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# MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR WASTE MANAGEMENT IN TARGETED REGIONS (WMTR) PROGRAM PHASES I & 2

**July 2018**

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# **MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR WASTE MANAGEMENT IN TARGETED REGIONS (WMTR) PROGRAM PHASES I & 2**

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# ACRONYMS

Acronym	Description
AOR	Agreement Officer's Representative
APA	Agency of Protected Areas
AR	Autonomous Region
CENN	Caucasus Environmental NGO Network
COP	Chief of Party
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DCOP	Deputy Chief of Party
DDL	USAID Development Data Library
DEC	USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse
EG	Economic Growth
EQ	Evaluation Question
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GEL	Georgian Lari
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GoG	Government of Georgia
ICMA	International City/County Management Association
KII	Key Informant Interview
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoEPA	Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture
MoENRP	Ministry of Environment and Natural Resource Protection
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSWMCG	National Solid Waste Management Company of Georgia
POS	Point of Service
SOW	Statement of Work
SWM	Solid Waste Management
SWMP	Solid Waste Management Plan
TA	Technical Assistance
TOCOR	Task Order Contracting Officer's Representative
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WMA	Waste Management Association
WMS	Waste Management System
WMTR	Waste Management Technologies in Regions Program

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## EVALUATION PURPOSE AND AUDIENCE

This report presents the findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of the Waste Management Technologies in Regions (WMTR) Program, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Georgia. The WMTR evaluation is a whole of program evaluation covering WMTR's Phases 1 and 2.

The purpose of the evaluation is to generate evidence and learning that can be used by USAID/Georgia for improving ongoing program interventions. The primary audience for the evaluation is USAID/Georgia and program implementing partners International City/County Management Association (ICMA) and Caucasus Environmental NGO Network (CENN). Secondary audiences include the Government of Georgia (GoG), municipal government officials, civil society organizations (CSOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other donors working in this area.

## PROGRAM BACKGROUND

USAID awarded WMTR to ICMA on March 18, 2014 under Cooperative Agreement AID 114-LA-14-00001 with a funding level of \$4,220,000. ICMA implemented WMTR in partnership with the local sub-recipient CENN during program Phase 1 under a Transition Award arrangement. According to the terms of the Transition Award, on March 16, 2017, CENN took over the administrative responsibility for WMTR for program Phase 2, with ICMA retaining only a technical advisory function. Program Phase 2 runs through March 16, 2020, with a funding level of \$3,399,973.

With activities falling under four program components in each of its two phases (see Box 1), WMTR Phase 1 worked in Adjara Autonomous Region (AR) and Kakheti. WMTR Phase 2 added the Shida Kartli region (which was not included in the evaluation Statement of Work) and Tbilisi. The focus of WMTR is to facilitate the emergence and growth of the solid waste recycling sector in targeted regions and municipalities; improve waste collection systems; minimize pollution of natural resources from landfills by closing down old, illegal landfills and dumpsites; enhance public awareness of waste management issues; and ensure public participation in the decision-making and the designing process for new waste management systems. WMTR also implements cross-cutting activities in the areas of gender, youth, ethnic minorities, and people with disabilities.

### ES Box 1: Program Components

#### Phase 1

- Component 1: Waste Collection and Recycling Systems
- Component 2: Private Sector-Led Recycling
- Component 3: Waste Management Strategy and Tariff Policy
- Component 4: Communication and Outreach

#### Phase 2

- Implementation of an Integrated Waste Management System
- Private Sector-Led Recycling
- Illegal Dumping Penalties and Tariff Policy
- Public Outreach

## EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation sought to answer the following four primary evaluation questions (EQs):

1. What are the major strengths/accomplishments of both phases of the WMTR program?
2. What are the constraints and challenges that inhibit the WMTR progress toward achieving the program objectives during the remaining term of the program?
3. What, if any, corrections are needed to WMTR II's implementation approach assisting aggregating and recycling companies in deploying modern and efficient equipment, improving associated technical skills, and introducing effective and efficient production processes to increase the quality of recycled products?

4. What were the positive or negative aspects of implementing a transition award vs. directly awarding the WMTR program to a local partner or vs. using a local partner as the major sub-awardee on a prime award to an international organization?

## EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

To answer the EQs, the evaluation used a mixed-methods design consisting of five qualitative and quantitative data collection methods (see Box 2). Key informant interview (KII) and focus group discussion (FGD) participants were selected using purposive sampling methods focusing on those key informants in primary stakeholder groups best able to provide information to answer the EQs. Overall, the evaluation team (ET) completed 58 KIIs with 67 individuals (35 men and 32 women) and one FGD with five female students belonging to the following stakeholder groups: USAID, program implementers, GoG, local government officials, private firms, donor organizations, and youth and university faculty. In addition, the ET conducted two point of service (POS) surveys at program-installed waste separation bins as well as site visits of five illegal dumpsites and one landfill closed with program assistance. Overall, the ET conducted fieldwork in 11 of 13 target program municipalities and in all three of its target cities located in Kakheti, Adjara AR, and Tbilisi.

The evaluation methodology involved the following methodological limitations: 1) absence of a counterfactual to assess attribution; 2) evaluation findings that are based on subjective perceptions of key informants; 3) difficulty assessing the sustainability of observed results; 4) potential for respondent and/or interviewer bias; and 5) turnover among key informants.

### ES Box 2: Data Collection Methods

- Document review
- Key informant interviews (KIIs)
- Focus group discussions (FGDs)
- Point of service (POS) surveys
- Site visits

## FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

### EQ 1: What are the major strengths/accomplishments of both phases of the WMTR program?

**Findings:** WMTR Phase 1 and 2 activities have played an important contributory role in: 1) creating an enabling environment for solid waste management (SWM) at the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture (MoEPA); 2) supporting the implementation of SWM policies in target municipalities; 3) developing the private SWM sector; and 4) increasing public awareness about SWM.

Program assistance was pivotal to the on-time completion of municipal solid waste management plans (SWMPs), target municipalities' ability to calculate waste collection tariff rates, and the cleanup of landfills and illicit dumpsites. Notwithstanding, municipalities have yet to implement the tariffs due largely to concerns about their size and potential political opposition, nor do they have in place any plans to phase-in the tariffs over time. SWM firms received substantial program assistance in both technical- and business-related operations that has, in some cases, materially improved their business performance.

Program assistance has been critical in the creation and operation of the Waste Management Association (WMA), which is now viewed by the GoG as a legitimate organization representing the SWM sector. Via a variety of outreach and communications activities, the program has both raised its profile among key stakeholder groups as a valuable resource in SWM and its awareness about SWM issues. WMTR's public awareness activities, however, have their limits as demonstrated by the low utilization rates of program-installed waste separation bins, the multi-month pause of its public waste separation pilot in Telavi, and the lack of public involvement in dumpsite cleanup (e.g., picking up the remaining waste post cleanup), monitoring, and enforcement. Much more work is required to influence public attitudes and behaviors about SWM, particularly waste separation/recycling.

Gender issues related to SWM include household consumption and waste management practices, policymaking and civic engagement, education, inter-generational transmission of values and practices, and income generating and employment opportunities. The WMTR Gender Strategy and Gender Action Plan, both developed in October 2017 during program Phase 2, describe a variety of activities

that fall under one or more of these gender issues; however, each is only in its early stages of implementation.

WMTR's communication and outreach activities under Component 4 include a strong focus on awareness raising among youth—while also targeting older populations aged 40 and over via social networks, print media, and television—reflecting the assumption that, relative to the older generation, youth are more open to messages about SWM and thus they are more likely to drive scalable and sustainable changes in related attitudes and behaviors. The ET acknowledges that time and generational change is required to affect behavior change.

**Conclusions:** Georgia's signing of the European Union (EU) Association Agreement in June 2014 created a political environment in which WMTR activities could gain traction. Program assistance to the GoG played a critical contributory role in creating an enabling environment for SWM, including a series of SWM laws and regulations at the national level, which the GoG would not have been able to do on its own.

WMTR's assistance played a crucial contributory role in the development of municipal SWMPs, the calculation of break-even solid waste collection tariffs, and the cleanup of landfills and informal dumpsites, none of which the municipalities would have been able to do on their own. Lingering challenges included developing strategies to implement the waste collection tariffs, completing dumpsite cleanup to remove remaining waste, and preventing locals from resuming waste dumping at the cleaned-up sites.

The program has further made a significant contribution in publicizing SWM issues to diverse audiences, particularly youth. Significant work remains, however, given the country's low baseline in SWM capacity.

The creation of the WMA, which was made possible through program assistance, was an important development in the growth of the Georgia SWM private sector as it offers potential to be an important mechanism for joint action and advocacy within the sector. The WMA, however, may be years away from becoming a viable and sustainable business association and will require ongoing support over the life of the program, and perhaps beyond, to achieve this outcome.

WMTR's Gender Strategy and Action Plan are based on a solid conceptual foundation and are well articulated, but they are too early in their implementation to draw any conclusions as to their effectiveness.

WMTR's strategy to target youth with its communication and outreach activities is appropriate if the objective is to achieve long-term and scalable and sustainable change in public attitudes and behaviors related to SWM, including waste separation/recycling.

## **EQ 2: What are the constraints and challenges that inhibit the WMTR progress toward achieving the program objectives during the remaining term of the program?**

**Findings:** WMTR faces several constraints and challenges, including 1) an insufficient level of staff, equipment, and funds at the national and local levels of government to implement the SWM Law; 2) an initial focus in regions outside of Tbilisi, which has slowed development of the private recycling sector and delayed possible demonstration effects; 3) cultural norms that make it difficult to change attitudes and behavior related to SWM; 4) regional program staffing that may be inadequate to meet the technical and public awareness needs in target municipalities; and 5) multiple issues that threaten program sustainability, including the ongoing need for technical assistance (TA) within all key stakeholder groups, the need to expand the scope of program assistance to other key stakeholder groups, and the precarious status of the WMA.

**Conclusions:** Lingering technical and staffing weaknesses in SWM capacity at the national and municipal levels of government, and the lack of political will at local levels to implement waste collection tariffs, have the potential to adversely affect the long-term results of program activities.

The lack of interest by the Soviet-era population cohort in SWM issues has the potential to negatively impact not only SWM activities in general but also the segregation and recycling of waste that are critical behavioral changes on which program success hinges.

Adding (or moving) staff to the regions or simply increasing the WMTR staff's hours in the regions to participate in regional activities is necessary to produce a wider implementation of program activities, including outreach, communication, and training.

Program sustainability is imperiled by several factors, each of which will need to be addressed during Phase 2 of the program.

**EQ 3: What, if any, corrections are needed to WMTR II's implementation approach assisting aggregating and recycling companies in deploying modern and efficient equipment, improving associated technical skills, and introducing effective and efficient production processes to increase the quality of recycled products?**

**Findings:** Possible adaptations to improve program implementation and results include the following: 1) restarting the grants program as soon as practicable to provide a needed boost to and increase investment in the recycling sector, and create demonstration effects for other private recycling firms; 2) refocusing waste segregation efforts in the private sector in urban centers where there are greater concentrations of large waste producers, including hotels, offices, malls, and other businesses; 3) restructuring WMTR's staffing structure with an eye to increasing program field presence in target municipalities and villages; and 4) extending WMTR's work in target cities and municipalities to the Sakrebulo (elected councils), which will play an important role in implementing SWM policies at the local level. It should be noted that the project has already begun working with businesses in urban areas including hotels and malls.

**Conclusions:** While the WMTR program is, overall, well-run and effective, there are many opportunities for the program to improve its implementation and results over the program's remaining life. These include restarting and ramping up the grantmaking process, refocusing waste separation activities to the private sector in urban centers and expanding over time to the periphery, and increasing staff resources in the regions to allow a more expansive and more intensive set of activities related, in principal, to training, outreach, and communications, and extending program support to other key policymaker actors, particularly the municipality and city Sakrebulo. Indeed, during program Phase 2, WMTR has embarked on this process by setting up waste separation activities in businesses located in urban centers, such as hotels and hypermarkets.

**EQ 4: What were the positive or negative aspects of implementing a transition award vs. directly awarding the WMTR program to a local partner or vs. using a local partner as the major sub-awardee on a prime award to an international organization?**

**Findings:** Program stakeholders outside USAID, ICMA, and CENN largely associate WMTR with CENN and were unaware of managerial issues related to the Transition Award. The Transition Award was successful in terms of its administration and the transition process in that it helped build CENN's managerial and financial capacity incrementally, especially with regard to the enhanced capabilities the current Chief of Party (COP) acknowledges result from her time as Deputy Chief of Party (DCOP). In contrast, it contributed little to help building CENN's technical capacity in SWM.

If the programming objective exists to build local capacity, key informants at USAID/Georgia and CENN prefer a variety of alternative contracting mechanisms to the Transition Award. The use of Transition Awards was seen as a mechanism to comply with USAID Washington's initiative to build local capacity, however. Outside of this external incentive, little demand exists to make additional Transition Awards among interviewed key informants.

**Conclusions:** The Transition Award was successful in that it helped incrementally improve CENN's managerial and financial capacity, made the transition from ICMA and CENN proceed smoothly, and provided CENN a window to build its technical capacity in SWM. However, the Transition Award may not have been necessary, given CENN's pre-existing management and financial capacity, and it did little to strengthen CENN's technical capacity in SWM. The ET notes that CENN had previously been

a recipient of a direct award from USAID and, given its successful pre-award survey, was already eligible to receive a direct award from USAID.

The Transition Award is not the preferred contracting mechanism for building local capacity, assuming building local capacity is a programming objective, although they do not agree on which alternative contracting mechanism they prefer. It was a programming response to incentives created by USAID Washington to build local capacity. There exists little demand among key informants for making additional Transition Awards in the absence of an external incentive to do so.

## **Recommendations**

### **EQ 1**

1. WMTR should work with municipalities to determine an appropriate phase-in schedule for implementing the waste collection tariffs, while simultaneously helping the municipalities to conduct outreach programs explaining the benefits from the new charges and working closely with the Sakrebulo to make sure they are onboard with the approach. CENN indicates that WMTR is in the process of implementing this recommendation.
2. WMTR should develop an approach to manage dumpsite closure, including procedures for monitoring the sites and imposing fines for illegal dumping after site closure that are aligned with the EU and then introduce the approach, with appropriate training, to target municipalities. CENN indicates that WMTR has completed development of an initial set of guidance, which can be used as a platform for further development.
3. WMTR should involve local municipality and village residents in the actual dumpsite cleanup activities to ensure that the sites are fully cleaned, create greater buy-in among residents for keeping the sites clean, and promote messages related to SWM, including anti-dumping messages and information related to dumping fines and waste collection tariffs.
4. WMTR should consider increasing collaboration with other donor programs and/or local CSOs or NGOs to provide entrepreneurship opportunities to women and youth in SWM.
5. WMTR should continue to support and subsidize the WMA through the end of the program while also developing a sustainability plan for turning the WMA over to another donor at the end of the program and/or weaning the WMA from donor support by the end of the program. WMTR should further work with the WMA to increase its capabilities in both lobbying the government and providing TA for standard-setting committees.
6. WMTR should establish procedures for monitoring the utilization of waste separation bins after their installation to determine their usage patterns and to craft strategies to increase proper usage. CENN indicates that WMTR is in the process of implementing this recommendation.
7. USAID and WMTR should investigate the feasibility of involving USAID's Development Credit Authority to provide partial loan guarantees to Georgian SWM firms as a strategy to mobilize local financing for the sector.

### **EQ 2**

8. WMTR should encourage the GoG to develop a plan to establish the internal institutional arrangements within MoEPA and the National Solid Waste Management Company of Georgia (NSWMCG) to manage solid waste and recycling activities in the country falling under its purview.
9. USAID and WMTR should reevaluate its communication and outreach strategy under Component 4 in terms of efforts and resources allocated to general public awareness activities vs. youth-oriented public awareness activities.

