to government or security officials whom community members came to know and trust.

The only downside to the intervention that respondents noted was that, due to cost constraints on the part of SCORE and the government, the trainings happened in a centralized location and involved only a small number of *Nyumba Kumi* members from selected localities. One respondent said that *Nyumba Kumi* members from communities who were not included are asking to be trained and a few respondents suggested that trainings should be conducted at the village level to reach more *Nyumba Kumi* members.

Police café/youth-police activities/community-police forums: Six sub-grantees across four counties (HURIA-Kwale, SUPKEM-Kwale and Kilifi, Kwacha-Kilifi, Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE)-Tana River, Likoni Community Development Programme (LICODEP)-Mombasa, Haki-Mombasa) used different types of dialogues, forums, and social activities to allow interactions between security agents and either community members or youth, including at-risk and gang-involved youth. In general, most respondents believed this approach to be effective, although effectiveness appears to vary depending on the county, stakeholder involved (youth or community), and the type of interaction or platform used.

In Mombasa, Tana River, and Kilifi, respondents in KIIs with sub-grantees, GOK/Security, and FGDs with youth agreed that interactions between police and youth via informal social activities, structured visits, police cafes (facilitated forums where community members voice their concerns to police), or “*Gumzo Maskani*” (facilitated meetings between police and gang members) helped improve the relationship between the two groups. Respondents cited evidence of (a) increased reporting by youth to police, (b) youth no longer running away upon seeing certain police officers, (c) joint involvement of youth and police in social media or WhatsApp groups, and (d) instances in which youth and police officers have planned friendly events together without the assistance of the sub-grantee.

In Mombasa, where youth outreach targeted criminal gangs, respondents perceived an increase in youth renouncing gangs. According to youth FGD participants and a GOK/Security respondent, using former gang members as facilitators, having police not wear uniforms, holding the interactions within the community itself, and creating a safe space for youth to talk about their problems without being intimidated by police made this approach effective. According to a sub-grantee, targeting both state and non-state actors and having sustained interactions with a limited number of youths from both elite and at-risk backgrounds helped ensure the quality of the intervention.

Respondents were also quick to point out several limitations. Respondents in sub-grantee KIIs and FGDs with youth noted the scale of youth-police activities has been small (i.e., reaching a limited number of young people), and that many youth and police continue to have negative relationships. According to FGDs with youth, SCORE activities have not been very successful at linking many reformed gang members to an income generating activity, making them liable to relapsing to crime. FGDs with youth reported that efforts to bring together the community at large and police in “*jukwa la usalaam*” (community peace meetings) were not as effective because the community is afraid to attend them given the number of illegal gangs operating in the area and the overall relationship between community and police remains weak: “*People don’t go because they fear being arrested or executed. They don’t even want to speak about their concerns. There are people who just attend, listen passively but they don’t take anything from that*” (FGD youth). Although respondents reported the in-person “*Gumzo Maskani*” approach to be effective, they were unclear if the radio talk-show version was reaching or affecting its target audience (i.e., gang members). In Kilifi, youth FGD respondents also brought up gender dynamics during police cafes and the potential for sexual harassment on behalf of police during contact sharing.

Findings were more mixed in Kwale, where respondents disagreed about the level of effectiveness of the various approaches for bringing together police and communities or youth. For example, whereas a GOK/Security respondent believed that youth-police interactions have been effective, respondents in FGDs with youth and a GOK/Security KII stated that this approach was not working well as youth still run away from police and do not report information as they believe that police will violate confidentiality—

indicators of continued mistrust. One respondent noted that religious affiliations in the region—a primarily Christian police force and a large Muslim youth population—could contribute to the barrier and misunderstanding between the two groups. On the positive side, one GOK/Security respondent reported that bringing together community members (rather than youth) and police in structured community meetings has been a more effective approach and led to an observed increase in community reporting.

Improvement of Kenya’s strained police-citizens’ relations is a key focus of the ongoing police reform process in the country,¹⁹ and KIs with GOK/Security respondents in Kwale and Mombasa suggested a positive effect on participating police and government officials. These respondents reported an increased understanding of community problems and the acceptance of a “softer” approach to obtaining information related to security, rather than the use of force. Many of the GOK/Security agents interviewed said that they shared their contact information with youth or communities and have received requests for assistance as a result.

Certain findings stood out across all counties. For example, many approaches featured awareness creation amongst the community or youth about the judicial system and citizens’ rights, which was reported by many as an effective component. In Mombasa, respondents in KIs with sub-grantees and FGDs with youth said that this empowered youth to claim their rights and use the system. In Kwale, a GOK/Security respondent believed that demystifying the court system and providing an enabling environment for people to air their grievances to police and judicial officials contributed to relationship building and increased willingness of the community to work with the system.

The majority of respondents also cited the essential role of the sub-grantee as a trusted intermediary between the community and the police, which makes the police-community or police-youth engagement possible in the first place. According to a GOK/Security respondent, *“It’s strange to find a policeman calling a meeting. [Sub-grantee] comes to bond us and that makes it effective...the community is more responsive if they see their friend there, not just the uniformed man. We will be taking our own notes and bonding with community.”* Lastly, the majority of respondents stated that relationships with police are still fragile and influenced by the actions of the police force as a whole. Respondents in KIs with sub-grantees and USAID/Act! and FGDs with youth noted that police transfers and community interactions with security agents who maintain a hardline approach, extort money from community members, and breach confidentiality of those who report, have eroded intervention gains.

“Even though the relationship has improved, there are still many more who have bad relationships with police...Police still profile youths, they just look at you and assume you are a criminal...The police have not changed as much.” – FGD with male youth

¹⁹ See Kenya National Police Service Strategic Plan, 2016.

WOMEN-FOCUSED ACTIVITIES

Trauma Counseling: One sub-grantee across three counties implemented trauma counselling (Coast Education Center (COEC) - Mombasa/Kwale/Kilifi). Respondents in the sub-grantee KII and two FGDs with women asserted that the intervention was effective at helping women who experienced VE related psychological distress heal and reintegrate into communities. In FGDs, women reported positive changes in their psycho-emotional states, from previously not being able to talk about and accept their situation (i.e., a family member being involved in al-Shabaab), to becoming emotionally stable enough to engage in economic activities to support their families. Furthermore, as suggested by the text box above, many of these women went a step further and became motivated sensitizers about VE. In one FGD, respondents cited other women reporting disappearances or other information to them rather than the police. In addition to reaching out to other women, FGD respondents claimed that—without the support of SCORE—they have been able to dissuade community members from joining al-Shabaab by organizing returnees to share negative stories with the community and using reformed returnees to confront al-Shabaab recruiters.

“Before, we never spoke, we broke down as we began to tell our situations, but today we can explain and even use our experience to help our neighbors”
– FGD with women

In Mombasa, respondents reported that a systematic approach to counselling was the key to effectiveness. This includes utilizing a trauma counselling training handbook, using women who had healed from trauma as counsellors, forming a support group, and having a manageable counsellor to client ratio (one counselor per five clients). Another reported success factor is linking affected women to entrepreneurship training and savings and loan opportunities to become economically self-reliant.

Respondents reported few limitations to trauma counselling. In an FGD, women stated that they work on a volunteer basis and, though they do their work with passion, they desire remuneration to sustain their motivation. Another respondent noted that establishing VE related safe-homes for women is still a need, as currently available gender-based violence (GBV) safe-homes have proven to be not appropriate for VE affected women, due to questioning received from other women there.

Women in peace and security: Three sub-grantees across four counties focused on women’s role in peace and security by using women as community sensitizers (Diani Chale Management Trust (DCMT) - Kwale, NCKK-Mombasa/Kwale/Kilifi) and promoting women in leadership (KECOSCE-Tana River). In general, sub-grantees trained women sensitizers on the drivers of conflict and radicalization, provided guidance on “good parenting,” and asked sensitizers to disseminate the messages to others through formal and informal channels. Results for this approach from KIIs with sub-grantees and FGDs with women involved in these activities were generally positive, suggesting that messages are being disseminated and heard by parents. For example, in Kwale, Kilifi, and Mombasa, women in FGDs cited specific examples where they identified radicalized youth and intervened. In both a KII with a sub-grantee and an FGD with women, respondents reported that other women have voiced how useful good parenting classes are, and that different villages ask for the women sensitizers to visit and teach good parenting and CVE skills. In Kwale, the trained women sensitizers helped provide the sub-grantee access to a dangerous locality for other interventions.

Though respondents generally agreed on the approach being effective, there was variation in approaches that likely impacted effectiveness. In Kwale, interactions between the sub-grantee and women sensitizers were frequent, structured, and sustained. This included biweekly reporting from women sensitizers and use of a Training of Trainers (TOT) model whereby 20 women are trained and asked to sensitize 20 more women. However, in Kilifi the sub-grantee relied on more informal dissemination, and women FGD participants reported that they could use more refresher trainings and support, including a better understanding of changing VE dynamics. Considering gender, for a sub-grantee working with women sensitizers from different faiths, a female respondent in an FGD with Christian leaders reported that Muslim women appeared to be less active in sensitization efforts than Christian women.

According to many respondents, one factor for why women sensitizers are successful include their access to other women in existing, women-dominant structures (e.g., village savings and loan groups) and cultural functions (e.g., weddings). Respondents in one FGD stated that good parenting interventions should target both parents, as mothers sometimes face opposition from fathers if they try to implement the learnings alone.

Qualitative findings were few on the third women-focused approach—training women in peacebuilding and decision making. According to respondents in KIs and FGDs associated with this approach, the training has positively resulted in women becoming more involved in peace structures in Tana River (e.g., becoming peace committee representatives, being elected to government offices, and leading the planning of the international day of peace), whereby conflict management was previously dominated by men. Although women’s inclusion in these spaces is a positive first step, the ET was unable to collect findings or evidence of what effect women’s inclusion in peace structures has had on the VE and conflict dynamics.

YOUTH-FOCUSED ACTIVITIES AND YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Youth-focused activities: Five sub-grantees across three counties (HURIA-Kwale, DCMT-Kwale, LICODEP-Mombasa, SUPKEM-Mombasa, Kwacha-Kilifi) engaged children or youth through clinics, clubs, or camps to discuss CVE, peace, and security issues. Respondents in sub-grantee KIs and FGDs with youth and community members reported positive results for CVE clinics for youth and children, especially as a preventative measure against youth joining violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and gangs. As noted in the textbox there is a strong theoretical reason to target youth when they are young. Two sub-grantees implemented the approach as part of school clubs, and one sub-grantee targeted youth outside of school in *maskanis* (informal public spaces where youth gather) and mosques. For those implemented at school, respondents in FGDs with youth and community members, as well as KIs with sub-grantees believed that the approach led to increased tolerance amongst students, and reported positive behavior changes amongst participants, including helping parents more at home, a reduction in school drop-outs, and a reduction in crime in school.

“Dry fish, if you want to fold it, you must fold it while it’s still fresh.” – FGD youth and FGD women (Kiswahili proverb used to illustrate why targeting young children is effective)

Cited factors that made the approach successful across counties included (a) targeting a broad range of influential stakeholders in children/youth’s lives (i.e., parents, teachers/school administrators, elders), (b) using former gang members as school club facilitators, and (c) having a safe and structured environment where individuals can dialogue and share concerns. Youth FGD participants confirmed that many instances

of VE recruitment occur at school, and many respondents across KIs and FGDs stated that targeting youth and children at a young age before gangs or extremists could influence them was another salient success factor. One youth stated, “*when children meet other children who already have bad behaviors, they can influence each other, and that’s how the gangs receive them, so talking to them at school washes their brains.*” The few downsides to the approach respondents mentioned were that it did not target even younger children (from 7-13 years old) who are also at risk of being recruited, and that it did not engage religious leaders who could help positively influence youth.

Findings related to youth camps and extravaganzas were mixed and inconclusive. Although respondents in KIs with sub-grantees and FGDs with youth spoke about these venues as entertaining and good dissemination events for CVE messages, respondents did not report much about how or if this approach is reducing the vulnerability of youth to VE. Some respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the events being one-off in nature, too much information disseminated at one time, and no follow-up or support after the event.

“There is need to make it easier for youth to gain access to [government] funds. The process is too long and bureaucratic. The processes do not seem to be transparent and youth therefore give up. Tenders are not awarded transparently to youth as indicated.” – FGD with youth

“All these [funds] have regulations that do not favor youth, especially returnees who do not want to see each other and do not want to form groups.”

–KI with a GOK/Security official

Youth entrepreneurship: Six sub-grantees across all six counties (Ummah Initiative Group (UIG)-Kwale, DCMT-Kwale, Kwacha-Kilifi, Kikozi-Lamu, SUPKEM-Kwale/Mombasa/Kilifi, MAZIDO-Taita Taveta) engaged youth in entrepreneurship skills training. The need to foster youth economic empowerment came up frequently in KIs and FGDs, however qualitative findings for this approach suggest that it was not as effective as implemented by most sub-grantees. Respondents in many FGDs with youth and KIs with sub-grantees reported that the primary barrier to the approach’s success was ineffectual linkages with start-up capital for youth to put entrepreneurship skills into practice and actually benefit economically. One woman in an FGD stated, “*The youths still go to maskanis because they’re trained, but [they] are not able to start their business and are likely to relapse.*” Some sub-grantees doing youth

entrepreneurship with non-SCORE funding reported the same challenge. As explained by one respondent, SCORE’s design did not allow for start-up capital as the program expected sub-grantees to connect trained youth with public or private funding sources, including government funds for youth.²⁰ Yet according to respondents in FGDs with women and youth, as well as KIs with sub-grantees and GOK/Security, more than half of the sub-grantees found it difficult to successfully connect their beneficiaries to government funds due to prerequisites (i.e., youth must be formally organized into groups, a long and bureaucratic process), or political corruption whereby funds are used to secure political support (see text box above).

A few sub-grantees managed to successfully link youth to start-up funds, and in most cases respondents in both KIs with sub-grantees and GOK/Security, as well as FGDs with youth and community members, were enthusiastic about the positive results. Youth and sub-grantees asserted that as a result of youth becoming economically empowered, youth have become “less idle” and dedicate their time to their

²⁰ These include the Youth Enterprise Development Fund (<http://www.youthfund.go.ke/>) and Uwezo Fund, DATU (Dawida Tuweta) Sawazisha Fund, Affirmative Action Fund, among others.

businesses rather than potential VE activities. In Taita Taveta, the sub-grantee managed to form youth into groups to access government funds, whereas in Kwale a sub-grantee created a web portal to link youth entrepreneurs directly to private clients. In both cases, the sub-grantees incorporated business planning based on market analysis. This appears to be an important success factor, as some projects appear to have failed due to inadequate market analysis, resulting in loan defaults.

Other factors cited that determined whether the approach was successful or not include: a) the TOT model whereby after completing the course, trainees enter into a volunteer contract to train others, b) sensitization efforts to dispel community myths/fears about credit, and most importantly c) the duration and comprehensiveness of the training. Respondents reported ineffective trainings were as short as one day, whereas effective training spanned up to three months. In Kwale, as a point of comparison, respondents in two FGDs associated with different sub-grantees referred to the USAID program Kenya Youth Employment and Skills (K-YES) as a better youth entrepreneurship model than SCORE due to its more extensive curriculum and engagement with participants.

ENGAGING GOVERNMENT ENTITIES

CVE Action Plans: Four sub-grantees worked with national and county government stakeholders and successfully developed CAPs in four counties through SCORE and other donor funding (HURIA-Kwale, Haki-Mombasa, KECOSCE-Tana River, Kikozi-Lamu).

The CAPs are in various stages of implementation; the Kwale and Mombasa CAPs are farthest along, whereas the Tana River CAP is still in the drafting phase and has not yet been launched. Although respondents were as of yet unable to report concrete impacts for the CAPs, the approach was well-regarded. Respondents in KIs with USAID/Act!, GOK/Security, and all sub-grantees, as well as one FGD with community members, all spoke positively about the effectiveness of CAPs as a policy framework to outline various actors' CVE roles and positively set the stage for coordinated government and civil society CVE implementation. In Kwale, Mombasa, and Lamu, participants in KIs with sub-grantee and GOK/Security spoke highly of the establishment of multi-stakeholder CVE Forums composed of government and non-government actors, where all members meet regularly to sustain buy-in and move the CAP forward. Some respondents also cited the importance of contextualizing the National CVE Strategy's areas of CVE work, known as "pillars,²¹" to the county's specific issues and characteristics, involving a variety of government and non-government stakeholders, and assigning specific actors to each pillar.

Despite these positive assessments, other respondents noted a few weaknesses. First, some CAPs are missing essential pillars. For example, Kwale's CAP does not have an economic pillar, even though economics is viewed as a main VE driver. Second, the most concerning issue to most sub-grantee and GOK/Security respondents was the lack of funding commitments on behalf of county governments to implement the CAPs and reliance on CSOs to fund and facilitate the multi-stakeholder CVE Forums. Some KIs recommended the need to work more closely with county government, especially in the development

²¹ The Kenya National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (2016) designates nine "pillars" for structuring CVE work. They are: psychosocial pillar, education pillar, political pillar, security pillar, faith-based and ideological pillar, training and capacity building pillar, arts and culture pillar, legal and policy pillar, and media and online pillar. County-level CAPs are also structured around pillars and are meant to feed into the National Strategy.

of County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs), to encourage government ownership and investment in CAPs as implementation begins to take place.

Other policy work with government: In addition to CAPs, a few sub-grantees developed and submitted to government other policy documents: COEC developed a Kenya Women’s CVE Charter to engender the National Action Plan on CVE,²² UIG developed and submitted a youth CIDP memorandum, and Tana River Peace Reconciliation and Development (TRPRD) a Peace Declaration. While these represent important milestones, two of the three documents are still waiting to be considered by government.

Only the youth CIDP memorandum has so far shown evidence of affecting policy change. A KII respondent reported that Kwale county accepted the youth’s request to establish a CVE office within the county government, and that the county furthermore integrated into its CIDP an internship program within the country government for individuals to apply and be properly guided and remunerated. In terms of the development process, respondents in sub-grantee KIIs identified conscientious efforts to be inclusive as a common factor for being able to galvanize the support of civil society, such as using WhatsApp to work around funding constraints and gather a larger number of stakeholder input for the youth CIDP memorandum. County government input into recommendations for the Women’s CVE Charter was also effective.

Certain facilitating and inhibiting factors stood out across strategies for working with government on CAPs and other policy measures, chief among them being the level of buy-in of the county and national government. The buy-in varied both by county and, at times, by sub-grantee. In some cases, participants in KIIs with sub-grantees, USAID/Act! and GOK/Security reported productive relationships with government. In other cases, KII respondents reported perceived reluctance on the part of government. These respondents also reported that CSOs need to better understand government operation and learn how to improve working with the government. KIIs reported the level and quality of sub-grantee involvement in county leadership from the onset, as well as personal motivation of county officials, as potential success factors. Nonetheless, participants in all GOK/Security KIIs expressed willingness and desire to work with CSOs and be included in CVE activities. As one respondent stated, *“The work [civil society] does needs support from all sectors. They should not get tired of reaching out/involving the county government even if county do not show up.”*

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

The majority of sub-grantees implemented an activity that attempted to engage and sensitize the community at large. Many respondents believed that the overall reduction of conflict, radicalization, or crime was in part due to people becoming more aware and involved due to broad-based and general sensitization efforts. For example, different respondents reported youth or women organizing demonstrations to address peace and security issues without sub-grantee assistance. In Kwale, Taita Taveta, Tana River, FGD and KII respondents cited peaceful elections where citizens did not vote according to a “communal” mentality (e.g., religious, ethnic, or community lines) as evidence of the sensitization’s effectiveness. However, the ET was unable to independently verify this claim within the scope of the evaluation.

²² SCORE April-June 2018 Quarterly report

Community engagement approaches varied across sub-grantees and counties and included a variety of community-based meeting platforms (e.g., *barazas*, clinics, dialogues, extravaganzas), radio shows, social media, theater, and new or existing community-based conflict management structures. Assessing such a diversity of approaches is challenging; however, below we divide the approaches into four groups and draw out some key themes.

In the area of community-based conflict management structures, KII respondents reported that the development of Resource Management Committee (RMCs) and Community Wildlife Associations (CWAs) in Tana River and Taita Taveta, respectively, were effective at resolving conflicts at the community level. These efforts were seen as putting conflict resolution skills in people's hands. In Tana River, one respondent stated that a useful approach was encouraging communities to hold accountable conflictive individuals rather than defending them because of communal solidarity. For the CWAs, an important success factor was linking communities to economic opportunities, such as the development of conservancies, and convincing communities that preservation was economically more beneficial than engaging in human-wildlife conflict. Yet one reported limitation to the CWA work mentioned in two FGDs was that Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) has not consistently implemented the government's compensation policy in instances of wildlife damage to human assets, and that helping the government in this regard is something that is needed.

A second grouping of community engagement includes dialogues, *barazas*, and other meetings that brought people together. Reported success factors among this group of interventions included (a) a highly inclusive and non-accusatory approach, (b) promotion of increased ownership over conflict issues, (c) a relaxed atmosphere, (d) a space for dialogue, discussion, and venting of feelings, (e) regular and frequent occurrence (see quote below), and (f) structured facilitation of the meeting by the CSO. Regarding this last point, according to an FGD with women, *"There's a difference in the way the government does awareness and the way CSOs do awareness. Government does it with some secrecy, while CSOs make it simple and easy for communities."* Though reactions to these meetings were mostly positive, some respondents disliked activities that were infrequent or centralized in larger towns (thus necessitating participants to commute from their villages in order to participate), and, as suggested by the quote below, asserted that sensitization needs to be continuous and at village-level to be most effective.

