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Final Performance Evaluation - Taqadum

March 14, 2018 – Revised Draft 2

This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared independently by International Business & Technical Consultants Inc., under the Performance Management and Support Program, AID-267-TO-17-00001.

USAID/IRAQ FINAL PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT

Abstract: This is the Final Project Evaluation Report for the USAID/IRAQ Taqadum Governance Strengthening (GSP) project implemented by Chemonics from 2011 to 2017, a project that aimed to assist the Iraqi government in its decentralization process. This process was part of a broader effort to devolve administrative, fiscal, and legal powers to local and provincial entities in Iraq and to provide local service delivery to a broader section of society through a decentralized governance model in accordance with the law. Through enhanced efficiency in delivering provincial government-based services, the project assumed that this would lead to increased government responsiveness to community needs and citizen participation in decision-making, which ultimately would garner the state heightened legitimacy and stability. This evaluation sought to delineate the failures and successes of the project with a keen awareness of the complexities in post-conflict Iraqi society and the various stakeholders and beneficiaries, namely women, the elderly, ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups. Overall, the Taqadum effort has achieved success in supporting a partial devolution of power through training and support for development mapping and planning processes from ministries to directorates and for service delivery improvement planning and implementation at the provincial levels. Despite these successes, legal and fiscal decentralization are largely incomplete and citizen perception of both GOI and local service delivery remains low. The latter may be due to lack of inclusivity of citizen participation from a broad spectrum of society and public awareness of advances made in decentralization and service delivery.

SUBMITTED: 14 March 2018

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This evaluation was a substantial undertaking that would not have been possible without the input and support of many people:

- PMSP/IBTCI Iraq staff: Ali Mohammed, IT and Database Manager; Mohammed Talal, Evaluation Coordinator; the Iraqi Field Monitors: Sarbast Missouri, Sufian Najim, Ayman Atia Ahmed, Ahmed Muzahem Ahmed Al Jubory, Arkan Hasan Frayyeh Duraye, Rana Sadeq Ali, Mohammed Abid Al-Ameer, Hayman Awrahim and Ammar Ali Hassan, Field Monitor Coordinator; Sue Tatten, Chief of Party and Cyndi Scarlett, Interim Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist;
- USAID/Iraq staff whose frank descriptions of Taqadam's implementation issues provided cogent insights into what did and didn't work during the course of project implementation and particularly Bushra Hamad who offered guidance and support throughout the evaluation process;
- National, provincial and local-level stakeholders who took the time to meet with the evaluation team and whose insights helped to contextualize Taqadam's activities;
- The team at SREO Consulting, without whom critical data would not have been collected;
- IBTCI's Home Office staff: Jeff Swedberg, PMSP Program Director and Wes Thompson, Program Associate without whom critical sections of the report would not have been completed; and,
- Chemonics International for their assistance in answering questions and the use of the photograph on the cover page.

Lastly, the authors extend heartfelt appreciation to community stakeholders all of whom contend with a myriad of challenges and barriers at the grassroots level as they try to effect positive change in their lives, their families, and their communities.

ACRONYMS

AFAD	Administrative and Financial Affairs Directorate
COI	Conflict of Interest
COP	Chief of Party
COR	Council of Representatives
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DG	Director General
DMAP	Decentralization Mapping and Analysis Plan
DO	Development Objective
ESDO	Essential Service Delivery Oversight
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GO	Governor's Office
GOI	Government of Iraq
GSP	Governance Strengthening Project
GSP/Taqadum	Governance Strengthening Project/Taqadum
HCCP	High Commission for Coordination between Provinces
HCCPSEC	High Commission for Coordination between Provinces' Secretariat
IBTCI	International Business & Technical Consultants Inc.
ICIP	Intergovernmental Coordination Implementation Plans
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFM	Iraqi Field Monitor
IGPA	Iraq Governance and Performance Accountability
IP	Implementing Partner
IS	Islamic State
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
KII	Key Informant Interview
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
LOP	Life of Project
LRU	Local Revenue Unit
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MMPW	Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works
MMPWCH	Ministry of Municipalities, Public Works, Construction, and Housing
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOCHPM	Ministry of Construction, Housing, and Public Municipalities
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOLSA	Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
MOP	Ministry of Planning
MOYS	Ministry of Youth and Sports
PC	Provincial Council
PFM	Public Financial Management
PM	Prime Minister
PMSP	Program Monitoring Support Project
PPDC	Provincial Planning and Development Council
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SAS	Social Accountability System
SDIP	Service Delivery Improvement Plan
SDIPDC	Service Delivery Improvement Plan Development Committee
SDIPIC	Service Delivery Improvement Plan Implementation Committee

SOW	Statement of Work
STTA	Short-term Technical Assistance
TCMS	Trash Collection Management System
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
VTC	Vocational Training Center

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Article 45	As amended, this article of Law 21 set out specific requirements for service delivery ministries to transfer competencies to provincial directorates under the supervision of the Governor
DMAP	Decentralization Mapping and Analysis Plan, mapping out which competencies and functions were to be transferred to provincial directorates pursuant to Article 45 of Law 21, the Provincial Powers Act (2008)
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
Law 21	Provincial Powers Act (2008) or “Transfer of Functions” Law, calling for decentralization of the government and the transfer of suitable ministerial “functions” to the provincial governments.
SDIP	Service Delivery Improvement Plan, mapping out approaches to both short- and long-term improvement in local service delivery across basic services sectors (health, education, water, sewer, trash, roads)
Taqadum	Arabic for “moving forward”
Takamul	Arabic for “integration”

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Iraq Governance Strengthening Project (GSP)/Taqadum was a six-year, US\$106 million project of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The goal of the project was to assist Iraq in its transition from a centralized state to a federalized system of government pursuant to Law 21 (2008, known as the “Provincial Powers Law”, as amended in 2010 and 2013). This was part of a broader effort to spread good governance practices to local and provincial entities in Iraq and to provide ‘citizen-centered’ service delivery to a broader section of society. These assumptions followed an expansive development hypothesis, namely that efficiency in delivering provincial government-based services would lead to increased government responsiveness to community needs and citizen participation in decision-making, which ultimately would garner the state heightened legitimacy and stability. Since its 2011 launch through the implementing partner (IP) Chemonics International, and as defined in the statement of work (SOW), GSP/Taqadum sought to assist the Government of Iraq (GOI) in addressing the following challenges:

- Reforming the legal framework governing Iraq’s federal system by clarifying and expanding the responsibilities, authorities, and resources to be decentralized from the central government to the provincial and local governments;
- Enhancing the institutionalization of decentralized authorities within provincial and local governments and improving resource management; and
- Leveraging elected provincial officials’ constituent support and oversight powers to hold central line ministries accountable for the delivery of services not decentralized.

Programmatic Areas

This evaluation covers the period of implementation of the final two years of the GSP/Taqadum from 2015 to 2017. The evaluation was designed to address three primary programmatic areas:

- Decentralization of functions: Supporting decentralization through the development of ministerial Decentralization Mapping and Analysis Plans (DMAPs), among other efforts;
- Local governance and basic service delivery: Supporting service delivery improvement through the development of provincial Service Delivery Improvement Plans (SDIPs), among other efforts; and
- Damage assessment and public financial management training in the provinces recently liberated from ISIS occupation, Anbar, Salah al-Din and Ninewa.

Methodology

The evaluation questions were addressed using a mixed-method approach. Question 1 used Key Information Interviews (KIIs) with national and provincial government officials. Question 2 utilized a population-based survey of 2,400 respondents along with KIIs and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Question 3 utilized telephone KIIs in the three newly-liberated provinces targeted for reconstruction and stabilization. In addition, context was given to these data through a series of communiques entitled “government letters” by the implementer. These **government letters** catalogue communication between the national and provincial governments, as well as ministries and directorates. The government letters were also entered into an extensive database and analyzed for trends and themes within the decentralization process.

Limitations

The limitations to the evaluation methods that were mitigated included selection bias by the evaluation team; recall bias among respondents; generalization of findings and conclusions; and attribution issues in contribution analysis for the case studies. Challenges to the data collection include the following: team turnover, movement within Iraq; availability of key informants for interviews; and closure of Taqadum prior to the start of the evaluation.

Evaluation Questions and Summary of Findings

For the three areas of focus of the evaluation, **three questions** were developed to help identify reasons that impeded or promoted success. This evaluation led to several **findings** summarized here and set out in more detail in the body of this report.

1. What factors promoted or impeded the success of Decentralization Mapping and Analysis Plans (DMAPs) to support the transfer of ministerial functions from the central to the provincial level: what factors promoted or impeded the success of DMAPs to support the transfer of central ministerial functions to the provincial level? This is to be assessed at the level of the each of the eight line ministries supported by Taqadum.

On a macro scale, all seven ministries slated for decentralization pursuant to Article 45 of Law 21, as amended, participated in completing DMAPs for their relevant directorates across the 15 Iraqi provinces not in the Kurdish region. DMAPs involved function allocation and transfer analysis as well as the sequencing and timeline for the actual transfer of functions from the ministry to the provincial directorates. All DMAPs were adopted pursuant to ministerial orders. This process was coordinated at the central level by the High Commission for Coordination among Provinces (HCCP) under the ultimate supervision of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). After adoption, DMAP implementation was uneven across the ministerial and provincial directorates. Full DMAP implementation, particularly in terms of the transfer of decision-making and finances, was delayed in each of the targeted ministries. The factors that may have caused delays included the various conflicting laws, a "centralized mentality", fiscal, capacity and budgetary¹ constraints, and political rivalry at the ministerial and provincial levels.

Notwithstanding the challenges of achieving full post-adoption DMAP implementation, Taqadum was a highly productive project, which met or exceeded intended programmatic targets. Some key high-level outcomes were achieved. A nearly unanimous number of respondents stated that decentralization is a high or the highest priority for Iraq (56 percent – 80 percent of the respondents in each of the 15 provinces). A majority of respondents (100 percent of the respondents in each of the 15 provinces, except Diyala with 89 percent %, and Ninewa with 80 percent) also stated that the Taqadum decentralization assistance supported the priorities of the GOI.² Agreement with these assertions was less pronounced among transferring central ministries and receiving provincial directorates. A majority of the latter group did not believe that ordinary citizens understood what decentralization meant. Furthermore, a few ministries [Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA), and Ministry of Youth and Sports (MOYS)], expressed the view that decentralization would make corruption worse. Most informants across the entire sample reported not seeking citizen or civil society input in the design and development of DMAPs or throughout the implementation process, with either the general population, or with women, youth or minorities.

Factors promoting the success of decentralization efforts included clarity of meaning of the constitutional and legal frameworks providing a mandate for decentralization and reflection of the broad awareness of the necessity for fiscal decentralization (including Law 21, as amended). Limiting factors potentially inhibiting decentralization included a broad range of conflicting laws that facilitated resistance among decentralization opponents and the sowing of confusion among national and provincial levels of government. This was further exacerbated by the lack of an enduring social compact in Iraq and the resulting lack of political will to fully decentralize, particularly with regard to the Ministry of Finance. The failure of central ministries to fully transfer not only the requisite legal and financial functions, but also policy, planning and other decision-making competencies, points to a reluctance on the part of national GOI actors to relinquish power, money and control—an overarching theme borne out by the research findings. A thorough analysis and understanding of the impact of considerations related to who wields the power, the money, and the control of future decentralization efforts in Iraq will impact the outcome of achievement of this mandate as well as quality of service delivery to the people as reflected by their input.

2. Improved public service delivery: what factors promoted or impeded the success of provincial service delivery improvement plans (SDIPs)? This should be assessed at the level of each of the provinces in which SDIPs were supported by Taqadum.

¹ "Fiscal" as used herein refers to monetary and fiscal policy while "budget" refers to financial planning, forecasting and the processes surrounding the annual Government of Iraq (GOI) proposed revenue and spending for a financial year as then submitted to and approved by the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR).

² See Chart 8 and 8a on page 28

On examining whether implementation and satisfaction of provincial service delivery had improved, the findings show that there was a clear and well-structured institutional and accountability framework for planning and implementing of SDIPs, development of an oversight and accountability framework, and a service-based performance management system adopted in eight provinces. The Taqadum project can be lauded in terms of achievements of project outputs and exceeding targets.

The question of whether higher level results were achieved by the project in terms of improved citizen-centered service delivery is not generally borne out by the citizen survey, KII, and FGD findings. A significant majority, or 92% of the 2,400 citizens surveyed, did not know about SDIPs or achievements made in service improvement over the last year. In fact, most citizens surveyed across the six target provinces perceived that service improvement over the last year had not been achieved both in terms of the availability and quality of service delivery. Between one-third and nearly half (34-44%) of respondents perceived no improvement in public services over the last year, including provision and quality of potable water supply, sewer systems, road conditions and rehabilitation or construction of primary schools and primary health care centers. Between 63 and 67% of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that provincial directorates provided clear information or that services are indeed accessible. Similarly, citizen participation in the design and implementation of SDIPs was low and inclusivity of a diverse group of the citizenry was significantly inadequate.

Upon further analysis of a small minority or 8% of survey respondents who knew about SDIPs, the findings are more positive in terms of perception of service delivery. These respondents agreed that SDIP services provided in their provinces aligned with their priorities for basic service provision. However, while perceptions were slightly higher among those who knew about the SDIPs, only 43% of this group felt that their voices and opinions were somewhat considered in SDIP development, while CSOs stated that the voices of women were not reflected. Participation in the design and implementation of SDIPs in the provinces was higher among males, younger age groups, and Shia religious affiliations (followed by Sunni and a few Christians), Arabs, residents as opposed to IDPs, and respondents without disabilities.

A majority of respondents perceive corruption, bias and a lack of transparency in service delivery by the provincial governments. Lastly, targeted training for damage assessment and public financial management is useful for addressing stabilization and reconstruction but must be more broadly offered within government, including higher level officials with more detailed selection efforts to ensure that participants will carry out their responsibilities in a more capable manner once the training is completed.

The potential for DMAP and SDIP processes to promote democratization, enhance peace building, prevent recurrence of violent conflict, and counter violent extremism in Iraq is considerable if more effectively harnessed and utilized by government officials with inclusion of citizens. An overwhelming majority or 89% of all survey respondents as well the CSO key informants and members of the focus group discussion (FGDs) believe that improved service delivery and inclusive, participatory governance can help to prevent and resolve violent conflict and facilitate democratization in Iraq; can improve public services; enhance the enabling legal environment based on the clear language of Law 21, despite conflicting laws; and strengthen the involvement of youths and vulnerable groups in design and implementation processes for effective governance. The impeding factors for success are the low knowledge about DMAPs and SDIPs as well as uneven knowledge about decentralization, low participation of citizens, and low inclusivity of women and other vulnerable groups in the design and implementation of SDIPs across the provinces. Gender and inclusion must be integrated in all aspects of project design and implementation.

3. Restoration of governance and service delivery in recently liberated areas (Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din): How effective were training efforts designed to restore local governance and basic service delivery in the recently liberated provinces of Ninewa, Anbar and Salah al-Din?

Training for both Damage Assessment and Public Financial Management (PFM) was perceived as linked to greater service improvement in Ninewa and Anbar than in Salah al-Din. In Salah al-Din province, there was a perception that the number of participants in the damage assessment and PMF trainings was too low. This is also linked to the perception that receiving financial support is needed to provide training in both topics. Respondents in Ninewa were also less likely to believe that the most qualified and well-positioned participants had been chosen for training, which would then hinder improved post-disaster damage assessments and service delivery. Lastly,

decentralization progress in these three provinces was halted amidst the disintegration of security resulting from ISIS occupation and ongoing military operations. The lack of decentralization in these post-conflict provinces demoralized local officials, as the process seemed only theoretical as opposed to reflecting actual policy.

Evaluation Question Conclusions

Evaluation Question One

While gains have been made, likely due to Taqadum but also successive past projects focused on decentralized governance, fundamental issues remain for Iraqi state building and democratization. The social compact underlying the requirement that Iraq decentralize and devolve power to the provinces is fragile and reflects the lack of inclusion of key groups when key decisions informing the social compact were made during the 2005 constitutional process. The scope and magnitude of the power to be transferred is clearly well understood by GOI actors at both the national and provincial levels – once power is devolved, it is gone for good at the central level. This is a factor that both promotes and impedes DMAP success, and therefore, the success of decentralization overall in Iraq.

Evaluation Question Two

The programmatic and policy environment for SDIPs is conducive to achieve the aim of citizen-centered service delivery as envisioned by Taqadum. Geographic proximity of provincial governments to citizens is necessary but not sufficient for effective service delivery; rather, inclusion of all citizens groups, including women, and use of a wide spectrum of outreach methods increases the perception of citizens' needs being met and may achieve broader peace building, democratization, and citizen-centered efforts. Lack of citizen participation in SDIPs negatively impacts on democratic governance and freedom of choice of priority social service delivery needed by the citizens to foster peace and stability.

Evaluation Question Three

Training leads to perception of improved services; however, training requires additional financial and programmatic support to be effective. The lack of decentralization progress in the three post-conflict provinces (first in Anbar and Salah al-Din and subsequently in Ninewa) has been demoralizing to local officials who were enthusiastic to apply their newly acquired knowledge in damage assessment and public financial management to improve service delivery in the provinces.

Recommendations

Evaluation Question One

Until a broadly inclusive national reconciliation process is undertaken, as well as renegotiation of key aspects of the Iraqi social compact, instability and political violence, including violent extremism, are likely to persist. The financial framework for decentralization must be addressed for DMAPs to function properly. Efforts must be made to mitigate against corruption and bolster the Iraqi economy at large. But this cannot be done without addressing core, predicate issues first, such as the constitutional and legal dimensions of the social compact relating to decentralization. For instance, decentralization of finance should not detract from the importance of putting in place the necessary legal, financial, administrative and organizational capacity development frameworks, though finance remains a critical element to achieving genuine and successful decentralization. The Mission should continue to foster relationships and continue engaging directly with the GOI, utilizing both carrots and sticks discerned from a robust political economic analysis to achieve development and political gains.

Future governance assistance, particularly assistance to decentralized governance, should include approaches focused on citizen participation and inclusion. It is essential that such assistance include at its core a specific emphasis on gender and vulnerability. Consider previous projects in Iraq that successfully utilized citizen participation to review best practices for such engagement. Furthermore, enable and reinforce a policy environment that includes oversight and monitoring of project processes as well as gender sensitivities and a citizen-demand driven approach inclusive of all stakeholders. Gender and vulnerability approaches should be mainstreamed into all future programming and a full-time senior-level Gender/Vulnerability Specialist should form part of the team in all aspects of program design and implementation. CSOs should also be engaged to facilitate these opinions and voices in a meaningful way, especially as it relates to citizen-centered community services. In

addition to electronic and social media which should be effectively harnessed to disseminate information, special attention should be given to address those in rural areas who may utilize radio, television, and print media. Issues with respect to targeting a broad range of identity, sex, and age groups as well as vulnerability should be integrated into an outreach and media strategy.

Evaluation Question Two

The existing enabling environment for policy should include a strong and functional oversight and monitoring of SDIPs design and implementation to ensure inclusion of all citizen groups in these processes. Capacity building assistance to GOI at both the national and provincial levels should be balanced to include the legislative branch of government at both levels to enhance performance of its oversight role in recovery and development programs. Lessons learned from previously implemented citizen-centered projects in Iraq should be reviewed for adoption/adaptation in citizen-centered projects either under implementation or within the project formulation process. A well-designed communication plan should be developed and implemented in all community-centered projects to ensure focus on participation, inclusivity, and consideration of voice/opinions of all stakeholders in such interventions. Finally, gender and inclusion mainstreaming should be a mandated aspect of any future assistance with focus on women and girls. A Senior-Level Gender and Inclusion Specialist with extensive understanding of the Iraq context should be part of all stages of project development and implementation to ensure integration and accountability. This recommendation should also hold true for the Mission in tracking performance and monitoring progress.

Evaluation Question Three

Increase the length and depth of trainings for both damage assessment and PFM to make them more practical. Training should also be focused on recruiting more trainees and those at high levels with more relevance to damage assessment and financial management within provincial directorates, and with the authority to ensure institution change. In doing so, it would be important to ensure there is no bias in selection and that participants in trainings are selected based on their involvement in conducting damage assessments and public financial management, respectively. Issues related to gender, vulnerability, and inclusion should be integrated in the training content as well as reflected among the participants trained. Lastly, training efforts should be intensified in Ninewa given the low ratings expressed by key informants and late entry of Ninewa into the training process. Finally, training should be linked to a strategic program that has the funding to carry out necessary projects.

Executive Summary Conclusion

The GSP/Taqadum project endeavored to improve decentralized governance and local service delivery and strengthen the social contract between citizens and officials. Time has yet to tell whether this endeavor will fulfill the democratization mandate rooted in the constitution and Law 21. What is known, however, is that this project has witnessed change across the provinces unevenly and with some obstruction. The Mission should continue its support of decentralization by enabling a culture, not just a theory, of transformative change at the highest and lowest levels. This includes more inclusion of traditional minorities in Iraqi politics, as well as ethnic and religious minorities, women, youth and people with disabilities, and recently created marginalized groups such as IDPs. Such groups should be engaged via social media as well as more traditional outlets with the assistance of CSOs and other community groups. Engagement with media to promote public awareness is critical but cannot replace the government's obligation to inform its citizens about governance activities and progress towards commonly agreed upon aims established in an inclusive social contract for peace and sustainable development.

Entrenched power politics, corruption, and fiscal hoarding are systemic problems that could undo all the work that has been achieved in this endeavor, while uneven distribution of resources, public services, and training in the newly liberated provinces could be the thread that unravels Iraqi stability. The recent collapse of ISIS in these areas provides a window of opportunity for the Iraqi government to gain legitimacy and reassert sovereignty in these unstable provinces. Decentralization is a key to reunification and national healing as disenfranchised groups are once again brought under the fold of the federalized government. Providing basic services and building the capacity of local government will serve the broader Iraqi agenda of a unified and stable state - a mitigation against violent extremism.

2. INTRODUCTION

In 2011, The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Iraq launched the Governance Strengthening Project (GSP)/Taquadum (USAID Contract No. AID-267-C-11-00006) in Iraq.³ Implemented by Chemonics, Inc., this \$106,591,654.00 activity was designed to address USAID's Development Objective (DO) "Provincial and Local Government More Effectively Respond to Community Needs." To address this DO, Taquadum's focus was to strengthen the capacity of local government to respond to citizens' service needs by bolstering relationships and accountability between governors' provincial councils (PCs) and their constituents under Iraqi law helping them to identify areas to reform local government systems to respond better to citizen needs.^{4,5}

USAID/Iraq commissioned International Business & Technical Consultants Inc. (IBTCI) to conduct a final performance evaluation of Taquadum through its Program and Monitoring Support Program (PMSP), which provides monitoring and evaluation services to the USAID Mission in Iraq.⁶ Although Taquadum was implemented over a six-year period (September 2011–September 2017), the statement of work (SOW) called for IBTCI to evaluate only the last two years of implementation, 2016–2017 (see Annex A for SOW). The initial evaluation team comprised Claire Pullon, Team Leader; April Powell-Willingham, Governance and Public Administration Expert; and Ashraf Bakr Al-Shareef, Methodologist, who resigned in January 2018. He was replaced by Dr. Ganiyu Ipaye (see Annex B for team CVs). The team commenced the evaluation by reviewing background materials (see Annex C, Bibliography) and drafting the evaluation design (see Annex D) in September 2017. Prior to deploying to Iraq, Ms. Pullon resigned on November 6, 2017, and Ms. Powell-Willingham stepped in as Team Leader while also acting in her capacity as the Governance and Public Administration Expert. The team deployed to Iraq in November 2017, where they were joined by Adil Al-Lami, the Public Administration and Good Governance Specialist. The evaluation team also consisted of data collectors that included the PMSP Iraqi Field Monitors (IFMs) as well as the consulting firm SREO (see Annex E for COI forms). Support was also provided by IBTCI's home office Project Director, Jeff Swedberg.

The purpose of the evaluation is to identify factors that promoted successful implementation of several specific Taquadum interventions in its final two years. This will inform a follow-on activity, known as the Iraq Governance and Performance Accountability (IGPA)/Takamul, which focuses on improving GOI service delivery and public financial management and strengthen citizen monitoring and oversight of public expenditure.⁷

As outlined in the SOW, this evaluation has three objectives:

- (1) To review, analyze, and evaluate the performance of Taquadum⁸ against assumptions and results, throughout its implementation, as designed by the U.S. Government (USG) and implemented by Chemonics International Inc.
- (2) To identify and characterize factors (anticipated and unanticipated) that promoted or impeded the success of Taquadum's activities, including attention to both intended and unintended outcomes
- (3) To provide lessons learned and, if appropriate, specific programmatic recommendations for future USAID democracy and governance assistance in Iraq and to contribute to USAID's institutional learning on decentralization programming

The primary audiences for this evaluation are USAID/Iraq and USAID/Washington's Middle East Bureau. Secondary audiences may include other USAID Missions in the Middle East and North Africa region involved in post- and peri-conflict administrative decentralization efforts. GOI counterparts and stakeholders may also find the

³ Taquadum is an Arabic word meaning "moving forward."

⁴ Taquadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 5.

⁵ SOW, page 2.

⁶ The evaluation was conducted from October 10, 2017 to February 14, 2018

⁷ IGPA, known locally as "Taqaumul" or "Integration" began operations in the first quarter of FY 2018.

⁸ GSP/Taquadum and Taquadum will be used interchangeably through the report.

evaluation useful for gaining a better understanding of the wider decentralization effort and may reinforce the lessons learned by Taqadum. Finally, other bilateral donors working on decentralization activities may find this evaluation report helpful as they work to support decentralization in Iraq.

3. BACKGROUND

Taqadum or GSP is the culmination of projects supported by USAID since 2003⁹ to strengthen community engagement and citizen participation, and to empower/strengthen local and provincial government to be more responsive to communities' needs.¹⁰ Since its inception in September 2011, Taqadum has engaged with provincial leaders to increase accountability and transparency in local governance and improve provincial-level service delivery.¹¹ In its six years of implementation, the project was modified 13 times due to many of these modifications significantly altering the scale and scope of the project. As a result of these modifications, the project was essentially implemented in three stages; however, the key focus throughout was to build the capacity of local governments to improve the basic services they provide to their citizens.¹²

In August 2013, Law 21, also known as the Provincial Powers Act of 2008, was amended to mandate that governance be decentralized by delineating certain powers to provincial levels of government, enabling them to enact provincial legislation, regulations, and procedures; selecting the provincial governor; and transferring appropriate technical, legal and administration powers or ministerial functions of eight ministries to provincial governments of provinces not incorporated into a region.¹³ Taqadum's first extension in May 2014 ushered in Phase II of the project, and shifted the focus to providing support to the GOI in its efforts to decentralize three ministries: Education, Health and Municipalities, and Public Works.¹⁴ Concentrating its efforts in five targeted provinces initially, (Babil, Baghdad, Qadisiya, Najaf and Wasit) the project supported the GOI in its implementation of Law 21.¹⁵ (See Annex F for map of Iraq showing provinces in which Taqadum implemented activities in the three phases.) In particular, Taqadum focused on providing support in the implementation of Articles 44 and 45 of Law 21, providing training to individuals within the 15 governorates, and developing work plans to transfer functions from the federal government to the provincial level.¹⁶

During the second phase (October 2014–June 2016), Taqadum provided customized training and technical assistance to 4,127 males and 1,169 females from 15 targeted governorates, including officials in the directorates of the three targeted ministries on their roles and responsibilities under Law 21 and its Second Amendment. Additionally, it reached an agreement between central and provincial governments for a phased approach to determine which functions would be transferred immediately, after six months, and longer periods pending on capacity needs and other legal restrictions.¹⁷

Phase III of the project started in 2016 and continued until Taqadum ended in September 2017. The development hypothesis for this phase added a third point to the two that had been in use since the project's inception. The hypotheses made the following assertions:

- *If a government body is closest to its citizens, then it is more likely to understand and react to its needs, and if decentralization is accomplished, then Iraq's governorates will be more effective in responding to community needs.*

⁹ Tarabot, 2012–2015; Tatweer, 2006–2011; Community Action Program (2003–2012), Local Governance Program 1, 2, and 3 (2009–2011).

¹⁰ GSP Provincial Report, May 2013.

¹¹ Taqadum Quarterly Report, April–June 2016, page 7.

¹² Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 6.

¹³ Ibid page 10.

¹⁴ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 7.

¹⁵ Taqadum Performance Management Plan, June 2014, page 3.

¹⁶ Taqadum Performance Management Plan, June 2014, page 2.

¹⁷ Taqadum Performance Management Plan, October 2016, page 5.

- If (a) centrally controlled service providers (directorates) are transitioned to local government ownership and (b) local service delivery improvements are implemented, *then* a more citizen-focused public service delivery system will emerge to take the place of the (current) bureaucratic service provision model. The projected outcome of this change is the better delivery of public services for Iraqis.
- If functions of services devolved from the ministry to local government, the governor's office will be responsible for any shortage of services directly in front of the community, and the central government will not be a hanger of excuses anymore.¹⁸

Phase III expanded Taqadam's work plan by increasing the number of supported ministries from three to seven, adding the Ministries of Agriculture, Youth, and Sport; Construction and Housing; and Labor and Social Affairs. Responding to this increase in work, the project deepened its interventions in sectors where it had worked previously and widened its scope to accommodate a greater number of sectors and services within the four newly added ministries. This included the following activities:

- Initiating work with the 15 provinces (including Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din) to develop and implement Decentralization Mapping and Analysis Plans (DMAPs)
- Working with the 12 provinces (excluding Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din) to develop and implement short-term, high-impact Service Delivery Implementation Plans (SDIPs) in transferred (ministerial to provincial) directorates

In Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din, SDIP implementation focused on post-disaster capacity building for service delivery.¹⁹ Per the SOW, this third phase is being evaluated.

4. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The three overarching evaluation questions consider two primary programmatic areas addressed by Taqadam in the past two years of implementation: (1) Decentralization of functions: Supporting decentralization through the development of ministerial DMAPs, and, (2) local governance and basic service delivery: Supporting service delivery improvement through the development of SDIPs.

For each of these areas, the evaluation questions are designed to result in the identification of factors that promoted or impeded success. Sub-questions are designed to elicit the following information for each province/ministry:

- descriptions of activity implementation in those areas
- descriptions of the achievement of key high-level results
- characterizations of inclusivity and representation of civil society in design and implementation

The information gleaned from the analysis of data collected to answer the broad questions above informed two case studies, which identified successful and instructive examples that contributed most to achieving or impeding success (primarily those that can be replicated or mitigated by USAID or other donors or partners in similar kinds of programming).

The third evaluation question addresses the resumption of governance and basic service delivery in recently liberated provinces (Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din). The focus is on the trainings that took place in damage assessment of essential public infrastructure and public financial management (PFM). The evaluation team assessed who was targeted for training, whether any of the skills targeted by the training are still evident (either in the individuals who received training, or because those individuals instituted good practices), and what factors contributed to higher capacity for damage assessments or PFM in targeted communities. (Annex D, Evaluation Design provides a matrix of the evaluation questions.)

¹⁸ Taqadam Performance Management Plan, October 2016, page 19.

¹⁹ Taqadam Quarterly Performance Report, September 2017, page 6.

5. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The PMSP evaluation team employed a mixed-method process for collecting and analyzing data to reach defensible conclusions about the GSP/Taqadum program. Data were collected over a six-week period from December 25, 2017 to February 7, 2018. The innovative and creative mixed-method evaluation design meets the standards of rigor established by the USAID evaluation policy and can be used to answer the questions posed in this evaluation. The mixed-method evaluation involves collecting both quantitative data using closed-ended questions and qualitative data using open-ended questions. The combination of data collection methods in the evaluation involved a population-based survey to collect quantitative data, key informant interviews (KIIs) that contain a mix of closed-ended and open-ended questions for both quantitative and qualitative data (see Annex G for list of key informants), focus group discussions (FGDs) containing open-ended questions for qualitative data, and case studies (a qualitative method of data collection). The case study approach was also included in the design to provide in-depth analysis to identify which factors promoted/imposed success of the program. The mixed-method evaluation involved triangulating or integrating both quantitative and qualitative data to leverage the strength of each data collection method to generate greater insight into the evaluation questions than would be obtained by using a single data collection method.

The evaluation design ensured that all aspects of the three evaluation questions and their respective sub-questions were adequately addressed in the data collection tools, thereby ensuring relationships between the data collected and the evaluation questions. In addition, the design ensured that sex considerations were taken into account across all evaluation questions and sub-questions, and invariably in all the data collection tools. Further, other characteristics of the respondents regarding age, religion, ethnicity, vulnerable groups, marital status, and other characteristics were considered in constructing the population-based survey tool for collecting quantitative data. This is to ensure representativeness or inclusiveness of the sample drawn for the evaluation and to enhance validity of findings from the data analysis.

Data collected in the evaluation were analyzed using document analysis, descriptive statistics, and contribution analysis with due consideration for the issues of triangulation of findings, sex consideration, and inclusivity in the data analysis. Various sampling methods such as purposive sampling, cluster sampling, and stratified random sampling were used to ensure representativeness of selected respondents for addressing relevant evaluation questions. Adequate sample sizes were used to enhance accuracy of findings from the evaluation. Finally, high response rates ranging between 87% to 100% were achieved in sampling across the spectrum of respondents targeted for the evaluation. (Please see Annex H for full methodology and discussion on limitations and challenges.)

All persons interviewed gave their informed consent, regardless of the interview technique. The evaluation team devised an informed consent statement in Arabic that was read to the informant prior to the start of an interview. Both respondent and interviewer were required to indicate that the informed consent statement was read to the respondent and that s/he provided consent before the interviewer initiated any data gathering. As part of the informed consent process, target respondents were oriented on why data were being gathered, confidentiality, the minimal risks and inconveniences associated with participation, and the voluntary nature of their participation in the interview or discussion.

6. LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES

The limitations to the evaluation methods that were mitigated against were selection bias by the evaluation team, recall bias among respondents, generalization of findings and conclusions, and attribution issues in contribution analysis for the case studies. Challenges to the data collection include team turnover, movement within Iraq, availability of key informants for interviews, and the closure of Taqadum prior to the start of the evaluation.

Limitations

Selection bias by the evaluation team: Bias was introduced in the sampling method for the population-based survey to ensure gender consideration in the selection of respondents through including adequate number of women in the survey. The negative effects of the bias were mitigated by selection of a large sample size (2,400 respondents), based on empirical determination of the sample size from the population, in order ensuring accuracy

of findings to enhance generalization from sample to population in the evaluation.

Recall bias among respondents: Cognizance was taken of the inherent systematic error that would be caused by inaccurate and incomplete recollection of issues regarding DMAP and SDIPs as well as the damage assessment training among all the respondents interviewed, using different data collection tools. The effect was mitigated by limiting question to issues relevant to the respondents on EQ1 and EQ3, while requesting for recall of situation regarding SDIP in the last one year, and one issues of relevance to the individual respondents among respondents for the population survey. This led to issues of missing cases in some aspects of the analysis of data. However, this did not impact negatively on the data analysis as there were sufficiently large sizes of valid cases for data analysis, whenever the issue of missing case arose.

Generalization of findings and conclusions: The use of descriptive statistical analysis for the population-based survey and some aspects of the KIIs, and qualitative analysis for the remaining aspects of KIIs and FDGs did allow for inferential determination of the statistical significance of relationships or differences among variables involved in all the three evaluation questions. This puts a limitation of generalization of findings and conclusions from the sample to the various target populations (government officials at GOI and provincial levels, citizens, CSOs, and trainees in the damage assessment training). The limitation was mitigated by enhancing the external validity that is concerned with generalization of the findings and conclusions in the evaluation from sample of respondents to population. The action was undertaken by use of appropriate sampling methods to ensure representativeness of sample; selection of large sample size and ensuring large response rates among the different categories of respondents for ensuring accuracy of findings; and selecting respondents that have close similarity to the contexts of the various populations targeted in the evaluation.

Attribution issues in contribution analysis for the case studies: Attribution of an intervention to observed results is an inherent consideration that could limit the use of contribution analysis for case studies. Hence, understanding the operating context of GSP/Taqadum was crucial in interpreting any observable effects. In particular, the fact that the evaluation period is specified as the last two years (2015–2017) of an extensive, multi-year effort that itself built on the efforts of previous and contemporary initiatives, both USAID-funded and otherwise, means that isolating the effect of the last two years alone may prove tricky. Therefore, a dependence upon the literature pertinent to other and previous initiatives will be essential in establishing reliable—or at least defensible—baselines. The limitation was mitigated by considering “plausible association” in interpreting findings from analysis and drawing conclusions between the GSP/Taqadum activities and observed results in the last two years of the program and observed result based on the theory of change set for the program

Challenges

Team Turnover: At the outset of the Evaluation, the former Team Leader, Claire Pullon, resigned suddenly due to serious illness. The Governance and Public Administration Expert, April Powell-Willingham, then took on the Team Leader role, as well as the technical role. Ashraf Bakr Al Shareef, the Evaluation Methodologist, was unable to join Ms. Powell-Willingham in the field in early November. Although the two worked together remotely until November 29, this was rather cumbersome in terms of launching data collection. Finally, Dr. Al Shareef resigned on January 12, 2018, prior to returning to the field, due to a death in the family. The IBTCI team mitigated these challenges by assigning other IBTCI personnel to assist, both in person and by remote. Jeffrey Swedberg joined the evaluation team to provide additional technical expertise from the home office and Cyndi Scarlett, the interim SMES, provided oversight and support during the report-writing stage. Sue Tatten, the new COP also provided support to the gender analysis aspect of the findings. The hiring process for a new Evaluation Methodologist, Ganiyu Ipaye, was expedited and he worked remotely from January 24 until he deployed to Baghdad on February 5, the day before the Exit briefing with USAID. Although he was not involved in the methodology design and data collection aspect of the evaluation, he had to step in and review the data and provide analysis during the final stages of the process which was a substantial limitation as well as having no access to English translations of the SDIPs as they were only available in Arabic.

Movement within Iraq: Security concerns curtailed the expatriate team’s ability to travel outside of Baghdad and even to some locations within Baghdad. As a result, the Iraqi Field Monitors (IFMs) facilitated many of the KIIs for Evaluation Question 1, in conjunction with IBTCI’s subcontractor SREO, which facilitated collection of survey

data, KIIs and FGDs on Evaluation Questions 1, 2, and 3. Despite these limitations, the evaluation team worked effectively throughout the training and early stages of field work, and multiple debriefing, feedback and problem-solving sessions. The team relied on local national team members with intimate knowledge of the area from which data was collected and who also experienced few impediments. The local national team members experienced fewer impediments to movement. However, individual ethno-sectarian identities were a factor restricting the ability of certain team members to operate in certain Provinces.

Availability of key informants for interviews: Despite repeated requests and follow-up, the evaluation team was unable to meet with several key informants. Reasons ranged from scheduling and communication problems, particularly over the Christmas and New Year holiday period when many key informants were away or otherwise unavailable, to outright refusals to participate. The evaluation team pursued alternative key informants, such as deputies, or other senior managers, when a Minister, DG, or other principal key informant was unavailable or unwilling to participate in the evaluation.

Closure of Taqadum prior to the start of the evaluation: The closeout of Taqadum and the release of staff prior to the evaluation commenced limited the evaluation team's ability to collect project data. This especially affected the teams' ability to schedule interviews. To mitigate this limitation, the evaluation team conducted a Skype call with the former Taqadum Chief of Party and attempted to liaise with former Taqadum Provincial Coordinators. This was not ideal, as neither the Chief of Party nor other Taqadum staff were accessible on an ongoing basis.

Gender imbalances and lack of availability of female enumerators: Due in part to the nature of the work involved in survey data collection, recruitment of female enumerators was difficult. Among the Iraqi IFMs, only one is a woman. Similarly, among the SREO enumerators, only three women were recruited. This posed a challenge in terms of ensuring that the numbers of male and female survey respondents were roughly equal. However, to mitigate this problem, the evaluation team devised strategies to ensure that the lack of female enumerators did not compromise the ability to achieve equal numbers of female respondents. Strategies included male enumerators seeking the imprimatur of *Mokhtars*, male religious leaders in the community, to escort male enumerators and to announce to communities that it would be permissible for unaccompanied women in their homes to participate in the survey conducted by an unrelated male. Other strategies included seeking out women and girl respondents in community centers or civil society organizations.

7. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. QUESTION 1: What factors promoted or impeded the success of Decentralization Mapping and Analysis Plans (DMAPs) to support the transfer of ministerial functions from the central to the provincial level? This is to be assessed at the level of the each of the eight line ministries supported by Taqadum.

This section discusses findings regarding the degree to which DMAPs were successful in supporting the transfer of central ministerial functions to the provincial level. It looks at how plans were implemented, whether high-level results were observed, whether DMAP development and implementation was inclusive, and what factors promoted or impeded success.

Background on DMAPs in Phase 2 of Taqadum (post-2014): The DMAPs were the tools developed by the Taqadum project that formed part of an overall "road map mechanism" for decentralization. DMAPs sought to define, analyze, categorize, and assign ministerial functions to the appropriate level of government based on comprehensive criteria and elements.²⁰ Other parts of this road map to decentralization included legal, financial, organizational development, and service delivery improvement planning tools and mechanisms.²¹

²⁰ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 11.

²¹ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 17.

It is important to understand the broader context of the project's evolution over time. The DMAP process was one step out of a package of interrelated project activities designed to prepare and adopt plans to implement Article 45 of Law 21 (also known as the Provincial Powers Act 2008, or Transfer of Functions Law), as amended by Article 12 of Law 19 of 2013, the second amendment to Law 21 since its initial passage in 2008.

The amendment of Article 45 of Law 21 in August 2013 created the High Commission for Coordination among the Provinces (HCCP), chaired by the Prime Minister (PM) and affected ministers, governors, and provincial council chairs, among others. Article 45 also mandated that within two years from the date of entering into force, governance in Iraq be decentralized by “gradually”²² transfer[ing] to the provinces “sub-directorates, departments, tasks, services and competencies” executed by nine national ministries – Ministry of Education (MOE), Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (MMPW), Ministry of Construction and Housing (MOCH), Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA), Ministry of Youth and Sports (MOYS), Ministry of Planning (MOP), and Ministry of Finance (MOF). Under the law, these ministries retained only their respective powers and duties related to planning and general policy formulation.

Significantly, the amendment to Article 45 of Law 21 states that “[t]he Commission shall accomplish its functions ... within two years starting from the date of which this law comes to force. In the event these tasks are not accomplished, they shall be considered transferred by law.”

Enactment of this amendment to Law 21 marked a turning point in Taqadum's direction, although GSP would ultimately focus only on the decentralization of the first seven ministries and not Planning and Finance. In May 2014, USAID modified Taqadum's contract to support the “Law 21 Road Map” that Taqadum developed, which was adopted at all provincial levels of government. Taqadum's mandate from May 2014 forward was therefore to “help set the stage for administrative decentralization in Iraq” in provinces not organized into a region, essentially all 15 non-Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) provinces.²³

²² ARTICLE 45:

First: A commission shall be established named High Commission for Coordinating among the Provinces, chaired by Prime Minister and membership of Ministers of Municipalities and Public Labor, Reconstruction and Housing, Labor and Social Affairs, Education, Health, Planning, Agriculture, Finance and Sports, and Youth, State Minister for Provincial Affairs, Governors, and chairmen of provincial Councils, and undertake the following actions:

1. Gradually transfer sub-directorates, departments, tasks, services, and competencies executed by Ministries of Municipalities and Labors, Reconstruction and Housing, Labor and Social Affairs, Education, Health, Planning, Agriculture, Finance and Sports, and Youth, along with their funds allocated by the General Budget and their staff to the provinces in accordance with their functions set forth in the Constitution and relevant laws, whereby the role of ministries shall remain in planning general policy.
2. Coordinate among the provinces on everything related to their affairs and local administration and tackle problems and obstacles faced.
3. Set mechanisms to manage joint competencies-jurisdictions between federal and local governments stated in Articles 112, 113, and 114 of the Constitution.
4. Review the authorization of federal authorities that are requested by local government from the federal government and vice versa, which are required to manage investment projects and facilitate administering the province according to the provisions of Article 123 of the Constitution.
5. The Commission shall accomplish its functions mentioned in Paragraph 1 above within two years starting from the date of which this law comes to force. In the event these tasks are not accomplished, they shall be considered transferred by law.
6. The Commission shall convene at least once every two months or whenever necessary. *
7. The Commission shall develop a bylaw organizing its meetings and following up its businesses.

Second: A coordinating committee shall be established in every province. It shall be chaired by the Governor and membership of heads of administrative units under jurisdiction of province and chairmen of district and sub-district Councils and shall undertake the following:

1. Addressing mutual issues among administrative units.
2. Mandating powers to heads of administrative units.

See Governance Strengthening Project (GSP/Taqadum) Contract No. AID-267-C-11-00006, Law of Provinces Not Incorporated into a Region No. 21 of 2008, as amended, p. 49–50.

²³ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 11.

The core elements of the road map mechanism to facilitate the transfer of functions and develop organizational structures in the 15 targeted provinces were as follows:

- DMAPs
- Legal
- Financial
- Organizational Development
- Service Delivery Improvement Planning (SDIP)

By the time the project ended in September 2017, the DMAP and Transition Road Map Development activity had reached its intended target of sharing final DMAPs for seven of the initially targeted Ministries (Municipalities and Public Works, Education, Health, Labor and Social Affairs, Agriculture, Youth and Sports, and Construction and Housing).²⁴

The Ministry of Finance participated to the extent required to establish Administrative and Financial Affairs Directorates (AFADs) within the Governor's office (GO) in each province.²⁵ The MOF was among the eight ministries designated for decentralization in Article 45, Law 21. However, it was not included in the project's Year 6 extension. This was because it was considered "a hard nut to crack."²⁶ The project did work with MOF, to a limited degree, to develop financial systems and processes to facilitate decentralized governance.²⁷

By the end of the project, Taqadum reported that all 15 provinces had adopted DMAPs for their seven targeted ministries²⁸ and relevant directorates, not including the MOF²⁹ as set out below in Table I. The first group of DMAP ministries and directorates (2015–2017) included the three ministries and eight directorates as shown below. In DMAP Phase 2 (2016–2017), this included four additional ministries and 11 directorates:

Table I: First Group of DMAP Ministries

First Group of DMAP Ministries	
Ministry of Education	Directorate of Education
Ministry of Health	Directorate of Health
Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works	Directorate of Urban Planning Directorate of Planning and Follow-Up Directorate of Sewer Directorate of Municipalities Directorate of Municipality Directorate of Water
Second Group of DMAP Ministries	
Ministry of Construction and Housing	Directorate of Roads and Bridges Directorate of Housing Directorate of Buildings
Ministry of Agriculture	Directorate of Agriculture
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs	Directorate of Vocational Training Directorate of People with Special Needs Directorate of Occupational Health and Safety Directorate of Labor and Social Affairs Directorate of Employment and Loans Common Functions
Ministry of Youth and Sports	Directorate of Youth and Sports

²⁴ Taqadum Weekly Report, August 30–September 7, 2017, page 28.

²⁵ AFAD KIs.

²⁶ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017 page 8.

²⁷ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 3.

²⁸ In August 2015, the PM merged the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works with the Ministry of Construction and Housing, bringing the new total number of Ministries to six. The number of affected Directorates remained the same at 19, as per the above.

²⁹ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 17.

By the end of the project, the DMAP process resulted in analysis and mapping of 816 functions for the 18 directorates of the seven ministries.³⁰ Of the 816 functions, 610 were identified as local government functions and were further mapped for transfer based on criteria designed to assess the capacity of provincial governments to perform the devolved functions. Of these 610 identified local government functions, 584 were identified through the DMAP process as immediately transferable. The seven ministries issued orders to transfer 402 functions, or 69 percent of the 584 functions the DMAP process identified as immediately transferable.

Methodology for Question I: To answer Question I sub-questions, the evaluation team interviewed 173 key informants across these levels and branches of the GOI. Of these, 164 key informants responded to close-ended questions. The majority of the 164 respondents were male (88 percent, with the remaining 12 percent female) as shown in the figure below.




Chart 1: Grouped by Sex

7.1.1. 1a. DMAP Implementation: How were plans implemented? To what extent were DMAPs implemented according to plan? For each line ministry, identify which elements of the plans were and were not implemented, as well as any major deviations from the plans or adaptations to the plans made over time and what challenges or circumstances prompted the changes.

This section answers the evaluation sub-question by examining whether DMAPs were utilized effectively in implementing core, requisite elements of decentralization. This included the transfer to lower levels of government of “competencies,” which are powers, duties, and permissions (not merely functions), as well as human and financial assets, and liabilities.

The goal of the DMAP process was to ensure that the ministries identified in Article 45, Law 21, as amended, transferred their functions, staff, and assets to the provinces. The DMAP process also sought to enhance the capacities of the transferred directorates to best assume these functions. Taqadum reports indicate that to implement decentralization in Iraq, the DMAP tool was devised to guide the process of analyzing the functions of ministry directorates subject to the requirements of Law 21 of 2008, as amended; and to help determine which

³⁰ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 18.

directorates, functions, and equipment should be transferred to the provinces and which would remain at the ministerial level.³¹

Across 15 provinces, all seven of the line ministries slated for decentralization of functions completed and adopted their own DMAP function allocation and transfer analysis: Taqadum developed the DMAP tool³² to ensure that provincial leaders understood the structures, functions, responsibilities, resources, and day-to-day workings of each national ministerial directorate about to be transferred to them. The DMAP process involved identifying, defining, analyzing, categorizing, and assigning ministerial “functions” to the level of government required by a particular interpretation of Law 21’s provisions. The DMAP process developed by Taqadum set out comprehensive criteria and elements designed to guide this functional allocation process.

The DMAP tool itself reviewed and assessed the following:

- Each ministry’s laws, regulations, and organizational structure
- Each directorate and its vertical and horizontal links with its ministry and department
- Organizational structures and functions of each directorate and the Governor’s office
- Core services and delivery status
- All functions of the targeted ministries, including criteria, current resources, and skill sets in each relevant office
- Staff capacity needs
- Properties to be transferred³³

The DMAP identified critical elements of decentralization to guide the transfer process and set out the functions within each ministerial directorate, including staffing numbers and equipment used. The DMAP then determined which functions should be transferred to the provinces in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws and which should remain with the national ministries.³⁴ The DMAP identified which functions remained shared, pursuant to the Constitution and other applicable laws. The DMAP also set time frames for the transfer of each function determined to be a provincial one, as follows: immediately, after six-months, one-year, or whether ministerial orders did not specify a time frame for transfer.

In the first wave of the DMAP process, Taqadum held workshops with representatives from MOE, MOH, and MMPW, specialists from the provincial directorates, representatives from Governor’s Offices (GOs) and the Provincial Councils (PCs) from the first wave of DMAP provinces— Babil, Baghdad, Qadisiya, Diyala, Kirkuk, Najaf and Wasit. These workshops resulted in the completion of analysis and DMAP approval.³⁵ The project replicated this work with a second wave of workshops held with representatives from Anbar, Basrah, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din. These groups undertook the same analytical process and approved their respective DMAPs.

Once complete, the results of the DMAP analysis by each of the 15 provinces were unified and reviewed by Taqadum specialists. The results of this review were then presented to the three first wave ministries, MOE, MOH, and MMPW, as well as representatives of the provinces, the HCCP, and relevant committees of the Council of Representatives (COR).³⁶ These actors then determined the transfer and transition periods and the detailed road map for the transition of these three ministries to the provinces. The road maps included the steps necessary to effect transfer, such as conducting inventories, and transferring staff, assets and liabilities, funds, and records from the ministries to the provinces.³⁷

³¹ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 30.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 31.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

In July 2016, Taqadum replicated this DMAP process with the second wave of four ministries slated for devolution: MOA, MOCH, MOLSA, and MOYS. This phase was slightly less intensive because these ministries simply had to achieve consensus on the road map already developed by the first three ministries. Once DMAPs were adopted in each of the 15 provinces for their seven targeted ministries, excluding the Ministry of Finance and relevant directorates, each province sent an official request to the HCCP seeking authorization for the ministries to complete the transfer of functions as agreed. In sum, DMAP work intensified after the second amendment to Law 21 in August 2013, which sets out the legal requirements for administrative decentralization through the transfer of powers to the provinces. The actual DMAP process and adoption itself was only half the battle.

Once the DMAP analysis and adoption process was complete, the post-adoption implementation process proved much more difficult and challenging. After completion and adoption, DMAPs were partially implemented and adapted to circumstances and challenges over time for particular ministries. DMAP implementation involved the following series of steps designed to prepare and execute plans to implement Article 45 of Law 21 (the Provincial Powers Act 2008), as amended:

1. Form and train provincial task forces and sectoral committees (at PCs)
2. Identify the “as is” status of functions, roles, responsibilities, structures, laws, regulations, and instructions within local directorates as well as their intergovernmental relationships at the national and provincial levels
3. Engage in the DMAP process itself, as described above
4. Develop legal, administrative, and financial frameworks for the transfer of functions
5. Negotiate and agree on the functions mapped and determine which were to be kept by ministries and which were to be allocated to national ministries and provincial directorates under the supervision of governors
6. Build capacity among provincial directorates and governors’ offices to receive and perform functions³⁸

The mechanisms to implement these steps as part of the effort to implement DMAP transfers are described briefly in more detail below:

- Intergovernmental Coordination Implementation Plans (ICIPs): The mechanism for the actual transfer of functions set out in adopted DMAPs was the formation of ICIPs. The ICIPs served as a tool to facilitate consensus building around the identification of tasks, services, and competencies to be gradually transferred from the federal to the provincial level, pursuant to Article 45 of Law 21, as amended. The project’s legal, administrative and financial frameworks in turn supported the ICIP mechanism,³⁹ which involved DMAP—decentralization—and implementation training to provincial officials.⁴⁰
- Establishment of Provincial Planning and Development Councils (PPDCs): An element of DMAP implementation was the establishment of local provincial administration structures in each province. The PPDCs were created to manage decentralization transfers. The project exceeded the target of 12 and established 15, one in each province.⁴¹
- Administrative and Financial Affairs Directorates AFADs: To establish and develop financial frameworks to manage devolved fiscal functions and facilitate DMAP implementation, Administrative and Financial Affairs Directorates (AFADs) were established in 15 GOs and 11 Local Revenue Units (LRUs) in 15 GOs by the project’s end.⁴²

³⁸ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, pages 10–12.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² KILs with AFADs.

- Legal Working Groups were formed to identify and resolve conflicting laws and regulations by drafting new ones. This resulted in 55 amendments being drafted— but not enacted—to deconflict decentralization laws and regulations.

The project reported in its final Weekly Report that during FY 2016, the Ministries of health, Education, as well as Municipalities and Public Works, including in each of the 15 provinces (45 total), were the first approved and sent to HCCP.⁴³ For FY 2017, Taqadum reported that all 15 provinces reached consensus on DMAPs for the 10 newly targeted directorates and that each governor submitted such plans to the HCCP.⁴⁴

At its conclusion, Taqadum reported that ministerial orders from the targeted ministries were issued for the transfer of functions and covered 69 percent (402) of the 584 functions that DMAP analysis deemed to be immediately transferable. The following is the breakdown for the percentage of total functions transferred to directorates post-DMAP adoption, through the adopted ICI Plans as reported by Taqadum at the close of activities:

- MMPW transferred 163/218 functions
 - o Municipalities 39
 - o Water 29
 - o Sewage 31
 - o Urban Planning 31
 - o Planning and Follow-Up 33
- MOE transferred 36/41 functions
- MOH transferred 11/32 functions
- MOA transferred 15/47 functions; five additional functions were partially transferred but not counted
- MOYS transferred 26/39 functions
- MOCH delegated only six authorities and was not counted
- MOLSA transferred 89/94⁴⁵

The process of DMAP implementation—the actual transfer of competencies (functions), staff, assets, and financial allocations—was uneven, much like the process of implementing constitutional and legislative mandates for decentralization from which DMAPs ultimately stemmed. Implementation depended on ministerial orders to effect transfer of functions, staff, salaries, assets.⁴⁶ Ministerial orders seem to have been pro forma only, or partially effective in the actual transferring power to the provinces. Problems arose in the practical application and implementation of ministerial orders.

KII results on DMAP implementation across transferring national ministries and receiving provincial directorates confirm incomplete and delayed implementation, as well as adaptations over time. The evaluation team focused its analysis on a sampling of KIIS from the first three ministries to adopt DMAPs, MOE, MOH, and the Municipalities and Public Works directorates of what is now MMPWCH. Charts Two and Three below show the range of responses across ministries and directorates at all levels and across provinces.

⁴³ Taqadum Final Weekly Report (August 30–September 5, 2017) page 18.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Taqadum Final Weekly Report, (August 30–September 5, 2017) pages 18–19.

⁴⁶ Ibid.




Chart 2: Was the DMAP fully implemented?

Across the entire sample, as shown above in Chart 2,⁴⁷ a majority of officials interviewed reported incomplete DMAP implementation, with MMPWCH showing a comparatively higher rate of incomplete DMAP implementation. Lack of completion, and perhaps delay also could be due in part to the merger of MMPW and MOCH. The latter was part of the second group of ministries to adopt DMAPs. Additionally, the former Minister of Construction and Housing was reportedly not in favor of decentralization, “which formed part of the reason for the merger.” The high rate of incomplete implementation at MMPWCH may be in part related to this background concerning the construction and housing directorates.

⁴⁷ The graphs show the frequency of respondent answers but cannot be considered statistically significant.




Chart 3: Was the DMAP fully implemented? (n = 102)

Ministry of Education: Respondents at the national level indicated that the ministry’s role “was to advise on decentralization” and that the MOE formed committees for this purpose. The ministry further reported that the operational budget, salaries and administrative affairs have been fully transferred to the provinces and therefore fully implemented. One element that has not yet been implemented, however, is “the modification of administrative structures and the promotion of personnel at higher grades.” This was “due to lack of clarity in these powers in the law.” Respondents further reported that “financial resources have declined significantly. The impact on decentralized planning has been negative, given that financial issues are central to devolution.” MOE respondents attributed delays in implementation to the fact that “some officials in the center and in the provinces want the center to retain all powers, even if these powers exclusively belong to the provinces.” However, MOE respondents also stated that the transfer of the operational budget and staff to the provinces “lifted a burden from the ministry.”