### **EQ 3**

10. WMTR should move quickly to jump-start its grantmaking process. Given the low baseline from which the private recycling sector is starting, TA itself will not be enough to facilitate sector growth consistent with program objectives. A significant need for increased investment in fixed assets to expand the sector's carrying capacity also exists.
11. WMTR should revise its strategy falling under Component 2 to focus primarily on promoting waste separation, and the waste aggregation and recycling sectors, in the large urban areas of Tbilisi, Telavi, and Batumi, in conjunction with private firms and other large waste producers. Once it has established momentum in those locations, it should begin to expand out to target municipalities.
12. USAID and WMTR should allocate resources to expand regional field staff in Kakheti and Adjara to allow broader and deeper coverage of target municipalities and villages.
13. WMTR should expand its TA and public awareness activities to Sakrebulo in target cities and municipalities.

### **EQ 4**

14. USAID should only consider doing another transition award if the recipient local organization is technically strong but has marginal financial and managerial capacity that precludes it from receiving a direct award from USAID.

# I.0 EVALUATION PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS

## I.1 EVALUATION PURPOSE

This report presents the findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the mid-term performance evaluation of the Waste Management Technologies in Regions (WMTR) program funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Georgia. The WMTR evaluation is a whole of program evaluation covering WMTR Phases I and 2.

The purpose of the WMTR's performance evaluation is to generate evidence and learning that can be used by USAID/Georgia for improving ongoing interventions in the areas of: 1) implementation of an integrated waste management system (WMS); 2) private sector-led recycling; 3) tariff policy and illegal dumping penalties; and 4) public outreach.

The primary audience for the evaluation is USAID/Georgia, and particularly its Economic Growth (EG) office, as well as the implementing agencies International City/County Management Association (ICMA) and Caucasus Environmental NGO Network (CENN). Secondary audiences for the evaluation include the Government of Georgia (GoG), particularly the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture (MoEPA),<sup>1</sup> National Solid Waste Management Company of Georgia (NSWMCG), municipal government officials, civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other donors working in this area. Finally, the evaluation results will also be used for reporting purposes to Washington-based stakeholders.

The evaluation was conducted by a team assembled by ME&A from April – June 2018.

## I.2 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

In line with the evaluation Statement of Work (SOW) requirements (see Annex A), the evaluation answers the following four primary evaluation questions (EQs):

1. What are the major strengths/accomplishments of both phases of the WMTR program?
2. What are the constraints and challenges that inhibit the WMTR progress toward achieving the program objectives during the remaining term of the program?
3. What, if any, corrections are needed to WMTR II's implementation approach assisting aggregating and recycling companies in deploying modern and efficient equipment, improving associated technical skills, and introducing effective and efficient production processes to increase the quality of recycled products?
4. What were the positive or negative aspects of implementing a transition award vs. directly awarding the WMTR program to a local partner or vs. using a local partner as the major sub-awardee on a prime award to an international organization?

The evaluation team's (ET) responses to these questions is elaborated in Section 4.0 of this report.

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<sup>1</sup> The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resource Protection (MoENRP), which was previously WMTR's primary counterpart ministry in the GoG, recently merged with the Ministry of Agriculture to form the MoEPA.

## 2.0 PROGRAM BACKGROUND

USAID awarded WMTR to ICMA on March 18, 2014 under Cooperative Agreement AID 114-LA-14-00001 with a funding level of \$4,220,000. ICMA implemented WMTR in partnership with the local sub-recipient CENN during program Phase 1 under a Transition Award arrangement.<sup>2</sup> According to the terms of the Transition Award, on March 16, 2017, CENN took over the administrative responsibility for WMTR for program Phase 2, with ICMA retaining only a technical advisory function. Program Phase 2 runs through March 15, 2020, with a funding level of \$3,399,973.

With activities falling under four program components in each of its two phases (see Box 1), WMTR Phase 1 worked in Adjara Autonomous Region (AR) and Kakheti. WMTR Phase 2 added the Shida Kartli region (which was not included in the evaluation SOW) and Tbilisi. The goal of WMTR is to provide professional waste management technical assistance to support WMS development and recycling in targeted regions, cities, and municipalities. Program activities promote greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation and sequestration by developing the waste management sector, including waste collection, recycling, and public awareness. The program seeks to enable GHG mitigation and sequestration from the waste sector by facilitating the emergence and growth of the solid waste recycling sector in targeted regions and municipalities; improving waste collection systems; minimizing pollution of natural resources from landfills by closing down old, illegal landfills and dumpsites; enhancing public awareness of waste management issues; and ensuring public participation in the decision-making and design process for new WMSs.

### Box 1: Program Components

#### Phase 1

- Component 1: Waste Collection and Recycling Systems
- Component 2: Private Sector-Led Recycling
- Component 3: Waste Management Strategy and Tariff Policy
- Component 4: Communication and Outreach

#### Phase 2

- Implementation of an Integrated Waste Management System
- Private Sector-Led Recycling
- Illegal Dumping Penalties and Tariff Policy
- Public Outreach

WMTR also implements cross-cutting activities that support the above four components and promote local governance. The cross-cutting activities include, among others, empowerment of youth and women, ethnic minorities and people with disabilities, and gender mainstreaming.

## 3.0 EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

### 3.1 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation used a mixed-methods approach consisting of the five qualitative and quantitative data collection methods listed below:<sup>3</sup>

- I. Document review;

<sup>2</sup> The purpose of a Transition Award is to award a USAID program without competition to a local organization that has been a sub-recipient under a USAID prime award (the "initial award") when certain conditions are met. Under the Transition Award arrangement, the initial awardee is responsible for developing the local organization's capacity to become a stronger and more mature entity that will enable it to receive a direct award from USAID or other donors in the future.

<sup>3</sup> In addition to these four data collection methods, the evaluation design had proposed to conduct mini-surveys integrated into the KII and FGD discussion guides. Unfortunately, as most of the key informants interviewed did not speak English, the interpretation process took more time than expected, which made it difficult to cover all of the discussion topics in the 60-90 minutes of time allotted for the interviews. Thus the ET opted to focus on using the available time to ensure full coverage of the discussion topics rather than to cut the interviews short to administer

2. Key informant interviews (KIs);
3. Focus group discussions (FGDs);
4. Point of service (POS) surveys; and
5. Site visits.

The above methods were selected based on what would achieve the highest quality and rigor in answering the EQs, given the purpose for the evaluation and existing evaluation resources. Each of these five data collection methods is described at greater length below.

**Document review:** The ET reviewed many documents pertaining to the WMTR program. These included documents provided by USAID and CENN as well as those collected by the ET during its own literature search and from various sources collected during the evaluation fieldwork. (See Annex C for a bibliography of documents reviewed for the evaluation.)

**Secondary data review:** The ET reviewed quantitative data examining what the program has accomplished to date against planned activity benchmarks drawn from WMTR’s quarterly and annual reports and performance monitoring data. The ET cross-referenced the findings from this secondary data analysis with the qualitative and quantitative data collected during its fieldwork to determine the extent to which this secondary data contributes to the overall body of evidence to answer the four primary EQs.

**Key informant interviews:** KIs are semi-structured interviews conducted with key informants representing principal program stakeholder groups. As seen in Table I below, the ET conducted a total of 58 KIs with 67 individuals (35 men and 32 women) representing seven key program stakeholder groups: USAID/Georgia; program implementers (ICMA and CENN); GoG;<sup>4</sup> city, municipality and village officials; private sector waste management firms;<sup>5</sup> other donor or development organizations working in solid waste management (SWM); and youth and university faculty.<sup>6</sup> (See Annex B for a list of persons interviewed for the evaluation along with their organizational affiliation and job title, and Annex D for an English-language version of the KI discussion guide.)

**Table I: Number of KIs and People Interviewed by Stakeholder Group**

Stakeholder Group	Number of KIs	Number of People Interviewed
USAID	2	3
Program implementers	11	11
GoG	4	4
City, municipality, and village officials	18	24
Private sector firms	9	10
Donor and development organizations	7	7
Youth and university faculty	7	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>67</b>

**Focus group discussions:** FGDs are in-depth, semi-structured, and moderated discussions conducted face-to-face with small groups of program beneficiaries. The ET conducted a single FGD with five female students from the Telavi State University Eco-Hub. (See Annex E for an English-language version of the FGD discussion guide.)

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the mini-surveys.

<sup>4</sup> Ministry of Environment and Agriculture, Agency of Programed Areas, and Georgia National Solid Waste Management Company. The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resource Protection (MoENRP), which was previously WMTR’s primary counterpart ministry in the GoG, recently merged with the Ministry of Agriculture to form the Ministry of Environment and Agriculture.

<sup>5</sup> These include firms working in waste aggregation and waste recycling and firms where the program had placed waste recycling bins.

<sup>6</sup> These include univiersity faculty and youth (both university students and secondary school students) participating in program public awareness activities under program Component 4.

Point of service surveys: The ET conducted two POS surveys of users at program-installed waste separation bins at the Goodwill Hypermarket and Eastpoint Mall in Tbilisi to determine their usage patterns. The survey enumerator spent four hours during each of two days (two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon) at both locations and interviewed each person who brought waste to be separated at the bins. Over the course of the eight hours, 17 persons, including 10 women and seven men, separated waste at Goodwill Hypermarket; and four persons, including three women and one man, separated waste at Eastpoint Mall. The ET had planned two additional POS surveys at program-installed separation bins located at the MoEPA office building and Public School 54 in Tbilisi; however, the few users at these bins did not use them to separate waste but rather to deposit single items of waste, making the POS survey inappropriate in those cases.

Site visits: The ET visited three illegal dumpsites in Kakheti (Lagodekhi, Sighnaghi, and Tsinandali), two illegal dumpsites in Adjara (Kobuleti and Khulo), and one landfill in Kakheti (Gurjaani) that had been cleaned with program assistance. The purpose of the site visits was to determine the extent to which the dump/landfill had been cleaned, whether the public had begun using the site again to dump waste since the cleanup, and to note other contextual issues related to the cleanup site via observation and informal discussions with community officials and/or residents.

### **3.2 SAMPLING METHODOLOGY**

The ET used purposive sampling methods to select KII and FGD participants. The objective in purposive sampling is to focus on characteristics of a population that are of particular interest, which will best enable evaluators to answer the EQs. (As the ET was interested in talking to the persons with the best firsthand knowledge of the relevant topics, the interviewee's sex was not used as a selection criterion.) In this case, the ET sought to achieve as comprehensive a sample as possible of key informants belonging to the above seven stakeholder groups within the approximately 2.5 weeks allotted to conduct the evaluation fieldwork.

### **3.3 GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

The ET conducted fieldwork in Tbilisi, Kakheti, and Adjara. In Kakheti, the ET conducted fieldwork in Telavi City and in seven of the program's eight target municipalities: Telavi, Akhmeta, Gurjaani, Sagarejo, Sighnaghi, Lagodekhi, and Dedoplistskaro. In Adjara, the ET conducted fieldwork in Batumi and four of the program's five target municipalities: Kobuleti, Keda, Shuakhevi, and Khulo. (For logistical and time reasons, the fieldwork omitted the Kvareli municipality in Kakheti and the Khelvachauri municipality in Adjara.) Overall, the evaluation fieldwork covered 11 of the program's 13 target municipalities in Kakheti and Adjara and all three of the program's target cities (Tbilisi, Telavi, and Batumi).

### **3.4 DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY**

Qualitative data analysis involved coding the data using Atlas.ti software, with the purpose of identifying themes and sub-themes and assessing their relative importance in answering the EQs. Quantitative data analysis consisted of calculating summary statistics from the POS survey results.

### **3.5 EVALUATION TEAM**

The ET consisted of the following:

- Joseph Atchue (Team Leader): Mr. Atchue, CEP, CHMM, was responsible for overseeing and coordinating all activities related to the evaluation and for ensuring the production and completion of quality deliverables in a professional manner, in compliance with the evaluation SOW.
- Dr. Gary Woller (Evaluation Expert): Dr. Woller was responsible for providing guidance to the Team Leader on technical issues related to evaluation design and implementation. He contributed to all aspects of the evaluation design, preparation, fieldwork, data analysis, and reporting.
- Giorgi Kobaladze (Local Solid Waste Management Expert): Mr. Kobaladze contributed to the evaluation design and implementation, data collection, data analysis, and report writing.

- Lisa Basishvili (Interpreter, Logistics Specialist): Ms. Basishvili provided logistical support in scheduling and provided interpretation during KIIs.
- Giorgi Giorgadze (Survey Manager): Mr. Giorgadze and his local firm IT, Research & Metadata Solutions (IRMS) translated and implemented the POS surveys and notes from the FGD.

Finally, oversight of the evaluation mission fell under the remit of Ms. Mirela McDonald, Evaluation IQC Manager with ME&A, and Mr. Christopher Coffman, Project Manager with ME&A.

### 3.6 METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS

The evaluation methodology involved the following methodological limitations:

- Absence of a counterfactual to assess attribution. The evaluation design does not include the construction of a “counterfactual,” or what would have happened in the absence of the program, which is required to attribute observed outcomes to program activities in a statistically credible manner. (The construction of a counterfactual in turn requires observations on a comparison group of municipalities, cities, firms, etc. that have not benefitted from program activities.) To address this limitation, the ET utilized triangulation from multiple data sources to reach informed conclusions about the likely contribution of program activities to observed results.
- Evaluation findings are based largely on the subjective perceptions of key informants interviewed using qualitative data collection methods. Due to a lack of time, the ET was not able to verify all perceptions and anecdotes cited by interviewed stakeholders. The evaluation sought to compensate for this limitation through triangulation achieved by generating data from multiple sources using multiple data collection methods.
- Difficulty assessing the sustainability of observed results. USAID defines sustainability as “*the capacity of a host country entity to achieve long-term success and stability and to serve its clients and consumers without interruption and without reducing the quality of services after external assistance ends.*”<sup>7</sup> The evaluation, however, was implemented while many examined activities remain ongoing. This made it difficult for the ET to determine whether certain observed outcomes have been, or are likely to be, sustained over the long term. To address this limitation, the ET asked probing questions related to sustainability, wherever relevant. This allowed the ET to estimate the “likelihood” of sustainability and the factors contributing to this likelihood.
- The potential for respondent and interviewer bias. The evaluation’s reliance on respondent perceptions and interviewer interpretation introduced potential sources of respondent and interviewer bias. For example, the desire to attract additional program support or to protect one’s reputation was a possible source of respondent bias. The ET sought to compensate for this limitation through the application of best practices in data collection, cross-team validation, and systemic data analysis that synthesized multiple data sources.
- Staff turnover. Due to staff turnover at GoG ministries and city/municipal governments among civil servants and elected officials, certain key informants either were not available to participate in the KIIs or were relatively new to their position and thus less well-informed about program activities. To compensate for this weakness, the ET worked closely with CENN to identify and contact key informants who were best positioned to provide information to answer the EQs.

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<sup>7</sup> <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/global-health/hiv-and-aids/technical-areas/aid-investment>

# 4.0 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

## 4.1 EQ 1: WHAT ARE THE MAJOR STRENGTHS/ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF BOTH PHASES OF THE WMTR PROGRAM?