A third broad type of community engagement, theater and mini/dhow buzz (free public transport that the sub-grantee used to sensitize everyone on the vehicle about CVE for the duration of a specified route), were viewed by KII respondents as successful. Both approaches were implemented fairly regularly, and the sub-grantees conducted and incorporated findings from CVE issue mappings within targeted communities prior to contextualizing CVE messages for those communities. For theater, respondents cited several reasons for perceived effectiveness, including (a) the use of gender-balanced youth who are of the communities themselves, (b) performances occurring at the community level, and (c) the use of simple language in dialects understood by the community. For the mini/dhow buzz, a KII respondent reported that community members frequently asked when the next "buzz" transport was going to occur, and that the demand led the sub-

"You don't do [sensitization] once because if you do it just once people can't retain the knowledge for long. People should repeat the same sensitization forums at least after a month." – FGD with religious leaders

grantee to establish a second transport line. For this engagement, the use of a trained mediator and crowd controller to ensure order and organization to the ride/discussion contributed to its effectiveness.

It is difficult to judge the effectiveness of a fourth grouping of community outreach efforts: radio programs and social media campaigns. Some respondents said radio was useful for reaching a large amount of people in a short amount of time, and that reach and listenership could be successfully quantified using available analytics. These respondents also cited instances of community members coming to the sub-grantee office because of hearing a radio show. At the same time, outside of these personal incidents, all three sub-grantees using radio-based interventions—whether to discuss a conflict or CVE issue, or advertise for another intervention—were unsure of whether their specific target audience was listening (e.g., whether at-risk youth listen to radio), and if they were, what impact the message was having on them. As one respondent noted, “for radio we rely on people to listen and call in, but to the point of building resilience, it is hard to tell. You would also not know if people listen consistently and if people are not loyal to listening to the radio program, then it cannot be effective. Except for the people who call in, you can’t tell how the show is affecting others.” Efforts focused on social media produce a similar measurement challenge.

PRIORITIZING APPROACHES

As a way of quantifying respondents’ preference for CVE and conflict mitigation approaches, the mini survey asked respondents to divide a pot of funds among six different interventions with an additional category for “other.” Figure 6 presents the averages across 231 evaluation study participants who responded to the question, whereas Table 2 provides a breakdown of these prioritizations disaggregated by two respondent types: USAID, Act!, and sub-grantees in one column (KIs) and beneficiaries (FGDs) in the other. In aggregate, a plurality prioritized youth leadership and economic development, followed by women-focused CVE programming and community sensitization.

Figure 6: Average percent of resources to be distributed among seven approach categories




Table 2: Percent of resources to be distributed among approaches by respondent type

Approach Type	KIIs (USAID, Act!, Sub-grantees)	FGDs (beneficiaries)
Youth leadership or economic development*	24.6%	21.0%
Community sensitization	16.4%	15.4%
Improving police-community cooperation*	16.0%	13.1%
Women-focused CVE programming*	15.4%	18.4%
Interfaith dialogue*	11.6%	14.5%
County CVE action plans*	11.4%	14.0%
Other	4.7%	3.6%
No	70	161
Total	100%	100%

Note: Starred items are statistically significant with at least a 95% confidence level

Both KII and FGD respondents allocated the most funding to youth leadership or economic development, suggesting that both respondent types find the most value in working with youth. Unfortunately, it is not possible to pinpoint which specific youth activity—leadership, economic leadership, or both—respondents preferred. This result generally aligns with qualitative findings whereby respondents expressed appreciation for youth-focused activities, even if they felt that SCORE’s implementation of these activities was not always well executed.

Respondents differed, however, in how they would prioritize funding for other interventions. Beneficiaries (FGD respondents) provided more funding than those affiliated with SCORE (KII respondents) to women-focused CVE programming, whereas KII respondents prioritized improving police-community to a higher degree than FGD respondents. Indeed, FGD respondents allotted the least amount of funds, on average, to improving police-community relations. According to qualitative findings detailed above, community-police relationships remain fragile despite some positive impacts; this may be one possible explanation for the discrepancy in values placed on this intervention. There was no statistical difference between respondent types observed for community sensitization, suggesting that both groups regard this intervention rather highly. This confirms KII findings which were generally enthusiastic about SCORE’s community engagement activities.

EQ 1.2 Which approaches could be taken to scale, either through this or other ongoing or future programs?

YOUTH-FOCUSED ACTIVITIES AND YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP

KII and FGD participants in Kilifi, Kwale, and Mombasa advised that youth CVE clinics and peace clubs in schools should be scaled up because they showed positive results, have high potential to prevent VE, and yet had only reached a small number of youth and children. With respect to the youth clinics, some respondents suggested that a mapping exercise should be undertaken to contextualize CVE messages to local cultural and social dynamics prior to replication. In Mombasa and Kwale, respondents in KIIs and FGDs with community members and youth enthusiastically recommended scaling up the use of peace clubs to spread CVE messages in more classes and schools, as it is important to sensitize children on peace

at an early age to reduce their risk of joining VE groups or criminal gangs. One KII participant noted that two other CSOs (one SCORE partner and one non-SCORE partner) have already tried to replicate working with school peace clubs. The respondents, however, underscored the importance of consultations with other implementing CSOs before replicating the approach, as they felt one of the new implementers may be sending mixed messages to children.

Some respondents also recommended scaling up youth entrepreneurship. As previously noted in the findings for EQ 1.1, the majority of sub-grantees implementing this approach experienced challenges in successfully linking youths to economic opportunities to make this approach effective. Nevertheless, GOK/Security, sub-grantee, and FGD respondents in Kwale, Lamu, Mombasa, Kilifi, and Taita Taveta supported expanded efforts to provide youth with livelihood options because they felt youth economic empowerment would address youth radicalization. Where youth were successfully linked to economic opportunities, respondents reported that only a small number of youths were reached and that more could benefit. At the same time, some respondents identified crucial points for consideration before scaling up youth entrepreneurship. For example, one KII respondent cautioned that it is better to start with small numbers of youth and implement the approach well rather than reaching many youths ineffectively. Other KII respondents felt that, for some sub-grantees, youth entrepreneurship training curricula needs to be more comprehensive and strategic—involving solid business planning and market analysis—before expansion.

COMMUNITY POLICING

KII respondents in Kwale, Lamu, and Taita Taveta believed *Nyumba Kumi* training was ready for scaling given their observed effectiveness and the ease with which they could be rolled out to other *Nyumba Kumi* committees. One suggested modification to the training was to conduct it at the village level rather than at a centralized, town location in order to reach more *Nyumba Kumi* members and communities.

Respondents in FGDs and KIIs with GOK/Security and sub-grantees recommended that community policing approaches be scaled up in order to address the still-strained relationship between communities and police, although specific findings varied by county. In Mombasa and Tana River, respondents identified police-youth cafes, police-youth social activities, and *Gumzo Maskani* meetings as effective approaches that had only reached a small number of youth but could be scaled as-is, or with few modifications. When replicating the approach elsewhere, respondents recommended keeping the number of youth per activity small so as to maintain quality, engaging more police (including those at a higher, divisional police command level so as to create linkages for participating citizens to sub-county security committees), and engendering the approaches used in implementing police cafes to consider the different needs of men and women. In Kwale, however, the majority of FGD and KII respondents felt that communities were not yet ready for wide scale police-community engagement, and that this activity implementation should be limited until relationships improve in targeted areas.

INTERFAITH DIALOGUE AND TARGETING OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS

Interfaith dialogue and working with religious leaders have yielded benefits in addressing extremism and radicalization but have been limited in their coverage of the coast region. Sub-grantee KIIs and FGD participants in Kilifi, Kwale, and Mombasa argued that the approach was ready for scale-up because religious leaders, both Christian and Muslim, already have established structures, churches and mosques,

in their communities that they can use to promote peace, tolerance and anti-radicalization messages. In Lamu, respondents suggested that interfaith dialogue work should be deepened there for at least two more years to have a strong impact.

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

As noted in the findings for EQ 1.1, SCORE's community engagement activities are numerous and diverse. Respondents reported many of these efforts as successful; likewise, respondents often felt that all activities to sensitize communities should be scaled to increase reach and potential impact. However, we focus below on the most prominent approaches with the potential for scaling.

In the area of community-based conflict management structures, strengthening CWAs stood out as an activity that would be straightforward to scale up, and would be effective at helping state and non-state actors work together to manage human-wildlife conflict. Before scaling and replication, however, respondents recommended that the CWAs that have been formed be registered to operate independently, that state compensation policy and implementation be ironed out.

Within the second grouping of community engagement (dialogues, *barazas*, and other meetings that brought people together), respondents in Tana River connected the peaceful 2017 elections to peace dialogues and felt that peace dialogues could be scaled throughout the county to sustain peace, especially with buy-in from the Tana River Multi-Ethnic Peace Council.

KII participants additionally selected theater, mini/dhow buzz, radio programs, and social media as scalable/replicable vehicles for disseminating CVE messages, despite their high operating costs and an inability to determine impact for some of these approaches. Respondents determined theater to be quite effective and easily scaled due to its relative low operating cost and ability to penetrate communities, and as long as it committed to contextualizing its CVE messages prior in each new locality. The mini/dhow buzz also showed some evidence of effectiveness and is already being replicated by the Mombasa county government to discuss land issues. Interestingly, some respondents believed that radio shows and social media should be scaled up due to their reach potential, even though impact for the majority of those reached was unclear. If radio shows were to be scaled up, some respondents proposed creating different radio content for different contexts and audiences, or that they could be longer to fit in more content. This, however, would be costly to do. For social media, the ease and low cost of creating social media content was enough to persuade some KII respondents that it should be scaled.

WOMEN-FOCUSED ACTIVITIES

Of the women-focused activities, trauma counselling for women affected by VE and using women sensitizers to transmit “good parenting” messages related to CVE stood out as ready for scaling. KII and FGD participants indicated the cost effectiveness of this approach as one trauma counsellor is able to reach multiple women, who in turn can reach others. The fact that a trauma counselling handbook has already been developed can assist in replicating this approach with consistency and according to certain standards. For women sensitizers, EQ 1.1 findings noted that this approach was more effective in places like Kwale where the sub-grantee had clear curricula, and structured and frequent contact with the sensitizers. As such, respondents recommended that CVE messages on good parenting—whether through women sensitizers or other important figures in youth's lives (e.g., parents and other family members of

both genders/teachers/religious leaders)—be scaled up since it can be implemented informally and can reach the grassroots inexpensively.

CVE ACTION PLANS

A few respondents, notably KIs with USAID/Act! and sub-grantees, reported that CAPs were at a point that they could be scaled to other counties as there are enough lessons learned regarding working with government and other stakeholders to pursue CAP development, even if learnings on CAP implementation are still ongoing.

EVALUATION QUESTION 1: CONCLUSIONS

1. ***SCORE's CVE and conflict mitigation approaches/tools were correlated with observed changes in targeted communities, including greater public awareness and discussion about CVE and conflict, decreased VE recruitment, increased trust between civil society and state actors, increased tolerance between different groups, and the establishment/strengthening of structures for responding to VE and conflict.*** Given the number of other CVE/conflict programs in Kenya and other external factors, it was not possible for this evaluation to determine sole attribution of any one of these results to SCORE, nor the extent to which SCORE contributed to each result. In general, it can be said that communities have shown positive changes in their ability to understand and resist VE/conflict, and that evaluation respondents linked these changes in part to SCORE programming.
2. ***SCORE was inclusive in the sense that the program considered gender and youth dynamics as part of its programming, but much more can be done to make sure that gender, youth, and PWD considerations are meaningfully considered*** at program design—moving beyond knowing that men/women should be included and towards crafting specific strategies based on needs—and that demographic differences are analyzed at the outcome level to ensure benefits, in addition to participation, are inclusive.
3. ***The six SCORE approaches on which this evaluation focused varied in their success based on the operating context and how they were implemented by each sub-grantee.*** Given the breadth and variety of activities implemented, it is difficult to conclusively determine more versus less successful approaches as respondent sample sizes were small per approach and subject to bias; respondents saw value and evidence of success in almost all activities; within approaches, some sub-grantees achieved more successes than others; and because some activities were effective but had limited reach. Generally speaking:
 - a. Most **community engagement** activities were perceived by respondents as successful at disseminating CVE and conflict mitigation messages. However, the evaluation was not able to assess the reception of these messages by the public at large (i.e., people who did not directly participate in SCORE). Furthermore, the question remains whether sensitization is enough to affect behavior change in some instances given the other economic and cultural drivers of VE.
 - b. Success regarding **working with governments** on CAPs and other policy issues is nascent but yet to be determined—important gains have been made in setting up a coordinated framework for state and non-state actors to address VE and conflict, but

other policy work has yet to be adopted, implemented, and funded with government resources.

- c. **Community policing** efforts, especially regarding fostering youth-police or community-police relationships, were seen as very important, though some specific activity designs were more successful than others.
- d. Within **women-focused activities**, trauma counselling was observed to be quite successful at addressing the gender-specific gap in services for women affected by VE, whereas women's role in peace and security (e.g., as sensitizers or leaders) was more successful in some instances and counties compared to others.
- e. **Interfaith dialogues** and work with religious leaders appeared successful at affecting those involved with increasing dissemination of peace and tolerance messages, although it is unclear how this message is being received by the community.
- f. Different data sources indicated that **youth-focused activities and entrepreneurship** were highly valued, though this approach varied in its success depending on the specific activities. Use of school peace clubs was successful, whereas youth entrepreneurship was largely unsuccessful except in a few exceptional cases.

Activities differed in their success and inhibiting factors, yet some takeaway success factors seen across approaches were: inclusive and participatory in analysis, design, and/or implementation; contextualizing activities for different localities or audiences; providing a comfortable and safe space for dialogue; using influential or well-positioned community members (e.g., religious leaders, women, former gang members) as disseminators; implementing with consistency rather than one-off events; the quality of the relationship between sub-grantee and community or sub-grantee and government; and working through existing structures.

- 4. **Several SCORE activities have the potential for scaling or replication based on cost-effectiveness, though some would benefit from improvements or more research before a scaling decision is made.** They also differ regarding how they should be expanded or implemented elsewhere.
 - a. Certain activities are straightforward enough that they can be scaled relatively easily now or in the near future: CVE clinics and peace clubs in school, *Nyumba Kumi* training, CWAs, peace dialogues through peace committees, theater, and CAPs. However, it is the ET's opinion that activities working with structures that are technically the responsibility of government should be implemented with a well-articulated strategy for sustainability and government ownership prior to and during scale up. This is particularly important given respondents' skepticism about government willingness or ability to dedicate budgets and other resources to leading these efforts rather than civil society.
 - b. Community-police and youth-police interactions, women sensitizers, and working with religious leaders could be scaled with caution, and after some improvements. Community-police interactions have the high potential for impact but need to be well designed and contextualized—ensuring that local communities and police are ready for such an intervention—prior to being implemented elsewhere. Using women sensitizers or interfaith dialogues/working with religious leaders has perceived impact and could be

easily done given religious and community infrastructure but could benefit from more consistency and focus.

- c. Trauma counselling, mini/dhow buzz, and radio show signs of effectiveness and/or reach; they have the potential to be scaled but would benefit from more research before making a scaling decision. Although trauma counselling fills a gap in current CVE programming, it is the ET's opinion that working with traumatized individuals may promote healing but also risks re-traumatization. More research on how to best implement the intervention in accordance with global mental health best practices and the “do no harm” principle would be beneficial prior to further investment and scaling. The mini/dhow buzz is an innovative strategy which the Mombasa county government has already replicated for a different subject matter, yet more research is needed on public perceptions of this strategy to confirm perceived impact. Meanwhile, radio has large reach but unclear impact. Given the high cost of both interventions, further research confirming their effectiveness should be done.
- d. Many respondents supported the need for youth entrepreneurship activities as a way of addressing economic drivers of young people into VE. Yet the evaluation did not find this approach to be well-implemented by the majority of SCORE partners, and other USAID programs (K-YES) appeared to be addressing economic drivers in parallel to SCORE. Scaling of this intervention—whether by SCORE or other CVE programs—should not occur unless the process from entrepreneurship training to capital acquisition and business incubation can be well executed and perfected, implementers have adequate expertise to carry out the intervention, and the market can support entrepreneurship endeavors.

EVALUATION QUESTION 2: FINDINGS

EQ 2 To what extent was the intended outcome of quickly intervening to mitigate incidents of VE and conflict realized through the Rapid Response Fund? How relevant were the approaches used (how responsive were they to ongoing contextual changes related to conflict and VE)?

SCORE funded eight projects across the six coastal counties under its RRF component. RRF grants of a maximum of KES 500,000 (approximately 5,000 USD) were disbursed in the 2017-2018 period to COEC (two grants), Haki Africa, Kiunga Youth Bunge Initiative (KYBI, a non-SCORE organization²³), KECOSCE, MAZIDO (two grants), and TRPRD.

²³ KYBI was not yet a SCORE sub-grantee at the time of the evaluation fieldwork and the writing of this report. However, according to USAID, KYBI has since become a sub-grantee in Project Year 5.

Table 3: Approximate time between proposal submission to USAID and RRF grant disbursement

Time	Sub-grantee
1 week	COEC, Haki Africa
1-2 weeks	MAZIDO, TRPRD
1-2 months	KECOSCE, KYBI, MAZIDO
>2 months	COEC

Timelines for Approval/Denial of RRF Grant Applications: The RRF was conceptualized as a flexible conflict response approach whereby applications would be approved (or denied) and funds disbursed within a period of 72 hours. However, desk review and KII with USAID/Act! and sub-grantees showed that the mechanism did not succeed in disbursing funds within 72 hours; rather, disbursement ranged from a week to several months. KIIs with USAID/Act! respondents clarified that delays were primarily due to the contracting mechanism which required both Act! and USAID approval; within USAID, even the Contracting Officer’s approval was required despite the small grant amounts. The majority of sub-grantees indicated that grants were not rapid, especially in comparison to the grants some sub-grantees received under USAID

Kenya Electoral Assistance Program (KEAP). However, sub-grantee KII respondents indicated the RRF grants were “timely” in that they were still able to address the respective incidents to which they were meant to respond.

At least five sub-grantee KII respondents stated they either submitted proposals and were denied or felt discouraged to apply despite believing a grant would be useful. Emerging issues sub-grantees identified that did not receive/implement an RRF for included juvenile gang violence in Kwale, ethnic conflicts between minority and majority communities in Kilifi, and land related conflicts in Taita Taveta. More than the denial itself, KII respondents suggested that communication between Act! and the sub-grantees, as well as the length of time it took for the denial (up to several months), were problematic as they raised expectations on behalf of the sub-grantee and some community or government stakeholders who had been informed about the grant possibility. One sub-grantee that was denied an RRF reported that they never received any response from Act! on why their application was not approved. Other sub-grantees reported being told that they were not approved due to the high volume of RRF proposals and lack of funds, or because they had already received an RRF grant and other applicants should be prioritized. Still another sub-grantee reported that they did not apply despite identification of an incident in need of a response, as they were told that a separate sub-grantee was granted an RRF grant to address the same issue.

Relevance of RRF Projects to Contextual Changes: Participants in KIIs with USAID/Act! and sub-grantees agreed that the RRF activities were relevant in addressing emerging conflict and security issues, including increasing gang activity, land-related and human-wildlife conflicts, suspected extremist infiltration, and brewing election violence. One KII respondent noted that proposals appeared to be mainly preventative rather than reactive, with sub-grantees addressing issues before they escalated to extreme violence. The finding that the majority of RRF recipients believed their grants and interventions to be timely suggests that most incidents and interventions did not require a rapid (72-hour) response. Rather, KII participants agreed that the RRF mechanism facility provided sub-grantees with the flexibility to address emerging conflict and CVE concerns that were not part of their project proposals because they could not have been foreseen.

Respondents cited a few positive and negative factors that influenced the relevance of the RRF projects. One positive factor included the fact that the facility was open to non-SCORE organizations that were

pre-qualified to apply for it (i.e., KYBI, increasing the pool of actors to identify and respond to an incident. According to a sub-grantee KII participant, another positive factor was sub-grantees' use of biweekly reporting and context analysis that helped track changes in the VE/conflict landscape: *"Partners do reports on a bi-monthly basis reporting on the context and how it is changing in the area of operation. These are compiled, more scanning done in-house at the Act! level, these help to determine Rapid Response needs."* On the contrary, the disbursement delays and RRF amount were negative factors. In a few instances, participants in sub-grantee KIIs reported that the disbursement delay made the RRF project less relevant as the context had changed during the approval process. Although they still managed to address the incident, they found it challenging to adapt or implement the intervention. In two cases, participants in KIIs noted that the small RRF amount made small interventions possible but did not provide a permanent solution for conflict/CVE issues as they did not allow for larger projects addressing root causes.

EQ 2.1 What is the likelihood of achieving intended output/result targets under this objective by the end of the activity in 2019?

Since the RRF's launch in 2017, only eight RRF projects have been funded out of the life of project target of 20 RRF projects. Yet a few KII respondents were optimistic that SCORE might still land close to its target. USAID/Act! KII participants and quarterly program reports stated that Act! received several applications each quarter (including four applications in the April-June 2018 quarter), and a participant in one KII reported that it was possible to approve additional grants before the close of the program. Given these mixed findings, target attainment by the end of the project seems ambitious and is yet to be seen.