The evaluation team interviewed officials in eight provincial education directorates in Kirkuk, Karbala, and in each of the provinces where the citizen survey was conducted: Baghdad, Najaf, Babil, Wasit, Diyala, and Muthanna. Perceptions of DMAP implementation across the eight provincial directorates varied. For instance, a Kirkuk Education Directorate official pointed out that the directorate now sets plans on its own, as required by the DMAP, but that such plans must be approved by the ministry, “otherwise, the directorate is implementing plans relying on the resources available at the directorate with the help of the ministry and the governorate.”

In Kirkuk, fully implemented aspects of the DMAP are functions related to literacy, school construction, coordination with the other institutions, and, finally, sports and science activities. This official explained that “the financial resources and the management of financial affairs are listed on par with the other administrative and legal powers, but only a few have been implemented. This is because the ministry did not transfer them to the provinces completely.” While he indicated it was to be expected that there would be disagreements between the directorates and the ministry in transferring some powers and recognized that the DMAP slated certain functions to be transferred immediately or gradually, “the ministries do not seem serious about transferring powers at all, especially the Ministry of Finance.” The Karbala Education Directorate echoed these views and experiences of delays or blockages in the transfer process, the key action for decentralization.

Among the other six survey provinces, respondents reported some similar perceptions and experiences. For instance, an education directorate official in Muthanna said that delays in implementation were due to disagreements regarding overlapping powers. But a counterpart in Wasit stated the opposite, saying that decentralization of education functions was complete. It must be noted that the Wasit respondent was new and had not been involved in the Taqadum-assisted DMAP process but was aware of it. All the other education directorate officials in the remaining survey provinces indicated that delays in full implementation and transfer were “due to differences between ministries and local governments.” One official in Diyala stated bluntly that, in addition to central ministries’ delaying tactics, “political intervention by the Governor’s Office and the Provincial Council, together with financial constraints, limit DMAP implementation.”

Ministry of Health—A ministerial representative at the national level stated that “the planning department handled policy making and planning” and therefore participated in the DMAP implementation process on behalf of the ministry (MOH). A respondent from MOH reported that “no elements of the DMAP have been fully implemented.” He explained that this was due to “the lack of clarity of the plan and the lack of real partnership between the ministry and the governorate.” Moreover, “the issue of financial resources management has not yet been addressed” and “this is in its infancy and still has not matured.” The ministry official indicated that when decentralization was approved, the ministry formulated plans. However, “they have not been implemented because of the shortcomings of the legislation, the lack of budget, staff who lack the necessary qualifications, and lack of capacity building. So, there are no major changes, just gaps.”

The evaluation team interviewed officials in provincial health directorates in Qadisiya, Maysan, and four of the six provinces covered by the population-based survey: Muthanna, Najaf, Baghdad Al Karkh, Babil, and Wasit. These respondents largely reflected experiences similar with those of the provincial education directorate officials interviewed. The provincial health directorates are still required to send policies and plans to the ministry for approval. An official in the Baghdad Al Karkh Health Directorate stated that only immediately transferable functions have been implemented, and even then, only those related to short-term service delivery plans for primary health services have been implemented. Unfortunately, “the long-term plan has not been implemented because it contradicts the ministry’s five-year plan and the ministry is in control of health policies. The province demanded similar powers based on the law.”

A colleague in the same directorate flatly said that “nothing has been actually implemented due to the failure to transfer powers. And no transfer of powers has occurred because of obstacles and disputes between the ministry and the provinces.” The same official stated that financial resources and PFM functions had been included in the DMAP, but “nothing actually happened, except that the ministry cut off our funding and imposed the revenue-generation project on the province. But the Ministry gave us nothing to make up for the financial deficits we face.” The official informed the evaluation team that “because of the dispute over powers, the Ministry of Finance did not fund the transfer of staff for 2016. All processes are now more complicated because we need approval from the Governor, the Minister, and the Ministry of Finance.”

Ministry of Municipalities, Public Works, Construction, and Housing—A representative of MMPWCH at the national level described the process as “dividing up the tasks that fall on the ministry, and the tasks that are the responsibility of the directorates that have not been transferred to the governorates, and to set policy, as well as to prepare the budget for large scale projects the province is not able to implement.” This respondent went on to state that he has a role in oversight and monitoring implementation and commented that “some directorates still do not absorb and do not want to plan.” This ministry indicated that “financial matters are present in every planning process but have been implemented unevenly.” MMPW reported the following reasons for delays in implementation:

1. Lack of clarity of legislation, overlapping laws, and sometimes conflicts between legislation and budget laws
2. Scarcity of funds, especially in recent years
3. A “centralized mentality” that still exists
4. The weakness of education and lack of awareness of decentralization
5. “Ministries and Provinces deal with one another as opponents”

A national-level MMPWCH official reported that the DMAP was “fully implemented, through identifying the provinces’ budget needs, and training provincial cadres on how to implement our public policies,” given that only “strategic projects” remain under the control of ministry. A national level MMPWCH directorate official confirmed that during DMAP development, the ministry retained strategic projects and follow-up. One stated that DMAPs were implemented “through Taqadum trainings and workshops to define functions, specialization and description and what was to be transferred administratively within specific time frames” and that “implementation is ongoing.”

However, another national-level MMPWCH Directorate official remarked that “nothing has been transferred completely.” An official from the Sewage Directorate commented that the functions transfer process was not fully completed because financial authority has not been transferred. One function that national ministry and directorate respondents seemed to agree had been transferred completely, for example, was the “task of compiling sub-plans by the ministry and submission to the Ministry of Planning, which in turn submits them to the provincial councils and provincial governments for consideration as ‘planning and strategic projects.’”

MMPWCH National Director Generals (DGs) stated that financial resources and PFM functions were included in the DMAPs but reported delays until late 2017 in financial orders to transfer employees and the financial authorizations for staff salaries. All cited the MOF as the reason for the delays. An MMPWCH directorate official stated that “almost all of the directorates of water and sewage in all provinces and municipalities have been decentralized, but some of the functions from construction and housing do remain centralized.”⁴⁸ He went on to explain that “the functions from MMPWCH, primarily from the MPW side, which have not yet been fully transferred to the provincial level are strategic projects, particularly urban projects, as these require central government policy planning and coordination. Financial functions have also not yet been transferred, and this is due primarily to the lack of MOF approval.

As is the case in MOHs, the views from the provincial MMPWCH directorates both mirror and contradict the views expressed by national counterparts. The evaluation team interviewed representatives from 28 MMPWCH directorates in all non-KRG provinces except Baghdad. Most respondents in this group reported that very few staff had been transferred, especially those in finance-related staff positions, and reported that control of revenues was not yet devolved. One stated, “Financial tasks did not transfer because of the Ministry of Finance.” Another respondent explained that delays in implementation are “because ministries are holding onto power, both the line ministries and the Ministry of Finance.” One respondent in Muthanna said, “Political reasons caused the delay in power devolution.”

In MOLSA, a national-level official reported that “no DMAP implementation will start until 2018,” and that it will be working on policy and planning. The MOLSA official stated that “we did not implement decentralized planning because we did not transfer power yet.” Similarly, a MOYS directorate official stated that all administrative, financial, fixed, and mobile assets have been transferred to the Provinces, as well as technical powers and personnel.” A reason for this is that “we understand the law very well.”

Finally, a ministerial official in MOA summed the problem up succinctly: “Functions and the required resources are included in decentralized planning [DMAP], but financial constraints are one of the problems that hinder full DMAP implementation. The lack of a budget is the main reason behind the delays in implementation. The other main reason is the lack of understanding of the respective separate and shared powers. This causes a lot of problems.”

In sum, as show below in Chart 4, ministry and directorate respondents indicated that DMAPs were implemented to the point of adoption. This is confirmed across the entire sample of GOI decentralization actors across the provinces, as shown in Chart 5.

⁴⁸ An explanation for the uneven picture of implementation painted at MMPWCH may be twofold: (1) The former MOCH was part of the second wave of ministries to engage in the DMAP process; and (2) the two ministries merged in 2016, just before Taqadum concluded. An official from the High Commission for Coordination between Provinces Secretariat (HCCPSEC) related to the evaluation team that the merger was not well received by the former Minister of Construction and Housing and that the PM mandated the merger because of this minister’s resistance to decentralization of the MOCH’s powers and duties.




Chart 4: Did you experience delays in the implementation of the DMAP?




Chart 5: Did you experience delays in the implementation of the DMAP? (n = 80)

Although delays did occur in DMAP implementation, not many actual adaptations or changes to the DMAPs took place over time. Similarly, responses indicating that there were very few adaptations suggest a “parking” of DMAP implementation. Thus, post-adoption, follow-on implementation involving the transfer of authorities, staff, and functions remains incomplete. This again is confirmed across the entire sample of key informants, as shown in as shown in Charts Five and Six. Such delays were largely due to failure of the center to

transfer money or staff, or to give up decision-making competencies around policy, planning, and legal processes; however, once DMAPs were adopted, they appear to have remained fixed.




Chart 6: Were there any major changes or adaptations to DMAPs over time?




Chart 7: Were there any major changes or adaptations to DMAPs over time (n = 80)

The lack of clarity over exclusive and shared powers has been an additional cause of delay, incomplete implementation and adaptation. Aside from fiscal and budgetary constraints on full implementation of DMAPs, changes and adaptations to DMAPs appear to have occurred during the pre-adoption,

design phase based on further discussion and “negotiation” among stakeholders at the national and provincial levels. These “negotiations” took place through Taqadum workshops and meetings to further clarify the allocation between ministries and provinces, a proxy for long-deferred constitutive negotiations that still need to take place. The project cannot be faulted for this, although it is curious that adherence to the actual substantive content of Law 21 was not a higher priority for the project. As will be discussed elsewhere in this report, Law 21 is rather sweeping, and reflects both an Iraqi political reality—a nation that hovers between full federalization through the creation of regions and administrative decentralization. The constitutive foundations of the latter are more far-reaching than the DMAPs appear to acknowledge. At some point, this tension must be resolved. In the meantime, this slow, often convoluted march toward devolution will continue, characterized by cycles of progression and retrenchment.

7.1.2. 1b. Are high-level results observed? Which key functions identified in DMAPs were successfully implemented at the provincial level following transfer from targeted ministries? Which were not?

By the end of the project Taqadum reported achieving the following targets with respect to DMAPs:

1. Final DMAPs for all 15 provinces for the seven targeted ministries were shared with the HCCPSEC, provinces, and ministries.^{49,50}
2. Ministries issued orders for the transfer of functions, with some unspecified deviations from DMAPs, for the targeted 15 provinces.
3. Ministerial staff and financial allocations to 12 provinces (excluding Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din) occurred for MOA, MOH, MOE, and MOYS, however, there were no allocations to provinces for MOLSA, MMPW, and MOCH.

High satisfaction results are observed overall with respect to the GOI perceived quality and utility of Taqadum assistance. As will be addressed below in section 1d, regarding factors promoting or impeding success, respondents almost unanimously stated that Taqadum decentralization assistance supported the priorities of the GOI. Although support for decentralization was somewhat weak for respondents from central ministry and provincial directorates, support was strong across the entire sample for Taqadum (Chart 8). Most indicated that they had benefited in some way with Taqadum, through conferences, meetings, training, technical assistance, or some combination of the foregoing. Taqadum also produced numerous resource manuals. Most respondents noted they are still using the manuals.

⁴⁹ Taqadum Final Weekly Report, page 28.

⁵⁰ Taqadum Quarterly Report, April–June 2017, page 114.




Chart 8: Overall, did Taqadum assistance in this regard (decentralization) support the priorities of GOI? (n = 141)




Chart 8a: Do you believe that decentralization is a national priority – or that it should be a national priority? Why or why not? (n = 148)

The degree to which key functions identified in DMAPs were successfully implemented at the provincial level following transfer from targeted ministries is sector-specific, but financial functions other than those associated with staff transfer remain unevenly implemented, if at all. For example, an MOE official reported that administrative affairs and operations budgets for salaries have been fully implemented in the provinces, but central planning functions regarding the status of administrative personnel regarding promotion to higher grades have not been transferred because of conflicting laws that remain unresolved. He added,

“Financial resources have declined significantly, and the impact on decentralization has been negative, given that financial functions and powers remain central.”

An MOH informant reported that “the Ministry formulated a DMAP, but it has not been implemented because of the shortcomings in the legislation, the lack of budget, and the lack of qualification of provincial staff as well as lack of capacity building. So, there are no major changes.” It must be noted that this official also viewed decentralization as “the last priority” for Iraq, behind all other competing priorities. A MOLSA official interviewed indicated that the ministry has not fully implemented its DMAP because it is “still in conflict with the Ministry of Finance.” He also pointed out that the legal mandates for decentralization are insufficient, especially Law 21, “as evidenced by the Budget Law battles and Ministry of Finance taking advantage of the legal gaps and conflicts.”

The MOA reported that “some elements of the DMAP have not been implemented, such as training courses, due to the financial deficit. Financial resources and their functions are included in DMAPs, but financial constraints are one of the problems hindering full implementation.” He also expressed the view that another factor hindering successful implementation is “the lack of understanding of decentralized powers on both sides of the equation, at the center and in the provinces, causing misunderstandings and problems.” He gave the example of an ongoing struggle between the ministry and the provinces regarding the function of agricultural pest control and distributing agricultural inputs, which are central functions. But “some provinces want the administration of these functions transferred to them, and this is one of the points of contention we encountered in this field.”

An official interviewed in the MMPWCH pointed out that “prior to decentralization, ministries would receive their budget allocations directly from the Ministry of Finance, and the line ministry would distribute funds to the provinces, but now the Ministry sends the budget allocations directly to the Provinces.” In addition to fiscal impediments to full implementation of the DMAP, other impediments to implementation are power struggles over shared competencies, especially in policy setting and planning.

At the provincial level, GOs particularly bear the brunt of incomplete implementation of the fiscal dimensions of DMAPs. An official from the GO in Basrah stated that “the ministries seek to not implement the transfer of powers, hoping that the lack of financial ability of the province will weaken it and therefore the transfer process will fail.” Even if the function does not directly involve financial functions (e.g., staff travel), the informant indicated that ministries were not implementing aspects of DMAPs “because ministries do not wish to effectively apply Law 21, especially regarding financial matters of any sort” as a Maysan GO official stated. Another official in the Diyala GO stated simply that “everything related to money is being grabbed by the central ministries, which does not help decentralization.” A respondent in the Baghdad GO said “we have not yet seen any fruits of these changes. We can speak of success when we can provide building and reconstruction to citizens. Success comes with presentation of projects, rather than merely issuing administrative orders from the center to provinces.”

Perceptions about the impact of decentralization on corruption were mixed. Among ministry respondents, more felt that decentralization has resulted in more corruption than before, followed by those who felt there was less or about the same roughly equal in number. Across the entire sample of decentralization actors in all provinces, however, a plurality of respondents felt that decentralization has resulted in less corruption than before, followed by those who feel there is more corruption and those who think there are about the same levels of corruption as before (see Charts 9 and 10).




Chart 9: In your opinion, has decentralization resulted in less corruption, more corruption, or are corruption levels about the same as before?




Chart 10: In your opinion, has decentralization resulted in less corruption, more corruption, or are corruption levels about the same as before? (n = 112)

The majority of GOI officials across the sample agreed that decentralization is a national priority; however, while a majority also indicated that it is a high priority, it is not the highest or only priority. When asked about where decentralization fits among priorities for Iraq given the political, economic, social, and security issues the country is facing, many respondents felt decentralization was a high priority or a priority, but few felt it was the highest, often listing security, economic, fiscal, and budgetary as well as political problems before or alongside decentralization.

National ministry views are particularly instructive, given the report of delays at the province level. One respondent from MOA even cited “strengthening of law enforcement—the rule of law” as a competing high priority. An official from MOLSA opined that “the priorities at this stage are the development of the economy, services, and the displaced, and as for decentralization, the economy and services take priority.” This view was echoed by an MMPWCH official, who stated that “education, municipal services and decentralized provision of services along with central planning are priorities, but decentralization is the first priority.” However, an MOH official stated that decentralization is the “last priority.” Finally, an MOE official viewed national reconciliation, economic development, and legislative reform as competing priorities, with decentralization ranking as “the second priority” for the nation.

7.1.3. 1c. Were development and implementation inclusive? To what extent was civil society, including women, youth, minorities, and other vulnerable populations, represented in the design and implementation of DMAPs?

Taqadum project documents state that a “key element throughout the project has been building the capacity of the local government to better provide services to its citizens. We have made advances in building the capacity of provincial governments to plan and deliver services with the participation of their constituents.”⁵¹

By the close of the project in September 2017, reports state that Taqadum exceeded its life of project (LOP) targets with regard to increase in Provincial Local Council citizen outreach and input intermediate results.⁵² The target for the percentage of women, youth, and minority groups participating in the provincial planning process was 18 percent, and Taqadum reported exceeding that target over the LOP and achieving 30.26 percent. Similarly, the intended target for the number of government officials receiving Taqadum training in conducting community outreach and citizen participation processes was exceeded by 25 over a target of 229. Finally, the project exceeded its target for the number of consensus building fora held with Taqadum assistance by 134 over a target of 22.⁵³

In its final report, Taqadum states only that “activities were Iraqi-led and supported government and civil society efforts to strengthen the responsiveness of provincial and local governments to meet community needs.” However, it is not clear whether these activities were focused on the specific DMAP design and implementation process or on other project focal areas across the spectrum of support to decentralization. Rather, these activities and performance indicators do indicate that Taqadum did include citizen outreach and involvement as a program component. However, civil society inclusion and participation as a core feature of democratization and devolution of power to local governments does not appear to have been the focus of the project. Rather, technical assistance and institutional capacity building appears to have been the primary focus. Key informants’ responses, addressed below, match up with this observation.

Most ministry key informants as well as most GOI respondents across the entire sample believe that some Iraqi citizens understand what decentralization means for them in their daily lives, and others do not. In looking at the wider sample in Baghdad, where both national and provincial level respondents were interviewed, a majority of respondents do not believe that the majority of Iraqis understand what decentralization means for them. As shown in Charts 11 and 12 below, responses varied among those who responded, “most do not understand”.

⁵¹ Taqadum Quarterly Report, July–September 2017, page 10.

⁵² Ibid, page 15.

⁵³ Ibid.




Chart 11: Do you believe that the general public/ordinary citizens understand what decentralization means/should mean for them in their daily lives?




Chart 12: Do you believe that the general public/ordinary citizens understand what decentralization means/should mean for them in their daily lives? (n = 145)

For instance, one high-level national GOI respondent stated that “the mentality in the GOI and in the provinces is against decentralization because before 2003, we only knew a centralized system.” Another national parliamentarian stated that only some Iraqis understand decentralization because the percentage of those who are educated has decreased because of the conflict in Iraq over the past 15 years. Several other national executive officials who responded “no” echoed this sentiment, with one adding high illiteracy and poverty rates to the list of causes, and another saying that “the people are not interested in decentralization—they want services.” Another national GOI official added that “the people think that by centralization all problems are solved.” Only one national official gave lack of awareness as a reason why most Iraqis do not understand what decentralization means for them in their daily lives.

Overall these responses indicate a gap between the Iraqi people and the GOI at both the national and provincial level, a gap that must be bridged if democratic governance at any level is to take hold and move beyond internecine power struggles, expressed most acutely during election cycles. The GOI perception of citizens as being only somewhat informed, coupled with the “centralized mentality” may at least in part account for the low reports of active GOI outreach to secure citizen involvement in the DMAP process.

Some GOI respondents reported conducting civic education on the DMAP process through Taqadum-led conferences and workshops. Most of these activities, particularly the PPDC mechanism at the provincial level, appear to have included civil society organizations (CSOs) and not citizens at large. The responses across the sample indicate that where outreach was conducted, it was primarily through Taqadum or social media, including Facebook and other internet-based social media sites, posters, and television. Moreover, outreach was primarily focused on services, not DMAPs or the design and planning of other transfers of government functions.

A majority of respondents at both the national ministry and provincial levels responded that they did not conduct citizen outreach and seek input into the design and implementation of the DMAP, thus DMAP development was inherently government-centric and appears not to have lent itself to civil society involvement for that reason. When looking at the wider sample across provinces and the national level, in response to the question of whether they had conducted citizen outreach, the response “no” still leads, followed by “yes,” and then “don’t know.” This rather muddled picture indicates that CSO involvement was not a high priority, even among ministries and directorates providing health and other human services focused on youth, labor, social affairs, education, and health, as Charts 13 and 14 below show. One official from MMPWCH stated, “There is no practical way” when asked whether citizens participated in the DMAP process. Another national official from MOYS said, “This consideration is inapplicable because the law was implemented administratively.” An official from the Qadisiya health directorate stated that “No outreach was conducted because the DMAP analysis regarding jobs or transfers of competencies and functions, for example, requires specialized personnel and normal citizens are not qualified for this job.” Baghdad Health-Karkh directorate officials interviewed characterized the DMAP process as “an administrative process only between the ministry and the province—no role for citizens.”




Chart 13: During the process of developing and implementing the DMAP for your Ministry, did you conduct citizen outreach and seek input to the design and implementation of the DMAP?




Chart 14: During the process of developing and implementing the DMAP for your Ministry, did you conduct citizen outreach and seek input to the design and implementation of the DMAP? (n = 116)

The views of women, youth, minorities, and other vulnerable populations were clearly not sought out at the ministry level, except in a few cases. Across the wider sample, however, although a substantial majority of respondents reported not seeking out the views of these groups in DMAP design and implementation, more did respond positively. As shown in Charts 15 and 16 below, this possibly indicates some unevenness in specialized outreach when actors outside of ministries and directorates are included (e.g., provincial council members), in part through the PPDC mechanism. Officials from provincial directorates confirm that the outreach conducted was done through Taqadum-organized symposia, workshops, and social media such as ministry

Facebook pages and TV; but, as a provincial MOLSA directorate official in Kirkuk informed the team, “this occurred in the field of services, but not in decentralized planning, not job and function transfer planning.”




Chart 15: Did you particularly seek out the views of women, youth, minorities and other vulnerable populations in the design and implementation of the DMAPs?




Chart 16: Did you particularly seek out the views of women, youth, minorities and other vulnerable populations in the design and implementation of the DMAPs? (n = 140)

An education directorate official in Kirkuk explained, “The Taqadum project targeted our directorate from the beginning of the project, and the Ministry of Education was one of the first four lead ministries targeted by Taqadum. Taqadum did not deal with the citizens directly but worked with ministries, with the [HCCP] that

coordinates between governorates and the Council of Ministers, COR, the governors, the chairmen of the provincial councils, directorates involved in transfer of powers in the field of central planning, and planning analysis. Therefore, it did not conduct outreach to the citizens.”

Women’s representation among the citizens who did participate in DMAP planning and implementation was especially low. At the ministry and directorate level, a majority of respondents selecting “don’t know/not sure” is striking as a possible indicator of indifference. Again, as shown in Charts 17 and 18 below, by stepping back and looking across the entire sample, although we still see that most informants answered that women were not fairly represented, followed by those who were not sure, some felt women had been fairly represented among those citizens who did participate.




Chart 17: Were women fairly represented among the citizens who participated in the DMAP planning and implementation process?




Chart 18: Were women fairly represented among the citizens who participated in the DMAP planning and implementation process? (n = 142)

Most respondents felt that the views of women were reflected in decisions made regarding DMAP planning and implementation. This perception was higher across the entire sample, although substantial numbers responded that they did not know. Most striking was that the majority of ministry and directorate officials again responded that they were unsure. This is shown in Chart 19.




Chart 19: Were the views of women reflected in decisions made regarding DMAP planning and implementation? (n = 138)

Notably, as indicated in Charts 20, 21, and 22 below, in the six provinces where the citizen survey was conducted, the majority of DGs indicated that citizen outreach was conducted regarding SDIP. This confirmed the views expressed by provincial ministry officials in non-survey provinces, as referenced above, evidencing a rather truncated and limited view of citizen-centered, inclusive, and participatory service delivery.




Chart 20: During the process of developing and implementing the SDIPs for your Directorate, did you conduct citizen outreach and seek input to the design and implementation of the SDIP?




Chart 21: Did you particularly seek out the views of women, youth, minorities and other vulnerable populations in the design and implementation of the SDIPs?




Chart 22: Did the SDIP process take into account service provision designed to meet the unique needs of girls and women?

A slim majority of GOI officials felt that the process of developing and implementing the DMAP was fair and that they did not see evidence of bias or corruption in the process, followed by those who were not sure, and then those who felt the process was unfair. This pattern held true at both the ministry level and across the entire sample. The development of the DMAP, perhaps by virtue of its focus and content, and, therefore the implementation process itself, were intrinsically government-centric and focused on intra- and inter-institutional actors, relationships, structures, processes, and functions. It is worth noting in relation to this finding that corruption comes up as a priority for Iraq among GOI officials, often before decentralization. Indeed, some officials hold the view that “decentralization merely decentralizes corruption.”

Overall, therefore, development and implementation were not particularly citizen-inclusive or participatory, much less of women, youth, minorities and other vulnerable populations. Government officials exhibited uneven awareness and perception of civil society and citizen participation and inclusion in the DMAP development, decision-making, and implementation process, and yet, felt the process was fair and free from bias. This rather striking paradox warrants attention, as it evidences a lack of awareness of the meaning of “citizen-centered” governance at any level, national or local. This is evident also in the discussion regarding the results of the citizen survey under Evaluation Question 2 on SDIPs.

7.1.4. 1d. What factors promoted/imposed success? What factors were associated with the most successful DMAPs, as measured by successful uptake of functions following transfer from targeted ministries? What factors resulted in impediments to success?

Factors promoting or impeding the success of DMAPs to support the transfer of central Ministerial functions to the provincial level: To answer this part of Question 1, key informants were asked a series of questions related to factors central to understanding success or impediment factors, such as political, legal, administrative, financial, and other factors, as well as those related to institutional capacity. Questions also addressed Taqadum’s contributions generally, as well as the project’s assistance to the DMAP process specifically. Factors that promoted or impeded success are addressed below. These factors are explored through case studies on the directorates of water and trash.

Taqadum itself was a success factor. A substantial majority of informants across the entire sample reported having directly benefited from Taqadum, particularly in Baghdad, through a variety of activities, including technical assistance, training, workshops, mentoring, and conferences. The Chief of Party (COP), Cameron Berkuti, was well-liked and respected by his Iraqi counterparts. As an Iraqi-American with a solid understanding of the country and Arabic fluency, this likely facilitated the good will and significant access he had with GOI officials who were key to the decentralization process.

As mentioned previously, a key feature of Taqadum’s legacy was the comprehensive manuals it produced in both Arabic and English. A majority of respondents reported that they are still using these manuals and find them very useful. Access to and utilization of such resources is a success factor for DMAP implementation because they serve as repositories of knowledge that can be transferred, as well as a mechanism for capacity building of relevant skills required for full implementation of DMAPs and decentralization generally.

Respondents across both the legislative and executive branches at both the central and provincial levels of the GOI overwhelmingly agreed that Taqadum assistance supported GOI priorities. One Thi Qar official stated that “[i]n fact, if [it had] not been for Taqadum, we would not have been able to get to where we are now. Taqadum has been the catalyst, the engine, and the real drive towards decentralization.” A Ninewa official stated that “it is only through Taqadum that knowledge was acquired about decentralization.” An official from Salah al-Din squarely opined that while “Taqadum was very helpful to local governments,” it was the central government that “did not offer enough support to decentralize as it is not among its priorities.”

In sum, Taqadum provided welcome, much-needed technical assistance and capacity building assistance to the key national and provincial government officials charged with implementing devolution of the institutions and authorities identified in Article 45, Law 21. Taqadum involvement was a clear success factor in the DMAP transfer and devolution process.

The degree to which GOI officials perceive decentralization as a priority for Iraq is an indicator of political will and is therefore a factor that either promoted or impeded success if considered in conjunction with other findings related to challenges and gaps in post-adoption DMAP implementation. Most respondents ranked decentralization among the highest priorities for Iraq, followed by those who felt it was the highest priority. A governor who ranked decentralization as the highest priority for Iraq stated, “Decentralization is a national priority [because] it enables local governments to deliver and improve services provided to citizens by reducing bureaucracy and saving citizens’ time and effort. It is also a constitutional right and sanctioned by Article 45 of Law 21.”

Several national respondents from both the executive and legislative branches said that decentralization is among the highest priorities because “the Iraqi system is democratic and federal.” An official in Diyala said that “decentralization is a national priority to provide services to citizens in a short time and eliminate bureaucracy.” Many respondents who viewed decentralization as one of the highest priorities for Iraq cited security, economic, corruption, administrative, and capacity challenges as competing priorities. One respondent from Mosul stated that “decentralization is a priority but with conditions.”

However, almost equal numbers ranked decentralization as “not a priority for the time being” or “the highest priority,” while the minority of respondents felt decentralization was “not a priority at all.” Paradoxically, many of the reasons given for the lower ratings were similar, such as security, terrorism, economic crisis, and corruption. This may reflect antipathy toward decentralization, or it may equally reflect a respondent’s overall assessment of whether others see it as a priority for Iraq. For example, a respondent in Thi Qar opined that “decentralization is successful if properly implemented, and we hope that it would be a political priority in Iraq.”

The above variance in viewpoints is borne out by different views expressed regarding the degree of support for decentralization across the national and provincial governments. A national-level DG stated that “some provinces are determined to receive transferred powers, while others are not willing to receive them.” Another national-level director general asserted that “it mainly depends on the governor’s character rather than the directorates and offices.” A high-level national executive official expressed the view that “Governors say ‘what is delegated is not enough.’” A Minister interviewed posited that the disparity in support among the provinces is due to variances in “the size of the population, geographic size, and the degree of deprivation; in other words, the proportion of the need for projects according to the poverty line and according to the resources of the province itself.”

A critical factor for DMAP success was that it was part of a greater whole of connected, interrelated activities that formed part of a road map mechanism. This evaluation question focuses on the DMAP only. However, it must be recognized that it was only one part of an overall mechanism designed to transfer functions to the provinces. Other tools and frameworks in this overall mechanism were as follows:

- Legal – identifying and drafting amendments to Iraqi laws and regulations impeding implementation of Law 21, as amended, for the seven targeted ministries
- Financial – establishing Administrative and Financial Affairs Directorates (AFADs) and Local Revenue-Generation Units (LRUs) in each province
- Organizational development – developing organizational structures, roles, and responsibilities in ministries, provincial Governors’ Offices, provincial Councils, and provincial directorates
- Service Delivery Improvement Planning – developing SDIPs to enhance delivery of citizen-centered community services

The degree of public awareness about decentralization, as well as inclusion in DMAP planning and implementation processes is an essential factor impeding success. Citizen awareness and participation is a critical component of governance. It is a significant part of the logic and purpose behind local governance and devolution of power to the level of government closest and, therefore, most responsive to citizens and communities as a result. Without citizen awareness and participation, governments are hard put to be responsive, much less accountable. Most of the respondents felt that some Iraqis understand what decentralization means for them in their daily lives, and some do not understand.

For instance, several governors expressed the view that a majority of citizens do not understand decentralization and that civic education is required to correct this. One stated that “[m]ost Iraqis do not understand decentralized administration and its advantages and disadvantages. For example, most people do not know about the transfer of powers and its role in providing service for their benefit.”

One provincial DG responded that “decentralization is a new experiment. The public are used to centralization.” Another provincial DG stated that “a majority of the people do not understand what decentralization means depending on the level of the culture, and the degree of citizen access to information through several channels, such as social networks websites.” He further opined that this “depends on the educational level of the individual.”

Another provincial governor stated that “people know what they are used to, and Iraq never experienced decentralization. Street culture and that of most officials is the product of centralization.” Other respondents stated that “there is no public education on decentralization, nor does the public trust that it will succeed.” A national-level Minister opined that “a majority of Iraqis do not understand the meaning of decentralization because of the lack of public involvement in public policy making.”

The gap in citizen awareness and participation in the DMAP and overall decentralization process is a significant factor that likely impedes/imposed DMAP success. A DG from one of the newly liberated provinces set the issue out in clear terms:

Even those who know decentralization, know it by name only, and do not know its meaning, or its benefits and disadvantages... Yes, decentralization is the transfer of power and orders from ministers to governors, but citizens should understand that they have rights and duties. For example, when the citizen understands that services will improve by decentralization, for example water, he or she should understand that the water directorate will be self-funded, and therefore [the] citizen has the duty to pay related fees and demand good service.

In sum, citizen awareness, education, and participation in DMAP and related decentralization processes are critical factors. The presence of an active, aware citizenry is a success factor, and the absence of such is an impeding factor for DMAP planning and implementation. Inclusion is addressed in more depth above, specifically in response to Evaluation Question 1c, and Evaluation Question 2.

The degree of clarity and sufficiency of the various constitutional and legal provisions mandating decentralization are success factors affecting DMAP planning and implementation; however, the failure of the GOI to enact legislation deconflicting relevant laws is an impeding factor, as is the failure to fully implement the law generally. The failure to follow constitutional and legal provisions as set out in Article 45, Law 21, as amended, is an impeding factor. The law is clear. It is the failure to adhere to the constitution and Law 21 in and of itself that is an impeding factor because it contradicts and violates the very foundations of a constitutionalist democracy based on the rule of law.

The absence of serious efforts to ensure adherence to the law is an impeding factor, particularly in light of the clarity of the law and the perception of the law as such, especially Article 45's two-year automatic transfer provision. It appears that this will be yet another flagrantly ignored law on the books in the new Iraqi democracy. The evaluation team did not observe that any respondent felt any sense of urgency to comply with the timeline inherent in the law itself. Rather, the team observed a widespread sense of the *de facto* acceptance, if not outright exploitation, of an ongoing violation of both the letter and the spirit of the law—an essential law providing for decentralization, a central feature of democratization.

The kinds of key functions being transferred are largely success factors; however, they are not the success factors necessary to effect transfer of real power in policy making and financial decision-making, particularly to deliver citizen-centered services. The functions transferred according to DMAPs are based on narrow rather than expansive readings of the constitution and Law 21, as amended, and thus do not in and of themselves advance democratic devolution of power to local government in Iraq.

For example, substantive, sectoral policy making in the health sector stays primarily national but administrative, human resources policy making regarding staff issues is transferred in accordance with the law. This means that local sectoral policy making in health is subordinate to that national ministry, which makes sense to the extent that common health policy standards are shared across the nation. However, it no longer holds the same weight in freeing the provinces to deal with specific health concerns their citizens face on a local level. For instance, Basrah has a high incidence of oil production and war-related environmentally caused cancer, based on local conditions stemming from violent conflict. Basrah must rely on the national level to generate or approve health policy and

planning to address the health needs of its citizens although its particular health needs are unique to the province and may not be viewed as a national concern.⁵⁴

The uniformity across DMAPs in the kinds of functions slated for transfer is in part dictated by the provision of Article 45, Law 21. Plus, especially for the second phase ministries, the DMAPs were not able to engage in the depth of DMAP design as the first phase ministries MOE, MOH, and MMPW. This uniformity is a partial success factor because the tool is comprehensive. It is also an impediment to the extent that a uniform approach across different sectoral portfolios may not prioritize particular sectoral or provincial considerations. A one-size-fits-all approach may not work as well across vastly different sectors providing vastly different services in vastly different policy domains.

Article 45 does provide for gradual transfer. However, it squarely states that “the role of ministries shall remain in planning general policy” while “directorates, departments, tasks, services, and competencies ... along with their funds allocated by the General Budget ... and their staff” are to be transferred. Article 45 also has a “time’s up” clause, as mentioned previously: this process was to take only two years. The second amendment to Article 45 occurred in 2013; it is now 2018, five years later.

Further, the DMAPs should be referencing “competencies” or powers and duties, rather than “functions,” in the sense of rule of law and state building (e.g., MMPWCH vs. health and human services-oriented ministries such as MOH, MOE, MOLSA, and MOYS). So, in some sense the DMAPs themselves do not comport with Article 45, Law 21, as amended. This is ultimately a paradox that will need to be addressed, because this very characteristic of DMAPs impedes success.

The nature, structure and substantive content of the DMAP plans themselves are success factors, for the most part: The plans are detailed in terms of the inventory and classifications of functions identified and mapped. They clearly identify which functions are national, provincial, or shared. The plans note but do not particularly provide problem-solving or plans of action to resolve issues where, for instance, plans note that ministerial orders were unclear on the time frame for transfer or were otherwise ambiguous. The final DMAPs are clear, detailed, user-friendly matrices that appear action-oriented. The time frame for actions and status of the transfer of functions, timelines, and ministerial orders are clearly set out. The types of key functions being transferred are administrative, technical, planning, policy, financial, and legal. These are the right functions from both a governance and project perspective. As has been noted above, although inclusion may not have been a strong suit of the DMAP process overall across the ministries (in the center and in the provinces), it appears that the immediate end users of the plans at the ministerial level feel Taqadum’s assistance was helpful overall.

As has been noted, Article 45, Law 21, as amended, determined in the first instance the kinds of key competencies or functions to be transferred. This in turn, as noted previously, guided to an extent the DMAP process of assessing which functions should remain central, which would be shared, and which would be devolved to the provinces, in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution, Articles 110, 112–114, 115, and 123.

The lack of progress on fiscal decentralization, coupled with the recalcitrance of the Ministry of Finance, has resulted in the incomplete transfer of relevant mandated financial functions to the provinces and is a major impediment. The shared viewpoints regarding the importance of decentralization and fiscal decentralization across the entire sample is a success factor but coupled with the failure to act decisively to resolve the issue, this is an impeding factor because it indicates lack of political will. This dynamic also impedes the progress of decentralization in all respects because a fundamental prerequisite—sharing of wealth, and clear functional allocation of powers and duties related to fiscal and revenue—is open to ad hoc interpretation not only by the MOF, but also by other central and provincial actors. This relates back to the fiscal crisis and failure to agree on a budget law, as cited by numerous GOI respondents, and to remaining conflicts in laws, starting with lingering ambiguities in the Constitution, Law 21, and other laws relevant to the transfer of central powers, duties, and functions to the provinces.

⁵⁴ Fallujah in Anbar and other provinces also evidence similar, war-related and other environmentally caused health problems, including birth defects. See <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/rewind/2018/02/iraq-americans-180207084031731.html>; see also <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3492088/>.

EVALUTION QUESTION I: CASE STUDY

As called for in the SOW, the following is a case study on two critical service areas: water and trash collection. These were both identified by USAID as important areas for the follow-on project to Taqadum. Water and trash collection fall under the Ministry of Construction, Housing, and Public Municipalities (MMPW), one of the first ministries targeted for decentralization.⁵⁵

The first part of this case study uses the case of the MMPW to illustrate in detail the Decentralization Mapping and Planning (DMAP) process, providing additional depth to the evaluation. It includes tables from Taqadum that show how the DMAP process was reflected in the indicators at the end of the project as well as excerpts from the DMAP for water functions to illustrate how the process worked.⁵⁶ This section is followed by an analysis of relevant interviews conducted with water sector stakeholders in the province of Kirkuk, showing the DMAP process from their perspective. Finally, the case study looks in detail at the case of trash collection, one of the most successful Taqadum decentralization examples, implemented in several provinces.

Background: GSP/Taqadum initially worked with three of the seven citizen-centered service ministries slated for decentralization: MOE, MOH, and MMPW (which was later merged with the Ministry of Construction and Housing). This case study looks at water and trash collection, both of which fall under the MMPW ministry. Figure One below, illustrates that MMPW has been a focus of Taqadum's work since the beginning of the project.




Figure 1: DMAP Phases⁵⁷

DMAP Process: Using the DMAP tool, GSP reviewed and assessed: (1) each ministry's laws, regulations, and organizational structure (including MMPW); (2) each directorate and its vertical and horizontal links with its ministry (including water and trash functions) and departments; (3) organizational structures and functions of each directorate and GO; (4) then-current core services and delivery status; (5) all functions of the targeted ministries, including criteria, current resources, and skill sets in each relevant office; and (6) capacity needs of staff, as well as properties to be transferred.

The DMAP process identified and listed the multiple functions within each ministerial directorate including staffing numbers and equipment used. It then determined which of these should be transferred from the central to the provincial level and which should remain at the central level. The DMAP analysis was completed through regional

⁵⁵ For consistency, this report will use the term (MMPW). Despite the evolving name of this ministry, MMPW was used by Taqadum in its final report for the Ministry of Public Municipalities, Construction and Housing (MMPWCH)

⁵⁶ This information supplements answers to EQ 1a. How were plans implemented?

⁵⁷ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017

GSP/Taqadum-hosted workshops with representatives from the three ministries of Education, Health, and MMPW; specialists from the provincial directorates; and GO and PC representatives from the seven provinces of Babil, Baghdad, Qadisiya, Diyala, Kirkuk, Najaf, and Wasit. Once analysis was complete and these DMAPs were approved, further workshops were then held with representatives from the other eight provinces of Anbar, Basrah, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Ninawa, and Salah al-Din that shared the results of work with the aforementioned provinces, replicated their DMAP work, and approved their respective DMAPs.

When all 15 provinces had completed the DMAP analysis, the results were unified and reviewed by Taqadum, presented to the three targeted ministries and representatives of the provinces, the High Commission for Coordination between Provinces (HCCP), and relevant Council of Representatives (COR) committees that: 1) determined the transfer and transition periods; and 2) in cooperation with GSP/Taqadum, developed a road map for transition of these three ministries with detailed steps for conducting inventories and transferring staff, assets and liabilities, funds, and records from the ministries to the provinces.

After a 2016 extension, GSP/Taqadum began replicating this DMAP work with four additional service delivery ministries, including Construction and Housing, Labor and Social Affairs, Agriculture, and Youth and Sport.

By the end of the program, all 15 provinces adopted DMAPs for the seven targeted ministries, including MMPW. A total of 892 functions were analyzed and mapped.

End of Project Status: The tables that follow are from the final Taqadum Quarterly Report and highlight the status of the MMPW and the directorates covering water and trash functions.

Table 2: Example of DMAPs

#	Major Activities	Target	Achieved	Anbar	Babil	Baghdad	Basrah	Dhi Qar	Diwaniyah	Diyala	Karbala	Kirkuk	Muthanna	Maysan	Najaf	Ninawa	Salah ad Din	Wasit
1	DMAP and Transition Roadmap Development																	
1.2	Final DMAPs for the Seven Targeted Ministries (MMPW, MOE, MOH, MOLSA, MOAg, MOYS, and MOCH) shared with HCCPSEC, Provinces, and Ministries	15	15	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C
2	Ministries Issued Orders for the Transfer of Functions																	
2.1	Ministries Issued Orders for the Transfer of Functions (with some deviation from DMAPs)	15	15	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C
3	Ministerial Staff and Financial Allocations Transferred to the Provinces																	
3.1	Ministry of Agriculture, Health, Education, Youth and Sport	15	12		C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C			C
3.2	Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and Construction, Housing and Public Municipalities	15	0															

*MMPW did transfer these function to the provincial level in December 2017

Table 3: Example of DMAPs

10	Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities and Relations of GO and Directorates																	
10.5	Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities of GO and Municipalities Directorate Adopted	10	12		C	C	C	C	C	C	C		C	C	C	C		C
10.6	Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities of GO and Directorates of Urban Planning, Planning and Follow UP, Water, and Sewer Adopted	10	10			C	C	C	C	C	C		C		C	C		C

Municipalities Directorate (10.5) includes Trash and Water (10.6)

Table 4: Example of DMAPs

17	Trash Collection Management System Development														
17.1	TCM Plan Completed, Adopted and Action Plan Developed		7		C	C					C	C		C	C
17.2	TCM Plan Implementation Phase Completed		6		IP	C					C	C		C	C
17.3	TCMS Shared Among Other Districts and Sub-Districts		3			C							IP	C	C

Excerpts from a DMAP

The following charts are excerpted from the DMAP Final Report for MMPW. Table Five below is the summary analysis from the MMPW Water DMAP from 2016. Among other things, it totals the number of MMPW functions analyzed (55). Of this total, 17 functions were determined to stay Ministerial, with 38 functions to be transferred. Of those functions to be transferred, 35 were found ready to be transferred immediately, one within six months, and two within a year or more.

Table 5: Example of DMAPs

The final statistics after being reviewed by the Taqadum Project

Department	Total of Ministerial function analyzed	Analysis Results					The functions transferred with Ministerial orders			
		Total of function that will stay Ministerial	The functions that will transferred to the Province and their transition period				Not mentioned in the Ministerial orders	Stay Ministerial	Functions totally transferred	Functions partly transferred
Water Directorate	55	17	38	35	1	2	6	17	28	4

Table Six below contains examples from the 2016 DMAP Final Report. The original report is in matrix form and contains detailed information about each function transfer decision, including the relevant laws cited to justify each opinion. The matrix below focuses on one example each of a function to be transferred immediately, within six months, within one year, and within two years. It also shows an example of a function that will stay Ministerial.

Table 6: Example of DMAPs

Illustrative Examples from the MMPW DMAP – Showing Examples of Function Transfer Decisions		
Function Category	Illustrative Function	GSP Opinion
Function to be transferred to Provinces immediately	Providing water meters	(Consistent with Ministerial Order No. 79 dated 22/9/2015)
Function to be transferred to Provinces within six months	Managing movable properties and disposing of them, except the cash balances belonging to the Ministry's headquarters	(Consistent with Ministerial Order No. 79 dated 22/9/2015, and this function was transferred on 4/11/2015)
Function to be transferred to Provinces within one year	Training and developing technical and administrative staffs	Consistent with Ministerial Order No. 82 dated 11/10/2015
Function to be transferred to Provinces within two years	Purchasing and providing sterilization and filtering materials for operating water filtration plants and complexes	(Consistent with Ministerial Order No. 82 dated 11/10/2015)
Function that will stay Ministerial	Drafting the operating budget for the general Directorates in the Ministry's headquarters	Not indicated in the Ministerial Order No. 79 dated 22/9/2015, which is a Ministerial function

The DMAP perspective from Key Informant Interviews (KIs):

The evaluation team held interviews with over 40 local officials involved at the local level with the decentralized functions of MMPV. Their aggregated opinions can be found in the broader analysis of Question 1. In this case study, the focus is on Kirkuk, where officials provided some of the most insightful views about the DMAP process described above.

Function categories matter: A Kirkuk Water Office official described the process as follows: Functions were classified in three classes. First were the functions immediately transferred after the law was implemented. The second were the functions transferred after six months of the law's implementation, of which many have already transferred. These functions were successfully devolved as they did not require financial allocations. The third class was to be transferred in a year but was delayed due to lack of a proper environment, mainly on the financial side and the lack of capacity of departments.

This was a common view in several KIs from multiple ministries—decentralization functions work well if they do not require financing. The Kirkuk official continued: “Elements [of water functions] not yet implemented are financial and administrative. [DMAP functions] were classified into short term and long term. Short-term solutions were all implemented, but not the long-term solutions, which require funds allocated by the public budget in Baghdad. The challenging plans were those that required financial allocations.”

Workshops and trainings were important: An official with the Ministry of Housing and Municipalities/Kirkuk Water Office, described the process with obvious pride: “DMAPs were developed through workshops and intensive training by Taqadum. Information was collected from all service sectors in 12 provinces, where transfer procedures of all service sectors were unified to be applicable in all provinces. They were agreed in workshops dedicated for mapping and simplifying procedures to provide best services for citizens. Kirkuk was ranked first in implementing plans among all provinces.”

Outreach was a focus, to a degree: The Kirkuk Water Office official described outreach efforts for community input. “We conducted citizen outreach through Facebook and official websites of ministries, or through wall posters near the main gate and reception offices of the department.” The department held public meetings but did not otherwise perform any outreach with the citizens specific to **women, youth, and minorities**. Most Ministry officials conceded that they did not seek out the views of women, youth, minorities, and other vulnerable populations in the design and implementation of the DMAPs.

Trash Collection – A DMAP Success Story

Trash collection in Iraq also falls under the MMPV. Every day in Iraq, around 31,000 tons of solid waste are generated, with per capita daily waste generation estimated at 0.8 kilogram to 1.4 kilograms.⁵⁸ Before implementation of Law 21, trash collection services were managed by provincial municipalities, funded by the central ministry. In one of its more successful undertakings, GSP/Taqadum worked with provincial governments to improve services within a decentralized environment. As the final Taqadum Report described it, “Although the federal government had a system theoretically in place, it had not been applied at the local government level. This left the lower provincial level government without a viable trash collection system.”⁵⁹

In May 2016, GSP/Taqadum began working with Najaf and Wasit as pilot provinces and developed the Trash Collection Management System (TCMS). This system later expanded from these two provinces to Babil, Baghdad, Karbala, Kirkuk, and Maysan. Because of the popularity of this system, GSP/Taqadum continued to provide TCMS-related technical assistance to the Municipalities Directorates in the four provinces of Baghdad, Karbala, Kirkuk, and Maysan until late July 2017.

⁵⁸ Alnajjar, Ashraf Yahya, EcoMENA, October 13, 2016.

⁵⁹ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 57.

What factors promoted success in trash collection?

This case study is a supplement to Question 1(d), which asks about the factors that promoted or impeded success of the DMAP process, as measured by successful uptake of functions following transfer from targeted ministries.

With respect to trash collection, Taqadum cites the establishment of the TCMS as being key. There was cooperation among multiple government actors, including the MMPW, GOs, and PCs. Also important was the piloting of TCMS in Najaf and Wasit, which allowed for scale-up after the development in two relatively small provinces. Some of the key factors in TCMS success involved the use of technology, including identification of garbage truck routes and other trash collection and cleaning mechanisms via use of satellite maps, and tracking actual garbage truck and cleaning mechanism movements by using the GPS. TCMS also benefited from monitoring and evaluation processes conducted by the Municipality Directorate.

Another factor GSP claims contributed to oversight of trash collection and solid waste removal efforts was implementing the use of weigh stations to determine the amount of collected solid waste for each garbage truck. Because different truck designs have different capacities, this data informed officials who made changes to trash collection modes, usage of trucks, and required quantities (e.g., depending on neighborhood? needs, etc.).

What factors impeded success in trash collection?

Trash collection was an undeniable success story for Taqadum. However, perception of trash collection improvement has not noticeably improved, at least at the national level. Chart 23 below shows the results from the survey undertaken by the evaluation team as part of Question Two. From a sample of six provinces, it shows that trash (or garbage) services are perceived to have *worsened* somewhat compared with a year ago, results that are similar to other services measured here, with the exception of water.




Chart 23: Perception of Provincial Government (n=1200)

Chart 23 represents Aggregate data from the citizen perception survey of Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, Muthanna, Najaf, and Wasit conducted as part of this evaluation. This survey includes both Najaf and Wasit, which Taqadum has worked with since May 2016 as part of TCMS, as well as Babil and Baghdad, which joined this effort later. TCMS does not seem to have improved citizens' perception of trash collection services. Part of this may be explained by a lag between the actual status of trash collection and perception because the survey measured only citizen perception and did not look at actual indicators of service quality.⁶⁰

Status of Decentralization on Trash Collection: An interview with a municipal trash official from Wasit, however, shows that this province, one of the two TCMS pilot governorates, was frustrated by the slow pace of decentralization. According to this Wasit official, "So far powers are not devolved by the (MMPWCH) ministry, except for some legal ones. Financial powers and human resources were not devolved."

The Wasit municipality waste management official said he participated in some capacity building trainings and workshops and complimented Taqadum; however, he criticized the legal framework for decentralization. For instance, he said that the Budget Law "does not clearly support provinces in terms of powers, and there are many limitations on spending on the provincial level. The most important element in the success of decentralization is organizing public finance and maximizing provincial revenues. So far, powers are not devolved by the ministry, except for some legal ones." He added that financial, administrative, and technical functions were not devolved. Regarding inclusion, the Wasit trash services official was blunt. When asked whether citizens actually participated in the decision-making process, he simply said, "Citizens are not part of the decision-making process."

⁶⁰ This is discussed at length in the section addressing Question 2.

CONCLUSIONS

Overarching Conclusions

Core, determinative issues should be addressed head on lest another 15 years pass by and more U.S. treasure is expended: Avoiding confrontation and engagement with core, determinative issues, such as Iraq's incomplete and inchoate social compact, does not solve them, it merely enables dysfunction, subversion, and delay. The social compact underlying the requirement that Iraq decentralize and devolve power to the provinces is fragile and reflects the lack of inclusion of key groups when key decisions informing the social compact were made during the 2005 constitutional process. For example, like the 2005 Iraqi Constitution and Law 21 upon which it is based, the DMAP represents a design and drafting process that resulted in duly adopted documents—paper tigers in essence—that are discarded at best, or manipulated and subverted, at worst.

Taqadum did excellent work in supporting DMAP design and adoption, as part of a comprehensive and realistic approach: It substantially achieved intended life of project (LOP) targets, raised capacity and knowledge levels, and set up excellent organizational frameworks and process mapping. However, Taqadum adopted a “lightweight” interpretation of Article 45, Law 21, as amended, perhaps to ensure some incremental progress given prevailing circumstances at the time. Between this “decentralization-light” interpretation and a dizzying array of conflicting and often unworkable constitutional and legal provisions, the DMAP tool could advance the cause of decentralization only so far.

The underlying social compact is still fragile, at best: Until the underlying foundational, constitutive dimensions of devolution of power are resolved and a workable, sustainable social compact around power sharing is confronted and sorted out, finally, along with a robust national reconciliation process after 15 years of deferring and avoiding this conversation—the current pattern of political avoidance and delay will persist at best, or, at worst, Iraq will continue to be vulnerable to cycles of insecurity and violent extremism. DMAPs will remain paper tigers, like the legal framework they are based on until these issues are sorted out.

“Decentralization champions” are first and foremost political creatures: The political will to fully implement decentralization of money, power and control remains in short supply and is highly dependent on “decentralization champions,” such as PM Abadi and the HCCP Secretariat. It must be recognized, however, that they too are, at the end of the day, political actors first and foremost. Thus, they may exhibit mixed motivations at different times, and, equally important, may not have the political support required to substantially advance the decentralization agenda.⁶¹

Specific Conclusions:

The issue is not “function” per se, but legal powers and duties or competencies, along with political will: All relevant line ministries participated in the DMAP design process and adopted DMAPs, yet DMAP implementation of the transfer of functions remains incomplete, uneven, and, in some cases, attempted reversals have even been observed. DMAPs were implemented to the point of adoption across all ministries. However, post-adoption implementation involving the transfer of certain authorities is uneven, and in some instances, so are administrative and staffing related issues. Partial or incomplete implementation is in part a result of: (1) different stages of post-adoption implementation (MOH, MOE, and MMPW benefitted from Taqadum for a longer period of time than the second wave of ministries to engage in the DMAP process, MOCH, MOA, MOLSA, and MOYS); and (2) the fact that while the DMAPs allocate some administrative, staff, and salary functions to the provinces, more general financial, policy- and technical decision-making functions specific to each sectoral line ministry are still being allocated and contested in practice. The antipathy of some parts of the GOI toward decentralization is evidenced, for example, by the fact that a draft law purporting to “reverse” the decentralization of MOH and MOE, among the first ministries to participate in DMAP design, and to adopt DMAPs has survived

⁶¹ The Government Letters database (Annex I) provides a substantial amount of background evidence on how the HCCP worked, under the supervision of the PM.

three readings in the Council of Representatives. Finally, the DMAP process itself, through the design, planning, adoption, and post-adoption phases was, despite the inclusive membership of the HCCP, centrally managed at the national level, and, to a degree, inserted more bureaucracy into the process of “gradually” transferring power within two-years, as provided by law.

The DMAP process did not adequately address the financial framework for decentralization, which remains unresolved, including lack of a coherent and effective anti-corruption strategy, as well as a strategy for economic diversification to ameliorate oil dependency, thereby impeding DMAP implementation. There is little evidence that Taqadum focused on these issues as part of a strategy for the necessary fiscal decentralization of governance power and functionality to truly achieve decentralization. The Ministry of Finance is widely blamed by respondents for delays and changes to DMAP implementation plans. While this is indeed a significant factor for delayed, partial or, in some cases, as reported, no progress on DMAP implementation, MOF recalcitrance alone is not the primary culprit.

Indeed, centralized public financial management may well be one of the last frontiers on Iraq’s journey to democratization through greater devolution to the provinces, second, perhaps, only to security and stability. Many key informants indicated that “decentralization only decentralizes more corruption.” Whether such a statement is objectively true or not, it indicates a lack of confidence in both the veracity of central public financial management and ongoing and potentially more public financial management at the provincial level. And, Public financial management cannot be addressed without a robust system of citizen accountability and legislative oversight, a conclusion discussed below in relation to inclusivity and responsive governance.

The DMAP process was based on a legal framework for decentralization that is clear to the GOI at the national and provincial levels, but only to a degree; the GOI’s failure to harmonize conflicting constitutional and statutory provisions creates confusion and delays and enables devolution detractors to impede progress on implementing DMAPs. This is particularly the case when it comes to the inextricably linked issues of federalism, decentralization, geopolitical power sharing, wealth sharing, generation, and management. Contestation over “functions” is in essence a struggle over powers, duties and responsibilities as set out in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, as well as Law 21, as amended, and numerous other related enabling laws regarding ministry domains, civil service, and public financial management. The relevant constitutional provisions regarding decentralization confer significant powers on the provinces and regions. For instance, Articles 110-115 of the Constitution of Iraq set out the powers of the federal government. Notably, Article 115 shifts “all powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government” to the regions and provinces and gives priority to their laws over federal law in the event of a dispute in the case of shared powers.