Overall Findings
Key informants almost universally agreed that WMTR’s Phase 1 and 2 activities have played an important contributory role in: 1) creating an enabling environment for SWM; 2) supporting the implementation of SWM policies in target municipalities; 3) developing the private SWM sector; and 4) increasing public awareness about SWM. Staff at GoG cognizant ministries indicated that the program has substantially assisted in operationalizing the SWM Law and associated regulations. Municipal and city staff stated that the program assistance was pivotal to the on-time completion of their municipal solid waste management plans (SWMP), their ability to calculate tariff rates for solid waste collection, and the cleanup of landfills and illicit dumpsites. SWM firms reported receiving substantial program assistance in both technical- and business-related operations that has, in some cases, materially improved their business performance. Program assistance has been critical in the creation and operation of the Waste Management Association (WMA), which is now viewed by some in the GoG as a legitimate organization representing the SWM sector. Finally, program stakeholders across the board acknowledged the contribution that the program has made in publicizing SWM issues to diverse audiences, particularly youth. Despite progress made in each of the above, however, a great deal of work remains given the country’s low baseline in SWM capacity.

### 4.1.1 Solid Waste Enabling Environment

Key informants uniformly agreed that, prior to Georgia’s signing of the European Union (EU) Association Agreement in June 2014 (which took effect in July 2016), SWM was not a high priority within the country at any level of government. Technical capacity in SWM within the government, moreover, was commensurate with the priority given to it. The signing of the Association Agreement, however, provided the motivation within the GoG and, consequently, municipal and city governments to prioritize SWM and to begin addressing it at policy and implementation levels. It should thus be acknowledged that the EU Association Agreement played an important contributory role in WMTR’s operations and accomplishments by creating an environment in which WMTR activities could gain traction.

Within the context described above, program assistance to the MoEPA enabled it to create (more or less from scratch) an enabling environment for SWM. This assistance included a number of different activities, which took place during both Phase 1 and Phase 2. Critical among these activities was assistance to the MoEPA to analyze and prepare bylaws and regulations, including the Landfill Bylaw and regulations covering collection, treatment, and waste incineration and co-incineration. The program also developed a variety of implementation guidelines for which it also provided training to MoEPA staff, including Waste Management Plan Development, Protected Area Waste Management Plans, and Landfill Waste Acceptance Criteria and Procedures. All four GoG respondents indicated that they would not have been able to reach the point they are now without program assistance.

*“Even though the program was designed for only two regions, it has been crucial in giving our department a helping hand in developing guidelines, normative acts, sub-laws, and technical regulations and guidelines.”*  
– Senior member of MoEPA

*“We would not be able to accomplish the communication with the municipalities without program involvement. WMTR is cooperating with municipalities in three regions, and we have no problems communicating with municipalities from there. Elsewhere else is more difficult.”* – Senior member of MoEPA

Much of this work was initiated in WMTR Phase 1 and was completed during Phase 2.

The program also played an important role facilitating communication between GoG ministries and municipal and city governments, which has in turn facilitated the implementation of GoG SWM laws and regulations at the municipal and city levels and provided the GoG valuable feedback on policy implementation. According to a senior GoG official, this degree of communication would not have occurred without program assistance.

#### Conclusion I

Georgia's signing of the EU Association Agreement in June 2014 elevated SWM to a high priority within the GoG and among municipal and city governments thereby creating an environment in which WMTR activities could gain traction. In this context, program assistance to the GoG played a critical contributory role in the creation of an enabling environment for SWM, including a series of SWM laws and regulations at the national level. Beginning from a low capacity base, the GoG would have been unable to create this enabling environment on its own either at the same speed or at the same level of expertise as it did with program assistance.

#### 4.1.2 Municipal Solid Waste Management Plans

The program has assisted all 14 target municipalities in the Adjara and Kakheti regions to complete SWMPs and submit them to the MoEPA by the December 31, 2017, deadline. WMTR is now working with Tbilisi during program Phase 2 to develop its SWMP. Starting towards the end of Phase I and continuing through the end of 2017, program staff assisted municipal officials to prepare the SWMPs.

After preparing the SWMP guidelines, program staff worked with selected municipal (and city) employees providing them with training and hosting workshops on the requirements for preparing the SWMP. Municipalities provided the plans to WMTR staff for review prior to submitting to MoEPA for review. The MoEPA reported that the program's target municipalities in Adjara and Kakheti were the only municipalities in those two regions that submitted the SWMP by the deadline. (Program municipalities in Shida Kartli, which was not covered by this evaluation, also submitted their SWMPs by the deadline.)

All 11 municipalities visited during the evaluation fieldwork agreed without exception either that they would not have been able to complete the SWMPs on their own without program assistance or that, while they may have been able to produce the plan on their own, there is little chance that they would have completed it by the December 2017 deadline or that the plan would have been near the quality and comprehensiveness of plan completed with program assistance.

*"We could never have created these plans, because we have no experience, no specialists and no money."*  
– Senior member of MoEPA

Of the 11 municipalities visited, eight said that they would be able to prepare the SWMP on their own in the future, with the remainder stating that they would require further assistance to complete the plan.

#### 4.1.3 Waste Collection Tariffs

The program assisted target municipalities to develop a cost-recovery model for calculating solid waste collection tariffs. Municipal key informants generally agreed, moreover, that the tariffs adequately reflected the unique context of their municipality. Notwithstanding, most of the municipal key informants interviewed also indicated that the tariff model produced too high a tariff rate that residents—particularly those in the poorer, more remote villages—would be unable to pay.

Elected officials within the municipalities were also reluctant to impose the tariffs for political reasons perceiving that they would not be well received by a public accustomed to paying low tariff rates for solid waste collection. Certain municipalities indicated that they would not even bring the tariff to the Sakrebulo (elected council) for approval because the tariffs were too high [sometimes as much as GEL 3 (Georgian Lari) per person per month].

*“Based on the tariff calculation, the tariff should be about GEL 3 per person. We cannot impose this high of a tariff. Fees in villages are currently 30 tetri in the villages and 50 tetri in the city. We can only can double this in both cases to be feasible. We want to use the tariff calculation, but it is not feasible. People will not be able to pay this tariff. But over time, we will be able to increase it. At end of five years, we hope to get up to the full tariff amount.”* – Senior municipal official

When asked whether they had in place, or contemplated, a tariff phase-in strategy that might be more politically acceptable and financially feasible, all but one of the 11 municipalities indicated that they did not, nor had any of the municipalities received any assistance from the program to develop a tariff collection or phase-in strategy. Notwithstanding, CENN asserts that the WMTR team has proposed a tariff phase-in strategy to the municipalities that incorporates waste collection expenses not exceeding GEL 3 and has offered to support the municipalities to collect the tariffs.<sup>8</sup>

That said, key informants also indicated that the tariff model was important for two reasons. First, it required the municipality to determine the actual costs of solid waste management, identifying all the various factors that contribute to those costs. Second, once final approval comes from the Sakrebulo, they will be able to use the need to collect the tariff as a rationale to create a billing system.

#### **4.1.4 Landfill and Dumpsite Cleanup**

WMTR further assisted in the cleanup of an official landfill near Gurjaani and an unofficial dumpsite in Khulo and numerous illegal dumpsites and the cleaning of parks, schools, and other public areas.

*“The program helped us to prepare a landfill closure plan for Gurjaani. The document was approved by the MoEPA, and the landfill is now closed. They also prepared a closure document for Telavi landfill. They worked side by side with NSWMCG staff.”* – Senior member of NSWMCG

The landfill-closure assistance consisted of developing closure plans that met the EU landfill closure and post-closure care requirements. Several illegal dumpsites were identified in each municipality, and the program assisted the municipalities to clean them, including funds to hire waste removal equipment and to install garbage bins at the cleaned dumpsite. (See Photo 1 in Annex G for an image of the Gurjaani former landfill site.)

The ET visited five of the cleaned informal dumpsites and found that, in all but one case, the cleanup had left a fair amount of waste (e.g., plastic bags and plastic bottles) at the sites that could not be picked up by the mechanized equipment hired to conduct the cleanup. The ET learned that in none of the cases did the program involve local community members in the actual cleanup, for example by returning to the site after the mechanized equipment had left to pick up the remaining waste. As a result, some dumpsites had not been completely cleaned (see Photo 2 in Annex G). It should be emphasized that the remaining waste in these cases was but a minute fraction of the waste that had been removed; however, it was of sufficient amount that it was definitely noticeable and detracted from the aesthetic qualities of the site. In two additional cases, community members had begun dumping waste at the site again (see Photo 3 in Annex G). Finally, in four cases, neither the program nor the municipality placed trash bins at the site to discourage additional dumping there.<sup>9</sup>

None of the relevant municipalities, moreover, had instituted a policy of monitoring the cleaned dumpsites or imposing fines or other measures to discourage renewed waste dumping, despite the fact that a memorandum of understanding (MOU) had been signed to that effect.<sup>10</sup> CENN reports that it is working

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<sup>8</sup> The idea of tariff phase-in strategy is that, after the approval at Sakrebulo, the municipal government can partially subsidize a waste collection tariff and, during the initial stage, ask residents to pay the same amount they were paying before with the remaining amount subsidized. This would presumably help municipal governments improve budget allocation planning for SWM, while allowing them time to increase the tariff gradually over time.

<sup>9</sup> According to CENN, it has only placed waste bins in those places where the municipal government is able to collect trash from the bins, for example if the bins are located along the route of a waste collection truck.

<sup>10</sup> According to the Waste Management Code, municipalities, the Supervision Department at the MoEPA, and local police are responsible for imposing fines for littering.

with municipal governments to build their capacity to impose fines; however, human resource deficiencies and a lack of equipment at the municipalities limit their ability to do so.

WMTR routinely involved local government officials and municipality and village residents in the above program activities – except for the actual dumpsite cleanup – via such activities as holding public meetings, conducting public information campaigns, working with local citizens’ groups (e.g., women’s groups), and mobilizing teachers (primarily women) and students at the local schools and universities.

### **Conclusion 2**

WMTR’s assistance played a crucial contributory role in the development of municipal SWMPs, the calculation of break-even solid waste collection tariffs, and the cleanup of landfills and informal dumpsites at target program municipalities in Kakheti and Adjara AR. Target municipalities would have been unable to complete any of these important SWM functions on their own either at the same speed or at the same level of expertise as they did with program assistance. To achieve these results, the program pursued a highly participatory process that involved diverse community members, including women and youth, in almost all aspects of planning and implementation (except for the actual dumpsite cleanup work). Lingered challenges include developing strategies to implement the waste collection tariffs, completing dumpsite cleanup to remove remaining waste, and preventing locals from resuming waste dumping at the cleaned up sites.

#### **4.1.5 Communication and Outreach**

As part of its communication and outreach activities, the program hosted several cleanup days at local schools, parks, and other scenic areas. These have been valuable not only in achieving (and in many cases maintaining) waste cleanup but also in advertising the fact the SWM Law is coming and that the public will have responsibilities under it.

Key informants consistently remarked on the effectiveness of WMTR’s communication and outreach activities under Component 4 in raising public awareness about the program and SWM issues, and in building the program’s reputation among key stakeholder groups. Communication and outreach activities included, for example, supporting cleanup days at municipalities, cleanup of informal dumpsites, hosting youth Eco Camps, supporting university students to propose and implement waste recycling programs, placing waste segregation units in public places, mobilizing private firms to participate in waste cleanup under the Keep Georgia Beautiful initiative, and broadcasting public service announcements on television, radio, and social media. For their part, municipal staff stated that the program’s communication and outreach activities had been useful in educating the public in the importance of both SWM and waste segregation/recycling.

Along the same lines, one of the most common themes emerging from the KIIs was the critical importance of public awareness raising to shift public attitudes and behaviors related to SWM and, particularly, waste separation/recycling.

Whereas the EU Association Agreement has served to motivate the GoG and municipal governments to prioritize SWM, no such motivating event has occurred with regards to the public; awareness of SWM issues and associated attitudes and behaviors remains low. Key informants again and again emphasized that much more work will be required in raising public awareness to elicit a significant shift in public attitudes and behaviors related to waste separation/recycling (see Text Box 1).

### **Text Box 1: Survey of Separation Bin Users at the Goodwill Hypermarket**

A survey of separation bin users at the Goodwill Hypermarket found that 17 different people brought waste to be separated over an eight-hour period of whom nine used the separation bin daily and five used it twice a week. Paper and plastic constituted 75 percent of the segregated waste. Fifteen (15) of the 17 respondents indicated that they had discovered the separation bins when coming to the store to shop. None of the respondents made a special trip to the store to separate waste, but all said that they would separate waste more if there were separation bins closer to home. Key informants at Goodwill attributed the bins' low utilization rate to a lack of public awareness about the bins, while noting that the bins were primarily used for waste separation by expatriates living in the area rather than by local Georgians.

A good illustration of this lingering gap in public awareness is the findings of the POS surveys. The ET originally set out to do five POS surveys at waste separation bins installed with program assistance at the Goodwill Hypermarket, Eastpoint Mall, Public School 54, and the MoEPA offices. However, the ET ultimately decided to limit the survey to Goodwill Hypermarket and Eastpoint Mall given that school was currently out on vacation and that the core staff from the Ministry had recently moved to another building after the merger between Ministry of Environment and Natural Resource Protection (MoENRP) and the Ministry of Agriculture.

Notwithstanding that the program conducted an awareness event at each bin site on its installation, only 17 persons used the bins at the Goodwill Hypermarket and only a total of four persons used the bins at the Eastpoint Mall at each of its three bin locations covered by the survey over an eight-hour period.

*“CENN has big role, [and is] doing its best to increase understanding and awareness, but at this point [the] result is satisfactory, not necessarily good.” – Owner of a waste aggregation company*

Another example of the challenges related to public awareness is the waste segregation pilot that the program implemented early in Phase I with Telavi Municipality in the villages of Akura, Busheti, Kvemo Khodasheni, Tsinandali, and Vanta. WMTR provided plastic and paper waste segregation bins to each village (along with a solid waste bin) and provided villagers training on how to segregate the waste. Key informants from Telavi and one of the villages indicated that initially there was good participation; however, after municipal elections in 2017, the participants in the pilot stopped segregating waste.

Key informants placed the blame for this on the local government's decision to deposit the paper and plastic from the bins in a single truck as opposed to conducting separate collections of the two that had occurred at the beginning of the pilot, which served to demotivate the general public from doing further separation of waste. Apparently, the decision to combine the waste had been made by the newly elected officials with little knowledge of WMTR or the pilot program. According to CENN, moreover, the recent merger of Telavi city and Telavi municipality also complicated this process.

Key informants in Telavi further stated that, should pickup of segregated waste be initiated again, they believe that the general public will restart segregating waste, while CENN noted that WMTR continues to work with the relevant local government officials to renew the pilot project.

### Conclusion 3

Via a variety of communication and outreach activities, WMTR has succeeded in raising its profile among key stakeholder groups and raising awareness about SWM issues, including waste separation/recycling. The evidence indicates that CENN has achieved reasonable prominence among key stakeholder groups as an expert and valuable resource in SWM. This said, the evidence also suggests that the scale and effectiveness of WMTR's communication and outreach activities have their limits as demonstrated by the low utilization rates of program-installed waste separation bins (see Text Box 1) and the interruption in its waste separation pilot in five villages in Telavi Municipality. Clearly much more work is required in raising public awareness to extend the reach of the program's messages and influence public attitudes and behaviors with regards to SWM, particularly with regards to waste separation/recycling.

#### 4.1.6 Support to Private Recycling Firms

Currently, there are 18 recyclers operating in Georgia, and many of them are not operating as full-fledged businesses. Each of the five recyclers interviewed expressed frustration on three points. First, recyclers unanimously cited limited access to raw materials (paper, plastic, glass, and aluminum) as the single greatest constraint inhibiting firm and sector growth. The second frustration, which is closely related to the first, are barriers competing for available raw materials with foreign firms (primarily Turkish), which pay a price premium for waste that local recyclers cannot match. The local recyclers feel strongly that there should be some protection for them in this regard. The third frustration expressed by interviewed recyclers is the lack of funding. In the program context, this refers specifically to the lack of grant support, which recyclers understood the program would be providing. During WMTR Phase I, the program issued a single grant. More than one year into WMTR Phase 2, the program has yet to issue a second grant while awaiting the approval the WMTR Grants Manual. CENN, however, noted that the Grants Manual has already been approved and that on June 6, 2018, WMTR announced a grant competition for recycling and aggregating companies.