Whether or not SCORE meets its target, a greater concern is the appropriateness of the chosen indicator for measuring whether or not the RRF mechanism was meeting its objective to rapidly and effectively respond to incidents of violence. Participants in a few KIIs expressed concern about the validity of the indicator (*"# of rapid response grants issued through US Government [USG]-supported CVE activities"*), due to the different possible interpretations of the actuals for this output indicator. According to a respondent, *"Less RRFs could be an indicator of success. You may do more RRFs and consider that you are being successful. You may do less and take this to be evidence that CVE and conflict are on the decline."* This perspective brings up the issue that targets for such an indicator should only be met if there is a genuine need.

On the individual RRF project level, six out of seven²⁴ RRF projects managed to resolve the conflict in question, according to KIIs with sub-grantees and RRF completion reports. One sub-grantee was unable to fully implement their RRF project to address a land conflict as funding delays caused the implementation period to coincide with an election period, making RRF implementation too risky. As a result, the RRF project was suspended.

EQ 2.2. Were the expected output/outcome targets under this objective realistic given the project timeframe and resources?

As noted in the findings for EQ 2 above, there were other emerging conflict and CVE issues in various

²⁴ The ET received RRF completion reports for seven out of eight RRF projects as COEC's second RRF was yet to be implemented at the time of the evaluation.

parts of the coast which could have been addressed by RRF grants but were not for various reasons, including juvenile gang violence, ethnic conflicts, and land related conflicts. Given that there were many more reported conflict and CVE issues that could have been addressed, sub-grantee and USAID/Act! KII participants reported the target was realistic.

EVALUATION QUESTION 2: CONCLUSIONS

1. ***SCORE partially achieved its outcome of quickly intervening to mitigate incidents of VE and conflict through the RRF mechanism—the mechanism achieved mitigation, though not as quickly as intended.*** The RRF proved to be a useful mechanism for sub-grantees to mitigate emerging conflict/CVE issues that could not have been foreseen and for which the RRF was designed to respond. RRF projects were relevant to the emerging context, though funding delays did affect relevancy in a few cases. Grant disbursements and RRF implementations were timely in that they were able to address emerging issues, yet the mechanism was not quick enough to be considered a “rapid” mechanism capable of responding to incidents within 72 hours. Rigid approval requirements for small grants by Act! and USAID did not allow for flexible and quick approvals.
2. As implemented, the **RRF could more realistically be defined as a flexible conflict mitigation facility, rather than a rapid response mechanism.** Most RRF grant proposals focused on long-standing or even historical conflict/CVE issues that had been “activated” but that were not necessarily emergencies requiring a rapid response.
3. ***Criteria and communication about the RRF grant approval and denial process were unclear to some sub-grantees.*** This challenge frustrated some sub-grantees and/or demotivated others from seeking RRF resources.
4. ***It would be ambitious but not impossible for RRF to meet its Life-of-Project (LOP) target.*** However, though it is realistic for SCORE to achieve its current RRF target, the indicator chosen to assess RRF efficacy is not a valid measure because counting the number of RRF grants issued does not clearly indicate whether or not VE and conflict incidents are being addressed quickly. Due to problems with the chosen indicator, it is important that SCORE pursue only legitimate needs for RRF, and not simply award RRF projects in order to reach the target.

EVALUATION QUESTION 3: FINDINGS

EQ 3. To what extent has the organizational and technical capacity-building approach used by SCORE been effective in developing a cadre of CSOs capable of responding to conflict and CVE?

CAPACITY BUILDING APPROACHES

SCORE used seven capacity building approaches to strengthen sub-grantees' ability to respond to conflict and VE, described in Figure 7.²⁵ One of the approaches was the use of the OCA tool, which scored sub-grantee capacity along seven dimensions.²⁶ Act! and the sub-grantee would then develop IIPs that would articulate specific interventions for increasing a sub-grantee's scores in the various dimensions. Yet desk review and qualitative findings suggest that this tool was problematic when viewed in isolation. OCAs were meant to measure pre- and post-intervention capacity, as a diagnostic tool as per the Act! contract to determine the specific changes needed to strengthen the sub-grantees and the impact of capacity building efforts.²⁷ OCA scores gleaned from the desk review indicated that, on average, sub-grantees' second OCA scores (2017) was often lower than the first OCA score (2016) in many OCA subcategories (see **Annex E** for a summary of OCA scores per participating sub-grantee). When examining only the 2017 OCA scores, the capacity areas in which sub-grantees scored highest in general included Governance and Leadership; Management and Administration, and Financial Management. On the contrary, MERL, Human Resources, sustainability, and CVE observed weak trends across the sub-grantees.²⁸

If viewed in isolation, the scores suggest a decrease in organizational capacity. However, project monitoring reports and KII participants from USAID/Act! and sub-grantees explained that initial high scores by the sub-grantees was due, in part, to sub-grantee misunderstanding of what constitutes a well performing organization. As sub-grantees learned to better understand and adjust expectations, they consequently scored themselves more realistically, hence the lower scores. Respondents suggested that, though useful from a process perspective, OCA scores in themselves may not be valid indicators for measuring changes in organizational capacity as they are self-assessing and hence subjective.

Figure 7: SCORE Capacity Building Approaches

1. **A three-part capacity assessment** including:
 - a. CSO mapping exercise to develop an inventory of CSOs in target counties
 - b. OCAs to assess strengths and weaknesses
 - c. IIPs based on the OCAs
2. **Thematic round tables** including various stakeholders; aimed at identifying challenges and building consensus on CVE and conflict mitigation practices.
3. **Centralized training workshops**
4. **Mentorship and accompaniment** of a sub-grantee with a mentor (the mentor was normally Act! staff)
5. **Peer learning forums** held annually with the aim of exhibiting best practices and learning from high performing institution.
6. **Technical exchange** and benchmarking visits
7. Short-term, **on the job trainings** for sub-grantees

²⁵ SCORE is a transition activity from the six yearlong KCCSP – Kenya Civil Society Strengthening programme – a USAID/KENYA/DRG program under which Act was the capacity building partner. Act is building from the lessons learned and gains made during the KCCSP program that implemented the SAFE Coast Project in 2012. Source: Act Contract Document Section C pgs 17, 24-26

²⁶ The seven OCA dimensions are Governance & Leadership, Management & Administration, Financial Management, Human Resource Management, MERL, Sustainability, and CVE

²⁷ Act! Capacity Building Manual

²⁸ October-December 2017 quarterly report

IMPROVEMENTS TO ORGANIZATIONAL & TECHNICAL CAPACITY

Overall, triangulation of document reviews, KIIs, and mini survey results reveal that all sub-grantees made significant capacity building improvements to both their organizational and technical capacity. In an exceptional case, one sub-grantee reported being able to graduate from Community Based Organization (CBO) to non-governmental organization (NGO) status within Kenya due to SCORE support. Although improvement varied by sub-grantee, some of the major themes identified in KIIs included: a) establishment or improvements to operational policies and governance structures, b) better financial management, including internal controls and resource mobilization c) improved communication, d) better understanding of MERL and e) increases in CVE technical capacity.

All sub-grantees reported one or more ways in which they now have certain operational policies or structures that did not exist prior to SCORE. In terms of organizational structure, one sub-grantee noted how they recruited new board members to maintain board independence. A different sub-grantee reported re-structuring so that project officers are assigned to programming topics rather than donor programs, which increased work efficiencies. The qualitative data aligns with the most recent SCORE quarterly report²⁹ that notes how sub-grantees have reviewed or made progress on board manuals, operational plans, strategic plans, MERL frameworks, and human resource manuals, among others.³⁰

All sub-grantees also reported improving their financial management, including strengthening internal controls and in many cases securing additional funding from other donors. USAID/Act! confirmed the latter finding, reporting that almost all subgrantees have secured funding, however minor, from at least one other source besides SCORE. According to the 2016 – 2017 annual report³¹ all sub-grantees had endeavored to comply with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAPs) and USAID grantee regulations. All organizations were trained on QuickBooks™, and according to participants in KIIs, all but one sub-grantee reported using QuickBooks™ (the last sub-grantee was still waiting to receive the software from Act!). In a few interesting cases, smaller sub-grantees that have not attained NGO status prided themselves on being able to comply with national auditing standards, even though this is not required. To ensure they themselves were financially compliant, some sub-grantees reported building the capacity of local suppliers and vendors to issue valid invoices, receipts, and supporting documents.³² According to a USAID/Act! KII participant, this increased financial management makes sub-grantees more attractive to other donors and contributes to the sub-grantees' financial sustainability.

A few sub-grantees noted that a third area of improvement was better communicating success stories, through written reports or social media. These KII respondents noted that doing so has assisted them to attract funding from other donors and to know whether or not their theories of change (TOCs) still hold.

Lastly, qualitative interviews suggested a better understanding of how to do MERL. KIIs and mini survey data indicated a related improvement in technical capacity. A sub-grantee explained that better

²⁹ 3rd quarter April to June 2018 quarterly


³⁰ April - June 2018 quarterly report

³¹ Annual report 2016-2017 pg 26

³² Quarterly report April – June 2018 pg 17/18

understanding of MERL enabled them to do evidence-based program design: “Program designing skills are better now. Learning how to design so that it’s not just about us and what we want; it’s about what works.” Other sub-grantees noted better understanding in general of CVE concepts, ideas and practices. Mini survey data confirms this perceived increase in sub-grantees’ technical capacity, as the vast majority of respondents (93 percent; 64 out of 69 respondents³³) said that SCORE had been “effective” (70 percent) or “very effective” (23 percent) at increasing the sub-grantees’ technical capacity.

Figure 8: Percent of respondents who believe SCORE has been effective in increasing the technical capacity of sub-grantees to counter violent extremism or respond to conflict



All participants in sub-grantee KIIs noted appreciation for the capacity building received, although some approaches stood out as more useful than others. Sub-grantees indicated that SCORE partner coordination meetings, thematic roundtables on CVE, in-house mentoring from Act! staff (especially regarding financial management and MERL), the ability to call Act! staff at any time, proposal

design clinics, MERL training for all sub-grantee staff to mitigate the effects of MERL staff turnover, and the OCA and IIP process were very beneficial. Although KII respondents noted the deficiencies with the OCA tool, they found the process of self-assessment and setting of capacity building targets in IIPs as an effective learning approach.

AREAS FOR CONTINUED CAPACITY BUILDING

Only two sub-grantees noted that they were confident in their capacity and did not require much more capacity building. However, KIIs and desk review findings indicated that more training is needed for Act! and sub-grantees in the following areas: a) resource mobilization, proposal writing, and communication, b) technical subjects such as advocacy and conflict mapping, and c) MERL. Both monitoring reports and KIIs with sub-grantees, including those that are receiving other donor funding, stated that sub-grantees could benefit from additional assistance in writing proposals, especially securing funding as a prime organization. Relatedly, some noted that even though SCORE improved sub-grantee ability to share success stories, they could still do this better to communicate their results. On the technical side, multiple sub-grantees talked about wanting to improve advocacy and conflict mapping skills, especially given evolving CVE/conflict landscapes.

Very few participants in KIIs with USAID/Act! or sub-grantees mentioned MERL as a capacity building need. A KII respondent noted a problem with finding good, outcome-oriented CVE indicators, and that as a result SCORE indicators were often standard output indicators related to conflict, not well linked to a coherent program logic, nor do they track program impact. However, the ET’s review of SCORE MERL documents revealed other limitations to SCORE MERL implementation. For example, despite

³³ The mini survey question on technical capacity building was only administered to USAID, Act!, and sub-grantee respondents, therefore the sample size is smaller (69 individuals) than the total respondent pool (241 individuals).

requirements for sub-grantees to have TOCs,³⁴ the ET's review of sub-grantee proposals revealed that many lacked a clearly articulated TOC, despite the proposal design clinics which were lauded as successful by many respondents. Furthermore, data quality assessment (DQA) reports from 2018 noted that organizations still had difficulties monitoring targets for outreach/large events or identifying and tracking "marginalized" groups as part of their indicators. Lastly, consistent MERL data on capacity building progress was missing from Act! reporting, making it difficult to track IIP progress.

EQ 3.1 What is the likelihood of achieving intended output/result targets under this objective by the end of the activity in 2019?

According to its Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, SCORE has only one official capacity building indicator: "Number of CSOs that have improved capacity as a result of USG support." According to its Performance Indicator Reference Sheet, SCORE defines "improved capacity" as making progress (at least one step) in the OCA or by achieving or improving on at least one dimension within the OCA. According to annual and quarterly reports, little progress has been made in meeting the indicator target of 14 CSOs given the previously mentioned deficiencies of the OCA tool and the fact that many organizations saw a reduction in scores.

However, qualitative interviews indicate a brighter picture regarding the likelihood of sub-grantees completing their IIPs. Many sub-grantee KII respondents considered completing the contextualized capacity building tasks in their IIPs as evidence of their improved organizational capacity. Some sub-grantees were optimistic about easily meeting their targets by SCORE's end, whereas others reported difficulty achieving capacity building targets set in their IIP due to resource challenges (e.g., delayed funding disbursements, staff turnover) which delayed progress. One USAID/Act! KII respondent positively estimated that 80 percent of sub-grantees will have completed their IIPs.

EQ 3.2 Were expected output/outcome targets under this objective realistic given the project timeframe and resources?

In KIIs with all sub-grantee, respondents reported that capacity development targets as articulated in IIPs were realistic as the sub-grantees developed the plans themselves. However, as noted above, some respondents reported challenges to IIP progress, and the majority of sub-grantees still need capacity building support beyond their current IIP targets.

EVALUATION QUESTION 3: CONCLUSIONS

- 1. SCORE's capacity building approach has, in general, been effective at increasing the organizational and technical capacity of targeted sub-grantees. Sub-grantees embraced the capacity building efforts and have made improvements that have professionalized their operations in several areas** (e.g., strengthened operational policies and governance structures, financial management, external communications, MERL, and CVE/conflict technical capacity). Of the capacity building approaches used, numerous sub-grantees found partner coordination meetings,

³⁴ Act contract final 'requires that projects supported through sub-grants hypothesize a clear TOC that hypothesizes potential risks and benefits of devolution and the need to focus on women youth and marginalized communities,' pg 12

thematic roundtables, in-house mentoring, whole-of-staff MERL training, proposal design clinics, and the OCA/IIP process to be particularly effective.


2. ***Despite improvements, additional capacity building is still required for the majority of sub-grantees*** in order to move them from a theoretical understanding of technical and organizational development concepts, to smooth implementation of these concepts with a focus on sustainability (e.g., growth from developing internal policy documents to implementing those policies in practice). Areas for improvements include MERL, proposal design and resource mobilization, external communication, and technical CVE/conflict skills to continually assess and respond to changing contextual landscapes.
3. ***As a program, SCORE could have done a better job at establishing, tracking, and documenting capacity building requirements and sub-grantees' capacity building progress towards them.*** The ET observed that capacity building requirements were not clearly built in at the proposal level as was envisaged in the Act! Contract document; IIP progress had to be tracked from scattered monitoring reports and the program did not have a clear method of linking which of the seven capacity building approaches were implemented for its sub-grantees, nor the results of these efforts.
4. ***SCORE is unlikely to achieve its LOP target for its indicator, although qualitative findings suggest SCORE succeeded in improving sub-grantee capacity.*** Part of the discrepancy is because the chosen indicator and its associated data source (OCA tool) to measure this objective are problematic. Use of OCAs and IIPs had clear and appreciated benefits in terms of helping sub-grantees and Act! assess, diagnose, and remedy capacity building needs and is useful as a capacity building approach. However, the OCA was not a reliable measure of capacity building results as changes in subjectivity caused inconsistent measurements. Furthermore, the fact that the majority of sub-grantees still need capacity building support implies that a five-year programming period was not a realistic timeframe to expect these selected sub-grantees to meet or surpass USAID organizational capacity standards.

EVALUATION QUESTION 4: FINDINGS

EQ 4: To what extent are the structures, activities, and networks established by SCORE been adopted and institutionalized in order to allow them to sustainably respond to conflict and CVE in the short, medium, and long term?

The mini survey asked respondents if they agreed or disagreed with the statement, “SCORE-funded organizations and their community partners will continue to counter VE or respond to conflict even if there is no more funding for this work?” As shown in Figure 9, of 241 respondents, 61 percent agreed or strongly agreed that this work would continue compared with 21 percent that disagreed or strongly disagreed. This suggests a general sense among stakeholders that the work has a degree of sustainability. However, it is worth noting that there were differences among groups. A high 76 percent of USAID, Act!, and sub-grantee respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement (only 4% disagreed), but beneficiaries were on average more skeptical: 56% agreed or strongly agreed and 28% disagreed or strongly disagreed.

Figure 9: Percent of respondents who agree that SCORE work will continue even without funding



Qualitative data helps elucidate these quantitative findings. In KIIs and FGDs, respondents reported examples of the acceptance and uptake of certain activities by government or community bodies. This adoption manifested through (a) sub-grantees institutionalizing SCORE's capacity building efforts, (b) sub-grantee adoption of SCORE activities, (c) community adoption of SCORE activities, and (d) government adoption of SCORE activities. We consider each in turn.

SUB-GRANTEE ADOPTION OF CAPACITY BUILDING EFFORTS

As discussed in the above findings for EQ 3, desk review and qualitative interviews confirm that sub-grantees made many structural and policy changes within their organizations as recommended in their IIPs, although some sub-grantees are farther along regarding the establishment and implementation of capacity building changes.³⁵ Participants in all KIIs with sub-grantees and USAID/Act! believed that sub-grantees' bought-in to these changes, and this institutionalization made sub-grantees stronger and more sustainable to varying degrees, especially with regards to financial sustainability (see EQ 4.1 below for more findings on funding).

SUB-GRANTEE ADOPTION OF SCORE ACTIVITIES

A few sub-grantee KII respondents reported integrating SCORE activities into other non-SCORE programs as they were convinced of the program's effectiveness and need to continue. For example, sub-grantees plan to use the youth theater begun under SCORE in other programs and will replicate the mini/dhow buzz approach to engage citizens on land conflict issues with county government funding (see findings for EQ 1.2 above for more information).

COMMUNITY ADOPTION OF SCORE ACTIVITIES

Many respondents in KIIs and FGDs reported evidence of communities taking ownership of SCORE supported networks, structures, and activities. One manifestation of this are community-led structures that are now operating independently without much sub-grantee support. For example, in Kwale, both sub-grantees and participants in FGDs with women reported that the Madrasa Teachers Association has fully institutionalized the madrasa curriculum developed under SCORE. Respondents in Tana River reported that RMCs meet on their own and hold their own meetings without financial help from the sub-grantee. Because of SCORE training, *Nyumba Kumi* more actively report incidences to authorities. In addition, various community members report integrating CVE and anti-conflict messages into community and school based forums such as public barazas, school peace clubs, CWAs, and religious groups. Lastly, the desk review and a few respondents mentioned that some SCORE beneficiaries (e.g., women who

³⁵ Mid - Term SCORE Round table report April 2017

received trauma counselling, youth) successfully completed formal registration into groups to access business capital or individually access business tenders, and believed this to be evidence of adoption and sustainability of efforts to reduce youth risk to VE and continue supporting women affected by VE. ³⁶

ADOPTION OF SCORE ACTIVITIES BY NATIONAL AND COUNTY GOVERNMENT

Respondents most often cited national and county government adoption of CAPs as an example of institutionalization of SCORE efforts. For example, Mombasa has since established a County Security Coordination office to work with SCORE partners and other like-minded actors. In Tana River, respondents stated that the county is supportive of the CAP forming a part of the CIDP, and one respondent noted an offer of partial funding to implement the CAP through the Women's Representative, implying that the CAP would be less dependent on SCORE funding. In Kwale, the county adopted the youth-led proposal to establish a CVE desk within the country government. In Lamu, by contrast, respondents were less certain about the CAP being implemented and owned. However, even where positive steps had been made towards institutionalization, many respondents were concerned about inadequate funding or spearheading from the government side.

Other examples of government adoption of SCORE activities include county government integration of SCORE entrepreneurship training into Vocational Education and Training (VET) in Taita Taveta, county government buy-in of SCORE strengthened *Nyumba Kumi* and CWAs, and the revival of a sub county peace committee in Tana River. According to the desk review, the committee *"met for the first time since they were elected in 2014 to deliberate on peace and security issues in the sub county. Later in the day, the peace committee held a peace Baraza in Malakoteni location where 94 community members from Orma, Pokomo and Wailwana Communities attended and agreed to solve their differences amicably."*³⁷ There has also been government enthusiasm for cultural extravaganzas, for which a participant in a KII reported that a County Assembly member requested to rename the event and replicate it in his ward.

EQ 4.I What evidence shows that the project is adequately considering exit strategies to ensure sustainability of results over time?

A review of documentation suggests that sub-grantees were not required to articulate an exit or sustainability plan as part of their grant proposals. Intentional movements towards sustainability were also not well articulated in SCORE program reporting. Yet participants in KIIs and FGDs provided evidence that all sub-grantees are implementing various strategies to sustain their organizations and SCORE activities. Strategies include (a) organizational and technical capacity building, (b) pursuing funding from other sources, (c) anchoring activities in existing structures, and (d) creating linkages between beneficiaries and other resources.

Participants in KIIs with USAID/Act! and some sub-grantees stated that building up a cadre of CSOs that could effectively maintain their operations and implement CVE was a primary strategy of SCORE. As

³⁶ From the SCORE Semi- Annual Report Oct 2016 - March 2017, "Youth groups trained and mentored by UIG have secured tenders to supply foodstuff to the local hotels. Vumbu and Juhudi youth groups from Magaoni in Msambweni Sub County have been supplying chicken to Leisure Lodge in Diani."