The DMAP design and implementation process addressed the organizational, institutional capacity framework for decentralization, including resolution of the civil service framework, which, while still nascent, has the potential to become a driver of decentralized and democratic governance in Iraq. Taqadum was heavily government-centric in its approach to a large degree, and rightly so, given its mandate to provide technical assistance and capacity building to the GOI to prepare it for decentralization at both the national and provincial levels. A strong, independent cadre of civil servants is a prerequisite for state functioning in accordance with principles of democracy and the rule of law. A strong, streamlined bureaucratic structure enables a state to withstand the political tides over time, and to keep both the state apparatus and the nation intact. A strong, rules-based bureaucracy “keeps the trains running,” literally, in some cases. However, to truly be “citizen-centered,” and to deliver good services to all citizens, the bureaucracy itself must be transparent, accountable and responsive, both on its own, and in relation to the executive oversight conducted by national and provincial representative bodies, e.g. the Council of Representatives, and Provincial Councils.

The DMAP process was not as inclusive and participatory as it could or should have been and could have benefited from a more robust framework for citizen involvement in the DMAP decision-making processes at both the national and provincial levels and at both the design and implementation stages. Inclusion issues generally, and specifically, for women, youth, minorities, and vulnerable populations, were not clearly prioritized in the program design or implementation of Taqadum, including the staffing of the project. A striking fact about the Iraqi population is that the median age is 19.9 years. Women constitute 57 percent of the population yet make up only 8.4 percent of the labor force, indicating that rather than

increasing their presence in employment, the conflict and instability in the country has had a detrimental effect on women's participation now and in the future. Moreover, women have unique service delivery needs, so their exclusion from policy making and planning decisions impedes social, cultural, and economic recovery, reconstruction, and development, as well as political and national cohesiveness. It is imperative, therefore, that women and girls be at the forefront of decisions that affect them and their families.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Specific Programmatic Recommendations

- I. Assistance should continue to address the legal, financial, administrative, and organizational capacity development frameworks for decentralization and should not overly narrow its focus to financial framework inputs alone to secure and solidify decentralization gains.**

It is undeniably critical to address the financial impediments to DMAP or decentralization implementation through the transfer of powers and functions. However, the evaluation team cautions that democratic governance is multidimensional and works only when balanced. Accordingly, assistance programming going forward should focus on ensuring that the “three legs of the governance stool” are balanced to achieve democratic, responsive, inclusive, and effective governance, especially at the local level, which is still in a nascent stage of development as it continues to uptake functions, powers, and duties from the center. This means that the three branches of government need to be separate, but coequal for checks and balances to function properly. With an over-concentration of power in the Executive, a legacy of Iraq's recent centralized past, continual monitoring and incentivized corrections of reversions to centric tendencies will be required. It is notable, in this regard, that implementation has slowed since Taqadum closed out. This indicates that the project was effective in keeping the pace of progress moving along, amidst challenges and struggles.

Therefore, while mindful of resource limitations, we recommend the following:

- Continued technical assistance and capacity building to the executive national and provincial GOI institutions be balanced with concomitant assistance to the central and provincial legislative bodies to ensure representation, participation, and inclusion. This assistance should not, for example, be limited to interactions with only sectoral committees in the provinces, or the regions and provinces committee in the COR, but should address for instance, the internal institutional capacity and other impediments these representative bodies face in becoming full governance partners in GOI, especially but not only in exercising legislation oversight of the budget. This is related in turn to the next recommendation.
- Renewed assistance to civil society strengthening the focus on inclusion, both in coordination with other donors, and as a component of ongoing governance programming. Taqadum is to be commended for its focus on citizen-centered, decentralized service, but the data demonstrate that citizen-centric policy making is incomplete and often ineffective without robust civil society oversight, involvement, and participation. In this regard, transparency and inclusion are essential to accountability, particularly when it comes to public financial management of hotly contested oil and other sources of national and provincial wealth.
- The need to balance the above elements in decentralization assistance is equally mandated in the newly liberated provinces, Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din, even amid reconstruction and stabilization efforts, coupled with ongoing humanitarian assistance. If stabilization is to not only be “held” but to also be “built,” and, equally important, sustained, a balanced mix of programmatic interventions must take place in these provinces to prevent extremist recidivism. In this respect, the evaluation team notes that “soft” services such as youth, psycho-social and cultural services are equally as relevant and necessary for recovery as health, education and infrastructure, and lend themselves easily to serving as vehicles for greater citizen involvement, addressed below. Taqadum assistance to youth programs and orphanages are an ideal model to build upon for these kinds of services, including for example, other social welfare services such as widows' pensions, and employment and loans for women.

2. **Assistance should continue to focus on resolving conflicting provisions in the constitutional and legal framework because these gaps and conflicts continue to impede decentralization of powers and duties by allowing maneuvering room for decentralization detractors.** This recommendation flows from the data, which evidence that the existence of related but conflicting laws and regulations that remain on the books is in fact a serious impeding factor to DMAP implementation and decentralization overall, despite the relative clarity of the constitutional and legislative underpinnings of decentralization. This dynamic appears also to underscore and deepen financial impediments to transfer of functions to the provinces. Finally, given that one of the transferred powers to provinces is legislative powers, preventive harmonization at the national level is imperative, especially given the constitutional clause in relation to the constitutional and legal underpinnings of the allocation of powers to either the central or provincial level or as shared between the two. An even more chaotic legal field will only further impede decentralization. A full blown constitutional review process, while necessary, is unlikely to occur in the near future. Such a process also carries risks presently. In the absence of a process to resolve constitutive contradictions and problematic constitutional formulations, instead use strong legal mechanisms to re structure underlying political agreements so that they in effect act as de facto constitutive laws.

The caveat to this recommendation is that lawmaking requires political will and some degree of willingness to compromise. These appear to be in short supply, particularly as elections approach. However, while the short term is unlikely to be favorable for activities in this regard, in the medium to long term, a continued focus on the legal basis for decentralization will be both an enabling as well as preventive factor and will help shore up the required legal accompaniments to decentralization.

3. **Citizen inclusion and participation in governmental planning, design, and implementation processes such as DMAPs and SDIPs should be a necessary component of any future assistance programming, with a focus on women's and girls' participation.**
 - a. Mainstreaming of inclusion of gender and vulnerability in all aspects of program formulation, design, and implementation should be mandated in all USAID governance programs.
 - b. A senior-level gender and inclusion specialist should be involved in the design and implementation of all governance programs to ensure that gender and vulnerability considerations are integrated in all aspects of the program.
 - c. Outreach programs and public awareness activities should be tailored to the target group with a special emphasis on addressing women's and girls' access to public space.

Overarching Recommendations

1. **Both the development and political arms of the mission should continue to engage directly, and perhaps more proactively, as partners, utilizing carrots and sticks, in assisting the GOI with leading and owning the processes of resolving problems in the implementation of the legal, financial, administrative, and civil society frameworks for decentralization.**

These frameworks for decentralizing the different aspects of the transfer of power to the provinces remain delayed, incomplete and, in some cases, dysfunctional. As set out above in the discussion of conclusions, the DMAP is just that—a tool or mechanism along the road map to decentralization.

Decentralization, however, is a central feature of the Iraqi political settlement and social compact, as reflected in the Iraq Constitution and implementing laws, of which Law 21, as amended, is a part. These constitutive legal frameworks are designed to promote national reconciliation and democratization as Iraq continues to emerge from decades of a highly centralized dictatorship prior to 2003, and, now over fifteen years of violent extremism. Neither well-resourced governance projects providing technical assistance and capacity building, nor diplomatic arm twisting alone will facilitate GOI problem solving and garner the requisite political will to decentralize power in a way that promotes national cohesion, recovery and progress.

Therefore, the overall Mission should continue and deepen its direct engagement as partners with an incentivized GOI in the lead and owning the enterprise of state building and reform. This should be done not only through support to decentralization, but appropriate, context-driven support to areas of the country where peacemaking and national reconciliation and/or reconstruction and stabilization is required to prevent another cycle of extremist driven, violent conflict. The evaluation team notes with interest that the creation of AFADs was in part a creature of such a negotiated incentive-driven partnership, in this instance between the IMF/World Bank and the GOI. International finance actors required, as a condition of partnership in addressing debt relief with the GOI, that it open provincial operating and investment bank accounts.

A meaningful partnership should focus on progressing through unresolved issues in the state building agenda reflected in the Iraqi constitutional and legal frameworks, including reform of financial and economic laws and policies. This process should be supported by a robust yet targeted program of technical assistance and capacity building. The financial and economic policy arena is critical not only for democratic state building, but also for continued stabilization and securitization of Iraq, especially in aftermath of ISIS. This is so for one central reason: inequality breeds conflict, particularly regional and horizontal (identity group) and gender inequalities.

2. Any “carrots and sticks” approach proposed must be grounded in a sophisticated, “ground-truthed” political-economic analysis of the Iraqi geo-political, security, political, economic and social terrain, in short, a “political marketplace” analysis.

This is true with respect to both the COR and MOF, critical governance actors which are not working particularly well in terms of oversight, checks and balances, or keeping the decentralization trains running, so to speak. Conditionalities based on laudable but general exhortations to reform the economy and democratize in exchange for debt or loan forgiveness, assistance or other concessions are not working particularly well in Iraq or elsewhere. This is evidenced across the globe, including in Iraq and Afghanistan, each of which is led by laudable reform champions and where the United States Government is heavily invested. Traditional multilateral conditionality mechanisms, such as the International Monetary Fund Standby Arrangements (SBAs) or other mechanisms utilized by the World Bank and World Trade Organization are often necessary but insufficient to effect desired reforms. Some evidence suggests that such approaches can be ineffective if not harmful in fragile, conflict affected countries.⁶² Bilateral aid conditionality premised on the same traditional approaches is similarly flawed and fraught with numerous similar risks and problems. Yet, these traditional mechanisms often seem like the only or the most potentially successful ways to facilitate or incentivize political and economic reform.

In the last two decades, new concepts and approaches have emerged, accompanied by significant debate and controversy, shifting from purely conditional and sanction-based mechanisms to incentive-based ones.⁶³ A recent concept in this debate has emerged based on a shift in traditional political economic analysis in some policy and academic circles. Rather, an analysis of the “political marketplace governance system” would focus on understanding the complex, political-economic and socio-cultural ways in which Iraqi society, culture, politics, finance and economy actually ‘interact’ and function.

Understanding these dynamics and realities is critical to being able to identify entry points for discussion as development partners, much less actual leverage in aid negotiations. The ways in which and modalities through which violence and security are transacted in the “political marketplace” and how it affects politics must be also be understood, particularly in fragile, conflict affected and at-risk countries or regions.

⁶² World Bank, *IMF and Armed Conflicts: Helping Peace or Creating the Conditions for War?* Bretton Woods Project (February 2004); see also World Bank *Conditionalities: Poor Deal for Poor Countries*, A SEED Europe (2008).

⁶³ Ibid.

The “political marketplace is a contemporary system of governance, characterized by pervasive monetized patronage, in the form of exchange of political loyalty or cooperation for payment.”⁶⁴ Political marketplace analysis looks at how governance systems in weak and fragile states currently function.⁶⁵ A political marketplace is related to systemic corruption, state capture by kleptocratic rule, warlordism or militia-ism, and war economies. However, “the technical tools to deal with corruption will not dismantle the political market place itself.”⁶⁶ Rather, political marketplace analysis helps explain why a reform champion ends up “operating as a political entrepreneur nonetheless.”⁶⁷

Such an analysis can generate a set of tools for understanding the Iraqi context and certain proposed interventions through the lens of likely scenarios and the impacts of policy approaches. This type of analysis may yield the best insight into what matters most to those with whom the aid community must negotiate assistance. An important incidental benefit of a political marketplace based political economic analysis is that it helps identify potentially more effective points of leverage than traditional SBA type conditionalities and may be utilized equally as effectively on a bilateral or multilateral basis.

So, for instance, regarding the difficult case of the Ministry of Finance -- which is really the hard case of getting the dominant political actors to toe the line in terms of fiscal, monetary and development reform -- and the potential runaway train if KRG oil wealth gets back in their hands -- conditionality is still key, but the issue is what conditionality, based on what understanding of what actually is at stake in detail for Iraqi players? What does the GOI want and need from international actors, in this case, the Government of the United States of America, the most? What are the specific incentives driving and funding the complex web of Iraqi patronage politics? What might be specific points of entry for calculated, discrete conditionalities that will push forward what is in essence a reform agenda. How might such an agenda be attractively packaged and sold to the GOI? It must be attractive, because MOF can always decide to take its chances with the KRG oil money.⁶⁸

The COR legislative functioning and MOF budgetary, fiscal management issues are somewhat related in terms of assessing what approaches might work. Both intersect with corruption, but also with power, money and control. Both evidence a lack of both political will and institutional capacity across the Iraqi political economic and governance landscape. MOF's failure to work out wealth sharing in practical, applied terms, and annual budgetary arrangements, for instance, and the COR's lagging law-making and executive oversight are primarily political issues. As such they have as much to do with institutional capacity as they do political will and the intersections among how political parties and political party financing and campaign finance work -- both *de jure* and *de facto*. What are the identifiable or likely incentives driving individual politicians, parties and blocs? How do they work once they are actually in the COR and the executive? To what extent are MPs more beholden to their respective parties than to their constituents? It is highly likely that many of these parties are backed up by militias as well. How does this play out?

In terms of the COR holding GOI to account, the Iraqi system of government is a hybrid parliamentary system that is more parliamentary than presidential, and the biggest party bloc controls the GOI. Parliamentary oversight only works if the political party and electoral systems work properly and the people can and do “vote the rascals out of office” in new election cycles. The problem is whether the political party and electoral system apparatus works that way. One might point to Prime Minister Abadi's election in 2014 as an example of the system working. He is,

⁶⁴ Alex de Waal, *The Political Marketplace: Analyzing Political Entrepreneurs and Political Bargaining with a Business Lens*, World Peace Foundation (2015);

⁶⁵ Alex de Waal, *Introduction to the Political Marketplace for Policy Makers*, JSRP Policy Brief I, World Peace Foundation (March 2016)

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ The unresolved constitutional issues regarding the federalism-decentralization-wealth sharing continuum serve as a cautionary tale about lost opportunities and leaving core issues undecided. Had the political will on the international side been stronger in terms of pushing and brokering a more coherent and equitable state framework in 2005, some of these issues might not still be dragging on and acting as barriers to democratic reform, as discussed earlier.

after all, a decentralization and anti-corruption champion. He is also a political actor, and a very talented one, in other words, a political entrepreneur in a political marketplace.

The Ministry of Finance, and whoever is responsible for it at any given point, is a critical linchpin for Iraq's democratization and inclusive economic growth. The state is the largest employer in Iraq. While there is a nominal civil service in place, political parties compete for control over the state and its oil wealth. In the run-up to elections in May of 2018, the posturing, positioning and bargaining – along with the actual campaigning – will intensify. Violence may escalate during the process of party coalitions and alliances forming and reforming as calculations are made and risk tolerance determined in the political marketplace. The currency in this marketplace is only nominally the Iraqi voters, but rather patronage and violence in a contestation for power, money and control. Iraq resembles “a rentier political marketplace with dispersed control over the instruments of coercion.... [where] political bargaining is conducted using violence or the threat of violence.”⁶⁹

A political marketplace analysis of Iraqi governance would look underneath the institutional facades of the Ministry of Finance or the COR as institutions, and instead examine them as part of the landscape of a political marketplace, filled with political entrepreneurs and their agents. It would look at how the institution, as a collection of such actors, transacts business internally, externally, and where and how both the formal and informal lines of political power and money flow. Iraq presents as a nascent, fragile, conflict affected state with all the modern institutional accoutrements in place, but which is struggling with democratic reform and development. While this is true, it is also a political marketplace. Key questions to investigate are the following: how is it managed? What is the “political budget?” An underlying premise of these questions is that the “goal is power” and “profit is [the] political budget, which is (mostly) reinvested in their political project, especially patronage payoffs”?⁷⁰

In undertaking a political economic or political marketplace analysis to identify points of leverage in negotiations, it must be kept in mind that “under the pressures of competitive monetized politics, transitions from authoritarian rule are not likely to lead to institutionalized democracy. They are more likely to lead to a deregulated and potentially violent political marketplace.” Iraq resembles such a “political marketplace based on rents – such as oil revenue or foreign assistance” where government is dominated by monetized transactional politics. Therefore, what is required might be hard hitting, in depth political economic based approaches to discern what the leverage points are or might be in conditioning USAID assistance, and which ones are also potentially palatable. Iraq has long been at a point where the USG has had to choose among “least-bad” options, whether the options concern security, state fragility, poor governance, oil dependency or humanitarian tragedy.⁷¹ Questions to explore might include: what matters the most to key actors and others in this marketplace? What can be used as a bargaining chip or political currency?

3. The overall Mission should engage more directly and deeply with the HCCP as a primary and necessary decentralization interlocutor because, although it is a good mechanism for coordination and intergovernmental cooperation, it still operates in a top-down, heavily centric approach in which national GOI actors remain in control of the pace and progress of decentralization; moreover, it is politically vulnerable given the upcoming elections.

The HCCP has tremendous potential to be an even more effective agent of change in decentralizing Iraq. It is nested within the Council of Ministers and under the direct supervision of PM Abadi, a decentralization champion. In the upcoming months, prior to the national elections and subsequent provincial elections, the Mission should consider direct support, mentoring, and partnership, both through the development arm and the political arm of the overall Mission, to secure gains made thus far. A closer relationship with the “technical” arm of the decentralization mandate, particularly in the face of political party jockeying before and after the elections, may help safeguard the decentralization gains made through HCCP, as well as prevent political losses as the GOI weathers the upcoming transition.

⁶⁹ Alex de Waal, *The Political Marketplace: Analyzing Political Entrepreneurs and Political Bargaining with a Business Lens*, page 2.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Stephen Biddle, *Evaluating U.S. Options for Iraq*, Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives (June 29, 2014).

These overarching recommendations stem from the observations and conclusions of the team that it would be important, in any further assistance programming, to infuse greater accountability in the partnership between the USAID Mission, and perhaps even international development aid actors, with the GOI around decentralization. The reason is that decentralization, of course, has its inherently technical dimensions in terms of legal, financial, administrative, and civil society engagement frameworks. Equally if not more important is the inherently constitutive and determinative political dimension of decentralization. It is an inescapable conclusion that, despite widespread agreement that decentralization is a national priority, the political will to decentralize remains uneven at both the national and provincial levels to a degree that threatens to undo the progress made through Taqadum and, indeed, 15 years of USAID assistance to Iraq's decentralization mandate.

7.2. Question 2: Improved public service delivery: What factors promoted or impeded the success of provincial service delivery improvement plans (SDIPs)? This should be assessed at the level of each of the provinces in which SDIPs were supported by Taqadum.

This section covers findings regarding the SDIP implementation process and addresses the elements of plans most likely to be implemented, as well as deviations or adaptations to the plans and the rationales for those changes. Next, this section addresses findings, based on the population survey, KIs and FGDs, as to whether high-level results are observed, and the extent to which provinces that developed SDIPs witnessed an improvement in targeted basic services. The issue of whether these improvements are related to more efficient local governance is examined. Additional findings explore whether SDIP development and implementation were inclusive of citizens, particularly women, youth, minorities, and other vulnerable populations. Finally, the section closes with an analysis of SDIP success factors and factors impeding success, in part by way of case studies on service delivery in Baghdad and Babil provinces.

In the wake of the second amendment to the Provincial Powers Law of 2008 in 2013, Taqadum's mandate was to "help set the stage for administrative decentralization in Iraq," especially during the last two years of program activity (2015–2017).⁷² During this period, Taqadum endeavored to lay the groundwork for the transfer of service delivery functions (i.e., technical, legal, and administrative ministerial functions directly to provincial directorates). The DMAP process was an integral part of this overall objective. The SDIP process in part reflected the desired end state to be achieved—improved local service delivery—in short, the very purpose of the decentralization road map itself and all the accompanying tools, mechanisms, and activities.⁷³

The service delivery component was the second major element of Taqadum, in addition to the transfer of functions supported by the DMAP process, which was addressed above. SDIPs were envisioned to be the means for achieving "delivery of citizen-centered community services" across Iraq's provinces to "actually improve the lives of the Iraqi people."⁷⁴

The SDIP process was centered at the provincial level, unlike the DMAP process. Specifically, Taqadum worked with the provinces to develop activities focused on the short-term solutions listed in the SDIPs and linked to the provinces' adoption of the Service Delivery Improvement Standard Performance Management System.⁷⁵ Short-term solutions are those basic services that SDIP Implementation Committees (SDIPICs) determined could be a priority.

At its closure, the GSP/Taqadum project had developed 112 SDIPs (the target was 96) in 12 provinces (the exceptions being Anbar, Ninawa, and Salah ad Din provinces) in the transferred sectors of seven ministries as presented in Table 7 below.⁷⁶ In addition, the project implemented 715 short term solutions as against its end state deliverables targeted 648 short term solutions (67 more solutions achieved than targeted). This represents a 110% success rate in the project achievement that by far exceeds the set target.⁷⁷ The GSP/Taqadum strengthened local government capacity in citizen-based service delivery directly benefited about 7.6 people across the 12 provinces targeted in the intervention.⁷⁸

The interventions benefited about 7.6 million people, as follows:⁷⁹

⁷² Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 11.

⁷³ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 13.

⁷⁴ Taqadum Final Weekly Report (August 30–September 5, 2017), page 11.

⁷⁵ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, pages 13, 22.

⁷⁶ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 22.

⁷⁷ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, pages 22–23.

⁷⁸ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 51.

⁷⁹ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 51.

Table 7: SDIPs by Locations

Location	Number and Type of SDIP
Babil, Basrah, Diyala, Kirkuk, and Maysan	8 SDIPs -1 SDIP each for the 8 targeted sectors/directorates: Health, Education, Water, Sewer, Municipality, Youth, Vocational Training Centers (VTCs), and Orphanage Care
Baghdad	19 SDIPs -1 SDIP for each of the 8 targeted sectors/directorates: Health, Education, Water, Sewer, Municipality, Youth, VTCs, and Orphanage Care, plus additional SDIPs per sector: -5 Education -1 Health -2 Youth -2 Agriculture -1 VTC
Qadisiya, Najaf, and Wasit	1 additional SDIP each for Agriculture
Dhi Qar and Karbala	1 additional SDIP each for Municipalities outside city centers
Muthanna	8 SDIPs, 1 each for the targeted sectors (except VTCs) of Health, Education, Water, Sewer, Municipality, Youth, Orphanage Care, and Agriculture

Methodology for Question 2: To answer Question 2, the evaluation team conducted a 2,400-citizen survey, 6 KIs with CSOs, and 6 FGDs (one per province covered). Analysis of data from the citizen survey informs most of the discussion below, triangulated with analysis of qualitative data from the KIs and FGDs.

Per the evaluation design, six provinces were included in the sample for Question 2: Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, Muthanna, Najaf, and Wasit. Four of these provinces, Babil, Baghdad, Najaf, and Wasit were “model” provinces where Taqadum had worked since July 2014. Taqadum began working in Diyala in October 2014, and in Muthanna in June 2015. As was the case with DMAPs, SDIPs also focused first on basic service delivery across MOH, MOE, and (the former) MMPW. Work with MOA, MOLSA and MOYS came later.

The survey focuses on the following five areas of inquiry, which inform the discussion on findings:

1. Demographic information, including province, urban/rural location, gender, age, ethnicity, vulnerability (IDP, returnee, local resident status), marital status, parent of primary school age children, and disability status
2. The availability and quality of services
3. Citizen interaction with provincial directorates
4. Citizen perception of provincial governments’ performance
5. Citizen inclusion and participation in SDIP design and implementation, focusing particularly on the views of those who knew what a SDIP is in the first instance

Unlike Question 1, which is analyzed from the perspectives of GOI officials, Question 2 analysis of service delivery improvement is drawn primarily from the perspectives of citizens, reflecting their experiences with and perceptions of service provision and provincial governments. The survey does not measure objective service

delivery improvements per se, but citizen perceptions of whether service delivery improved. Taqadum project documents serve as the primary source of information for answering Question 2a on SDIP design and implementation, to determine whether service delivery improvement targets were met, and how they were met. Findings and analysis regarding Questions 2b-d are also based in part on what Taqadum reported regarding SDIP design and implementation and targets achieved. However, these questions are examined primarily based on the quantitative and qualitative data drawn from citizen end-users regarding their experience and perceptions of local service delivery improvements. Additional information showing detailed survey results is set out in Charts and Tables in Annexes L and LL.⁸⁰

The evaluation team's review of SDIPs was limited given that they were provided to USAID and therefore to the Evaluation Team in Arabic only. It was neither practical nor feasible to translate these lengthy plans. Due to time constraints, Arabic speaking members of the team focused on translation of key sections of the SDIPs, such as the strengths and weaknesses (SWOT) analysis of the provincial enabling environments for service delivery.⁸¹ See Annex M for translations of excerpts of select SDIPs.

7.2.1 2a – How were plans implemented? To what extent were SDIPs implemented according to plan? For each province, identify which elements of the plans were more or less likely to be implemented, as well as any major deviations from the plans or adaptations to the plans made over time, and what challenges or circumstances prompted these changes.

Answers to this evaluation sub-question draw largely from a review of project documents to identify whether the institutional framework and implementation process adopted in implementing the SDIPs across the provinces followed the expected implementation procedures set out in the plans. This involved identification of the administrative and institutional processes regarding SDIP implementation committees, accountability and oversight of the plans, and service-based management systems for effective results achievement across the provinces.

The institutional framework and process for SDIP design and implementation was structured and functional: Review of various project documents on how SDIPs were implemented across the provinces shows that the institutional framework for the process required to implement SDIPs was structured and functional. The process involved coordination of implementation, performance management, accountability, and oversight of SDIPs. Planning and implementation of SDIPs took place at the directorate level in the provinces, thus bringing service delivery improvement design and planning closer to citizens. Planning and development of solutions was done by the SDIP Development Committees (SDIPDCs) and was reviewed by the GO task force before the Governor adopted the plans for implementation. The directorates informed the Governor as each solution was implemented, and the province's Essential Service Delivery Oversight (ESDO), a working group of technical experts, then undertook a monitoring process to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the solution's implementation.

On the programmatic side, SDIPs were implemented through plans that prioritized short- and long-term solutions on delivery of social services. The number of approved SDIPs and implemented short-term solutions exceeded the project targets across the 12 provinces. Full details about the findings that address this evaluation sub-question are presented below.

Taqadum's service delivery work focused on improving delivery of basic, vital services to Iraq's citizens by enabling provincial governments to respond more effectively and efficiently to the needs of their communities. This work was based on the assumption that local governments best know their citizens' needs, and, equally important, that citizens can better monitor elected local government officials and hold them accountable.⁸² Accordingly, SDIPDCs,

⁸⁰ Annex K sets out charts referred to in the body of this report, but which are set out separately in the interests of space. Annex L sets out the entire set of charts for reference purposes as they clearly set out the data.

⁸¹ The translation of excerpts of SDIPs will be provided to USAID in a separate transmission.

⁸² Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 49; Taqadum Quarterly Report, April–June 2017, pages 26–29.

consisting of directorate experts, were established in each provincial sectoral directorate and chaired by the directorate's planning manager. SDIPDCs main task was to develop SDIP solution frameworks.

The SDIPDCs measured the current or "as is" status of each service and compared it with the desired, targeted standard. The SDIPDCs devised solutions to close standard gaps. From these baselines, the SDIPDCs then developed those solutions into an SDIP solution framework. Citizen outreach was then conducted by presenting the SDIP solution framework to citizens for feedback through public meetings, surveys, and local government websites. Feedback was collected and sent to the GO task force, which consisted of experts and was chaired by the Governor or directorate official. The GO task force then reviewed and provided feedback to the DC. At the completion of the task force review, SDIPs were formally submitted to the Governor for adoption and immediate implementation.⁸³

At this stage, an SDIP Implementation Committee (SDIPIC), chaired by the Governor or Deputy Governor, was formed within each directorate to oversee the implementation process. Implementation involved the following process:

1. Determining the priority of solutions as short- or long-term
2. Ascertaining available funding levels
3. Assessing the solution's impact intensity (quick or gradual)
4. Determining each solution's effect on its respective gap between the "as-is" state and the desired standard.⁸⁴

The SDIPIC then developed two action plans, one short-term and one long-term. Each plan outlined and detailed how each solution would be implemented and identified responsible parties, location, timeline, and purpose for the implementation of the solution. Once the above steps were completed, SDIP implementation began.

These mechanisms were effective in terms of the technical, sector specific knowledge and expertise required, and do appear to have included citizens to some extent.

SDIP implementation involved a systematized process for monitoring service delivery: As implementation progressed, directorates provided regular updates to the Governor. At the same time, each province's ESDO monitored the effectiveness and efficiency of each solution's implementation.⁸⁵ The ESDOs did this by comparing the "as-is" indicator data collected and assessed the degree to which the gap had closed, thereby determining the success level of the solution's implementation.

Taqadum developed an online Social Accountability System (SAS) and related program that were adopted by 12 provinces and implemented in eight. A service-based performance management system was also adopted by eight provinces: Babil, Dhi Qar, Qadisiya, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, and Wasit. The system was used to develop SDIPs based on standards, criteria, service gaps, implementation, monitoring, and follow-up. Examples include the following:

- Twelve systematized processes for monitoring service delivery were achieved, exceeding the planned target of 9.
- GSP/Taqadum met its target of nine provinces for the five sectors of Water, Sewer, Solid Waste Collection, Primary Health Care, and Primary Schools, which was the set target for FY2016.
- During FY2017, GSP/Taqadum managed to cover the three additional non-ISIS controlled provinces (Basrah, Karbala, and Muthanna) resulting in coverage for all 12 provinces.
- In addition, GSP/Taqadum expanded the 12 ESDOs to include the three new target sectors of Orphanage Care, Vocational Training Centers, and Youth Services of Specific Age Groups; to adopt the SD Monitoring and Oversight SOP; and to develop an action plan for SD monitoring and oversight.

⁸³ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 51.

⁸⁴ Ibid, page 49.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

SDIPs were implemented through plans that contain prioritized short- and long-term solutions on delivery of social services, both meeting, and, in some instances, exceeding targets: Exceeding a planned target of 96, a total of 112 SDIPs were developed in 12 provinces, except Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din. SDIPs were developed in the transferred sectors of seven ministries as set out above in Table 7 above and included identified short term solutions.⁸⁶ Taqadum's end state deliverable targeted 644 short-term solutions for implementation of approved SDIPs. However, the project implemented 715 solutions, thereby exceeding the LOP target by 71 solutions (10 percent).

Achievements in SDIP implementation, meeting and in some instances exceeding targets over the life of the project are as follows:⁸⁷

- Implemented 444 out of 638 short-term solutions (70 percent) for the five sectors of Water, Sewer, Solid Waste Collection, Primary Health Care, and Primary Schools in seven provinces (Babil, Baghdad, Qadisiya, Diyala, Kirkuk, Najaf, and Wasit)
- Implemented 141 out of 415 short-term solutions (34 percent) in the approved SDIPs for the five sectors of Water, Sewer, Solid Waste Collection, Primary Health Care, and Primary Schools in five provinces (Basrah, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Maysan, and Muthanna)
- Implemented 130 out of 370 short-term solutions (35 percent) for the three new target Sectors of Orphanage Care, Vocational Training Centers, and Youth Services for Specific Age Groups in the 12 non-ISIL provinces

7.2.2. 2b. Are high-level results observed? To what extent did the delivery of (targeted) basic services improve in provinces with SDIPs? Are these improvements related to more efficient local governance?

The findings regarding SDIP design and implementation, discussed above, are drawn primarily from project reports, and set out an impressive record of accomplishments and arguably objectively improved local service delivery.

However, the findings regarding evidence of high level results, in terms of the availability, quality and inclusive access to services,⁸⁸ derived from analysis of the citizen survey, interviews and focus group discussions stand in sharp contrast to Taqadum reported achievements in SDIP design and implementation. Indeed, the data elucidate a paradox of sorts. On the one hand, the data show objective evidence of SDIPs' success in improving basic service delivery e.g., service penetration to underserved areas, trash collection where there had been none etc. On the other hand, as will be discussed below, the data based on citizen perspectives paint a different picture in terms of high-level results regarding the availability and quality of basic services, as well as inclusive access to them.

This section sets out findings regarding high level results in terms of the quality and availability of services, interaction with provincial directorates, and citizen perceptions of provincial governments. Findings regarding inclusion and participation are addressed briefly here and in more depth in the discussion of Question 2c.

⁸⁶ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, pages 22–23.

⁸⁷ GSP/Taqadum Activities, Taqadum Weekly Report, Di3, August 30–September 5, 2017, page 24.

⁸⁸ See Annex A, Taqadum Evaluation Scope of Work, page 11.




Chart 24: To what extent do you agree, or disagree, with the following statement: Improving services delivery will help resolve the Iraqi conflict/Iraq's problem/help democracy in Iraq. (n= 2,400)

A large majority of Iraqis across the six provinces surveyed agree that improving services delivery will help resolve conflict in Iraq, help solve Iraq's problems and strengthen democracy in Iraq. This result alone indicates that from both state building as well as nation building perspectives, Iraq has a strong foundation for vibrant, responsive, inclusive and therefore credible and legitimate governance at both the central and local levels. This represents a valuable opportunity, if utilized properly and constructively, for GOI to deliver good governance and improved local service delivery dividends.

By the same token, however, examined in relation to other findings from the survey, this finding represents an equally significant threat to democratic governance in Iraq if, in fact, government does not behave democratically, even if it is objectively improving service delivery. Unfortunately, to the degree that inclusivity is a marker of representativeness and accountability in democratic governance, Iraq's provincial governments remain insufficiently inclusive, despite being closer to the people whom they serve. Examination of the additional findings on the availability and quality of basic services, as well as interaction with and perception of local government underscore this reality.




Chart 25: In your opinion, to what extent were the services included/targeted in this Service Delivery Improvement Plan (SDIP) the priority ones for your area/province? (n= 190)

A majority (70 percent) of respondents who have knowledge of SDIPs agreed that the SDIP services provided were in fact the priority services for their province (see Table I, Annex LL). It must be noted; however, this response did not agree with the rating of the majority of the aggregate of the 2,400 respondents in the survey who indicated that most service delivery had remained the same or had become worse over the past year. This finding suggests a relationship between the knowledge of SDIPs and rating of the performance of the services. Taqadum reports portrayed a picture of improved service performance in the province, but a majority of citizens participating in the survey did not agree with the claim made in the report. Although the project could have performed to a high extent on delivery of targeted basic services, this did not result in citizen perception that service delivery had improved. Only Wasit province had the highest proportion of respondents who indicated that availability and quality of most of the services improved slightly from one year ago (See Chart 25).

SDIP development resulted in provincial directorates objectively demonstrating improved ability to manage and improve service delivery to citizens. Taqadum achieved the following results over the life of the project:

1. Developed and implemented 102 SDIPs in 12 provinces, directly benefiting 7,650,500 Iraqis
2. Implemented 577 (20 percent) of the short-term solutions identified based on the underlying strategic planning system inherent in the SDIP process that laid the foundation for further devolution to provincial districts and sub-districts
3. Developed and implemented a Trash Collection Management System in two pilot provinces, which continues to replicate its success across Iraq
4. Enacted legislation mandating institutionalization of a Service-Based Performance Management System in five provinces
5. Developed science-based Service Delivery Performance Standards
6. Collected data and measured service indicators to continually monitor progress and address challenges or gaps

7. Involved citizens in defining community service needs and monitoring those services

The survey questions on the availability and quality of services were directed at all 2,400 respondents in the population survey. In general, citizens felt that the availability and the quality of service delivery remained the same – or were worse than the services provided over one year ago. This stands in contrast to Taqadam’s reported results achieved.

Despite objective, demonstrated improvement in basic service delivery to citizens by provincial directorates due to Taqadam assisted SDIP development, citizen perceptions of improvement in the availability and quality of basic services are low and a majority of citizens feel that there has been no improvement in basic services over the past year – except for Wasit, where perceptions are somewhat higher.⁸⁹ This is true across the board for all basic services. It holds true for the availability and quality of potable water supply. The highest proportion of respondents across four provinces indicated that the potable water supply to their homes had remained as it was one year ago, except for Muthanna and Wasit (See Chart 1, Annex L). In Muthanna, the highest proportion of respondents felt that the level of water supply became worse in the past year (135, or 34 percent of total respondents). In Wasit, the highest proportion of respondents (188, or 47 percent) indicated that the potable water supply had improved slightly during the past year. Similarly, a higher proportion of respondents across five provinces indicated that the quality of potable water supply to their homes had remained as it was one year ago, except for Wasit province. Wasit again yields the highest proportion of respondents (187, or 47 percent) who felt that the quality of potable water supply improved slightly during the past year.

This pattern is replicated for sewer services. A higher proportion of respondents across five provinces indicated that the sewer system in their area had remained the same as it was a year ago, except in Wasit, where again, the highest proportion of respondents (187, or 47 percent) indicated that the sewer system in their area had improved considerably from a year ago. Similarly, a higher proportion of respondents across five provinces indicated that the condition of roads in their area remained the same as a year ago. Babil and Diyala in particular had the highest proportion of respondents who indicated that the condition of roads in their area had worsened in the past year. And yet, again, the highest proportion of respondents (145, or 36 percent) who indicated that the condition of roads in their area improved slightly during the past year were in Wasit. Garbage collection across the six provinces followed a similar pattern to that of condition of roads in the provinces. Wasit province had the highest rating of slightly improved collection of garbage.

The same pattern holds true for the primary health sector. Wasit province had the highest proportion, with 265 (66 percent) of respondents indicating that a new health center had been constructed or established in their area during the past year. The other five provinces showed higher proportions of responses that there had been no construction of primary health services in their areas. A higher proportion of respondents across five provinces indicated that the quality of primary health care centers had remained the same as a year ago, except Wasit province (see Chart 6, Annex L). Baghdad province had the highest proportion of respondents (176, or 44 percent) who indicated that the quality of primary health centers worsened in their area during the past year. Wasit province again had the highest proportion of respondents (200, or 50 percent) who indicated that the quality of primary health centers improved slightly in their area during the past year.

Finally, for primary education, only respondents who have children (802 respondents, or 33 percent of the total of 2,400 respondents) were asked whether a new primary school had been constructed or established. Wasit province had the highest proportion of positive responses, with 88 (63 percent) of the 183 respondents responding that a primary school had been built or established, or an existing school renovated/refurbished/upgraded (availability) in their area during the past year. A higher proportion of respondents in the other five provinces answered “no.”

⁸⁹ More detailed information regarding the availability and quality of potable water supply, sewer system, road maintenance, garbage collection, primary health and primary education is set out in are set out in Charts 1 through 9 in Annex L, and Tables 2 through 10 in Annex LL.

Babil, Baghdad, Muthanna, and Najaf provinces had the highest proportions, among their respective respondents, who indicated that the quality of primary education had remained the same as it was a year ago. Diyala had the highest proportion of respondents (58, or 47 percent of the 123 respondents who answered) that the quality of primary education their children were receiving worsened over the past year. Wasit again had the highest proportion, with 49 (35 percent) of respondents who felt that the quality of primary education their children were receiving improved slightly in the area over the past one year.

In sum, higher proportions of the respondents (34-44%) across the six provinces indicated that the availability of potable water supply, sewer system, road conditions, and primary schools were the same as a year ago. Similarly, higher proportions of the respondents (37-44%) across the six provinces indicated that the quality of a potable water supply, primary health care, and primary education were the same as a year ago. A majority of citizens across the provinces, (80%) indicated that no new primary health care centers and no new primary schools had been constructed in the past year. Wasit demonstrates slightly higher proportions of positive citizen perceptions.

The possible reasons for the relatively higher proportion of positive citizen perceptions of the availability and quality of basic service delivery in Wasit are somewhat dichotomous and must be understood in context. All six provinces scored below average in terms of service delivery performance across all basic service sectors. Survey respondents indicated low opinions on performance of SDIPs regarding the availability and quality of water supply, sewer system, conditions of road, garbage collected, as well as the quality of primary health care and primary education (e.g. 34-44% of the respondents indicated that the services remained the same as in the last one year). Moreover, 80% of the respondents indicated a primary health center and a primary school respectively were not established/rehabilitated/constructed in their areas. Therefore, while the survey results were relatively better in Wasit, it must be noted that Wasit's results are higher only among very low perception ratings overall and are still below average.

To explore Wasit's relative divergence, the evaluation team triangulated the survey results with other data, including data from evaluation question one, and Wasit CSO KII and FGDs. None yielded particularly illuminating explanations. In fact, the data from GOI officials confirms that the status of decentralization progress in Wasit is the same as across the other provinces. A higher proportion of GOI officials in Wasit, Muthanna and Najaf indicated that they perceive lower levels of corruption than before. This may account to some degree for the relatively higher citizen satisfaction in Wasit, but this is tenuous.

Indeed, Wasit had very low levels of citizen knowledge of SDIPs at only 2 percent (See Chart 10, Annex L). The citizen FGD from Wasit confirms that the disconnect between GOI and citizens is true also in Wasit and reveals a high level of dissatisfaction and distrust of local government. One FGD respondent stated that "all decisions ... are taken between government parties without citizen knowledge." Another FGD respondent said "we regret electing" Wasit local government officials, and that many of them are not specialized or qualified. Interestingly, however, FGD respondents agreed that financial allocations from the central GOI are key to local service delivery and that, "decentralization without financial powers is not effective and useless." Paradoxically, however, yet another FGD respondent opined that "services are better than they were two-years ago and the main reason is because all the powers are in the hands of local government." Another FGD participant stated that "the province is aware of its citizens' needs; however, the services provided are still not enough."

The CSO KII in Wasit yields similarly paradoxical results, and yet, one striking comment stands out – "we can take care of simple matters at the provincial level, but we can't take of crucial matters because directorates' decisions and projects are still dependent on the central ministry." So, while delays in full DMAP or decentralization implementation, particularly in terms of financial resources and fiscal decision making may be partially responsible for citizens' negative perceptions of local governments performance, citizens and civil society actors also clearly understand this aspect of the local governance service delivery landscape. The evaluation team notes with interest that, while Wasit was among the provinces with the highest proportion of respondents who did not even know about SDIPs, that the CSO informant indicated that in Wasit there is a specific day for citizens to meet employees in the service departments, and that most of the service directorates in the province attempted to involve citizens in decision making. However, the CSO informant made it clear that local government did not adequately include citizens or CSOs in SDIP design and implementation, and that SDIP implementation was biased, and not fair.

Numerous possible reasons exist for Wasit's relative divergence from the other provinces in the sample. Wasit was highlighted as a success story in Taqadum's Final Draft Report (2017), "Wasit's e-Communication Moves Trash Collection Management System," available to both citizens and government entities and the first of its kind countrywide. This successful project may in part account for the positive responses for the province. Wasit was also a pilot province and benefitted longer from Taqadum assistance in institutional capacity building and technical support. This likely enhanced its capacity for higher performance in service delivery. This could have enhanced service delivery in Wasit more so than in others. However, a majority of the provinces included in the survey sample were also pilot provinces except Diyala and Muthanna.

Another possible explanation may lie in the strengths identified in the SWOT analysis section of the SDIPs from Wasit. Unlike other provinces, Wasit's SWOT analyses set out self-identified strengths in institutional and human resources capacity that may have contributed to its performance in service delivery across basic services sectors. For example, Wasit's SWOT analysis identified a more favorable security situation in the province that has perhaps allowed for more effective implementation of its education projects. It is likely that a more favorable security environment may have led to perceptions of high performance in the service delivery of the province. In the health sector, Wasit identified an effective administrative system that adheres to administrative controls in all health institutions. In addition, the province had a strategic plan for the construction and rehabilitation of primary and secondary health care centers. Other factors that were identified as strengths in relation to health service delivery include: improvements in partnership with other relevant local government departments and agencies; cooperation with civil society organizations and places of worship; and, conducting surveys and polls that have helped to provide the information base needed for effective health planning. In the provision of water, the province identified as a strength that it has competent engineering and technical staff who are specialists with substantial monitoring and supervisory capacities.

The major factor that differentiates Wasit from the other five provinces is citizen outreach. Citizen outreach in Wasit is stronger than in other provinces in terms of direct access to and interactions with government offices and personnel for information. Stronger, more direct citizen outreach in Wasit could be a cause for the higher perception of service delivery performance than in the other five provinces. While perceptions of provincial directorates' performance are still relatively low regarding various aspects of service delivery, respondents in Wasit province indicated higher perceptions than respondents in other provinces regarding the following:⁹⁰

- 51 percent of respondents in Wasit indicated Agree – Strongly Agree with the question asking whether respondents could easily find clear and accurate information about services provincial directorates provide.
- 50 percent of respondents in Wasit indicated Agree – Strongly Agree with the question asking whether respondents had easy access to provincial government services they needed.
- 49% of respondents in Wasit indicated Agree – Strongly Agree with the question asking whether they received clear and accurate information and instructions about the services sought.
- 44 percent of respondents in Wasit indicated Agree – Strongly Agree with the question asking whether they felt provincial government staff were knowledgeable and competent.

The modality through which citizen input is conveyed matters; direct, personal contact between citizens and government officials and citizen access to them seems to make a difference. As noted in other areas of low participation in the survey, and as shown below in Table 8, only 226 (9 percent) of 2,400 respondents indicated "yes" to survey question 503 ("Do you have the opportunity to have input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government, given limited financial resources?"). Further, as shown below in Table 9, Provincial Council Members are the major channel for citizen inputs generally. Table 9 shows that, for the aggregate of the 226 respondents who had the opportunity to give input, after input to individual provincial council representatives, the next most widely utilized modalities of conveying opinions are to the PC, followed by Public Sessions, CSOs, and Citizen Services (Affairs) offices.

⁹⁰ See Charts 11 through 14, Annex L

However, as shown in Chart 26 below, showing the breakdown of most used modalities for citizen input in Wasit, a higher proportion of respondents (67%) in Wasit used the Provincial Council Citizen Services/Affairs Office, followed by contacting the Governor and other officials through open days (33%). Such approaches to communicating opinions would also involve direct personal contact and access between citizens and government officials in government offices. This finding shows a relationship between the approaches used by citizens in Wasit and getting their opinions across as inputs in deciding priorities in Wasit.

Notably, these interactions require direct contact between citizens and government offices or officials, thus affording citizens greater opportunities for interaction with local government and obtaining information about activities in the provincial councils and directorates. In Wasit, this, in tandem with Taqadum's focus on citizen-centered service delivery, may have resulted in positive synergy in Wasit – which exhibited pre-existing pro-citizen approaches and a focus on institutional and human resource capacity. This could in turn then be linked to the observed results showing Wasit province performing higher than other provinces in terms of citizens' perceptions of service delivery across various sectors.

However, again, there is room for improved performance, even in Wasit province. Strong oversight and monitoring support would be required to ensure the continuation of the higher levels of improved service delivery in any location where replication of Wasit's success is attempted. The implications for the findings from Wasit and possible replication are addressed in the sections setting out conclusions and recommendations.

Table 8: Do you have the opportunity to have input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government, given limited financial resources

Opportunity to have input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government	Frequency	Percent
Yes	226	9
No	2,174	91
Total	2,400	100

Table 9: How do you have the opportunity to have input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government, given limited financial resources (n = 226)⁹¹

⁹¹ Table 9 is a multiple response table referring to a multiple response question where respondents may choose more than one response, as shown in the table above. For this reason, there is no total at the bottom of the table. Each response is to be looked at against the total number of respondents. Therefore, each percentage listed is out of 226 (e.g. 80 out of 226 is 35%).

How citizens have the opportunity to provide input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government, given limited financial resources	Total number of responses to each option by those responding	Percentage of the 226 respondents answering each option
Through Local Council Members (convey my opinion to Local Council members for them to convey to the Provincial or Local Council)	80	35
Through participation in the Public Sessions of the Provincial Council	72	32
Through contacting the Governor and other Official (through the Open Day they dedicate to meet with citizens)	63	28
Through CSOs (convey my opinion to the CSO for them to convey to the Provincial or Local Council)	58	26
Through contacting the Citizens' Services (Affairs) Office (in the Provincial or Local Council)	55	24
Through Social Media (e.g. Facebook pages of Provincial or Local Council)	39	17
Through "Mokhtar" (convey my opinion to the Mokhtar for him to convey to the Provincial or Local Council)	38	17
Other	1	0




Chart 26: How do you have the opportunity to have input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government, given limited financial resources (n = 226)

Local government and citizen interaction is low, and a significant majority – nearly two-thirds – of all respondents think provincial directorates governance and service delivery performance is poor. Only one-third of respondents interacted with local government over the past year. Only 758 respondents out of 2400 (32 percent) reported having any direct and personal interaction with any directorate.⁹²

Most respondents generally ranked provincial service delivery directorates low on all aspects of governance and service delivery performance across the six provinces. Out of 2400 respondents across the six provinces:⁹³

- 1,597 (66 percent) indicated that they could not easily find clear and accurate information about the services provincial directorates provide (see Table 12).
- 1,544 (64 percent) indicated that they could not easily access (any) provincial government service that they needed (see Table 13).
- 1,604 (67 percent) indicated that they did not get clear and accurate information and instructions about the service they were seeking (see Table 14).
- 1,519 (63 percent) “disagreed” or “strongly disagreed” that provincial government staff in the directorate were knowledgeable and competent (see Table 15).

Most notably, in terms of bottom lines, 1,589 (66 percent) respondents indicated that the service they got from provincial directorates did not meet their basic service delivery needs.⁹⁴

Again, these results reflect citizen perceptions, which appear paradoxical, yet make sense given current perceptions of local government. For example, citizens agree that service delivery priorities reflected in SDIPs are the right ones, and that service delivery will help solve Iraq’s problems and deepen democracy. However, citizens also feel that local government is not open, transparent, competent, fair or responsive, nor does it meet their needs. Given the importance citizens ascribe to service delivery as part of democratic governance, it is not surprising that they are critical of the GOI.




Chart 27: I was treated fairly (n= 2,400)

⁹² See Annex LL, Table 11.

⁹³ See Annex LL, Tables 12-15 and Annex L, Charts 11 – 14.

⁹⁴ See Annex LL, Table 16 and Annex L, Chart 15.

In addition to overall low citizen satisfaction regarding provincial directorates' performance, citizens' perceptions of local government bias and corruption are high across the six provinces among all identity groups.⁹⁵ The survey asked citizens to rank the performance of provincial directorates in regard to whether or not citizens felt they were treated fairly, and whether or not they felt that government revenue from the fees they pay to provincial directorates is used properly. Respondents perceive high bias by provincial governments regarding gender, age group, religion, ethnicity, vulnerability, and disability.

Table 10: I was treated fairly

Fair treatment	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	347	14
Disagree	1,262	53
Agree	740	31
Strongly agree	51	2
Total	2,400	100

As shown in Table 10 and Chart 27, a majority of respondents, (1,609 or 67 percent of 2,400) across the six provinces indicated that they were not treated fairly in their interactions with provincial directorates over the past year. Even groups with more societal privilege report higher proportions of perceived unfair treatment, broken down as follows: more males than females reported unfair treatment, as did youth over older age groups, Shia over Sunni religious groups, Arab over other ethnic groups, residents over IDPs and returnees, and, finally, respondents without disabilities over persons with disabilities⁹⁶.

Findings from CSO KIs and FGDs mirror the findings from the population survey. All CSO key informants in each of the six provinces indicated that the process of service delivery planning and implementation was not fair across these various identity groups.

Respondents who filed complaints (415 out of 2400 or 17 percent) with local government directorates similarly perceived bias and unfairness. A majority of these respondents (272 out of 416, or 65%) felt that provincial directorates did not deal with their complaints in a fair and objective manner. Respondents who knew of others who filed complaints but received disparate responses (398 out of 2400 or 17 percent) were asked if they perceived that certain groups receive better services than others. Of these respondents, 68 percent (268 out of 398) said yes. (See Charts 16 -19 in Annex K.

Put simply, a majority of citizens, irrespective of identity group membership, even those from more privileged groups (male vs. female, majority religious or ethnic groups vs. minorities etc.) indicate that they walk away from interactions with provincial directorates – the level of the GOI closest to them – feeling that they have been treated unfairly.

Table 11: The fees/money I pay to the provincial government is used properly

Fees/money paid to the provincial government is used properly	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	745	31
Disagree	661	28
Agree	237	10
Strongly agree	13	0
Not applicable/Not Aware	744	31
Total	2,400	100

⁹⁵ Perceptions among the 400 respondents in each province on local government bias and corruption were not remarkably different from the perception of the aggregate of 2,400 respondents in the six provinces.

⁹⁶ See Tables 17 - 22, Annex LL for details on perception of bias by provincial government based on different characteristics of respondents.

Not only do a majority of citizens walk away from interactions with local governments feeling that they have been treated in an unfair manner, a majority of citizens across the six provinces perceive local government as corrupt. Only 10 percent of the aggregate of 2,400 of respondents in the six provinces “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that there was no corruption in the business of the provincial governments (see Table 11 above), while 1,406 of the 2400 respondents (59 percent) believed that local government is corrupt in how they utilize revenues from citizen fees paid for various services.⁹⁷

In addition to strong perceptions of bias and corruption across the six provinces, citizens do not see local government as responsive, transparent or accountable.⁹⁸ Similar results are observed regarding citizen perceptions of whether local government is more responsive to the needs of citizens than before (see Table 13). Only 353 out of 2,400 (15 percent) agree or strongly agree that this is true, while 517 (21 percent) see no change. The highest proportion of respondents, 924 (39 percent) disagreed that local government is more responsive than before. Only 353 of the respondents (15 percent) “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that provincial government is now more responsive to the needs of citizens than it used to be (see Table 12).⁹⁹

Table 12: Provincial government is now more responsive to the needs of citizens than it used to be

Responsiveness of provincial government to the needs of citizens than it used to be	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	521	22
Disagree	403	17
Agree	334	14
Strongly agree	19	1
There has been no change	517	21
Do not know	606	25
Total	2,400	100

Perception is also high regarding lack of transparency in decision-making by the provincial governments. As shown above in Table 9 on inclusion (opportunity to have input in deciding priorities), 2174 (91 percent) of the aggregate of 2,400 respondents in the six provinces indicated that they had not been afforded the opportunity to give input, to be heard, a fundamental aspect of due process in administrative governance. The population survey confirms shows that 2,294 (96 percent) of the aggregate of 2,400 respondents in the six provinces indicated that local government has not consulted citizens about decisions (through a Provincial Council meeting or other means) during the past year about any topics, not just SDIPs, as shown in Table 13.¹⁰⁰

Table 13: In general, and other than the SDIP, have you been consulted about decisions of the provincial government (through a Provincial Council meeting or other means) during the last year?

Consulted about decisions of the provincial government during the last year	Frequency	Percent
Yes	106	4
No	2,294	96
Total	2,400	100

Perceptions among citizens vary as to whether or not local government conducts business in a more open and accountable manner than it used to a year ago. A total of 900 (38 percent) respondents indicated that they “disagreed” or “strongly disagreed” that the local government conducted its business in a more open and accountable manner than it used to. Only 301 (12 percent) of respondents indicated that they “agreed” or

⁹⁷ See Chart 20, Annex L for details on perception of corruption across the provinces.

⁹⁸ See Table 33, Annex L for details on perception of accountability.

⁹⁹ See Chart 21, Annex L for details on perception on responsiveness of provincial government across the provinces.

¹⁰⁰ See Chart 22, Annex L for details on transparency of provincial government across the six provinces.

“strongly agreed.” And a total of 416 respondents (17 percent) indicated that there had been no change regarding transparency in business processes of government as show in (see Table 14).¹⁰¹

Table 14: Provincial government conducts its business in a more open and accountable manner than they used to

Provincial government conducts its business in a more open and accountable manner	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	542	23
Do not know	783	33
Disagree	358	15
Agree	289	12
Strongly agree	12	0
There has been no change	416	17
Total	2,400	100

Perceptions among the 400 respondents in each province regarding the provincial government’s transparency were not remarkably different from the perceptions of the aggregate of 2,400 respondents in the six provinces. The KIs with CSOs and the FGDs regarding whether they trust local officials to be honest and fair support the finding of the perceived low level of transparency in the population-based survey.

7.2.3. 2c. Were development and implementation inclusive? To what extent did SDIPs (including both drafting and implementation) include women, youth, minorities, and other vulnerable populations?

Inclusion necessarily requires some form of active participation. Participation, in turn, requires awareness or knowledge of a process to be included in it. Therefore, the survey design treats citizen knowledge or awareness of SDIP processes as a necessary precondition for participating in SDIP design and implementation. Therefore, only survey respondents who responded “yes” to the question “[do] you know what a Service Delivery Implementation Plan (SDIP) is” were then asked to respond to questions regarding SDIP inclusivity. As a result, only respondents who answered “yes” were then asked about their participation and involvement in SDIP development and implementation, as well as their views as to whether SDIPs prioritized the right services for their provinces, and, finally, whether their voices and opinions were ultimately taken into account.

However, to ascertain whether citizens may have been involved in local government decision-making other than SDIPs, all respondents, including those who answered “no” regarding knowledge about SDIPs were asked “in general, and other than the SDIP,” whether they had been consulted about other decisions of the provincial government during the last year. Additionally, the survey explored whether citizens had the opportunity to provide input into other local government decision making processes.

Taqadum’s SDIP focus on citizen inclusivity and participation generally, and on vulnerable and underserved populations specifically appears to be tangential to the overall project and was therefore largely indirect and not a primary focus.¹⁰² Taqadum primarily provided assistance to local government officials to deliver “citizen-centered” services Taqadum reported achievements in the development of monitoring, oversight, and accountability frameworks that included development of an online Social Accountability System (SAS) that was adopted in 12 provinces and implemented in eight. The SAS provides a clear role for citizens and civil society to play in terms of holding the local government accountable for service delivery, promoting community accountability, and participating in local decision-making. Citizen-centered services therefore formed a part of the SDIP organizational development framework but was not a main thrust of the project, a fact which had deleterious consequences as evidenced by the survey results.

¹⁰¹ See Chart 23, Annex L for details on perception on openness and accountability of provincial government across the provinces.