The one grant the program has made to Zugo Ltd. appears, by all measures, to have been a success. Zugo Ltd. is a polyethylene bag manufacturer in Batumi that received a grant of \$150,000 to purchase a new chopper and extruder, allowing it to cease its dependence on foreign feedstock. The new equipment has allowed Zugo Ltd. to shift production from polyethylene beads, which it had purchased from outside Georgia, to locally-sourced waste plastic bags. Prior to the grant, Zugo Ltd. had sourced 100 percent of its raw materials outside of Georgia; today it is sourcing 100 percent of its raw materials within Georgia from locations in and around Batumi. While the grant itself was not the proximate cause of this shift, the owner credits WMTR technical assistance (TA) for planting the seed that led to the decision to source locally, something he had not seriously considered prior to working with WMTR.

*"We knew that local sources were good replacements, but we did not know how to get the plastic. Now our supply is 100 percent local. Our plastic bag production kicked out the Turkish plastic bags based on price. Once the idea was given to us, we identified sources and segregated by color." – Owner of Zugo Ltd.*

In addition to the grant, WMTR provided Zugo Ltd. TA to get a non-hazardous waste recycling permit from the GoG for polyethylene bag recycling, in addition to TA in accounting, finance, and business planning. As a direct and indirect consequence of the grant and TA received from WMTR, Zugo Ltd. has nearly tripled the size of its production facility (from 360 to more than 1,000 square meters) and has hired an additional 15 staff to pick-up, sort, and grind raw materials.

Aside from funding constraints, technical constraints or low levels of technical expertise among the predominantly small and unsophisticated recycling firms constrain sector growth. Thus, in addition to grants, WMTR provides a range of TA to private recycling firms. Interviewed firms described receiving TA from the program in areas such as performing energy assessments, business plan development, preparing and submitting documentation to apply for environmental permits, product branding or rebranding,

production engineering, and providing a venue (the WMA) for the businesses to meet and act as a unified voice to government. Firms receiving program TA uniformly spoke positively about the technical expertise and responsiveness of program staff and consultants as well as the usefulness of the assistance received.

*“WMTR is different from other programs, which were limited by their bureaucratic requirements and promised lots of things they did not deliver. The program minimized and simplified our bureaucratic requirements. Last year we obtained permission from the ministry for paper processing on basis of the new waste management code. This is a lengthy process, and the program helped us by providing information to deal with paperwork preparation and submission. We might have been able to do it on our own, but it would have taken a much longer time.”* – Owner of a waste recycling company

#### Conclusion 4

The Georgian waste recycling sector currently exists in a nascent, relatively undeveloped stage. Limited access to funding sources and low levels of technical expertise present serious challenges to sector development and growth. Thus, the types of funding and technical support provided by WMTR are critical if private sector development is to keep pace with Georgia’s rapidly evolving legal and regulatory regimen. The grant and TA support provided to date by the program to the private recycling firms has been of high quality, both in terms of its technical expertise and responsiveness to the firms’ needs—and has produced many positive outcomes that have improved these firms’ short and long-term business prospects. However, much more technical and financial (e.g., grant) support is needed.

#### 4.1.7 Waste Management Association

WMTR played the primary role in creating the WMA during program Phase I. Prior to the WMA, there was no mechanism through which waste management firms could work jointly to address issues confronting the sector or advocate jointly to the GoG. Since the WMA’s creation, the program has continued to support the WMA through financial and in-kind contributions, including providing the WMA secretariat and venues for meetings. With one exception, the private firms interviewed for the evaluation said that the creation of the WMA was an important milestone in the development of the private waste management sector. In particular, they cited the association’s ability to act as a convening body and also, on occasion, to facilitate business deals among members.

KIIs with private waste management firms and GoG representatives indicated that key informants with the GoG view the WMA as a legitimate voice representing private waste management firms.

*“Under no circumstances would the WMA have been created without the program. It will have an impact, because now we have different power communicating and dealing with the government as we can speak with a collective voice. Not only this, we can talk to the government. Before there were cases where government would refuse to talk to firms, but now it is more willing.”* – Member of the WMA

Private recycling firms, moreover, reported that, on at least one occasion, the GoG has approached the WMA for assistance, in this case with a standard-setting activity. Unfortunately, because of lack of staff, the WMA was not able to provide the requested assistance.

Thus, by all accounts, the WMA is perceived as a necessary, useful, and legitimate mechanism for private waste management firms to work and advocate collectively toward shared objectives.

*“Before, there were quite a few companies in waste management, but they didn’t know each other. The good thing is now everyone knows each other. Companies come together to share knowledge, experience, and even resources. The government now know that there is an entity that unites companies dealing with waste management. Companies can come to together and plan what they want from government and other stakeholders.”* – Member of the WMA

That said, the WMA remains a nascent organization whose long-term sustainability is uncertain. For example, when the ET asked private firms whether they would be willing to pay a higher price for

membership, which now stands at approximately GEL 100 per year, most indicated that they would, although they largely demurred as to how much they would be willing to pay. Two interviewees further indicated that an increase in price might cause them or other members to leave the association.

An additional challenge to the WMA is the geographic dispersion of members. For example, key informants reported that of three WMA members in Batumi, only two are active in the association and one, which is a member of the WMA Board, participates only sporadically due, in part, to the distances involved. Another key informant reported that two of the five WMA Board members do not participate actively in the association.

*“The WMA is functioning. At the last meeting, an expert came to talk about tax issues, and it provides a forum in which members can share their experience on issues like taxes. The WMA is taking its first steps at this point. It is independent but still requires strengthening from the program. It is hard to say how more time it needs program support.” – Member of the WMA*

The ET concedes that growing pains are normal for any type of organization, particularly one with little precedence in the country, but such issues are indicative of concerns related to the WMA’s long-term sustainability at this point in its existence.

### Conclusion 5

The creation of the WMA was an important milestone in the development of the Georgian SWM private sector. Without WMTR’s assistance, it is highly unlikely that the WMA, or something like it, would have been created. It offers the potential to be an important mechanism for the SWM sector to work and advocate collaboratively toward shared objectives. To date, the WMA has shown positive progress toward playing this role and shows signs of being accepted by the GoG as a legitimate voice of the SWM sector. The WMA, however, has significant challenges ahead and may be years away from becoming a viable and sustainable business association. It will likely require ongoing financial and in-kind support for the foreseeable future, without which the likelihood that the WMA remains functioning appears low.

#### 4.1.8 Gender and Youth

**Gender.** SWM intersects with gender in a variety of ways. For WMTR, four issues appear particularly relevant:

1. Women are generally responsible for household tasks related to waste management. However, due to women’s often-restricted participation in public affairs, decisions about waste management at both the household and community level are often taken by men who fail to consider women’s perspectives. The political/public policy process in SWM thus opens opportunities for women to participate in civic engagement, including through organized women’s groups, within their communities.
2. Women are the primary household consumers of goods and play a large role in determining the type of waste generated. Thus, women appear to be a relatively effective target for messages about the impact of household consumption and packaging practices on SWM.
3. Women, both as household managers and educators, play the primary societal role in socializing children and inculcating habits and values. Women thus appear to be a relatively effective target for messages on SWM to facilitate cross-generational socialization. This also suggests the potential advantage in mobilizing women to communicate messages on SWM via, for example, women’s groups or female teachers and/or school administrators.
4. Women suffer from a disproportionately higher incidence of economic unemployment resulting from limited income generating opportunities. Thus, women stand to benefit significantly from the creation of income generating opportunities linked to SWM.

CENN's approach to gender issues in SWM is described in its gender strategy and action plan developed for WMTR Phase 2. Unfortunately, for this mid-term evaluation, CENN's gender strategy and action plan, both developed in October 2017, remain in the early stages of their implementation, thereby making assessing them premature. A reading of the gender strategy, however, reveals it to be a reasonably detailed strategy with a well-developed conceptual framework and a diverse set of activities cutting across the program's four components and addressing each of the above four issues, which are described in the program's gender action plan covering all of its target regions and cities.<sup>11</sup>

It is of note when considering CENN's gender strategy and action plan that program stakeholders across the board, aside from certain CENN staff, consistently expressed limited understanding of gender issues related to SWM when asked about it during KIs. The exception to this was that key informants generally understood that women bore most of the responsibility for household waste disposal. Thus, to the extent that SWM policies and practices in Georgia incorporate gender considerations into their design and implementation, they are unlikely to do so organically and will require an explicit strategy and corresponding set of education and promotion activities to accomplish this, such as those proposed in the CENN gender strategy.

### **Text Box 2: Zugo Ltd. Demonstrates Job Creation Potential for Women in Recycling**

Zugo Ltd. demonstrates the potential for gender impact of expanding solid waste collection, aggregation, and recycling. After expanding its production capacity and sales with its WMTR grant, Zugo Ltd. hired an additional 15 employees, consisting of predominantly women, to pick up, sort, and grind waste. Economic opportunities for women, women's groups, and women-owned firms exist in activities such as waste pickup, waste aggregation and recycling, and site beautification maintenance. Even though there will be some economic opportunity generated from an expanding SWM sector; its impact on women's income earning opportunities will be limited by the relatively small size of the sector.

**Youth.** Supporting youth is a cross-cutting program activity and, as a result, raising youth awareness is a main program focus. Much of WMTR's public communication and outreach activities are targeted to youth. The program works closely with youth at local schools and universities to promote messages in SWM, educate youth in SWM principles and practices, and mobilize youth to take action among their peers, within their communities, and among their family members to promote SWM messages and practices.

*"I got more confidence, strength and power. Two years ago, I would have been ashamed to pick up garbage on my own and have people see me. Now I have the power to do it, and I've been able to convince younger kids to do cleanup. We actually got about 15-20 people to help in the cleaning."* – Male Eco Camp participant

These activities take several forms, including inviting elementary, high-school, and university students to participate in cleanups, supporting Eco Camps each summer for high-school students, working with university students on environmentally-related programs, and installing Eco-Hubs on college campuses, which are on-campus meeting areas creating a space for discussing environmental issues. The ET found that, almost without exception, these activities were well-received and, in some cases, have motivated high school and university students to identify a potential career in SWM.

*"Students benefit from having the space (Eco-Hub). They are able to have meetings there whenever they wish. The university's biggest benefit is seeing the student engagement... The university provides assistance with cleanups. There's been more than 15 cleanups in the past year."* – University Professor

WMTR's strategy to target youth reflects an explicit assumption that youth are the primary change agents within the country with regards to SWM, and there is much more "bang for the buck" to be gained by targeting public awareness activities to youth rather than to adults or the general public. This is not to say

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<sup>11</sup> Rather than take space to summarize the contents of the gender strategy here, interested parties are encouraged to read the gender strategy and accompanying gender action plan. It is available from WMTR on request.

that WMTR is omitting adults or the general public in its communication and outreach activities, as the examples above demonstrate, but rather that several of its Component 4 activities include a specific focus on youth. This strategy further reflects the assumptions that: 1) scalable change within Georgia with regards to SWM attitudes and practices is likely to be generational and only limited change can be expected in the short term; and 2) youth educated about SWM as a result of WMTR activities will convey these messages to their families (including older family members) and friends. Thus, the program is purposively taking a long-term perspective and attempting to lay the groundwork on which scalable and sustainable change can occur in the future, while also targeting older populations aged 40 and over via social networks, print media, and television.

The ET routinely asked key informants whether they believed this focus on youth was appropriate. Without exception, the key informants not only confirmed that the approach was appropriate but also validated the assumptions on which the approach was based. As one key informant noted, *“If you want to see change, it has to come through generational change.”*

*“In Georgia, youth are extremely active; they can break stereotypes and promote new approaches. Youth are very well informed about what is going on. Involving youth is the most effective leverage or mechanism one can use. Youth are catalyzing change now and as the older generation passes on.”* – Donor organization staff member

<b>Conclusion 6</b>
Gender intersects with SWM in a variety of ways related to household consumption and waste management practices, policymaking and civic engagement, education, inter-generational transmission of values and practices, and income generating and employment opportunities. The WMTR gender strategy addresses each of these issues, but the strategy implementation is in its initial phases such that no conclusions are possible about their effectiveness. WMTR’s strategy to target youth with its communication and outreach activities is appropriate if the objective is to achieve long-term, scalable, and sustainable change in public attitudes and behaviors related to SWM, including waste separation/recycling. Some potential also exists to affect short-term attitudes and behaviors of the older generation as a result the program’s mass media awareness campaign and youth communicating knowledge about SWM to family and friends.

**4.2 EQ 2: WHAT ARE THE CONSTRAINTS AND CHALLENGES THAT INHIBIT THE WMTR PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING THE PROGRAM OBJECTIVES DURING THE REMAINING TERM OF THE PROGRAM?**

<b>Overall Findings</b>
The program faces several constraints and challenges. These include: 1) an insufficient level of staff, equipment, and funds at the national and local levels of government to implement the SWM Law; 2) an initial focus in regions outside of Tbilisi, which led to a slower startup of meaningful TA and delayed possible demonstration effects; 3) cultural norms that make it difficult to change attitudes and behavior related SWM, particularly among the older generation; 4) regional program staffing that may be inadequate to meet the technical and public awareness needs in target municipalities and villages; and 5) multiple issues that threaten program sustainability, including the ongoing need for TA within all key stakeholder groups, the need to expand the scope of program assistance to other key stakeholder groups, and the precarious status of the WMA.

**4.2.1 Limited Government Capacity**

Sixty-seven (67) of 68 key informants both within and outside government acknowledged that the program played an essential role in the roll-out and initial implementation of the SWM Law and its enabling

regulations and in assisting municipal governments to respond. It appears, however, that the major driver for adoption of the SWM Law, as discussed above, was Georgia's Association Agreement with the EU.

While the GoG has moved forward by passing the SWM Law and supporting regulations, it has added little new funding or staff to implement them. This has extended down to the municipal level, where in addition to the lack of funding and staff, the recent elections and associated staff turnover have adversely impacted the usefulness and sustainability of the TA provided by the program.

*“Environment is not a priority for this country. It is not and has never been a priority. Environmental problems are severe. Awareness is not here, but youth are getting interested. Government enforcement has been very lax. However, they signed the Association Agreement 2015, and government got interested in the environment.”* – CENN staff member

A final challenge is the lack of political will at the municipal level either to institute fines (although at least one municipality has begun this) or impose higher waste collection tariffs. These issues currently impact implementation effectiveness and will work against the long-term sustainability of program activities if not addressed.

#### Conclusion 7

Lingering technical and staffing weaknesses in SWM capacity at the national and municipal levels of government and the lack of political will at local levels to implement waste collection tariffs have the potential to adversely affect the long-term results of program activities.

#### 4.2.2 Periphery to Center Strategy vs. Center to Periphery Strategy

Outside of its work with the GoG, WMTR's scope during program Phase I focused on the “periphery” of the country (outside of Tbilisi) in the regions of Kakheti and Adjara AR. (In Phase 2, WMTR's scope was expanded to Tbilisi and Shida Kartli.) For Phase I, unfortunately, there were very few local recyclers or aggregators headquartered in those areas limiting the potential to expand the market for waste separation, aggregation, and recycling, and generate demonstration effects to support expansion in other parts of the country. All 11 of the WMTR staff interviewed (including those from CENN, ICMA, and two consultants) noted that a strategy of beginning at the center (Tbilisi), where greater potential for market expansion and demonstration effects exists, and then expanding to the periphery made better strategic sense than beginning at the periphery and then expanding to the center. According to these key informants, much time was wasted during program Phase I focusing program activities in the regions where relatively little could realistically have been achieved in developing the private solid waste sector compared to in Tbilisi.