³⁷ See e.g., SCORE Semi- Annual Report Oct 2015 - March 2016

previously noted in the findings for EQ3, sub-grantees improved their capacity in many ways, including their ability to write proposals and secure funding from non-USAID sources, thus increasing their financial sustainability. Respondents in KIIs with USAID/Act! and sub-grantees reported that many sub-grantees have received non-SCORE funding from other donors, government, and the private sector, including: United Nations (UN) agencies, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), DANIDA, Adam Smith International, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), and others. A few people gave examples of how sub-grantees leveraged this new funding to integrate promising SCORE activities into their other programming (e.g., theater, mini/dhow buzz, school peace clubs, and continuing CVE clinics and CAP implementation). Beyond these traditional donors, another sub-grantee in Kwale successfully cultivated a relationship with Base Titanium, a private mining company, which provides support to the youth entrepreneurship program as part of their corporate social responsibility efforts. In addition, a few sub-grantees pursued profit making activities such as renting out their hall spaces, tents, or charging a fee to use an online web portal.

Many sub-grantees reported that they deliberately anchored activities in existing government or community structures, as they believed these structures were more likely to continue operating independently of SCORE in the future. For example, respondents in KIIs and a community member FGD reported that a sub-grantee successfully negotiated with the county government to incorporate SCORE entrepreneurship training in I I VET Centers. Other examples included working with *Nyumba Kumi*, school peace clubs, CWAs, women's village saving and loans groups, and women's unions in churches, among others. As a nod to the potential effectiveness of this strategy, several respondents across FGD groups noted that, as a result of being part of these structures, they are now champions for change and CVE in their communities.

Lastly, a few respondents reported linking beneficiaries to other programs, networks, or resources which SCORE could not provide, in order to sustain results. In Kwale, for example, a sub-grantee reported linking beneficiaries to internships with private companies.

EQ 4.2 Which conditions and mechanisms are in place so that the benefits of the project interventions are sustained and owned by the beneficiaries after the project comes to an end?

Activities Likely to Continue: KII and FGD respondents identified a range of SCORE activities they believed were likely to be sustained after SCORE. These activities fall into two general categories: (a) activities that show evidence of community adoption and (b) activities characterized by informal, decentralized implementation.

Respondents across counties stated that activities anchored in existing or community-based structures will continue as these structures have already taken ownership of the activities or operate under a pre-existing government mandate. For example, in Kwale and Mombasa, participants in sub-grantee KIIs and FGDs with youth and community members believed that school peace clubs would continue; respondents spoke about how these clubs are mandated (Amani Peace Clubs are an initiative in partial fulfillment of Section 25 of the NCIC Act, 2008), and are already being spearheaded by student leaders and teachers without sub-grantee support. Some FGD respondents even suggested the need to integrate CVE into

school curricula as a way of enhancing the sustainability of CVE messaging in schools at large, not just in school peace clubs. In addition, some respondents in Mombasa, Kwale and Kilifi mentioned that the Nyumba Kumi initiative, CWAs, and county peace committees are likely to continue as they are built off national and county government initiatives. Respondents also identified entrepreneurship activities that have successfully been linked to capital startup as likely to continue (e.g., linkages to VETs in Taita Taveta, private sector linkages in Kwale).

Another category of activities likely to be sustained were those implemented in an informal or decentralized way that reached participants in their communities rather than engaging them in a centralized location. These activities included some community sensitization approaches (e.g., social media, “good parenting” instruction), trauma counselling, and informal youth-police social interactions. Respondents suggested that the informal, decentralized nature of the sensitization allowed the work to be done anywhere (e.g., cultural functions, church groups) and with minimal costs. Participants in FGDs with religious leaders, women, and youth in other counties all reported that they would continue to spread CVE messages, especially because these issues are urgent and affecting their loved ones (see text box). However, some respondents cautioned that they would continue activities by themselves albeit at a much slower pace and frequency in the absence of SCORE support. As one participant in an FGD in Mombasa put it, “We can continue...but only at personal level. We can help those near our places but those in the far distance will require transport and other support to reach.”

“This [work] must go on because it affects either your child or a child in your community” – FGD with women

“[They won’t continue] unless these [CVE sensitization] forums are taken to the grass roots where they don’t have to incur expenses; but centralized forums, no way.” – KII with a sub-grantee

Activities Unlikely to Continue: KII and FGD respondents said that several activities were unlikely to continue despite their effectiveness, including those that (a) were resource intensive, (b) were formal and centralized in their implementation, and (c) required CSO facilitation due to still fragile relationships. In general, participants in KIIs with sub-grantees and FGDs with beneficiaries agreed that high-cost activities such as radio-based interventions and the mini/dhow

buzz cannot be sustained without intensive financial support. This cost factor underpinned centralized activities as well, since bringing participants to a centralized location necessitated refreshments and transport reimbursements, which participants have come to expect. A few participants in FGDs elaborated that not providing remuneration could result in suspicion between communities and organizations, which could impede activity continuity: “...even when there are no resources the participants will feel like [the sensitizer is] benefiting and hiding it from them.”

Despite several examples of activity adoption by communities and governments, respondents reported the need for ongoing CSO facilitation and involvement. Respondents in KIIs with sub-grantees, GOK/Security, and FGDs in Mombasa, Kwale, and Kilifi repeatedly argued that improved relationship between security and communities were the result of frequent meetings facilitated by SCORE. Given the still fragile community-police relations, respondents noted that formal and structured interactions such as *Gumzo Maskani* or other community-police dialogues are unlikely to continue. According to a

GOK/Security participant, “There is suspicion between police and community, so without [CSO] to facilitate it would be difficult for police to go direct to the community [to continue the dialogues].” In a similar vein, it is unlikely that work with reformed youth will continue absent CSO funding. Participants in KIs with sub-grantees and FGDs with youth and women report that youth require constant engagement or else they are liable to relapse back to VE or criminal gangs. Sub-grantees struggled with consistently engaging youth and other community members due to disbursement delays causing them to postpone or cancel SCORE activities, an issue that affects activity effectiveness, sustainability, and CSO credibility.

EVALUATION QUESTION 4: CONCLUSIONS

1. ***To some extent, a few structures established and/or strengthened by SCORE show evidence of beginning to be adopted or institutionalized by sub-grantees, national and county government entities, and communities, though future sustainability is not guaranteed for beyond the short-term.*** Sub-grantees integrated capacity building changes and some have adopted SCORE activities or tools into other programming. Some sub-grantees succeeded in cultivating good working relationships with government entities, resulting in government participation in and support for certain SCORE activities, especially those working with existing government structures (e.g., CAPs and their associated implementation forums, CWAs, peace committees). However, community and government goodwill are not enough; lack of substantial government funding commitments or resources to independently take up/support relevant SCORE activities threaten their sustainability. Similarly, though community members and structures propose that they will continue CVE and sensitization work, it is possible that the frequency and quality of this work will wane over time without external guidance and motivation - and funding - from SCORE sub-grantees or other civil society/government entities.
2. ***Act! and sub-grantees are thinking about program exit and sustainability, although not in a systematized or well documented way.*** To varying degrees, sub-grantees have all made conscious efforts to secure funding, promote adoption of activities/structures, and minimize costs. Strategies being used include a) organizational and technical capacity building of the sub-grantees, (b) pursuing funding from other sources, (c) anchoring activities in existing structures, and (d) creating linkages between beneficiaries and other resources. Act! and sub-grantees could do more to formally document and monitor progress towards exit and sustainability plans.
3. ***Across approaches, certain factors related to implementation and uptake appear to determine SCORE activity sustainability.*** SCORE activities that show evidence of community adoption or are characterized by informal, de-centralized implementation with low costs are most likely to continue. In contrast, activities that are resource intensive, are formal/centralized in their implementation, and require CSO facilitation due to still fragile relationships are unlikely to continue.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The ET offers the following recommendations, divided into those that can be implemented in SCORE's remaining year (short-term) versus those that are more appropriate for future programming (long-term).

SHORT-TERM

1. In its remaining year, SCORE should work with sub-grantees to make slight programming adjustments to more promising activities identified in this evaluation, with a focus on maximizing success factors. Select activities (Nyumba Kumi training, CWAs, certain youth-police interactions or dialogues) could be scaled up at this time in the sense of happening more often and with more consistency, but only within current counties. One-off activities should be avoided.
2. SCORE should develop and disseminate to RRF applicants a concise communication that explains how RRF grants are reviewed, processed, and approved/denied, demystifying the process and managing expectations. Act! should regularly and objectively communicate any process updates to applicants during the approval/denial process.
3. For capacity building, SCORE should continue assisting sub-grantees on implementing their IIPs, with continued focus on MERL, resource mobilization, advocacy, and conflict analysis. This may be best achieved using the in-house mentoring approach, as sub-grantees found this approach to be a good opportunity to practice a capacity building aspect (e.g., financial management) and receive real-time feedback from an expert. Advocacy and conflict analysis are particularly important given the CAP/policy work and constantly evolving CVE and conflict landscape. Capacity building should also potentially include gender mainstreaming (including how to conduct a solid gender analysis) as a subject. Within MERL, provide additional training on articulating TOCs to show how activities will lead to higher outcomes; types of indicators and the development and use of custom indicators, especially for measuring outcomes (this would be beneficial for future programs given that SCORE's indicators are standard and set); and data quality and monitoring. For ease of IIP progress tracking, SCORE should implement a 'one window' data viewing system where agreed upon capacity building aspects in the proposal design are reflected in the IIP as targeted areas, appear in the IIPs and can be tracked in one document throughout the life of the project.
4. SCORE should assist sub-grantees in making progress on exit and sustainability plans in a more organized manner. Regular updates on sustainability plan progress can be included in sub-grantees current biweekly reporting and integrated as an agenda topic during partners' Quarterly Coordination meetings.
5. SCORE should intensify efforts on advocacy and relationship development with national and county government to encourage adoption and resourcing of SCORE activities that are supporting current government structures (CAPs, Nyumba Kumi, Peace Committees, etc.). USAID should consider building a communication and feedback mechanism with the Ministry of Interior and NCTC to increase trust, buy-in, and support to its CVE interventions in Kenya. These relationship building efforts can be intensified in the last year of SCORE and should continue with future USAID programming.

LONG-TERM

1. **PROGRAM DESIGN:** Given the large diversity of CVE approaches implemented under one program (SCORE), the findings that some of these approaches still require more research (e.g., trauma counselling) or were inconsistent in their implementation and outcomes (e.g., youth entrepreneurship), and the economic and social long-term drivers of VE in Kenya, USAID/KEA should consider ways to better link CVE programs with other technical sectors and their programming to more holistically tackle VE. One possible avenue is to develop cross-cutting programming by which certain CVE drivers are addressed by USAID programs in other sectoral pillars to promote efficiency and cross-sector collaboration. For example, strengthening the psychosocial emotional health of men, women, boys, and girls affected by VE might be better addressed under a public health program, whereas economic drivers of VE might be addressed under an economic growth or youth empowerment program (such as K-YES or future programming). CVE or conflict activities that could not be addressed in a cross-cutting way (e.g., policy/advocacy activities, interfaith dialogues, community-police relations) under other sectoral pillars might then be consolidated into a stand-alone CVE/conflict mitigation program.

Furthermore, future CVE/conflict mitigation programming should 1) invest more research on promising activities for which impact is still unclear (e.g., trauma counselling, mini/dhow buzz, radio programming), keeping the Do No Harm principle in mind, and 2) be designed inclusively with potential beneficiaries (youth, religious leaders, police, parents, teachers, PWDs), the GOK (e.g., Ministry of Interior, NCTC, NCIC), and potential sub-grantees to ensure they are accessible and relevant to beneficiary needs, and maximize potential impact, and align with national and country-level government strategies

2. **SCALING:** Many SCORE activities could use refinement prior to scaling up. In general, future CVE programming could consider promoting and possibly scaling up:
 - a. Low-cost, de-centralized community engagement activities including theater, dialogues/barazas
 - b. Community-police and youth-police engagements with adjustments and careful contextualization
 - c. Interfaith dialogues and work through religious leaders as long as engagement is focused and consistent
 - d. Sensitization through (and capacity building work with) existing government and community structures (CVE clinics and peace clubs in school, *Nyumba Kumi* training, CWAs, peace dialogues through peace committees, and CAPs). These activities should first develop a sustainability and take over plan with associated government agencies to promote ownership and determine a timeframe/milestone for handing the activity over. Future support should also include capacity building for state actors to manage and resource the activities. These efforts could build off of the current police reform process, for example.
3. **RRF:** USAID should reflect on the purpose and definition of the RRF for future CVE programming and decide if flexibility should be built into the CVE program itself (eliminating the need for a separate

RRF), or if there should be a stand-alone rapid response funding mechanism such as was implemented in SCORE. If the RRF is aimed at providing sub-grantees with flexibility to address ongoing or long-standing but pressing conflict/CVE issues, then either 1) program flexibility can be built into the actual contract or cooperative agreement with the implementer to allow for program adaptations over LOP (USAID missions are experimenting with flexible contracting mechanisms as part of the Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting (CLA) dialogue – USAID/KEA should tap into these discussions); or 2) RRF can remain as a stand-alone fund for which grantees must apply, but be re-conceptualized as a “flexible conflict mitigation fund.” If issued once again as a stand-alone fund, then the current grant review process could still stand with an increased ceiling for grants to address conflict/CVE issues more holistically. However, if it is deemed that the fund should be truly rapid and responsive to urgent conflict/CVE issues, then the current grant review process is too time consuming and should be revised to allow for a more streamlined approval/denial process involving fewer reviewers.

Depending on the future objective of the RRF, USAID should furthermore revise the indicators for RRF type mechanisms, moving away from a single output indicator to between 1-3 customized process and outcome indicators. For example, rapidity of the mechanism could be measured by the “*Percent of RRF grants issued within 72 hrs of application submission.*” These indicators could be in addition to the any required indicators that align with those in USAID/KEA’s Performance Management Plan.

4. **CAPACITY BUILDING:** Future USAID programming should continue to provide capacity building opportunities for implementing partners. As USAID/KEA begins to conceptualize its new CDCS, the mission should consider contracting a specialized capacity building institution to provide dedicated organizational capacity building support to program implementers across all USAID programs. This would ensure that both grantees and sub-grantees get tailored capacity building support according to their needs and may further the mission’s CLA aims by providing an opportunity for implementers from different sectors to interact and collaborate. This arrangement would also free up a primary CVE implementer to focus on program management, though they could continue to provide technical capacity building support to sub-grantees.

Furthermore, future capacity building support should strengthen its MERL approach. The OCA should continue to be used as a process and learning tool but should not be relied on as the sole data source for an indicator. USAID should consider measuring capacity building objectives using 1-3 indicators that assess multiple manifestations of capacity, such as “*Percentage of sub-grantees that secured non-USAID funding.*”

ANNEXES

ANNEX A: EVALUATION METHODS & LIMITATIONS

The mixed-methods evaluation included the following data collection methods: 1) a **desk review** of program documents; 2) 33 **KIIs** including 82 respondents; 3) 24 **FGDs** including 172 beneficiaries of SCORE activities; and 4) a quantitative mini survey administered in person to 241 respondents during the KII/FGDs (see Table for a gender breakdown of respondents). Following the desk review, the ET, composed of four members, conducted three weeks of field work in early September 2018 within the six program counties in Kenya. Fieldwork began with an in-brief meeting held with USAID and Act! staff on September 10th. The ET conducted primary data collection in Nairobi and the first day in Mombasa as one team, then split into sub-teams for the remainder of fieldwork. The team concluded the field work in Nairobi with preliminary analysis and an out briefing presentation to USAID and Act! on September 28th.

Table 3: KIIs, FGDs, and mini surveys completed

33 KIIs (82 individuals)	
54 Male	28 Female
24 FGDs (172 individuals)	
61 Male	111 Female
Mini Survey (241 individuals³⁸)	
105 Male	127 Female

Social Impact's Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed the evaluation methodology, informed consent scripts, and data collection tools to ensure that the evaluation adhered to ethical standards in research and the protection of human subjects. The ET collected respondents' verbal informed consent

prior to proceeding with any interviews. At least two team members (and an English-Kiswahili interpreter) were present during the KIIs/FGDs, with one team member facilitating the interview and the other team member taking notes. Sub-team members met remotely on a weekly basis to review findings on an iterative basis.

See **Annex B** for all data collection protocol(s) and **Annex C** for a list of evaluation respondents.

DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND SOURCES

DESK REVIEW & SELECTION OF CVE/CONFLICT MITIGATION APPROACHES

Prior to and throughout field work, the ET conducted a desk review of available programmatic documentation, including Act! reporting, sub-grantee reporting, RRF proposals, and MERL data, OCA scorecards at baseline and midline, and other white papers or lessons learned documents.

The ET extracted relevant findings from the documents and used contextual information to inform the evaluation design. SCORE sub-grantees are implementing a range of CVE activities. Based on the desk review, the ET grouped the activities into six main CVE and conflict mitigation approaches on which to focus the evaluation for EQs 1 and 4. Table 5 presents the six approaches of interest, along with information about what organizations are implementing these approaches and where.

³⁸ Nine mini survey respondents did not indicate their gender

Table 4: CVE/conflict mitigation approaches and associated sub-grantees

Approach	County	Sub-grantee
Interfaith dialogues and targeting religious leaders	Lamu	Kikozi
	Kwale, Mombasa, Kilifi	NCCK, SUPKEM
	Kwale	DCMT
Community policing	Kwale	HURIA
	Mombasa	Haki, LICODEP
	Taita Taveta	MAZIDO
	Lamu	Kikozi
	Kwale, Mombasa, Kilifi	SUPKEM
	Kilifi	Kwacha
	Tana River	KECOSCE
	Kwale, Mombasa, Kilifi	NCCK, COEC
Women-focused activities	Tana River	KECOSCE
	Kwale	DCMT
	Kwale	DCMT
Youth-focused and youth entrepreneurship activities	Lamu	Kikozi
	Kilifi	Kwacha
	Kwale	UIG, HURIA, DCMT
	Taita Taveta	MAZIDO
	Kwale, Mombasa, Kilifi	NCCK, SUPKEM
	Mombasa	Haki, LICODEP
	Kwale	HURIA
Engaging government entities	National	COEC
	Lamu	Kikozi
	Tana River	KECOSCE
	Kwale	HURIA
	Mombasa	Haki
	Mombasa	Haki
	Lamu	Kikozi
Community engagement	Kilifi	Kwacha
	Kwale, Mombasa, Kilifi	SUPKEM, COEC
	Taita Taveta	MAZIDO
	Tana River	TRPRD, KECOSCE
	Mombasa	Haki
	Lamu	Kikozi

Source: FY18Q1: Quarterly Report (April-June 2018) and others

To examine effectiveness, the ET used reporting documentation and available MERL data to understand sub-grantees' expected outcomes and compare indicator actuals to targets to determine whether the intervention is on track to achieve these outcomes by the end of SCORE. To help assess sustainability, the ET mined documents for sub-grantees' proposed sustainability strategies, if available. For EQ2, the ET compared the RRF proposal submission date to the funding and implementation dates to assess the

timeliness of the RRF mechanism. For EQ 3, the ET examined OCA scores and IIP narratives over time. Desk review findings for sub-grantees were documented in excel tables (see **Annex D**) and triangulated with KII/FGD and mini survey data.

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

The ET conducted KIIs either with individuals or small groups of key informants to gather findings for all EQs. Table 5 below lists the KII respondent groups (as referred to in this report³⁹), their sub-groupings, and the counties in which the KIIs occurred.

Table 5: KII Respondent Groups

KII Group	Sub-group	County
USAID/Act!	USAID/KEA staff	Nairobi
	Act! staff	Nairobi, Mombasa
Sub-grantees	Sub-grantee staff	Nairobi, Mombasa, Taita Taveta, Tana River, Kwale Kilifi, Lamu,
GOK/Security	National and county government officials (NCTC, County or Deputy/Assistant Commissioners)	Nairobi, Kilifi, Tana River, Lamu, Kwale, Taita Taveta, ⁴⁰
	Security officials (police commanders and constables)	Kilifi, Tana River, Mombasa ⁴¹
CVE Expert	Expert on CVE in coastal Kenya	Nairobi

Sampling for KIIs: Key informants were purposively sampled based on their role and the nature of their engagement with SCORE. Act!, sub-grantee, and USAID helped to inform the ET's selection of key informants. In the majority of cases the team's logisticians invited key informants to participate. For certain respondent types (e.g., GOK/Security), a USAID, Act! or sub-grantee representative made initial contact with the participants and the ET followed up.

FOCUS GROUPS DISCUSSIONS

The ET conducted FGDs with a specific subset of beneficiaries in order to contribute findings for EQ 1 and 4. FGD respondent groups aligned with the evaluation's focus on the six intervention types and a subset of their target beneficiaries: youth who participated in youth leadership and entrepreneurship activities, women who participated in women-focused activities, community members who participated in community engagement activities, and religious leaders who participated in interfaith dialogues.

³⁹ To protect respondent confidentiality the ET refers to respondent groups rather than individual respondents throughout the report. The ET combined sub-groups with small sample sizes into larger respondent groups as another strategy for maintaining confidentiality.

⁴⁰ The ET prioritized the four counties in which SCORE worked with government entities or implemented community policing interventions.

⁴¹ The ET prioritized the four counties in which SCORE worked with government entities on CVE CAPs or implemented police cafes/community policing.