¹⁰² Taqadum Annual Monitoring and Evaluation Report – FY2016,

Activities related to citizen oversight of essential service delivery did accompany the project's focus on SDIPs and implementation of SDIP short-term solutions.¹⁰³ These activities served as a mechanism for both inter-branch governmental cooperation and coordination between local executive and legislative branch institutions as well as citizen involvement. Citizens' participation in SDIPs, when it occurred through the limited outreach conducted, involved providing feedback on SDIP solution frameworks through public meetings, surveys, and local government websites.

Taqadum primarily focused on capacity building in directorates "to prepare a strategic planning SDIP system that involved developing and implementing short- and long-term solutions to: 1) fill gaps in services; and 2) improve the efficiency and coverage level of these services."¹⁰⁴ Thus Taqadum built the capacity of local governments, which in turn, provided specific and improved services to citizens, including women, youth, minorities and other vulnerable populations.

It must be noted that in its workshops and training activities, Taqadum encouraged female government officials to participate in project interventions that sought a 20 percent rate of female participation throughout activity planning, execution, and monitoring. The highest percentage of female participation reached by the end of the project was 22 percent. The project also made sure that topics of each training activity addressed gender-specific issues, such as barriers to service delivery that may be specific to women¹⁰⁵




Chart 28: Knowledge about SDIP

Despite the citizen-centered service delivery approach embedded in SDIPs, very few citizens knew about SDIPs and even fewer participated in SDIP design and implementation processes:

The views of civil society and community stakeholders were not widely solicited. Only 190 of the 2,400 (8 percent) respondents across all six provinces indicated that they knew about SDIPs. Baghdad province had the highest number (88) of respondents who actually knew about SDIPs. Most of the 190 respondents (88) who knew about SDIPs were in Baghdad, as were the highest proportion of respondents who participated in both the design and implementation of SDIPs. No respondent participated in the implementation of SDIPs in Diyala.¹⁰⁶

The level of participation in the design and implementation of SDIPs was generally low among citizens, including women across the six provinces. Only 42 of the 190 respondents (22%) who knew about SDIPs

¹⁰³ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 23; Final Quarterly Report No. 53.

¹⁰⁴ Taqadum Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 51.

¹⁰⁵ Taqadum, Draft Final Report, December 2017.

¹⁰⁶ See Chart 24, Annex L

participated in the actual SDIP design. However, only 58 of the 190 (31 percent) participated in SDIP implementation.¹⁰⁷ Baghdad had the highest proportion of respondents who participated in both design and implementation of SDIPs, while no respondent participated in implementation of SDIPs in Diyala.

Moreover, participation in the design and implementation of SDIPs varies with the self-identified characteristics of the respondents who knew about SDIPs in the first place. In comparing the 42 of the 190 respondents across the various groups who participated in SDIP development and implementation across the entire sample, the following results emerged. Men were the largest group of participants, with fewer women than men participating. More youth participated than older citizens. A majority of participants were from Shia religious communities while the next highest group of participants was from Sunni communities, followed by a smaller number of Christians. The ethnicity of a majority of participants was Arab, while the next highest groups were Kurds and then Turkmen. A smaller number of vulnerable groups (e.g. IDP or returnee communities) participated than established residents. Fewer persons with disabilities participated than those without disabilities. In sum, fewer women, youth, minorities, and other vulnerable groups were involved in the design and implementation of SDIP service delivery planning and implementation.¹⁰⁸

This low level of SDIP knowledge and participation was mirrored in the FGDs in each of the six provinces as well. However, most of the respondents who knew about SDIPs were in Baghdad.

Knowledge of SDIPs matters: a higher proportion of the 190 respondents who knew about SDIPs had higher perceptions across the board. Those who know about SDIPs have higher perceptions of the availability and quality of basic service delivery than those who do not know about SDIPs. Similarly, among the 190 who know about SDIPs a higher proportion have a higher perception of provincial government service delivery in terms of access to information and services. Finally, a higher proportion of the 190 who know about SDIPs have more interaction with provincial directorates than those who do not know about SDIPs. Charts 27 – 43, Annex L show this relationship between knowledge on the one hand, and a higher proportion of more positive perception of local government service delivery on the other hand.

This demonstrates evidence of a relationship between respondents' knowledge about SDIPs and perception of provincial government service delivery and performance. This has implications for citizen awareness, outreach and participation in governmental decision-making processes. If it is the case that the more citizens know about what the government is doing, the more positive their perception of government will be, then clearly more citizen outreach is needed. Again, Taqadum helped provincial directorates achieve verified targets in improving service delivery. The disconnect here seems to be that this valuable work was insufficiently disseminated to citizens in a way that reached the majority.

Table 15: In your opinion, to what extent were your voice, opinions, and needs as a woman/widow/ youth/ PWD/IDP/returnee etc. that you contributed in the design/ implementation process of SDIP heard and taken into account?

Extent to with respondents' voice, opinions, and needs contributed in the design/implementation process of SDIP	Frequency	Percent
Not considered/taken into account	73	38
Somewhat considered/taken into account	81	43
Largely taken into account	20	11
Not sure/ Do not know	16	8
Total	190	100

While knowledge is key, so is governmental responsiveness to citizen input: a majority of respondents who knew about SDIPs felt that their views and needs were not heard or taken into account in SDIP design and implementation. Only 20 out of 190 (11 percent) respondents indicated that their views were largely taken into account. A total of 81 out of 190 (43 percent) of respondents in the six provinces considered that their voice/opinions were "somewhat taken into account," and a total of 73 of the relevant respondents (38 percent) considered that their voice/opinions were "not taken into account." A CSO informant put it succinctly and stated that "the truth is that citizens were not involved, and if they were,

¹⁰⁷ See Charts 25 and 26, Annex LL.

¹⁰⁸ See Tables 23-36 in Annex LL.

their opinions were not taken into account.” This dovetails with the finding that most citizens did not feel their input was taken into account in service delivery decision making as shown in Table 15 above.

Baghdad province has the highest proportion of respondents who indicated that their voices or opinions were “somewhat to largely taken into account” in SDIP processes. Diyala, Muthanna, Najaf, and Wasit provinces had higher proportions of respondents who indicated that their voices or opinions were not considered or taken into account (See Chart 44, Annex L.

This is echoed by the KIs with CSOs and the FGDs, which show that gender considerations in the design and implementation of SDIPs do not appear to have been addressed nor the views of women considered. The CSOs also indicated that SDIPs did not take into account service provision designed to meet unique needs of girls and women along a spectrum of “not at all” to “some extent.”

Women and girls remain marginalized and excluded from decision making, and their special service delivery needs remain unmet. Both CSO and GOI KIs underscore this reality in Iraq. GOI officials in the six survey provinces admit that the special service delivery needs of girls and women were not taken into account in decentralization and service delivery design and planning. CSOs confirm this across the provinces and identified the following as examples of gaps in service delivery to girls and women:

- Maternal health
- Single mothers and their children
- Victims of domestic violence
- Victims of sexual and gender-based violence
- Pensions for widowed women
- Employment and loan services tailored for women
- Educational disparities between girls and boys

One CSO informant states that “women were not fairly represented; women’s views were not sought out, nor were women’s service delivery needs taken into account.”

Most respondents who knew about SDIPs and participated in their design did so through CSOs, but despite knowing about SDIPs, CSO participation itself was low: Respondents who indicated that they knew about SDIPs were then asked if they participated in the design of SDIPs and, if so, to identify how. Options were:

- PC or PC committee sessions held on SDIP design
- Public hearing or presentation sessions held by PCs
- Through CSOs
- Response to PC surveys or polls, or
- Other modalities of participation

A majority of respondents indicated that they participated through CSOs. A majority (five out of six) of CSO key informants across the six provinces did know about SDIPs but indicated that provincial directorates had not included or otherwise consulted CSOs about SDIPs. In particular, one out of six CSO key informants interviewed indicated that provincial directorates had asked about the views of CSOs on women, youth, minorities and other vulnerable groups in the design and implementation of the SDIPs. Most CSO informants, except for Wasit and Najaf, indicated that women’s needs are not adequately included nor are women adequately consulted in the process of developing and implementing SDIPs. In addition, SDIP design and implementation did not appear to consider the unique needs of girls and women or otherwise reflect any gender impact analysis. Finally, all six CSO key informants indicated that fewer women than men participated in SDIP processes.

Generally, the CSO KIs support findings from the population survey regarding the low level of inclusion and diversity of citizens in SDIP activities.

Table 16: In general, and other than the SDIP, have you been consulted about decisions of the provincial government (through a Provincial Council meeting or other means) during the last year?

Participation in implementation of SDIPs	Frequency	Percent
Yes	106	4
No	2,294	96
Total	2,400	100

Citizen inclusion in local government decision making is also very low across the board generally. A majority of respondents reported not having been consulted by their respective provincial governments about decisions, other than SDIPs specifically, at all over the past year. Only 106 out of 2400 (4 percent) respondents indicated having been consulted about decisions taken by provincial governments, while the vast majority, 2,294 respondents (96 percent), reported no consultation. See Table 16 above.

Similarly, a total of 2,174 of the respondents (91 percent) indicated that they did not have the opportunity to have input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government, given limited financial resources as shown in Table 13 above, and detailed by provinces in Chart 22, Annex L.

Otherwise, even if local government plans and priorities are the same or similar with those of citizens, and citizens and local government share the same values regarding the importance of local government driven service delivery to democratization in Iraq, disconnects such as these demonstrated here are a risk and may continue to be expressed through low citizen satisfaction. Low citizen satisfaction in turn may leave the door open to extremists, who will exploit this low citizen satisfaction, discontent, and distrust of local government.¹⁰⁹

2d. What factors promoted/imposed success? What factors were associated with the most successful plans, as measured by improvements in service delivery outcomes? What factors impeded the success of plans?¹¹⁰

Taqadam citizen-centered assistance provided in the design and implementation of SDIPs, together with the nature and structure of the SDIP plans themselves were clear success factors. SDIPs are well structured in terms of institutional and programmatic framework design for their implementation even though, as captured by the survey results, these were not sufficient to promote inclusive and participatory service delivery.

Taqadam assistance included an impressive array of capacity building and technical assistance activities designed to enhance effective and accountable local service delivery to citizens. Taqadam assistance to improved service delivery overall, culminating in SDIPs, included ostensibly citizen-centered approaches. The following aspects of Taqadam assistance support this observation:

1. The structured and functional institutional framework and process for public policy as well as related SDIP design and implementation
2. The systematized process for monitoring service delivery
3. SDIP implementation according to prioritized short- and long-term solutions
4. Electronic, web-based Social Accountability System (SAS) and Citizen Service Desks

Taqadam provided assistance to provincial government in organizational development, process mapping and streamlining of citizen-centered services and increasing citizen awareness as well as developing monitoring, oversight, and accountability frameworks among national and provincial governments and citizens. A key example of a related initiative is the electronic, online Social Accountability System (SAS) adopted in twelve provinces, including each of the surveyed provinces except Muthanna. The SAS was designed “to support local

¹⁰⁹ This pattern of government failure providing fertile ground for extremists to garner support is present in similar countries throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region, as well as the Horn of Africa and now West Africa. Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*, Edinburgh University Press (2011)

¹¹⁰ See Chart 24, *supra*.

governments to be more transparent and responsive to local needs and to empower citizens to hold their local governments accountable for services delivered.... [and] to go online and submit their feedback regarding the quality of services being delivered.”¹¹¹ Taqadam reported “a surprisingly high level of broad acceptance” of this tool, which is encouraging. This tool was designed to facilitate citizens to become more involved in local government proceedings and to make local government more transparent and responsive to citizens.

It must be noted that Taqadam’s assistance to local governments in public policy making was a strong feature of the project’s assistance to improved service delivery in the wake of decentralization pursuant to the amendment to Article 45, Law 21. Critically, the shift in the locus of service delivery and other governance related powers and duties from the central government to the local government marked a watershed moment for provincial governments and particularly service delivery directorates from 2015 to the end of the project in 2017. “The concept of public policy making is relatively new to local Iraqi officials as the ministries have traditionally done most of the policy making. Now with the ongoing decentralization process the concept of policy making has transformed.”¹¹²

This formative, initial post-transition period was still underway when Taqadam closed out. As demonstrated in the discussion of Evaluation Question I, this transition is far from complete, and agreement on decentralization and what it means in practice remains elusive. The intergovernmental cooperation required in the planning, policymaking and fiscal management dimensions of local service delivery has yet to be established or even sustained, much less citizen involvement in this rather complex and fraught process in Iraq. Therefore, it is possible that the withdrawal and lack of continued support to newly empowered and tasked local governments since project close out and the date the survey was administered might have been a factor contributing to a drop in the affirmative focus and management of initiatives focused on citizen involvement and in negative citizen perceptions at the time of the survey.

In sum, Taqadam reported significant accomplishments in SDIP implementation across relevant service sectors and provinces. These resulted in objective improvements in service delivery, notwithstanding negative citizen perceptions. Taqadam’s focus and activities were a positive and necessary intervention for improved service delivery *per se*, but nonetheless an insufficient precondition for improved citizen confidence and satisfaction. However, citizen awareness and inclusion are a governance issue that advanced democracies also continue to struggle with, even with substantial checks and balances in place designed to ensure openness, transparency and responsiveness. It may be that the lack of awareness is in part due to the short time-frame for Taqadam’s work with local governments on service delivery solutions. Again, Taqadam’s achievements often exceeded targets established in the contract without additional project funds or GOI investment budgets. Solutions were nonetheless carried out due to the project’s capacity-building efforts, management of resources and direct project oversight of the decentralized provincial government. However, it is precisely the issue that transference of oversight from the project to citizens, either directly to citizens or indirectly to provincial councils in the exercise of their representative functions, did not occur at the project’s end. That is a higher level of oversight in terms of overall project design and sustainability than just project oversight. Perhaps this was beyond the scope of the project contract.

In sum, the project’s focus, objectives, activities and the results it did objectively achieve are success factors for service delivery improvement.

The enabling environment created by the legal framework for decentralization is a success

factor: Provinces benefit from the same enabling legal environment, regarding administrative decentralization provided in the Iraqi Constitution and Law 21, as amended. As was the case with DMAPs, several institutional frameworks are also in place to ensure effective planning and implementation of SDIPs, including the following:

- PPDCs
- Service-based performance management systems (Baghdad province not included)
- TCMS (Babil province not included)
- Monitoring, oversight, and accountability framework among national and provincial governments and citizens

¹¹¹ Taqadam Final Quarterly Performance Report Y6Q3 July 28, 2017, pages 15-17, 58.

¹¹² Ibid, page 59.

Although the legal framework is upheld to a degree through the DMAP and SDIP processes, and the above mechanisms were effective in promoting decentralization of service delivery functions through process mapping and institutional capacity development. However, the institutional frameworks are primarily operational, except for the monitoring, oversight and accountability framework. The latter, based on the survey results, did not capture the issue of inadequate inclusivity and participation by citizens, women and CSOs. As a result, again, based on the survey, citizen voice and opinions appear to be absent in the design and implementation of SDIPs in the provinces, despite the e-based SAS effort, which does seem to have reached primarily youth. The lack of inclusion overall likely accounts for the low rating of service delivery by citizens, and the high proportion of respondents who perceive a lack of transparency, bias, and corruption in the use of funds. This is supported by the population-based survey and corroborated by KIs held with CSOs and the FGDs in the provinces, particularly the finding that SDIP development resulted in provincial directorate objectively demonstrating improved ability to manage and improve service delivery to citizens.

Specific behaviors or actions taken by provincial governments for design and implementation of SDIPs across all provinces are success factors. Constant coordination between provincial ministries and directorates and high-level coordination between directorates and the various departments enhanced effective planning and implementation of SDIPs. For example, provincial governments made efforts to plan and activate the various institutional frameworks needed for design and implementation of their respective SDIPs, as intended by Taqadum. The actual planning and implementation of some short-term solutions set out in SDIPs demonstrated that the intended service delivery can be achieved.

However, the project's documents did not appear to address the oversight or quality assurance of standard operating procedures regarding the promotion of cooperation between provincial governments and citizens, including women and CSOs. SDIPs mention this, but the lack of clear communication mechanisms to reach out to citizens and the lack of educational awareness programs hindered inclusivity and participation.

Both citizens and GOI actors agree that improving service delivery can help resolve the Iraqi conflict and help democratize Iraq: A majority of the citizen survey respondents indicated that improving service delivery will help resolve issues and democratize Iraq. This is supported by the CSO KIs and FGDs (see Chart 24 above), as well as KIs with GOI officials on DMAPs. This is a critical success factor and represents shared values across citizens as well as central and provincial GOI actors. This is a foundational determinant not only for SDIPs, but most critically, for nation building, first and foremost, as well as state building.

As stated earlier, this finding is a success factor. However, by the same token, if the central, definitional component of democratic governance is missing – citizen awareness, inclusion and participation in key decision-making processes in a transparent, accountable, responsive government – then democratic nation and state building is at risk and the absence of citizen involvement becomes an impeding factor for SDIPs and the larger democratization effort of which SDIPs form an integral part. Even if government fails and citizens grumble and complain, which they do and will no matter what, the expression of such dissatisfaction should be through the ballot box or citizen advocacy and not resort to violent extremism. Iraq remains at extremely high risk for future cycles of violent extremism as, in part, an expression of exclusion, inequality and consequent dissatisfaction with service delivery and governance. GOI ignores this opportunity to improve service delivery through intensive citizen interaction and demonstrated responsiveness to citizen feedback at its peril.

State building is primarily technical. Nation building is the more amorphous process of cementing the ties that bind peoples together, no matter how diverse, and of realizing and honoring the social compact. An agreed, shared set of values, as expressed and set out in a social contract or compact is a predicate for both the legal state building and the social cohering dimensions of nation building. As discussed elsewhere, Iraq has a social compact deficit, and is therefore vulnerable from a security standpoint. The “clear, hold, build” aspect of USAID’s intertwined decentralization and stabilization efforts have focused on the right issues, but within a vacuum. That vacuum is the absence of a foundation built on a strong, durable social compact and deepened democracy. Decentralization, while a laudable and necessary focus, has become simply yet another bargaining chip in power and money sharing in the Iraqi political economic landscape. This is so primarily because core, determinative issues remain unresolved at the constitutive level of the state and the nation of Iraq.

As stated by a civil society key informant in Diyala, “there is a gap between the citizen and the government and this gap plays a big role.” Iraqi minds have been won on the democratization-stabilization front, but the hearts have yet to be won over in building a nation based on inclusion. This is where the real work lies.

The priority services targeted in SDIPs are success factors, although aside from health and education, other critical “soft services” are not included in primary service delivery: The services targeted were in fact citizen-centered services that met the requirement to improve the lives of Iraqis as intended in the project’s objectives. Moreover, a majority of respondents who knew about SDIPs agreed that these are high priority services. However, both the survey as well as CSO and GOI KIIs show that, for instance, the special service delivery needs of girls and women are not a focus of service delivery. Services regarding the following are not included in SDIPs, and yet, from a gender equality and empowerment perspective, are essential:

- Maternal health
- Female-headed households
- Victims of domestic violence (and lack of police and justice sector support)
- Victims of sexual and gender-based violence
- Pensions, employment and loan services tailored for widowed and other women
- Educational disparities between males and females

Citizen inclusion – knowledge of and participation in SDIPs specifically, but also in government decision making generally – is a success factor, but the lack of such inclusion is both an impeding factor as well as a risk factor. Consultation with stakeholders was in fact conducted by the project and took place primarily through electronic social media that reached more youth than other age groups. This is a success factor, given that the median age of the Iraqi population is 19.9 years of age. The ways in which cooperation among stakeholders was promoted, through primarily web-based social media is a success factor and resulted in more youth participating in service delivery decision making processes. As stated previously, most of those consulted were the younger age groups, especially youth. In other words, consultation decreases as age increases. However, the failure to reach other age groups and diversity of identity groups is an impeding factor.

Citizens perceive provincial GOI as biased, corrupt and unresponsive which constitutes an impeding factor: Respondents perceive bias toward different categories of the respondents with respect to sex and gender considerations, age groups, religion, ethnicity, vulnerable groups, and people with disabilities. CSOs were not included in local government decision making on service delivery issues or to support citizen outreach, nor were the views of CSOs and citizens adequately considered in the design and development of SDIPs. However, local government across all six provinces undertook the design and implementation of their respective SDIPs using the available legal and institutional framework.

The low inclusion of CSOs and a wide range of citizens, including women and vulnerable groups, led to the low level of knowledge about SDIPs among them. This resulted in limited knowledge of the contributory effects of SDIPs in the mechanism for improved service delivery in both provinces, and invariably in the low rating of performance of ministries and directorates in both provinces, as well as high perception of unethical governance issues such as lack of transparency in decision-making, perception of bias towards citizens based on their various identity characteristics, and perception of corruption in use of government funds at both the national and provincial levels.

Knowledge matters: lack of citizen knowledge and involvement in SDIP design and implementation specifically and local government decision making generally appears to contribute to low citizen perceptions overall and is therefore an impeding factor. Findings from the survey show low levels of knowledge and involvement of citizens, CSOs, women, and other vulnerable groups in SDIP design and implementation. However, among those who know about SDIPs have higher perceptions than those who did not know about SDIPs of the following: the availability and quality of basic services, interactions with provincial directorates; and, perceptions of local government accessibility and responsiveness.¹¹³

¹¹³ These results are shown in Charts 27 – 43, Annex L, showing multiple bar charts of responses by the 190 who knew about SDIPs, versus those who did not know about SDIPs.

There was a higher engagement with youth in Babil and Baghdad, as well as the other four provinces, but the youth perceived a higher level of bias against them than older citizens,¹¹⁴ the reasons for which must be explored by GOI to prevent further social and political instability in Iraq. The use of social media as the primary tool of public awareness creation is appropriate for youth, who are most likely to have greater access to internet sources of information than citizens of older age groups who were less involved in planning and implementation of SDIPs in both provinces. This indicates the need for GOI actors to use other communication media, including traditional means such as newspapers, television, radio, town hall meetings, and public hearings that will reach all categories of citizens located in rural and urban areas.

Evaluation Question Two – Case Studies on Factors That Promoted/Impeded SDIP Success in Both Babil and Baghdad

The case studies of Babil and Baghdad provinces look at the nature or structure of the SDIPs, services targeted, enabling environments, and specific behaviors or actions taken by local government that promoted planning and implementation of SDIPs in cooperation with stakeholders, including how women and youth were engaged. Factors that promoted or impeded the success of SDIPs in both provinces were identified from analysis of the case studies.

Both Babil and Baghdad have respective SDIPs targeting the same sectors and similar services. However, Baghdad appears to have stronger institutional capacity in a greater number of directorates, and invariably more widespread coverage areas of the directorates that are available to provide service delivery. For instance, Baghdad province has six education directorates, and two directorates for health youth, and agriculture respectively.¹¹⁵ The focus in the urban centers could have affected the rate and quality of the spread of services to remote rural areas in Babil province.

A central finding and success factor is that respondents who know about SDIPs also have higher perceptions that the service delivery priorities across the six provinces are the right ones for their areas.¹¹⁶ Also, certain SDIP programmatic areas involved delivery of specific citizen-centered community services. SDIP plans included promotion of cooperation among the stakeholder and inclusiveness of women and other vulnerable groups without bias. Further, the SDIPs were expected to strengthen the capacity of staff in provincial ministries and directorates to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery performance.¹¹⁷

However, despite the many avenues created by the available enabling environment and institutional frameworks for high performance in the implementation of SDIPs, these did not translate into improved service delivery, as evidenced by: (1) the low level of participation by citizens, women, and CSOs; and (2) the accompanying low scores given to service delivery performance in both Babil and Baghdad. The CSO KIs and FDGs support the finding from the population-based survey in this respect. FGD participants in various provinces made various statements confirming the low level of participation in service delivery design and implementation by the provincial governments. One participant said, “we are not consulted by the local government in planning the development of providing services in the province.” Another stated that “the local government did not take into consideration opinions of the citizens regarding services” and yet another opined that “local government did not consult us because they are corrupt and do not want to be exposed.”

Factors promoting success in Babil and Baghdad. The following factors are considered to have promoted the success of SDIP plans in Babil and Baghdad, and should be considered in planning and implementing other community citizen-centered interventions elsewhere:

Various factors have been identified as having promoted the success of SDIP plans in Babil and Baghdad, either through increasing operational efficiency of SDIP plans or building confidence and encouraging community buy-

¹¹⁴ See Table 18, Annex LL.

¹¹⁵ Taqadam Draft Final Weekly Report (August 30-September 5, 2017), pages 18-22.

¹¹⁶ See Table 1, Annex LL and Chart 25 above.

¹¹⁷ This is indicated in Taqadam’s development objective, that GOI will respond more effectively to community needs, and a development hypothesis that decentralization will result in improved, more citizen-focused local service delivery. See Taqadam Draft Final Report, December 2017, page 2.

in. These issues should be taken into consideration when planning the implementation of community citizen-centered interventions elsewhere.

One of the factors that increased operational efficiency of SDIP plans in Babil and Baghdad is the fact that both provinces possess greater institutional capacity thanks to a larger number of directorates and this capacity has helped deliver services over a wider area. Second, capacity building and technical assistance provided to these already-gifted provinces helped promote the successful design and implementation of SDIPs. Furthermore, both Babil and Baghdad have enabling legal environments and strong institutional frameworks which contributed to decision-making in the design and implementation of SDIPs and, finally, constant coordination between the ministries and the directors along with very close cooperation between directorates and the various departments helped promote effective planning and follow-through.

Community confidence and local buy-in of the activities was also key to the success of SDIPs in Babil and Baghdad provinces and various factors exist which promoted these key traits: One is the fact that some short-term solutions were formulated and implemented by SDIPs. Once achieved, these short-term solutions demonstrated that SDIPs could deliver the targeted service within an established time frame and helped build community confidence. Second, the SDIPs targeted sectors and services that were higher citizen priorities while, third, focusing on citizen-centered development objectives and results, hypotheses, and critical assumptions. Finally, greater engagement with youth in the planning and implementation of SDIPs proved to be very effective, as did the strategic use of social media to reach a broader cross-section of citizens.

Factors that impeded success of plans in both Babil and Baghdad provinces. While some success factors were evidenced, other factors have also been identified as having impeded the success of plans in Babil and Baghdad provinces. These factors can be broken down into two categories; operational deficiencies and faults in community engagement and perceptions.

One operational deficiency that impeded success of SDIPs in Babil and Baghdad was the focus on service delivery in central cities. Second, the monitoring, oversight, and accountability frameworks in both provinces proved ineffective in promoting relationships among national and provincial governments as well as citizens and CSOs. Additionally, cooperation among citizens was also impeded due to inadequate, poorly enforced, or nonexistent standards of operations that should have been designed to promote cooperation, while no clear communication mechanism existed to reach out to citizens or conduct educational awareness programs. A lack of financial allocations to cover the implementation activities by the directorates also impeded success, as did staff shortages in some technical areas that were needed for service delivery. This last factor – a shortage of qualified staff - resulted in some employees lacking the knowledge or competencies required to perform their assigned responsibilities successfully.

Finally, SDIP success was also impeded into Babil and Baghdad provinces due to deficiencies in community engagement and perceptions. For example, due to the low level of participation, inclusion, and consideration of citizens, including women and CSOs, in the SDIP design and implementation process, overall community awareness remained low throughout implementation right through the results stage. This lack of awareness was furthered by the absence of multiple means of communications - including traditional media - which might have been used by SDIP staff to reach all categories of citizens located in both rural and urban areas. Additionally, perception of the work was harmed by the fact that participants in SDIPs came into the program with a poor perception of governmental transparency in decision-making and many participants – especially youth – believed that biases existed based on various factors which included gender, age group, religion, and more. Finally, participants had poor confidence in the responsible use of funds by provincial governments and believed that corruption was taking place. All of these factors ultimately impeded the success of SDIP plans in Babil and Baghdad provinces.

Both provinces indicated as impeding factors the challenge of inadequate numbers of personnel and lack of technically-trained staff, as well as financial allocations to cover the activities implemented by directorates: Both provinces indicated staff shortages in some technical areas of drainage and sewer management as well as professional service staff needed for service delivery. Babil province indicated that the lack of staff causes available staff to be assigned responsibilities that are beyond their capacity. Staff are also overloaded with the many tasks carried out by the directorates. This claim is supported by findings of the survey, KIIs with CSOs and the FDGs, which are that provincial government staff (in the directorates) were not knowledgeable and competent enough to perform their responsibilities.

CONCLUSIONS¹¹⁸

The overarching conclusions regarding Question 2 are similar in nature to those regarding Question 1. Service delivery and concrete, tangible livelihood improvements that respond to citizens' needs and priorities are key to transparent, accountable, and effective democratic and decentralized governance. In a context such as Iraq, which has wavered back and forth between post-conflict and conflict affected status, service delivery inevitably takes on inherently stabilizing, conflict prevention, or amelioration, as well as reconstruction purposes. Without solid and stable public services and genuine citizen-centered governance – at national and local levels – Iraq will inevitably remain in a tenuous state of fragility leaving it perpetually vulnerable to conflict threats and instability.

Notwithstanding the NLAs, which are in a new post-conflict cycle since their liberation from ISIS in 2014, USAID decentralization assistance in Iraq historically has generally been both about local governance and stabilization, particularly, for example, since 2006/2007 when the platform for USAID assistance was devolved down to the provincial level and embedded with civilian-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).¹¹⁹ PRTs were informed by counterinsurgency doctrine's "clear, hold, build" theory and practice of stabilization triage.¹²⁰ After reviewing the project background and materials as well as data, the evaluation team sees clear evidence of the legacy of this approach in Taqadum's central purposes and approach, especially in the NLAs. Indeed, SDIPs themselves particularly lent themselves to the sort of "triage" approach adopted from the PRT era, as evidenced by the urgency underlying short-term service delivery aspects of SDIPs. These short-term imperatives sometimes, however unintentionally, took precedence in Taqadum implementation at the expense of citizen outreach and achieving longer-term democratization and decentralization dividends other than immediate, short term gains designed to win the confidence of the local populace without having sufficiently consulted with them to ensure that the services were reaching the right parts of the community such as underserved groups or those in rural areas.

Taqadum achieved commendable gains in improving the capacity for the GOI to design and implement SDIPs under challenging and exigent circumstances to deliver priority services. Any project on the ground must triage and manage myriad competing and often contradictory imperatives stemming from the project contract, design and work plans as well as intervening circumstances dictating shifts in focus, approach and direction. This is especially so in conflict affected and post-conflict contexts. Taqadum traversed this minefield with dexterity and expertise. Not only was the project technically on point, it earned the confidence, loyalty and respect of its GOI counterparts and national staff – no small feat, indeed. Another important aspect of Taqadum that must be mentioned is its impressive national staff, many of whom voluntarily assisted the evaluation team in numerous ways throughout the course of the evaluation research even though the project had closed out.

The problems identified in this evaluation are larger, deeper policy issues that must in the first instance be dealt with by USAID and the wider donor community in terms of the focus and conditions under which a development partnership with the GOI will proceed.

Service delivery alone, whether short- or long-term, is not the panacea to cure what ails Iraq.

While local service delivery is a necessary pre-condition for local governance, it is by far not the only pre-condition nor is it alone sufficient to improve local governance. Service delivery is an element of governance, and in a devolved democratic system, it is a core element of local governance. But local service delivery alone is insufficient to deem democratization successful. To expect improved local service delivery as an output of provincial governments in the context of an incomplete and inchoate framework for decentralization is, in the first instance, unrealistic. Local service delivery cannot serve as a substitute for participatory democratic governance. The survey results, more than the results of KIIs with GOI, clearly demonstrate this. Citizen perception of GOI is distressingly – and more importantly – dangerously low, despite evidence that, at least to some degree in some provinces, service delivery did objectively improve due to Taqadum interventions.

¹¹⁸ The evaluation team incorporates by reference many of the conclusions and recommendations set out in the section dealing with Evaluation Question 1 to the extent that some of the same governance, political and fiscal issues that affect decentralization generally certainly also affect decentralized service delivery.

¹¹⁹ Cite to lit found by Lamar Craven and other LGP 1, 2 et al folks.

¹²⁰ The United States Army and Marine Corps, *U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, (2007), University of Chicago Press; see also USIP Special Report March 1, 2007, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq*, www.usip.org, accessed March 8, 2018.

Again, as stated previously, to the degree that core, determinative issues remain unsettled and Iraq's social compact unresolved, the same issues that plague the DMAP process will also, to a large extent, continue to plague provincial governments' SDIP processes. Geographic proximity to citizens alone is not a sufficient criterion for decentralization and improved, efficient and effective service delivery. Provincial governments are part of a whole system and state structure, in term governed by certain political agreements expressed in law and policy. While the Constitution and Law 21 provide an enabling legal and institutional framework for improved local service delivery, without sufficient power, money and control over decision making in policy, planning and implementation, improved service delivery will continue to be elusive, as will higher citizen perceptions.

Equitable sharing of power, money and control over decision making will not be forthcoming until Iraq settles key, foundational issues such as the division of powers between the central, regional and provincial governments, wealth sharing, and resolution of the internal geo-political status of various provinces. These issues, in turn, will not be resolved until the constitutive agreements underlying them are resolved in a workable social compact. Even then, Iraq's economy must diversify and move away from oil dependence and new sources of wealth generation must be developed so that economic growth, not just governance, is inclusive and sustainable.¹²¹ Ultimately, this requires citizen involvement in these decisions and must be supported to achieve genuine transformation of the governance system away from authoritative centralized governance to citizen-centered democratic governance.

In sum, democratization in Iraq is not only about state building, governance reform, decentralization and service delivery. These do not necessarily translate into nation building if inclusivity and the mechanisms for popular participation are not built in. Without democratic mechanisms such as citizen inclusion and participation, provincial government will simply replicate the central GOI at the local level and decentralization will not be transformational. The way in which GOI KII responses, CSO and citizen response mirror one another at the provincial level is striking with regard to inclusion, participation, as well as views on corruption.

For example, most citizens agree that decentralization is essential to democratization. And, as previously discussed, the majority of citizens strongly agree or agree that improving service delivery will help resolve the conflict and other problems in Iraq and help democracy in Iraq. The majority also agree that the overall services targeted by SDIPs are the priority ones for their provinces. This is a potentially strong foundation for state building and nation building. These, taken together with the fact that the majority among those who did know about SDIPs – 101 out of 190 (54 percent) felt that their views had been largely to somewhat taken into account, indicates that citizen knowledge and inclusion matters in terms of citizen perception of local government performance on an issue that citizens consider critical to the future of the nation.

Knowledge matters: the data evidence a relationship between knowledge of SDIPs and perception of service delivery and the performance of provincial government and implies the need for more citizen outreach to increase awareness and participation. The evaluation team cannot underscore enough that those who knew about SDIPs have higher perceptions of the availability and quality of services in terms of information, access to services, the integrity of local officials, and local government responsiveness. The data evidences a strong association between participation/inclusivity of stakeholders in the SDIPs, and the recognition/appreciation of relevance and priorities of the service delivery provided by SDIPs among engaged stakeholders.

Taqadum objectively improved service delivery where SDIP solutions were implemented. Taqadum performed above targets. Yet, even more so in pilot provinces, the data demonstrate citizens who did not know about SDIPs did not perceive any improvement in service delivery. However, citizens who did know about SDIPs show consistently more positive perceptions than those who did not know about SDIPs.¹²² This finding and the evidence underlying it imply the need for more citizen outreach so that citizens are aware of the good work the government is doing, where it is doing it, why and for whom (e.g. in the case of specific services for girls, women and other vulnerable populations).

¹²¹ See Iraq Systematic Country Diagnostic, World Bank (2017); Diversified Development in a Resource Rich Fragile State: World Bank Background Note (2015).

¹²² This is shown in multiple bar charts on the responses by those who knew versus those who did not know about SDIPs in Charts 27 – 43, Annex L.

Lessons from Wasit are instructive for future programming and should be replicated. When the findings in Wasit are considered against the background of the strengths identified in Wasit's SDIP SWOT analysis, particularly the improvement in partnerships with relevant departments and agencies, civil society organizations and places of worship, as well as citizen surveys and polls, it may be concluded that access to government offices for information and direct contact with government officials for clear, accurate information and instruction resulted in higher citizen opinions in Wasit regarding service delivery in the province.

Electronic media outreach is necessary for creating public awareness but alone it is insufficient to reach a wider cross section of citizens, especially older age-groups and citizens in rural areas.

The project's main citizen-centered activities for SDIP implementation were the e-SAS and Citizen Services Desks. This web based, electronic social media approach is essential and should continue, but it appears to have reached youth more than other groups. While both male and female youth are a priority, particularly in terms of preventing radicalization, it is equally important to reach other groups and for GOI to have good overall information penetration and saturation among all citizens. For example, print, radio and television news may help widen information saturation levels, as may public meetings, awareness raising events and citizen fora in, for example, mosques, high schools, and universities.

Even in the midst of unresolved core constitutive issues, SDIPs and other service delivery processes can contribute toward resolving Iraqi conflict and the fostering of democracy in Iraq if they are designed and implemented with the inclusive awareness and participation of citizens.

The inclusivity of women, vulnerable groups, and people with disabilities was generally low in the design and implementation of SDIPs, as was citizen inclusion generally. It must be noted that even the most comparatively privileged groups felt treated unfairly by provincial government and that local officials exhibit bias. Citizens' and CSOs' inadequate awareness and lack of voice/opinions about SDIPs is a governance issue that affects the human rights, freedom of expression, and choices of citizens regarding the project. Lack of citizen participation thus negatively impacts democratic governance and citizens' fundamental freedoms, not to mention basic trust and confidence in their government, particularly in the Iraq context that is recovering from decades of authoritarian, centralized rule and conflict. While respondents who knew about SDIPs did agree for the most part that the services identified in the SDIPs were indeed the priority ones for their area,¹²³ a majority of respondents across the sample also indicated that they did not have input into determining priorities.¹²⁴

In addition to low levels of citizen awareness, knowledge and participation in the design and implementation of SDIPs, institutional capacity issues also could have affected SDIP

performance. As discussed, the low level of awareness, knowledge, and participation of stakeholders in the design and implementation of SDIPs may be related to higher levels of perceived bias, lack of transparency, and corruption in the provincial governments. However, the general low rating of efficiency and effectiveness of the provincial ministries and directorates, as well as the knowledge and competence of staff of the directorates, also reflects institutional and human resource capacity issues. These in turn could have affected the performance of service delivery in SDIP, notwithstanding Taqadam capacity building and technical assistance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations incorporate and build on recommendations set out in relation to DMAPs and are provided to offer guidance in the development of a new phase of citizen-centered local service delivery planning, design and implementation in the service of not only the technical aspects of state building and democratization, but the equally critical aspect of nation building in Iraq which requires building a national community across diversity and gaining citizen trust and confidence in the state, in government. This is a core aspect of not only stabilizing Iraq but encouraging transformative change to mitigate the very real risk of deepened citizen dissent and recurring cycles of extremist violence.

- **Integrate and balance assistance holistically across the legal, policy, fiscal and sectoral dimensions of local governance and service delivery.**

¹²³ See Table I, Annex L and Chart 25 above.

¹²⁴ See Table I3 above and Chart 22, Annex L.

It bears repeating that democratic governance is complex and multidimensional. It works only when balanced. Improved service delivery across the different basic services sectors requires intensive, sector specific technical recommendations that are beyond the scope of this evaluation or the Evaluation Team's expertise. However, legal, policy and fiscal decentralization as well as efficient, effective and inclusive local service delivery are part of an interconnected continuum relevant to both state building and nation building. Therefore, recommendations for further SDIP related programming incorporate and build on the overarching and specific governance and programing recommendations for decentralization as set out in the prior section discussing DMAP design and implementation. This includes the recommendation to undertake a robust political marketplace analysis of horizontal inequality and exclusion in Iraq to design more effective programs aimed at promoting citizen awareness, inclusion and participation, especially with regard to women, minorities, vulnerable populations and other excluded groups. A cautionary note to this recommendation, however specifically pertains to continued assistance to the GOI to improve service delivery. This is that mechanistic, technocratic solutions alone will not achieve sustainable development gains in terms of local governance or service delivery, much less solidifying a national identity that transcends the divisions in Iraqi society.

- **Balance support to the GOI across the executive and the legislative branches to enhance the capacity of the legislative branch to perform its development oversight functions.**

The Iraqi Council of Representatives must be engaged and brought back into the equation as the representative, law-making branch of government at the national level the legal obstacles to decentralization are to be overcome. Similarly, Provincial Councils must be supported to perform the same legislative functions – representation, law making and executive oversight – at the provincial level, particularly to ensure citizen awareness and participation in decisions regarding local service delivery and other local governance issues.

For instance, decentralization and improved local service delivery are inherently inter-related and mutually interdependent. Given that decentralization remains incomplete, twin processes need to continue at both the national and provincial levels. At the national level, parliamentary oversight of executive progress in implementing the legal, fiscal and administrative aspects of decentralization will be critical to improved local service delivery. In turn, at the provincial level, provincial council oversight will be equally critical to ensuring local executive branch officials are properly exercising their powers and duties and delivering improved services. Legislative bodies also serve representational functions, and through the exercise of both executive oversight and citizen representation functions, can enhance citizen inclusion and participation. Indeed, the data clearly establish that Provincial Councils play a critical role in citizen participation. This must be enhanced.

The enabling policy environment for local service delivery should be grounded in strong executive oversight and monitoring of service delivery by Provincial Councils, as the elected provincial representatives of citizens. Such executive oversight and monitoring will help ensure gender sensitive, human rights-based and demand-driven approaches in conjunction with CSOs and other civil society actors. These in turn should promote greater participation and inclusivity of all stakeholders and ensure that project objectives are responsive to the needs of targeted beneficiaries. Concomitant mechanisms for quality assurance in the implementation of service delivery projects should also be incorporated into management processes on the provincial executive branch side. Technical assistance and capacity building should be provided to GOI and civil society actors engaged in these initiatives.

- **Gender and inclusion mainstreaming should be a mandated aspect of any future assistance, with a unique focus on women and girls.**

It is well documented that gender equality and empowerment is an essential prerequisite to development generally. Gender and inclusion must be treated as a central requirement, not only for USAID funded programming, but for GOI itself as a condition for relief and development assistance. The service delivery needs of girls and women, especially in the wake of violent conflict and the resulting humanitarian fallout, must be a chief priority across the board in Iraq given the legacy of fifteen-years of conflict. Gender sensitive service delivery includes addressing sexual and gender-based violence, domestic violence, single mothers, girl-child marriage, forced marriage, maternal and early childhood health, as well as educational and socio-economic disparities between males and females, all of which have been exacerbated by the conflict.

- **Knowledge is powerful and positive, both for citizens and GOI, therefore improved service delivery must be coupled with public outreach and support provided to provincial directorates to conduct regular, robust outreach to keep citizens informed and involved.**

As evidenced by the findings of this evaluation, citizen knowledge and participation are powerful determinants in perceptions of government generally, and certainly in terms of service delivery. Equally important is that citizens feel that their input and involvement matter and are taken into account. Without this primary contact and interaction between government and citizens to build trust and confidence, tangible improvements in local service delivery will continue to go largely unnoticed and may create resentment and further distrust of the community threatening a relapse into violence.

A central, essential recommendation is that future programming support the establishment and/or strengthening of GOI public information and outreach functions and activities in conjunction with the civil society and media strengthening component of future assistance. Where directorates do not already have public information and outreach offices, they should establish them. A robust local government communication plan should be developed and implemented as well as reviewed and monitored to promote diverse engagement and inclusion of all stakeholders. This will help ensure the relevance and sustainability of the project as well as promote perceptions of transparency and fairness in project delivery to citizen beneficiaries.

In order to reach older age groups and a wider cross section of citizens, additional and more traditional media than web-based approaches must be used to ensure wider coverage, including the use of radio, TV, and newspaper. Other socially and culturally relevant and appropriate mechanisms should be utilized such as CSOs, citizen groups, universities and think tanks, as well as religious institutions and leaders. Particularly in the Iraqi context, strategically tapping into the ethical and moral values inherent in religious, faith-based principles and religious figures may provide additional common ground for holding GOI to account. It may also serve as a bulwark against deepened inroads made by religious extremists, particularly among disaffected youth – both male and female.

For example, a public information access project component facilitating such direct contact could involve:

- Establishing government contact points such as citizens' services or affairs offices, or public information offices
- Building the capacity of government contact points
- Facilitating more direct communication with elected officials
- Ensuring the presence of dedicated, qualified and trained information officers serving as the first line of citizen contact responsible for preparing and disseminating credible information regarding government service delivery and critical government decision making processes through direct personal, group and mass media fora.
- GOI entities, particularly provincial directorates, pushing information out to the public to increase citizen awareness and outreach
- Robust engagement via town hall meetings, lectures, presentations, call-in radio and TV shows, between provincial directorates and, for example, CSOs and community action groups, among other mechanisms for engaging various groups of citizens, e.g. women, youth, vulnerable groups
- Provincial directorate representatives engaging citizens through media outlets such as radio or television announcements, and question and answer sessions
- A strong, visible, vocal anti-corruption campaign where, for example, provincial GOI officials must file ethics disclosures, recusals to counter the image of GOI officials as corrupt and using their official positions to profit personally, including, for example, ethical codes of conduct and enforcement of them

It would be critical to assist GOI to pilot such projects and empirically test out what works best with specific services and specific communities. Wasit may serve as a useful model for approaches that could be replicated systematically and systemically across all provincial service delivery directorates. The point here is to build a base of shared vies and values regarding democracy in Iraq and the importance of equitable local delivery of basic services.

- **Support independent, non-governmental mechanisms for direct citizen inclusion, awareness and participation such as CSOs, independent media organizations, think tanks, educational institutions, community-based action groups, including faith-based institutions.**

The opinion/voices of citizens should be promoted through specialized CSOs and other social and cultural institutions that are considered able and committed representatives and advocates of citizens in citizen-centered community services interventions like Taqadum. Consider reviewing past projects in Iraq that supported citizen participation to review what did and did not work in those projects as lessons learned for new citizen-centered projects in Iraq. CSOs face stringent registration requirements, which some organizations cannot fulfill.¹²⁵ The latter are nonetheless effective in their communities. Therefore, it would be important to work with both formal CSOs, community groups, educators, leaders and media outlets. As recommended, why not promote reform of NGO laws to allow for more freedom of association?

- Replicate successful elements of programming in Wasit.

It is possible that replication of successful approaches in Wasit in other provinces may result in achieving more effective citizen outreach and improve citizen perceptions of local government performance in service delivery. However, Wasit citizens' perceptions were still overall below average, so these approaches are a starting point only and represent the bare minimum.

The key elements to replicate are:

- Establishing government contact points and like Citizen Services/Affairs Offices and Information Offices
- Building the capacity of government contact points
- Facilitating more direct communication with elected officials,
- Ensuring the presence of dedicated, qualified and trained information officers in government offices serving as the first line of citizen contact, responsible for preparing and disseminating credible information regarding government service delivery and critical government decision making processes through direct personal, group and mass media fora.

¹²⁵ The legal framework for CSOs is unduly restrictive and amelioration of this should also be a focus of any programmatic assistance going forward.

7.3. EVALUATION QUESTION THREE Restoration of governance and service delivery in recently liberated areas (Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din): How effective were training efforts designed to restore local governance and basic service delivery in the recently liberated governorates?

Large parts of the provinces of Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din fell under ISIS control in 2014. While liberations were staggered, Ninewa was the last province to be fully liberated in mid-2017. This made addressing the same decentralization goals applied to the other 12 provinces covered under Taqadum unrealistic for the newly liberated areas. During the last two years of the program, efforts in the three newly liberated provinces focused on training designed to restore local governance and basic service delivery. Key to this effort were “emergency response cells” in four provinces: Anbar, Ninewa, Salah al-Din, and Diyala. Taqadum trained stakeholders on overall post-conflict disaster management, including: (1) the steps, processes, assessments, prioritization, and determination of the level of hazard vulnerability; (2) creating a “laundry list” of critical infrastructure sites in each province; and (3) selection of the disaster management team. To this end, Taqadum conducted workshops focused on post-conflict service delivery management.

In looking at the effectiveness of these training efforts, the evaluation team focused on two areas of training, damage assessment, and public financial management. The team sent data collectors to Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din to conduct key informant interviews of training participants to gauge their impression of the training. Data collectors asked respondents to recall details of the training they received from GSP/Taqadum, and whether it helped them perform their jobs better. Respondents were asked whether the topics were the most appropriate for their needs at the time and whether the trainees were selected based on clear and objective criteria. The data collectors also asked respondents whether they felt the training had improved local governance and basic service delivery or had a positive impact on the skills of local government officials.

Methodology for EQ 3: Data for this question relied on KIs to determine the extent to which training improved governance and service delivery functions in recently liberated areas. There are two prongs to this question: the training of those required to assess damage to infrastructure, and public financial management training to support the financial aspects of restoration of infrastructure. The respondents were drawn from Taqadum’s training database related to training in damage assessment (220 names) and public financial management (59 names) in the newly liberated areas. The evaluation team conducted a stratified, random sample of each list and identified names of training participants to interview. All female names were selected for interview, due to their relatively small number on the master lists. The evaluation team was able to carry out KIs with 33 participants in the damage assessment training, 15 percent of the total; and 30 participants in the PFM training, slightly under 50 percent of the total.

7.3.1 3a. Damage assessment:

Sub-question – Who did GSP/Taqadum target for training in damage assessment of essential service infrastructure?

According to the Taqadum training database, GSP targeted people with the following titles for damage assessment training in the three post-conflict provinces, in order from largest group to smallest: Line Ministry Department Section Managers; Line Ministry Department Managers and Directors; Governorate Office Managers and Heads of Units; Line Ministry Department Staff; Provincial Council Members, Advisors and Staff; Provincial Council Section Managers District Council and Sub-District Members, Governors, and Deputy Governors; Parliamentary Members.¹²⁶

Background on damage assessment training: Taqadum first held workshops for federal-level decision makers to ensure buy-in and support and to gather recommendations. This was followed by workshops for local government senior management from the three targeted provinces of Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din. The Taqadum technical team also held additional workshops conducted in four targeted provinces (including the addition of Diyala). The objective of this phase of the project was to build the capacity of the Iraqi local government and Emergency/Disaster Management Teams to be prepared for conducting assessments, planning,

¹²⁶ Using this list of trainees, the evaluation team conducted KIs on a stratified random sample based on job title. Due to the small number of female trainees on the list, the team endeavored to interview all of them.

prioritizing, and managing of service restoration and improvements for citizens.

	Event	Date	Venue	No. of Participants
1	Key Stakeholder Meeting	Sept. 9, 2015	Sheraton Hotel Erbil	20
2	Senior Staff Workshops	Sept. 12-13 (Anbar) Sept. 15-16 (Salah ad-Din) Sept. 17-18 (Ninawa)	Nobel Hotel Erbil	142
3	Technical Staff Workshops	Nov. 17-19 (Salah ad-Din) Nov. 21-23 (Anbar) Nov. 25-27 (Ninawa)	Royal Ainkawa Hotel Erbil	111
4	Pilot Damage Assessment Exercises	January-April 2016 (Anbar, Salah ad Din, and Diyala)		FTT 30
5	Assessment Review Workshop	March 28 - April 7, 2016	Sky Erbil Hotel Erbil	108

Table 17: Summary of Training Events from GSP Post-Conflict Report, June 2016, page 10.

The aim of the damage assessment workshops was to train local governments and provincial service delivery directorates on post-conflict service delivery assessment, planning, and prioritization of shows how the damage assessment training fit into the overall training schedule.

Civil society was not involved in any substantial way in the trainings. In the GSP Post-Conflict Report (June 2016) Taqadum recommended that in the future, inviting representatives of national and international nongovernmental organizations interested in recovery and stabilization as participants in the workshops would enable more networking and open a new avenue for partnerships and potential funding.

Key Informant Interview Results on Damage Assessment Training: The evaluation team's primary tool for assessing training quality and utilization was a series of telephone KIs conducted in the three post-conflict provinces. The figures below show the breakdown of the 33 local Iraqi officials who participated in the KIs on damage assessment training: Anbar 9; Ninewa 12; and Salah al-Din 12. Of the 33 interviewed, 26 were male and seven were female.¹²⁷




Chart 29 Overview of the total respondents by Province and Sex

Sub-question: Are skills targeted by these trainings evident in key local governance bodies or stakeholders, where trainings were implemented (either among those who received the training, or as a result of institution of good practices by those individuals)?

The KIs conducted asked several questions that probed aspects of this sub-question. Summaries from the data

¹²⁷ The graphs in this section show the frequency of respondent answers but cannot be considered statistically significant.

are below.

Most trainees did conduct actual damage assessments: Most of the interviewed local Iraqi officials who participated in damage assessment training in the three post-conflict provinces indicated that they had actually conducted damage assessments following the training, as can be seen in Chart 51 (KII Question 3103) below. The number who reported that they had conducted damage assessments was particularly high in Anbar and Salah al-Din. There were a surprising number of “don’t know” answers in Ninewa, indicating some confusion as to the term “damage assessment” there.




Chart 30 Do you feel the damage assessment training resulted in the restoration of local governance and basic service delivery?

Perceptions in Anbar on the link between trainings and improved services were mostly positive:

An Anbar official said the training allowed his department to make plans for the restoration and rehabilitation of governmental institutions and schools “and bring them back to life despite the low financial allocations.” Another Anbar official specializing in accounting agreed with this assessment but offered a caveat, emphasizing the importance of following up damage assessment with funding: “If the local government won’t assess damages and compensate people, people will trust it less. But the more [the local government] assesses damage and compensates people, the more people will trust it.”

Perceptions were not so positive in Ninewa: One official from Ninewa who complained about services explained that this was “due to the lack of trainings and workshops.” A member of the Ninewa Provincial Council also answered “no,” and said this was “because the political direction [in his province] conflicts with efficiency.”

Need for Financial Support: Another Ninewa official said, “There is no increase [in services after damage assessment training]. [Ninewa] needs *financial* support.” Although this point was brought up by several other respondents in Ninewa, it was not unique to that province. Frustration over finances was echoed by an Anbar official who said, “There is no real assessment of damage due to the lack of financial allocations. It is just *identification* of this damage.”

Perceptions differ by province as to whether damage assessment training helped institutionalize good practices: On the question of whether the damage assessment training contributed to the institutionalization of good practices (Chart 52), the number of those answering “yes” was highest in Salah al-Din and lowest in Ninewa. Those not answering “yes” answered “don’t know” instead, but no one answered “no.”




Chart 31 Do you feel that the trainings contributed to the institutionalization of good practices by personnel who were trained?

Multiple respondents from Ninewa said, “I don’t have an example for that” when asked to cite an example of good practices. According to an official with the Governor of Ninewa, “There is no increase in the capabilities of the local government.” A member of the Ninewa Provincial Council primarily cited the “lack of efficiency in Ninewa provincial departments.”

Respondents from the other provinces made more positive comments. One Anbar official working in education said, “Through the training, I have noticed that some trainees lacked knowledge regarding [damage assessment], so the training had a positive impact on them and enabled them to put forward plans in all of their specializations.” Several Anbar informants separately mentioned the importance of information sharing among participants as a critical ingredient to the success of the training in that province. One Anbar official put it this way: “Local governments lack teamwork, and this training helped increase teamwork.”

In Salah al-Din several respondents expressed their frustration that decentralization had not yet occurred in their province. As one official said: “Regarding powers, there must be a guideline to give them to the Governorate.” Another Salah al-Din official recommended the “cancellation of the local, governorates, territories and district councils because they did not provide real services to the citizens.”

Sub-question: What factors most enabled any observed increases in capacity for damage assessments?

Choosing the appropriate participants for training: A primary factor for key informants across all three provinces was whether the appropriate people were chosen for the damage assessment training. Some respondents, especially in Ninewa, either felt the training did not reach the appropriate personnel or were unsure. In Ninewa, the number of respondents responding “no” or “don’t know” to this question was larger than the number saying “yes.” See Figure Chart 53.




Chart 32 In your opinion, did the training reach the right personnel?

Concerns about training participation: One theme that came through strongly in the Ninewa KIs was a perception that the number of participants from that province in the damage assessment training was too low. One Ninewa official said that “not enough employees participated.” A Ministry of Health employee from Ninewa said that training planners chose “inappropriate and inefficient persons” to attend the damage assessment trainings. According to another official working for the Governor of Ninewa, “Most officials and employees didn’t participate in the trainings,” inferring that, while some people may have attended, the “capable and specialized people didn’t participate.” However, Ninewa respondents did not dismiss the need for training. As one advisor to the Governor put it, “Most officials don’t know about the transfer . . . so they need trainings.”

Multiple respondents from all three provinces expressed reservations about the way trainees were chosen for participation. As one Anbar official put it, “The local government system is dominated by tribalism, which took precedent over technical and professional considerations.”

Concerns over the length and depth of the training: Many, especially in Ninewa, criticized the perceived short duration of the training they attended, although this was not an issue only in Ninewa. One Anbar engineer, though more positive in tone, indicated the trainings needed to be continued in the future for them to be effective, saying “*Continuous* sessions and workshops . . . will result in better plans to assess damage and potential emergencies in the future.” While most Salah al-Din participants praised the training and those who conducted it, one Salah al-Din official said, “The training was very short.”

Political infighting was an issue in Ninewa: An undercurrent of cynicism about funding and political infighting pervaded several of the KIs with Ninewa officials. One such official identified two issues standing in the way of increasing capacity for damage assessments: disagreement within the local government and lack of available financial information. A member of the Ninewa Provincial Council said the problem was due to disagreements “between political groups.” There was some disgruntlement also in Salah al-Din, where one official said of his province that “there was no communication between the government and local officials.”

Pressure from IDP Issue: One Anbar official cited the negative influence of the internally displaced person (IDP) crisis, which he said “was an obstacle [to] assessing damage.” According to this official, the rush to return IDPs to Anbar “caused pressure on the local government and decreased the priority of assessing damage.”

Security: Land mines were cited as a major issue, particularly in Anbar. “Land mines made it very difficult to assess damage in the areas that belong to the health department.” A few respondents in Salah al-Din also raised mines as an issue, and one official highlighted the need to remove mines in Baiji City.