*“We could have done more if we were active with companies outside of the two regions. But at the end of the day, that's how the program was designed.”* – ICMA staff member

#### 4.2.3 Cultural Norms

In the Soviet era, SWM was the purview of the state. People brought up in that time generally do not see a personal responsibility for managing solid waste, including disposing waste in designated areas and separating and recycling their waste. Thus, as discussed under EQ 1, key informants routinely said that changing the public's attitudes and behaviors related to SWM was one of the most pressing needs, if not the most pressing need, facing the sector. The lack of engagement of those aged 40 or older may thus become a significant impediment to achieving program objectives over its remaining life. The program's focus on youth under its communication and outreach activities, consistent with its cross-cutting emphasis on youth, makes good strategic sense from a long-term perspective, but it is not designed, per se, to maximize short-term results. Accordingly, the program complements its youth activities under Component 4 with a variety of other public awareness activities targeted to the general population.

The contrast between the younger and older generations in terms of their receptiveness to SWM messaging presents a dilemma for the program over its remaining life.

*“A lot of work to be done and takes time to get there. At some point we need a new generation to change the mindset. We can’t do awareness raising and expect the country to change. It requires constant work of different initiatives to achieve long-term change. More work with youth on a regular basis would also help increase sustainability.” – Donor representative*

On the one hand, targeting youth promises to have greater long-term efficacy, but it may not produce significant results over the remaining life of the program, if, as many key informants claim, significant changes in attitudes and behaviors toward SWM await generational transition. On the other hand, targeting the older generation (including current decision-makers and opinion leaders) may be more effective, all else being equal, to produce shorter-term results, but the older generation is less receptive to such messages. WMTR activities under Component 4 indicate an attempt to balance these two approaches.

#### Conclusion 8

The lack of interest in SWM issues among the Soviet-era population cohort has the potential to negatively impact not only SWM activities in general but also the segregation and recycling of waste that are critical behavioral changes on which program success hinges. WMTR has addressed this challenge through its diverse communication and outreach activities, including activities targeted to the general public (which presumably offer greater short-term efficacy) and to youth (which presumably offer greater long-term efficacy). If the Mission’s objective is to maximize results over the remaining life of the program, a reconsideration of the program’s targeting mix for its public awareness activities may be worthwhile.

#### 4.2.4 Program Regional Staffing

Another constraint the program faces is its regional staffing structure. Currently there is only a single regional representative in Kakheti and another in Adjara. Although the regional representatives receive support from headquarters staff and external consultants, both indicated that they would welcome more on-site support, whether full or part time. They were particularly interested in having assistance with communication, outreach, and training within the regions at target municipalities and villages.

*“Additional resources would help us provide more grants [e.g., in-kind contributions] to municipalities [by helping private firms become more grant ready].” – CENN staff member*

Given that the pressing need to maintain and even ramp up public outreach activities (see above)—which inevitably includes working with local governments, community groups, schools, etc.—is added to this, then having a more permanent or consistent presence in target municipalities and villages is arguably an effective means to enhance the program’s public awareness activities.

#### Conclusion 9

WMTR’s regional staffing levels may not be adequate to achieve the program’s objectives, particularly with regards to increasing SWM capacity and public awareness in target municipalities. Thus, increasing staff availability to participate in regional activities is likely to result in wider implementation of program activities, including training, communication, and outreach.

#### 4.2.5 Challenges to Sustainability

Several challenges threaten the sustainability of program activities and results beyond those already discussed above. One challenge is the need for ongoing TA to program stakeholders within the GoG, municipal governments and private waste management sector owing to lingering limited capacity within those stakeholder groups. The need for ongoing TA is further exacerbated by the frequent turnover of key staff at all government levels, leaving them relatively bereft of both technical expertise and institutional memory. On top of this, there remain important stakeholders that have yet to be brought into the program’s direct orbit—most importantly the city and municipal Sakrebulo—that will also play key roles in ensuring program the sustainability (see EQ 3). As discussed under EQ 2, moreover, achieving the

sustainability of the WMA remains a distant objective that will require ongoing support and subsidies for an indeterminant length of time.

#### Conclusion 10

Program sustainability is imperiled by several challenges, including TA, staff turnover, and lack of inclusiveness. Each of these issues will need to be addressed during program Phase 2 over the remaining WMTR program life.

### 4.3 EQ 3: WHAT, IF ANY, CORRECTIONS ARE NEEDED TO WMTR II'S IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH ASSISTING AGGREGATING AND RECYCLING COMPANIES IN DEPLOYING MODERN AND EFFICIENT EQUIPMENT, IMPROVING ASSOCIATED TECHNICAL SKILLS, AND INTRODUCING EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT PRODUCTION PROCESSES TO INCREASE THE QUALITY OF RECYCLED PRODUCTS?

#### Overall Findings

Possible adaptations to improve program implementation and results include the following: 1) restarting the grants program as soon as practicable to provide a needed boost to and increase investment in the recycling sector and create demonstration effects for other private recycling firms; 2) de-emphasizing program focus on municipal and village-level waste segregation and refocusing waste segregation efforts in the private sector where there are greater concentrations of large waste producers, including hotels, offices, malls, and other businesses, combined with increased efforts to create more waste segregation points and to encourage larger-scale recycling efforts, something WMTR has begun work on already during program Phase 2; and 3) restructuring WMTR's staffing structure with an eye to increasing program field presence in target municipalities and villages.

#### 4.3.1 Grants

Although only a single grant for recyclers was issued in Phase I, it had a significant impact, as described above under EQ 1. While this level of success is unlikely across the board, it shows that there are talented entrepreneurs that can act as role models for the sector given the opportunity. WMTR reported to the ET that the Grants Manual was approved in the last week of May, and it intends to begin the grants process again as quickly as possible as possible.

#### 4.3.2 Refocusing WMTR's Strategic Approach for Private Sector Development

Refocusing WMTR's strategic approach to developing the private recycling market is another possible adaptation that offers promise. Waste recycling involves recycling by both the general public and the private sector. To date, the program has attempted to promote recycling by both. However, businesses generate far more recyclable waste per unit than households, thus offering more easily accessible raw materials for the recyclers with lower transaction costs to procure which in turn promotes a quicker and less expensive path to scale and profitability for private recycling firms. At the same time, private businesses are arguably more progressive than the general public when it comes to environmental issues and have (potential) monetary incentives to recycle.

In tandem with this effort, WMTR can work with GoG to modify the timeline for waste segregation to begin by focusing on the private sector in urban centers and then working out to the periphery in the regions, municipalities, and villages. The ET understands that, as currently written, the law requires all residents and businesses to begin segregating waste in 2019. Refocusing from the (primarily rural) public to (primarily urban) private sector will allow the program to more quickly reach the takeoff point where recycling is a relatively common activity. The ET believes that this approach better-supports the objective of WMTR to "*assist... aggregating and recycling companies in deploying modern and efficient equipment, improving associated technical skills, and introducing effective and efficient production processes to increase the quality of recycled products.*"

### 4.3.3 Program Staff Restructuring

WTMR's two regional representatives both indicated that they believed they could accomplish more if they had more staff support in the regions focused primarily in training, communication, and outreach. With more support, regional representatives believed that this would allow deeper contact with city, municipal, and village officials, private businesses, and community members that will be necessary to effect sustainable changes in capacity, attitudes, and practices among those groups.

### 4.3.4 Expanding Activities to Sakrebulos

Sakrebulos constitute an important policymaking body in city and municipal governments. The Sakrebulo, for example, has the power to approve the city budget and any changes to it, and to set local taxes. The Mayor and other city/municipal officials are responsible to the Sakrebulo. To date, program activities within target cities and municipalities have placed relatively little focus on working with the Sakrebulos, despite their influential role in policymaking on issues of relevance to the municipal SWMPs, including tariff setting. This should probably change during Phase 2 as the target cities and municipalities move to implement the SWMPs they worked with the program to develop during Phase 1 and up to their submission in December 2017.

#### Conclusion II

The WMTR program is, overall, well-run and effective. Nonetheless, there exist a number of opportunities for the program to improve its implementation and results over the remaining life of the program by restarting and ramping up the grantmaking process; refocusing recycling activities to the private sector in urban centers (which the program has initiated during Phase 2) and expanding them over time to the periphery; increasing staff resources in the regions to allow a more expansive and more intensive set of activities related, in principal, to training, outreach, and communications; and expanding program activities to the city and municipal Sakrebulos.

### 4.4 EQ 4: WHAT WERE THE POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING A TRANSITION AWARD VS. DIRECTLY AWARDED THE WMTR PROGRAM TO A LOCAL PARTNER OR VS. USING A LOCAL PARTNER AS THE MAJOR SUB-AWARDEE ON A PRIME AWARD TO AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION?

#### Overall Findings

Program stakeholders outside USAID, ICMA, and CENN largely associate WMTR with CENN and were unaware of issues related to the Transition Award. KIs with ICMA, CENN, and USAID/Georgia indicated that the Transition Award was successful in terms of its administration and the transition process. Key informants reported the award helped build CENN's managerial and financial capacity incrementally but contributed little to help building CENN's technical capacity in SWM. If the programming objective exists to build local capacity, key informants prefer a variety of alternative contracting mechanisms to the Transition Award. The use of Transition Awards was seen as a mechanism to comply with USAID Washington's initiative to build local capacity.

#### 4.4.1 Perceived Success of the Transition Award

The findings for EQ 4 are based primarily on the perspectives of key informants at USAID/Georgia, ICMA, and CENN. Notably, none of the key informants in the other stakeholder groups interviewed during the evaluation were aware of WMTR's management structure nor the changes that occurred to it as a result of the transition from ICMA to CENN in March 16, 2017. For these key informants, their interactions with the program were almost entirely with CENN, including members of CENN's management team in Tbilisi, CENN's regional staff in Kakheti and Adjara, and program consultants. Thus, from the stakeholders' perspective, WMTR is closely identified with CENN.

Key informants at USAID, ICMA, and CENN uniformly viewed the Transition Award as a success from three perspectives. First, key informants attributed incremental benefit to CENN from the Transition

Award in terms of building CENN's managerial/financial capacity, which is the primary purpose of the Transition Award contacting mechanism.<sup>12</sup> CENN noted that seconding the Deputy Chief of Party (DCOP) to ICMA during WMTR Phase I offered particular benefits to it in terms of learning how to administer a USAID-funded program.

*"I think we learned a lot. Working with ICMA allowed us to gain the necessary skills and, by the third year, we were absolutely read."* – Senior manager of CENN

While the Transition Award did help build CENN's managerial/financial capacity at the margin—the current Chief of Party (COP) attributed much of her success to the time she spent as DCOP—the key informants were split as to whether a Transition Award was necessary in this case. The majority of key informants in fact expressed the opinion that CENN already possessed adequate managerial/financial capacity to implement WMTR given that CENN had already won a previous direct award from USAID and had successfully implemented other international donor-funded programs prior to WMTR. Had a local implementer other than CENN been selected for the Transition Award, it would have made more sense. As it was, however, it is unclear that any benefit CENN received from the Transition Award was sufficient to justify it in this case.

*"CENN could have applied for the award and probably won it given the program funding size if its technical application were adequate."* – USAID/Georgia staff

Second, the transition from ICMA to CENN proceeded relatively smoothly without significantly affecting program operations; key program stakeholders were largely unaware of the transition. In part, this occurred because CENN was already shouldering the large burden of program operations prior to the transition owing both to how the program management had been structured (CENN seconding the DCOP position to ICMA and providing the majority of technical staff) and to the turnover/instability of the COP position, which required CENN to assume significant operational responsibility to ensure that the program proceeded apace.

*"Due to all the turnover in COPs, from USAID's perspective, it seems like CENN was managing the program from the beginning. Then why pay a big international NGO if CENN was doing the work anyway?"* – USAID/Georgia staff

Third, all key informants interviewed agreed that the three year interim between the original award in March 2014 and the transition to CENN in March 16, 2017 gave CENN a window to strengthen both its technical capacity in SWM and its capacity to manage USAID awards. At the time of the original award, relatively little SWM technical capacity existed in the country, including at CENN. CENN successfully used the intervening three years to build its technical capacity in SWM to the point where it is now not only capable of implementing the technical demands of the program but is also widely seen as a go-to resource on certain SWM issues at the GoG and among other key program stakeholders.<sup>13</sup>

With this said, a critical finding is that the Transition Award itself played little role in strengthening CENN's technical capacity in SWM but rather this occurred largely as a result of CENN's own efforts to move up the learning curve by bringing in international SWM experts to advise it and program stakeholders and through the experiential learning process of implementing the program. A common program feature noted by key informants was that ICMA appeared to lack technical expertise in SWM and thus was not in a position to build CENN's technical capacity. In actuality, the intention of Transition Award was for ICMA to focus its support on enhancing CENN's administrative, financial, and technical capability to manage USAID grants. Because of this focus, there was little funding available to ICMA to provide technical support

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<sup>12</sup> The purpose of the Transition Award is to build the local contactor's managerial and financial capacity to implement a USAID-funded program as opposed to its technical capacity to implement the program.

<sup>13</sup> While informants universally agreed that CENN was helpful on the "soft side" of SWM, which focused on legal compliance, training, outreach, and certain technical support. Some also noted that CENN's engineering capabilities were not such that they could actually design and implement a landfill or design and implement a remediation.

in SWM. While, as noted above, building the local sub-contractor's technical capacity is not the express purpose of a Transition Award, that ICMA lacked the technical ability to play this role was noted by several key informants as a weakness in this specific Transition Award.

### Conclusion 12

On the positive side, the Transition Award was a success in that: 1) it incrementally built CENN's managerial and financial capacity to administer an USAID award; 2) the transition from ICMA and CENN proceeded smoothly without, for the most part, disruptions to program operations; and 3) it provided CENN a window to build its technical capacity to the point where it is now a recognized SWM expert within Georgia. On the negative side, the evidence suggests (although is not conclusive) that the Transition Award may not have been necessary given CENN's experience implementing international donor-funded programs and its strong (relative to other local contractors) administrative and financial management capacity. Also, the Transition Award did little to strengthen CENN's technical capacity in SWM. ICMA's lack of budget to provide technical support to CENN in this area, suggested that the progress CENN made moving up the SWM learning curve would likely have occurred at a similar same rate had it been awarded the grant from the onset.

#### 4.4.2 Support for the Transition Award and Alternatives to It

Relevant key informants expressed little support for Transition Awards, either in general or for future program awards relative to other possible contracting mechanisms. According to this perspective, Transition Awards make sense if building local capacity is an important programming objective. The award offers a *"useful tool in the toolbox that can be used if needed"* to pursue this objective.

In this context, the Transition Award offers three relative advantages for building local capacity. First, it provides an explicit contractual mechanism for building local capacity. Second, it is administratively streamlined in that it is designed to allow a rapid follow-on award that will not need to be re-competed. Third, it provides USAID the flexibility to not transition the program to the local contractor if the pre-award survey deems it not to possess the requisite managerial/financial capacity.