Table 6 below lists the FGDs held according to respondent group, county, and sub-grantee.

Table 6: FGD Respondent Groups

Respondent Group	County	Sub-Grantee
Youth	Kilifi	Kwacha
	Mombasa	LICODEP, Haki Africa
	Kwale	UIG, DCMT
	Taita Taveta	MAZIDO
	Tana River	TRPRD, KECOSCE
	Kilifi, Mombasa, Kwale	NCCK, COEC
	Lamu	Kikozi
Women	Kilifi, Mombasa, Kwale	COEC, NCCK
	Tana River	KECOSCE
	Kwale	DCMT
Community members	Kwale	HURIA
	Taita Taveta	MAZIDO
	Tana River	TRPRD
Religious Leaders	Lamu	Kikozi
	Kilifi, Mombasa, Kwale	NCCK

FGDs were guided by a semi-structured FGD protocol, comprised between six to ten individuals, and lasted approximately two hours. All FGDs with community members, all FGDs with women, and select FGDs with youth were gender segregated to better elicit gender-specific perspectives and provide a comfortable environment for more open discussion among participants.

Sampling for FGDs: The ET sampled FGD participants using a combination of stratified random sampling, convenience sampling, and purposive sampling. Sub-grantees provided the ET with participant lists or attendance sheets from SCORE activities. The ET stratified the lists by gender then randomly selected primary and alternate candidates from the stratified lists. In some cases, FGD beneficiary lists were so small that random sampling was not feasible, and participants were invited and confirmed based on their availability to attend (convenience). In certain cases (FGDs with religious leaders and FGDs with women who experienced trauma), the sub-grantee preferred to select and invite FGD participants (purposive).

MINI SURVEY

KIs and FGDs began with a very short written mini-survey, slightly tailored for different respondent groups, to provide data used to answer all EQs. This allowed for some common questions to be asked of all respondents. Each respondent took five to ten minutes to fill out the mini survey before the interview. The mini survey was based on a structured paper-based questionnaire and provided in English and Kiswahili. If the respondent was not literate, then a member of the ET read aloud the survey form to the respondent in a private location and recorded the respondent's answers.

POTENTIAL BIASES AND LIMITATIONS

Potential Biases: There is the possibility of selection bias on the part of the ET for non-random samples, especially those for which USAID/Act!/Sub-grantee were involved. Respondent answers may be subject to recall bias related to past events or experiences, as well as response/desirability biases whereby respondents may alter their answers due to explicit or implicit expectations. The ET attempted to mitigate recall and desirability biases by asking respondents the same question using multiple phrasings in order to internally triangulate for consistency in responses. Gender bias could be present for mixed-gender FGDs with youth, although the ET mitigated against this by having gender-segregated FGDs as much as possible. Lastly, it is possible that wording of the mini survey could have provoked misunderstanding in certain instances.

Generalizability: Sample sizes for each respondent type and for each approach are relatively small. Evaluation results may therefore be indicative of those who participated but cannot be generalized to the rest of SCORE stakeholders or the general public.

Scheduling limitations: The ET made several attempts to speak with as many stakeholders as possible within the available fieldwork period, including proposing phone interviews with respondents who were not available for in-person interviews. Nevertheless, due to availability constraints the ET was unable to speak to some key informants such as SDS, meaning that this sub-grantee's perspective is not included in the report. Similarly, the ET only succeeded in speaking with one CVE expert. As the evaluation timeline only allowed for an average of two days with each sub-grantee, the ET was limited in the number of FGDs they were able to hold with beneficiaries per sub-grantee and approach.

ANNEX B: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

CONSENT FORM FOR KII

FOMU YA RIDHAA KWA WAHOJIWA WA KIMSINGI

KII ID

Note to evaluator: The evaluator must read the informed consent script aloud to the respondent exactly as written.

Kumbusho kwa mtathmini: Mtathmini lazima amsomee mhojiwa nakala ya ridhaa jinsi ilivyoandikwa, kwa sauti.

Introduction: Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. We are researchers from Social Impact (SI) and we have been contracted by USAID to evaluate the Strengthening Community Resilience Against Extremism (SCORE) activity implemented by Act! and NAME OF CSO. We are independent researchers as we are not part of USAID, Act! or NAME OF CSO. You have been selected to participate in this research because of your knowledge of the SCORE activity. Today's interview is expected to last approximately 1 hour, and we will discuss SCORE's approaches to CVE and their effectiveness, the likelihood of these approaches continuing in the future, the effectiveness and timeliness of the rapid response fund, and how well SCORE implemented capacity building for sub grantees.

Utangulizi: Shukran kwa kutenga muda wako kukutana na sisi leo. Sisi ni watafiti kutoka Social Impact (SI) na tuna mkataba na USAID kutathmini mradi wa “Kuboresha Ustahimilivu wa Jamii Kupambana na Misimamo Mikali,” almaarufu SCORE unaotekelezwa na **Act! na (JINA LA SHIRIKA)**. Sisi ni watafiti huru kwa kuwa hatuhusiani na **USAID, Act! au (JINA LA SHIRIKA)**. Umechaguliwa kuhusika katika utafiti huu kwa sababu ya ufahamu wako wa mradi wa SCORE. Mahojiano ya leo yatachukua takriban masaa 1.5-2 na tutajadili mbinu zinazotumiwa na SCORE kukabiliana na misimamo mikali; ufanisi wao; uwezekano wa kuendeleza mbinu hizi siku za usoni; ufanisi na muda wa shughuli za ufadhili wa dharura na vipi SCORE ilitekeleza ujenzi wa uwezo wa wafadhiliwa-wadogo.

Risks and benefits: We do not anticipate that you will incur any risk or direct benefit from participating in this interview. We do ask about some sensitive issues like conflict and extremism, but we will not ask you to share anything that may be emotionally sensitive to you.

Hasara na faida: Hatutazamii kuwa utapata hasara yoyote ama faida ya moja kwa moja kutokana na kuhusika katika mahojiano haya. Tunauliza maswala nyeti kuhusu mizozo na misimamo mikali lakini hatutakuomba uelezee chochote ambacho kitazua hisia nyeti kwako.

Confidentiality: Your responses in this interview will be kept in confidence by the evaluation team. Only the evaluation team will have access to the notes that are taken. Your name or position will not appear in any reporting.

Usiri: Majibu yako katika mahojiano haya yatahifadhiwa kwa usiri na kikosi cha utathmini. Ni kikosi hiki tu ambacho kitaweza kupata nakala za maandishi ya mahojiano haya. Jina lako ama cheo chako hakitaonekana katika ripoti yoyote.

Voluntary participation: Your participation is voluntary. If you do not want to participate or to answer specific questions you do not have to. Should you choose to participate, please know that you may change your mind at any point during our discussion. There will be no consequences to your decision not to participate.

Kuhusika kwa hiari: Kuhusika kwako ni kwa hiari. Iwapo hutaki kuhusika au kujibu maswali fulani, sio lazima ufanye hivyo. Ukiamua kuhusika, elewa kuwa unaweza kubadili uamuzi wako wakati wowote katika mazungumzo yetu. Hakutakua na adhabu ya kutoshiriki.

Report: We expect to speak with approximately 200 people as part of this evaluation. The information that you and others provide will be used to write a report. This report will be shared with USAID and other stakeholders for comment and eventually be made public.

If you have any concerns, you may contact the Social Impact Institutional Review Board at irb@socialimpact.com with questions about the study or results, or you can contact Mikewa Ogada at +254-725-657597 or mikewaogada@gmail.com.

Ripoti: Tunatarajia kuzungumza na takriban watu 200 katika utafiti huu. Habari mnazotupa wewe na wenzio zitakumika kuandika ripoti. Ripoti hii itapewa USAID na wadau wengine kuhariri na hatimaye kuwekwa wazi.

Ikiwa unazo hofu zozote, unaweza kuwasiliana na Bodi ya Ukaguzi wa Taasisi ya Social Impact kupitia irb@socialimpact.com na maswali kuhusu utafiti na matokeo, au uwasiliane na Bw. Mikewa Ogada kwa +254-725-657597 ama mikewaogada@gmail.com.

- Do you have any questions for us before we get started? [Researcher to answer any questions]
Je, una maswali yoyote kwetu kabla tuanze mahojiano? (Mtafiti ajibu swali lolote)
- Are you willing to participate in this interview? [Gain verbal consent then tick one]
Je, uko radhi kujihusika katika mahojiano haya? (Pata ridhaa ya maneno)

_____ Yes / Ndiyo

_____ No / Hapana

I _____ (Researcher name), affirm that the participant gave verbal consent to participate in the evaluation. _____ (Signature) _____ (Date)
Mimi _____ (Jina la mtafiti), nadhiirisha kuwa mshiriki alitoa ridhaa ya maneno Kuhusika katika utathmini. _____ (Sahihi) _____ (Tarehe)
***PARTICIPANT NAME / JINA: _____

CONSENT FORM FOR FGD

FOMU YA RIDHAA KWA MAJADILIANO YA KIKUNDI

FGD ID _____

Note to evaluator: The evaluator must read the informed consent script aloud to the respondent exactly as written.

Kumbusho kwa mtathmini: Mtathmini lazima amsomee mhojiwa nakala ya ridhaa jinsi ilivyoandikwa, kwa sauti.

Introduction: Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. We are researchers from Social Impact (SI) and we have been contracted by USAID to evaluate the *Strengthening Community Resilience Against Extremism* (SCORE) activity implemented by **Act! and NAME OF CSO**. We are independent researchers as we are not part of **USAID, Act! or NAME OF CSO**. You have been selected to participate in this research because of your knowledge of the SCORE activity. Today's interview is expected to last approximately 1.5-2 hours and we will discuss SCORE's approaches to CVE and their effectiveness, the likelihood of these approaches continuing in the future, and, if relevant, the effectiveness and timeliness of any rapid response fund activities in which you participated.

Utangulizi: Shukran kwa kutenga muda wako kukutana na sisi leo. Sisi ni watafiti kutoka Social Impact (SI) na tuna mkataba na USAID kutathmini mradi wa **"Kuboresha Ustahimilivu wa Jamii Kupambana na Misimamo Mikali,"** almaarufu SCORE unaotekelezwa na **Act! na (JINA LA SHIRIKA)**. Sisi ni watafiti huru kwa kuwa hatuhusiani na **USAID, Act! au (JINA LA SHIRIKA)**. Umechaguliwa kuhusika katika utafiti huu kwa sababu ya ufahamu wako wa mradi wa SCORE. Mahojiano ya leo yatachukua takriban masaa 1.5-2 na tutajadili mbinu zinazotumiwa na SCORE kukabiliana na misimamo mikali; ufanisi wao; uwezekano wa kuendeleza mbinu hizi siku za usoni; na kama itafaa, ufanisi na muda wa shughuli za ufadhili wa dharura ambazo uliwahi kuhusika.

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Usiri: Majibu yako katika mahojiano haya yatahifadhiwa kwa usiri na kikosi cha utathmini. Ni kikosi hiki tu ambacho kitaweza kupata nakala za maandishi ya mahojiano haya. Jina lako ama cheo chako hakitaonekana katika ripoti yoyote. Tafadhali zingatia kuwa ingawa watafiti watachukua tahadhari kukuza usiri wa mahojiano haya, asili na muundo wa mahojiano ya vikundi unaweza kukomaza uwezo wetu wa kuhakikisha usiri. Tungependa kuwakumbusha wahusika kuheshimu faragha ya muhusika mwenzako na usiyarudie yaliyosemwa katika mahojiano ya kikundi hiki kwa wengine.

Voluntary participation: Your participation is voluntary. If you do not want to participate or to answer specific questions you do not have to. Should you choose to participate, please know that you may change your mind at any point during our discussion. There will be no consequences to your decision not to participate.

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Je, uko radhi kujihusika katika mahojiano haya? (Pata ridhaa ya maneno)

_____ Yes / Ndiyo

_____ No / Hapana

I _____ (Researcher name), affirm that the participant gave verbal consent to participate in the evaluation. _____ (Signature) _____ (Date)

Mimi _____ (Jina la mtafiti), nadhiirisha kuwa mshiriki alitoa ridhaa ya maneno Kuhusika katika utathmini. _____ (Sahihi) _____ (Tarehe)

***PARTICIPANT NAME / JINA: _____

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

KII Protocol - USAID/KEA and Act!

DATE/TIME:	
COUNTY/INTERVIEW LOCATION:	
RESPONDENT NAME:	
RESPONDENT SEX:	
RESPONDENT ID:	
RESPONDENT ORGANIZATION/TITLE:	
INTERVIEWER NAME:	
NOTETAKER NAME:	

EQ	Interview Question:
EQ I	1. What have been SCORE's greatest achievements/results over the past three years? - To what extent have you achieved the SCORE goal of building community resilience? - What is the evidence of this change/impact? - What specific interventions or factors led to these results?
EQ I.I	2. Which SCORE approaches/tools have been <u>MOST</u> successful at building community resilience to conflict or VE? <i>(ask them to describe specific examples that show community resilience has been built – what does this increase in resilience look like?)</i> - What made these approaches/tools successful? <i>(probe for different conditions and/or factors for success, including potentially using approaches in combination)</i> [Let respondent speak to open-ended question, then narrow down to CVE approaches of interest, as needed: i. Interfaith dialogues and targeting religious leaders ii. Youth leadership and entrepreneurship* activities iii. Women-focused activities iv. Police Cafés/Community policing/youth police v. Community engagement vi. Work with county government on CVE action plans]
EQ I.I	3. Which SCORE approaches/tools have been <u>LESS</u> successful at building community resilience to conflict or VE? What made these approaches/tools <u>less</u> successful? <i>(probe for different conditions and/or factors that <u>hindered</u> success and if/how the program addressed them)</i>
EQ I.I	4. Which SCORE approaches/tools are ready to be taken to scale, either through SCORE or a future program? <i>Probes:</i>

	• Why are these approaches/tools ready for scaling up and in what contexts/locations? • For approaches/tools that are almost ready for scaling up, what else needs to be done before scaling up can happen?
EQ2	5. How <u>successful</u> has the Rapid Response Fund been at addressing incidents of conflict or VE? (<i>probe for examples of more successful and less successful RRF projects</i>) • How relevant were the funded RRF projects to the conflict or VE context? • Was the project design/theory of change appropriate for the incident at hand? • Were there other incidents of conflict or VE that the RRF did not respond to?
EQ2	6. How <u>quickly</u> has the Rapid Response Fund been able to address incidents of conflict or VE? • What factors enabled certain RRF projects to be able to quickly address incidents? • What factors caused certain RRF projects to be slower to address incidents?
EQ2.1 EQ2.2	7. How likely is it that the RRF will achieve its intended results or indicator targets by the end of the program? Why or why not? • Were the targets realistic? If not, what would have been a more realistic target or indicator? • Were the indicators appropriate? If no, what would have been a better indicator for measuring RRF results?
EQ1 EQ2	8. What were the different ways in which the project engaged men and women? • To what extent were men and women engaged equally? • To what extent were men and women engaged effectively? • What effect did women's inclusion or participation have on project outcomes? • What effect did men's inclusion or participation have on project outcomes? • What effect did youth inclusion or participation have on project outcomes?
EQ3	9. Please describe the capacity building support SCORE provided to grantees. How receptive have grantees been to capacity building support?
EQ3	10. In what ways have SCORE grantee's capacity changed as a result of this support? (<i>probe for both organizational capacity changes and technical capacity changes - What is the evidence of change, and are there any specific examples or case studies they want to highlight?</i>) • In what ways could SCORE grantee's capacity still be improved? • What forms of support have been most effective? • What forms of support have been less effective?
EQ3.1 EQ3.2	11. How likely is it that SCORE will achieve its intended results or indicator targets for grantee capacity building by the end of the program? Why or why not?

	• Were the targets realistic? If not, what would have been a more realistic target or indicator?
EQ4.1 EQ4.3	12. How well has SCORE planned for the exit and sustainability of its interventions? (<i>Probe for examples</i>) • What are the risks to the sustainability of SCORE's intervention? How has SCORE addressed these risks? • What conditions or mechanisms has SCORE put in place to enable subgrantee, community, or government ownership of SCORE activities?
EQ4	10. If there is no follow-on support from USAID, which SCORE activities or results are likely to continue after SCORE? Who will continue them (<i>probe for sub-grantees, communities, government, or networks/groups</i>)? Which are unlikely to continue? Why/why not? • What structures or activities do communities now have in place to counter violent extremism? (<i>Probe for examples/evidence of adoption and institutionalization</i>) • What evidence is there that communities will continue to use these structures or activities in the short-term? Medium-term? Long-term?
EQ4.2	13. What more can be done to make sure that SCORE activities and results continue in the future? • What else can SCORE do to improve its exit and sustainability strategy?
EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4	14. What are some of the key lessons learned that can inform future SCORE programming? <i>Probe for:</i> • Key lessons learned related to CVE approaches for building community resilience • Key lessons learned related to RRF projects • Key lesson learned related to capacity building • Key lessons learned related to sustainability
EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4	15. What recommendations do you have to improve SCORE or future CVE programming? Probes as needed: • What would you do differently if you could start from scratch? • What changes would you make to the theory of change and objectives? • What changes would you make to the activities (CVE/RRF/capacity building)? • What changes would you make to increase uptake and sustainability?

KII PROTOCOL – SCORE GRANTEES

ITIFAKI YA WAHOJIWA MAALUM KWA WALIOFADHILIWA

DATE/TIME:

COUNTY/INTERVIEW LOCATION:

RESPONDENT NAME JINA LA MHOJIWA:

RESPONDENT SEX JINSIA YA MHOJIWA:

RESPONDENT ID UTAMBULISHO WA MHOJIWA:

RESPONDENT

ORGANIZATION/TITLE:

**SHIRIKA/CHEO YA
MHOJIWA:**

- ☐ Coast Education Centre (COEC)
- ☐ Diani Chale Management Trust (DCMT)
- ☐ Haki Africa
- ☐ Human Rights Agenda (HURIA)
- ☐ Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE)
- ☐ KIKOZI Programme Group
- ☐ KWACHA Africa
- ☐ KYBI
- ☐ Likoni Community Development Programme (LICODEP)
- ☐ Management of Arid Zones Initiatives and Development Options (MAZIDO)
- ☐ Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM)
- ☐ Sustainable Development Solutions (SDS)
- ☐ Tana River Peace & Reconciliation & Development (TRPRD)
- ☐ UMMAH Initiative Group (UIG)

Title/Cheo: _____

APPROACHES USED:

MBINU ZA

KUPAMBANA NA

MISIMAMO MIKALI:

- ☐ Interfaith dialogues and targeting religious leaders
- ☐ Mazungumzo kati ya dini tofauti na kuwalenga viongozi wa kidini
- ☐ Youth leadership and entrepreneurship activities
- ☐ Uongozi wa vijana na shughuli za ujasiriamali
- ☐ Women-focused activities
- ☐ Shughuli zinazowalenga wanawake
- ☐ Police Cafés/Community policing/youth police
- ☐ Vikao na polisi/ulinzi-shirikishi/vijana na polisi
- ☐ Community engagement
- ☐ Ushirikiano wa kijamii
- ☐ Work with county government on CVE action plans
- ☐ Ushirikiano na serikali za ugatuzi katika maazimio ya kupambana na misimamo mikali

Note name of specific activity / Andika jina la shughuli maalum:

RRF PROJECT (if applicable) / MRADI WA UFADHILI WA DHARURA:

INTERVIEWER NAME:

NOTETAKER NAME:

EQ Interview Question:

EQ I 1. What have been SCORE's greatest achievements/results over the past three years?

- What specific interventions or factors led to these results?

Mafanikio makubwa zaidi ya mradi wa SCORE katika miaka mitatu iliyopita ni yapi?

- Ni shuguli au hali zipi zilichangia matokeo haya?

EQ I.1 2. Which SCORE approaches/tools that your organization used have been MOST effective at building community resilience to conflict or VE?

Kati ya mbinu za SCORE zilizotumiwa na shirika lako, ni zipi zilikuwa na fanaka zaidi katika kujenga ustahilivu wa jamii dhidi ya mizozo na misimamo mikali?

(Ask them to describe specific examples that show community resilience has been built – what does this increase in resilience look like?)

- What made these approaches/tools effective?

Ni kipi kiliwezesha mbinu hizi kupata ufanisi?

(probe for different conditions and/or factors for success, including

******potentially using approaches in combination/sequencing*****)*

[Let respondent speak to open-ended question, then narrow down to CVE approaches of interest, as needed:

- 1. Interfaith dialogues and targeting religious leaders*
- 2. Youth leadership and entrepreneurship* activities*
- 3. Women-focused activities*
- 4. Police Cafés/Community policing/youth police*
- 5. Community engagement*
- 6. Work with county government]*

EQ I.1 3. Which SCORE approaches/tools that your organization used have been LESS effective at building community resilience to conflict or VE?

- What made these approaches/tools less effective?

Kati ya mbinu za SCORE zilizotumiwa na shirika lako, ni zipi hazikuwa na fanaka kubwa katika kujenga ustahilivu wa jamii dhidi ya mizozo na misimamo mikali?

- Ni kipi kilizuia mbinu hizi kupata ufanisi?
(probe for different conditions and/or factors that hindered success and if/how the program addressed them)

EQ1.1

4. Which, if any, SCORE approaches/tools that you have used are ready to be taken to scale, either through SCORE or a future program?
 - a. Why are these approaches/tools ready for being scaled or replicated?
 - b. How would you change them before scaling, if at all?
 - c. For approaches/tools that are almost ready to be scaled or replicated up, what else needs to be done before this can happen?