7.3.2. 3b. Public financial management:

Taqadum found that new directorates lacked understanding of accounting and financial tools to facilitate implementation of transferred functions and develop provincial budgets. Therefore, GSP instituted training in public financial management (PFM) for local government officials and staff. Taqadum provided training on planning and budgeting as well as provincial financial organization and processes, including in the three post-conflict provinces of Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din.

KII Results

Sub-question: Who did GSP/Taqadum target for training in public financial management?

According to the Taqadum training database, GSP targeted people with the following titles (largest to smallest number) for public financial management training in the three post-conflict provinces: Line Ministry Department Section Managers; Line Ministry Department Staff; Governorate Office Managers and Heads of Units; Governorate Department Section Staff; Governor's Assistants, Advisors, and Staff; and Line Ministry Department Managers and Directors.¹²⁸

Sub-question: Are skills targeted by these trainings evident in key local governance bodies or stakeholders, where trainings were implemented (either among those who received the training, or as a result of institution of good practices by those individuals)?




Chart 33 Do you feel that the trainings contributed to the institutionalization of good practices by personnel who were trained?

The lowest ratings for the PFM training were in Ninewa: Of the three provinces, Ninewa had the lowest number of respondents who said that the trainings institutionalized good practices. Given the recent devastation experienced in Mosul, this is not surprising. As a Mosul engineer who attended the PFM training put it, “The circumstances that Ninewa province has been through was a major obstacle to increasing local capabilities.” Some of the negative responses were triggered by a sense that decentralization in Ninewa is not happening. When asked what helped increase provincial government (or directorate) capacity for PFM, a Ninewa employee of the Department of Occupational Health and Safety credited the training with providing useful information but said there was “no practical application.” A Ministry of Finance official from Ninewa went further, saying the “training sessions had no real-life applications” regarding a local treasury that has not expanded powers, and added, “There is no increase in the power of the local government.” This attitude, while more pronounced in Ninewa, was not unique to that province. A Salah al-Din housing official was supportive of the training quality but said that the efforts are “not helping because powers are still not

¹²⁸ Using this list of trainees, the evaluation team conducted KIIs on a stratified random sample based on job title. Due to the small number of female trainees on the list, the team endeavored to interview all of them.

transferred.”

There was more evidence of skill transfer in Anbar and Salah al-Din: Opinions of the PFM training were higher in Anbar and Salah al-Din than in Ninewa. According to one Anbar official, transferring functions from the Ministry of Labor and Social Services to the local government “made so many administrative matters easier and led to better services.” This Anbar official went on to say that “because there were discussions with trainees and officials about financial management matters, we always ended up with positive outcomes, which proves the value of the training and its impact on trainees.” An Anbar housing official pointed to post-training discussions that had been generated, saying “there were discussions after the training with trainees and officials regarding financial issues, and discussions were mostly positive.” The Anbar housing official also said that the training made trainees “practice a lot of procedures regarding financial management.” An Anbar employee of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs said, “Trainees and officials now understand financial management. This was obvious from looking at their work performance. The training enables them to find solutions in the field of financial management.”

Two separate Salah al-Din participants reported some training of trainers. A Department of Housing and Construction official said, “The trainees started to train others in the governmental departments.” Another Salah al-Din participant from the Ministry of Construction and Housing said the PFM training “helped my department because it helped us in the training of our own staff.”

Sub-question: What factors most enabled any observed increases in capacity for public financial management?

Concerns about training participation: As in the case of damage assessment, several Ninewa respondents said that officials did not participate adequately in the PFM trainings. One Ninewa participant, an engineer, said, “Officials didn’t attend or participate in the trainings.” This was also the view of a Ninewa financial officer, who also maintained that there had been “no increase in the capability of the local government.” One Ninewa Ministry of Construction and Housing (MOCH) official raised the issue in his answers to almost every question.

Concerns over the length and depth of the training: A Ninewa participant from the Ministry of Agriculture said the training did not increase the capability of the local government or the directorate, given the short duration. A Salah al-Din participant also stated that “the training period of time was short.” Another Salah al-Din official (Construction and Municipalities) felt the training period was “too short, theoretical, and not practical.” There was a widespread view, across all provinces, that Taqadum should have increased the number, duration, and depth of trainings and workshops.

Conflicts between central and local governments: According to a Ninewa employee of the MOCH, a major problem in increasing capacity for PFM was a “conflict of interest between the central and local governments.” Another respondent from the same Ministry said, “officials with positions in the local governments are not fit and not efficient.” This attitude was shared to a degree in all three provinces studied. Anbar participants from the Water Department and the roads directorate separately alluded to problems between ministries and local government. A Salah al-Din Governorate employee lamented that “the ministries haven’t transferred powers yet.”

Existing capacity of participants: According to an Anbar respondent working in finance, a major obstacle was “administrators not knowing about the financial administration status.”

Selection of the most appropriate training participants: As one Anbar official put it, “choosing employees with experience and efficiency” is the most important factor. This view was expressed by several participants in all three provinces.

Lack of financial support: Lack of financial support also came up, including from an Anbar participant from the Governorate’s financial office, as well as employees of the roads directorate and the sewer administration.




Chart 34 To what extent was the training in Public Financial Management (PFM) coordinated with immediate interventions by government/international organizations in your province

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, it appears that post-conflict damage assessment was to a large degree an add-on activity. The training activities were initiated under trying, extremely dangerous and exigent circumstances caused by the ISIS occupation and violent conflict that ensued. It is also not clear that Taqadum possessed the requisite specialized personnel to engage in post-disaster service restoration capacity building. While the project was designed to provide technical assistance and capacity building for decentralized local governance and service delivery, dealing with stabilization and post-disaster relief and reconstruction management is an equally complex and specialized endeavor. Of course, these post-disaster, emergency response capacity and skill sets are those that any government must have, these are often located in highly specialized agencies. GOI capacities are still nascent and emerging from centralized authoritarian rule, followed by war and then a subsequent deadly cycle of extremist violence during the conflict with ISIS.

Dealing with the magnitude of the humanitarian and other fallout from the conflict with ISIS would be a tall order for any government, but even more so for a fragile state such as Iraq. Provincial government officials themselves as well as their families were displaced during the war with ISIS. Taqadum, as it did throughout the life of the project, rose to the occasion as best it could. It is also true that some of the issues identified in the evaluation of the two training programs were basic and avoidable, for example, longer and more in-depth training sessions, more practical and immediately applicable trainings.

Data from Taqadum: The Taqadum Post-Conflict Report, June 2016 listed a number of lessons learned from the training, including the following:

- **Target Group and Selection Criteria:** Although the main targets of the workshop were technical experts from the various sectors, participants represented a mix of senior managers and technicians. The project felt that more attention should have been paid to participant selection according to the agreed selection criteria.
- **Gender Imbalance:** Male participants significantly outnumbered female participants—there were no females in attendance from Salah al-Din or Diyala, and only one from Anbar and two from Ninewa.
- **Training Needs Assessment:** Greater care should have been taken to better identify training needs.
- **Training Schedule:** Having back-to-back consultancy-related trainings was exhausting.
- **Workload:** The heavy workload throughout the duration of the workshops could be avoided in the future by having two trainers.

Training links to perceptions of improved services: An analysis of the findings by province shows there was a divergence in the perception of participants regarding the effectiveness of both the damage assessment and PFM training. Training efforts were more successful in Anbar and Salah al-Din than in Ninewa. Training was perceived as linked to service improvement in the first two provinces more so than in the latter. This holds true for both damage assessment and PFM training.

Need for Financial Support: In all three provinces, there is widespread belief that receiving financial support is needed for training in either damage assessment or PFM to be more effective. This was a point made most strongly in Ninewa.

Factors that enabled any observed increases in capacity for damage assessments and PFM: In provinces where there was greater support for the training, it was accompanied by a sense that Taqadum chose the right participants. There was more of a feeling in Anbar and Salah al-Din than in Ninewa that the most-qualified and well-positioned participants had been chosen for training.

Training participation: Especially in Ninewa, there was a perception that the number of participants from that province in the damage assessment and PMF trainings was too low.

Trainees wanted longer and more in-depth training sessions: Concerns over the length and depth of the training, especially in Ninewa, highlighted the need to make the trainings longer, more in-depth, and more practical. Damage assessment training may have been better received because so many participants went on to participate in an actual damage assessment. PFM training seemed to have fewer practical applications and was therefore criticized as being more theoretical than practical. Training should be linked to a strategic program that has the funding to carry out necessary projects.

Trainees are training colleagues in some instances: Two separate Salah al-Din participants reported that they were taking the skills they learned in PFM training and training colleagues. This is a positive development that may point to longer-term capacity building.

Lack of decentralization progress in the three post-conflict provinces has been demoralizing to local officials: Trainings on decentralization often seemed pointless to some participants, making the sessions seem only theoretical. This was especially true with regard to PFM training. Again, this negative attitude was more common in Ninewa than in the other two provinces.

It should be noted also that until now, to the best of the evaluation team's knowledge, Anbar, Salah al-Din and Ninewa remain excluded from the decentralization processes that had been underway prior to the conflict with ISIS. While the HCCP has indicated rather vaguely that these provinces will soon "be decentralized again," given the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts and their budgetary impact, that devolution of authority, particularly financial, may be further postponed.

The post-conflict status of the provinces thus pushes their progress further back than other provinces in terms of DMAP advancement and service delivery improvements as well as overall local autonomy and control. However, Taqadum reports that “it has ensured these local governments are equally prepared as the other provinces to implement decentralization and provide improved services to their citizens.”¹²⁹ Indeed, with the advent of stabilization assistance funds and programs this remains to be seen.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Overarching recommendation:

Long-term decentralization, improved local service delivery improvement and democratization goals should not be subsumed in the post-disaster rush and urgency to reconstruct and stabilize the NLAs. Stabilization is by nature urgent, exigent and necessitates triage approaches, particularly in Iraq, in the wake of yet another cycle of devastating, extremist violence. Stabilization is very much focused on the “build” part of the “clear, hold, build” equation. But it is critical to keep at the forefront of stabilization efforts the underlying goal of decentralization and even stabilization – to shore up strengths and capacities that will serve as a bulwark against the underlying internal causes of susceptibility to extremist violence.

Stabilization efforts must not sacrifice essential elements of democratic governance. Indeed, should these sorts of decisions appear to be biased or corrupt, particularly regarding which communities will receive assistance exclude citizens, the very stabilization assistance that is designed to help communities recover may indeed sow seeds for future cycles of conflict. Horizontal exclusion, inequality, inequity and injustice – whether perceived or real – are causes of conflict, particularly extremist, ideology driven conflict.¹³⁰

Therefore, to the degree that follow-on damage assessment-oriented PFM and damage assessment training continues through what appears to be a direct follow-on program, the FFS and/or FFES stabilization projects funded by USAID and implemented by UNDP, these recommendations have direct and immediate applicability with regarding both the training and capacity building as well as decentralization dimensions of stabilization efforts in the three NLAs.

Again, lessons applicable from the PRT era are instructive. While partnerships for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction involve necessarily different modalities of working than development efforts *per se*, the risk for diluted national ownership is ever-present. Equally present is the risk of sacrificing activities and assistance that could and would nonetheless contribute to long-term capacity building that is sustainable. In other words, efforts that would simultaneously progressing the goals of devolution of power, money and control to provincial governments. A particular risk in stabilization efforts is that citizens credit the international community rather than the national and local government. And, even if citizens do see the GOI appearing to be in control, this perception will suffer, as the evaluation data have demonstrated, if GOI does not govern democratically.

So, it will be critical for the international community to not only appear to simply be supporting the GOI in taking the lead in determining where funding will be utilized and which projects will be going forward, but for the international community to actually be utilizing the opportunity to deepen GOI’s institutional capacity strengthen its ability to govern democratically. Both local government (e.g. Governors, Provincial Councils, key directorate officials who presumably are technical experts and best know their provinces) and public involvement will again be key in determining priorities for where GOI decides to direct international stabilization funding. In this way, central GOI will necessarily have to respect decentralization and the NLA provincial governments will also be accountable for exercising leadership on behalf of its affected citizens.

¹²⁹ Taqadum Final Report, page 53.

¹³⁰ Frances Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities: a Neglected Dimension of Development,” QEH Working Paper Series, Queen Elizabeth House University of Oxford, Oxford, NO. 81(2002).

The bottom line is these decisions must be transparent and must result equally from consultation across affected communities to avoid the further appearance of bias and corruption in the allocation of funds and services. And consultation must not be simply to “tick a box” or “for show.” Central and local GOI must ensure that they conduct live post-consultation feedback mechanism to convey its decisions about where to fund reconstruction projects or it runs the risk of citizens feeling that their opportunity to be heard was meaningless.

In sum, both the national and provincial levels of GOI must coordinate and communicate in a manner that promotes local decision making at the same time that overarching national concerns are addressed (e.g. border or national security dimensions of reconstruction/stabilization efforts). Both levels of the GOI must consult the Iraqi people, especially those in affected communities (e.g. established residents, returnees, IDPs) and absolutely must ensure that women, youth, minorities and other vulnerable populations as well as persons with disabilities are informed, aware, consulted about and are given explanations for decisions about reconstruction and prioritized service delivery. While the situation in the NLAs and other ISIS-affected provinces remains dire, the opportunity presented by the post-disaster stabilization efforts is a potentially profoundly positive one,

Specific Recommendations for ongoing training efforts

Increase the length and depth of trainings for both damage assessment and PFM. Planners of future trainings should make them more practical to the tasks participants are currently undertaking. The trainings should be longer and be repeated at more frequent intervals. The new project should recruit high-quality consultants suited to these tasks.

Recruit more trainees, and at higher levels: Special attention should be paid to ensuring that there are no feelings of an unfair or biased selection process for training participants. A train the trainers model could be helpful to multiply the effects of the training throughout local government offices.

Intensify training efforts in Ninewa: This province reported the most serious dissatisfaction with the training process for both subjects and needs special attention should future trainings be planned.

Provide specific training in “soft” service delivery sectors relevant in humanitarian and post-conflict disaster contexts: This is especially relevant for girls, women, youth, minorities, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups. In the NLAs and other ISIS-affected provinces, the humanitarian fall out requires immediate attention, and different approaches than “hard” service delivery (e.g. roads, bridges, construction of schools, hospitals etc.). Specialized health and psycho-social services are required, for instance, for girls and women who have been subjected to sexual violence during the conflict, for people who may be suffering from trauma, or other physical injuries or other health issues such as severe malnutrition, among a few issues facing heavily impacted communities. Training in public private partnerships for GOI officials may be especially appropriate and could accompany support to GOI coordination and cooperation with media and civil society to provide services that overwhelmed local directorates may not be able to provide as efficiently and effectively as needed in a post-disaster, recovery context.¹³¹

Again, GOI faces an opportunity amidst tragedy to prove to its citizens that it can and does both lead and serve them.

EVALUATION CONCLUSION

The GSP/Taqadum project endeavored to improve decentralized governance and local service delivery and strengthen the social contract between citizens and officials. Time has yet to tell whether this endeavor will fulfill the democratization mandate rooted in the constitution and Law 21. What is known, however, is that this project has witnessed change across the provinces unevenly and with some obstruction. The Mission should continue its support of decentralization by enabling a culture, not just a theory, of transformative

¹³¹ A risk here is that the GOI is overshadowed by international and national private organizations. The key here is that GOI must ultimately be credited with successes and own any failures. Therefore, the optics and design of such partnerships must be structured in favor of GOI being in the lead, supported by a capacity building and technical assistance program.

change at the highest and lowest levels. This includes more inclusion of traditional minorities in Iraqi politics, as well as ethnic and religious minorities, women, youth and people with disabilities, and recently created marginalized groups such as IDPs. Such groups should be engaged via social media as well as more traditional outlets with the assistance of CSOs and other community groups. Engagement with media to promote public awareness is critical but cannot replace the government's obligation to inform its citizens about governance activities and progress towards commonly agreed upon aims established in an inclusive social contract for peace and sustainable development.

Entrenched power politics, corruption, and fiscal hoarding are systemic problems that could undo all the work that has been achieved in this endeavor, while uneven distribution of resources, public services, and training in the newly liberated provinces could be the thread that unravels Iraqi stability. The recent collapse of ISIS in these areas provides a window of opportunity for the Iraqi government to gain legitimacy and reassert sovereignty in these unstable provinces. Decentralization is a key to reunification and national healing as disenfranchised groups are once again brought under the fold of the federalized government. Providing basic services and building the capacity of local government will serve the broader Iraqi agenda of a unified and stable state - a mitigation against violent extremism.

ANNEX A: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

STATEMENT OF WORK

Final Performance Evaluation

OF

USAID/IRAQ's Governance Strengthening Project/TAQADUM

(1) PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of the evaluation is to identify factors that promoted successful implementation of Taqadum interventions in its final two years to inform a follow-on activity focused on improving Government of Iraq (GOI) service delivery and public financial management and strengthen citizen monitoring and oversight of public expenditures.

The evaluation will determine the extent to which the project met programmatic objectives and achieved both intended and unintended outcomes in its final two years of implementation. The Contractor will systematically integrate the performance evaluation to examine project activities and answer the research questions elaborated in section IV.

This mixed-methods evaluation will be designed to inform future USAID governance strengthening and decentralization programming in complex, unstable security environments. The results might inform programs in countries experiencing democratic transitions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. However the main audiences of the evaluation will include USAID/Iraq and USAID/Washington's Middle East Bureau.

Therefore the objectives of this evaluation are three-fold:

- (1) Review, analyze and evaluate the performance of the Governance Strengthening Project (GSP)/Taqadum, against the assumptions and results, throughout its implementation, as designed by the U.S. Government and implemented by Chemonics International Inc.
- (2) Identify and characterize factors (anticipated and unanticipated) that promoted or impeded the success of GSP activities, including attention to both intended and unintended outcomes.
- (3) Provide lessons learned and, if appropriate, specific programmatic recommendations for future USAID democracy and governance assistance in Iraq and contribute to USAID's institutional learning on decentralization programming.

II. SUMMARY INFORMATION

Strategy/Project/Activity Name	<i>USAID IRAQ Governance Strengthening Project (GSP)/Taqadum</i>
Implementer	<i>Chemonics, Inc.</i>
Cooperative Agreement/Contract #	<i>AID-267-C-11-00006-13</i>
Total Estimated Ceiling of the Evaluated Project/Activity(TEC)	<i>\$106,591,654.00</i>

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Life of Strategy, Project, or Activity	<i>September 29, 2011 – September 29, 2017</i>
Active Geographic Regions	<i>All Iraq except three Kurdish provinces</i>
Development Objective(s) (DOs)	<i>Provincial & Local Government More Effectively Respond to Community Needs</i>
USAID Office	<i>USAID/Iraq Governance and Economic Opportunities</i>

III. BACKGROUND

The GSP/Taqadum activity was designed to assist Iraq's transition to a more decentralized federal system of government, consistent with its constitution, laws and regulations, notably the Law 21 of 2008 (known as the "Provincial Powers Law"), as amended in 2010 and 2013.

Decentralization of central government service delivery authorities to provincial and local governments presents an opportunity to deepen democratic and good governance practices in Iraq. These practices include: government responsiveness to community needs, state legitimacy and stability, accountability and transparency, efficiency in delivering provincial government-based services, and citizen participation in decision-making. At inception in September 2011, GSP/Taqadum set out to assist the GOI in addressing the challenges of:

- Reforming the legal framework governing Iraq's federal system by clarifying and expanding the responsibilities, authorities and resources to be decentralized from the central government to the provincial and local governments;
- Enhancing the institutionalization of decentralized authorities within provincial and local governments and improving resource management; and
- Leveraging elected provincial officials' constituent support and oversight powers to hold central line ministries accountable for delivery of services not decentralized.

The activity's primary focus was *assisting Iraq's provincial councils and governors to carry out their responsibilities under Iraqi law, while helping them organize across political, provincial and sectarian lines and identifying areas to reform local government systems to respond better to citizen needs*. This also required the project to support engagements with key constituencies for decentralization reforms at the national level, seizing windows of opportunity of elections and electoral incentives, civil society advocacy and judicial actions.

At the time of GSP/Taqadum's design in 2010, elements of the central government demonstrated legal and policy commitment to decentralization through a number of budgetary, legislative, regulatory, judicial, electoral and constitutional actions. GSP/Taqadum was tasked with building on these commitments to support consensus actions and facilitate constructive policy dialog between the central and provincial governments on core governance functions related to service delivery. These functions include budget, policy, finance, procurement, personnel, and oversight spanning a range of service delivery sectors: municipal services, public works, agriculture, housing, health, education, social welfare programs, youth and sports, and water resource management. While underlying partisan and ethno-sectarian motivations have an impact on decentralization, the activity did not engage on these issues. Nor did the project engage on issues related to the formation of provinces into semi-autonomous "regions" or issues affecting the relations between Kurdistan Regional Government and the Central Government in Baghdad.

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Conflicts over decentralization cannot be separated from historical grievances between ethnic and sectarian groups that view reforms from a zero-sum perspective in which regions and groups are cast as winners and losers in a struggle for economic and political power. Discussions involving administrative boundaries, natural resource management, sub-national elections, budget allocations, and even the national census quickly collapse into broader issues of ethno-sectarian political competition. These ethnic and sectarian cleavages create acute political pressures—for instance, federalist factions advocating for regional autonomy in the north and south are cast as “secession” movements by nationalist factions.

Underlying ethnic and sectarian cleavages have generated asymmetric approaches to decentralization with a diversity of legal authorities on intergovernmental relations. These are not only framed in the constitution, but are also codified in legislation, interpreted in judicial decision, and administered through regulation and the annual federal budget development and roll out. In this respect, Iraq does not lend itself to a “comprehensive approach” to decentralization dictated from the top-down. For the foreseeable future, however, decentralization issues—while politically charged—can be peacefully addressed through ad hoc negotiation, local accommodation, and case-by-case consideration through the national legislative agenda.

Many of the underlying determinants governing the pace of decentralization are, therefore, beyond the manageable interests of even Iraq’s internal political and judicial processes to mediate and resolve, let alone those of technical experts supported by foreign donors.

To seize windows of opportunity and manage these risks, the project worked through two components:

- **Component I: *Institutional Strengthening*** – Institutionalize core authorities and responsibilities of provincial and local government.
- **Component II: *Executive Oversight*** – Provincial and local elected officials hold executive ministries accountable for improved services.

Under each component, GSP/Taqadum promoted the institutional development of provincial and local government to build the capacity of the Provincial Council and Governor’s Office and their budget, procurement and oversight responsibilities. This early work informed major revisions to the Provincial Powers Law, which was amended in 2013 to improve service delivery and accommodate local aspirations for greater local control of service ministry policy, budget and investment priorities. In response, on July 1, 2014 (after Modification 7), GSP/Taqadum shifted its focus to the implementation of these amendments and the “administrative decentralization” of three out of eight ministries slated for decentralization – Education, Health, and Municipalities and Public Works – working with five “model” provinces (Babil, Baghdad, Diwaniyah, Najaf, and Wasit). The scheduled August 2015 devolution of powers from Iraq’s federal ministries to provincial governments drove activities with provincial government actors to prepare them to accept the authority and embrace the responsibility of improving public services for citizens. Two additional provinces – Diyala and Kirkuk – were added to GSP/Taqadum’s work plan as of October 2014.

This reform agenda became a top priority for Prime Minister Abadi and his overall plan to manage the country’s fiscal crisis by finding efficiency in government organization, while promoting reconciliation among disaffected Sunni constituencies and accommodating competing Shia factions within his own political base. GSP/Taqadum became a central enabler of the Prime Minister’s “functional federalism” reform agenda. Consistent with this agenda and with the policy backing of the U.S. Ambassador, the State Department and the National Security Council, USAID, on June 1,

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2015 (Modification 9), expanded the scope of GSP/Taqadam to cover the 15 remaining provinces. As of June 23, 2016, GSP/Taqadam added an additional four ministries – Agriculture; Construction and Housing; Labor and Social Affairs, and Youth and Sport – to its work plan. GSP/Taqadam’s activities have included partnering with local authorities in 15 provinces, counterparts at the ministries, the Prime Minister’s Office, the High Commission for Coordination between Provinces (HCCP), the Council of Representatives (COR), and related entities.

A. Development Hypothesis

GSP/Taqadam’s development hypothesis asserts that:

- If a government body is closest to its citizens, then it is more likely to understand and react to their needs; if decentralization is accomplished, then Iraq’s provinces will be more effective in responding to community needs.
- If (a) centrally controlled service providers (directorates) are transitioned to local government ownership and (b) local service delivery improvements are implemented, then a more citizen-focused public service delivery system will emerge to take the place of the (current) bureaucratic service provision model. The projected outcome of this change is the better delivery of public services for Iraqis.
- If functions of services devolved from the ministry to local government, the governor’s office will hold the responsibility of any shortage of services directly in front of the community and the central government will not be a hanger of excuses anymore.

Accordingly, the process to decentralize services to the local level supports the hypothesis that such a shift can more effectively respond to community needs, a declaration that is consistent with GSP/Taqadam’s development objective.

Critical Assumptions

The critical assumptions, formulated for the final extension of GSP/Taqadam (detailed in Modification 13), related to the development hypothesis include the following:

1. Commitment and support is given by Ministries of Agriculture, Ministry of Construction and Housing (MOCH), Youth and Sports and Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) to identify roles, responsibilities, authorities, personnel, and budgets to disengage from the federal level and correspondingly decentralize to the provincial level;
2. The Province Task Forces are established and populated with appropriate individuals and qualified subject matter experts drawn from the directorates, PC, and GO. Additionally, Task Force members commit the necessary time needed to accomplish the workplan elements;
3. Cooperation and consensus among the 15 targeted provinces is easily obtained;
4. The High Commission for Coordination among the Provinces (HCCP) sponsors the devolution of functions after an agreement between central and local governments on those devolved functions;
5. Target provinces are striving to implement most of the short and long term solutions outlined in the approved service delivery improvement plans (SDIPs);
6. The security environment permits the delivery of project assistance in the target provinces for the target ministries.
7. The three ISIS-controlled provinces are liberated with enough time to implement the developed action plans of post-Disaster; and
8. After SDIPs of five sectors completed and adopted by the five southern provinces, they can

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go further in implementing short and long term solutions if their assigned staff shows commitment and dedication to do so promptly.

B. Summary Intervention to be evaluated

Component I: *Institutional Strengthening* – Institutionalize core authorities and responsibilities of provincial and local government.

Component II: *Executive Oversight* – Provincial and local elected officials hold executive ministries accountable for improved services.

C. Summary of the Project/Activity Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) Plan

GSP/Taqadum's Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) was revised in September 2015, coinciding with Modification 11, and again in July 2016, with Modification 13. The PMP includes 21 indicators at both the output and outcome levels, of which four were added in July 2016 at the time of that PMP revision, to monitor decentralization of functions from the central level. The table below captures the monitoring indicators and how they relate to the results framework.

Development Objective Provincial & Local Government More Effectively Respond to Community Needs <i>Indicator No. 1: Life of Project Change in Provincial Sectoral Services Indicators due to GSP Intervention</i>	
Intermediate Result 1.0 Provincial and Local Government Core Authorities and Responsibilities Institutionalized <i>Indicator No. 2: Number of Decentralization Action Plans Developed and submitted to HCCP</i>	
Sub-Intermediate Result 1.1 Provincial Intergovernmental Coordination Plans for Transition of Tasks, Services, and Competencies Implemented <i>Indicator No. 3: Number of provincial staff trained to implement decentralization activities</i> <i>Indicator No. 4: Percentage of total functions transferred to directorates as determined by the adopted ICI plan</i>	Sub-Intermediate Result 1.2 Provincial Government Service Delivery Improvement Plans Implemented <i>Indicator No. 13: Number of Sub-national entities receiving GSP/Taqadum assistance that improve their performance</i>

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Sub-Intermediate Result 1.1.1 New Structure, Roles, Responsibilities, and Relations for GOs Implemented

Indicator No. 5: Number of provincial local administration structures to manage decentralization defined

Indicator No. 6: Number of local government staff trained on organizational development process mapping and procedures

Indicator No. 7: Number of functions related to service delivery that are mapped, streamlined and posted

Indicator No. 18: Number of Provinces Adopted New Distribution of Roles, Responsibilities and Authorities

Indicator No. 19: Number of Provinces Adopted a Model of Oversight and Accountability Relationship between Local and Federal Governments

Sub-Intermediate Result 1.1.2

Financial Framework for Local Revenue, Capital Budgeting and Financial Management Systems Enhanced

Indicator No. 8: Number of units implementing newly devolved functions and authorities *Indicator No. 9: Number of local government staff trained on local revenue generation and collection* *Indicator No. 10: Number of provinces that enhance budgeting, financial management, and internal control system*

Indicator No. 20: Number of Provinces Developed Capital Investment and/ or Operations Plans and Budgets

Sub-Intermediate Result 1.1.3 Conflicting Laws and Regulations for Enabling Legal Framework Amended

Indicator No. 11: Number of legal workgroups/units formed/expanded in PC to draft laws and regulations to solve conflictions with decentralization

Indicator No. 12: Number of drafted amendments to deconflict decentralization laws and regulations

Sub-Intermediate Result 1.2.1 Service Delivery Improvement Plans of Provincial Governments Drafted

Indicator No. 14: Number of provincial Sectoral performance standards developed with line ministries to address service delivery issues

Indicator No. 15: Number of Service Delivery Improvement Plans drafted

Sub-Intermediate Result 1.2.2 Short-term Impact-Oriented Solutions from Provincial Governments' SDIPs Implemented

Indicator No. 16: Percentage of implemented solutions of identified solutions in Service Delivery Improvement Plans

Indicator No. 17: Number of provinces implementing a systematized process for monitoring service delivery

Indicator No. 21: Number of Provinces Formed Post-Disaster Technical Team for Service Restoration

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See Attachments 4 and 5 for full Performance Monitoring Plan revisions associated with Modifications 11 and 13.

IV. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation will consider two primary programmatic areas addressed by GSP/Taqadum in the past two years of implementation. These include:

- 1) **Decentralization of functions:** Supporting decentralization through the development of ministerial Decentralization Mapping and Analysis Plans (DMAPs), among other efforts;
- 2) **Local governance and basic service delivery:** Supporting service delivery improvement through the development of provincial Service Delivery Improvement Plans (SDIPs), among other efforts;

For each of these areas, the evaluation questions are designed to result in the identification of factors that promoted or impeded success. To achieve this, the sub-questions are designed to elicit, for each province/ministry, (1) descriptions of activity implementation in those areas, (2) descriptions of the achievement of key high-level results, and (3) characterization of inclusivity and representation of civil society in design and implementation. With this information, the evaluation team should (4) identify successful and instructive examples at the level of the province or ministry and analyze these as case studies. This analysis will serve the main purpose of the evaluation, to identify the factors and characteristics that contributed most to achieving or impeding success, primarily those that can be replicated or mitigated by USAID or other donors or partners in similar kinds of programming. The evaluation questions below (organized by key programming area) provide additional detail on the specific variables the evaluation team should address.

The third evaluation question addresses the resumption of governance and basic service delivery in recently liberated provinces (Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din). Of particular interest to USAID, for the purpose of this evaluation, are the trainings that took place in (1) damage assessment of essential public infrastructure; and (2) public financial management (PFM). The evaluation team will assess who was targeted for training, whether any of the skills targeted by the training are still evident (either in the individuals who received training, or because those individuals instituted good practices), and what factors contributed to higher capacity for damage assessments or PFM in targeted communities.

1. Transfer of ministerial functions from the central to the provincial level: What factors promoted or impeded the success of Decentralization Mapping and Analysis Plans (DMAPs) to support the transfer of the central Ministerial functions to the provincial level? This should be assessed at the level of each of the eight line ministries supported by GSP/Taqadum.

1a. **How were plans implemented?** To what extent were DMAPs implemented according to plan? For each line ministry, identify which elements of the plans were and were not implemented, as well as any major deviations from the plans or adaptations to the plans made over time and what challenges or circumstances prompted the changes.

1b. **Are high-level results observed?** Which key functions identified in DMAPs were successfully implemented at the provincial level following transfer from targeted ministries? Which were not?

1c. **Were development and implementation inclusive?** To what extent was civil society, including women, youth, minorities, and other vulnerable populations, represented in the design and implementation of DMAPs? The evaluation team should consider the following:

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- Whether civil society was consulted in the development of DMAPs or throughout implementation, and what mechanisms were used to consult with them;
- Whether the views of civil society were reflected in decisions made;
- Whether these decisions were made in a transparent manner; and
- Whether there is any evidence of a) corruption or b) bias (on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or political affiliation) in the development or implementation of DMAPs.

1d. **What factors promoted/impeded success?** What factors were associated with the most successful DMAPs, as measured by successful uptake of functions following transfer from targeted ministries? What factors resulted in impediments to success? In answering this question, the evaluation team should draw on case studies of line ministries in addition to other relevant evidence already collected. Factors in success may be associated with:

- The nature or structure of the plans themselves;
- The kinds of key functions being transferred;
- Ministry-level characteristics;
- Specific behaviors or actions taken by the ministries;
- Political, administrative, or legal obstacles; or
- The approach to implementation, including whether and how women, youth, and minorities were engaged.

2. Improved public service delivery: What factors promoted or impeded the success of provincial service delivery improvement plans (SDIPs)? This should be assessed at the level of each of the provinces in which SDIPs were supported by GSP/Taqadum.

2a. **How were plans implemented?** To what extent were SDIPs implemented according to plan? For each province, identify which elements of the plans were more or less likely to be implemented, as well as any major deviations from the plans or adaptations to the plans made over time, and what challenges or circumstances prompted those changes.

2b. **Are high-level results observed?** To what extent did the delivery of (targeted) basic services improve in provinces with SDIPs? Are these improvements related to more efficient local governance?

2c. **Were development and implementation inclusive?** To what extent did SDIPs (including both drafting and implementation) include women, youth, minorities, and other vulnerable populations? In answering this question, the evaluation team should consider the following:

- Whether the views of civil society and community stakeholders were solicited;
- Whether these views, as expressed, were apparent in the plans and their implementation;
- Whether decisions were made in a transparent manner; and
- Whether there is any evidence of: a) corruption, or b) bias (according to religion, ethnicity, or political affiliation) in the design or implementation of SDIPs.

2d. **What factors promoted/impeded success?** What factors were associated with the most successful plans, as measured by improvements in service delivery outcomes? What factors impeded the success of plans? The evaluation team should identify and draw on particularly instructive case studies in responding to this question. Factors may be associated with:

- The nature or structure of the plans themselves;

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- Which services were targeted;
- The enabling environment in a province;
- Specific behaviors or actions taken by provincial governments; or
- The implementation of the plans, including whether and how cooperation among stakeholders was promoted or whether and how women and youth were engaged.

3. Restoration of governance and service delivery in recently liberated areas (Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din): How effective were training efforts designed to restore local governance and basic service delivery in the recently liberated provinces of Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din?

- **3a. Damage assessment:**
 - Who did GSP/Taqadum target for training in damage assessment of essential service infrastructure?
 - Are skills targeted by these trainings evident in key local governance bodies or stakeholders, where trainings were implemented (either among those who received the training, or as a result of institution of good practices by those individuals)?
 - What factors most enabled any observed increases in capacity for damage assessments?
- **3b. Public financial management:**
 - Who did GSP/Taqadum target for training in public financial management?
 - Are skills targeted by these trainings evident in key local governance bodies or stakeholders, where trainings were implemented (either among those who received the training, or as a result of institution of good practices by those individuals)?
 - What factors most enabled any observed increases in capacity for public financial management?

Gender considerations must be taken into account in this performance evaluation. In addition to gender disaggregation and differences in trends for all questions, PMSP also should briefly summarize GSP/Taqadum assistance promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women that was provided to GOI partners. The evaluation should consider the extent to which central and provincial governments took women's issues and concerns into consideration in delivering services.

V. EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The GSP/Taqadum award had, in total, 14 modifications over the six years of implementation. Several of those modifications led to extensive changes in the project's scope due to the political changes in Iraq and alterations in USAID plans, as well as to changes in the overall security situation.

There were two primary periods in the project implementation: from 2011-2015 the project was focused on capacity building of GoI institutions in preparation for decentralization to start. New developments in Iraqi politics since 2015 have presented opportunities to expand and extend the efforts of GSP/Taqadum. In response to a request from the GOI, USAID and Chemonics modified the implementation approach, taking into consideration the additional tasks requested and maintaining all activities within its prior scope. This approach deepened GSP/Taqadum's interventions in provinces where it was previously working, but also widened its scope to accommodate greater geographical coverage. This evaluation will focus on the period since 2015.

The evaluation team is encouraged to propose an innovative and creative mixed-method evaluation design that meets the standards of rigor established by the USAID evaluation policy and that can be

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used to answer the research questions posed above.

The design will be shared with USAID for comment. Given the large amount of data that will be reviewed and collected, it is important that a clear workplan be established. It is expected that both quantitative and qualitative methods will be needed to fully answer the evaluation questions. Wherever possible, quantitative data should be disaggregated by gender. Qualitative data should be representative and analyzed systematically, to minimize the potential for bias and ensure that results are representative of diverse community perspectives.

Activity performance data are available on a mix of output- and outcome-level indicators. These may be of use to the evaluation team in assessing factors in success at provincial and ministerial levels. However, they are not sufficient, by themselves, to assess the achievement of high-level results as requested in sub-questions 1a. and 2a. Therefore, the evaluation team may utilize the performance data but should gather additional results-level data as needed to answer the evaluation questions.

Desk Study:

Before fieldwork begins, the evaluation team will conduct a desk study of relevant information. This evaluation should address primarily the final two years of the award. In the desk review, PMSP may review materials and documentation prior to 2015, particularly those leading up to the modification of activities, as these may provide context for programmatic decision-making. The evaluation should pay particular attention to the periods since Modification #11 (May 2015), which expanded the geographic reach of GSP/Taqadum, and since Modification #13 (June 2016), which instituted additional programmatic changes to decentralization programming.

Some of the documents that USAID will share with the evaluation team are as follows:

- Activity weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports;
- Previous evaluations, including USAID/Iraq Capacity Building Office summative evaluation and USAID Local Governance Program Phase III evaluation;
- Activity booklets;
- Activity performance management plan, including the October 2016 revised performance management plan;
- Annual work plans;
- Implementing partner M&E data; and
- GSP/Taqadum's field-monitoring reports, and any other relevant QED or PMSP data.

Analysis of “Government Letters”

Starting with the Year 5 Quarter 1 report (period October-December, 2015), GSP/Taqadum has provided what they term “government letters” in each of their quarterly reports. Reports contain anywhere from ~15 to ~85 examples. The “Letters” constitute English-language summaries of official communications of various kinds, issued by diverse government bodies, in areas pertaining to both decentralization of ministerial functions and local governance and basic service delivery. These summaries provide direct evidence of government actions and changes in practice. USAID will provide a coded catalog of these summaries in a spreadsheet. Codes will include the province, government offices involved, level of government involved, and which (if any) high-level result is evidenced, as applicable, by that example, along with variables such as sector or function being decentralized. Relevant Letters should be analyzed comparatively across provinces/ministries. The evaluation team should propose additional coding and analysis that emerge from early review, as they think relevant.

Key informant interviews

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The evaluation team will conduct key informant interviews (KIIs) with USAID Mission staff, government counterparts at the national and provincial levels, and senior implementing partner staff, such as Chief of Party, and other key technical staff, as well as representatives from civil society and community representatives. These interviews will provide information about implementation, barriers or challenges confronted, and decisions that were made in response. *KIIs should not be relied upon as the sole source for data on high-level results*, though they may provide supporting and/or contextual evidence.

The team will draft a list of key informants based on the GSP/Taqadum and USAID-supplied background documents and inputs, which will be finalized during the evaluation desk review of project materials/reports. The evaluation team must ensure that respondents are knowledgeable about GSP/Taqadum or that they demonstrably represent the communities intended to benefit from the activity, as applicable. The nature, relationship to the activity, and potential for bias of KIIs should be weighed in interpreting responses and acknowledged in the Evaluation Limitations. Over the course of early interviews, the evaluation team should be probing for additional relevant sources and respondents, and should remain flexible in accommodating additional interviewees. The team should also consider the close-down of the activity (and related loss of key staff) in organizing data collection and scheduling interviews.

Population-based surveys on local governance and service delivery

The evaluation team will conduct a population-based survey(s) to provide evidence of high-level results in response to EQ2. The team will propose a sampling approach (e.g. cluster-based) that is rigorous and appropriately representative of women, youth, minorities, people with disabilities, and other marginalized groups to produce statistically significant descriptive quantitative data on inclusive access to basic services. The team should work with USAID to identify provinces and sectors to include in the survey; this may be a subset of provinces or sectors addressed by GSP/Taqadum. The team should use this survey to assess availability of relevant basic services addressed by SDIPs, as well as quality of services and inclusive access to them. The survey may also inquire about perceptions of local governance in areas where this is appropriate. Because there are no baseline data for the GSP/Taqadum activity, the survey will need to be designed to elicit retrospective perceptions. The evaluation team should be prepared to validate the results of these questions through pilot testing in the field. The evaluation team should stratify sampling by gender to ensure an equal number of male and female respondents, with appropriate assigned enumerators.

The survey should be integrated methodologically with direct observation (described below). Wherever possible, direct observations of services and service infrastructure should be made in communities in which the survey is administered, although USAID recognizes that some communities with particular security challenges may receive the survey by telephone. The evaluation team may draw upon situation reports and other monitoring data from the communities being surveyed, collected by PMSP or others on behalf of USAID.

Case studies/systematic qualitative analysis

In responding to EQs 1d and 2d, the evaluation team should identify and analyze particularly successful examples at the provincial/ministerial levels. The team should also choose examples that may be characterized by less progress on high-level results, but which provide meaningful evidence for what factors, within USAID's (or other donors') manageable interest, could promote or impede success of future initiatives. These examples will form the basis for a selection of case studies for each of the two main evaluation questions, which the evaluation team should analyze in greater depth, integrating multiple sources of evidence. The team should provide a clear evidence-based rationale for the selection of cases, and should consult USAID before finalization of selections. In analyzing

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these case studies, the evaluation team should ensure that both intended and unintended results (whether positive or negative) are captured as part of the in-depth analysis.

The evaluation team is encouraged to consider innovative systematic and/or participatory qualitative evaluation methods to apply to these case studies, such as outcome harvesting, contribution analysis, or collaborative outcomes reporting. The evaluation team should propose a method in the initial evaluation design. If early results indicate that an alternative method may be more appropriate, the team should seek USAID approval before making any changes.

Focus group discussions

KIIs are preferred over focus group discussions (FGDs) for interviewing key stakeholder groups. However, USAID recognizes that on certain occasions, the evaluation team may need to use a group format for interviews due to logistical constraints. Analysis of any FGD data should be approached systematically according to key themes of interest. If FGDs are used, the evaluation team should provide justification for the selection of individual respondents (in addition to the stakeholder groups to which they belong) and seek to ensure that diverse perspectives are represented, including those of women, minorities, and youth.

Questionnaires/Instruments

All KIIs and FGDs conducted should follow a semi-structured interview schedule in which relevant key themes are addressed. Community-level survey(s) should follow a rigorously designed survey protocol. USAID will review and approve these tools as part of the evaluation design.

Questionnaires will be pre-tested in the field to ensure their validity and reliability, and revisions made as indicated, with notification to USAID. If appropriate, the evaluation team will design a sample survey instrument covering key aspects of the activity and the survey instruments will have to be approved by local institutional review boards.

On-site observations

To the extent possible, the evaluation team is expected to make site visits to assess the work implemented with GSP/Taqadum assistance. A description of proposed site visits should be included in the evaluation workplan. These should be selected to align with other data collection methods, particularly sites selected for surveys.

VI. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team must demonstrate familiarity with USAID's evaluation policies and guidance included in the USAID Automated Directive System (ADS) in Chapter 200.

The contractor will utilize a realistic and sound evaluation team with appropriate relevant prior experience in public-sector/governance-strengthening and program evaluation. Relevant governance evaluation experience in a post-conflict development context is preferable.

Collectively, the evaluation team must have the following qualifications:

- Demonstrated technical expertise in the public sector, including familiarity with:
 - Decentralization reforms
 - Implementation in post-conflict and fragile states
 - Governance programs in the Middle East
 - Inclusive governance
 - Iraq public sector and democracy and governance
- Strong expertise in monitoring and evaluation methodology, including in:

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- Post-conflict, high risk security environments
- Relevant participatory evaluation methodology
- Population-based perceptions survey design
- Appropriate language skills:
- Fluency in Arabic
- English language writing, editing, and communication skills

The majority of materials available for review to the evaluation team will be in Arabic. Likewise, interviews, surveys, and participatory evaluation sessions will be conducted in Arabic. Therefore, multiple team members will need to have fluency in Arabic.

Data collectors will include a sufficient number of female staff to ensure female data collectors are available for all female survey respondents. The evaluation team should include all of the skills listed above. It is up to PMSP to ensure that the overall composition of the team is comprehensive and complementary.

VII. CRITERIA TO ENSURE THE QUALITY OF THE EVALUATION REPORT

Per ADS 201maa, Criteria to Ensure the Quality of the Evaluation Report, draft and final evaluation reports will be evaluated against the following criteria to ensure the quality of the evaluation report.

- Evaluation reports should represent a thoughtful, well-researched, and well-organized effort to objectively evaluate the strategy, project, or activity.
- Evaluation reports should be readily understood and should identify key points clearly, distinctly, and succinctly.
- The Executive Summary of an evaluation report should present a concise and accurate statement of the most critical elements of the report.
- Evaluation reports should adequately address all evaluation questions included in the SOW, or the evaluation questions subsequently revised and documented in consultation and agreement with USAID.
- Evaluation methodology should be explained in detail and sources of information properly identified.
- Limitations to the evaluation should be adequately disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.). If the evaluation team wishes to provide information on challenges to data collection, they should do so in a separate section.
- Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence, and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay, or simply the compilation of people's opinions. For each evaluation sub-question, findings should be clearly linked to analysis; conclusions should be clearly linked to findings, and any recommendations made should be clearly linked to the conclusions.
- Findings and conclusions should be specific, concise, and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.
- If evaluation findings assess person-level outcomes or impact, they should also be separately assessed for both males and females.
- If recommendations are included, they should be supported by a specific set of findings and should be action-oriented, practical, and specific. For this evaluation, recommendations should be grounded in the analysis of factors that contribute to or impede success, and provide information about the potential replicability of those factors by USAID or other

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donors in future programming.

VIII. OTHER REQUIREMENTS

All quantitative data collected by the evaluation team must be provided in machine-readable, non-proprietary formats as required by USAID's Open Data policy (see ADS 579). The data should be organized and fully documented for use by those not fully familiar with the project or the evaluation. USAID will retain ownership of the survey and all datasets developed.

IX. DELIVERABLES

1. Evaluation work plan: Within 1 week of the award of the contract, a draft work plan for the evaluation must be completed by the lead evaluator and presented to the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR). The work plan will include: (1) the anticipated schedule and logistical arrangements; and (2) a list of the members of the evaluation team, delineated by roles and responsibilities.

2. Evaluation design: Within 3 weeks of approval of the work plan, the evaluation team must submit to the COR an evaluation design (which will become an annex to the Evaluation report). The evaluation design will include: (1) detailed evaluation design matrix that links the Evaluation Questions in the SOW to data sources, methods, and the data analysis plan; (2) draft questionnaires and other data collection instruments or their main features; (3) the list of potential interviewees and sites to be visited and proposed selection criteria and/or sampling plan (must include calculations and a justification of sample size, plans as to how the sampling frame will be developed, and the sampling methodology); (4) known limitations to the evaluation design; and (5) a dissemination plan.

USAID offices and relevant stakeholders are asked to take no more than 5 business days to review and consolidate comments through the COR. Once the evaluation team receives the consolidated comments on the initial evaluation design and work plan, they are expected to return with a revised evaluation design and work plan within 2 days.

- 3. In-briefing:** Within two days of arrival in Baghdad, the evaluation team will have an in-briefing with USAID for introductions and to discuss the team's understanding of the assignment, initial assumptions, evaluation questions, methodology, and work plan, and/or to adjust the SOW, if necessary. If the team arrives prior to conducting the primary desk review, then a second in-briefing should take place after the review has taken place. Note: The core PMSP staff will meet regularly with USAID to discuss progress; evaluation team members will join when needed. In lieu of an inception report, the weekly updates will include electronic copies of materials presenting during the regular briefings.
- 4. Mid-term briefing:** The evaluation team is expected to hold at least one mid-term briefing with USAID program office and the technical team on the status of the evaluation, including potential challenges, emerging opportunities, and preliminary findings. The timing of the mid-term briefing(s) will depend upon the workplan and should be agreed upon by the time of the approval of evaluation design.
- 5. Exit briefing:** The evaluation team is expected to hold a final exit briefing prior to leaving the country to discuss the status of data collection and preliminary findings. This may include a

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presentation to be scheduled as agreed upon during the in-briefing to USAID. USAID's feedback and requests for additional analyses during this briefing should be taken into account in preparing the exit presentation (below, #7).

- 6. Exit presentation:** The evaluation team is expected to hold a final presentation of findings and recommendations to USAID and other stakeholders, potentially including implementing partners of this or related activities, key government stakeholders, or other donors, at USAID's discretion. This presentation will be scheduled as agreed upon during the in-briefing. It will be held after sufficient preliminary findings are available, which may be before the evaluation team leaves the country, or it may be arranged by video or telephone/teleconference, with key evaluation team members. The draft power-point slide deck should be shared with USAID for review at least two days prior to the presentation. PMSP core staff, IBTCI headquarters staff, and/or evaluation staff may also be asked to reprise the presentation for DC-based USAID and partner staff and stakeholders, depending on availability of personnel and travel requirements.
- 7. Draft evaluation report:** The draft evaluation report should be consistent with the guidance provided in Section IX: **Final Report Format**. The report will address each of the questions identified in the SOW and any other issues the team considers to have a bearing on the objectives of the evaluation. Any additions or changes to the report not included in the approved evaluation design should be made only after consultation with USAID. The submission date for the draft evaluation report will be determined in the evaluation work plan. Once the initial draft evaluation report is submitted, USAID program and technical offices will have 10 business days in which to review and comment on the initial draft, after which point the COR will submit the consolidated comments to the evaluation team. The evaluation team will then be asked to submit a revised final draft report ten business days hence, and again the USAID program and technical offices will review and send comments on this final draft report within five business days of its submission.
- 8. Final evaluation report:** The evaluation team will be asked to take no more than five business days to respond/incorporate the final comments from USAID. The evaluation team leader will then submit the final report to the COR. All project data and records, including the Government Letters database, will be submitted in full and should be in electronic form in an easily readable format, organized and documented for use by those not fully familiar with the intervention or evaluation, and owned by USAID.

The evaluation final report will include an abstract; executive summary; background of the local context and the strategies/projects/activities being evaluated; the evaluation purpose and main evaluation questions; the methodology or methodologies; the limitations to the evaluation; findings, conclusions, and recommendations. For more detail, see "How-To Note: Preparing Evaluation Reports" and **ADS 201mah, USAID Evaluation Report Requirements**.

The executive summary will be 2–5 pages in length and summarize the purpose, background of the project being evaluated, main evaluation questions, methods, findings, conclusions, and recommendations and lessons learned (if applicable).

The evaluation methodology must be explained in the report in detail. The evaluation team should clearly describe all sampling methodologies, including for group discussions. This includes describing the sampling frame, the sampling method, and all sample sizes with justification. Limitations to the evaluation will be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (e.g., selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.)

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The annexes to the report must include:

- The Evaluation SOW;
- Any statements of difference regarding significant unresolved differences of opinion by funders, implementers, and/or members of the evaluation team;
- An updated evaluation matrix summarizing key findings to the sources and methods used for each evaluation question and sub-question;
- All data collection and analysis tools used in conducting the evaluation, such as questionnaires, checklists, and discussion guides;
- All sources of information, properly identified and listed;
- Signed disclosure of conflict of interest forms for all evaluation team members, either attesting to a lack of conflicts of interest or describing existing conflicts of interest; and
- Summary information about evaluation team members, including qualifications, experience, and role on the team.

In accordance with ADS 201, the contractor will make the final evaluation reports publicly available through the Development Experience Clearinghouse within three months of the evaluation's conclusion, unless otherwise directed by USAID. USAID may request PMSP to redact sensitive material before posting.

X. CLIN 004 PAYMENT SCHEDULE

Deliverable	Document Required for Payment.	Payment Amount
Final Evaluation Design		25%
Draft Evaluation Report	Acceptance by COR of the Draft Evaluation Report	10%
Exit Presentation	Email from COR accepting the presentation as Acceptable	25%
Final Evaluation Report	Acceptance by COR Final Evaluation Report	40%

XI. SUBMISSION REQUESTS

Evaluation matrix

The evaluation team should utilize a design matrix following the general format provided below to submit their initial evaluation design. The information in the matrix should be specific at the sub-question level. At the submission of the evaluation design deliverable, the team should include an updated version of this matrix identifying the tools (including which sections/questions are relevant) that were developed to provide data for each sub-question. The evaluation team should submit a matrix of the same format identifying key high-level findings as an annex to the evaluation report.

Questions	Data Sources (*)	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods
1.[Insert	[Documents	[Key informant	[To be determined by

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Evaluation question]	<i>(including. Performance monitoring data, previous evaluations, etc.), national statistics, project staff, stakeholders, expert knowledge, beneficiaries ...]</i>	<i>interviews, questionnaires or surveys, focus group discussions, direct observation, desk review...]</i>	<i>evaluation team]</i> <i>[Requested level of disaggregation—gender, ethnicity, location (district, province), etc....]</i>
2. [Insert Evaluation question]			
3. [Insert Evaluation question]			

Evaluation schedule

The evaluation team should submit a draft schedule for briefings, data collection, analysis, and submission of deliverables.

XII. LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

1. GSP/Taqadum award (September 2011)
2. Revised technical proposal Modification #11 (April 2015)
3. Revised workplan Modification #13 (June 2016)
4. Performance Monitoring Plan revision for Modification #11 (September 2015)
5. Performance Monitoring Plan revision for Modification #13 (October 2016)

ANNEX B: CONSULTANT BIOGRAPHIES

APRIL POWELL-WILLINGHAM J.D., M.A.U.P. TEAM LEADER/GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION EXPERT

A graduate of the University of California, Los Angeles School of Law (1990), Ms. Powell-Willingham is a governance and democracy expert, as well as constitutional lawyer and legal drafter with a law and international development background and experience in Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, and South Sudan. She has experience managing complex, large initiatives with substantial budgets centered on peace building, state building, and structural and institutional change in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Advising on, designing, and assisting in negotiating complex technical underpinnings of political agreements as part of an overall peace process, of which constitutional democratization is an integral part, Ms. Powell-Willingham has experience as a senior technical expert providing technical and policy advice as well as training in critical and essential core governance and law-making skills. Notable accomplishments include the following:

- Establishing new, interdisciplinary, interagency units in domestic contexts as well as conflict-affected countries, such as Commonwealth Development legal services, the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs (CLA) Office at US Embassy Baghdad, and the Joint Constitutional Unit (JCU) at UNDP Somalia and the UN Political Mission to Somalia (UNPOS)
- Designing legal and process architecture to significantly move forward constitutional, legal, and legislative process development in Iraq
- Designing and implementing large-scale democratic governance reforms at the national and subnational levels across the whole of government in Iraq and Somalia
- Designing and leading UN Somalia support to the constitutional process in Somalia, through to provisional adoption on August 1, 2012, of the first such duly adopted constitution for Somalia since 1960
- Designing and assisting in carrying out the procedures leading to the selection of parliament and the subsequent election of the president pursuant to the new constitution. At the request of and in consultation with national counterparts, designing and drafting provisions establishing the post-adoption constitutional review and implementation process, set forth in the final chapter of the constitution. This chapter continues to successfully guide Somalia's democratization, as evidenced by the continued peaceful transfer of political power in 2012 and again in the 2016–2017 electoral cycle.

ADIL MOHAMMED ALWAN AL-LAMI PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE SPECIALIST

With a law degree from the University of Baghdad earned in 2001 and accredited before the A and B level courts in Iraq, Mr. Al-Lami is an expert in the Iraqi legal system, laws, and regulations. He directed the ISAR regulatory reform program for three years, working with the central government and all ministries to review and modernize legal acts consistent with market principles. He has experience in human rights issues, compensation for human rights violations, the electoral system, process and procedures, public administration reform, judicial reform, commercial law reform, parliamentary system reform and development, post-conflict country political and economic reform, foreign investments, and doing business in Iraq. From 2007 to 2011, Mr. Al-Lami was the senior liaison advisor with the Iraqi Ministry of Justice providing technical assistance for strengthening the public administration capacity of the GOI's executive offices and Ministry of Justice. As the Chief Electoral Officer for Iraq from 2004 to 2007, he administered the operational and executive activities required for holding the three national electoral events during Iraq's transitional period (2004–2006), which included the election of Iraq's transitional National Assembly, the referendum on Iraq's new constitution, and the election of Iraq's new Council of Representatives.

GANIYU ALADE IPAYE

METHODOLOGIST

Having received his MS and Ph.D. from the University of Ibadan in Nigeria in Agriculture and Rural Development, Dr. Ipaye has a wealth of experience in research methods, measurement and scaling techniques for designing of research instruments, statistical analysis and results interpretation, and strategic management. In addition to his work in statistics, Dr. Ipaye has most recently provided consulting services as a program adviser in strategic planning to the USAID-funded US\$74 million SUCCESS Program of Democracy International in South Sudan: Development of the “Program Strategic Plan (2015–2018)” and the “Year 3 Implementation Plan (2015–2016)” that ensured adaptation of the program to the fluid sociopolitical context in South Sudan caused by the violent political conflict that broke out in December 2013. He also provided technical support to the development by DI, of their Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (PMEP) for the period 2014–2018, Strengthening of Program Implementation Mechanism: Program Budget and Funds. In addition, Dr. Ipaye developed the “Gender Approach to the Darfur Development Strategy Document” for UN Women, Sudan. This document engendered the “Darfur Development Strategy” (DDS) including agriculture, livestock and rural livelihoods, and natural resources management thematic areas for implementation among the planned recovery interventions in Darfur, Sudan.