Notwithstanding these relative advantages of a Transition Award, key informants expressed preferences for using an alternative contracting mechanism to build local capacity. Four key informants gave a few reasons for preferring alternatives to the Transition Award. One criticized the Transition Award as an administrative "run-around" of the need to compete awards; two noted that alternatives to the Transition Award are more administratively straightforward; and three expressed concern that the Transition Award under prioritized the "technical fluency" of the international contractor. Alternatives mentioned favorably by key informants included the following:<sup>14</sup>

- Award the program to an international contractor but include a specific contractual requirement that the international contractor must build the capacity of local sub-contractors or implementing partners.
- Award the program to an international contractor but plan for a follow-on program to be awarded to a local contractor, possibly combined with a contractual requirement for the international contractor to build local capacity.
- Design RFAs so that they are more accessible to local organizations by, for example, making programs smaller and/or less technical or by avoiding fixed-price contracts.
- Contract with a local prime contractor but require that an international organization with the requisite technical expertise be included as a sub-contractor.

<sup>14</sup> The ET makes no judgement as to the preferability of these alternative contracting mechanisms.

*“If I were to redesign the program today, I would probably have just given it to an international NGO to begin with entirely with the idea in mind to design a follow-on with a local NGO.” – USAID/Georgia staff member*

Not surprisingly, the stated preference for an alternative contracting mechanism depends to a degree on the key informant’s perspective. Contract officers tended to focus on issues related to the contractor’s managerial/financial capacity and their fiduciary responsibility to the United States (U.S.) government and U.S. taxpayers, while technical officers focused more on issues related to the contractor’s technical capacity, notwithstanding this is not the specific purpose of the Transition Award.

### Conclusion 13

Key informants largely agreed that the Transition Award is not their preferred contracting mechanism for building local capacity, assuming building local capacity is a programming objective. Key informants, however, do not agree on which alternative contracting mechanism they prefer, and which mechanism they prefer depends in part on whether their focus is on contracting or technical considerations.

#### 4.4.3 Support for the Transition Award Absent the Objective to Build Local Capacity

If programming objectives do not include building local capacity, key informants’ support for a Transition Award falls. According to Mission key informants, the motivation to do Transition Awards was largely a response to USAID Washington under its “Local Solutions” initiative. The Transition Award became popular because Missions saw it as *“an attractive alternative when there was not a local organization that currently had the capacity to run the program. So in this way, they were able to bring the local organization around a bit more slowly and then transition the program over to them.”*

According to key informants, however, outside of such an external incentive to build the capacity of local implementing organizations, they see little need to implement a Transition Award. In fact, none of the key informants interviewed expressed a desire to make additional Transitional Awards within the current programming context, while the contracting office reported that none are currently in the pipeline or planned.

*“Unless there is some stated objective technically or otherwise to develop the capacity of a local firm, I see no reason to give local firms any preference. The best firm should win the contract regardless of its origin.” – USAID/Georgia staff member*

### Conclusion 14

The Transition Award was a programming response to incentives created by USAID Washington to build local capacity via formal contracting mechanisms. In this context, Missions saw the Transition Award as a useful mechanism for demonstrating compliance. However, absent such an external incentive to build local implementer capacity, there exists little demand among interviewed key informants for making additional Transition Awards.

## 5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1 EVALUATION QUESTION I

- I. WMTR should continue its work with municipalities to determine an appropriate phase-in strategy for implementing the waste collection tariffs, while simultaneously continuing its local outreach activities explaining the benefits of the tariff and fine system and working closely with the Sakrebulo in each municipality to make sure they are onboard with the approach. Conducting a public awareness campaign about waste collection tariffs further offers WMTR an opportunity to piggyback other messages related to SWM as part of the campaign. This campaign also should include discussion of the upcoming fine system that is coming into place.

2. While WMTR has made good progress in working with municipalities and educating them on SWM, including developing closure guidelines for spontaneous dumpsites, the WMTR program should work with the EU and other donors to create **technical implementation manuals** to manage dumpsite closure, including procedures for monitoring the sites and imposing fines for illegal dumping after site closure, that are in alignment with the EU. WMTR should then introduce the approach, with appropriate training, to target municipalities. WMTR does not have the financial capability to assist in cleaning up each site in target locations; thus, to continue the process, local governments will require guidelines both during the remaining program life and after the program ends. The ET further considers the likelihood high that municipality/village residents will resume dumping at closed dumpsites or, in lieu of this, at other illegal sites. Indeed, at four of the five closed dumpsites visited by the ET, community members had resumed dumping waste at the site. To the extent that other donor organizations, CSOs, NGOs, etc. are working on cleaning and closing illegal dumpsites, WMTR may consider working in conjunction with these other organizations to implement this recommendation.
3. WMTR should safely involve local municipality and village residents in the actual dumpsite cleanup activities both prior to cleanup and after major cleanup has been accomplished. This recommendation offers three potential benefits. First, it helps ensure that the dumpsite is completely cleaned. The large equipment used to clean the dumpsites is not able to pick up all debris and thus can leave a significant amount of debris behind at the end of the cleanup. This would involve mobilizing locals to complete the cleanup and remove all remaining debris by hand, albeit appropriately equipped with trash bags, gloves, etc. Second, involving locals in the actual cleanup presumably increases their incentive to ensure that the dumpsite remains clean afterwards. Third, the program can use the cleanup activity as a public awareness opportunity to help drive home important messages related to SWM, including anti-dumping messages and information related to dumping fines and waste collection tariffs.
4. WMTR should consider collaborating with other donor programs and/or local CSOs or NGOs to provide entrepreneurship opportunities to women and youth in SWM. Examples might include forming and training women's groups to monetize waste separation and recycling, helping students to flesh out business ideas in SWM and linking them to entities that can help them implement their ideas, or providing land for women's groups to locate markets or other income generating opportunities in protected areas in exchange for keeping the area free of waste. The ET is aware that the program is already collaborating to some degree with the USAID-funded Youth Entrepreneurial Skills for Advancing Employability and Income Generation in Georgia program (YES Georgia), but it believes that substantial room exists to expand such efforts should the Mission and CENN choose to prioritize gender and youth interventions during WMTR Phase 2.
5. WMTR should continue to support and subsidize the WMA through the end of the program while also developing a sustainability plan for turning the WMA over to another donor at the end of the program and/or weaning the WMA from donor support by program end. The WMA faces several challenges, including a small customer base, lack of independent funding (including a symbolic membership fee and questionable willingness among members to pay a cost-recovery fee), a less than fully committed Board of Directors, a lack of full-time staff, and a risk that it will fail for a lack of interest. The WMTR will not only need to continue to provide secretariat support but also must work with the WMA members to develop and implement a strategy for achieving the financial sustainability and independence of the WMA. WMTR should further work with the WMA to increase its capabilities both in lobbying the government and providing technical assistance for standard-setting committees. As the membership sees the role WMA plays in helping to negotiate such changes in the trade relationship, it could serve as an organizing point for the members and create more interest in joining (or remaining in) the organization. The ET believes that other donors may be interested in playing a role in assisting the WMA over that period and urges WMTR to open discussions with them, particularly the EU.

6. WMTR should establish procedures for monitoring utilization of waste separation bins after their installation, whether by the program or by the site owners. The POS results suggest that separation bin usage is low. Based on the results of this monitoring activity, and notwithstanding the public awareness activities WMTR has implemented with site owners to date, WMTR should work with site owners to develop a strategy to increase usage via additional public awareness campaigns or other means. The results of the POS survey and pilot test in Telavi indicate that merely installing a waste separation facility by no means translates into increased waste separation, even when accompanied by an initial public awareness event, and that further public awareness activities are necessary to ensure that the facilities are both used and used as intended.
7. USAID and WMTR should investigate the feasibility of involving USAID's Development Credit Authority to provide partial loan guarantees to Georgian SWM firms as a strategy to mobilize local financing for the sector.

## **5.2 EVALUATION QUESTION 2**

8. As the GoG is still both underfunded and understaffed, WMTR should encourage them to develop a plan to establish the internal institutional arrangements within MoEPA, the NSWMCG, and, most especially, the municipalities required to manage solid waste and recycling activities in the country. The areas involved would be financing, capacity-building, technology requirements, staffing and other resource requirements, and development of a new organizational structure as required. This process should include an analysis of current legal and regulatory requirements, division of responsibility among different agencies and offices, and an assessment of gaps (including financing, capacity-building, technology, staffing, resources, and legal authority) along with a plan to address them.
9. USAID and WMTR should evaluate its communication and outreach strategy under program Component 4 in terms of the efforts and resources allocated to general public awareness activities vs. youth-oriented public awareness activities. While the ET lacks the evidence to determine the appropriateness of the current strategy, evidence gathered during the mid-term evaluation, together with priority given by key informants to public awareness activities, suggest that public awareness raising is key to both short-term and long-term program success. At the very least, this implies in turn that the current communication and outreach strategy merits reconsideration in terms of both overall resource allocation, resource allocation to specific public awareness raising activities, and that allocation of resources and activities to the youth market segment and the general public.

## **5.3 EVALUATION QUESTION 3**

10. WMTR should move quickly to jump-start its grantmaking process. Given the low baseline from which the private recycling sector is starting, TA itself will not be enough to facilitate sector growth consistent with the program's objectives; a significant need for increased investment in fixed assets to expand the sector's carrying capacity also exists. The ET acknowledges that many of the private recycling firms may not qualify for grant support, but as the Zugo Ltd. case demonstrates, it is possible to achieve significant incremental improvements in sector capacity even with a relatively small number of targeted grants.
11. WMTR should continue its initiative begun under program Phase 2 to promote waste recycling in the large urban areas of Tbilisi, Telavi, and Batumi in conjunction with private firms and other large waste producers and, only once it has established momentum in those locations, begin to expand out to target municipalities. At the same time, the current focus on initiating segregation in villages should continue perhaps with another pilot (in addition to Telavi). However, the ET recommends that WMTR focus a larger effort on private firms and other large waste producers. This recommendation incorporates four critical assumptions. First, WMTR lacks the resources to conduct a full rollout of waste recycling activities across all its target locations. Thus, either it achieves shallow penetration by allocating its resources across multiple target areas, or it achieves deeper penetration by focusing its

resources in a smaller number of high potential areas. The ET believes that the latter is the preferred strategy. Second, the law requiring waste separation in February 2019 will not be implemented and enforced across the entire country immediately; some type of phase-in will be required. This recommendation assumes that the best phase-in strategy is to begin at the center where attitudes, incentives, and capacity are more amenable to implementing the law, followed by expansion to peripheral areas that are less amenable to implementing the law. Third, focusing resources where the likelihood of success is higher is also more likely to generate lessons learned and demonstration effects that can be leveraged to increase the likelihood of success as implementation moves from the center to the periphery. Finally, pushing public waste separation before the capacity to aggregate and recycle the waste exists makes little sense and may ultimately be counterproductive. At the same time, the relatively low level of separated waste generated (at least initially) by the general public may not incentivize higher levels of investment by private recycling firms. However, the higher level of separated waste produced per unit by private businesses is more likely to trigger an investment response by private sector recyclers. In addition, the ET recommends that WMTR continue with communication and training in waste segregation at the village level. Reinvigorating the Telavi segregation project and establishing at least one more could serve as good nuclei for further expansion.

12. USAID and WMTR should allocate resources to expand regional field staff in Kakheti and Adjara (and presumably also Shida Kartli) to allow both broader and deeper coverage of target municipalities and villages. Given the large deficit in SWM capacity at all levels of local government, together with the expected turnover of civil servants and elected officials, and widespread ignorance or apathy of SWM issues among locals, extensive efforts in TA and public awareness raising are required which, in turn, will require an ongoing presence in the target municipalities that is not possible with current regional staffing levels. Note that this recommendation holds even if WMTR adopts Recommendation 10, which is limited to waste recycling, as municipalities will still need to comply with other aspects of the SWM Law and implement integrated SWM policies.
13. WMTR should expand its TA and public awareness activities to Sakrebulo in target cities and municipalities. To date, the program has worked primarily with city and municipal officials and has invested relatively little time in working with Sakrebulo, notwithstanding that the Sakrebulo is a principal policymaking body within Georgian cities and municipalities and will play a key role in SWM policymaking and implementation, including waste collection tariffs.

#### **5.4 EVALUATION QUESTION 4**

14. USAID/Georgia should only consider doing another Transition Award if an explicit priority to develop local capacity to administer a USAID-funded program exists and when a targeted local organization severely lacks financial and management capacity but has a strong technical competence. Even then, the Mission should consider alternatives to the Transition Award. This recommendation reflects the finding that there is little support for doing Transition Awards among interviewed stakeholders relative to alternative contracting arrangements and little appetite for doing another one in the future.

# ANNEXES

**ANNEX A: STATEMENT OF WORK**

# MID-TERM EVALUATION OF USAID's WASTE MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY IN REGIONS (WMTR) PROGRAM

December 2017

## I. EVALUATION PURPOSE AND USE

1. Award Number: Cooperative Agreement No. AID-I14-LA-14-00001  
Award Dates: 03/18/14 – 03/17/18  
Funding: \$4,220,000.00  
Implementing organization: International City/County Management Association (ICMA) Devex (ICMA)  
Agreements Officer's Representative (AOR): Gocha Lobzhanidze
  
2. Award Number: Cooperative Agreement No. AID-I14-A-17-00002  
Award Dates: 03/16/17 – 03/15/20  
Funding: \$3,399,973.00  
Implementing organization: Caucasus Environmental NGO Network (CENN)  
Agreements Officer's Representative (AOR): Gocha Lobzhanidze  
Alternate Agreements Officer's Representative (Alternate AOR): Veronica Lee

The evaluation Contractor must provide non-personal services for a mid-term performance evaluation of the Waste Management Technology in Regions (WMTR) program. This evaluation is a whole-of-program evaluation. The WMTR program includes two implementing mechanisms: WMTR phase 1 and WMTR phase 2 awards.

The evaluation Contractor must assess: strengths and weaknesses of the program and provide recommendations to USAID for course corrections or further work and inform future planning.

The results of the evaluation will be used by USAID/Georgia for improving ongoing interventions in the areas of (1) Implementation of an Integrated Waste Management System, (2) Private Sector-Led Recycling, (3) Tariff Policy and Illegal Dumping Penalties, and (4) Public Outreach.

The primary audience of the evaluation will be USAID, and in particular Economic Growth (EG) office and the implementing partner (CENN). The results of the study will be shared with local stakeholders (Ministries of energy, economy, regional development, partner NGOs, municipalities, etc.) and other donors working in this area. Finally, evaluation results will also be used for reporting purposes to Washington-based stakeholders.

## 2. SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

The evaluation Contractor must ensure that the evaluation team will complete the following tasks and provide the following deliverables within the terms defined by the contract:

- Teleconference with USAID/Georgia to discuss the upcoming work.
- Provide a draft evaluation design and work plan to USAID for review and comment two weeks prior to the evaluation team's arrival in country.
- Incoming briefing with USAID management to present the detailed evaluation design.
- Conduct the evaluation in accordance with the USAID-approved evaluation design and work plan.
- Outgoing briefing with USAID management to present the preliminary findings of the Evaluation.

- Provide an evaluation report to USAID in accordance with Reporting Guidelines under Section 9 – Deliverables. The evaluation report should follow the “Criteria to Ensure the Quality of the Evaluation Report” of the USAID Evaluation Policy.
- Submit USAID-approved evaluation report to Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) within 30 calendar days following the acceptance of the report by the USAID Task Order Contracting Officer’s Representative (TOCOR.)
- Submit quantitative dataset in a machine-readable format to the Development Data Library (DDL) as part of the Open Data initiative.

### 3. KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED

Question 1: What are the major strengths/accomplishments of both phases of the WMTR program?

- The evaluation team must review actual progress of first and second phases of the program toward achieving key expected results and identify major accomplishments, as well as the strengths of the program’s implementation approaches. For example, the evaluation team could review the effect of the WMTR’s grantmaking program on increasing the volume of recycled material on the Georgian market.