Ni mbinu zipi za **[**]Jina la Shirika**]** ziko tayari kuigwa aitha kupitia kwa score ama miradi ijayo?

- Kwa nini mbinu hizi ziko tayari kwa upanuzi na kuigwa?
- Mtazibadilisha vipi kabla ya kuzifanyia upanuzi?
- Ni nini cha ziada kinatakiwa kufanywa kwa zile mbinu zilizotayari kwa upanuzi au mwigo kabla ya kufanya hivyo?

****QUESTIONS 1-4 (RESILIENCE) SHOULD TAKE 20 MINS****

EQ2

5. [Only ask for applicable CSOs] How effective was your RRF project at addressing the incident?
 - a. Why did you choose this particular intervention to address the incident?
 - b. Were there other incidents of conflict or VE could have warranted a response? If so, why wasn't there a RRF project for the incident

(probe to find out if there were any projects that didn't make the cut and why not)?

Mradi wenu wa ufadhili wa dharura ulipata fanaka kwa kiwango gani?

- a. Kwa nini mlichagua mbinu hii kutatua tatizo hilo?
- b. Je, kulikua na matukio mengine ya mizozo na misimamo mikali ambayo ilihitaji udhibiti? Ikiwa yalikuwepo, hakukuwa na ufadhili wa dharura wa kudhibiti tukio hilo?

EQ2

6. [Only ask for applicable CSOs] How timely was your RRF project been at addressing the incident of conflict or VE?
 - a. What factors positively or negatively affected the timeliness of your response?

	Je mradi wenu wa ufadhili was dharura uliweza kutatua tukio la mzozo au misimamo mikali kwa wakati unaofaa a. Ni visababishi vipi vilihakikisha au kuzuia utatuzi kwa wakati?
EQ2.1 EQ2.2	7. [Only ask for applicable CSOs] How easy or difficult was it to meet your RRF targets? Why? - Were the targets realistic? If not, what would have been a more realistic target or indicator? Je, ilikuwa rahisi au vigumu kuafikia malengo yenu ya mradi wa ufadhili wa dharura? Kwa nini? - Je, malengo yenu yalikuwa halisi? Ikiwa hayakuwa halisi, ni malengo gani au vigezo vipi vingekuwa halisi Zaidi?
QUESTIONS 5-7 (RRF) SHOULD TAKE 15 MINUTES	
EQ1 EQ2	9. To what extent did SCORE engage men and women effectively? - What effect did women's inclusion have on your outcomes? - What effect did men's inclusion have on the project outcomes? - What effect did the youth inclusion have on the project outcomes? Mradi wa SCORE uliwahusisha wake kwa waume kikamilifu? - Kuhusishwa kwa wanawake kulichangia vipi matokeo ya mradi? - Kuhusishwa kwa wanaume kulichangia vipi matokeo ya mradi? - Kuhusishwa kwa vijana kulichangia vipi matokeo ya mradi?
EQ3	11. In what ways has your capacity changed as a result of SCORE's capacity building support? <i>(Probe for both organizational capacity changes and technical capacity changes - What is the evidence of change, and are there any specific examples or case studies they want to highlight?)</i> a. Which specific SCORE capacity building approaches led to these changes? b. In what ways could your capacity still be improved? Uwezo wenu umebadilika kwa kiwango gani kwa mujibu wa shughuli za SCORE za kujenga uwezo? a. Ni mbinu gani haswa za kujenga uwezo zilizosababisha matokeo haya? b. Ni vipi uwezo wenu unaweza kuboreshwa Zaidi?

EQ3

12. How easy or difficult has it been to reach the targets for your capacity building indicators?

- Were the targets realistic? If not, what would have been a more realistic target or indicator?

Je, ilikuwa rahisi au vigumu kuafikia malengo na vigezo vyenu vya kujenga uwezo?

- Je, malengo yenu yalikuwa halisi? Kama hayakuwa halisi, ni malengo na vigezo vipi vingekuwa halisi?

*****QUESTIONS 8-11 (CAPACITY BUILDING) SHOULD TAKE 20 MINUTES*****

EQ4.1

13. What is your exit and sustainability plan for when SCORE ends? *(Probe for examples)*

EQ4.3

- What progress have you made on your exit and sustainability plan so far?

Ni ipi mipango yako ya kuondoka kutoka jamii-lengwa na udumishaji wa matokeo wakati mradi wa SCORE utakapofikia mwisho?

- Ni hatua zipi umepiga katika mipango yako ya kuondoka kutoka jamii lengwa na udomishaji?

EQ4

14. If there is no follow-on support from USAID, which activities or results are likely to continue after SCORE?

- What will your organization continue to do, even without SCORE funding?
- What will your beneficiaries (communities, government, networks) continue to do, even without SCORE funding?
- What structures or activities have you or your beneficiaries **ADOPTED** to counter violent extremism and mitigate conflict? *(Probe for examples/evidence of adoption and institutionalization)*
- What evidence is there that you or your beneficiaries will continue to use these structures or activities in the short-term? Medium-term? Long-term?

Ikiwa hakutakuwa na ufuatiliizi kutoka kwa USAID ni shughuli au matokeo gani yataendelea baada ya mradi wa SCORE?

- Ni shughuli zipi shirika lenu litaendelea kutekeleza hata bila ufadhili wa score?
- Ni shughuli zipi zitaendelea kutekelezwa na walengwa wenu (jamii, serikali, miungano) hata bila ufadhili wa SCORE?

- Ni miundo au shughuli zipi ambazo jamii au washirika wako wamezichukua kupambana na misimamo mikali na kuzuia mizozo?
- Ni dhibitisho zipi zipo za kuonyesha kuwa jamii na washirika wako wataendelea kutumia miundo au shughuli hizi kwa muda mfupi, muda wa kati na muda mrefu?

EQ 4.2

14. Which activities or results are unlikely to continue? Why/why not?

Ni shughili au matokeo gani huenda yasiendelee? Kwa nini?

EQ4.2

15. What more can be done to make sure that SCORE activities and results continue in the future?

- What else can SCORE do to improve its exit and sustainability strategy?

Ni nini cha ziada kinaweza kutekelezwa kuhakikisha kuwa shughuli na matokeo ya SCORE yanaendelea katika siku zijazo?

- Ni nini la ziada linafaa kutekelezwa na SCORE kuboresha mipango yake ya kutoka katika jamii-lengwa na udumishaji wa matokeo?

***QUESTIONS 12-15 (SUSTAINABILITY) SHOULD TAKE 20 MINUTES**

EQ1
EQ2
EQ3
EQ4

16. What are some of the key lessons learned that can inform future SCORE programming? *Probe for:*

- Key lessons learned related to approaches for building community resilience
- Key lessons learned related to RRF projects
- Key lesson learned related to capacity building
- Key lessons learned related to sustainability

Ni mafunzo gani muhimu mlifunza ambayo yanaweza kuchangia mipango ya kudhibiti mizozo na misimamo mikali?

- Mafunzo muhimu yanayohusiana na mbinu za kujenga ustahimilivu wa jamii
- Mafunzo muhimu yanayohusiana na udumishaji wa matokeo
- Mafunzo muhimu juu ya kuboresha uhusiano kati ya mashirika ya jamii na serikali.

EQ1
EQ2
EQ3
EQ4

17. What recommendations do you have to improve SCORE or future CVE programming? [*Probe as needed:*]

- What would you do differently if you could start from scratch?

-
- What changes would you make to the theory of change and objectives?
 - What changes would you make to the activities (CVE/RRF/capacity building)?
 - What changes would you make to increase uptake and sustainability?

Una mapendekezo gani yanayoweza kuboresha mradi wa SCORE au mipango ya baadaye ya kudhibiti misimamo mikali?

- Ni mambo gani ungefanya tofauti ungeanza mradi upya?
 - Ni mabadiliko gani ungefanyia mfumo wa mradi na malengo yake?
 - Ni mabadiliko gani ungefanyia shughuli (za kupambana na misimamo mikali, mradi wa dharura na kujenga uwezo)?
 - Ni mabadiliko gani ungefanya kuboresha kibali na udumishaji?
-

KII PROTOCOL FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

ITIFAKI YA WAHOJIWA MAALUM KWA MAAFISA WA SERIKALI

DATE/TIME TAREHE/WAKATI:	
COUNTY/INTERVIEW LOCATION:	
RESPONDENT NAME:	
RESPONDENT SEX:	
RESPONDENT ID:	
RESPONDENT ORGANIZATION/TITLE: SHIRIKA/CHEO CHA MHOJIWA:	
ASSOCIATED CSO:	
CVE APPROACHES USED: MBINU ZA KUPAMBANA NA MISIMAMO MIKALI:	☐ Interfaith dialogues and targeting religious leaders ☐ Mazungumzo kati ya dini tofauti na kuwalenga viongozi wa kidini ☐ Youth leadership and entrepreneurship activities ☐ Uongozi wa vijana na shughuli za ujasiriamali ☐ Women-focused activities ☐ Shughuli zinazowalenga wanawake ☐ Police Cafés/Community policing/youth police ☐ Vikao na polisi/ulinzi-shirikishi/vijana na polisi ☐ Community engagement ☐ Ushirikiano wa kijamii ☐ Work with county government on CVE action plans ☐ Ushirikiano na serikali za ugatuzi katika maazimio ya kupambana na misimamo mikali Note name of specific activity / Andika jina la shughuli maalum: _____
INTERVIEWER NAME:	
NOTETAKER NAME:	
EQ	Interview Questions
EQI	What is the role of your office in addressing conflict or CVE? In which [**CSO name**] activities did your office directly participate Ofisi yako inamajukumu yapi katika kutatua mizozo na kupambana na misimamo mikali? Ni shughuli zipi za [**Jina la shirika**] ambazo ofisi yako ilihusishwa? <i>(Prompt the respondent with the list of CVE approaches or activities if needed)?</i>
EQI	I. What are some of the changes in peace and security in your local area/county over the last three years? How did [**CSO name**] activities contribute to these changes? Kuna mabadiliko gani ya Amani na Usalama kwenye eneo lako katika miaka mitatu iliyopita?

	Ni vipi shughuli za [**]Jina la Shirika] zilichangia mabadiliko hayo?
EQI.I	Which [**CSO name**] approaches/tools have been <u>MOST</u> effective at building community resilience to conflict or VE? - What made these approaches/tools effective? Ni mbinu zipi za [**]Jina la Shirika] zilikuwa na ufanisi mkubwa katika kujenga ustahimilivu wa Jamii dhidi ya misimamo mikali? - Ni kipi kiliwezesha mbinu hizi kupata ufanisi? <i>(Ask them to describe specific examples that show community resilience has been built – what does this increase in resilience look like?)</i> <i>(probe for different conditions and/or factors for success, including ***<u>potentially using approaches in combination/sequencing</u>***)</i> <i>[Let respondent speak to open-ended question, then narrow down to approaches of interest:</i> <i>Interfaith dialogues and targeting religious leaders</i> <i>Youth leadership and entrepreneurship* activities</i> <i>Women-focused activities</i> <i>Police Cafés/Community policing/youth police</i> <i>Community engagement</i> <i>Work with county government]</i>
EQI.I	2. Which [**CSO name**] approaches/tools have been <u>LESS</u> effective at building community resilience to conflict or VE? - What made these approaches/tools <u>less</u> successful? Ni mbinu zipi za [**]Jina la Shirika] hazikuwa na ufanisi mkubwa katika kujenga ustahimilivu wa Jamii dhidi ya misimamo mikali? - Ni kipi kilizuia mbinu hizi kupata ufanisi? <i>(probe for different conditions and/or factors that <u>hindered</u> success and if/how the program addressed them)</i>
EQI	3. Overall, what effect did women’s inclusion have on project outcomes? Kwa ujumla, kuhusishwa kwa wanawake kulichangia vipi matokeo ya mradi?

	Kuhusishwa kwa wanaume kulichangia vipi matokeo ya mradi? Kuhusishwa kwa vijana kulichangia vipi matokeo ya mradi?
EQ1.1	5. Which, if any, [**CSO name**] approaches/tools are ready to be taken to scale, either through SCORE or a future program? • Why are these approaches/tools ready for being scaled or replicated? • How would you change them before scaling, if at all? • For approaches/tools that are almost ready to be scaled or replicated up, what else needs to be done before this can happen? Ni mbinu zipi za [**Jina la Shirika**] ziko tayari kuigwa aitha kupitia kwa score ama miradi ijayo? • Kwa nini mbinu hizi ziko tayari kwa upanuzi na kuigwa? • Itachukua muda gani kabla ya upanuzi au mwigo huo kufanyika? • Ni nini cha ziada kinatakiwa kufanywa kwa zile mbinu zilizotayari kwa upanuzi au mwigo kabla ya kufanya hivyo?
EQ4	15. Which [**CSO name**] activities or results are likely to continue in the future without donor funding? • What will your organization continue to do, even without SCORE funding? • What will your communities or partners continue to do, even without SCORE funding? • What structures or activities have you, your communities, or partners ADOPTED to counter violent extremism and mitigate conflict? • What evidence is there that you or your communities or partners will continue to use these structures or activities in the <u>short-term</u>? <u>Medium-term</u>? <u>Long-term</u>? Ni shughuli zipi za [**Jina la Shirika**] zinaweza kuendelea bila ufadhili? • Ni nini shirika lako litaendelea kutekeleza bila ufadhili wa SCORE? • Ni nini jamii ama washirika wako wataendelea kutekeleza hata bila ufadhili wa SCORE? • Ni miundo au shughuli zipi ambazo jamii au washirika wako wamezichukua kupambana na misimamo mikali na kuzuia mizozo? • Ni dhibitisho zipi zipo za kuonyesha kuwa jamii na washirika wako wataendelea kutumia miundo au shughuli hizi kwa muda mfupi, muda wa kati na muda mrefu?
EQ4.2	6. What more can be done to make sure that [**CSO name**] activities and results continue in the future? • What else can SCORE do to improve its exit and sustainability strategy?

	Ni nini cha ziada kinaweza kutekelezwa kuhakikisha kuwa shughuli na matokeo ya [**]ina la Shirika**] yanaendelea katika siku zijazo? • SCORE ifanye nini la ziada kuboresha kuondoka kwake na kudumisha matokeo yake?
EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4	7. What are some of the key lessons learned that can inform future conflict and CVE programming? • Key lessons learned related to approaches for building community resilience • Key lessons learned related to sustainability • Key lessons about strengthening the relationship between civil society and government Ni mafunzo gani muhimu mlifunza ambayo yanaweza kuchangia mipango ya kudhibiti mizozo na misimamo mikali? • Mafunzo muhimu yanayohusiana na mbinu za kujenga ustahimilivu wa jamii • Mafunzo muhimu yanayohusiana na udumishaji wa matokeo • Mafunzo muhimu juu ya kuboresha uhusiano kati ya mashirika ya jamii na serikali.
EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4	8. What recommendations do you have to improve SCORE or future CVE programming? Probes as needed: • What would you do differently if you could start from scratch? • What changes would you make to the activities (CVE)? • What changes would you make to increase uptake and sustainability? Una mapendekezo gani yanayoweza kuboresha mradi wa SCORE au mipango ya baadaye ya kudhibiti misimamo mikali? • Ni mambo gani ungefanya tofauti ungeanza mradi upya? • Ni mabadiliko gani ungefanyia shughuli (za kupambana na misimamo mikali)? • Ni mabadiliko gani ungefanya kuboresha kibali na udumishaji?

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE / MWONGOZO WA MAJADILIANO YA KIKUNDI

DATE/TIME: TAREHE/WAKATI:		
COUNTY/FGD LOCATION GATUZI/ENEO		
CSO SHIRIKA:	☐ Coast Education Centre (COEC) ☐ Diani Chale Management Trust (DCMT) ☐ Haki Africa ☐ Human Rights Agenda (HURIA) ☐ Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE) ☐ KIKOZI Programme Group ☐ KWACHA Africa ☐ KYBI ☐ Likoni Community Development Programme (LICODEP) ☐ Management of Arid Zones Initiatives and Development Options (MAZIDO) ☐ National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) ☐ Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) ☐ Sustainable Development Solutions (SDS) ☐ Tana River Peace & Reconciliation & Development (TRPRD) ☐ UMMAH Initiative Group (UIG)	
FGD RESPONDENTS GROUP: KIKUNDI CHA MAHOJIANO:	☐ Women ☐ Youth (male/female) ☐ Community members (male) ☐ Community members (female) ☐ Community members (elder) ☐ Religious Leaders	☐ Wanawake ☐ Vijana (waume/wake) ☐ Wanajamii (waume) ☐ Wanajamii (wake) ☐ Wanajamii (wazee) ☐ Viongozi wa kidini
CVE APPROACHES USED: MBINU ZA KUKABILIANA NA MISIMAMO MIKALI ZILIZOTUMIKA:	☐ Interfaith dialogues and targeting religious leaders ☐ Mazungumzo kati ya dini tofauti na kuwalenga viongozi wa kidini ☐ Youth leadership and entrepreneurship activities ☐ Uongozi wa vijana na shughuli za ujasiriamali ☐ Women-focused activities ☐ Shughuli zinazowalenga wanawake ☐ Police Cafés/Community policing/youth police ☐ Vikao na polisi/ulinzi-shirikishi/vijana na polisi ☐ Community engagement ☐ Ushirikiano wa kijamii ☐ Work with county government on CVE action plans ☐ Ushirikiano na serikali za ugatuzi katika maazimio ya kupambana na misimamo mikali Note name of specific activity (Nakili jina la shughuli maalum)	

FGD FACILITATOR NAME / JINA LA MSHIRIKISHI WA MAHOJIANO:
NOTETAKER'S NAME / JINA LA ANAYENAKILI:

_____FGD ID

PARTICIPANT NAME	SEX	TRANSPORT REIMBURSEMENT RECEIVED (SIGNATURE & ID Number)
a.		
b.		
c.		
d.		
e.		
f.		
g.		
h.		
i.		
j.		

EQI (10 mins)	1. Which CVE SCORE activities have you participated in? Umehusika katika shughuli zipi za SCORE za kupambana na misimamo mikali? [Get an understanding of which activities, how many, where, and for how long] [Probe if any of the activities happened to be an RRF activity – describe the RRF activity when doing so]
EQI (10 mins)	2. Which of these activities are successful at helping communities to better prevent or address conflict/VE? a. Why do you think these activities have been effective? Kati ya shughuli hizi ni zipi zenge mafanikio na zinasaidia jamii kuzuia au kupambana na misimamo mizozo/mikali? b. Wadhani ni kwa nini shughuli hizi zimepata fanaka? <i>[If needed to provoke discussion, probe using resilience index categories. However, let participants answer open-ended question first:</i> i. Extent to which communities have access to secure livelihoods ii. Mechanisms for communities to voice their concerns are in place; planning processes takes into account concerns raised by communities iii. Perceived level of accountability of public officials in use of resources iv. Public officials uphold human rights in executing mandate related to conflict and CVE v. Forums for open, frank and honest dialogue on radicalization, conflict and CVE are in place and operational vi. The extent to which there are robust community-based institutions to manage conflict and VE

	vii. <i>Target communities have access to alternative interpretation to potentially radicalizing political and religious ideologies]</i>
EQ1 (10 mins)	3. Which of these activities are <u>less successful</u> at helping communities' to better prevent or address conflict/VE? • Why do you think these activities have been <u>less successful</u>? Kati ya shughuli hizi ni zipi hazikuwa na mafanikio na kusaidia jamii kuzuia au kupambana na misimamo mizozo/mikali? a. Wafirikia ni kwa nini shughuli hizi hazikupata fanaka?
EQ1 (10 mins)	4. What were the key differences in how men and women were involved? - What difference did it make, if any, to involve men? - What difference did it make, if any, to involve women? - Who else should have been involved that was not? Ni tofauti zipi maalum katika jinsi walivyohusishwa wake na waume? - Kulikuwa na natija gani kutokana na kuwahusisha waume? - Kulikuwa na natija gani kutokana na kuwahusisha wake? - Ni akina nani wengine wangehusishwa na hawakuhusishwa?
EQ1 (10 mins)	5. What changes would you make to any of the activities? - What activities should be up-scaled by SCORE or other ongoing or future programs? - Which ones should be downscaled? - Which activities, if any, should be sequenced (that is: activities coming one after the other)? - Which activities, if any, should be layered (that is, happening at the same time)? Ni mabadiliko yapi ungetekeleza katika shughuli yoyote ile? - Ni shughuli zipi zinafaa kupanuliwa na SCORE au miradi mingine ilioko na ijayo? - Ni zipi zinafaa kunyweza (punguzwa)? - Ni shughuli zipi zinafaa kufululizwa (kutekelezwa moja baada ya nyingine)? - Ni shughuli zipi zinafaa kuambatanishwa (kutekelezwa kwa wakati mmoja)?
EQ4 (10 mins)	6. Which activities do you think will continue after SCORE ends? Why? Ni shughuli zipi unakisia zitaendelea baada ya mradi wa SCORE kumalizika? Kwa nini?
EQ4 (10 mins)	7. What did you or your community do differently, if anything, as a result of your participation in the program? • What did you or your community not change, even after this program? Ni jambo lipi wewe au jamii yako mlitekeleza tofauti kwa sababu ya kuhusika kwako katika mradi huu? a. Ni jambo lipi wewe na jamii yako hamkuweza kubadilisha hata baada ya mradi huu?