As a Senior Program Specialist for UNDP’s Conflict Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU) South Sudan (2010–2013), he was responsible for quality assurance, provided technical advisory support, and M&E for the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program. He provided technical and managerial leadership functions as Deputy Team Leader in providing oversight on the unit’s program management and operations processes of project portfolio of over US\$80 million per year and represented UNDP on the Steering Committee of World Bank Multi-Trust Funds (MDTF) funded DDR Program, interagency UN joint-programming (UNDAF), and South Sudan Humanitarian Coordination Team (HCT). Dr. Ipaye ensured quality assurance of the DDR program management process and results achievement and coordinated the web-based platform (ATLAS) financial and results reporting of the program for submission to UNDP office, donors, and other stakeholders with quality and timeliness. In this role, he served as the focal point for outcome evaluations of projects in the CPRU providing technical support on data collection through survey, KIIs, FGDs, data analysis, and reporting.

ASHRAF BAKR AL SHAREEF

FORMER METHODOLOGIST

Ashraf Bakr Al-Shareef is the Results-Based Management (RBM) Advisor to Global Affairs, Canada (GAC; formerly CIDA) and an independent international consultant with extensive experience in the institutionalization of RBM and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). Dr. Al-Shareef has conducted, and led teams in the conduct of, impartial research, evaluation and survey activities employing both quantitative and qualitative research techniques in Egypt and across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. He has led senior staff of the Ministry of State for Administrative Development (MSAD) in the development of a results-based framework for public sector reform in Egypt, and was recently a key member of an international team evaluating administrative reform in Iraq. He has worked with the governments of Iraq, Sudan and Jordan on the application of RBM in developing national employment policies. Dr. Al-Shareef has developed and delivered numerous interactive capacity building programs in RBM and M&E for both governmental and non-governmental organizations, both in Egypt and in other countries. He has also contributed significantly to the design and maintenance of comprehensive management information systems.

ANNEX C: BIBLIOGRAPHY

PROJECT DOCUMENTS

1. DMAP: Ministry of Youth and Sports (MOYS), Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA); Ministry of Health (MOH); Ministry of Education (MOE), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Ministry of Construction and Housing (MOCH); Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (MMPW)
2. DMAP: Water, Final Report 2016; Urban Planning, Final Report 2016; Sewers, Final Report 2016; Planning and Follow-Up, Final Report 2016; Municipalities, Final Report 2016
3. DMAP MOLSA: Vocational Training, Final Report 2016; People with Special Needs, Final Report 2016; Occupational Health and Safety, Final Report 2016; Labor and Social Affairs, Final Report 2016; Common Functions, Final Report 2016
4. GSP/Taqadum Annual Work Plans, 2015, 2016, 2017
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8. GSP/Taqadum Ministry of Agriculture: Final Report 2016
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16. GSP/Taqadum weekly reports 2016–2017
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ANNEX D: EVALUATION DESIGN

INTRODUCTION

This document describes the proposed design, methodologies, and work plan for the final evaluation of the Governance Support Project (GSP)/Taqadam project. USAID has contracted with International Business and Technical Associates, Inc. (IBTCI), through the Performance Management and Support Program for Iraq (PMSP), to conduct a final evaluation of the Governance Support Project (GSP)/Taqadam project.¹³² The purpose of the evaluation is to identify factors that promoted successful implementation of Taqadam interventions in its final two years to inform a follow-on activity focused on improving Government of Iraq (GOI) service delivery and public financial management and strengthen citizen monitoring and oversight of public expenditure.

Summary of Evaluation Design Process

This Evaluation Design Proposal is the final step in the evaluation's design process and has been preceded by the development of a Statement of Work, Evaluation Proposal, and desk research on the basis of a wide range of GSP/Taqadam's project reports and cognate materials provided to the PMSP by USAID. In the course of developing the current proposal, PMSP and IBTCI staff consulted with USAID in the field in order to clarify USAID's key questions, objectives and further requirements for the evaluation. The evaluation has been designed to take into consideration the need to provide actionable lessons for ongoing administrative decentralization initiatives in Iraq. The design retains sufficient flexibility to be refined in the field subsequent to final consultation with USAID, and in response to emerging findings over the course of the evaluation implementation period.

PROGRAM OVERVIEW

GSP/Taqadam Program Overview

Taqadam ended on September 30, 2017. It was a six-year, \$106 million project covering 15 governorates, working with eight ministries (Municipalities and Public Works, Health, Education, Agriculture, Construction and Housing, Finance, Labor and Social Services, and Youth and Sports) on decentralization of services. To date, the relevant functions of the Ministries of Construction and Housing, and Municipalities and Public Works have been fully transferred to the Governorates. In addition, more than a thousand small projects consistent with local community priorities—such as rehabilitating local water supply systems, paving roads, and refurbishing schools—have been implemented by local authorities. The Taqadam program was intended to facilitate the decentralization of key functions via training and capacity building of the administrative functions required to enable that decentralization. Specifically, it was designed to ensure greater efficiencies at the administrative level that led to tangible service-based benefits to the public, in ways intended to maximize accessibility and service quality for the diverse range of Iraqis. GSP/Taqadam was also responsible for providing key, targeted training on key functions (specifically, disaster assessment and public financial management) within the newly liberated areas of Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din.

GSP/Taqadam was modified 13 times over the course of its implementation, which covered a six-year period through September 2017. Many of these modifications significantly altered the scale and scope of the project.

¹³² The terms GSP and Taqadam will be used interchangeably in this document.

PMSP approach

The evaluation will determine the extent to which GSP met programmatic objectives and achieved both intended and unintended outcomes in its final two years of implementation. The PMSP evaluation team will systematically integrate the performance evaluation to examine project activities and answer the research questions contained in USAID's evaluation scope of work (SOW).

The following are the evaluation's three key objectives:

1. Review, analyze, and evaluate the performance of GSP/Taqadum against the assumptions and results, throughout its implementation, as designed by the U.S. Government and implemented by Chemonics International Inc.
2. Identify and characterize factors (anticipated and unanticipated) that promoted or impeded the success of GSP activities, including attention to both intended and unintended outcomes.
3. Provide lessons learned and, if appropriate, specific programmatic recommendations for future USAID democracy and governance assistance in Iraq and contribute to USAID's institutional learning on decentralization programming.

DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS

As defined by USAID, a "development hypothesis states what will occur if a particular intervention is undertaken, or a combination of several building blocks that are critical for bringing about a particular development outcome are put in place."¹³³

GSP/Taqadum's development hypothesis makes the following assertions:

- o If a government body is closest to its citizens, then it is more likely to understand and react to their needs; if decentralization is accomplished, then Iraq's governorates will be more effective in responding to community needs.
- o If centrally controlled service providers (directorates) are transitioned to local government ownership and (b) local service delivery improvements are implemented, then a more citizen-focused public service delivery system will emerge to take the place of the (current) bureaucratic service provision model. The projected outcome of this change is the better delivery of public services for Iraqis.
- o If functions of services devolved from the ministry to local government, the governor's office will hold the responsibility of any shortage of services directly in front of the community and the central government will not be a hanger of excuses anymore.

Accordingly, the process to decentralize services to the local level supports the hypothesis that such a shift can more effectively respond to community needs, a declaration that is consistent with GSP/Taqadum's development objective.

The evaluation team will seek to test this hypothesis via a suite of questions set forth, in the first instance, in the SOW.

PURPOSE, AUDIENCES, AND INTENDED USES

Evaluation purpose

The objective to provide lessons to inform ongoing and future USAID-funded decentralization efforts in Iraq fundamentally informs the overall purpose of the evaluation. USAID has already commissioned further work to build on the initiatives implemented by the Governance Support Project, and the current evaluation has been designed in recognition of the need to furnish usable,

¹³³ <http://usaidprojectstarter.org/content/development-hypotheses>

practical lessons for the Implementing Partner over the course of the new project. Moreover, although we believe the Iraqi situation to be somewhat unique, we are mindful of the opportunity to derive generalizable lessons for similar decentralization efforts elsewhere. Testing the development hypothesis of GSP/Taqadum, therefore, is critical. The current evaluation design has been prepared with those considerations at heart.

Audiences

The primary audiences for this evaluation are USAID/Iraq, USAID Missions involved in post- and peri-conflict administrative decentralization efforts, other USAID Bureaus, and other participating USG agencies. Government of Iraq counterparts and stakeholders may also find the evaluation useful for gaining a better understanding of the wider decentralization effort, and reinforce the lessons of the Taqadum program. Incoming implementing partners of administrative decentralization activities may also draw lessons from the evaluation.

Intended uses

The evaluation will yield detailed findings, conclusions, and lessons learned from the GSP/Taqadum program. Based on this information, the evaluation will provide actionable recommendations for future programming to enhance ongoing decentralization efforts funded by USAID in Iraq and elsewhere.

EXISTING INFORMATION

In the course of developing the Evaluation Design, the evaluation team received from USAID a number of documents for review. These included, *inter alia*,

- o Activity weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports
- o Previous evaluations, including USAID/Iraq Capacity Building Office summative evaluation and USAID Local Governance Program Phase III evaluation
- o Activity booklets
- o Activity performance management plan, including the October 2016 revised performance management plan
- o Annual work plans
- o Implementing partner M&E data
- o GSP/Taqadum's field-monitoring reports, and any other relevant QED or PMSP data

Other information central to the evaluation of Taqadum's decentralization efforts include the most recent law(s), official policy documents and regulations on decentralization and local governance, and any pertinent constitutional revisions regarding decentralization. Such legal documents represent governance architecture and set the stage for further engagement among and between government and civil society actors. The team has also looked at how Taqadum is situated within overall USAID Iraqi governance assistance programming over time and has examined what other USAID programming preceded and occurred in tandem with or alongside Taqadum. Understanding the operating context of GSP/Taqadum is crucial in interpreting any observable effects. In particular, the fact that the evaluation period is specified as the last two years of an extensive, multiyear effort that itself built on the efforts of previous and contemporary initiatives, both USAID-funded and otherwise, means that isolating the effect of the last two years alone may prove tricky. Therefore, a dependence upon the literature pertinent to other and previous initiatives will be essential in establishing reliable—or at least defensible—baselines.

The team will also have recourse to the “Government Letters” that constitute official communications of various kinds issued by diverse government bodies in areas pertaining to decentralization of ministerial functions and local governance and basic service delivery. The team will analyze the letters, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The analysis will focus on answering the evaluation questions, the KII selection process, and assessment of reforms addressed in the letters. The evaluation team understands that USAID will be providing the Government Letters, as well as any existing coding systems for them.

Many of the available documents are, of course, in Arabic. The team will rely on the native Arabic language skills of its methodology specialist and PMSP evaluation coordinator to derive English language content adequate for the evaluation.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation questions are set out in Table I. They are drawn directly from the SOW without any modification, although we do propose that some modest reordering would be helpful for the final report to facilitate flow and to adequately set forth the findings; for example, under EQ1, EQ1c would follow EQ1d, so that the questions move from considerations of process, to outcome, to contribution analysis, followed by a consideration of the project's overall success in meeting the needs of civil society.

Questions
EQ1. Transfer of ministerial functions from the central to the provincial level: What factors promoted or impeded the success of Decentralization Mapping and Analysis Plans (DMAPs) to support the transfer of the central Ministerial functions to the provincial level? This will be assessed at the level of each of the eight line ministries supported by GSP/Taqadum. Ia. How were plans implemented? To what extent were DMAPs implemented according to plan? For each line ministry, identify which elements of the plans were and were not implemented, as well as any major deviations from the plans or adaptations to the plans made over time and what challenges or circumstances prompted the changes. Ib. Are high-level results observed? Which key functions identified in DMAPs were successfully implemented at the provincial level following transfer from targeted ministries? Which were not? Ic. Were development and implementation inclusive? To what extent was civil society, including women, youth, minorities, and other vulnerable populations, represented in the design and implementation of DMAPs? The evaluation team will consider the following: • Whether civil society was consulted in the development of DMAPs or throughout implementation, and what mechanisms were used to consult with them • Whether the views of civil society were reflected in decisions made • Whether these decisions were made in a transparent manner • Whether there is any evidence of corruption or bias (on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or political affiliation) in the development or implementation of DMAPs Id. What factors promoted/impeded success? What factors were associated with the most successful DMAPs, as measured by successful uptake of functions following transfer from targeted ministries? What factors resulted in impediments to success? In answering this question, the evaluation team should draw on case studies of line ministries in addition to other relevant evidence already collected. Factors in success may be associated with the following: • The nature or structure of the plans themselves • The kinds of key functions being transferred • Ministry-level characteristics • Specific behaviors or actions taken by the ministries • Political, administrative, or legal obstacles • The approach to implementation, including whether and how women, youth, and minorities were engaged
EQ2. Improved public service delivery:

What factors promoted or impeded the success of provincial service delivery improvement plans (SDIPs)? This will be assessed at the level of each of the governorates in which SDIPs were supported by GSP/Taqadum.

2a. How were plans implemented? To what extent were SDIPs implemented according to plan? For each governorate, identify which elements of the plans were more or less likely to be implemented, as well as any major deviations from the plans or adaptations to the plans made over time, and what challenges or circumstances prompted those changes.

2b. Are high-level results observed? To what extent did the delivery of (targeted) basic services improve in governorates with SDIPs? Are these improvements related to more efficient local governance?

2c. Were development and implementation inclusive? To what extent did SDIPs (including both drafting and implementation) include women, youth, minorities, and other vulnerable populations? In answering this question, the evaluation team should consider the following:

- Whether the views of civil society and community stakeholders were solicited
- Whether these views, as expressed, were apparent in the plans and their implementation
- Whether decisions were made in a transparent manner
- Whether there is any evidence of corruption bias (according to religion, ethnicity, or political affiliation) in the design or implementation of SDIPs

2d. What factors promoted/impeded success? What factors were associated with the most successful plans, as measured by improvements in service delivery outcomes? What factors impeded the success of plans? The evaluation team should identify and draw on particularly instructive case studies in responding to this question. Factors may be associated with the following:

- The nature or structure of the plans themselves
- Which services were targeted
- The enabling environment in a governorate
- Specific behaviors or actions taken by provincial governments
- The implementation of the plans, including whether and how cooperation among stakeholders was promoted or whether and how women and youth were engaged

EQ3: Restoration of governance and service delivery in recently liberated areas (Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din):

How effective were training efforts designed to restore local governance and basic service delivery in the recently liberated governorates of Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din?

3a. Damage assessment:

- Who did GSP/Taqadum target for training in damage assessment of essential service infrastructure?
- Are skills targeted by these trainings evident in key local governance bodies or stakeholders, where trainings were implemented (either among those who received the training, or as a result of institution of good practices by those individuals)?
- What factors most enabled any observed increases in capacity for damage assessments?

3b. Public financial management:

- Who did GSP/Taqadum target for training in public financial management?
- Are skills targeted by these trainings evident in key local governance bodies or stakeholders, where trainings were implemented (either among those who received the training, or as a result of institution of good practices by those individuals)?
- What factors most enabled any observed increases in capacity for public financial management?

EVALUATION DESIGN

The evaluation questions (above) require a robust overview of a broad range of interventions targeted at a number of key beneficiary groups from high-level Government of Iraq officials, operational civil servants in line ministries and governors' offices, and members of the public. Specifically, EQ1 requires an interrogation of the extent of comprehension of decentralization across the GOI and wider civil service, and the factors facilitative of the legislative and operational interventions required of the decentralization effort. EQ2 is intended to measure the extent to which GSP/Taqadum succeeded in its efforts to improve service delivery and quality to Iraqi citizens, including marginalized groups (minorities, vulnerable groups et cetera). EQ3 specifically focuses on the effectiveness of training on specific issues considered critical to recovery after occupation in the newly liberated areas of the lower 15 provinces.

The Evaluation Design, therefore, demands a mixed methodology capable of capturing the extent to which Taqadum's development hypothesis was borne out by the activity's approach, and of developing sufficiently rich findings upon which to base recommendations for ongoing decentralization work funded by USAID. The proposed evaluation questions are intended to capture both the intentions of GSP and its performance in the field. Our approach is premised on an understanding that Taqadum reached—or intended to reach—a very broad and diverse range of beneficiaries across the 15 governorates. However, we are also cognizant of the need to develop rich and robust findings in ways that take into account that range and diversity of beneficiaries without diluting the validity of the evaluation.

In accordance with the work plan, the current design plan will take the following format: First, we set out a detailed matrix that links the evaluation questions with data sources, methods and approach to analysis. Second, we outline the requisites for a range of data collection instruments intended to furnish data in accordance with our mixed methodology. Third, we list the selection criteria for sites and interviewees, and propose a preliminary list of respondents. Here, we also set forth our sampling methodology for the quantitative component of the evaluation. Next, we consider some acknowledged limitations to the design, before proposing a dissemination plan that is intended to capture the needs and interests of a wide range of stakeholders.

Our proposed approach is intended to be refined in the field, in consultation with USAID and with key participants and beneficiaries. Further, it is recognized that an iterative approach—particularly with regard to qualitative data collection, and in the interface between quantitative and qualitative data—will be helpful and will assist us to build knowledge in a real-world setting.

Data collection methods

This section describes the proposed methodology for collecting and analyzing data to answer the EQs based on the research design described in the previous section. The evaluation will employ a mixed-methods approach that will incorporate a range of qualitative and quantitative data methods, gathering information from a range of sources to increase confidence in the validity and reliability of the evaluation results. The Getting to Answers evaluation design set out below presents a detailed, question-by-question table of the data sources, data collection methods, sampling approaches, and data analysis methods that will be used.

Under our proposed mixed-methods design, we will implement a combination of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods to answer the key evaluation questions. The sole quantitative method is the population-based survey, which will be administered to residents living in communities where Taqadum activities were implemented. The qualitative data collection instruments include desk study, in-depth key informant interviews (KIIs) with diverse Taqadum stakeholders, and focus group discussions (FGDs) with persons participating in and benefiting from the Taqadum activities. This robust evidence base will be analyzed to provide comprehensive answers to evaluation questions within and across clusters. A description of each data collection method is provided below.

Desk review: The team has had recourse to a range of documents, supplied by USAID, relevant to and/or generated by GSP/Taqadum, as documented under “Existing Information” above.

Key Informant Interviews: The evaluation team will conduct key informant interviews (KIs) with USAID Mission staff, Government of Iraq (GOI) counterparts at the national and provincial levels, senior implementing partner staff. Additional KIs will be held with civil society organizations, focused on citizen voice and participation in local governance, and citizen beneficiaries. KIs will be analyzed to answer each evaluation question in conjunction with the survey on Evaluation Question 2 and focus group discussions (FGDs). While the Taqadum staff is no longer working on the project, to the extent possible the team will try to interview the Chief of Party, and other key technical staff, as well as representatives from civil society and community representatives. The selection of the KIs will be done in collaboration with USAID to develop a representative list of informants well versed in the project design, implementation, and anticipated outcomes.

Focus group discussions: Although the evaluation team has prioritized KIs over focus group discussions (FGDs) for interviewing key stakeholder groups, we may use a group format for some interviews to help to draw out issues emerging from preliminary findings from EQ1 and EQ3. Our team will analyze any FGD data systematically according to key themes of interest. The evaluation team will provide justification for the selection of individual respondents (in addition to the stakeholder groups to which they belong) and seek to ensure that diverse perspectives are represented, including those of women, minorities, and youth.

We would also like to retain the option of conducting a very small number of FGDs (~1–2) subsequent to the administration of the population-based survey that comprises the principal data source for EQ2. This would help to explore some of the key themes emerging from the early analysis of the survey data, and provide an opportunity to discuss some issues that would benefit from a qualitative approach, such as transparency, corruption, and responsiveness.

KI and FGD Interview Guides: Tool guides have been developed for FGDs and KIs, and these are set out below. The FGD guide will give the discussion moderator a set of key questions and topics for guiding the discussions to uncover key information for answering the evaluation questions. FGDs will be organized at the venues where participants will be comfortable to be recorded using digital audio recorders. The FGDs will include from 6 to 10 participants for a two-hour discussion session.

KI interview guides follow an open-ended format that will give the participants space to describe their experiences in their own words and allow the interviewer to probe for information that will uncover new insights into key aspects of Taqadum performance. The discussion guides are modular, allowing certain question modules to be asked of all respondents, while other question modules will be tailored to specific groups of respondents, clusters, and objectives.

The evaluation team will use a five-point Likert scale to gauge respondents’ feedback with regards to various questions in different data collection instruments. This will facilitate analysis and allow drawing of conclusions in a quantifiable manner. The points of the scale (the labels) will be phrased in the most appropriate manner to the issue at hand. For instance, under EQ3, when asking training beneficiaries about the usefulness of training they have received through GSP, the points of the scale may be identified as Very Useful, Useful, Neutral (or: Neither Useful nor Useless), Not Useful, or Not Useful at All. Similarly, under EQ 2, citizens’ satisfaction with the quality of a service may be assessed along the scale Very Satisfied, Satisfied, Neutral (Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied), Dissatisfied, or Very Unsatisfied.

Case studies/systematic qualitative analysis: The team will employ case studies to develop a richer, triangulated picture of key aspects of GSP/Taqadum, its implementation and its success. The timing for the case studies will parallel that of the KIs. In consultation with USAID, the evaluation

team will identify successful examples at the provincial/ministerial levels as well as examples characterized by less progress on high-level results. The team will then conduct case studies, analyzing the issues in greater depth, and integrating multiple sources of evidence. In analyzing these case studies, the evaluation team will ensure that both intended and unintended results (whether positive or negative) are captured as part of the in-depth analysis.

The evaluation team will use systematic and/or participatory qualitative evaluation methods to apply to these case studies, such as outcome harvesting, contribution analysis, or collaborative outcomes reporting.

Population-based survey on local governance and service delivery: The evaluation team will conduct a population-based survey to provide evidence of high-level results in response to Evaluation Question 2: What factors promoted or impeded the success of provincial service delivery improvement plans (SDIPs)? The survey will be conducted in six provinces reflective of the overall typology of provinces with which GSP/Taqadum worked.

The evaluation team will test the validity of the survey tool through pilot testing in the field. The team will stratify sampling by gender with appropriate assigned enumerators.

The survey will be integrated methodologically with direct observation. Wherever possible, direct observations of services and service infrastructure will be made in communities in which the survey is administered. The evaluation team will draw upon situation reports and other monitoring data from the communities being surveyed, collected by PMSP or others on behalf of USAID.

Getting to Answers: the evaluation design matrix

In accordance with USAID Automated Directive System (ADS), the design matrix sets out the data sources and methodological approaches for each of the evaluation questions. There are three main questions contained in the SOW, supplemented by a total of 10 sub-questions. For the purposes of the matrix, and for identifying sufficiently fine-grained sources to answer the evaluation questions, we treat each of these separately in the following. The proposed indicators will be confirmed and refined in the field in consultation with USAID to ensure that they include an appropriate mix of output and outcome class measures.

The data collection instruments

The data collection approaches include a range of methods, including document/secondary analysis, key informant interviews (KIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), population-based survey and case studies (CS). Indicative questions and areas of focus, to be refined and confirmed once the team is in-country, are set out below broken down by question and, where appropriate, by respondent type.

EQ1. Outline of questionnaire schedule for Key Informant Interviews and FGD

EQ 1: Transfer of ministerial functions from the central to the provincial level: What factors promoted or impeded the success of Decentralization Mapping and Analysis Plans (DMAPs) to support the transfer of the central Ministerial functions to the provincial level?

Respondents: Internationals, High-Level GOI (Pres, PMO, Ministers), COR/Political Party Leaders CSO think tanks, University Professors, Judiciary, Governors, Provincial Council Chairs, etc.

- o To what extent have you interacted with and/or known about GSP/Taqadum and its purposes and activities?
- o What is your understanding of what Law 21 requires of the Central GOI and Provincial GOI? Who is supposed to do what? What functions are supposed to be transferred to the Provinces? Who actually does what?
- o What is your understanding of what “functional federalism” means and what it is in the Iraqi context? Of “administrative decentralization”? Do you see either or both of these as the same or different from federalism?
- o What is your understanding of what the constitution says/requires in respect to decentralization?
- o What other laws are relevant to decentralization? In what ways?
- o Is the legal framework for decentralization sufficient? Why/why not? In what ways? What remains to be done? By whom/what part of government? And at what level of law: constitutional, legislative, Ministry regulation/rules (e.g., at the administrative level)?
- o From your perspective, how do decentralization and public financial management relate to one another? [Need more information on GOI PFM processes, laws/regs etc.] Who is responsible for ensuring that public financial management is decentralized along with other powers and functions?
- o Do you believe that the general public/ordinary citizens understand what decentralization means/should mean for them in their daily lives?
- o In your view, is decentralization mainly about service delivery? What else might or should it be about, if anything else at all?
- o Do you believe that decentralization is a national priority? That it should be a national priority? Why or why not?

- o Of the governmental functions/powers and duties that the constitution, Law 21 and other applicable laws mandate must be transferred to the Provinces: ▪ What/which governmental functions/powers and duties have been fully transferred to the provincial level? ▪ Which functions/powers and duties have been partially transferred to the provincial level? ▪ What functions/powers and duties have not been transferred to the provincial level? Please describe and give examples and explain why or why not in your view. - o To what extent/degree do you feel decentralization has been successful in Iraq? - o What remains to be done? What should the next steps be now to further decentralize Iraq? What should be done differently, if anything at all, and how? What are the obstacles to be overcome? What might be easy successes? - o Going forward, where, how and on what issues specifically should USAID focus its technical assistance in terms of decentralization, local governance and service delivery?
<u><i>Council of Representatives ('COR') (Speaker, relevant committee chairs)</i></u> - o What are the dynamics and debates within Parliament around decentralization, and particularly around decentralization and PFM? - o Which groups within the COR favour and which disfavour decentralization? What are the reasons? - o Is decentralization adequately addressed in Ministries' enabling laws? Why or why not? How? - o What challenges does parliament face in reconciling constitutional and legal contradictions and gaps in the legal architecture?
<u><i>Judicial Sector</i></u> - o What are the constitutional and legal issues in dispute concerning decentralization? - o What issues have been the focus of litigation/court cases on this issue? - o What are some of the specific disputes, between/among whom? - o How has the court resolved these issues? - o Does the fact of a unitary national judicial branch have an impact on how these cases/issues are resolved?
<u><i>Governors and Provincial Council Leaders</i></u> <i>NB. These respondents will be asked the same questions as for Central GOI Executive and Legislative interviewees, with a key focus on the Executive-Legislative "divide" and tensions.</i> o What is your understanding of their powers and duties under the Constitution and relevant laws (e.g., Law 21, Budget Laws, etc.)?

- o How do the Governor's/PCs and the Central GOI, particularly the eight line service delivery Ministries, interact? Is there good communication and cooperation? Have you experienced problems? Please give specific examples of both positive and negative instances. - o Focus in particular with these individuals on what's next? What needs to happen to build on GSP/Taqadum? - o What Provincial laws do you feel need to be in place to facilitate decentralized service delivery?
<u>GSP/Taqadum-specific respondents</u> <i>Respondents: Line Ministries, Central Directorates, Provincial Directorates, Provincial Councils, Governors</i>
- o From your perspective, what are the key objectives of GSP assistance to your organization? Do you agree with these objectives/feel they are the right ones? - o For high-level GOI officials: Describe the extent to which you personally have been involved in/contributed to decentralization strengthening efforts, particularly the DMAP process? To what degree have you worked closely with/cooperated with/benefited from GDP Taqadum? - o To what extent and in what ways were you/your ministry/directorate, etc. assisted by the GSP program? Please describe. - o Describe your Ministry's powers, duties, and functions. Are these set out in an enabling law, regulations, or written policies?¹³⁴ - o In your view, do these written laws, regulations or policies conflict with Law 21 and/or the constitution? If so, how should these be amended so that they are harmonized? - o Describe the process of developing the DMAP for your Ministry. - o Describe what was done to implement the DMAP for your Ministry. Please give specific examples. - o Was the DMAP fully and timely implemented? What elements of the DMAP were implemented and how? Which elements of the DMAP were not implemented? If not implemented: why/why not? - o Were there any major changes or adaptations to DMAPs over time? If so, please describe when, why and how such changes or adaptations were made, (e.g., what problems, challenges or positive developments/successes prompted the changes). - o Once identified in the DMAP, which of these key functions were successfully transferred from the Ministry and implemented at the Provincial level?

¹³⁴ Our ability to assess this depends upon the availability, in English, of the enabling laws for each of the relevant Ministries, and MOF, along with the last several years of Budget Laws.

- o Which ones were not transferred or implemented at the Provincial level? Why not?
- o To what extent were PFM functions included in the DMAPs? Please give examples or how, and if they were not included, please explain why.
- o Do you feel the DMAPs were successful in promoting the transfer of ministerial functions to the provincial level? Why/why not? Please give examples and reasons for success or failure, (e.g. what factors contributed to success and which factors contributed to failures/difficulties), such as the following:
 - The DMAP itself
 - The kinds of functions being transferred
 - Unique Ministry characteristics
 - Specific Ministry behaviors or actions
 - Political, legal or administrative obstacles
 - Approach to implementation
 - Degree of public engagement, particularly vulnerable populations
- o During the process of developing and implementing the DMAP for your Ministry, did you conduct citizen outreach and seek input to the design and implementation of the DMAP? What form did this citizen engagement take? Where? At the Central GOI level in Baghdad, in the relevant Province(s), or both? Did you particularly seek out the views of women, youth, minorities, and other vulnerable populations in the design and implementation of the DMAPs? If so, where? In Baghdad at the Central GOI level, in the relevant Provinces, or both?
- o How did you conduct such outreach and ensure participation and input from citizens and civil society in DMAP design and implementation?
- o Did they participate in decision-making processes? Are their views reflected in decisions made?
- o Was the process of developing and implementing the DMAP fair, or did you see evidence of bias or corruption in the process?
- o What would you do differently if you could?

FGDs (primarily with citizens/CSO members etc.) on EQ I (if needed)

The focus group discussion(s) will concentrate on key areas pertinent to Taqadum's success in building capacity to deliver services to minority and vulnerable groups. Correspondingly, the focus areas will be, inter alia:

- o Degree of inclusion in DMAP process
- o Degree of information provided about the process, if not included in process
- o Observed and felt changes in their lives, lives of their communities in terms of service access and delivery in the domains covered by the eight line Ministries at the local level
- o The degree to which PAX feel they can access decision makers and decision-making processes focused on decentralized service delivery

- o Their explanations and reasons for their answers
- o Assessing the degree to which PAX understand what decentralization means and are even in favour of it if they do. Ask PAX to state succinctly what they understand decentralization or local governance to mean. The degree of disagreement, lack of understanding, and different desires in Iraq around issues pertaining to local autonomy by any name (federalism, confederalism, decentralization, devolution, local governance, etc.) cannot be overstated, whether along Central-Provincial/Regional GOI axes, or within Provinces, or across Iraq generally. To what degree this is related to (unresolved?) wealth sharing issues (which would in part explain MOF hostility and intransigence) and/or inchoate national reconciliation is not yet fully understood.

EQ2. Outline of Population-Based Survey

2. Improved public service delivery: What factors promoted or impeded the success of provincial service delivery improvement plans (SDIPs)?

Notes: Given that the purpose of the survey is to elicit citizens' feedback with regards to the availability and quality of provincial government services and their perception of provincial government, it is recommended the questions are not close-ended. Instead, the respondent will be presented with statements to which s/he can rate their response along a 5-point scale from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree".

The project interventions included both service delivery—in water, sewer, solid waste collection, primary health care and primary schools—and process streamlining. Appropriate statements will be included to cover both.

A. Introduction, Purpose, Confidentiality, and Consent

B. Demographics

- o Province
- o Urban/Rural
- o Sex
- o Age Group
- o Ethnicity
- o Marital Status
- o Disability status
- o Children
- o Minority Groups [?]

C. Services Received/Acquired Over the Past Year

- o List of different services (based on project interventions with targeted ministries and directorates) the respondent may have benefited from, or government department s/he dealt with, over the past year. The most recent interaction will then be used to base the subsequent suite of questions.
- o A tick-box list

D. Availability of and Access to Services

Examples:

- o I can easily find clear and accurate information about provincial government services
- o I can easily locate the closest service location [*and the right telephone number and the right person to talk to, if applicable*]
- o I can readily access [any] provincial government service I need [*locating the service and being actually able to access it are different especially for PWD, or perhaps even women*]

- o I got clear and accurate information [re: process, forms to fill, and any requirements to obtain a service]
- o Other specific statements with regards to: potable water; sewer; solid waste collections, and others as relevant

For each of the services (potable water; sewer; solid waste collections, electricity, etc.), establish from each respondent the following:

- o Connected/not connected to service/grid
- o Distance to the service
- o Affordability of service
- o Reliability of service

E. Quality and Benefit of Services

Examples:

- o The services that I get from provincial government meet my needs
- o Provincial government services have a positive effect on me and my life
- o I was satisfied with the amount of time it took to get the service
- o Provincial government staff were knowledgeable and competent
- o Provincial government staff were courteous and made sure I get what I needed
- o I was treated fairly
- o I got the service I needed
- o For ongoing, necessary services: connection to service, satisfaction with complaint resolution
- o Other specific statements with regard to potable water, sewer, solid waste collections, and others as relevant

For each of the services (potable water; sewer; solid waste collections, electricity, etc.), establish from each respondent the following:

- o Ever filed a complaint? Yes/No
- o How many complaints ever filed through phone, sms, face-to-face, email
- o How many complaints were responded to
- o Among those responded to, how many took acceptable time to be responded to
- o Among those responded to, how many were positively resolved
- o Among those positively resolved, how many in acceptable time
- o How long (hours/24, months/12) do you get consistent service
- o How can you rate the quality service? Very high or high quality, Just Okay, poor or very poor quality?
- o How can you rate the supply of service? Very high or adequate, Average, Very limited or not available

F. Perception of Local Government

Examples:

- o My view of provincial government is shaped to a large extent by the quality of services they provide
- o Provincial government conducts its business in an open and accountable manner
- o I believe provincial government does a good job
- o I get good value for my taxes
- o Provincial government is responsive to the needs of citizens
- o Hidden cost (corruption)

For each of the services (potable water; sewer; solid waste collections, electricity, etc.), establish from each respondent the following:

- o How can you rate the GOI staff who deals with your service? Very or helpful, Just there, Very uncooperative or uncooperative

- 0 How can you rate the GOI staff who deals with your service in terms of problem resolution? Always solves the problem, sometimes solves, hardly solves anything.

EQ3. Indicative questions for Key Informant Interviews with trainees in NLAs

EQ 3: Restoration of governance and service delivery in recently liberated areas (Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din): How effective were training efforts designed to restore local governance and basic service delivery in the recently liberated provinces of Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din?

This question will be answered, in conjunction with the secondary data, via KIs conducted with beneficiaries of Taqadam's training program in damage assessment and public financial management. Indicative questions are set out below.

On damage assessment

For decision makers

- 0 Do you feel the training to restore local governance in the NLAs was effective and comprehensive enough?
- 0 Was damage assessment the right place to start?
- 0 Who was selected for the training and why, based on what criteria? How were trainees selected? On what basis?
- 0 Was the training fit for purpose? Did it cover the right issues for the particular Ministry and Province? Did the training reach the right personnel?
- 0 Do you feel the damage assessment training resulted in restoration of local governance and basic service delivery? Why, how, why not?
- 0 Do you feel that the damage assessment trainings had a positive impact on the skills sets of local government officials? Please give specific examples.
- 0 Do you feel that the trainings resulted in the institutionalization of good practices by people who were trained? So you see the follow on effects of such training and good practices? What are these effects?
- 0 To what extent was the damage assessment training coordinated with disaster management/emergency services/security personnel (de-mining, exploded/unexploded ord.)/humanitarian relief data, issues and practices? Were humanitarian considerations included in the training?
- 0 What do you think helped increase capacity for damage assessments? What got in the way of increasing capacity for damage assessments?

For those trained

Group I: by sector (e.g., PFM, Assessments of Damage, other) or by province

Group I: by sector (e.g., PFM, Assessments of Damage, other) or by province

- 0 Did you participate in trainings?

- o Did you find each training useful in your work? Please rate each training on a scale of 1–5, 5 being highest and 1 lowest.
- o When was that training?
- o Please describe why you thought it was useful.
- o Did the training help you change the way you do your work? Please explain how your work changed.
- o What do you think could have been done better and why?
- o Which training did you find not so useful and why?

Group 2: by sector (e.g. PFM, Assessments of Damage, other) or by province

- o Similar questions as above, utilizing the Likert scale as appropriate.

On public financial management (PFM)

- o Do you feel GSP/Taqadum assistance to NLAs was helpful and relevant?
- o Do you feel the PFM training as part of the effort to restore local governance in the NLAs was appropriate? Effective and comprehensive enough?
- o Do you understand why PFM and damage assessment were the main focus of training in the NLAs? What is your understanding of why? In your view, were damage assessment and PFM the right places to start? Why or why not?
- o Who was selected for the training and why, based on what criteria? How were trainees selected? On what basis?
- o Was the training fit for purpose? Did it cover the right issues for the particular Ministry and Province? Did the training reach the right personnel?
- o Do you feel the PFM training resulted in restoration of local governance and basic service delivery? Why, how, why not?
- o Do you feel that the trainings had a positive impact on the skills sets of local government officials? Please give specific examples.
- o Do you feel that the trainings resulted in the institutionalization of good practices by people who were trained? Do you see the follow-on effects of such training and good practices? What are these effects?
- o What do you think helped increase capacity for PFM in the context of post conflict reconstruction and humanitarian crisis in NLAs? What got in the way of increasing capacity for PFM in NLAs?
- o Did the PFM training result in obtaining adequate resources for the Province in question? Why/why not?
- o What do you see as the way forward for local governance and decentralization in NLAs? What should the focus of USAID assistance be now in the NLAs?

- Is there evidence that the number of statutory financial reports produced and submitted on time has increased as a result of the training?

Sampling and selection criteria

Sampling and selection criteria have been designed to respond to the evaluation questions, taking into consideration the need to generate data relatively quickly while capturing project implementation and effect granularity among and between high-ranking officials, operational public servants in ministries and governorates, and the public. Sampling and selection criteria differ accordingly across the questions.

EQ1: sampling and selection criteria

For EQ1, we will conduct key informant interviews in all 15 of the provinces to identify specific local factors affecting implementation and effectiveness. To focus resources, and to develop sufficient information to inform the question, we will weight the sample more heavily in the six provinces that have been selected for the population-based survey. These six provinces are also representative of the three “groups” of provinces that Taqadam focused on: the “model” provinces, the later provinces, and the newly liberated areas (‘NLAs’). Correspondingly, this group of six includes Baghdad, Najaf, and Wasit from the model provinces and Babil, Muthanna, and Diyala from the other provinces.

Respondents will be drawn from the following groups:

- High-level GOI officials
- COR/senior party officials
- The judiciary
- Governors
- Provincial Council Chairs
- Senior operational managers from line ministries
- Civil society organizations

We propose sampling for 12 KIs drawn from high level GOI officials and the Council of Representatives. Further, we propose conducting interviews with each of the governors (n=15) or high-ranking delegates, along with each of the Provincial Council Chairs (n=15). We also propose including ~four interviews with members of the judiciary. Our preference, wherever possible, is for these interviews to be conducted face-to-face and—in the case of the Baghdad-based GOI officials—for PMSP/Taqadam evaluation team members to co-facilitate. This gives a total of n=46 KIs at the senior level. Given the scale and scope of Taqadam, this is the minimum required to generate the requisite data. In addition, we propose two to three telephone-based KIs with senior operational managers in each province, generating a further 30–45 respondents.

Dependent upon preliminary findings, it may be necessary to conduct one focus group discussion with civil society organizations in order to derive more detailed information about Taqadam’s success in reaching minority and vulnerable groups.

EQ2: Respondent selection criteria.

To answer EQ2, we will primarily make use of a survey, and secondarily will use KIs and FGDs to more fully explore emergent themes from survey results. This population-based survey will adopt a cluster-based approach. Of the 15 provinces that have been targeted by GSP/Taqadam, the following six are

recommended for the survey to provide a representative sample of both the project interventions (in nature/focus and longevity) as well as the characteristics of different provinces and population dynamics:

Baghdad, Najaf, Babil, and Wasit

- These are four of the five “model” provinces in which project interventions in “administrative decentralization” started as of June 2014. Baghdad is the capital and seat of government, as well as the largest urban center. Najaf has a predominantly Shia population, but it is also reported there are communities of Sunni IDPs that are taking root in a number of locations in the province. Wasit stands out as the only “model” province where there have also been project interventions in the area of “Post-Disaster Service Restoration Capacity Building” due to an influx of IDPs. Babil is a southern interior province that was one of the five model provinces, with close proximity to Baghdad. Available GSP documentation shows that not much was achieved in Babil with regard to the project’s major activities in the area of Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities, and Relations of GO and Directorates. This may have well impacted the project’s performance and achievements in administrative decentralization.

Diyala and Muthanna

- Both are non-model provinces. Diyala was included within the scope of the project in October 2014 and, as such, is among the provinces that have benefited from project interventions for the longest period of time. On the other hand, Muthanna is one of the provinces that was added to the scope of GSP/Taqadum almost a year later (June 2015).

Sample Size

Within the premise of the cluster-based approach the team adopts to the survey, an overall sample of 2,401 respondents will be selected. This is calculated as a random sample of the total population of the six provinces with a confidence level of 95 percent and a margin of error (confidence interval) of 2 percent.

It is understood the population in each province is far from being homogeneous. Additionally, and in order to assess “inclusive access to basic services,” particular focus will have to be placed on surveying large enough numbers of minorities and vulnerable groups (e.g., women, youth, people with disabilities (PWDs), IDPs, etc.) to yield reliable results.

As more information is made available to the evaluation team, and in consultation with USAID and the survey company (given their experience in Iraq), the sample will be divided among provinces and purposefully stratified in each province in a manner that better reflects population structure and responds to the objective of the survey, while also being informed by project interventions in different provinces. It is possible a particular population group may be “over-sampled” in one or more provinces.

EQ3: Respondent Selection Criteria

EQ3 will require a purely qualitative assessment through use of KIIs and case studies to determine the extent to which governance and service delivery functions have been restored in recently-liberated areas, specifically Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din. There are two prongs to this question: the training of those required to assess damage to infrastructure, and public financial management training to support the restoration of infrastructure. Respondents will be drawn from Taqadum’s training database pertinent to training in damage assessment and public financial management in the newly liberated areas.

The overall training figures in the NLAs, for both damage assessment and public financial management, are as follows.

Province	Male trainees	Female trainees
Anbar	401	20
Ninewa	462	77
Salah al-Din	341	31

There is an obvious disproportionality in the numbers of male and female trainees. We presume the reason for this is extra-programmatic; that is, the available civil servants for training were characterized by a preponderance of males. The circumstances surrounding Da'esh occupation were such that any preexisting gender disproportionality would have been greatly amplified. However, we will confirm this supposition in the field.

We propose conducting phone interviews with approximately 55 male trainees distributed among the various dimensions to be studied (e.g., a number will be those trained in a certain aspect, or those who received many trainings, etc.). We propose oversampling female trainees, conducting telephone interviews with as many female trainees from each province as may be required to capture the various dimensions of the trainings. This will help to determine any gender differences in the delivery of training, and the implementation of skills acquired during training.

DATA ANALYSIS

Document Analysis

A document review process has been used to identify the key institutions, accomplishments, lessons and milestones attendant to GSP/Taqadum. They are also being used to develop a list of key stakeholders that will be used to inform sampling for the key informant interviews. The document analysis will develop themes that will be used to identify and triangulate emerging findings from primary sources.

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics provide simple summaries and quantitative descriptions in a manageable form. Descriptive statistics will be employed to understand the frequency with which selected variables are present for any given data analysis point, such as uptake of key decentralized government services. Descriptive statistics will enable the evaluation team to develop a profile of GSP/Taqadum. This will include coverage of particular interventions, levels of comprehension and uptake of training initiatives, and the extent to which marginalized, minority and vulnerable groups were able to benefit from the initiatives undertaken. Descriptive statistics will also facilitate comparative analysis, particularly related to province-specific trends and findings.

Triangulation

Subsequent to the collection of data from the range of sources set out here, the evaluation team will compare that information to understand points of difference or convergence. This technique is particularly helpful when formal sampling procedures have not been used; certainly, the relatively low numbers of some key respondent groups (e.g., high-level GOI officials) means that random sampling is neither possible nor helpful. Triangulation allows for an assessment of validity on the basis of agreement

between respondents of different types on any given question; for example, if GOI respondents claim that the public were made well aware of a particular service, and the public themselves evince knowledge of that service (either explicitly, or implicitly through service use), the original claim is considered to have increased validity. An additional step may also be to compare findings across provinces; for example, comparisons between “model” and late-entry provinces may garner additional useful information regarding implementation and bedding-in periods.

Contribution Analysis

Contribution analysis is used to determine causal relationships between actions and observations, permitting a determination of effectiveness. It will be particularly useful in identifying some of the reasons why particular interventions have proved effective (or otherwise), inasmuch as it employs a range of methods to make a determination of causation. The method entails setting out the causation question, and interrogating it using a theory of change and the attendant risks to that theory. It requires gathering evidence on the theory of change, while maintaining vigilance for any confounding evidence. The contribution “story” can then be constructed and further evidence sought to permit the richest possible analysis of causal relationships between the initiatives and observed posited impacts. During this process, we anticipate analyzing the baseline at the start of the evaluation period (mid-2015) to ensure that effects felt prior to that are eliminated, as far as possible, in the analysis of contribution. However, we should also be mindful that the baseline would have been, at least in part, constructed via Taqadum efforts, and that it did not constitute a clean start in evaluative terms.

Gender considerations

In accordance with USAID’s Automated Directives System (ADS) 203.3.1.5, the evaluation design for this evaluation will consider gender-specific and differential effects of the Taqadum program. The evaluation team will examine gender-based differences in terms of access to, and participation in, the program across the different interventions. Gender disaggregation will take place as a matter of course in the EQ2 survey analysis, taking into consideration any differences regarding results, benefits, and lessons learned for, and by, female beneficiaries.

EVALUATION LIMITATIONS

GSP/Taqadum covered, over time, all the lower 15 governorates. We will, of course, collect data in all of these, although our quantitative data collection will take place in six of these (Baghdad, Najaf, Wasit, Diyala, Muthanna, and Babil). We will attempt to extrapolate the likelihood of provinces not surveyed of demonstrating the same findings (using, for example, demographic characteristics to infer propensity), although it is always possible that there are considerable differences in population-based access to, uptake of, and effectiveness of decentralized public services.

There is a serious information gap with regard to population information. The team has no access to recent, reliable, detailed, and geographically referenced population information. In addition to impacting the design of the sample, this will also have its implications in the field as data enumerators may have little or no guidance where certain groups are located.

It is also recognized that we cannot attain statistical significance in the samples of minority groups selected. Nevertheless, given the mixed method approach, we believe this limitation is offset by the qualitative component. Indeed, the qualitative approach will facilitate the collection of the sort of rich data required for evaluation and research with minority groups in accordance with best practice.

We are also cognizant of the probability that some of the effects will not necessarily be observable or recognized by some respondents, particularly in the survey of the public. This may be due to a general

lack of recognition or understanding of government processes. In some cases, this may be because the evaluated period focuses on only two years. Many of the changes that GSP/Taqadum was seeking to implement may not be observable in such a short time span, but we will attempt to account for that by including, where necessary, information regarding Taqadum's activities prior to 2015.

On this matter, we also recognize that the evaluation works, somewhat, on a false baseline, inasmuch as Taqadum's activities post-2014 built on significant work already done by them, and other projects, whether or not funded by USAID. Where possible, we will attempt to untangle what effects relate to the observable period, but it will also be important to recognize, for future planning, where successes have occurred as a result of extended and hard-won outreach efforts.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The format of the evaluation report will follow USAID guidelines set down in the USAID Evaluation Report Template (<http://usaidlearninglab.org/library/evaluation-report-template>) and the How-To Note on Preparing Evaluation Reports (<http://usaidlearninglab.org/library/how-note-preparing-evaluationreports>). The final version of the evaluation report will be submitted to USAID and is not expected to exceed 30 pages, excluding references and annexes.

Dissemination plan

Prior to leaving the country, the evaluation team will conduct, with USAID staff, an exit briefing and an exit presentation. Subsequent to this, the team will provide to USAID, via IBTCI home office, a final written report. Once the final report has been accepted, in accordance with ADS requirements, the report will be lodged on the Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC). Given, however, that there are a number of identified stakeholders—not least the incoming Implementation Partner responsible for continuing USAID's administrative decentralization commitments in Iraq—the evaluation team proposes working with USAID to develop a range of potential concise resources outlining the key findings and recommendations of the evaluation. The beneficiaries of these resources would be the Government of Iraq, the incoming IP, USAID Mission staff planning or overseeing cognate or codependent initiatives in the region, and the public (via, for example, social media). Resources would be correspondingly tailored to expectation and need.

SCHEDULING AND LOGISTICS

The timeline below sets out the key tasks, events, and milestones for the evaluation. The evaluation has been designed to allow for in-country tasks to be undertaken simultaneously as far as is possible. This will permit refinements to the data collection and analysis process without delaying milestones.

The timeline for the data collection period is based on the assumption that the evaluation team is able to commence interviews with high ranking GOI officials immediately after the USAID finalization meeting. The PMSP will endeavor to facilitate meeting times prior to the start of the in-country visit.

The evaluation team will also require the provision of recording devices for the conduct of the KIs that they facilitate themselves, and access to at least one translator with sufficient technical knowledge and experience to enable key informant interviews with high level officials, members of the judiciary, etc. This will be facilitated by the Short-term Technical Assistance (STTA) Logistics Coordinator.

TASK / EVENT / MILESTONE	START	END
Contract Awarded	5 OCT 2017	5 OCT 2017
Draft work plan submitted	10 OCT 2017	10 OCT 2017
USAID Reviews and Approves Work Plan	10 OCT 2017	13 OCT 2017
Literature Review – e.g., Taqadum Project Reports, Ministries' Reports	11 OCT 2017	10 NOV 2017
Team Leader/ Governance Specialist Travel and Arrival in Baghdad	10 NOV 2017	11 NOV 2017
Initial Meetings with USAID	19 NOV 2017	19 NOV 2017
Evaluation Design developed and submitted (proposed timeline, methods, survey questions, tools) 3 weeks after	13 OCT 2017	6 NOV 2017
USAID Reviews Evaluation Design	6 NOV 2017	13 NOV 2017
Evaluation Design Finalization Meeting with USAID	19 NOV 2017	19 NOV 2017
Interviews – Ministries, Municipalities, and other stakeholders	19 NOV 2017	10 DEC 2017
Direct Observation of selected sites and case study	19 NOV 2017	10 DEC 2017
Evaluation Methodologist Travel and Arrival in Baghdad	29 NOV 2017	30 NOV 2017
Enumerators Training	3 DEC 2017	5 DEC 2017
Survey Pre-test and Revision	5 DEC 2017	7 DEC 2017
Weekly Update – Email or Meeting	Ongoing	Ongoing
Data Collection – Survey, KIIS, FGDs, Direct Observation	10 DEC 2017	5 JAN 2018
Data Cleaning and Collation	10 DEC 2017	5 JAN 2018
Mid-Term Briefing	14 DEC 2017	14 DEC 2017
Christmas Break for Expat Staff	17 DEC 2017	6 JAN 2018
Data Analysis – key findings, learning implications	4 JAN 2018	11 JAN 2018
Exit Briefing	11 JAN 2018	11 JAN 2018
Exit Presentation	17 JAN 2018	17 JAN 2018
Report Preparation	11 JAN 2018	18 JAN 2018
STTA Team Leave Iraq	19 JAN 2018	19 JAN 2018
Evaluation Report – 1 st Draft – shared with USAID and IP	19 JAN 2018	19 JAN 2018
USAID and IP 1 st Draft Review	19 JAN 2018	5 FEB 2018
Revisions of Evaluation Report	6 FEB 2018	12 FEB 2018
Evaluation Report – Final – submitted to USAID with data sets	12 FEB 2018	12 FEB 2018
Translation of Report – into Arabic	13 FEB 2018	28 FEB 2018

Ms. April Powell-Willingham, Team Leader and STTA Subject Matter Specialist (SMS), focused on governance, with a strong background in Iraq, will help design the evaluation tools and the wording of the questionnaires and FGD protocols. She will take a lead role in interviews with Taqadum personnel and interviews with Ministry officials. She will work on the background section and analysis sections of the evaluation report.¹³⁵

Dr. Ashraf Bakr Al Shareef,¹³⁶ the STTA Evaluation Methodologist (EM), with a background in statistical analysis and a native Arabic speaker, will take the lead in designing the sampling frame and will work closely with the local partner firm to ensure data quality. He will work with the SMS to analyze qualitative data from FGDs and KIIs. He will also take the lead in review and analysis of all Arabic

¹³⁵ The original Team Leader, Ms. Claire Pullon, offered her resignation from the position on November 5.

¹³⁶ Dr. Ashraf resigned in early January and was replaced by Dr. Ipaye, who quickly familiarized himself with the design methodology and led the data analysis.

language background materials. Due to his schedule, he will arrive in late November, working remotely until then.

Mr. Crispus Kamanga, the Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist (SMES), will provide oversight over the team in the PMSP office.

Mr. Mohammad Talal, the STTA Logistics Coordinator (LC) will coordinate the team's schedule, make appointments, and serve as the primary liaison with the security provider to organize movements. He will also provide liaison with the translators.

Mr. Jeffrey Swedberg, IBTCI Home Office Director, will serve as an evaluation advisor. He will provide advice throughout the process as well as quality control of the deliverables.