Question 2: What are the constraints and challenges that inhibit the WMTR progress toward achieving the program objectives during the remaining term of the program? What are the outstanding needs?

- The evaluation team must determine major constraints and challenges that hinder the achievements of the program’s major objectives and identify outstanding needs. Major program objectives/outcomes include: (1) Integrated waste management systems adopted and as a result, natural resource management is improved, (2) An increase in the amount of recyclable waste originating in Georgia sorted, sold, recycled, and aggregated, (3) Waste management systems are properly funded through public tariffs and fines, which are imposed in targeted municipalities to reduce public littering/dumping, and (4) An increase in the number of people who report a willingness to sort. In answering this question, the evaluation team must examine the following four priority support areas under WMTR program: 1) progress in implementation of an Integrated Waste Management System; 2) utilization of potential of Georgia’s solid waste recycling industry; 3) progress in implementation of tariff policy and illegal dumping penalties; and 4) increasing public motivation, capacity and skills via interactive activities.

Question 3: What, if any, corrections are needed to WMTR II’s implementation approach assisting aggregating and recycling companies in deploying modern and efficient equipment, improving associated technical skills, and introducing effective and efficient production processes to increase the quality of recycled products?

- According to the market research for plastic, glass, paper, and aluminum waste, Georgia’s solid waste recycling industry has great potential for development. However, this potential is not currently utilized. The evaluation team must make specific recommendations with regard to WMTR II’s implementation approach. For example, the team may identify opportunities to improve the operations of supporting private companies or suggest additional interventions.

Question 4: What were the positive or negative aspects of implementing a transition award vs. directly awarding the WMTR program to a local partner or vs. using a local partner as the major sub-awardee on a prime award to an international organization?

- USAID/Georgia implements the Georgia Waste Management Program through a transition award. The purpose of the transition award is to build local capacity of sub-recipient(s) so that they may be eligible to receive a direct award from USAID. The initial first phase 4- year award (CA, AID-114-LA-14-00001) was made to an international recipient (ICMA) to implement the program in the first 3 years. ICMA was responsible for identifying the local partner that eventually became the prime recipient in year 4 (CENN). In year 3, the international prime recipient started a gradual

phase-out from the program and transferred more responsibilities to CENN. In March 2017, by the end of year 3, USAID awarded the second phase 3-year grant to CENN (CA, AID-I 14-A-17-00002). In year 4, ICMA is retaining only a technical advisory function to support CENN.

- Considerations could include: ease/challenges related to management from the Mission perspective, success (or lack thereof) in building the capacity of a local partner to potentially receive direct awards from USAID or other donors in the future, ease/challenges related to management from the local partner's and international organization's perspectives, pitfalls that occurred because of the transition set-up, pitfalls that occurred despite the transition set-up, and finally pitfalls that were likely avoided because of the transition set-up.

#### **4. METHODOLOGY**

The Mission is looking for the Contractor to suggest the best methods that minimize bias and provide strong evidence.

The Contractor is expected to suggest the use of various data collection and analysis methods, both quantitative and qualitative, including document review, key informant interviews with program beneficiaries, the GoG, private sector, focus group discussions, survey instruments (if applicable), and others. The methodology for any evaluation process that involves the selection of participants (e.g., surveys, focus groups, interviews) must be clearly explained and justified. For example, for a survey or mini-survey (if proposed), the number of respondents and their selection process should be explained and justified. The same is true for key informants, focus group discussions, and other methods as well. Selected respondents should be representative of women, youth, and vulnerable groups, where appropriate. The Contractor must conduct a desk review for both phase of WMTR related documents and will help identify areas that merit closer attention once the team begins its fieldwork. Reading materials will be available to the team prior to their arrival.

The Contractor must develop a detailed evaluation design and a workplan, including data collection plan and drafts of data collection tools. A draft of the workplan and evaluation design must be shared with USAID TOCOR for review and comment prior to the evaluation team's in-country arrival. The plan will then be presented to the Mission during the in brief in more detail. The evaluation design must include the evaluation matrix (an illustrative evaluation matrix for this study is given below). The evaluation design must explain how the evaluation Contractor intends to conduct the study in detail, including a detailed description of one or more proposed methodologies as well as limitations of proposed methodologies. It must explain in detail what methods will be used to obtain answers for each evaluation question. The design must also explain how the proposed methodology (mix of methods) to conduct the study generates evidence to ensure rigor and reliability of results; and how and why the proposed methodology will minimize bias. The evaluation design must also include the data analysis plan for each question, draft questionnaires (to be included as an attachment), and other data collection instruments or their main features, criteria for assessing responses to evaluation questions, known limitations, and a dissemination plan. The evaluation design must also include specific sub-questions for each evaluation question, where needed.

Again, the methods described herein are only illustrative and USAID expects that the Contractor will suggest the best methods that would generate most reliable and evidence-based answers to the key evaluation questions.

**Illustrative evaluation matrix:**

Research Question	Data Source	Methodology
<p><u>Question 1: What are the major strengths/accomplishments of both phases of the WMTR program?</u></p>	<p>Activity documentation: weekly, quarterly, and annual reports, M&amp;E plan, results framework, workplans, sub-grant documentation (solicitations, applications, selection memos, etc.)</p> <p>Partner documentation Program Appraisal Document</p> <p>Program staff</p> <p>WMTR grantees (Private recycling companies)</p> <p>WMTR’s TA and training recipients; former employees of the MoEPA</p> <p>Agency of Protected Areas (APA) Solid Waste Management Company of Georgia (NSWMCG)</p> <p>Targeted municipalities, other GoG stakeholders</p>	<p>Document reviews (e.g., to compare achieved results and set benchmarks)</p> <p>KIIs and/or FGDs with program staff and beneficiaries</p> <p>WMTR grantees (Private recycling companies)</p> <p>WMTR’s TA and training recipients; MoEPA</p> <p>APA, NSWMCG</p> <p>Targeted municipalities, other GoG stakeholders</p>
<p><u>Question 2: What are the constraints and challenges that inhibit the WMTR progress toward achieving the program objectives during the remaining term of the program? What are the outstanding needs?</u></p>	<p>Program documentation: weekly, quarterly, and annual reports, M&amp;E plan, results framework, workplans, sub-grant documentation (solicitations, applications, selection memos, etc.)</p> <p>Partner documentation Program Appraisal Document</p> <p>Program staff</p> <p>WMTR grantees (Private recycling companies)</p> <p>WMTR’s TA and training recipients; former employees of MoEPA, APA, etc.</p> <p>NSWMCG</p> <p>Targeted municipalities, other GoG stakeholders</p>	<p>Document reviews (e.g., to compare achieved results and set benchmarks.)</p> <p>KIIs and/or FGDs with program staff and beneficiaries</p> <p>WMTR grantees (Private recycling companies)</p> <p>WMTR’s TA and training recipients; MoEPA</p> <p>APA, NSWMCG</p> <p>Targeted municipalities, other GoG stakeholders</p>

Research Question	Data Source	Methodology
<p><u>Question 3: What, if any, corrections are needed to the WMTR II's implementation approach assisting aggregating and recycling companies in deploying modern and efficient equipment, improving associated technical skills, and introducing effective and efficient production processes to increase the quality of recycled products?</u></p>	<p>Program documentation: weekly, quarterly, and annual reports, M&amp;E plan, results framework, workplans, sub-grant documentation (solicitations, applications, selection memos, etc.)</p> <p>Partner documentation Program Appraisal Document</p> <p>Program staff</p> <p>WMTR grantees (Private recycling companies)</p> <p>WMTR's TA and training recipients; former employees of MoEPA, APA, etc.</p> <p>NSWMCG</p> <p>Targeted municipalities, other GoG stakeholders</p>	<p>Document reviews (e.g., to compare achieved results and set benchmarks)</p> <p>KIIs and/or FGDs with program staff and beneficiaries</p> <p>WMTR grantees (Private recycling companies)</p> <p>WMTR's TA and training recipients, MoEPA</p> <p>APA, NSWMCG</p> <p>Targeted municipalities, other GoG stakeholders</p>
<p><u>Question 4: What were the positive or negative aspects of implementing a transition award vs. directly awarding the WMTR program to a local partner or vs. using a local partner as the major sub- awardee on a prime award to an international organization?</u></p>	<p>Various documentation assessing the local implementer's capacity produced by the prime implementing partner (ICMA) and USAID (e.g., pre-award survey, audits, etc.).</p> <p>Activity approval documentation Program Appraisal Document</p> <p>Program staff</p> <p>Senior management of implementing partners</p> <p>WMTR grantees and TA recipients</p> <p>USAID EG/OFM/RCO Offices and USAID AOR</p>	<p>Document reviews (e.g., to compare achieved results and set benchmarks)</p> <p>KIIs and/or FGDs with program staff and beneficiaries</p> <p>Senior management of implementing partners</p> <p>WMTR grantees and TA recipients and other in-country stakeholders</p> <p>Offices and USAID AOR</p>

## 5. WORK LOCATION

Tbilisi and selected Georgian regions (Kakheti and the Adjara Autonomous Republic), and the U.S.

The teams will travel outside the capital as needed to visit Georgian municipalities (e.g., Batumi, Keda, Khulo, Gori, Telavi) in order to meet with key players in diverse parts of the country and to get a better sense of the overall context within Georgia.

## 6. EVALUATION SCHEDULE

The following levels of effort are illustrative and should serve only as an example of the staff which may be mobilized under this Task Order. These levels may not reflect the actual level of effort contracted, and the Contractor will be expected to submit its own estimate of the level of effort needed to fulfill the objectives.

Staff Member	No. of Work Days in Country/ Consultant	No. of Days for Preparation and Report Writing	Total No. of Work Days/Consultant
International Technical Expert – Team Leader	19	14	33 (plus 2 travel days)
Evaluation Expert	19	14	33 (plus 2 travel days)
Local Consultant	19	4	23

A six-day workweek will be authorized in Georgia with no premium pay. The timeline of activities provided below is also illustrative with the exception of the July 5, 2018 deadline for submitting the final evaluation report to USAID.

Timing (Anticipated Month or Duration)	Proposed Activities
April 24-25, 2018	Initial teleconference with USAID Georgia Preparation work and finalization of the evaluation design; document review
May 10-12, 2018	Travel and preparation for data collection
May 14, 2018	In-Briefing
May 15-June 5, 2018	Data collection and analysis (in Georgia)
June 4, 2018	Out-briefing
June 5-19, 2018	Data analysis and report writing
June 20, 2018	Submission of the draft report to USAID
June 21- July 11, 2018	USAID review of a draft report; incorporation of USAID comments by Contractor  Note: As needed, there may be several rounds of review prior to finalizing the report.
July 12, 2018	Deadline for the submission of the final report to USAID

## 7. PROGRAMS DOCUMENTS FOR REVIEW

Relevant reports and other program documentation will be provided by the Mission to the Contractor prior to travel to Georgia. The evaluation contractor shall initiate Washington-based work by reading reports and familiarizing him/herself with the program. These documents are:

- Program Descriptions for the both phases of WMTR awards;
- Program Appraisal Document (PAD);
- WMTR Work Plan(s);
- WMTR quarterly Reports;
- WMTR annual reports;
- Initial list of in-country contacts;
- Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plans submitted and approved by USAID and performance data tables;
- Various program documentation [analytical documents, studies, grants manual, Requests for Applications (RFAs), grants selection memos, grants applications, monitoring reports, etc.];
- Relevant studies/assessments/expert reports/publications produced by various stakeholders, including third party assessments of Georgia's solid waste management system and environment;
- Other program documents; and
- Initial list of in-country contacts.

## 8. DELIVERABLES

The contractor will be required to provide USAID with the following deliverables:

- a. Final Work Plan and Evaluation Design: Final Work Plan and Evaluation Design document for the evaluation shall be completed by Contractor and presented to the TOCOR two weeks prior to the team's arrival in country. The evaluation design will include a detailed evaluation design matrix (including the key questions, methods, and data sources used to address each question and the data analysis plan for each question), draft questionnaires and other data collection instruments or their main features, known limitations to the evaluation design, and a dissemination plan. The final design requires TOCOR approval. The work plan will include the preliminary schedule of interviews and logistical arrangements and delineate the roles and responsibilities of members of the evaluation team.
- b. In-brief with the Mission: will be held within five days of the team's arrival in country. This will be a maximum of 30-minute presentation of the plan, namely, how the questions asked in SOW will be answered. Prior to in-brief, the evaluation team may have working meeting/s with TOCOR and WMTR AOR to agree all the details of the design.
- c. Conduct fieldwork: The in-country evaluation must expand upon the analysis in the desk review and in the facilitated discussion through methods proposed by the evaluation team that might include interviews with focus groups of sub-contractors, beneficiaries or end-users, Georgian government, recycling companies, other private sector entities, field visits, and mini-survey, if proposed. The evaluation team should spend 19 work days in- country.
- d. Check in with the TOCOR: Half way through the 19 days in country, the evaluation team must have a mid-way check-in with the TOCOR to determine if there is any additional support needed from the Mission.
- e. Mission out-brief: After finishing the fieldwork, the evaluation team must present an outline (in bullets, possibly in PowerPoint or as a handout) of the evaluation report with general findings, conclusions, and anticipated recommendations. The team will present their findings to USAID during a debriefing for all interested USAID staff at the end of their visit in Georgia.
- f. Draft reports: The Contractor must submit to TOCOR a draft report within two to three weeks of completing the out-briefing with USAID. This document must explicitly respond to the requirements of the SOW, answer the evaluation questions, be logically structured, and adhere to the standards of the USAID Evaluation Policy.

- g. Final Evaluation Report: The Contractor must incorporate USAID’s comments and submit the final report to TOCOR within five (5) working days following receipt of the final batch of USAID’s comments on the draft report. The Contractor will make the final evaluation reports publicly available through the Development Experience Clearinghouse at <http://dec.usaid.gov> within 30 calendar days of final approval of the formatted report with USAID consent. In case it is determined that the full report includes sensitive information, the Contractor must produce sanitized version for submission to DEC; the latter also requires TOCOR’s clearance.
- h. All records from the evaluation (e.g., interview transcripts and summaries, focus group transcripts, code books, etc.) must be provided to the evaluation TOCOR as requested. All quantitative data collected by the evaluation team must be provided in an electronic file in an anonymized, machine-readable format agreed upon with the TOCOR. The data should be organized and fully documented for use by those not fully familiar with the program or the evaluation. USAID will retain ownership of the survey and all datasets developed. In addition, the dataset must be submitted to the Development Data Library (DDL) as part of the Open Data initiative.

### Reporting Guideline

The illustrative format for the final evaluation report is as follows:

1. Executive Summary—summarizes key points, concisely states the purpose, background of the program, main evaluation questions, methods, findings, conclusions, recommendations and any lessons learned; should be sufficiently detailed, yet brief, to serve as a stand-alone product (3-5 pp).
2. Introduction—state the purpose, audience, and outline of the evaluation (1 pp);
3. Background—provide a brief overview of the program and the study implemented (1-2 pp);
4. Methodology—the evaluation methodology shall be explained in the report in detail. Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology. Greater detail can be included in the appendices (2-3 pp);
5. Findings/Conclusions/Recommendations—explicitly answer each evaluation question; the report should distinguish between findings (the facts), conclusions (interpretation of the facts), and recommendations (judgments related to possible future programming) (10-15 pp); however, it should be clear what the link is between them;
6. Lessons Learned (if not covered in findings, conclusions and recommendations) (2–3 pp);
7. Annexes—annexes must include this statement of work and its modifications (if any); any “statements of differences” regarding significant unresolved difference in opinion by funders, implementers, and/or members of the evaluation team; a glossary of terms; sources of information, properly identified and listed; clear documentation of schedules, meetings, interviews and focus group discussions, and any tools used in conducting the evaluation, such as focus group scripts or questionnaires, checklists and discussion guides used; and signed disclosures of conflict of interest. The evaluation design should also be attached to the report.