**EQI, 4
(10
mins)**

4. What recommendation can you give SCORE or other programs regarding for helping your community better prevent or address conflict/VE now or in the future?

Ungependekeza nini kwa SCORE ama miradi mingine kuhusu kusaidia jamii yako kuzuia au kupambana na mizozo na misimamo mikali sasa na siku za usoni?

MINI-SURVEY TOOL A: KEY INFORMANTS (USAID, ACT, SUB-GRANTEES)
MWONGOZO WA UCHUNGUZI-MDOGO A: WAHOJIWA MAALUM (USAID, ACT, WAFADHILIWA WADOGO)

Organization/Shirika	
Date/Tarehe	
Gender/Jinsia: please circle	Male Female
Location/Eneo: please circle	Nairobi Mombasa Taita-Taveta Kwale Kilifi Tana River Lamu

1. In thinking about how things were two years ago, would you say that Kenya's coastal communities are more able or less able to counter violent extremism? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER** Ukizingatia jinsi hali ilivyokuwa miaka miwili iliyopita, waweza kusema kuwa Jamii za Pwani ya Kenya wana uwezo zaidi au uwezo duni wa kukabiliana na misimamo mikali? (**TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA**)
 - a. Much more able (Inauwezo mkubwa sana)
 - b. More able (inauwezo mkubwa)
 - c. Neither more nor less (Uwezo wake si mkubwa wala mdogo)
 - d. Less able (Inauwezo mdogo)
 - e. Much less able (Inauwezo mdogo sana)

2. In thinking about how things were two years ago, would you say that Kenya's coastal communities are more able or less able to respond to conflict? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER** Ukizingatia hali ilivyokuwa miaka miwili iliyopita, unaweza kusema kuwa jamii yako inauwezo zaidi ama mdogo wa kukabiliana na mizozo? (**TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA**)
 - a. Much more able (Inauwezo mkubwa sana)
 - b. More able (inauwezo mkubwa)
 - c. Neither more nor less (Uwezo wake si mkubwa wala mdogo)
 - d. Less able (Inauwezo mdogo)
 - e. Much less able (Inauwezo mdogo sana)

3. How effective do you think SCORE has been in helping Kenya's coastal communities to counter violent extremism? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER** Je, wadhani mashirika ya kijamii yamekuwa na ufanifu katika kusaidia jamii za Pwani ya Kenya kukabiliana na misimamo mikali? (**TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA**)
 - a. Very effective (fanifu sana)
 - b. Effective (fanifu)
 - c. Neither effective nor ineffective (siyo fanifu wala siyo pungufu)
 - d. Ineffective (pungufu)
 - e. Very ineffective (pungufu sana)

4. How effective do you think SCORE has been in helping Kenya's coastal communities to respond to conflict? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER** Je, wadhani mashirika ya kijamii yamekuwa na ufanifu katika kusaidia jamii za Pwani ya Kenya kukabiliana na mizozo? (**TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA**)
 - a. Very effective (fanifu sana)
 - b. Effective (fanifu)
 - c. Neither effective nor ineffective (siyo fanifu wala siyo pungufu)
 - d. Ineffective (siyo fanifu)
 - e. Very ineffective (pungufu sana)

5. How effective do you think SCORE has been in increasing the technical capacity of SCORE sub-grantees to counter violent extremism or respond to conflict? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER** Je, wadhani SCORE imekuwa ikiboresha uwezo wa kitaaluma wa wafadhiliwa wadogo kukabiliana na misimamo mikali na kutatua mizozo? **(TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA)**
- Very effective (fanifu sana)
 - Effective (fanifu)
 - Neither effective nor ineffective (siyo fanifu wala siyo pungufu)
 - Ineffective (siyo fanifu)
 - Very ineffective (pungufu sana)
6. Would you agree or disagree with the following statement: “SCORE-funded organizations and their community partners will continue to counter violent extremism or respond to conflict even if there is no more funding for this work”? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER** Je, unakubaliana au unapinga mstakabadhi huu; “Mashirika yaliyofadhiliwa na SCORE na washiriki wao wakijamii wataendelea kukabiliana na misimamo mikali na kutatua mizozo hata bila ufadhili kwa kazi hii”? **(TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA)**
- Strongly agree (Nakubaliana kabisa)
 - Agree (Nakubaliana)
 - Neither agree nor disagree (Sikubaliani wala sipingi)
 - Disagree (Napinga)
 - Strongly disagree (Napinga kabisa)
7. Below are different activities for countering violent extremism (CVE) or conflict. Imagine that you have 1,000 Kenyan shillings to donate (10 notes of 100 shillings each). How would you divide up the money among these different activities? You could donate all the money to one activity, divide it equally among a few activities, or spread it across the activities. You can even put 0 for some activities. Write an amount in the column below next to each item. The column should total to 1,000. Hapo chini kwenye jedwali ni shughuli tofauti za kukabiliana na misimamo mikali na mizozo. Hebu waza kuwa unazo shilingi 1,000 za Kenya (noti 10 za shilingi 100). Utagawaje pesa hizi kwa shughuli hizi? Unaweza kutoa pesa zote kwa shughuli moja, kugawanya sawa kwa shughuli zote, ama uzisambaze kwa shughuli hizi utakavyo. Unaweza hata kuzipa shughuli zingine 0. Andika kiwango cha hela kwenye kisanduku kilicho kando ya kila shughuli. Zote zinafaa kufika 1000.

Approach/Mbinu	Amount Kiwango
Interfaith dialogue (Mazungumzo baina ya dini tofauti)	
Youth leadership or economic development (Uongozi wa vijana na ujasirimali)	
Women-focused CVE programming (Miradi ya kudhibiti misimamo mikali inayowalenga wanawake)	
Improving police and community cooperation (Kuboresha mahusiano kati ya jamii na polisi)	
Community sensitization (Hamasa kwa jamii)	
CVE action plans (Mipango ya shughuli za kudhibiti misimamo mikali)	
Other: (you may write in another activity not listed above) Zingine: (Unaweza kuandika shughuli zingine ambazo hazijaorodheshwa hapo juu)	

TOTAL	1,000
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(Optional) Please provide any additional comments regarding any of the survey questions here / (Kwa hiari)
Tafadhali tupe maoni yoyote ya ziada kuhusu maswali yalio hapa:

MINI-SURVEY TOOL B: OTHER KEY INFORMANTS

MWONGOZO WA UCHUNGUZI-MDOGO B: WAHOJIWA MAALUM WENGINE

Organization/Shirika	
Date/Tarehe	
Gender: <i>please circle</i> Jinsia:	Male Female
Location/ Eneo: <i>please circle</i>	Nairobi Mombasa Taita-Taveta Kwale Kilifi Tana River Lamu

1. In thinking about how things were two years ago, would you say that Kenya's coastal communities are more able or less able to counter violent extremism? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER** Ukizingatia jinsi hali ilivyokuwa miaka miwili iliyopita, waweza kusema kuwa Jamii za Pwani ya Kenya wana uwezo zaidi au uwezo duni wa kukabiliana na misimamo mikali? (**TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA**)
 - a. Much more able (Inauwezo mkubwa sana)
 - b. More able (inauwezo mkubwa)
 - c. Neither more nor less (Uwezo wake si mkubwa wala mdogo)
 - d. Less able (Inauwezo mdogo)
 - e. Much less able (Inauwezo mdogo sana)

2. In thinking about how things were two years ago, would you say that Kenya's coastal communities are more able or less able to respond to conflict? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER** Ukizingatia hali ilivyokuwa miaka miwili iliyopita, unaweza kusema kuwa jamii yako inauwezo zaidi ama mdogo wa kukabiliana na mizozo? (**TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA**)
 - a. Much more able (Inauwezo mkubwa sana)
 - b. More able (inauwezo mkubwa)
 - c. Neither more nor less (Uwezo wake si mkubwa wala mdogo)
 - d. Less able (Inauwezo mdogo)
 - e. Much less able (Inauwezo mdogo sana)

3. How effective do you think SCORE has been in helping Kenya's coastal communities to counter violent extremism? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER** Je, wadhani mashirika ya kijamii yamekuwa na ufanifu katika kusaidia jamii za Pwani ya Kenya kukabiliana na misimamo mikali? (**TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA**)
 - a. Very effective (fanifu sana)
 - b. Effective (fanifu)
 - c. Neither effective nor ineffective (siyo fanifu wala siyo pungufu)
 - d. Ineffective (pungufu)
 - e. Very ineffective (pungufu sana)

4. How effective do you think SCORE has been in helping Kenya's coastal communities to respond to conflict? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER** Je, wadhani mashirika ya kijamii yamekuwa na ufanifu katika kusaidia jamii za Pwani ya Kenya kukabiliana na mizozo? (**TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA**)
 - a. Very effective (fanifu sana)
 - b. Effective (fanifu)
 - c. Neither effective nor ineffective (siyo fanifu wala siyo pungufu)
 - d. Ineffective (pungufu)

e. Very ineffective (pungufu sana)

5. Would you agree or disagree with the following statement: “SCORE-funded organizations and their community partners will continue to counter violent extremism or respond to conflict even if there is no more funding for this work”? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER** Je, unakubaliana au unapinga mstakabadhi huu; “Mashirika yaliofadhiliwa na SCORE na washiriki wao wakijamii wataendelea kukabiliana na misimamo mikali na kutatua mizozo hata bila ufadhili kwa kazi hii”? **(TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA)**

- a. Strongly agree (Nakubaliana kabisa)
- b. Agree (Nakubaliana)
- c. Neither agree nor disagree (Sikubaliani wala sipingi)
- d. Disagree (Napinga)
- e. Strongly disagree (Napinga kabisa)

6. Below are different activities for countering violent extremism (CVE) or conflict. Imagine that you have 1,000 Kenyan shillings to donate (10 notes of 100 shillings each). How would you divide up the money among these different activities? You could donate all the money to one activity, divide it equally among a few activities, or spread it across the activities. You can even put 0 for some activities. Write an amount in the column below next to each item. The column should total to 1,000. Hapo chini kwenye jedwali ni shughuli tofauti za kukabiliana na misimamo mikali na mizozo. Hebu waza kuwa unazo shilingi 1,000 za Kenya (noti 10 za shilingi 100). Utawajaze pesa hizi kwa shughuli hizi? Unaweza kutoa pesa zote kwa shughuli moja, kugawanya sawa kwa shughuli zote, ama uzisambaze kwa shughuli hizi utakavyo. Unaweza hata kuzipa shughuli zingine 0. Andika kiwango cha hela kwenye kisanduku kilicho kando ya kila shughuli. Zote zinafaa kufika 1000.

Approach/Mbinu	Amount Kiwango
Interfaith dialogue (Mazungumzo baina ya dini tofauti)	
Youth leadership or economic development (Uongozi wa vijana na ujasirimali)	
Women-focused CVE programming (Miradi ya kudhibiti misimamo mikali inayowalenga wanawake)	
Improving police and community cooperation (Kuboresha mahusiano kati ya jamii na polisi)	
Community sensitization (Hamasa kwa jamii)	
CVE action plans (Mipango ya shughuli za kudhibiti misimamo mikali)	
Other: (you may write in another activity not listed above) Zingine: (Unaweza kuandika shughuli zingine ambazo hazijaorodheshwa hapo juu)	
TOTAL	1,000

(Optional) Please provide any additional comments regarding any of the survey questions here / (Kwa hiari)

Tafadhali tupe maoni yoyote ya ziada kuhusu maswali yalio hapa:

MINI-SURVEY TOOL C: FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS

MWONGOZO WA UCHUNGUZI-MDOGO C: WASHIRIKA WA MAJADILIANO YA VIKUNDI

Date /Tarehe							
Gender: (please circle)	Male	Female					
Jinsia:	Mume	Mke					
Location/ Eneo: (please circle)	Nairobi	Mombasa	Taita-Taveta	Kwale	Kilifi	Tana River	Lamu

- In thinking about how things were two years ago, would you say that today your community is more able or less able to counter violent extremism? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER.** Ukizingatia hali ilivyokuwa miaka miwili iliyopita, unaweza kusema kuwa jamii yako inauwezo zaidi ama mdogo wa kukabiliana na misimamo mikali? (**TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWA JIBU MOJA**)
 - Much more able (Inauwezo mkubwa sana)
 - More able (inauwezo mkubwa)
 - Neither more nor less (Uwezo wake si mkubwa wala mdogo)
 - Less able (Inauwezo mdogo)
 - Much less able (Inauwezo mdogo sana)
- In thinking about how things were two years ago, would you say that today your community is more able or less able to respond to conflict? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER.** Ukizingatia hali ilivyokuwa miaka miwili iliyopita, unaweza kusema kuwa jamii yako inauwezo zaidi ama mdogo wa kukabiliana na mizozo? (**TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA**)
 - Much more able (Inauwezo mkubwa sana)
 - More able (inauwezo mkubwa)
 - Neither more nor less (Uwezo wake si mkubwa wala mdogo)
 - Less able (Inauwezo mdogo)
 - Much less able (Inauwezo mdogo sana)
- How effective do you think civil society organizations have been in helping your community to counter violent extremism? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER.** Je, wadhani mashirika ya kijamii yamekuwa na ufanifu katika kusaidia jamii yenu kukabiliana na misimamo mikali? (**TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA**)
 - Very effective (fanifu sana)
 - Effective (fanifu)
 - Neither effective nor ineffective (siyo fanifu wala siyo pungufu)
 - Ineffective (pungufu)
 - Very ineffective (pungufu sana)
- How effective do you think civil society organizations have been in helping your community to respond to conflict? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER** Je, wadhani mashirika ya kijamii yamekuwa na ufanifu katika kusaidia jamii yenu kukabiliana na mizozo? (**TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA**)
 - Very effective (fanifu sana)
 - Effective (fanifu)
 - Neither effective nor ineffective (siyo fanifu wala siyo pungufu)

- d. Ineffective (siyo fanifu)
e. Very ineffective (pungufu sana)
5. Would you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Civil society organizations and their community partners will continue to counter violent extremism even if there is no more foreign donor funding for this work”? **PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER** Je, unakubaliana au unapinga mstakabadhi huu; “Mashirika yasiyo ya kiserikali na na jamii wanazoshirikiana nazo wataendelea kukabiliana na misimamo mikali na kutatua mizozo hata bila ufadhili kwa kazi hii”? (**TAFADHALI WEKA MVIRINGO KWENYE JIBU MOJA**)
- a. Strongly agree (Nakubaliana kabisa)
b. Agree (Nakubaliana)
c. Neither agree nor disagree (Sikubaliani wala sipingi)
d. Disagree (Napinga)
e. Strongly disagree (Napinga kabisa)
6. Below are different activities for countering violent extremism (CVE) or conflict. Imagine that you have 1,000 Kenyan shillings to donate (10 notes of 100 shillings each). How would you divide up the money among these different activities? You could donate all the money to one activity, divide it equally among a few activities, or spread it across the activities. You can even put 0 for some activities. Write an amount in the column below next to each item. The column should total to 1,000. Hapo chini kwenye jedwali ni shughuli tofauti za kukabiliana na misimamo mikali na mizozo. Hebu waza kuwa unazo shilingi 1,000 za Kenya (noti 10 za shilingi 100). Utagawaje pesa hizi kwa shughuli hizi? Unaweza kutoa pesa zote kwa shughuli moja, kugawanya sawa kwa shughuli zote, ama uzisambaze kwa shughuli hizi utakavyo. Unaweza hata kuzipa shughuli zingine 0. Andika kiwango cha hela kwenye kisanduku kilicho kando ya kila shughuli. Zote zinafaa kufika 1000.

Approach/Mbinu	Amount Kiwango
Interfaith dialogue (Mazungumzo baina ya dini tofauti)	
Youth leadership or economic development (Uongozi wa vijana na ujasirimali)	
Women-focused CVE programming (Miradi ya kudhibiti misimamo mikali inayowalenga wanawake)	
Improving police and community cooperation (Kuboresha mahusiano kati ya jamii na polisi)	
Community sensitization (Hamasa kwa jamii)	
CVE action plans (Mipango ya shughuli za kudhibiti misimamo mikali)	
Other: (you may write in another activity not listed above) Zingine: (Unaweza kuandika shughuli zingine ambazo hazijaorodheshwa hapo juu)	
TOTAL	1,000

(Optional) Please provide any additional comments regarding any of the survey questions here / (Kwa hiari)
Tafadhali tupe maoni yoyote ya ziada kuhusu maswali yalio hapa:

ANNEX C: LIST OF EVALUATION RESPONDENTS

Respondent Number	County	Method	Respondent Type	Organization
1	Nairobi	KII	USAID	USAID
2	Nairobi	KII	USAID	USAID
3	Nairobi	KII	USAID	USAID
4	Nairobi	KII	USAID	USAID
5	Nairobi	KII	USAID	USAID
6	Nairobi	KII	USAID	USAID
7	Nairobi	KII	USAID	USAID
8	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	Haki
9	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	Haki
10	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	COEC
11	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	COEC
12	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	LICODEP
13	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	LICODEP
14	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	LICODEP
15	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	LICODEP
16	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	LICODEP
17	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	LICODEP
18	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_female	LICODEP
19	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_female	LICODEP
20	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_female	LICODEP
21	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_female	LICODEP
22	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_female	LICODEP
23	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_female	LICODEP
24	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_female	LICODEP
25	Mombasa	KII	Police	LICODEP
26	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	Haki
27	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_male	LICODEP
28	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_male	LICODEP
29	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_male	LICODEP

30	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_male	LICODEP
31	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_male	LICODEP
32	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_male	LICODEP
33	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_male	LICODEP
34	Mombasa	FGD	Women	COEC
35	Mombasa	FGD	Women	COEC
36	Mombasa	FGD	Women	COEC
37	Mombasa	FGD	Women	COEC
38	Mombasa	FGD	Women	COEC
39	Mombasa	FGD	Women	COEC
40	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_m/f	Haki
41	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_m/f	Haki
42	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_m/f	Haki
43	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_m/f	Haki
44	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_m/f	Haki
45	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_m/f	Haki
46	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_m/f	Haki
47	Taita Taveta	KII	GOK	National Government
48	Taita Taveta	KII	Sub-grantee	MAZIDO
49	Taita Taveta	KII	Sub-grantee	MAZIDO
50	Taita Taveta	KII	GOK	National Government
51	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_female	MAZIDO
52	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_female	MAZIDO
53	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_female	MAZIDO
54	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_female	MAZIDO
55	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_female	MAZIDO
56	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_female	MAZIDO
57	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_female	MAZIDO
58	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_female	MAZIDO
59	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_female	MAZIDO
60	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_male	MAZIDO

61	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_male	MAZIDO
62	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_male	MAZIDO
63	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_male	MAZIDO
64	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_male	MAZIDO
65	Taita Taveta	FGD	Community_male	MAZIDO
66	Kwale	KII	Sub-grantee	UIG
67	Kwale	KII	Sub-grantee	UIG
68	Kwale	KII	Sub-grantee	UIG
69	Kwale	KII	Sub-grantee	UIG
70	Kwale	KII	Sub-grantee	DCMT
71	Kwale	KII	Sub-grantee	DCMT
72	Kwale	KII	Sub-grantee	DCMT
73	Kwale	KII	Sub-grantee	DCMT
74	Kwale	KII	Sub-grantee	DCMT
75	Kwale	KII	Sub-grantee	DCMT
76	Kwale	KII	Sub-grantee	DCMT
77	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	UIG
78	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	UIG
79	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	UIG
80	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	UIG
81	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	UIG
82	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	UIG
83	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	UIG
84	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	UIG
85	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	UIG
86	Kwale	FGD	Women	DCMT
87	Kwale	FGD	Women	DCMT
88	Kwale	FGD	Women	DCMT
89	Kwale	FGD	Women	DCMT
90	Kwale	FGD	Women	DCMT
91	Kwale	FGD	Women	DCMT

92	Kwale	FGD	Women	DCMT
93	Kwale	FGD	Women	DCMT
94	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	DCMT
95	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	DCMT
96	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	DCMT
97	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	DCMT
98	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	DCMT
99	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	DCMT
100	Kwale	FGD	Religious	DCMT
101	Kwale	FGD	Religious	DCMT
102	Kwale	FGD	Religious	DCMT
103	Kwale	FGD	Religious	DCMT
104	Kwale	FGD	Religious	DCMT
105	Kwale	FGD	Religious	DCMT
106	Kwale	FGD	Religious	DCMT
107	Kwale	KII	Sub-grantee	HURIA
108	Kwale	KII	Sub-grantee	HURIA
109	Kwale	KII	Sub-grantee	HURIA
110	Kwale	KII	GOK	NPS
111	Kwale	KII	GOK	Ministry of Interior
112	Kwale	KII	GOK	Ministry public service, youth, and gender affairs
113	Kwale	FGD	Community_m/f	HURIA
114	Kwale	FGD	Community_m/f	HURIA
115	Kwale	FGD	Community_m/f	HURIA
116	Kwale	FGD	Community_m/f	HURIA
117	Kwale	FGD	Community_m/f	HURIA
118	Kwale	FGD	Community_m/f	HURIA
119	Kwale	FGD	Community_m/f	HURIA
120	Kwale	FGD	Community_m/f	HURIA
121	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	SUPKEM