ANNEX E: EVALUATION MATRIX

Table 2: Getting to Answers: The evaluation design matrix

EQ	Evaluation Questions	Data Source	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods Requested level of disaggregation—gender, ethnicity, location (district, province)	Summarized Key Findings
EQ1.	Transfer of ministerial functions from the central to the provincial level:				
I.	What factors promoted or impeded the success of Decentralization Mapping and Analysis Plans (DMAPs) to support the transfer of the central Ministerial functions to the provincial level?	Project reports, GSP PMP;	Desk Review, KIs and FGD by focus governorate	Qualitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, position description, gender through content analysis	
Ia.	How were plans implemented? To what extent were DMAPs implemented according to plan? For each line ministry, identify which elements of the plans were and were not implemented, as well as any major deviations from the plans or adaptations to the plans made over time and what challenges or circumstances prompted the changes.	PMP, project reports, plan modifications and other DMAP documentation	Desk Review, KIs	Qualitative data disaggregated by line ministry, focus governorate, position description, gender through content analysis	The process of DMAP implementation was uneven. Ministerial orders were pro forma and practical application was problematic. MMPWCH was particularly reluctant, reportedly not in favor of decentralization. MOA official summed up as saying that the budget is one of the main problems of delay in DMAP implementation.
Ib.	Are high-level results observed? Which key functions identified in DMAPs were successfully implemented at the provincial level following transfer from targeted ministries? Which were not?	PMP, project reports, government letters, other documentary analysis where available (e.g., Local ministry/governorate communications)	Desk Review, KIs,	Qualitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, position description, gender through content analysis. Triangulated through	MMPWCH official stated that employees are now being paid at provincial level, though an official from the Basrah GO noted that “the ministries seek to not implement the transfer of powers, hoping that the lack of financial ability of the province will weaken

				review of PMP indicators.	it and therefore the transfer process will fail.”
Ic.	Were development and implementation inclusive? To what extent was civil society, including women, youth, minorities, and other vulnerable populations, represented in the design and implementation of DMAPs? The evaluation team will consider the following: • Whether civil society was consulted in the development of DMAPs or throughout implementation, and what mechanisms were used to consult with them • Whether the views of civil society were reflected in decisions made • Whether these decisions were made in a transparent manner • Whether there is any evidence of corruption or bias (on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or political affiliation) in the development or implementation of DMAPs	PMP, project reports	KIIs; FGD (per target group); case studies	Qualitative data disaggregated by gender, age, ethnicity, disability status in each focus governorate.	Majority of respondents at national ministry and provincial levels indicated that they did not conduct citizen outreach. The views of women, youth, minorities and other vulnerable populations were engaged in only a few cases, and participation of women was especially low. Despite this, most officials stated the process was fair and free from bias
Id.	What factors promoted/impeded success? What factors were associated with the most successful DMAPs, as measured by successful uptake of functions following transfer from targeted ministries? What factors resulted in impediments to success? In answering this question, the evaluation team should draw on case studies of line ministries in addition to other relevant evidence	DMAP documentation	PMP, project reports, KIIs; case studies, survey	Qualitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, position description, gender through content analysis. Triangulated through review of PMP indicators.	Most reported that Taqadum was of great aid, particularly the comprehensive manuals created. Political will was a major factor of how officials regarded decentralization and DMAP implementation. Another critical factor for DMAP success was that it was part of a greater whole of connected, interrelated activities that formed part of a road map mechanism, as well as citizen

	already collected. Factors in success may be associated with: • The nature or structure of the plans themselves • The kinds of key functions being transferred • Ministry-level characteristics • Specific behaviors or actions taken by the ministries • Political, administrative, or legal obstacles • The approach to implementation, including whether and how women, youth, and minorities were engaged				efficacy in the process. Furthermore, the lack of legislation to negate conflicting laws was a major impediment to implement Law 21.
EQ2.	Improved public service delivery				
2.	What factors promoted or impeded the success of provincial service delivery improvement plans (SDIPs)? This will be assessed at the level of each of the governorates in which SDIPs were supported by GSP/Taqadum	SDIP documentation, PMP project report,	Desk review, KII, survey, case studies, FGD	Quantitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, gender, ethnicity, age. Qualitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, position description, gender through content analysis	
2a.	How were plans implemented? To what extent were SDIPs implemented according to plan? For each governorate, identify which elements of the plans were more or less likely to be implemented, as well as any major deviations from the plans or adaptations to the plans made over time, and what challenges or circumstances prompted those changes.	SDIP documentation, PMP, project report	Desk review, KII, survey	Quantitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, gender, ethnicity, age. Qualitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, position description, gender through content analysis	SDIPs were implemented through plans that contain prioritized short- and long-term solutions on delivery of social services, both meeting, and, in some instances, exceeding targets: Exceeding a planned target of 96, a total of 112 SDIPs were developed in 12 provinces (the exceptions being Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din)

2b.	Are high-level results observed? To what extent did the delivery of (targeted) basic services improve in governorates with SDIPs? Are these improvements related to more efficient local governance?	SDIP documentation, PMP, project report	KII, survey, case studies	Quantitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, gender, ethnicity, age. Qualitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, position description, gender through content analysis. Triangulated through review of PMP indicators.	The vast majority of Iraqis across the six provinces surveyed agree that improving services delivery will help resolve conflict in Iraq, help solve Iraq's problems and strengthen democracy in Iraq. Implemented 577 (20 percent) of the short-term solutions identified based on the underlying strategic planning system inherent in the SDIP process that laid the foundation for further devolution to provincial districts and sub-districts. Developed and implemented a Trash Collection Management System in two pilot provinces, which continues to replicate its success across Iraq.
2c.	Were development and implementation inclusive? To what extent did SDIPs (including both drafting and implementation) include women, youth, minorities, and other vulnerable populations? In answering this question, the evaluation team should consider the following: • Whether the views of civil society and community stakeholders were solicited • Whether these views, as expressed, were apparent in the plans and their implementation • Whether decisions were made in a transparent manner • Whether there is any evidence of: corruption or bias (according to religion, ethnicity, or political	SDIP documentation, PMP, project report	KII, survey, FGD where appropriate	Quantitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, gender, ethnicity, age. Qualitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, position description, gender through content analysis.	Despite the citizen-centered service delivery approach embedded in SDIPs, very few citizens knew about SDIPs and even fewer participated in SDIP design and implementation processes. Only 190 of the 2,400 (8 percent) respondents across all six provinces indicated that they knew about SDIPs. Men and Shia's were most represented in the participants that were included in SDIP design and implementation, while women and the elderly were marginalized with other vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities. Most respondents who were aware of SDIPs were made aware through CSOs, but overall CSO participation was very low.

	affiliation) in the design or implementation of SDIPs.				
2d.	What factors promoted/impeded success? What factors were associated with the most successful plans, as measured by improvements in service delivery outcomes? What factors impeded the success of plans? The evaluation team should identify and draw on particularly instructive case studies in responding to this question. Factors may be associated with: • The nature or structure of the plans themselves; • Which services were targeted • The enabling environment in a governorate • Specific behaviors or actions taken by provincial governments • The implementation of the plans, including whether and how cooperation among stakeholders was promoted or whether and how women and youth were engaged	SDIP documentation, PMP, project report	Desk Review, KII, survey, case studies, possible FGD to inform CS.	Quantitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, gender, ethnicity, age. Qualitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, position description, gender through content analysis. Triangulated through review of PMP indicators.	Constant coordination between provincial ministries and directorates and high-level coordination between directorates and the various departments enhanced effective planning and implementation of SDIPs. Consultation did take place, primarily through electronic social media that reached more youth than other age groups. This is a success factor, given that the median age of the Iraqi population is 19.9 years of age.
EQ3:	Restoration of governance and service delivery in recently liberated areas (Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din):				
3.	How effective were training efforts designed to restore local governance and basic service delivery in the recently liberated governorates of Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah al-Din?	Training database, government documentation (e.g., protocols) project reports	Desk Review, KIIs	Qualitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, position description, gender through content analysis.	
3a.	Damage assessment: ○ Who did GSP/Taqadum target for training in damage assessment of essential service infrastructure?	Training database, government documentation, project reports	KIIs.	Qualitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, position description,	GSP targeted people with the following titles for damage assessment training in the three post-conflict provinces, in order

	○ Are skills targeted by these trainings evident in key local governance bodies or stakeholders, where trainings were implemented (either among those who received the training, or as a result of institution of good practices by those individuals)? ○ What factors most enabled any observed increases in capacity for damage assessments?			gender through content analysis.	from largest group to smallest, from Line Ministry Department Section Managers to Parliamentary Members. Most trainees actually did conduct damage assessments, particularly in Anbar and Salah al-Din. Choosing the most appropriate participants for training increased the capacity, while IDPs and security issues made it very difficult to perform damage assessments.
3b.	Public financial management: ○ Who did GSP/Taqadam target for training in public financial management? ○ Are skills targeted by these trainings evident in key local governance bodies or stakeholders, where trainings were implemented (either among those who received the training, or as a result of institution of good practices by those individuals)? ○ What factors most enabled any observed increases in capacity for public financial management?	Training database, government documentation, project reports	Kills.	Qualitative data disaggregated by focus governorate, position description, gender through content analysis.	According to the Taqadam training database, GSP targeted people with the following titles (largest to smallest number) for public financial management training in the three post-conflict provinces, from Line Ministry Department Section Managers to Line Ministry Department Managers and Directors. Most respondents indicated that training led to best practices, particularly in Salah al-Din. Capacity for public financial management was often determined by trainee participation and current existing capacity of participants (for example, according to an Anbar respondent working in finance, a major obstacle was “administrators not knowing about the financial administration status.”

ANNEX F: DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST

DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST FORM

Name:	April Powell-Willingham
Title:	Team Leader
Organization	IBTCI
Evaluation Position	
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument, if applicable)	AID-267-TO-17-00001PMSP
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), Implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Iraq Governance Strengthening Project GSP-Taquadum Contract Number: AID-267-C-11-00006
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:	
Real or potential conflicts of interest may include but are not limited to: 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change.

Signature:

Date	1.27.18	April Powell-Willingham
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DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST FORM


Name:	Cyndi Scarlett
Title:	Interim SMES (PMSP)
Organization	IBTCI
Evaluation Position	SMES
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument, if applicable)	AID-267-TO-17-00001PMSP
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), Implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Iraq Governance Strengthening Project GSP-Taquadum Contract Number: AID-267-C-11-00006
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	None

If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:

Real or potential conflicts of interest may include but are not limited to:

1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.
3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.
4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change.

Signature: 
Date January 28, 2018

DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST FORM

Name:	Ganiyu Alade Ipaye
Title:	Evaluation Methodologist
Organization	IBTCI
Evaluation Position	Evaluation Methodologist
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument, if applicable)	AID-267-TO-17-00001 PMSP
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), Implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Iraq Governance Strengthening Project GSP-Taquadum Contract Number: AID-267-C-11-00006
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:	
Real or potential conflicts of interest may include but are not limited to: 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	

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
Signature: 

Date	March 4, 2018
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DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST FORM

Name: Jeffrey Swadlow	
Title: Home Office Director	
Organization: IBTCI	IBTCI
Evaluation Position: Advisor	
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument, if applicable): CLIN 0004	AID-267-TO-17-00001 PMSP
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), Implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Iraq Governance Strengthening Project GSP-Taquadum Contract Number: AID-267-C-11-00006
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:	
Real or potential conflicts of interest may include but are not limited to: 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change.

Signature:  Date: 21-1-18

DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST FORM

Name:	Mohammed Tahar Mawlood
Title:	Evaluation Coordinator
Organization	IBTCI
Evaluation Position	Coordinator
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument, if applicable)	AID-267-TO-17-00001PMSP
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), Implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Iraq Governance Strengthening Project GSP-Taquadum Contract Number: AID-267-C-11-00006
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:	
Real or potential conflicts of interest may include but are not limited to: 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change.

Signature:

Date	Jan. 21, 2017 / Mohammed Tahar Mawlood
------	--

DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST FORM

Name:	Susan M. Taffel
Title:	Chief of Party
Organization	IBTCI
Evaluation Position	- Oversight
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument, if applicable)	AID-267-TO-17-00001PMSP
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Iraq Governance Strengthening Project GSP-Taquadum Contract Number: AID-267-C-11-00006
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:	
Real or potential conflicts of interest may include but are not limited to: 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	


I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change.

Signature:

Date

Susan M. Taffel
1-28-2018

ANNEX G: IMPLEMENTATION MAP (SOURCE TAQADUM FINAL REPORT)



Phase I October 2011 – April 2014



Phase II May 2014 – April 2015



Phase III May 2015 – September 2017

ANNEX H: KEY INFORMANTS

NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE LEVEL		
Location/Position		Respondent
	Baghdad	
1	Parliament Speaker	Saleem Al Juboory
2	Parliament Chair, Legal Committee-	Mohsen Al-Saadoun
3	Chair of regions and provinces committee	Soran Ismail
NATIONAL EXECUTIVES LEVEL		
Location/Position		Respondent
	Baghdad	
4	President office/Legal Advisor	Ameer Al- Kinany
5	Prime Minister Office/Financial Advisor	Dr. Mudhir Mohammed Saleh
6	Prime Minister Office/Head of HCCPC	Dr. Turhan M. Al Mufti
7	Ministry of Education/Advisor to the Minister	Dr. Ali Shdeekh Al Zubaide
8	Ministry of Health/Deputy Minister, Administrative	Dr. Zamil Al- Urabi -
9	Ministry of Municipalities and Housing/Minister Technical deputy	Yilmaz Shahbaz Abbas
10	Ministry of Agriculture/Deputy Minister, Technical	Dr. Mahdi dhamd Al-Qaisi
11	Ministry of Labor and social Affairs/Minister	Mohammed Shiaa al - Sudani
12	Ministry of Labor and social Affairs/Deputy Minister for Labor Affairs	Dr. Abdul Karim Abdullah Al Janabi
NATIONAL DG'S LEVEL		
Location/Position		Respondent
13	Ministry of Municipalities and Housing/ Manager of Legal Affairs	Nawal AbdLateef Abood
14	Ministry of Municipalities and Housing/Ministry followup dept. manager	Talal Qasim
15	Ministry of Municipalities and Housing/National Sewer DG Technical Assistant	Saad Mohammed Sakar
16	Ministry of youth and Sport/National planning DG	Dr. Akram Naeem Atwan
17	Ministry of Labor and social Affairs/DG of Special Needs directorate	Dr. Abber Mahdi
18	Ministry of Labor and social Affairs/DG of Loans and Employment	Dr. Ammar Al Soodani
PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVES KIIS		
LOCATION/POSITION		RESPONDENT
	Baghdad	
19	Administrative Deputy Governor	Kareem Khalaf Mohammed

20	Governor AFAD	Adil Kadhum Al-Rubaie
21	DG/Karkh Education 3 Directorate	Abdulmohsin Hassan Al-Mosawi-
22	DG/Karkh Health Directorate	Chasib Lateef Al-Hichamy
23	Manager/ Baghdad Agriculture	Dr. Iyad Hassan Abdel Radi
24	Karkh Health Directorate/Planning Department Manager	Dr. Dalya Farooq
	Anbar	
25	Governor AFAD	Mohammed Gharggan Hiyes
26	DG MMPW Water	Engineer, Madlool Mohammed
27	DG MOCH Housing	Engineer, Hussam Mohammed Ibraheem
28	DG MMPW Sewer	Engineer, Thakir Hameed Abd
29	DG MMPW Municipalities	Engineer, Emad Mohammed Abdullah
	Kirkuk	
30	Governor	Rakan Saed
31	Governor AFAD	Suhaila Sabir
32	DG Water	Abdulqadir Mohammed Ameen
33	DG Labor and Social Affairs	Jumaa Mohammed Amin
34	DG Education, Planning Department Manager	Ahmed Abd Allah
35	DG Agriculture, Head Engineer	Ashraf Sabir
	Ninewa	
36	Deputy Governor	Ali Omar
37	Governor AFAD, Manager	Ameen Fanash
38	DG/MoMPW/Water	Reem Hatam Rasheed
39	DG Housing	Raid AlTapo
40	DG Labor and Social Affairs: Work Department Manager	Mithaq Talib
41	DG Sewer	Salim Jameel Saleem
	Najaf	
42	First Deputy Governor	Abbas Al-Ilyawi
43	Governor AFAD	Abbas Kadhum Lafta
44	DG Education	Ayad Ameen Hasan
45	DG Health, Assistant Director	Muhammed Hussain Hadi
46	DG Water	Mahdi Hlaibus Tuhaili
47	DG Municipalities- Trash	Nabil Abdul Hussein Dikheel
	Qadisiya	
48	Consultants Board, Chief	Raad Al-Zaidi

49	Governor AFAD	Mohammed Abass
50	DG MOA Agriculture	Safa'a Mohammed Ali
51	Labor and Socials Affairs – Manager, Vocational Training Department	Ahmed Ganim Hameed
52	DG Health	Abdul Kazim Abdulzahra
53	DG Sewer	Galib Hasan Radhi
	Salah al-Din	
54	Deputy Governor (former), Provincial Council Member	Muhammed AbdulWahid Kocha
55	Governor AFAD	Marwan Meete'ib
56	DG Water	Muhammed Mahmoud Hussein
57	DG Housing	Sarmad Ahmed AbdulAzziz
58	DG Sewer	Muammar Hameed Muhammed
59	DG Health	Etidal Abbas Hussein
	Babil	
60	Deputy Governor	Wisam Aslan Al-Juboori
61	Governor AFAD	Ahmed Muhsin Ali
62	Assistant DG Education	Hajwal Radhi Aubaid
63	DG Health	Nawras A. Razzaq Al-Qasbi
64	Planning and Follow-Up dept. Manager in Water Directorate	Hadeel Zikri Jaleel
65	Assistant, DG Municipalities- Trash	Yas Haider Khidhir
	Dhi Qar	
66	Deputy Governor	Adil Abdul Hussain Al Dhukaily
67	Governor AFAD	Razaq Gsheish
68	Deputy DG Agriculture	Faraj Nahi
69	Assistant DG Roads and Bridges	Adel Kazim Zayer
70	Acting Manager, Vocational Training Department	Thaer Ali
71	Labor and Social Affairs Directorate, Operations and Loans Department	Ali Faruq Mohammed,
	Wasit	
72	Deputy Governor	Rasheed Eedan Freyh
73	Governor AFAD	Mahdi Wadi Najim
74	DG Education	Munem Sadiq
75	Assistant DG Health	Sadoon Al-Ameer
76	DG Water	Mohammed Jasim Mohammed
77	DG Municipalities- Trash	Ali Habeeb Humedan

	Maysan	
78	Governor, Technical Assistant	Mahmoud Sajit Abdul Hassan
79	Governor AFAD	Mrs. Sena'a Isma'el Muhammed
80	DG Water, Technical Assistant	Ahmed Sami Hasan
81	DG Agriculture	Hussein Abdul Hasan Abd Ali Al Sa'adi
82	Deputy DG Employment and Loans	Mohammed Qassim Shaneshil Al Farayji
83	Assistant DG MOH Health	Dr. Raysan Mahadi Daghir
	Diyala	
84	Governor, Legal Assistant	Lamaya Ghadhaban Salem
85	Deputy Governor AFAD	Ammar Hadi Nawar
86	Assistant DG Education	Sa'aed Kareem Ahmed
87	DG Water	Murtadha Al Makadam
88	Assistant DG Municipality	Ibrahim Kadhum Rasheed
	Karbala	
89	Governor Consultant	Adil Hashim Mohammed
88	Governor Acting AFAD Manager	Giyath Miqdad Jawad
89	Vocational Training Center Manager	Adnan Majeed Aziz
90	Deputy DG Agriculture	Nabeel Isa Dawod
91	Deputy DG MOCH Buildings	Muhammed Noori Said
92	DG MOE Education	Abbas Awdah Olaiwi
	Muthanna	
93	Governor	Falih Al-Ziyadi
94	Governor AFAD	Mustafa Dakhil Abbas
95	Assistant DG Education	Abdul Rahman Jawad Ali
96	Assistant DG Health	Kamil Aziz Jasim
97	Technical Assistant, DG Water	Ahmed Jasim Kadhum
98	Assistant DG Municipalities	Faris Shnawa Naif
	Basrah	
99	Assistant Governor, Legal Affairs	Mua'aen Saleh Al Hasan
100	Governor AFAD	Essa Hamid Hussein
101	Assistant DG Water	Maytham Jarallah Fadhil
102	DG Sewer	En.Qussay Shakir Al Harabi
103	DG Labor and Social Affairs	Mohsen Abdulsamad Obeid Al-Mudhaffar
104	Assistant DG Health	Dr. Namer Mohammed
PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE LEVEL		
Location/Position		Respondent
Baghdad		

105	Consultant on behalf of Baghdad Governor	Advisor Shamil Abdul Rahman / Advisor Shuaa Abdul Nabi
106	Head of PC Education Committee	Adnan Kredi Saleh
107	Health Committee Member	Nahida Ali Hassoun
108	Agriculture Committee Member	Adnan Jameel Mahmood
109	Head of PC Services Committee	Hasson Al-Rubaieie
Anbar		
110	PC Chair	Ahmed Hamid Sharqy
111	Member of PC Services Committee	Othal Obeid Dahi
112	Head of PC Construction Committee	Arkan Khalaf Al-Tarmuz
113	Head of PC Youth and Sports Committee	Salma Ahmed Lafi
114	Head of PC Social Affairs Committee	Fatima Khalaf Saleh Al-Fahdawi
Kirkuk		
115	PC Chair Consultant	Almas Fadhil Kamal
116	Head of PC Services Committee/Head of PC Health Committee	Khaleel Ibrahim Abdullah Al-Hadidi
117	PC member/Committee Member of Women, Children, and Disabled People Affairs	Ramla Hameed Ahmed Al-Obaidy
118	Assistant Chairman, Education Committee	Majeed Uzet
119	Head of PC Agriculture Committee	Burhan Mezher al-Asi
Najaf		
120	PC Chair	Khuthair Nimaa Al-Joboury
121	PC Education Committee Member	Khadim Abd Hussain Al-Jalehawi
122	PC Health and Environment Committee Member	Ali Al-Shimmari
123	PC Water and Sewers Committee Member	Idrees Al-Yassiri
124	PC Services Committee Member	Hussien Al-Hadrawi
Qadisiya		
125	PC Chair	Haidar Hamada Al Shammari
126	PC Agriculture Committee Member	Jwad Kadhim
127	PC Member of Labor and Social Affairs Committee	Ali Badr Ghazi
128	Head of PC Health Committee	Hussein Mhesin Kadhim
129	Head of PC Water and Sewer and Services Committee	Jaafer Musa Al-Musawi
Babil		
130	PC Chair	Raad Hamza Alwan

131	Head of PC Health Committee	Haydar Al-Janabi
132	PC Member of the Services Committee	Hamza Obed
133	Head of PC Services Committee	Zaid Witwit
Dhi Qar		
134	PC Chair	Hamid Naeem Khudair
135	PC Member of Agriculture and Water Resources, Marshlands Planning and Investment	Rajah Matrood Aluboody
136	Head of PC Services Committee	Raheem Yasir
137	Head of PC Work and Social Affairs Committee	Ata Sajed Basheer Al-Zamily
138	Deputy of the PC Labor and Social Affairs Committee	Abdul Rahman Kadhim Rashid
Wasit		
139	Deputy PC Chairman	Turki al-Ghunaimawi
140	Head of PC Education Committee	Sajida Nazar
141	Chairman of the Health Committee and Vice-Chairman of the Committee of Municipalities and Urbanization	Muntader Naji Al-Shahmmani
142	Head of PC the Services Committee	Mahdi Younis
Maysan		
143	Member of PC Agriculture Committee	Ali Hassan Akram
144	Head of PC Human Rights Committee (MoLSA)	Ruqaya Al-Noori
145	Head of PC Services Committee	Bassem Saheb
Diyala		
146	PC Chair	Dr. Ali Zaid Manhal
147	Head of PC Education Committee	Ahmed Rzuqi Al-Rubaiey
148	Head of PC Health Committee	Najat Al-Taie
149	Head of PC Agriculture and Water Resources Committee	Haqqi Ismael AlJoboury
150	Head of PC Health and Environment Committee	Iman Abd Al-Wahab Mahmood
151	Head of PC Committee of Water and Sewers Services	Haider Ali Muhsen
152	Head of PC Municipality Services Committee	Hussain Ali
153	PC Education Committee Member	Jinan Abbas Ismael

Karbala		
154	PC Chair	Hakim Al-Yasiri
155	Head of PC Education Committee	Saad Khadim Jasim
156	PC Health Committee Member	Ammar Ghareeb
157	General manager of Water in Muthanna	Muhammed Talib Kareem
158	PC Water and Sewer Committee Member	Fahad Saif Faisal
Muthanna		
159	PC Chair	Hakim Al-Yasiri
160	Head of PC Education Committee	Saad Khadim Jasim
161	PC Health Committee Member	Ammar Ghareeb
162	General manager of Water	Muhammed Talib Kareem
163	PC Water and Sewer Committee Member	Fahad Saif Faisal
Basrah		
164	Deputy PC Chairman	Nashaat Al-Mansoury
165	Head of PC Services Committee	Jawad Abd Al-Abbas Muhammed Al-Amaara
166	Chairman of PC Legal Committee	Ahmed Abdhussain Kadhim
167	Head of PC Social Affairs Committee	Bushra Hameed Salman
168	Head of PC Health and Environment Committee	Haider Abd Al-Sada Al-Saadi
TAQADUM PROJECT STOCKHOLDERS		
Location/Position		Respondent
USAID		
169	Mission Director	Brooke Isham
170	Deputy Mission Director	William Patterson
171	Director of Governance and Economic Opportunity (GEO)	Michael Nehrbass
172	COR for Taqadum	Vladan Raznatovic
173	Project Specialist-Stabilization	Ahmed Al-Agha
Chemonics		
174	COP for Taqadum, Chemonics	Cameron Berkuti
TELEPHONE KII'S		
Location/Position		Respondent
Damage Assessment Training		
175	Anbar Department of Health	Jalal Abeed Zaidan
176	Anbar /Al-Ratba district Governor	Emad Mushel
177	Anbar Directorate of Water Resources	Muhammed Aeed Yunus
178	Anbar Directorate of Education	Abid Al-Ghafur Ibrahim Mubark

179	Anbar office of governorate	Salah Alwai Sameer
180	Anbar Directorate of Water Resources	Ibrahim Madlul Muhammed
181	Anbar office of governorate	Areej Hussien Alawai
182	Anbar office of governorate	Marawa Hussien Alawai
183	Lawyer / Judicial Expert Salah al-Din	Nuri Hussien Ali
184	Surrogate of Beiji district/ Salah al-Din	Muhammed Mahmodd Ahmed
185	President of the Judiciary Council of Samraa district/ Salah al-Din	Omer Muahmmmed Hasan
186	Ministry of Agriculture Salah al-Din	Ali Hussien Ahmed
187	Ministry of Health Ninewa	Suliman Ahmed Refaat
188	Ministry of Youth and Sports Ninewa	Muhammed Abid Al-Kareem Mahmood
189	Ministry of Youth and Sports Ninewa	Rana Muhammed Salih
190	Anbar office of governorate	Ameer Mulood Isa
191	The Ministry of Construction and Housing Salah al-Din	Ahmed Hasan Hadid
192	Member of the Provincial Council Salah al-Din	Amena Hameed Ali
193	Chairman of the advisers in the province of Salah al-Din /Head of Projects in Salah al-Din	Suliman Yusef Ahmed
194	Intelligence officer	Abid Al-Satar Abid Al-Jabar
195	Director of Al-Mutaasem town Salah al-Din	Alaa Abid Al-Rahman Mahmood
196	Surrogate of Al-Sherqat" Salah al-Din	Ali Dahdooh Khalf
197	Member of the Provincial Council of Salah al-Din	Kefaa Farhan Hussien
198	The Ministry of Construction and Housing Salah al-Din	Yunes Musled Dhaher
199	Ninewa office of governorate	Eman Jalal Al-Deen Ibraheem
200	Ninewa /Talkeef office of governorate	Basem Yaaqob Balo
201	Ninewa Legal Counsel	Balawi Yaseen Balawi
202	Ninewa governorate	Thabet Abed Al-Satar Hasan
203	Ninewa / Water Department Manager of Barteela district	Hazem Muhammed Qanber
204	Director of Urban Planning in Governorate of Ninewa	Ziyad Abed Al-Mula Mustafa
205	Member of the Provincial Council of Ninewa	Ghazwan Hamed Hameed
206	Member of the Provincial Council of Ninewa	Qusay Hajem Muhammed

207	Director of Urban Planning in Governorate of Ninewa	Ziyad Abed Al-Mula Mustafa
Public Finance Management Training		
208	Directorate of roads and bridges/ Financial manager dept. manager Anbar	Aziz Saleh Talaa
209	Office of the Governorate /Director of Accounting Anbar	Qasim Mohammed Abdullah
210	Municipality of Ramadi /Senior Accounts Manager Anbar	Ghada Kaml Khtab
211	Director of the Vocational Training Center Anbar	Mohammed Ismaeel Yaseen
212	Directorate of Anbar streams /Director of Audit Division Anbar	Rabah Mahmoud Abdullah
213	Anbar Housing Department management office	Dyaa Nawfal
214	Labor and Social Affairs Directorate/Assistant Director Anbar	Ahmed Mohammed Zeki
215	Labor and Social Affairs Directorate /Accountant Anbar	Waleed Nawaf Hamd
216	Office of the Governorate /Director of Budget Division Anbar	Sabah Hamd Abd
217	Directorate of Anbar Water /Director of Accounts dept.	Akram Abdllatif Ahmed
218	Directorate of Anbar Agriculture / Associate Account Manager	Hamd Saleh Mhl
219	Anbar province office/ Director of Monetary Affairs Division	Yaser Latif Fajr
220	Director of Agriculture Directorate Accounts Ninewa	Ahmed Mustafa Saleh
221	Financial Audit Ninewa	Amjd Younis Mahmoud
222	Director of vocational training center in Ninewa	Bassam Abd Al-Qadir Taha
223	Construction and Housing directorate/account manager Ninewa	Hassan Hussain Mohammed
224	Youth and Sports directorate/Audit Division Officer Ninewa	Rana Mohammed Salih
225	Construction and Housing directorate/Ninewa	Ryan Ahmed Jasim

226	Construction and Housing directorate/Associate Director Ninewa	Farhad Aziz Rasul
227	Operating Center/Director of Operations and Loans Department Ninewa	Mythaq Talib Yousif
228	Construction and Housing directorate /Chief Engineers Ninewa	Najim Saeed Mahmoud
229	Directorate of construction and Municipalities /Director of Municipal Accounts Ninewa	Nsr Mohammed Eidan
230	Labor and Social affairs/Director of Occupational Health and Safety Section Ninewa	Hiba Hikmet Taher
231	Directorate of construction and Municipalities /Urban Planning Engineer Salah al-Din	Ahmed Yas Khedir
232	Directorate of construction and Municipalities /Director of the accounts of Saladin Sewage system Salah al-Din	Hasan Akber Habib
233	Education directorate/ Associate Accounts Manager for Salah al-Din	Abdulaziz Khedir Mahmoud
234	Directorate of construction and Municipalities /Associate Director Salah al-Din	Uday Fzaa Hamdan
235	Directorate of construction and Municipalities /Head of Research dept. Salah al-Din	Ali Mahmoud Ibrahim
236	Municipality of Tikrit /Salary Division Official Salah al-Din	Emad Thaar Ahmed
237	Directorate of Agriculture/Accounts and storage Division Salah al-Din	Umran Badr Fadhil
238	Director of the province budget Salah al-Din	Uwad Khalif Musa
239	Directorate of construction and Municipalities/ Official Accounts Division of Salah al-Din Roads	Mohammed Sayd Jamal Mohammed
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS		
Location/Position		Respondent
CSO's		
240	Model organization of Iraqi Women/Head of org./Baghdad	Athraa Fadel Al-Hassani

241	Human Rights organization/ Women affairs/Muthana	Batool Dagher
242	General Secretary/ Diyala	Dr. Etmad Rasheed Hameed
243	Iraqi Women Corporation/Najaf	Hala Al-Musawy
244	Afaq Corporation for Supporting Women/Najaf	Najat Abd Al-Hussain
245	Center for Developing Working Community Babil	Salah Hassan Bahia

FOCUS GROUPS

Location/Position		Respondent
FGD's		
246	Babil	Citizens
247	Baghdad	Citizens
248	Diyala	Citizens
249	Muthana	Citizens
250	Najaf	Citizens
251	Wasit	Citizens

ANNEX I: EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

Data Collection

Data were collected over a four-week period from December 25, 2017, to January 18, 2018. The design followed a mixed method model. The use of the mixed-method evaluation design, involved triangulation of or integrating both quantitative and qualitative data, that helped to leverage the strength of each data collection method for generating greater insight into the evaluation questions than would be obtained by using a single data collection method.

- **Document Review:** The team reviewed a range of documents, supplied by USAID, relevant to and/or generated by Taqadum. The documents included the following:

- o Activity weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports
- o Previous evaluations, including USAID/Iraq Capacity Building Office summative evaluation and USAID Local Governance Program Phase III evaluation
- o Activity booklets
- o Activity performance management plan, including the October 2016 revised performance management plan
- o Annual work plans
- o Implementing partner M&E data
- o Taqadum's field-monitoring reports, and any other relevant QED or PMSP data

Other information central to the evaluation of Taqadum's decentralization efforts included the most recent law(s), official policy documents and regulations on decentralization and local governance, and any pertinent constitutional revisions regarding decentralization. These legal documents represent governance architecture and set the stage for further engagement among and between government and civil society actors. The team also looked at how Taqadum was situated within overall USAID/Iraqi governance assistance programming over time, and examined what other USAID programming preceded and occurred in tandem or alongside Taqadum.

- **Analysis of "Government Letters":** The team reviewed the "Government Letters" that constitute official communications of various kinds, issued by diverse government bodies, in areas pertaining to both decentralization of ministerial functions and local governance and basic service delivery. The team analyzed the letters, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The analysis focused on answering the evaluation questions and assessment of reforms addressed in the letters.

- **Population-based survey on local governance and service delivery:** The evaluation team conducted a population-based survey to provide evidence of high-level results in response to evaluation question 2 (EQ2): What factors promoted or impeded the success of provincial service delivery improvement plans (SDIPs)? The survey was conducted in six provinces reflective of the overall typology of provinces with which GSP/Taqadum worked. Prior to conducting the survey, the evaluation team tested the validity of the survey tool through pilot testing in the field.

The questionnaire used as the tool for data collection in the population-based survey was constructed in as closed-ended question and in modular form. The modular form involved targeting specific group of questions in the data collection tool towards specific sub-question under the evaluation question. This helped to ensure existence of relationship between the data collected and the evaluation question.

- **Individual Key Informant Interviews:** For overarching context, the team conducted individual key informant interviews (KIs) with USAID Mission staff, United Nations officials, and Dr. Cameron Berkuti, former Taqadum Chief of Party (COP). In order to address EQ1, KIs were held with Government of Iraq (GOI) counterparts at the national and provincial levels across the

legislative and executive branches of government.

Evaluation question 2 was addressed through six additional KIIs with civil society organizations (CSOs) in each of the survey Provinces. The CSO KIIs focused on gender equality, citizen voice, and participation in local governance. These KIIs were held in conjunction with the principal data source for evaluation EQ2, the population-based survey. Finally, EQ3 3 was addressed through telephone KIIs with damage assessment and public financial management trainees in the newly liberated provinces (NLAs), Anbar, Salah al-Din, and Ninewa respectively.

The KII guides were designed with a mix of open-ended and closed-ended questions. Examples of the latter include three to five-point Likert scales to gauge respondents' feedback with regard to various questions in order to facilitate analysis and allow drawing of conclusions in a quantifiable manner. The interviews were tailored for specific stakeholder types to probe for contextual and detailed information

- **Focus Group Discussions:** Focus group discussions (FGDs) were held in conjunction with the population-based survey in each survey Province. FGDs comprised 6-10 citizens for approximately two-hour discussion sessions, and focused on further elucidating themes of citizen inclusion and citizen perception of local government, decentralization and service delivery. The FGDs were conducted to collect data that addressed EQ2 and EQ3 respectively.
- **Case Studies:** The team addressed EQs 1d and 2d using case studies involving systematic qualitative analysis of documents, population survey, KIIs, and FDGs, through in-depth analysis, to identify and analyze particularly factors that promoted/imposed success of the program at the provincial/ministerial levels.

Data Collector Training:

Data collectors comprised Iraqi Field Monitors (IFMs) and SREO enumerators, as well as staff of PMSP. The IFMs were responsible for collecting KIIs data from the Provincial Governors and Director Generals. The SREO collected from members of provincial councils, FDGs conducted with CSOs, and the population-based survey. Staff of the PMSP collected KII data from the Government of Iraq (GOI) ministers and Director Generals, as well as members of the Council of Representatives (COR). The data collection exercise was conducted on December 4–5, 2017.

Data collector training was held on December 5–6, 2017. The training was led by the Team Leader and Evaluation Methodologist, as well as IBTCI PMSP Evaluation Coordinator Mohammed Talal. Bushra Hamad, USAID's COR for the PMSP activity attended the second day of the training. The SREO enumerators in attendance totaled 37, including 34 males and three females; all eight IFMs also attended. The training focused on the purpose and focus of the evaluation overall.

Data Quality Control

Data quality control in the evaluation was ensured through providing of proper and adequate guidance and monitoring the IFMs and SREO involved in the data collection. The IFMs and SREO worked under the technical guidance of the team leader and evaluation methodologist, who were supported by IBTCI's technical team in Iraq. The evaluation team, the eight-person IFM team, which included seven men and one woman, conducted KIIs focused on EQ1 in the capital city Baghdad and the Provinces. SREO conducted GOI KIIs, the population-survey across the six designated Provinces, as well as CSO KIIs, FDGs and telephone KIIs in conjunction with EQ 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Both the IFMs and SREO provided feedback on data quality and challenges encountered in the field related either to the instruments or access, among other issues. The evaluation team made adjustments to interview protocols as necessary. To facilitate both quality control and data analysis, the IFMS and SREO uploaded interview notes daily from the field into an online program that interfaces with Microsoft Excel and KoBo. They also transmitted scanned hard copies of handwritten notes for cross checking. Translation into and cross-checking of entries were ongoing throughout data collection, collation and cleaning. The team cleaned survey data and uploaded them to both Excel and SPSS for analysis.

At the end of data collection, the evaluation team debriefed the IFMs on their interviews and solicited additional notes and information. During the debriefings, the team clarified notes and identified themes and findings. The team completed final data entry on January 24, 2018, thereby concluding the data collection, cleaning, and collation process.

Data Management and Analysis:

The management of collected data, involved data entry, coding, data cleaning and storage of both quantitative and qualitative data using MS Excel. Data from FGDs, which were originally in MS Word documents, were also transferred and managed using MS Excel. The collected data were analyzed using MS Excel, Metabase, and SPSS respectively. The various data analysis tools, which give the same result outputs, were used as available to ensure timely delivery of findings and reporting on the evaluation.

Data analysis methods used in the evaluation include document analysis, descriptive statistics, content analysis, triangulation of findings from analysis of quantitative and qualitative data, and gender consideration. Both quantitative and qualitative data were analyzed systematically to minimize the potential of bias, and to ensure that the results address the evaluation questions across the diverse community perspectives. The following data analysis methods were used for the evaluation:

- **Document Analysis:** A document review process was used to identify the key institutions, accomplishments, lessons, and milestones attendant to GSP/Taqadum. They were also used to develop a list of key stakeholders that informed sampling for the key informant interviews. The document analysis developed themes that were used to identify and triangulate emerging findings from KIs and FGDs.
- **Descriptive Statistics:** Descriptive statistics provide simple summaries and quantitative descriptions in a manageable form. Descriptive statistics was employed to understand the frequency with which selected variables, such as uptake of key decentralized government services, are present for any given data analysis point in the population survey and KI data collection tools. The descriptive statistics involving cross-tabulation data also facilitated comparative analysis, particularly related to province-specific trends and findings.
- **Contribution analysis:** The team considered the innovative systematic Contribution Analysis approach for the case study analysis. The approach involves exploring the attribution through assessing to what extent GSP/Taqadum had contributed to observed results, based on cause-effect relationship built on the theory of change and assumptions of the program regarding how to successfully achieve the program objectives.

The following issues were taken into consideration in the data analysis:

- **Triangulation of findings:** The evaluation team integrated findings from analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data regarding particular evaluation question to provide in-depth analysis for addressing that particular question. The findings from the qualitative data allowed to more fully explore emergent themes from population survey results. For instance, with regard to a particular sub-question under EQ2, the team conducted descriptive analysis of the population survey data, and augment the findings with findings from subsequent analysis of qualitative data from KIs and FGDs.
- **Gender considerations:** In accordance with USAID's Automated Directives System (ADS) 203.3.1.5, the evaluation design for this evaluation considered gender-specific and differential effects of the Taqadum program. The evaluation team examined gender-based differences in terms of access to, and participation in, the program across the different interventions. Gender disaggregation will take place as a matter of course in the EQ2 survey analysis, taking into consideration any differences regarding results, benefits and lessons learned for, and by both female and male beneficiaries.

Gender considerations were also taken into cognizance, wherever necessary, in the analysis of data from KIIs and FDGs across all the evaluation questions.

- **Inclusivity in data analysis:** consideration of other characteristics of the respondents regarding age groups, religion, ethnicity, vulnerable groups, and marital status, among others characteristics, were considered in constructing and analysis of the quantitative data from the population-based survey. This was to ensure representativeness or inclusiveness of the sample drawn for the evaluation and to enhance external validity of findings from the data analysis.

Sampling and selection criteria:

Sampling and selection criteria were designed to respond to the evaluation questions, taking into consideration the need to generate data relatively quickly while capturing project implementation and effect granularity among and between high-ranking officials, operational public servants in ministries and governorates, the public, and the civil society. Sampling and selection criteria differ accordingly across the evaluation questions.

- **Evaluation Question 1: sampling framework and selection criteria:** For evaluation question 1, the evaluation team conducted key informant interviews in all 15 provinces, where GSP/Taqadum program was implemented, in order to identify locally specific factors affecting implementation and effectiveness.

Respondents for the KIIs were drawn by purposive sampling method, based on relevance of the selected official (respondent) to the GSP/Taqadum program, from the following groups: High-level GOI officials, CORs, Governors, Provincial Council DGs, and civil society organizations.

The sampling framework was designed to enable in-depth, intensive analysis of the performance of the ministries which championed decentralization in the “model” provinces as well as extensive analysis of other ministries and provinces that were targeted at subsequent phases of the project. A total number of 184 respondents were selected for the KIIs with a response rate of 157 (85.3 percent) achieved.

- **Evaluation Question 2: Respondent selection criteria:** To answer EQ2, the team used the survey primarily, and KIIs and FDGs secondarily to more fully explore emergent themes from survey results. The population-based survey adopted a cluster sampling approach that resulted in the selection of six provinces out of the 15 provinces that were targeted by Taqadum. The selected six provinces provided a representative sample of both the project interventions (in nature/focus and longevity) as well as the characteristics of different provinces and population dynamics: Baghdad, Najaf, Babil, and Wasit constitute four out of the five “model” provinces in which project interventions in “administrative decentralization” started as of June 2014. Whereas, Diyala and Muthanna are both non-model provinces, they meet the requirement of longevity of GSP/Taqadum program intervention for their inclusion into the sample for the survey.
- **Sample Size:** Within the premise of the cluster sampling approach that the team adopted for the survey, an overall sample of 2,400 respondents that were divided equally across the six selected provinces. The sample size was calculated as a random sample of the total population of the six provinces with a confidence level of 95 percent and a margin of error (confidence interval) of 5 percent. A response rate of 100 percent was achieved in the sampling for the population-based survey; the intended number of six KIIs and FDGs respectively that were sampled actually responded, (100 percent) response rate.

It was understood that the population in each province was far from homogeneous. Additionally, and in order to assess “inclusive access to basic services,” particular focus was placed on surveying large enough numbers of minorities and vulnerable groups (e.g., women, youth, people with disabilities (PWDs), IDPs, etc.) to yield reliable results in the population-based survey.

- Evaluation Question 3: Respondent Selection Criteria: The overall training figures in the NLAs, for both damage assessment and public financial management, are as follows.

Table 1: Number of Trainees in the newly liberated areas (NLAs)

Province	Male trainees	Female trainees
Anbar	401	20
Ninewa	462	77
Salah al-Din	341	31

There is an obvious disproportionality in the numbers of male and female trainees. It was presumed the reason for this is extra-programmatic; that is, the available civil servants for training were characterized by a preponderance of males. The circumstances surrounding Da'esh occupation were such that any preexisting gender disproportionality would have been greatly amplified.

In light of the above, the evaluation team adopted the stratified random sampling approach that involves inclusion of proportions of different categories of respondents in the evaluation, female and male. Accordingly, 55 male trainees distributed among the various dimensions to be studied (e.g., a number will be those trained in a certain aspect, or those who received many trainings, etc.) were randomly selected. The female respondents were oversampling in greater proportion than their action number in the population of respondents. Accordingly, all female trainees were included in the sample. The sampling method used was intended to help to determine any gender differences in the delivery of training, and the implementation of skills acquired during training. A total number of 75 respondents were selected for the KIIs, and a response rate of 65 (87 percent) achieved.

Overview of relationship between the evaluation questions and the evaluation methods:

The evaluation matrix below summarizes the evaluation methods that are detailed above, and how they are related to each of the three evaluation questions.

Evaluation design matrix

Evaluation question	Data collection tool	Data analysis*	Sampling method
EQ1	• Documents • KIIs • Case study	• Documents analysis • Qualitative analysis of KII data • Contribution analysis for the case study	Purposive sampling of GOI and provincial government officials
EQ2	• Documents • Population-based survey • KIIs • FDGs • Case study	• Documents analysis • Descriptive statistical analysis for quantitative data • Qualitative analysis of KII and FDG data • Contribution analysis for the case study	• Cluster sampling for the population-based survey • Purposive sampling of respondents for KIIs and FDGs
EQ3	• Documents • KIIs	• Documents analysis	• Stratified random sampling of trainees

		• Qualitative analysis of KII data	in the damage assessment training
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* Triangulation of findings of the separate data analysis method was done, and gender consideration (disaggregation of data by gender) was also ensured in the data analysis.

Limitations to the Evaluation Methods

The identified limitations to the design of the evaluation methods as well as efforts made by the evaluation team to mitigate the limitation throughout the evaluation process:

- Selection bias by the evaluation team:** The bias was introduced in the sampling method for the population-based survey to ensure gender consideration in the selection of respondents through including adequate number of women in the survey. The negative effects of the bias were mitigated by selection of a large sample size (2,400 respondents), based on empirical determination of the sample size from the population, in order ensuring accuracy of findings to enhance generalization from sample to population in the evaluation.
- Recall bias among respondents:** Cognizance was taken of the inherent systematic error that would be caused by inaccurate and incomplete recollection of issues regarding DMAP and SDIPs as well as the damage assessment training among all the respondents interviewed, using different data collection tools. The effect was mitigated by limiting question to issues relevant to the respondents on EQ1 and EQ3, while requesting for recall of situation regarding SDIP in the last one year, and one issues of relevance to the individual respondents among respondents for the population survey. This led to issues of missing cases in some aspects of the analysis of data. However, this did not impact negatively on the data analysis as there were sufficiently large sizes of valid cases for data analysis, whenever the issue of missing case arose.
- Generalization of findings and conclusions:** The use of descriptive statistical analysis for the population-based survey and some aspects of the KIIs, and qualitative analysis for the remaining aspects of KIIs and FDGs did allow for inferential determination of the statistical significance of relationships or differences among variables involved in all the three evaluation questions. This puts a limitation of generalization of findings and conclusions from the sample to the various target populations (government officials at GOI and provincial levels, citizens, CSOs, and trainees in the damage assessment training). The limitation was mitigated by enhancing the external validity that is concerned with generalization of the findings and conclusions in the evaluation from sample of respondents to population. The action was undertaken by use of appropriate sampling methods to ensure representativeness of sample; selection of large sample size and ensuring large response rates among the different categories of respondents for ensuring accuracy of findings; and selecting respondents that have close similarity to the contexts of the various populations targeted in the evaluation.
- Attribution issues in contribution analysis for the case studies:** Attribution of an intervention to observed results is an inherent consideration that could limit the use of contribution analysis for case studies. Hence, understanding the operating context of GSP/Taqadum was crucial in interpreting any observable effects. In particular, the fact that the evaluation period is specified as the last two years (2015–2017) of an extensive, multi-year effort that itself built on the efforts of previous and contemporary initiatives, both USAID-funded and otherwise, means that isolating the effect of the last two years alone may prove tricky. Therefore, a dependence upon the literature pertinent to other and previous initiatives will be essential in establishing reliable—or at least defensible—baselines. The limitation was mitigated by considering “plausible association” in interpreting findings from analysis and drawing conclusions between the GSP/Taqadum activities and observed results in the last two years of the program and observed result based on the theory of change set for the program

Challenges to Data Collection

Team Turnover: At the outset of the Evaluation, the former Team Leader, Claire Pullon, resigned suddenly due to serious illness. The Governance and Public Administration Expert, April Powell-Willingham, then took on the Team Leader role, as well as the technical role. Ashraf Bakr Al Shareef, the Evaluation Methodologist, was unable to join Ms. Powell-Willingham in the field in early November. Although the two worked together remotely until November 29, this was rather cumbersome in terms of launching data collection. Finally, Dr. Al Shareef resigned on January 12, 2018, prior to returning to the field, due to a death in the family. The IBTCI team mitigated these challenges by assigning other IBTCI personnel to assist, both in person and by remote. Jeffrey Swedberg joined the evaluation team to provide additional technical expertise from the home office and Cyndi Scarlett, the interim SMES, provided oversight and support during the report-writing stage. The hiring process for a new Evaluation Methodologist, Ganiyu Ipaye, was expedited as well.

Movement within Iraq: Security concerns curtailed the expatriate team's ability to travel outside of Baghdad and even to some locations within Baghdad. As a result, and the Iraqi Field Monitors (IFMs) facilitated many of the KIs for Evaluation Question 1, in conjunction with IBTCI's subcontractor SREO which facilitated collection of survey data, KIs and FGDs on Evaluation Questions 1, 2, and 3. Despite these limitations, the evaluation team worked effectively throughout the training, and early stages of field work, individual mentoring, and multiple debriefing, feedback and problem-solving sessions. Because of the limitation on expatriate movements throughout Iraq, the team relied on local national team members with intimate knowledge of the area from which data were collected. The local national team members experienced fewer impediments to movement. However, individual ethno-sectarian identities were a factor restricting the ability of certain team members to operate in certain Provinces.

Availability of key informants for interviews: Despite repeated requests and follow-up, the evaluation team was unable to meet with several key informants. Reasons ranged from scheduling and communication problems, particularly over the Christmas and New Year holiday period when many key informant were away or otherwise unavailable, to outright refusals to participate. One strategy to mitigate the problem of access and availability, the evaluation team pursued alternative key informants, such as deputies, or other senior managers, for example, when a Minister, DG, or other principal key informant was unavailable or unwilling to participate in the evaluation.

Closure of Taqadam prior to the start of the evaluation: The closeout of Taqadam and the release of staff prior to the evaluation commenced limited the evaluation team's ability to collect project data. This especially affected the teams' ability to schedule interviews without Taqadam staff. To mitigate this limitation, the evaluation team conducted a Skype call with the former Taqadam Chief of Party, and attempted to liaise with former Taqadam Provincial Coordinators. This was not ideal, as neither the Chief of Party nor other Taqadam staff were accessible on an ongoing basis.

Gender imbalances and lack of availability of female enumerators: Due in part to the nature of the work involved in survey data collection, recruitment of female enumerators was difficult. Among the Iraqi IFMs, only one is a woman. Similarly, among the SREO enumerators, only three women were recruited. This posed a challenge in terms of ensuring that the numbers of male and female survey respondents were roughly equal. However, to mitigate this problem, the evaluation team devised strategies to ensure that the lack of female enumerators did not compromise the ability to achieve equal numbers of female respondents. Strategies included male enumerators seeking the imprimatur or the [mal religious leaders in the community] to escort male enumerators and to announce to communities that it would be permissible for unaccompanied women in their homes to participate in the survey conducted by an unrelated male. Other strategies included seeking out women and girl respondents in community centers or civil society organizations.

ANNEX J: INSTRUMENTS

1. Evaluation Question 1 Master guide of the instruments used for data collection from different categories of key informants.

(The master guide instrument contains the full set of questions for all categories of the key informants on evaluation question one. A matrix containing the list of specific questions for each category of the key informants is at the end of the master guide instrument)

EVALUATION QUESTION 1 KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE MASTER GUIDE

Estimated length of interview = 60 minutes

Date of Interview	
Name of Data Collector	
Name of Respondent	
Organization (e.g. GOV, Directorate of Education etc.)	
Department/Unit	
Position of Respondent	
City and Province	
Telephone	
Email	
Male	
Female	

INTRODUCTION:

Thank you for meeting with me as part of the USAID evaluation of the USAID-Taqadum program. The results of this evaluation will provide lessons learned from the final implementation phase and provide specific programmatic recommendations for future USAID assistance.

CONFIDENTIALITY:

Everything we discuss is confidential. We do not share your name or anything that can be used to identify you with anyone outside of our evaluation team. We do not share information you provide with other people we are talking to for this evaluation. Although our internal report to USAID will include a list of everyone that we interviewed, the public version of the report does not include this list. Whatever you share with us will not have any impact at all on the level of support you receive now or are eligible to receive in the future.

Do you have any questions before we begin?

1000. EQ 1. What factors promoted or impeded the success of Decentralization Mapping and Analysis Plans (DMAPs) to support the transfer of ministerial functions to the provincial level?

A. Overarching/Context

1001a. Do you believe that decentralization is a national priority – or that it should be a national priority? Why or why not?

Allow a few minutes for the interviewee to talk/explain her/his views.

1001b. Then ask interviewee to rank her/his opinion on a scale of 1-5, with 5 being the highest priority:

“So, if we were to rank the priority of decentralization for Iraq on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest priority, what would the ranking/rating from your perspective be?”

		Code
The highest priority (No. 1 priority) for Iraq now	☐	5
Among the highest priorities (but not no. 1)	☐	4
Not sure/Do not know	☐	3
Not a priority for the time being (currently)	☐	2
Not a priority at all	☐	1

1002a. Do you believe that the general public/ordinary citizens understand what decentralization means/should mean for them in their daily lives?

Get the respondent to give you a clear-cut answer, first, along the following scale, and then if needed allow her/him a few minutes to explain the basis for her/his views

		Code
Yes. The majority of Iraqis understand what decentralization means for them	☐	3
Some Iraqi do understand and others do not	☐	2
No. The majority of Iraqis do not understand what decentralization means for them	☐	1
I am not really sure/Do not know	☐	9

- **1002b.** Please explain the basis for your answer, why/why not? And give examples. [EQ 1c]

1003. From your perspective, are there varying degrees of support for decentralization across the Governor, Ministries, Directorates and Provincial Council in Iraq/ in your Province (phrase according to the level of the interview)? Or, is the level of support about the same across these institutions and actors [rephrase as necessary]

Before we move on, I would like to ask you about GSP/Taqadum:

			Code
1004. Have you worked (cooperated) with/benefited from Taqadum?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

1005. If **YES**, what was the nature of this cooperation (Tick all that applies):

		Code
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Technical Assistance	☐	1
Capacity Building (e.g. training, workshops, ...)	☐	2
Mentoring	☐	3
Oversight of Committee/Task Force/Working Group	☐	4
Other (specify):	☐	5
Other (specify):	☐	6
Other (specify):	☐	7

Taqadum produced many manuals (please refer to the list below and choose one or two as examples.).

Manuals available in English:

- Administrative and Financial Affairs Directorate Manual
- Investment Budget Formulation Manual
- Operation and Maintenance Budget Formulation Manual
- Public Policy Development Guide For Iraqi Local Governments
- Guide for Governors' Office Organizational Structure
- Post-Disaster Capacity Building Manual
- Intergovernmental Guide and Technical Relation Guide
- Guide for Public Employee Law
- Law of Government Debts Collection Manual
- Governors' Authorities Manual
- Investment Budget Execution Manual
- Law 21 of 2008, As Amended, For Provinces not Incorporated into a Region Manual
- Process Mapping and Streamlining Manual
- Simplified Citizen Guide for Public Services
- Trash Collection Management System Manual

			Code
1006a. Are you using any of these manuals?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

1006b. To what extent do you find these manuals useful/helpful?

		Code
Very useful/helpful	☐	3
Slightly helpful	☐	2
Not helpful	☐	1

			Code
1007a. Overall, did Taqadum assistance in this regard (decentralization) support the priorities of GOI)?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

1007b. Please explain the basis for your answer? Why, why not?

1007c. If the respondent did not believe decentralization was a priority for Iraq, re-phrase the question: With all due respect to your views about decentralization, was Taqadum assistance helpful and effective to you in improving governance systems and processes related to service delivery?

B. Constitutional and Legal Frameworks

1008a. To what extent are the Constitution's provisions in this regard clear/adequate/sufficient?

Get the respondent to give you a clear-cut answer along the following scale – in addition to brief narrative explanation of her/his view

		Code
Very clear and sufficient provisions	☐	3
Somewhat clear and sufficient (<i>some provisions are clear and others are not, or missing</i>)	☐	2
Not clear or sufficient at all	☐	1

1008b. Please explain the basis for your answer? Why, why not?

1009a. What about Law 21? To what extent does it provide clear/sufficient mandates for decentralization?

Get the respondent to give you a clear-cut answer along the following scale – in addition to brief narrative explanation of her/his view

		Code
Very clear and sufficient mandates	☐	3
Somewhat clear and sufficient (<i>some mandates are clear and others are not, or missing</i>)	☐	2
Not clear or sufficient at all	☐	1

1009b. Please explain the basis for your answer? Why, why not?

1010. Do the Constitution and relevant laws clearly specify powers, duties and authorities among different players/stakeholders (President/PM/Judge/Minister/DG)?

Get the respondent to give you a clear-cut answer along the following scale – in addition to brief narrative explanation of her/his view

		Code
Powers, duties and responsibilities are clearly specified	☐	3
Somewhat (to some extent): some powers, duties and responsibilities are clearly specified	☐	2
Not clear or sufficient at all	☐	1

1011. If Constitutional and legal provisions are incomplete/insufficient (vis-à-vis decentralization), what needs/remains to be done?

At the Provincial Level

1012. What are the interactions/inter-relationships between and among the Governor's Offices, Provincial Councils, and provincial directorates? Do they cooperate, and how; do they coordinate, and how; lines of authority as between Provincial Executive (Governor) and Legislative organs (Provincial Council Chair); lines of reporting within organs; etc.

C. Fiscal Decentralization

1013a. What about the Budget Law? To what extent does it provide clear/sufficient support for the decentralization mandate?

Get the respondent to give you a clear-cut answer along the following scale – then **probe** as explained below

		Code
Very clear and sufficient mandates	☐	3
Somewhat clear and sufficient (<i>some mandates are clear and others are not, or missing</i>)	☐	2
Not clear or sufficient at all	☐	1

Probe:

- **1013b.** Why is this the case?

			Code
1013c. Is fiscal decentralization necessary for decentralization?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	9

- **1013d.** What in your view is the relationship between decentralization and public financial management (PFM)
- **1013e.** How do (should) public financial management and provincial revenue generation relate to one another

At the Governor's Office - SPECIFICALLY the Head of AFAD – separate KII

The project trained newly formed Administrative and Financial Affairs Directorates (AFADs) in Governors' Offices:

			Code
1014a. Are these AFADs still there?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

			Code
1014b. Are they still functional?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

1014c. What are the functions they perform?

Have Provincial Bank Accounts been opened for different expenditure lines:

			Code
1015a. Operational Budget (costs)	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

			Code
1015b. Investment (Development) Budget (costs)	Yes	☐	1

	No	☐	2
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			Code
1015c. Other (specify):	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

Is the Central Ministry of Finance sending money to these bank accounts for:

			Code
1016a. Operational Budget (costs)	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

			Code
1016b. Investment (Development) Budget (costs)	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

			Code
1016c. Other (specify):	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

1017. How are expenditures being monitored?

1018. Is the AFAD paying the salaries of the employees of the following Directorates:

			Code
1018a. Agriculture	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	9

			Code
1018b. Health	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	9

			Code
1018c. Education	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	9

			Code
--	--	--	------

1018d. Youth and Sport	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	9

			Code
1018e. Governor's Office	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	9

			Code
1019. Did your Province prepare and submit to the Ministry of Finance the operational budget for decentralized directorates and the Governor's Office on time?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	9

			Code	
1020. Did your Province develop a law for promoting local revenue generation?	Yes	☐	1	
	No	☐	2	
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	9	Go to 1101

			Code
1020a. If YES , was the local revenue generation law passed by the Provincial Council?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

1100. EQ1a. How were plans implemented? To what extent were DMAPs implemented according to plan? ...

[Note: you will have a copy of the DMAP for that Directorate's list of functions to which you should refer if necessary]

1101. Can you briefly describe to me how were DMAPs developed, and by whom, and your role in this process?

1102. How was the DMAP for your ministry implemented?
[Rephrase as necessary, e.g. "for your Directorate/Province" etc.]

	Code
--	------

1103a. Was the DMAP fully implemented?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	9

1103b. What elements of the DMAP were fully implemented and how?

1103c. Which elements of the DMAP were not implemented? If not implemented, Why/why not?

1103d. To what extent were financial resources and PFM functions included in the DMAP and to what extent have these been implemented?

			Code
1103e. Did you experience delays in the implementation of the DMAP??	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

1103f. Please explain the reasons behind these delays.

			Code
1104a. Were there any major changes or adaptations to DMAPs over time?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

1104b. If so, please describe when, why and how such changes or adaptations were made, e.g. what major problems, challenges or important positive developments/successes prompted the changes? Please be specific.