The report format should be presented in Microsoft Word and use 12-point type font throughout the body of the report, using page margins 1” top/bottom and left/right. The body of the report should ideally be within 20-25 pages, excluding the executive summary, table of contents, references, and annexes. The final report must follow USAID branding and marking requirements.

Per the USAID evaluation policy, draft and final evaluation reports will be evaluated against the following criteria to ensure the quality of the evaluation report.

- The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well-researched and well-organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the Programs, what did not and why.
- Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the statement of work.

- The evaluation report should include the statement of work as an annex.
- Evaluation methodology shall be explained in detail, and all tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists and discussion guides will be included in an Annex in the final report.
- Evaluation findings will assess outcomes and impact on males and females.
- Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).
- Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people's opinions. Findings should be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.
- Sources of information shall be properly identified and listed in an annex.
- Recommendations shall be supported by a specific set of findings.
- Recommendations shall be action-oriented, practical and specific, with defined responsibility for the action.

## **9. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT**

USAID/Georgia will provide an initial list of in-country contacts prior to the team's arrival but will not assist in the logistics of appointing meetings. Hence, the Mission will not be responsible for arranging logistics for the evaluation team. The Contractor must suggest how they plan to arrange translation, transportation, and logistical support to the evaluation team. The TOCOR, through USAID WMTR AOR, will put the Contractor in contact with WMTR implementing partner. While in Georgia, the Contractor will conduct meetings in Tbilisi. Some meetings will require traveling to regions outside Tbilisi to meet with WMTR grant recipients, and municipal government authorities. WMTR program implementing partner may assist with setting those meetings.

## **10. OTHER REQUIREMENTS**

The evaluation team must be familiar with USAID's Human Subject Protection Policy and USAID's Evaluation Policy (<http://www.usaid.gov/evaluation>). The evaluation team must provide adequate training for its survey staff on survey methodology, USAID's survey regulations, other relevant regulations, and the data collection plan.

The contractor has the responsibility to safeguard the rights and welfare of human subjects involved in the survey research supported by USAID. USAID has adopted the Common Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, Part 225 of Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations (<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/200mbe.pdf>). Recipient organizations must familiarize themselves with the USAID policy and provide "assurance" that they will follow and abide by the procedures of the Policy.

All modifications to the scope of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology or timeline, need to be agreed upon in writing by the Contracting Officer.

## **ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS**

## List of Key Interviewees

Name	Position	Organization
<b>USAID/Georgia</b>		
Veronica Lee	Director, Office of Economic Growth	USAID/Georgia
Rebecca White	Deputy Office Director Contracting Agreement Officer Regional Contracting Office	USAID/Georgia
Maya Chelidze	Administrative AO/Assistance Specialist	USAID/Georgia
Gocha Lobzhandidze	Mission Environmental Officer	USAID/Georgia
<b>Implementing Organizations</b>		
Damian George	Former COP	ICMA
Nana Janashia	Chief Executive Officer	CENN
Nino Shavgulidze	COP	CENN
Nino Tevzadze	DCOP/Component 1 Lead	CENN
Archil Lezhava	Component 2 Lead	CENN
Kakha Rukhaia	Component 3 Lead	CENN
Salome Sulaberidze	Component 4 Lead	CENN
Kakha Sukhitashvili	Kakheti Regional Coordinator	CENN
Kakha Guchmanidze	Adjara Regional Coordinator	CENN
Irine Sakhalashvili	Gender Expert	CENN
Leo La Rochelle	External Consultant	CENN
<b>GoG</b>		
Nato Sultanishvili	Head of Planning and Development Division, Agency of Protected Areas	MoEPA
Neli Korkotadze	Deputy Head Chief Inspector, Environmental and Supervision Department	MoEPA
Alverd Chankseliani	Head, Department of Waste and Chemical Substances	MoEPA
Khatuna Chikviladze	Advisor to the Director, National Solid Waste Management Company of Georgia	MoEPA
<b>Private Firms</b>		
Archil Tavadze	Executive Director	Neoprint Ltd.
Davit Tskitishvili	General Director	Clean World Ltd.
Genadi Takidze	Director	Zugo Ltd.
Giorgi Khachaturov	Manager	Georgian Paper Production Ltd.
Archil Nasrashvili	General Manager	Kriala Ltd.
Dodo Kurashvili	Program Manager	Kriala Ltd.
Giorgi Gulishvili	President	WMA

Name	Position	Organization
Diana Pertenadze		Metro City
Irina Kosashvili	Director	Goodwill Hypermarket
Anano Korkia	Head of Public Relations and Marketing	Pasha Bank
<b>Donor &amp; Development Organizations</b>		
Rene Boesten	Program Team Leader	KfW
Tea Melikadze	Principal Banker, Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
Rezo Getiashvili	Sustainable Governance Program	CENN
Nino Lagvilava	COP	YES-Georgia
Mariam Shotadze	Deputy Team Leader	Technical Assistance Program for the Improvement of Waste Management Systems in Georgia
Lia Chakunashvili	COP	Media for Transparency and Accountable Government Program (M-TAG)
Dylan Thomas	Volunteer	Peace Corps
<b>City, Municipality, and Village Officials</b>		
Tamar Sharashidze	Head Department of Ecology and Green Spaces	Tbilisi
Giorgi Enukidze	Head of Administrative Service	Telavi City
Zurab Enukidze	Head of Economical and Infrastructural Department (Former)	Telavi City
Irakli Chavleishvili	Deputy Head of City Council	Batumi
Eter Lomadze	Head of Department for Municipal Policy Planning, Risk Management and Monitoring	Batumi
Roman Surmandize	City Hall Subordinated Administration	Akhmeta Municipality
Aleksi Chankotadze	Deputy Mayor	Lagodekhi Municipality
Vepkhia Natrosvili	Senior Specialist Division of Supervision	Dedoplistskaro Municipality
Giorgi Nasrashvili	Head of Division of Supervision	Dedoplistskaro Municipality
Tomaso Alughiasvili	Head of Architecture Division	Dedoplistskaro Municipality
Ilia Maisuradze	Waste Management Chair	Akhmeta Municipality
Teimuraz Bachukashvili	Former Head of Economic and Infrastructure Department	Gurjaani Municipality
Madona Batiashvili	First Deputy Mayor	Sighnaghi Municipality
Roman Surmandize	Senior Specialist	Sagarejo Municipality
Davit Davitadze	Director of Communal Service	Shuakhevi Municipality
Rusudan Shavadze	Deputy Director of Communal Service	Shuakhevi Municipality

<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Zaza Davitadze	Communal Service	Shuakhevi Municipality
Mukhran Mhavanadze	Supervision Department of Kobuleti Municipality City Hall	Kobuleti Municipality
Malkhaz Surmanidze	Director of Communal Service	Keda Municipality
Zaza Abuladze	Head of Infrastructure and Economic Development Service	Khulo Municipality
Mariam Tandilashvili	Village Chief	Akura Village, Telavi Municipality
Otari Khatiashvili	Former Village Chief	Akura Village, Telavi Municipality
Nika Abashidze	Solid Waste Management Specialist	Tsindali Village, Telavi Municipality
Marika Asanashvili	Solid Waste Management Specialist	Tsindali Village, Telavi Municipality
<b>University Faculty and Youth</b>		
Magda Davitashvili	Dean of Faculty of Nature	Telavi State University
Tea Koiava	Assistant Professor of Biology	Batumi State University
Inga Diasamidze	Assistant Professor of Biology and Ecology	Batumi State University
Nino Lomtadze	Associate Professor of Biology	Batumi State University
Khvicha Beridze	Eco-Hub Student	Batumi State University
Giorgi Avazashvili	Eco Camp Participant	NA
Salome Sukhitashvili	Eco Camp Participant	NA
Eter Tskhvariashvili	Eco Camp Participant	NA

## **ANNEX C: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

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2. Cooperative Agreement RFA-114-17-00002, May 2017
3. Waste Management Technologies in Regions, Georgia Year 1 Annual Report Period: March 18–September 30, 2014, October 2014
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15. Calculation of GHG Emission Reduction Resulted by the Activities Conducted Within WMTR, May 2106
16. Seasonal Study of the Morphological Composition of Solid Municipal Waste in Adjara AR, May 2016
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22. Waste Management Technologies in Regions Phase II (WMTR II) Performance Monitoring Plan 2017-2020, October 2017
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28. Waste Management Technology in Regions, Phase II-WMTR II Quarterly Report Period: October 1–December 31, 2017, January 2018
29. Waste Management Technology in Regions, Gender Strategy: 2017

## **ANNEX D: KII DISCUSSION GUIDE**

## KII DISCUSSION GUIDE

<b>Interviewee</b>	
<b>Organization</b>	
<b>Position</b>	
<b>Email Address</b>	
<b>Telephone/Mobile</b>	
<b>Interviewer</b>	
<b>Date</b>	
<b>Location</b>	

### INTRODUCTION

- We are evaluating the Waste Management in Targeted Regions (WMTR) program, and we are interested in your experiences with and perceptions of the program.
- The information that you provide will be kept strictly confidential.
- If you don't understand something, please feel free to ask.
- Do we have your permission to proceed?

(NOTE: The following questions are asked consistent with the key informant and context of the interview. The interviewer may decide that some questions are not or less relevant for a particular key informant. At all times the interviewer is expected to ask probing follow-up questions to provide in-depth detail for each question asked.)

1. What do you know of the WMTR program? With which of its activities are you familiar?
2. How is your organization involved in the program? How are you personally involved in the program? (For example, what types of assistance have you or your organization received from the program, or in what types of activities have you or your organization participated with the program?)
3. What priority does your organization put on the WMTR program? In what ways are you supporting the program?
4. What results has the program had on the solid waste management industry in Georgia in the following areas? How do these results compare with the situation in the industry prior to the program?
  - Increasing overall awareness of environmental issues?
  - Promoting the adoption of integrated waste management systems?
  - Improving the performance and potential of Georgia's solid waste recycling industry?
  - Improving the funding of solid waste management systems through tariffs or fines?
  - Increasing the public's motivation and capacity to sort and recycle?
  - Improving your organization's capacity in solid waste management?
  - Improving the policy environment for solid waste management?
5. Which program activities have been more effective in obtaining these results? Which have been less effective? Why? (If the respondent does not mention it, probe to determine how effective the program's support to aggregating and recycling companies has been in achieving these results.)
6. How sustainable do you think these results will be? Why?

7. How would you describe the implementation of the WMTR program and your relationship with it? How satisfied are you with program implementation and your relationship with it?
8. What are the primary challenges or constraints that WMTR and similar initiatives face in trying to achieve these results?
9. How, in your opinion, does solid waste management interact with social issues, such as poverty and gender equality? To what extent do you think that the WMTR program has addressed these issues?
10. Overall, what are the strengths and weakness of the WMTR program?
11. What do you recommend to improve the program over its remaining life so that it can better achieve these results? (If the respondent does not mention it, probe to determine how the program can improve its support to aggregating and recycling companies to better achieve these results.)

(NOTE: The following questions are to be asked only of ICMA, CENN, and USAID.)

12. What was the rationale behind structuring the original WMTR award as a Transition Agreement? Do you agree with this rationale? Why or why not?
13. How well has the Transition Agreement worked in practice? What were its advantages and disadvantages?
14. More generally, what do you see as the advantages and disadvantages of having a local organization like CENN implement this type of program compared to an international organization like ICMA?
15. What alternatives exist besides structuring the award as a Transition Agreement? Which of these alternatives do you prefer? Why?

## **ANNEX E: FGD DISCUSSION GUIDE**

## FGD DISCUSSION GUIDE

<b>Type of Beneficiaries</b>	
<b>Number of Participants</b>	
<b>Male</b>	
<b>Female</b>	
<b>Date</b>	
<b>Location</b>	

### INTRODUCTION

- We are evaluating the Waste Management in Targeted Regions (WMTR) program, and we are interested in your experiences with and perceptions of the program.
- The information that you provide will be kept strictly confidential.
- If you don't understand something, please feel free to ask.
- Do we have your permission to proceed?

1. How did you find out about WMTR program?
2. In what ways have you participated in the WMTR program or received assistance from it? What were the objectives of these activities?
3. How effective were the activities in achieving these objectives?
4. Which aspects of the program activities were more effective in achieving these objectives? Which were less effective? Why?
5. How did you personally benefit from these activities? Why?
6. How sustainable do you think these results will be? Why?
7. More generally, how do you think the program activities are affecting the following? (Note: Beneficiaries may not be aware of all these areas. Gauge the respondents' familiarity with these issues and ask the question accordingly.)
  - Increasing awareness of environmental issues?
  - Promoting the adoption of improved waste management practices?
  - Increasing the public's motivation and capacity to sort and recycle?
  - Improving the funding of solid waste management systems through tariffs or fines?
  - Improving the policy or political environment for solid waste management?
8. What are the primary challenges or constraints that WMTR and similar initiatives face in trying to achieve these results?
9. How, in your opinion, does solid waste management interact with social issues, such as poverty and gender equality? To what extent do you think that the WMTR program has addressed these issues?
10. Overall, what are the strengths and weakness of the WMTR program activities?
11. What do you recommend to improve the WMTR activities?

## **ANNEX F: POINT OF SERVICE SURVEY INSTRUMENT**

### POS Survey Questionnaire for Solid Waste Recycling Site

Sex of respondent: ___ Male ___ Female How did you hear about this drop-off? Website _____ Drive-by/Sign _____ Word of Mouth _____ Other _____ Household Size: ___ Number of persons Approximate age of respondent Youth/Adult Where are you from: _____	<b>Drop Off Name</b>	
	<b>Date</b>	
	<b>Time</b>	
	<b>Enumerator</b>	
When was the last time you recycled at this drop-off? _____ How frequently do you come here to drop recycling off? 1 – once per day; 2 – twice a week; 3 – once a week; 4 – once in a month; 5 – other specify Do you know how often the material is picked up?? What do material do you leave here, typically? _____ and in what percentage? Paper _____ Glass _____ Metal _____ Plastic _____ Did you use this drop-off the last time you disposed? Y / N If No, which one? _____		
Is this material from: ___ Business ___ Your Household ___ Other, please describe _____ What % is from your household?		
Do you have other options to recycle? If yes, how: _____		
Is this a special trip to recycle, or are you combining it with another errand? If you weren't recycling, would you have taken this trip? (If no, treat it as special trip.) No (Combined) Yes (Special Trip) Special trip: If a special trip, how many kilometers did you drive to get here (list total distance round trip)? _____ Kilometers Combined: If a combined trip, how many TOTAL meters did you drive out of your way from the errand (list total distance out of your way)? _____ Kilometers		

## **ANNEX G: ILLUSTRATIVE PHOTOGRAPHS**



Photo 1. Location of former official dump site in Gurjaani. The area was fenced but a closer examination of the landfill cover indicates it was not appropriately installed. Note that WMTR was responsible only for providing the closure plan.



Photo 2. Residual waste left over from a dumpsite cleanup in Sighnaghi Municipality. While it would not be appropriate for the public to participate in cleanup when heavy equipment is being used or the large-scale removal of waste is occurring, they could be invited to help “finalize” cleanup to remove residual waste such as this pictured.



Photo 3. Photo 3 shows a pile of waste located at a cleaned-up dumpsite in the village of Vardisubani in Lagodekhi Municipality. The photo shows that local residents had re-commenced dumping waste at the site after its cleanup by USAID.



Photo 4. Photo 4 shows the sign that USAID had erected at the cleaned up dumpsite in the village of Vardisubani in Lagodekhi Municipality.