I22	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	SUPKEM
I23	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	SUPKEM
I24	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	SUPKEM
I25	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	SUPKEM
I26	Kwale	FGD	Youth_m/f	SUPKEM
I27	Nairobi	KII	GOK	N/A
I28	Nairobi	KII	Grantee	Act!
I29	Nairobi	KII	Grantee	Act!
I30	Nairobi	KII	Grantee	Act!
I31	Nairobi	KII	Grantee	Act!
I32	Nairobi	KII	Sub-grantee	SUPKEM
I33	Nairobi	KII	Sub-grantee	SUPKEM
I34	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	SUPKEM
I35	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	SUPKEM
I36	Mombasa	KII	Grantee	Act!
I37	Mombasa	KII	Grantee	Act!
I38	Mombasa	KII	Grantee	Act!
I39	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_female	NCCK
I40	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_female	NCCK
I41	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_female	NCCK
I42	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_male	NCCK
I43	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_male	NCCK
I44	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_male	NCCK
I45	Mombasa	FGD	Youth_male	NCCK
I46	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	KECOSCE
I47	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	KECOSCE
I48	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	KECOSCE
I49	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	KECOSCE
I50	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	KECOSCE
I51	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	KECOSCE
I52	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	NCCK

153	Mombasa	KII	Sub-grantee	NCCK
154	Mombasa	FGD	Religious leaders	NCCK
155	Mombasa	FGD	Religious leaders	NCCK
156	Mombasa	FGD	Religious leaders	NCCK
157	Mombasa	FGD	Religious leaders	NCCK
158	Mombasa	FGD	Religious leaders	NCCK
159	Mombasa	FGD	Religious leaders	NCCK
160	Mombasa	FGD	Religious leaders	NCCK
161	Mombasa	FGD	Religious leaders	NCCK
162	Mombasa	FGD	Women	NCCK
163	Mombasa	FGD	Women	NCCK
164	Mombasa	FGD	Women	NCCK
165	Mombasa	FGD	Women	NCCK
166	Mombasa	FGD	Women	NCCK
167	Mombasa	FGD	Women	NCCK
168	Mombasa	FGD	Women	NCCK
169	Tana River	KII	GOK Official	National Gvt
170	Tana River	KII	Sub-grantee	TRPRD
171	Tana River	KII	Sub-grantee	TRPRD
172	Tana River	KII	Sub-grantee	TRPRD
173	Tana River	KII	Sub-grantee	TRPRD
174	Tana River	FGD	Youth_female	TRPRD
175	Tana River	FGD	Youth_female	TRPRD
176	Tana River	FGD	Youth_female	TRPRD
177	Tana River	FGD	Youth_female	TRPRD
178	Tana River	FGD	Youth_male	TRPRD
179	Tana River	FGD	Youth_male	TRPRD
180	Tana River	FGD	Youth_male	TRPRD
181	Tana River	FGD	Youth_male	TRPRD
182	Tana River	FGD	Women	KECOSCE
183	Tana River	FGD	Women	KECOSCE

184	Tana River	FGD	Women	KECOSCE
185	Tana River	FGD	Women	KECOSCE
186	Tana River	FGD	Women	KECOSCE
187	Tana River	FGD	Women	KECOSCE
188	Tana River	FGD	Women	KECOSCE
189	Tana River	FGD	Women	KECOSCE
190	Tana River	KII	Govt Official	National Govt
191	Tana River	FGD	Youth_female	KECOSCE
192	Tana River	FGD	Youth_female	KECOSCE
193	Tana River	FGD	Youth_female	KECOSCE
194	Tana River	FGD	Youth_female	KECOSCE
195	Tana River	FGD	Youth_male	KECOSCE
196	Tana River	FGD	Youth_male	KECOSCE
197	Tana River	KII	Police	National Govt
198	Kilifi	KII	Govt Official	National Govt
199	Kilifi	KII	Police	National Govt
200	Kilifi	FGD	Youth_female	KWACHA
201	Kilifi	FGD	Youth_female	KWACHA
202	Kilifi	FGD	Youth_female	KWACHA
203	Kilifi	FGD	Youth_male	KWACHA
204	Kilifi	FGD	Youth_male	KWACHA
205	Kilifi	FGD	Youth_male	KWACHA
206	Kilifi	KII	Sub-grantee	KWACHA
207	Kilifi	KII	Sub-grantee	KWACHA
208	Kilifi	KII	Sub-grantee	KWACHA
209	Kilifi	KII	Police	National Govt
210	Kilifi	FGD	Women	NCCK
211	Kilifi	FGD	Women	NCCK
212	Kilifi	FGD	Women	NCCK
213	Kilifi	FGD	Women	NCCK
214	Kilifi	FGD	Women	NCCK

215	Kilifi	FGD	Women	NCK
216	Kilifi	FGD	Youth_male	SUPKEM
217	Kilifi	FGD	Youth_male	SUPKEM
218	Kilifi	FGD	Youth_male	SUPKEM
219	Kilifi	FGD	Youth_male	SUPKEM
220	Kilifi	FGD	Youth_female	SUPKEM
221	Kilifi	FGD	Youth_female	SUPKEM
222	Kilifi	FGD	Youth_female	SUPKEM
223	Kilifi	FGD	Women	COEC
224	Kilifi	FGD	Women	COEC
225	Kilifi	FGD	Women	COEC
226	Kilifi	FGD	Women	COEC
227	Kilifi	FGD	Women	COEC
228	Kilifi	FGD	Women	COEC
229	Kilifi	FGD	Women	COEC
230	Kilifi	FGD	Women	COEC
231	Lamu	KII	Sub-grantee	KIKOZI
232	Lamu	KII	Sub-grantee	KIKOZI
233	Lamu	KII	Sub-grantee	KIKOZI
234	Lamu	KII	Sub-grantee	KIKOZI
235	Lamu	KII	Sub-grantee	KIKOZI
236	Lamu	KII	Sub-grantee	KIKOZI
237	Lamu	FGD	Youth_female	KIKOZI
238	Lamu	FGD	Youth_female	KIKOZI
239	Lamu	FGD	Youth_female	KIKOZI
240	Lamu	FGD	Youth_female	KIKOZI
241	Lamu	FGD	Youth_male	KIKOZI
242	Lamu	FGD	Youth_male	KIKOZI
243	Lamu	FGD	Youth_male	KIKOZI
244	Lamu	FGD	Youth_male	KIKOZI
245	Lamu	KII	GOK	National Gvt

246	Lamu	KII	GOK	National Gvt
247	Lamu	FGD	Religious	KIKOZI
248	Lamu	FGD	Religious	KIKOZI
249	Lamu	FGD	Religious	KIKOZI
250	Lamu	FGD	Religious	KIKOZI
251	Lamu	FGD	Religious	KIKOZI
252	Lamu	FGD	Religious	KIKOZI
253	Lamu	FGD	Religious	KIKOZI
254	Nairobi	KII	CVE Expert	N/A
242	Lamu	FGD	Youth_male	KIKOZI
243	Lamu	FGD	Youth_male	KIKOZI
244	Lamu	FGD	Youth_male	KIKOZI
245	Lamu	KII	GOK	National Gvt
246	Lamu	KII	GOK	National Gvt
247	Lamu	FGD	Religious	KIKOZI
248	Lamu	FGD	Religious	KIKOZI
249	Lamu	FGD	Religious	KIKOZI
250	Lamu	FGD	Religious	KIKOZI
251	Lamu	FGD	Religious	KIKOZI
252	Lamu	FGD	Religious	KIKOZI
253	Lamu	FGD	Religious	KIKOZI
254	Nairobi	KII	CVE Expert	N/A

ANNEX D: EQ2 DESK REVIEW

Location	Name	Incident or fear	Brief description	Date of incident	Date of proposal	Date of funding decision	Date initiated	Date concluded
Kilifi County	Coast Education Centre (COEC)	Risk of violence against women running for elective office during the August 2017 general elections	Women candidates for elective office are seen as weak in the political arena. They have therefore become targets of violence, intimidation and harassment by their male opponents. This kind of environment not only puts the personal safety and security of women at risk, it also discourages women from participating in elective politics, further enhancing gender inequality.	June 2017 - estimated (source: KII)	30 th June 2017 (source: COEC RRF proposal document, attached to Act email to ET)	1 week after proposal submission (source: KII)	17 th July 2017 (source: COEC RRF closing report)	16 th August 2017 (source: COEC RRF closing report)
Kilifi County	Coast Education Centre (COEC)	Challenge of young women being recruited into Al-Shabaab.	Young women are being unknowingly lured into early marriages to extremists, and as a consequence being recruited into extremism.	No date of incident provided in COEC RRF proposal attached to Act email to ET.	March 2018 (source: KII) No initial proposal submission provided in application, attached to Act email to ET.	5 th September 2018 (source: USAID Sub-Award Approval Letter to Act)	4 th September 2018 (source: USAID Sub-Award Approval Letter to Act)	5 th October 2018 (source: USAID Sub-Award Approval Letter to Act)
Mombasa	Haki Africa	Risk of juvenile gangs used by politicians to perpetrate	Juvenile youth gangs have been known to attack, stab and rob. The criminal gangs are likely to be	April/May 2017 – estimated (source: KII)	17 th July 2017 (source: Haki Africa	Not Indicated	15 th July 2017 (source: Haki	17 th August 2017

		violence in Mombasa Old town	targeted by politicians in the run-up to the August 2017 elections		RRF proposal document)		Africa RRF closing report)	(source: Haki Africa RRF closing report)
Tana River	Tana River Peace Reconciliatio n and Development	Risk of resource- based conflict as a result of prolonged drought conditions	A prolonged drought situation has forced pastoral communities to concentrate in the dry season fall back areas. The scramble for range resources has resulted in high intra and inter county tensions leading to occasional violence between the hosts and migrating communities.	Not indicated in either RRF proposal or closing report.	17 th February 2017 (source: TRPRD RRF proposal document)	Within two weeks of proposal submission (source: KII)	March 2017 (TRPRD RRF closing report)	April 2017 (TRPRD closing report)
Kilifi County	Kenya Community Support Center	Risk of pastoralists and crop farmers conflict	The farmer/pastoralists conflict as a result of drought conditions, has now generated other conflicts. In particular there is a generational clash and then intra communal tensions	Conflict between the two groups started in 2016 and was ongoing. (source: KECOSCE RRF closing report)	5 th February 2018 (source: KECOSCE RRF proposal document)	26 th Feb 2018	23rd Feb 2018 (source: KECOSCE RRF proposal documen t)	31 st March 2018 (source: KECOSCE RRF proposal document)
Lamu County	Kiunga Youth Bunge Initiative	Risk of the unpoliced sea border with Somalia as a conduit for trafficking illicit arms and Al- Shabaab terrorists	The lifting of a state of emergency in Lamu county has reduced policing along the sea route between Lamu county and Somalia. This is likely to be used to traffic into Kenya illicit arms for purposes of	May-June 2017, after lifting of fishing ban in Lamu by GOK on May 1 st	13 th July 2017 (source: KYBI RRF proposal document)	Within one month of proposal submission, based on proposal date and start of	12 th August 2017 (source: KYBI RRF closing report)	26 th August 2017 (source: KYBI RRF closing report)

			politically motivated violence and Al-Shabaab terrorists to perpetuate insecurity in the County	(source: KYBI RRF closing report)		activities indicated in closing report.		
Taita Taveta County	Management of Arid Zones Initiatives and Development Options	Risk of an impending electric fencing project to mitigate human/wildlife conflict will ignite land contestations	Attempts to mitigate human/wildlife conflict by erection of an electric fence by the KWS has aroused past land ownership and boundary disputes.	February-March 2018 (source: MAZIDO KII)	March 2018 (source: MAZIDO KII)	Within a month of applying for the grant. (source: MAZIDO KII)	1 st March 2018 (source: MAZIDO RRF closing report)	15 th April 2018 (source: MAZIDO RRF closing report)
Taita Taveta County	Management of Arid Zones Initiatives and Development Options	There was fear that a long-standing land ownership dispute between squatters and a land-buying company could be politicized by political actors during the campaigns for the 2017 General Elections in ways that could lead to conflict and violence.	Intervention sought to amicably resolve the conflict between the Vindo Multi-Purpose Cooperative Society (land-buying company) and the squatter families by holding dialogue meetings that brought together the two sides to develop a roadmap for a permanent solution. Other stakeholders that were brought on board to support the process were the County Land Control Board and the National Government Administration Office.	The dispute has been going on since 1986 (source: MAZIDO RRF proposal document)	19 th July 2017, signing of grant (source: MAZIDO RRF closing report)	Within 6 weeks of applying for grant. (source: MAZIDO KII)	1 st August 2017 (Activities started after 1 st August, which is the day MAZIDO received the funds, source: MAZIDO RRF closing report)	This RRF was only partially implemented. Land being an emotive issue around elections, led to the cancellation of activities on the advice of the Taita Taveta C.C. (source: MAZIDO KII). Only 28% of the funds were used, and the rest were returned (source: MAZIDO RRF closing report).

ANNEX E: OCA SCORE TABLES

DCMT

OCA categories	OCA 1 score	OCA 2 score	Difference
Governance and leadership	2.47	2.55	0.08
Management and Administration	3.05	1.88	-1.17
Financial Management	3.03	2.23	-0.8
HRM	2.52	1.68	-0.84
MERL	2.55	1.69	-0.86
Sustainability	2.28	1.82	-0.46
CVE	2.19	1.81	-0.38

NCCK

OCA categories	OCA 1 score	OCA 2 score	Difference
Governance and leadership	3.57	2.92	-0.65
Management and Administration	3.33	2.90	-0.43
Financial Management	3.48	2.74	-0.74
HRM	2.91	2.42	-0.49
MERL	3.03	2.06	-0.97
Sustainability	1.89	2.36	0.47
CVE	2.73	2.12	-0.61

MAZIDO

OCA categories	OCA 1 score	OCA 2 score	Difference
Governance and leadership	3.67	3.07	-0.6
Management and Administration	3.45	2.62	-0.83
Financial Management	2.71	2.49	-0.22
HRM	2.47	2.38	-0.09
MERL	2.10	2.36	0.26
Sustainability	2.17	2.37	0.2
CVE	2.12	2.51	0.39

TRPRD

OCA categories	OCA 1 score	OCA 2 score	Difference
Governance and leadership	2.77	3.32	0.55
Management and Administration	2.44	3.08	0.64
Financial Management	3.24	3.26	0.02
HRM	2.66	2.71	0.05
MERL	2.18	2.43	0.25
Sustainability	2.22	2.86	0.64
CVE	2.46	3.19	0.73

KIKOZI

OCA categories	OCA 1 score	OCA 2 score	Difference
Governance and leadership	3.33	3.17	-0.16
Management and Administration	2.89	3.08	0.19
Financial Management	3.37	3.34	-0.03
HRM	2.27	2.68	0.41
MERL	2.35	2.42	0.07
Sustainability	2.44	2.60	0.16
CVE	2.35	2.59	0.24

KECOSCE

OCA categories	OCA 1 score	OCA 2 score	Difference
Governance and Leadership	4	2.79	1.21
Management and Administration	3.6	2.66	-0.94
Financial Management	3.66	2.89	-0.77
HRM	3.25	2.49	-0.76
MERL	3.48	2.7	-0.78
Sustainability	3.49	2.56	-0.93
CVE/CM	3.14	2.13	-1.01

COEC

OCA categories	OCA 1 score	OCA 2 score	Difference
Governance and Leadership	4	2.97	-1.03
Management and Administration	2.89	2.5	-0.4
Financial Management	2.15	2.94	0.79
HRM	1.8	2.05	0.25
MERL	1.91	2.09	0.18
Sustainability	1.69	2.03	0.34
CVE/CM	2.39	2.33	-0.06

SUPKEM

OCA categories	OCA 1 score	OCA 2 score	Difference
Governance and Leadership	3.01	2.39	-0.62
Management and Administration	2.4	1.47	-0.93
Financial Management	2.78	1.35	-1.43
HRM	1.99	1.27	-0.72
MERL	2.36	1.78	-0.58
Sustainability	2.63	1.46	-1.17
CVE/CM	3.07	2.67	-0.4

LICODEP

OCA categories	OCA 1 score	OCA 2 score	Difference
Governance and Leadership	3.32	2.1	-1.22
Management and Administration	2.75	2.2	-0.55
Financial Management	2.6	2.89	0.29
HRM	2.48	2.12	-0.36
MERL	2.03	2.2	0.17
Sustainability	2.33	1.98	-0.35
CVE/CM	2.62	2.6	-0.02

HAKI

OCA categories	OCA 1 score	OCA 2 score	Difference
Governance and Leadership	3.42	4.19	0.77
Management and Administration	3.13	4.15	0.85
Financial Management	2.91	4.41	1.5
HRM	2.78	3.61	0.81
MERL	2.36	3.35	0.99
Sustainability	2.74	3.1	0.36
CVE/CM	3.07	4.03	0.96

HURIA

OCA categories	OCA 1 score	OCA 2 score	Difference
Governance and Leadership	2.95	Not received by ET	Not received by ET
Management and Administration	2.98	-	
Financial Management	3.07	-	
HRM	2.59	-	
MERL	2.62	-	
Sustainability	1.89	-	
CVE/CM	3.05	-	

UIG

OCA categories	OCA 1 score	OCA 2 score	Difference
Governance and Leadership	2.68	2.69	0.01
Management and Administration	2.68	2.71	0.03
Financial Management	2.67	2.53	-0.14
HRM	2.65	2.47	-0.18
MERL	2.52	2.31	-0.21
Sustainability	2.31	2.32	0.01
CVE/CM	2.53	2.53	0

KWACHA

OCA categories	OCA 1 score	OCA 2 score	Difference
Governance and Leadership	3.25	2.69	-0.56
Management and Administration	3.23	2.7	-0.53
Financial Management	3.4	3.46	0.06
HRM	2.63	2.43	-0.2
MERL	2.31	2.49	0.18
Sustainability	2.02	2.23	0.21
CVE/CM	2.9	2.37	-0.53

ANNEX F: MINI-SURVEY TABLES

Question 1: In thinking about how things were two years ago, would you say that Kenya's coastal communities are more able or less able to counter violent extremism?

	Total		Gender				Type			
			Male		Female		USAID/Act!/Subgrantees		FGD Participant	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Much more able	39	17%	19	18%	19	16%	10	14%	26	17%
More able	94	40%	48	46%	43	36%	38	54%	50	32%
Neither more nor less	68	29%	28	27%	38	31%	19	27%	48	31%
Less able	23	10%	7	7%	13	11%	2	3%	21	14%
Much less able	10	4%	2	2%	8	7%	1	1%	9	6%
TOTAL	234		104		121		70		154	

Question 2: In thinking about how things were two years ago, would you say that Kenya's coastal communities are more able or less able to respond to conflict?

	Total		Gender				Type			
			Male		Female		USAID/Act!/Subgrantees		FGD Participant	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Much more able	33	14%	18	17%	15	12%	7	10%	24	15%
More able	109	46%	48	46%	57	46%	36	52%	68	43%
Neither more nor less	68	29%	30	29%	34	27%	23	33%	42	27%
Less able	19	8%	7	7%	11	9%	3	4%	16	10%
Much less able	8	3%	1	1%	7	6%	0	0%	8	5%
TOTAL	237		104		124		69		158	

Question 3: How effective do you think SCORE has been in helping Kenya's coastal communities to counter violent extremism?

	Total		Gender				Type			
			Male		Female		USAID/Act!/Subgrantees		FGD Participant	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Very effective	79	34%	32	31%	43	36%	19	27%	59	38%
Effective	118	50%	58	56%	55	45%	45	64%	64	42%
Neither effective nor ineffective	30	13%	11	11%	19	16%	6	9%	24	16%
Ineffective	7	3%	3	3%	4	3%	0	0%	7	5%
Very ineffective	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
TOTAL	234		104		121		70		154	

Question 4: How effective do you think SCORE has been in helping Kenya's coastal communities to respond to conflict?

	Total		Gender				Type			
			Male		Female		USAID/Act!/Subgrantees		FGD Participant	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Very effective	73	31%	29	28%	41	33%	17	25%	54	34%
Effective	126	53%	60	58%	60	48%	43	62%	75	47%
Neither effective nor ineffective	33	14%	14	13%	19	15%	9	13%	24	15%
Ineffective	5	2%	1	1%	4	3%	0	0%	5	3%
Very ineffective	2	1%	0	0%	2	2%	0	0%	2	1%
TOTAL	239		104		126		69		160	

Question 6: How effective do you think SCORE has been in increasing the technical capacity of SCORE sub-grantees to counter violent extremism or respond to conflict?

	Total		Gender				Type			
			Male		Female		USAID/Act!/Subgrantees		FGD Participant	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Very effective	16	23%	10	26%	4	14%	16	23%	N/A	N/A
Effective	48	70%	25	66%	22	79%	48	70%	N/A	N/A
Neither effective nor ineffective	4	6%	3	8%	1	4%	4	6%	N/A	N/A
Ineffective	1	1%	0	0%	1	4%	1	1%	N/A	N/A
Very ineffective	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	N/A	N/A
TOTAL	69		38		28		69		N/A	

Question 5/7: Would you agree or disagree: "SCORE-funded organizations and their community partners will continue to counter violent extremism or respond to conflict even if there is no more funding for this work"?

	Total		Gender				Type			
			Male		Female		USAID/Act!/Subgrantees		FGD Participant	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Strongly agree	40	17%	15	14%	22	18%	10	14%	30	19%
Agree	106	44%	49	47%	55	44%	43	61%	59	37%
Neither agree nor disagree	43	18%	24	23%	17	14%	14	20%	26	16%
Disagree	43	18%	16	15%	25	20%	3	4%	37	23%
Strongly disagree	7	3%	1	1%	6	5%	0	0%	7	4%
TOTAL	239		105		125		70		159	

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