1200. EQ 1b. Are high-level results observed? Which key functions identified in DMAPs were successfully implemented at the provincial level following transfer from targeted ministries? Which were not?

1201. How many functions were included in the DMAP for your Directorate?

Insert the number of functions	
--------------------------------	--

1202a. Of the key functions identified in the DMAP for your Directorate, which ones were successfully/fully transferred from the Ministry and implemented at the Provincial level? [\[Note: Fully transferred means that the Ministry of Finance has approved it, and staff have been transferred with salaries and are actually physically transferred and performing their duties in the province\]](#)

1202b. Why – and how – were these functions successfully transferred? Essentially, what made the transfer process work well? Please describe/give examples.

1203a. Which key functions were not fully transferred (i.e., only been partially transferred) to the provincial level?

1203b. Why were these functions not fully transferred? Please describe

1204a. What functions that should have been transferred according to the DMAPs have not been transferred to the provincial level?

1204b. Please describe and give examples and explain why or why not in your view

1205. Which are the top 2 DMAP Success Stories among your Ministry's Directorates?

Note: For Central GOI – ask also which Directorates in which Provinces.

1206. Which are the 2 Moderate DMAP Success Stories among your Ministry's Directorates?

Note: For Central GOI – ask also which Directorates in which Provinces.

1207. Which are the 2 Least Successful DMAP Stories among your Ministry's Directorates?

Note: For Central GOI – ask also which Directorates in which Provinces.

1208. In your opinion, has decentralization resulted in less corruption, more corruption, or are corruption levels about the same as before? Use the following scale

		Code
Less corruption than before	☐	3
Same levels of corruption as before	☐	2
More corruption than before	☐	1
Not sure/Do not know		

1300. EQ 1c. Were development and implementation inclusive? To what extent was civil society, including women, youth, minorities, and other vulnerable populations, represented in the design and implementation of DMAPs?

Intro: I would like now to move specifically to the involvement of citizens in the design/development and implementation of the DMAPs

			Code
1301. During the process of developing and implementing the DMAP for your Ministry, did you conduct citizen outreach and seek input to the design and implementation of the DMAP?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	9

1302. How did you conduct such outreach and ensure participation and input from citizens and civil society in DMAP design and implementation? What form did this citizen outreach take? Please give examples – Town Hall, flyers, TV, radio, Public Hearings? Where? At the Central GOI level in Baghdad, or in the relevant Province(s) or both?

1303. What kind of information was shared with citizens regarding DMAP planning and implementation? Examples (flyer; newspaper announcement; poster; electronic version of ad; website; etc.)

1304. Which of the above kinds of activities were most effective in reaching citizens and getting them involved?

			Code
1305. Did you particularly seek out the views of women, youth, minorities and other vulnerable	Yes	☐	1

populations in the design and implementation of the DMAPs ?				
	No	☐	2	Go to 1306

1305a. If so, how? Where; in Baghdad at the Central GOI level or in the relevant Provinces or both.

Gender Considerations

1306. Were women fairly represented among the citizens who participated in the DMAP planning and implementation process?			Code	
	Yes	☐	1	Go to 1306c
	No	☐	2	
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	9	

1306a. Roughly, what was the ratio of women to men? (e.g. more women, equal numbers of women, low numbers of women)

		Code
There were more women than men	☐	3
There were equal numbers of men and women	☐	2
There were less women than men	☐	1
Do not know/Not sure	☐	9

1306b. Were the views of women reflected in decisions made regarding DMAP planning and implementation?

		Code
Yes; to a large extent	☐	3
Somewhat/to some extent	☐	2
No; not reflected	☐	1
Do not know/Not sure	☐	9

1306c. Did the DMAP process take into account the transfer of functions related to the particular service delivery needs of girls and women?

		Code
Yes; to a large extent	☐	3
Somewhat/to some extent	☐	2
No; not reflected	☐	1
Do not know/Not sure	☐	9

1307. In general, how did citizens actually participate in decision making processes? Please give examples

1308a. To what extent was the process of developing and implementing the DMAP fair, or did you see evidence of bias or corruption in the process?

		Code
Very fair	☐	3
Somewhat/to some extent fair	☐	2

Not fair	☐	1
Do not know/Not sure	☐	9

1308a. Please explain the basis for your answer?

I have two questions specifically about **SDIPs**:

	Code	
1309. During the process of developing and implementing the SDIPs for your Directorate, did you conduct citizen outreach and seek input to the design and implementation of the SDIP ?	Yes	☐ 1
	No	☐ 2
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐ 9

	Code	
1310. Did you particularly seek out the views of women, youth, minorities and other vulnerable populations in the design and implementation of the SDIPs ?	Yes	☐ 1
	No	☐ 2
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐ 9

	Code	
1311. Did the SDIP process take into account service provision designed to meet the unique needs of girls and women? Examples: Health • Maternal health • Single mothers and their children • Victims of domestic violence • Victims of Sex and Gender Based Violence MOLSA • Pensions, e.g. for widowed women • Employment and loan services tailored for women Education • Educational disparities between girls and boys	Yes	☐ 1
	No	☐ 2
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐ 9

The Way Forward

1021. What are the priorities for Iraq now, given the political, economic, social, and security issues the country is facing?

1022. Within these priorities, where does decentralization rank?

1023. If respondent does not believe decentralization is priority for Iraq – not the approach to address democratization and stabilization – what would be the respondent's recommendations for the way forward? What should be the priority focus for both the GOI and international community for Iraq to address its current challenges and achieve stabilization?

Matrix of Questions for each category of key informants interviewed on evaluation question one

Administrative and Financial Affairs Directorate (AFAD)	Government of Iraq (GOI) Ministers	GOI National Director Generals (DGs)	Governors - Group 1 Provinces¹³⁷	Governors - Group 2 Provinces¹³⁸	Governors - Group 3 Provinces¹³⁹	Provincial Council (PC) Chair - Group 1 Provinces	PC Chair - Group 2 Provinces	PC Chair - Group 3 Provinces	PC Committee Chair - Group 1 Provinces	PC Committee Chair - Group 2 Provinces	PC Committee Chair - Group 3 Provinces	Province DGs - Group 1 Provinces	Province DGs - Group 2 Provinces	Province DGs - Group 3 Provinces
1014a	1001a	1001a	1001a	1001a	1001a	1001a	1001a	1001a	1001a	1001a	1001a	1001a	1001a	1001a
1014b	1001b	1001b	1001b	1001b	1001b	1001b	1001b	1001b	1001b	1001b	1001b	1001b	1001b	1001b
1014c	1002a	1002a	1002a	1002a	1002a	1002a	1002a	1002a	1002a	1002a	1002a	1002a	1002a	1002a
1015a	1002b	1002b	1002b	1002b	1002b	1002b	1002b	1002b	1002b	1002b	1002b	1002b	1002b	1002b
1015b	1003	1003	1003	1003	1003	1003	1003	1003	1003	1003	1003	1003	1003	1003
1015c	1004	1004	1004	1004	1004	1004	1004	1004	1004	1004	1004	1004	1004	1004
1016a	1005	1005	1005	1005	1005	1005	1005	1005	1005	1005	1005	1005	1005	1005
1016b	1007a	1006a	1006a	1006a	1006a	1007a	1007a	1007a	1007a	1007a	1007a	1006a	1006a	1006a

¹³⁷ Group one provinces are Kirkuk, Diwaniya, Thi Qar, Maysan, Karbala, and Basrah

¹³⁸ Group two provinces are Baghdad, Najaf, Babil, Wasit, Diyala, Muthanna

¹³⁹ Group three provinces are Anbar, Ninewa, Salah ah Din

1016c	1007b	1006b	1006b	1006b	1006b	1007b	1007b	1007b	1007b	1007b	1007b	1006b	1006b	1006b
1017	1007c	1007a	1007a	1007a	1007a	1008a	1008a	1008a	1007c	1008a	1008a	1007a	1007a	1007a
1018	1008	1007b	1007b	1007b	1007b	1009a	1009a	1009a	1008a	1009a	1009a	1007b	1007b	1007b
1018a	1008b	1007c	1007c	1007c	1007c	1010	1010	1010	1009a	1010	1010	1007c	1007c	1007c
1018b	1009a	1008a	1008	1008	1008	1011	1011	1011	1010	1011	1011	1008a	1008a	1008a
1018c	1009b	1008b	1008b	1008b	1008b	1012	1012	1012	1011	1012	1012	1008b	1008b	1008b
1018d	1010	1009a	1009a	1009a	1009a	1013a	1013a	1013a	1012	1013a	1013a	1009a	1009a	1009a
1018e	1011	1009b	1009b	1009b	1009b	1013b	1013b	1013b	1013a	1013b	1013b	1009b	1009b	1009b
1019	1013a	1010	1010	1010	1010	1013c	1013c	1013c	1013b	1013c	1013c	1010	1010	1010
1020	1013b	1011	1011	1011	1011	1013e	1013e	1013e	1013c	1013e	1013e	1011	1011	1011
1020a	1013c	1013a	1012	1012	1012	1101	1101	1101	1013e	1101	1101	1013a	1013a	1013a
	1013d	1013b	1013a	1013a	1013a	1205	1205	1205	1101	1103a	1205	1013b	1013b	1013b
	1013e	1013c	1013b	1013b	1013b	1206	1206	1206	1205	1205	1206	1013c	1013d	1013c
	1101	1013d	1013c	1013c	1013c	1207	1207	1207	1206	1206	1207	1013d	1013e	1013d
	1102	1013e	1013d	1013d	1013d	1208	1208	1208	1207	1207	1208	1013e	1101	1013e
	1103a	1101	1013e	1013e	1013e	1301	1301	1301	1208	1208	1301	1101	1102	1101
	1103b	1102	1101	1101	1101	1305	1305	1305	1301	1301	1305	1102	1103a	1102
	1103c	1103a	1102	1102	1102	1306	1306	1306	1305	1305	1306	1103a	1103b	1103a
	1103d	1103b	1103a	1103a	1103a	1306a	1306a	1306a	1306	1306	1306a	1103b	1103c	1103b
	1103e	1103c	1103b	1103b	1103b	1306b	1306b	1306b	1306a	1306a	1306b	1103c	1103d	1103c
	1103f	1103d	1103c	1103c	1103c	1306c	1306c	1306c	1306b	1306b	1306c	1103d	1103e	1103d
	1104a	1103e	1103d	1103d	1103d	1308a	1308a	1308a	1306c	1306c	1308a	1103e	1103f	1103e
	1104b	1103f	1103e	1103e	1103e	1021	1309	1021	1308a	1309	1021	1103f	1104a.	1103f
	1205	1104a	1103f	1103f	1103f	1022	1310	1022	1021	1310	1022	1104a	1104b	1104a
	1206	1104b	1104a	1104a	1104a	1023	1311	1023	1022	1311	1023	1104b	1201	1104b
	1207	1201	1104b	1104b	1104b		1021		1023	1021		1201	1202a	1201
	1208	1202a	1202a	1202a	1202a		1022			1022		1202a	1202b	1202a

	1301	1202b	1202b	1202b	1202b		1023			1023		1202b	1203a	1202b
	1302	1203a	1203a	1203a	1203a							1203a	1203b	1203a
	1303	1203b	1203b	1203b	1203b							1203b	1204a	1203b
	1304	1204a	1204a	1204a	1204a							1204a	1204b	1204a
	1305	1204b	1204b	1204b	1204b							1204b	1208	1204b
	1305a	1208	1205	1205	1205							1208	1301	1208
	1306	1301	1206	1206	1206							1301	1302	1301
	1306a	1302	1207	1207	1207							1302	1303	1302
	1306b	1303	1208	1208	1208							1303	1304	1303
	1306c	1304	1301	1301	1301							1304	1305	1304
	1021	1305	1302	1302	1302							1305	1306	1305
	1022	1305a	1303	1303	1303							1305a	1306a	1306
	1023	1306	1304	1304	1304							1306	1306b	1306a
		1306a	1305	1305	1305							1306a	1306c	1306b
		1306b	1305a	1305a	1305a							1306b	1307	1306c
		1306c	1306	1306	1306							1306c	1308a	1307
		1307	1306a	1306a	1306a							1307	1309	1308a
		1308a	1306b	1306b	1306b							1308a	1310	1021
		1021	1306c	1306c	1306c							1021	1311	1022
		1022	1307	1307	1307							1022	1021	1023
		1023	1308a	1308a	1308a							1023	1022	
			1021	1309	1021								1023	
			1022	1310	1022									
			1023	1311	1023									
				1021										
				1022										
				1023										

Instruments used for data collection for evaluation question two

Questionnaire for the population-based survey on evaluation question two:

Final Performance Evaluation Governance Strengthening Project/Taqadum Population-Based Survey

Coding Scheme:

SREO to decide on the coding scheme of instrument, based on the media to use for administering the survey (there is a strong possibility that a hard-copy may be required especially if it proves not possible to interview women); in addition to information of enumerator, field supervisor, etc.

A. Introduction, Purpose, Confidentiality and Consent

Hello. My name is _____ and I am part of a research team that is talking to people to conduct an evaluation about service provision and the performance of a number of provincial directorates. This evaluation will inform the government in planning future programs to better respond to citizens' need.

CONFIDENTIALITY:

Everything we discuss is confidential. We will not ask your name or anything that can be used to identify you. We do not share information you provide with other people we are talking to for this evaluation.

STRUCTURE:

I will ask you questions about services and the performance of provincial government (it is crucial that the enumerator makes it very clear and emphasizes to the respondent that the focus here is on the provincial not the central government) and will record these answers (either on a hard-copy of the instrument or on a tablet or a smart phone). It is important that you give me your objective and most accurate answer.

Do you have any questions before we begin?

B. Demographics

101. Province

		Code
Babil	☐	2
Baghdad	☐	3
Diyala	☐	4
Muthanna	☐	1
Najaf	☐	5
Wasit	☐	6

102. Urban/Rural

	Code
District (<i>Qadaa</i>)	1
City	2
Quarter (<i>Nahiya</i>)	3
Rural (<i>name of settlement</i>)	4

103. Gender

		Code
Male	☐	1
Female	☐	2

104. Age Group

		Code
(Youth) 18-29	☐	1
30-39	☐	2
40-49	☐	3
50-59	☐	4
60 and above	☐	5

105. Ethnicity – Self-Identification

		Code
Arab	☐	1
Kurds	☐	2
Turkman	☐	3
Other	☐	9

106. Vulnerable Groups – Self-Identification

		Code
IDP	☐	1
Returnee	☐	2
Local Resident	☐	3

108. Marital Status

		Code
Single	☐	1
Married	☐	2
Widowed	☐	3
Divorced	☐	4

Go to 109

109. Children

			Code
Do you have children in primary education?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

110. For Person with Disability (PWD) – what disability(s) the respondent may have

This question is answered either by observation or, if appropriate, by directly asking the respondent:

Do you have any physical or other disabilities? If so, please list)?

			Code	
Do you have/suffer from any disability? (if it is not appropriate to ask, the enumerator should observe it)	Yes	☐	1	Go to 111
	No	☐	2	Go to 201

111. What is (are) the disability (disabilities) that you have/suffer from) – or: what is/are the disability(s) that the enumerator observed the respondent to have/suffer from?

		Code	
Visual Impairment	☐	1	
Hearing Impairment	☐	2	
Orthopedic Impairment	☐	3	
Speech or Language Impairment	☐	4	
Intellectual Disability	☐	5	
Multiple Disabilities	☐	6	If more than one disability

C. Inclusion and Citizens' Participation

The enumerator has to explain to the respondent that the following questions are related to Service Delivery Improvement Plan (SDIP)

			Code	
201. Do you know what a Service Delivery Implementation Plan (SDIP) is?	Yes	☐	1	
	No	☐	2	Go to 207

			Code
202. Did you participate in the <u>design</u> of an SDIP for your area/province?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

203. How?

		Code
Participated in the Provincial Council's session(s) held for designing the Service Delivery Improvement Plan (SDIP)	☐	1
Participated in the Provincial Council's concerned committee's sessions held for designing the Service Delivery Improvement Plan (SDIP)	☐	2
Participated in the hearing/presentation sessions held in the Provincial Council	☐	3

Through Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) (contacting CSOs to convey my opinion/views to the Provincial Council)	☐	4
Respond to/provide feedback to surveys/polls conducted by the Provincial Council	☐	5
Other (Specify)	☐	9

204. In your opinion, to what extent were the services included/targeted in this Service Delivery Improvement Plan (**SDIP**) the priority ones for your area/province?

		Code
The highest priority services	☐	4
Among (<i>some of</i>) the highest priority services	☐	3
Among (<i>some of</i>) the lower priority services	☐	2
None of the priority services	☐	1

			Code
205. Were you involved in the implementation of the SDIP ?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

Phrase the following question according to the respondent

206. In your opinion, to what extent were your voice, opinions, and needs as a woman/widow/youth/PWD/IDP/returnee etc. that you contributed in the design/implementation process of SDIP heard and taken into account?

		Code
Largely taken into account	☐	3
Somewhat considered/taken into account	☐	2
Not considered/taken into account	☐	1
Not sure/Do not know	☐	9

			Code
207. In general, and other than the SDIP, have you been consulted about decisions of the provincial government (through a Provincial Council meeting or other means) during the last year?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

208. To what extent do you agree, or disagree, with the following statement:
Improving services delivery will help resolve the Iraqi conflict/Iraq's problem/help democracy in Iraq.

		Code
Strongly agree	☐	4
Agree	☐	3
Disagree	☐	2
Strongly Disagree	☐	1

Questionnaire for the Population-Based Survey:

D. Availability and Quality of Services

WATER SUPPLY

301. To what extent has **potable water supply** to your home/house improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago?

		Code
Improved Considerably	☐	5
Improved slightly	☐	4
Neutral (same as was 1 year ago)	☐	3
Became worse	☐	2
Became considerably worse	☐	1
Does not apply (<i>not connected</i>)	☐	9

Go To **303**

302. To what extent has the **quality of potable water** you get at your home/house through the network improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago?

		Code
Improved Considerably	☐	5
Improved slightly	☐	4
Neutral (same as was 1 year ago)	☐	3
Became worse	☐	2
Became considerably worse	☐	1

SEWER SYSTEM

303. To what extent has the **sewer system** in your area improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago?

		Code
Improved Considerably	☐	5
Improved slightly	☐	4
Neutral (same as was 1 year ago)	☐	3
Became worse	☐	2
Became considerably worse	☐	1
Does not apply (<i>not connected</i>)	☐	9

CONDITION OF ROADS

304. To what extent has the **condition of roads** in your city/town/village (pavement conditions, sidewalks, etc. **not** traffic-related) improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago?

		Code
Improved Considerably	☐	5
Improved slightly	☐	4
Neutral (same as was 1 year ago)	☐	3
Became worse	☐	2
Became considerably worse	☐	1

Garbage Collection

305. To what extent has solid waste/disposal/garbage collection improved in your area, compared to what it was 1 year ago?

		Code
Improved Considerably	☐	5
Improved slightly	☐	4
Neutral (same as was 1 year ago)	☐	3
Became worse	☐	2
Became considerably worse	☐	1

PRIMARY HEALTH SERVICES

			Code
306. During the past year, has a new primary health care center been built/established in your area, or an existing service been renovated/refurbished/upgraded?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

307. To what extent have the **quality of primary health care centers** in your area improved, compared to 1 year ago?

		Code
Improved Considerably	☐	5
Improved slightly	☐	4
Neutral (same as was 1 year ago)	☐	3
Became worse	☐	2
Became considerably worse	☐	1

PRIMARY EDUCATION - ONLY For those who have children in primary education

			Code
308. During the past year, has a new primary school been built/established in your area, or an existing school been renovated/refurbished/upgraded?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

309. To what extent has the **quality of primary education** your children are receiving improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago?

		Code
Improved Considerably	☐	5
Improved slightly	☐	4
Neutral (same as was 1 year ago)	☐	3
Became worse	☐	2
Became considerably worse	☐	1

E. Interaction with Provincial Directorates

			Code
401. During the past year, did you have any direct and personal interaction/dealing with any directorate in your province? (e.g., to issue a permit, license, birth certificate, request a service, file a complaint, etc.)	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

Go to 501

402. Can you please tell me the directorates that you interacted/dealt with – those that you can remember, at least?

Ministry	Directorate	Tick as applicable	Code
Education	TBD	☐	
Health	TBD	☐	
Municipality and Public Works	Water	☐	
	Sewer	☐	
	Municipality	☐	
	Municipalities	☐	
	Urban Planning	☐	
	Planning and Follow-Up	☐	
Agriculture	Agriculture	☐	
Construction and Housing	Housing	☐	
	Roads and Bridges	☐	
	Building	☐	
Labor and Social Affairs	Labor and Social Affairs	☐	
	Disability and Special Needs	☐	
	Vocational Training Center	☐	
	Employment and Loan	☐	
	National Center for Health and Occupational Safety	☐	
Youth and Sports	Youth and Sports	☐	
Not applicable	Not applicable	☐	

403. In your opinion, which of those directorates you interacted/dealt with were performing their duties in an efficient and effective manner?

Ministry	Directorate	Tick as applicable	Code
Education	TBD	☐	
Health	TBD	☐	
Municipality and Public Works	Water	☐	
	Sewer	☐	
	Municipality	☐	
	Municipalities	☐	
	Urban Planning	☐	
	Planning and Follow-Up	☐	
Agriculture	Agriculture	☐	
Construction and Housing	Housing	☐	
	Roads and Bridges	☐	
	Building	☐	
Labor and Social Affairs	Labor and Social Affairs	☐	
	Disability and Special Needs	☐	
	Vocational Training Center	☐	
	Employment and Loan	☐	
	National Center for Health and Occupational Safety	☐	
Youth and Sports	Youth and Sports	☐	
Not applicable	Not applicable	☐	

404. And, still in your opinion, which of these directorates were **not** performing their duties in an efficient and effective manner?

Ministry	Directorate	Tick as applicable	Code
Education	TBD	☐	
Health	TBD	☐	
Municipality and Public Works	Water	☐	
	Sewer	☐	
	Municipality	☐	
	Municipalities	☐	
	Urban Planning	☐	
	Planning and Follow-Up	☐	
Agriculture	Agriculture	☐	
Construction and Housing	Housing	☐	
	Roads and Bridges	☐	
	Building	☐	
Labor and Social Affairs	Labor and Social Affairs	☐	
	Disability and Special Needs	☐	
	Vocational Training Center	☐	
	Employment and Loan	☐	
	National Center for Health and Occupational Safety	☐	
Youth and Sports	Youth and Sports	☐	
Not applicable	Not applicable	☐	

Overall, and given your interaction with these directorates over the past year, to what extent do you agree, or disagree, with each of the following statements?

405. I could easily find clear and accurate information about the services provincial directorates provide

		Code
Strongly agree	☐	4
Agree	☐	3
Disagree	☐	2
Strongly Disagree	☐	1

406. I could easily access [any] provincial government service I need [*locating the service and being actually able to access it are different especially for PWD or women*]

		Code
Strongly agree	☐	4
Agree	☐	3
Disagree	☐	2
Strongly Disagree	☐	1

407. I got clear and accurate information and instructions about the service I was seeking [*i.e., process, forms to fill, fees to pay, and any requirements to obtain a service*]

		Code
Strongly agree	☐	4
Agree	☐	3
Disagree	☐	2
Strongly Disagree	☐	1

408. Provincial government staff [in the directorate] were knowledgeable and competent

		Code
Strongly agree	☐	4
Agree	☐	3
Disagree	☐	2
Strongly Disagree	☐	1

409. I was treated fairly

		Code
Strongly agree	☐	4
Agree	☐	3
Disagree	☐	2
Strongly Disagree	☐	1

410. The service that I got from provincial directorates met my needs

		Code
Strongly agree	☐	4
Agree	☐	3
Disagree	☐	2
Strongly Disagree	☐	1

411. The fees/money I pay to the provincial government is used properly (i.e., to provide better services for citizens)

		Code
Strongly agree	☐	4
Agree	☐	3
Disagree	☐	2
Strongly Disagree	☐	1
Not applicable/Not Aware	☐	9

F. Perception of Provincial Government

To what extent do you agree, or disagree, with the following statements?

501. Provincial government conduct their business in a more open and accountable manner than they used to

		Code
Strongly agree	☐	5
Agree	☐	4
Do not know	☐	3
Disagree	☐	2
Strongly Disagree	☐	1
There has been no change	☐	9

502. Provincial government is now more responsive to the needs of citizens than it used to be

		Code
Strongly agree	☐	5
Agree	☐	4
Do not know	☐	3
Disagree	☐	2
Strongly Disagree	☐	1
There has been no change	☐	9

			Code
503. Do you have the opportunity to have input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government, given limited financial resources	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

504. How?

Answer		Code
Through contacting the Citizens' Services (Affairs) Office (in the Provincial or Local Council	☐	1

Through participation in the Public Sessions of the Provincial Council (This answer is very likely limited to CSOs' members and media professionals who are permitted to attend)	☐	2
Through contacting the Governor and other Official (through the Open Day they dedicate to meet with citizens)	☐	3
Through "Mokhtar" (convey my opinion to the Mokhtar for him to convey to the Provincial or Local Council)	☐	4
Through Local Council Members (convey my opinion to Local Council members for them to convey to the Provincial or Local Council)	☐	5
Through CSOs (convey my opinion to the CSO for them to convey to the Provincial or Local Council)	☐	6
Through Social Media (e.g. Facebook pages of Provincial or Local Council)	☐	7
Other (Specify)	☐	9

505. To what extent do you believe/feel that your input/views/opinions are reflected in the decisions that the provincial government takes?

		Code
Largely taken into account	☐	3
Somewhat considered/taken into account	☐	2
Not considered/taken into account	☐	1
Not sure/Do not know	☐	9

			Code
506. In the last year, did you file any complaint with any directorate in your province?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

			Code
507. On average, do you believe the provincial directorate(s) dealt with your complaint(s) in a fair and objective manner?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

508. Do you know of others who filed complaints and received a different response?

		Code	
Yes	☐		Go to 509
No	☐	2	End of Survey – Thank the Respondent

509. In your opinion, and to the best of your knowledge, do you see that certain groups or certain areas/neighborhoods receive better services than others?

		Code
Yes	☐	1
No	☐	2
Do not Know	☐	9

601. Religion – Self-Identification

		Code
Shia	☐	1
Sunni	☐	2
Yazidi	☐	3
Christian	☐	4
I abstain	☐	5
Other	☐	9

Thank you very much for your time and the valuable information you have kindly shared with me.

2.2 Key informant interview guide for civil society organizations on evaluation question two:

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

**EQ2 KII with Representative of a Registered CSO
With Expertise in Service Delivery Issues Affecting Girls and Women**

(Baghdad, Najaf, Babil, Wasit, Diyala, Muthanna)

Estimated length of interview = 30 minutes

Date of Interview	
Name of Data Collector	
Name of Respondent	
Civil Society Organization	
Position of Respondent	
City and Province	
Telephone	
Email	
Male	
Female	

INTRODUCTION:

Thank you for meeting with me as part of the USAID evaluation of the USAID-Taquadum program. The results of this evaluation will provide lessons learned from the final implementation phase and provide specific programmatic recommendations for future USAID assistance.

CONFIDENTIALITY:

Everything we discuss is confidential. We do not share your name or anything that can be used to identify you with anyone outside of our evaluation team. We do not share information you provide with other people we are talking to for this evaluation. Although our internal report to USAID will include a list of everyone that we interviewed, the public version of the report does not include this list. Whatever you share with us will not have any impact at all on the level of support you receive now or are eligible to receive in the future.

Do you have any questions before we begin?

1002a. Do you believe that the general public/ordinary citizens understand what decentralization means/should mean for them in their daily lives?

Get the respondent to give you a clear-cut answer

	Code
--	------

Yes. The majority of Iraqis understand what decentralization means for them	☐	3
Some Iraqi do understand and others do not	☐	2
No. The majority of Iraqis do not understand what decentralization means for them	☐	1
I am not really sure/Do not know	☐	9

			Code
1002c. In your view, is decentralization mainly about service delivery?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

1002d. Please explain (give examples)

			Code
1300a. Do you know what a Service Delivery and Implementation Plan (an SDIP) is?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

			Code
1310. Did any directorate particularly seek out – or ask the CSO to seek out - the views of women, youth, minorities and other vulnerable populations in the design and implementation of the SDIPs/service delivery planning and implementation?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
	Do not Know	☐	3

1310a. How was such outreach conducted? Please give examples – Town Hall, flyers, TV, radio, Public Hearings? Where? At the Central GOI level in Baghdad, or in the relevant Province(s) or both?

1310b. Which of the above kinds of activities were most effective in reaching citizens and actually getting them involved?

1310c. What kind of information was shared with CSOs'/citizens regarding SDIP planning and implementation? Examples of information shared (for instance: day, time and topic of the event; selecting where a primary school should be built; what services should a primary clinic offer; ...)

			Code
1310d. Do you feel that citizen participation and feedback resulted in changes to proposed SDIPs?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

1310e. If YES, please give examples

1312. Which Directorate in your Province did the best job involving citizens in decision making and being responsive to citizen feedback by incorporating citizens feedback into decisions and implementation?

1313. To what degree do you feel citizens can access decision makers and decision-making processes focused on service delivery?

1314a. Do you feel citizens, citizen groups and CSOs were adequately included and consulted in the process of developing and implementing service delivery plans?

Adequately included	☐	3
Not adequately included	☐	2
Not included at all	☐	1

1314b. Please explain

Gender Considerations

			Code
1315a. Were women fairly represented among the citizens who participated in the SDIP planning and implementation process?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	9

1315b. Please explain

1315c. Roughly, what was the ratio of women to men? (e.g. more women, equal numbers, low numbers)

		Code
There were more women than men	☐	3
There were equal numbers of men and women	☐	2
There were less women than men	☐	1
Do not know/Not sure	☐	9

1315d. Were their views reflected in decisions made regarding service delivery planning and implementation?

Largely reflected	☐	3
Reflected to some extent	☐	2
Not reflected at all	☐	1

1311. Did the service delivery planning and implementation process take into account service provision designed to meet the unique needs of girls and women? Please give examples, for instance:

To a large extent	☐	3
To some extent	☐	2
Not at all	☐	1

1311b. Please explain/give examples (use the following examples to help the respondent)

Health

- Maternal health
- Single mothers and their children
- Victims of domestic violence
- Victims of Sex and Gender Based Violence

Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA)

- Pensions, e.g. for widowed women

- Employment and loan services tailored for women

Education

- Educational disparities between girls and boys

1316a. Was the process of service delivery planning and implementation fair, or did you see evidence of bias or corruption in the process?

		Code
Very fair	☐	3
Somewhat/to some extent fair	☐	2
Not fair	☐	1
Do not know/Not sure	☐	9

1316b. Please explain/give examples.

2.3 Focus group discussion guide on evaluation question two:

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE

EQ2 FGD

(Baghdad, Najaf, Babil, Wasit, Diyala, Muthanna)

Estimated length of interview = 2 Hours

Date of Interview	
Name of Data Collector	
City and Province	
No. of Males	
No. Females	

USE A SIGN IN SHEET TO GATHER NAMES, CONTACT INFORMATION AND OTHER DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION RE PARTICIPANTS, WHICH SHOULD BE 6-10 TOTAL.

INTRODUCTION:

Thank you for participating in this focus group discussion as part of the USAID evaluation of the USAID-Taqadum program. The results of this evaluation will provide lessons learned from the final implementation phase and provide specific programmatic recommendations for future USAID assistance.

CONFIDENTIALITY:

Everything we discuss is confidential. We do not share your names or anything that can be used to identify you with anyone outside of our evaluation team. We do not share information you provide with other people we are talking to for this evaluation. Although our internal report to USAID will include a list of everyone that we interviewed, the public version of the report does not include this list. Whatever you share with us will not have any impact at all on the level of support you receive now or are eligible to receive in the future.

Do you consent to participate in this focus group discussion? Yes.....No

Do you have any questions before we begin?

The enumerator must explain to the respondent 1) what Service Delivery Improvement Plans (**SDIPs**) are and 2) that the following questions are related to Service Delivery Improvement Plans (**SDIPs**).

1. Are you aware of how these SDIPs were implemented? If so, what did you see/observe?
2. Were you consulted/included by local government authorities in the process of developing SDIPs in your Province? If yes, how?
3. What are the highest priority services for your Province and do you feel the SDIPs addressed those priorities, or that your local government authorities have addressed those priorities?

4. Did you have the opportunity to have input into service delivery planning and implementation and, if yes, do you feel your voices, opinions, and needs as citizens were heard and incorporated into the design and implementation of SDIPs?
5. Do you feel local government officials are more accessible and responsive to citizens as a result of decentralization of service delivery? Please give examples to explain your answer.
6. Do you trust your local officials to be honest and fair? Please explain.
7. In your view, are your local officials competent in how they perform their duties and responsibilities?
8. Do you believe that decentralization is the key to improving local service delivery and will help resolve Iraq's problems? Why or why not?
9. Do you feel that certain groups or certain areas/neighborhoods receive better services than others? If yes, why do you believe this is true?
10. What results have you observed in service delivery because of SDIPs? And, in your view, what factors promoted these results and what factors impeded these results? In other words, what do you think made service delivery work well and what do you think made service delivery not work well?

2. Instruments used for data collection for evaluation question three

3.1 Key informant interview guide for Damage Assessment Trainees on evaluation question three:

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

Damage Assessment Trainees
(Ninawah – Salah ad Din – Anbar)

Estimated length of interview = 30 minutes

Date of Interview	
Name of Data Collector	
Name of Respondent	
Organization	
Department/Unit	
Position of Respondent	
City and Province	
Telephone	
Email	
Male	
Female	

INTRODUCTION:

Thank you for speaking with me as part of the USAID evaluation of the USAID-Taqadum program. The results of this evaluation will provide lessons learned from the final implementation phase and provide specific programmatic recommendations for future USAID assistance.

CONFIDENTIALITY:

Everything we discuss is confidential. We do not share your name or anything that can be used to identify you with anyone outside of our evaluation team. We do not share information you provide with other people we are talking to for this evaluation. Although our internal report to USAID will include a list of everyone that we interviewed, the public version of the report will not include this list. Whatever you share with us will not have any impact at all on the level of support you receive now or are eligible to receive in the future.

Do you have any questions before we begin?

1005. What was the nature of your cooperation/interaction with GSP/Taqadum (Tick all that applies):

		Code
Technical Assistance	☐	1
Capacity Building (e.g. training, workshops, ...)	☐	2

Mentoring	☐	3
Oversight of Committee/Task Force/Working Group	☐	4
Other (specify):	☐	5
Other (specify):	☐	6
Other (specify):	☐	7

3101. Could you please provide some details on the Damage Assessment training you received from GSP/Taqadum?

#	Date (mm/yy)	Name/Title of Training

3102. To what extent was the training to restore local governance in your province effective (in the sense that you have benefited from it and it helped you perform your job better)?

		Code
Very Effective	☐	1
Effective	☐	2
Not effective	☐	3
Not effective at all	☐	4

			Code
3103. As a result of this training on Damage Assessment, were you able to actually conduct Damage Assessment in your province and identify priority areas for plans and actions?	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

			Code
3104. In your opinion, was “Damage Assessment” the right topic/area of training to start with in building the capacity of provincial governments in your province?	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

			Code
3105. Were the sector specific damage assessment trainings used or linked to the identification of infrastructure projects by the UNDP?	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

			Code
3106a. In your opinion, were trainees selected on the basis of clear and objective criteria?	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

3106b. If answer is YES, what were these criteria?

1.

2.

3.

4.

			Code
3107a. In your opinion, was the process of selecting trainees transparent?	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

3107b. How were you selected for the training in Damage Assessment?

1.

2.

3.

4.

			Code
3108. In your opinion, did the training reach the right personnel?	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

			Code
3109. In your opinion, was the training fit for its purpose? That is, it covered the right issues for your particular Directorate and Province	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

			Code
3110a. Do you feel the damage assessment training resulted in the restoration of local governance and basic service delivery?	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

3110b. Why/how (either way)

			Code
3111a. Do you feel that the damage assessment trainings had a positive impact on the skills of local government officials?	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

3111b. Please give specific examples

			Code
3112a. Do you feel that the trainings contributed to the institutionalization of good practices by personnel who were trained?	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

3112b. Please give specific examples

3113. To what extent was the damage assessment training coordinated with immediate interventions by government/international organizations in your province (such as: disaster management; emergency services; security personnel (de-mining, exploded/unexploded ord.)?)

		Code
Very well coordinated	☐	1
Coordinated to some extent	☐	2
Not coordinated at all	☐	3

			Code
3114. Were humanitarian considerations included in the training?	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

3115. What do you think helped increase your provincial government (or directorate) capacity for damage assessments?

3116. What got in the way of increasing capacity for damage assessments?

3117a. In addition to Damage Assessment, did you also receive training from GSP/Taqadum in Public Financial Management (PMF)?	Yes	☐	Code
	No	☐	
			1
			2

3117b. If **YES**, could you please provide some details on the Public Financial Management (PFM) training you received from GSP/Taqadum?

#	Date (mm/yy)	Name/Title of Training	

3118. In your opinion, what would be the priority support required to restore local governance in your province?

3119. What should the focus of USAID assistance be now in your province?

3.2 Key informant interview guide for Public Financial Management (PFM) Trainees on evaluation question three:

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

Public Financial Management (PFM) Trainees (Ninawah – Salah ad Din – Anbar)

Estimated length of interview = 30 minutes

Date of Interview	
Name of Data Collector	
Name of Respondent	
Organization	
Department/Unit	
Position of Respondent	
City and Province	
Telephone	
Email	
Male	
Female	

INTRODUCTION:

Thank you for speaking with me as part of the USAID evaluation of the USAID-Taqadum program. The results of this evaluation will provide lessons learned from the final implementation phase and provide specific programmatic recommendations for future USAID assistance.

CONFIDENTIALITY:

Everything we discuss is confidential. We do not share your name or anything that can be used to identify you with anyone outside of our evaluation team. We do not share information you provide with other people we are talking to for this evaluation. Although our internal report to USAID will include a list of everyone that we interviewed, the public version of the report will not include this list. Whatever you share with us will not have any impact at all on the level of support you receive now or are eligible to receive in the future.

Do you have any questions before we begin?

1005. What was the nature of your cooperation/interaction with (Tick all that applies):

		Code
Technical Assistance	☐	1

Capacity Building (e.g. training, workshops, ...)	☐	2
Mentoring	☐	3
Oversight of Committee/Task Force/Working Group	☐	4
Other (specify):	☐	5
Other (specify):	☐	6
Other (specify):	☐	7

3201. Could you please provide some details on the Public Financial Management (PFM) training you received from GSP/Taqadum?

#	Date (mm/yy)	Name/Title of Training	

3202. To what extent was the training in Public Financial Management (PFM) effective (in the sense that you have benefited from it and it helped you perform your job better)?

		Code
Very Effective	☐	1
Effective	☐	2
Not effective	☐	3
Not effective at all	☐	4

			Code
3203. As a result of this training on Public Financial Management (PFM), are you currently able to actually manage public funds/budgets in your province and identify priority areas for budgeting?	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

			Code
3204. In your opinion, was Public Financial Management (PFM) the right topic/area of training to start with in building the capacity of provincial governments in your province?	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1
			Code
	Yes	☐	3

3205a. In your opinion, were trainees selected on the basis of clear and objective criteria?	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

3205b. If answer is YES, what were these criteria?

1.

2.

3.

4.

3206. In your opinion, was the process of selecting trainees transparent?			Code
	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

3207. How were you selected for the training in Public Financial Management (PFM)?

1.

2.

3.

4.

3208. In your opinion, did the training reach the right personnel?			Code
	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

3209. In your opinion, was the training fit for its purpose? That is, it covered the right issues for your particular Directorate and Province			Code
	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

			Code
	Yes	☐	3

3210a. Do you feel the Public Financial Management (PFM) training resulted in the restoration of local governance and basic service delivery?	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

3210b. Why/how (either way)

3211a. Do you feel that the Public Financial Management (PFM) trainings had a positive impact on the skills of local government officials?			Code
	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

3211b. Please give specific examples

3212a. Do you feel that the trainings contributed to the institutionalization of good practices by personnel who were trained?			Code
	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

3212b. Please give specific examples

3213. To what extent was the training in Public Financial Management (PFM) coordinated with immediate interventions by government/international organizations in your province (such as: disaster management; emergency services; security personnel (de-mining, exploded/unexploded ord.))?

		Code
Very well coordinated	☐	1
Coordinated to some extent	☐	2
Not coordinated at all	☐	3

			Code
3214. Were humanitarian considerations included in the training?	Yes	☐	3
	Don't know/Not Sure	☐	2
	No	☐	1

3215. What do you think helped increase your provincial government (or directorate) capacity for Public Financial Management (PFM)?

3216. What got in the way of increasing capacity for Public Financial Management (PFM)?

			Code
3217a. In addition to Public Financial Management (PMF), did you also receive training from GSP/Taqadum in Damage Assessment?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2

3217b. If **YES**, could you please provide some details on the Damage Assessment training you received from GSP/Taqadum?

#	Date (mm/yy)	Name/Title of Training	

3218. In your opinion, what would be the priority support required to restore local governance in your province?

3219. What should the focus of USAID assistance be now in your province?

ANNEX K: GOVERNMENT LETTERS ANALYSIS

Methodology

As part of the Taqadum evaluation, the implementing partner provided to IBTCI what they termed “government letters,” which are summaries of Government of Iraq communications regarding decentralization. These summaries were included in the project’s quarterly reports to USAID. These communiques were intended to provide evidence of communication between different levels and branches of government and the ministries slated for decentralization, as per Article 45, Law 21 of 2008, and the Iraqi Constitution. These government letters, summarized in English, describe the activity or action described, as well as their source and destination. As part of this evaluation, the team analyzed the letters for recurring themes and trends, including challenges, obstacles and successes and compiled each entry into an excel database.

The methodological process for this analysis began by coding as follows:

- identifying each letter as a letter or administrative order;
- assigning a number, in order by Quarterly Performance Report and by giving each a number to numerically differentiate one from another and to recall individually for analysis;
- noting dates when they were given;
- identifying senders, the point of origin for each letter, the position of the sender, name, and

entity (including level of government, e.g.: Federal or Provincial). For non-federal senders, the province of origin was noted for analysis by region.¹⁴⁰ similarly noting recipients, including the respective level of government, province if applicable, official position and names.

Each letter was then coded for type of action taken, for example an executive order or a call for a meeting. Every communication was then divided into the broad sector being decentralized, whether overall governance, health, etc., as well as each narrower function being decentralized, such as staffing or budgeting or revenue. Policy areas were also assigned in broader strokes, for example if a letter indicated a new legal policy or new service delivery mechanism. Indicators such as civil

society engagement, public participation and inclusion were also tracked if a letter indicated that the populace was engaged or to be engaged. Another simple way of coding was via a simple question of a change in practice: for example, was there indeed suggestion of change regarding Law 21? This was tracked in binary “yes” or “no” format. Lastly, each letter was given a single- or multiple key words



¹⁴⁰ Provinces were labelled in the summaries except for Al-Qadissiya which was called simply Diwaniyah. This was changed back into Al-Qadissiya in the coding and analysis for consistency and ease of reference.

for coding for larger trends and, following Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources F Indicators, including gender segregation.


Challenges There was an array of challenges that marked coding these government letters, including the quality of translation, transliteration, unclear content and muddled sender/recipient relationships when multiple letters were grouped and summarized together. The database would have benefitted from more thorough descriptions of each letter as opposed to summaries of varying qualities from different writers and translators. The letters also posed issues in consistency and

clarity in many places, including multiple spellings of similar names and provinces.

Government Letter Findings


Although these letters cannot answer our Evaluation Questions (EQ) directly, there is evidence that speaks to each question in a meaningful way and illuminates the rest of this evaluation. The letters do address certain themes,

Level of Government Letters were Sent from



allowing some trends and challenges to be teased out of the data.

Level of Government Letters were Sent to




The majority of letters, see above, were sent from the provincial level and were received, see below, at the provincial level. However, given provincial dominance of these letters, the newly liberated regions of Ninewa, Anbar and Salah al-Din are distinctly underrepresented. Of all the letters that originated from the provinces, only 7.5% of the letters originated from these three provinces, and only


4.1% of all letters addressed to the provinces were sent to these three provinces. Thus, we see a distinct lack of official activity in these post-conflict areas. This is likely because of the ongoing insecurity in those provinces due to violent conflict with ISIS from 2014 - 2017.

The themes are these letters are unequivocal, and represent the most major hurdles for decentralization in Iraq, both at a provincial and federal level. The plurality of the letters indicated

Provincial Senders



Selected Function Decentralized




issues related to financial framework issues, including budgets, revenue collection and banking. The functions that are being decentralized and devolved indicate what should be apparent: the authority and responsibility for funding and often times an unwillingness to let go of such control. A plurality of functions described in the letters are related to Basic Service Delivery and Service Delivery Implementation Plans, but the majority of functions are related to finance, revenue, banking, and budget as well. A very low proportion of the letters related to decentralization legal framework issues such as resolution of conflicting laws. Beyond functions, the evaluation team also coded the letters into key-words, or “themes”. In this case, both the plurality and majority of letters are coded into financial categories, as opposed to Basic Service Delivery or SDIPs.

As shown above, a plurality of actions taken in letters were non-legislative reform, at 32%, followed by an administrative order at 27%. These actions coded as reform encompass changes that

were seemingly adopted or were a step toward adoption as part of the pursuit of decentralization of the federal government.


The Government Letters' Decentralization Dialogue

Types of Actions Indicated




These Government Letters paint a picture of what decentralization has looked like for the ministerial functions of the Iraqi government. It illustrates a tumultuous road beset with challenges both complex and confused. Iraq's checkered reality is reflected in the nature of the letters, this should be no surprise. What is a surprise, however, is within the limited context of these letters there is hope for change: 93% of letters indicated a change in practice while 7% indicating a pre-Law 21 status-quo. There is widespread acceptance and understanding of the devolution of power in Iraq. While many of these letters do not indicate a *particular identifiable output*, this 93% indication is a sign of acknowledgement of the new federalization of authority.

Provincial Recipients



Quick Fact: Only 5 letters of 483 indicated a female sender or recipient



In regard to Evaluation Question 1b, some letters do show high-level changes in function. For example, in an un-demarcated letter dated November 30th, 2015, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) requested that Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi approve MOLSA's plan to decentralize, while letter 4606, dated May 5, 2016, the province of Muthanna announced its readiness to assume responsibility for transferred functions. Furthermore, in another unnumbered letter dated December 30th, 2015, the Governor of Basrah requested that the Ministry of Finance (MOF) open new bank accounts for the provincial government, which agreed a month later. One of the largest problems encountered in this data set is that of finance and banking, with federal ministries reluctant or unwilling to devolve into the provincial level, though there are clearly instances where financial obligations are successfully transferred. Despite this, finance is not the only problem troubling the decentralization process. In letter 4718, Karbala Governor Aqeel Al-Turaihi notified the High Council for Coordination Among the Provinces (HCCP) that the Ministry of Education failed to devolve some functions it had promised it would in Administrative Order 2687. This is repeated, for example, in letter 136, when previously transferred functions were brought back until the fold of the federal ministry.

As a function of analyzing of Evaluation Questions 1c and 2 c, only 5.4% of the letters contained any allusion to civil society engagement, public participation (even via social media) or inclusion, a disappointingly low number given the potential and oft-mentioned revamping of provincial internet communications.

As for EQ3, and the newly liberated provinces, there was some friction in restoration of governance and service delivery, as alluded to in the qualitative data and the sore underrepresented provinces of Anbar, Ninawa and Salah al-Din. These problems are illustrated in the below summary of letters:

“Anbar, Ninawa, Salah al-Din Immediately following the COMSEC’s issuance of Decision No. 141 of 2016 dated May 17, 2016, the second item, ordering the postponement “due to the precarious security situation” of the transfer of Ministerial functions to the provinces affected by ISIL terrorist activities (Anbar, Ninawa, and Salah al-Din), respective GO and PC officials responded by sending letters of their own to COMSEC objecting to this delay. (Note: COMSEC’s order was followed by HCCP letter No. 10/1.5.14128 dated May 19, that asked all Ministries involved in Article 45 of Law 21, as amended, to take all action necessary to implement Decision No. 141.) The first to object was Anbar Governor Suhaib Mahmood, who in letter No. 2364 dated May 26, asked that the second item of COMSEC’s Decision No.141 calling for the postponement of the functions transfer be canceled. He pointed to the fact that thanks to Anbar officials attending workshops hosted by the HCCP, in cooperation with GSP/Taqadum, Anbar is prepared to transfer the functions and had already adopted a mechanism to do so. Next, in letter No. 311 dated May 29, Salah al-Din Governor Ahmed Al-Jubouri, not only echoed Governor Suhaib’s objection and request to cancel this paragraph, but also informed COMSEC that thanks to the HCCP/GSP/Taqadum-hosted workshops, his province had also adopted a transfer mechanism and was ready to transfer the functions. Days later, Ninawa PC Chair, Mr. Bashar Al-Kiki, in letter No. 234 dated June 2, 2016, asked the Council of Ministers to reconsider its decision to postpone the transfer of functions and instead, treat Anbar, Ninawa, and Salah al-Din equally with the other provinces. According to Chair Al-Kiki, Ninawa currently has 13 districts and sub-districts that are under complete local government control (not under Islamic State terrorist control). All are in dire need of services and management, and any transfer postponement in Anbar, Ninawa, and Salah al-Din will not only negatively affect local government performance in the areas not under Islamic State terrorist control, but also weaken local government’s preparation efforts to administer the province post liberation. Chair Al-Kiki stressed that if the actual transfer of authorities Directorate of Educations not occur until 2017, the delay will negatively impact provincial Directorates currently working on meeting function transfer requirements, and recommended that the foundational work of finalizing the basic administrative and financial requirements needed for the transfer begin immediately. These letters highlight the contrast between Federal calls for the delay due to security issues, and provincial appeals that say delays to implement decentralization due to security issues will in fact only work to negatively impact the delivery of services to citizens in these provinces, and adversely affect their lives.”

ANNEX L: EVALUATION QUESTION 2 CHARTS




Chart 1: To what extent has potable water supply to your home/house improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago? (n= 2,400)




Chart 2: To what extent has the quality of potable water you get at your home/house through the network improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago? (n= 2,380)




Chart 3: To what extent has the sewer system in your area improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago? (n= 2,400)




Chart 4: To what extent has the condition of roads in your city/town/village (pavement conditions, sidewalks, etc. not traffic-related) improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago? (n= 2,400)




Chart 5: To what extent has solid waste/disposal/garbage collection improved in your area, compared to what it was 1 year ago? (n= 2,400)




Chart 6: During the past year, has a new primary health care center been built/established in your area, or an existing service been renovated/refurbished/upgraded? (n= 2,400)




Chart 7: To what extent have the quality of primary health care centers in your area improved, compared to 1 year ago? (n= 2,400)




Chart 8: During the past year, has a new primary school been built/established in your area, or an existing school been renovated/refurbished/upgraded? (n= 802)




Chart 9: To what extent has the quality of primary education your children are receiving improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago (n= 802)




Chart 10: Do you know what a Service Delivery Implementation Plan (SDIP) is? (n= 2,400)




Chart 11: I could easily find clear and accurate information about the services provincial directorates provide (n= 2,400)




Chart 12: I could easily access [any] provincial government service I need [locating the service and being able to access it are different especially for PWD or women] (n= 2,400)




Chart 13: I got clear and accurate information and instructions about the service I was seeking [i.e., process, forms to fill, fees to pay, and any requirements to obtain a service] (n= 2,400)




Chart 14: Provincial government staff [in the directorate] were knowledgeable and competent (n= 2,400)




Chart 15: The service that I got from provincial directorates met my needs (n = 2,400)




Chart 16: In the last year, did you file any complaint with any directorate in your province? (n = 2, 400)




Chart 17: On average, do you believe the provincial directorate(s) dealt with your complaint(s) in a fair and objective manner? (n = 416)




Chart 18: Do you know of others who filed complaints and received a different response? (n = 2, 400)




Chart 19: In your opinion, and to the best of your knowledge, do you see that certain groups or certain areas/neighborhoods receive better services than others? (n = 398)




Chart 20: The fees/money I pay to the provincial government is used properly (i.e., to provide better services for citizens) (n= 2,400)




Chart 21: Provincial government is now more responsive to the needs of citizens than it used to be (n = 2,400)




Chart 22: Do you have the opportunity to have input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government, given limited financial resources (n = 2, 400)




Chart 23: Provincial government conduct their business in a more open and accountable manner than they used to (n = 2,400)




Chart 24: Do you know what a Service Delivery Implementation Plan (SDIP) is? (n = 2,400)




Chart 25: Did you participate in the design of an SDIP for your area/province? (n= 190)




Chart 26: Were you involved in the implementation of the SDIP? (n= 190)




Chart 27: To what extent has potable water supply to your home/house improved, compared to what it was one year ago versus Knowledge about SDIPs (n = 2,400)




Chart 28: To what extent has the quality of potable water you get at your home/house through the network improved, compared to what it was one year ago? versus Knowledge about SDIPs (n = 2,380)




Chart 29: Q.303 To what extent has the sewer system in your area improved, compared to what it was one year ago? versus Knowledge about SDIPs




Chart 30: To what extent has the condition of roads in your city/town/village (pavement conditions, sidewalks, etc. not traffic-related) improved, compared to what it was one year ago? versus Knowledge about SDIPs




Chart 31: To what extent has solid waste/disposal/garbage collection improved in your area, compared to what it was one year ago? versus Knowledge about SDIPs




Chart 32: During the past year, has a new primary health care center been built/established in your area, or an existing service been renovated/refurbished/upgraded? versus Knowledge about SDIPs




Chart 33: To what extent have the quality of primary health care centers in your area improved, compared to one year ago? versus Knowledge about SDIPs (n = 2,400)




Chart 34: During the past year, has a new primary school been built/established in your area, or an existing school been renovated/refurbished/upgraded? versus Knowledge about SDIPs (n = 802)




Chart 35: To what extent has the quality of primary education your children are receiving improved, compared to what it was one year ago? versus Knowledge about SDIPs (n = 802)




Chart 36: During the past year, did you have any direct and personal interaction/dealing with any directorate in your province? (e.g., to issue a permit, license, birth certificate, request a service, file a complaint, etc.) versus Knowledge about SDIPs (n = 2, 400)




Chart 37: I could easily find clear and accurate information about the services provincial directorates provide versus Knowledge about SDIPs (n = 2, 400)




Chart38: I could easily access [any] provincial government service I need versus Knowledge about SDIPs (n = 2, 400)




Chart 39: I got clear and accurate information and instructions about the service I was seeking versus Knowledge about SDIPs (n = 2, 400)




Chart 40: Provincial government staff [in the directorate] were knowledgeable and competent versus Knowledge about SDIPs (n = 2, 400)




Chart 41: The service that I got from provincial directorates met my needs versus Knowledge about SDIPs (n = 2, 400)




Chart 42: Provincial government is now more responsive to the needs of citizens than it used to be versus Knowledge about SDIPs (n = 2, 400)




Chart 43: Do you have the opportunity to have input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government, given limited financial resources versus Knowledge about SDIPs




Chart 44: In your opinion, to what extent were your voice, opinions, and needs as a woman/widow/ youth/ PWD/IDP/returnee etc. that you contributed in the design/implementation process of SDIP heard and taken into account? (n= 190)




Chart 43: Do you have the opportunity to have input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government, given limited financial resources? (Knowledge about SDIPs)




Chart 44: In your opinion, to what extent were your voice, opinions, and needs as a woman/widow/ youth/ PWD/IDP/returnee etc. that you contributed in the design/implementation process of SDIP heard and taken into account? (n= 190)

ANNEX LL: EVALUATION QUESTION 2 TABLES

Table 1: In your opinion, to what extent were the services included/targeted in this Service Delivery Improvement Plan (SDIP) the priority ones for your area/province? (Asked of the 190 who know about SDIPs)

Opinion on priority of SDIPs in the provinces	Frequency	Percent
None of the priority services	18	9
Among (some of) the lower priority services	39	21
Among (some of) the highest priority services	84	44
The highest priority services	49	26
Total	190	100

Table 2: To what extent has potable water supply to your home/house improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago?

Availability of potable water supply	Frequency	Percent
Became considerably worse	233	10
Became worse	388	16
Neutral (same as was 1 year ago)	1053	44
Improved slightly	584	24
Improved Considerably	122	5
Does not apply (not connected)	20	1
Total	2,400	100

Table 3: To what extent has the quality of potable water you get at your home/house through the network improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago?

Quality of potable water	Frequency	Percent
Became considerably worse	139	6
Became worse	665	28
Neutral (same as was 1 year ago)	1,055	44
Improved slightly	441	19
Improved Considerably	80	3
Total	2,380	100

Table 4: To what extent has the sewer system in your area improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago?

Improvement in sewer system	Frequency	Percent
Became considerably worse	301	13
Became worse	465	19
Neutral (same as was 1 year ago)	931	39
Improved slightly	417	17

Improved Considerably	123	5
Does not apply (not connected)	163	7
Total	2,400	100

Table 5: To what extent has the condition of roads in your city/town/village (pavement conditions, sidewalks, etc. not traffic-related) improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago?

Improvement in conditions of roads	Frequency	Percent
Became considerably worse	187	8
Became worse	643	27
Neutral (same as was 1 year ago)	819	34
Improved slightly	527	22
Improved Considerably	224	9
Total	2,400	100

Table 6: To what extent has solid waste/disposal/garbage collection improved in your area, compared to what it was 1 year ago?

Improvement in solid waste/disposal/garbage collection	Frequency	Percent
Became considerably worse	266	11
Became worse	537	23
Neutral (same as was 1 year ago)	895	37
Improved slightly	586	24
Improved Considerably	116	5
Total	2,400	100

Table 7: During the past year, has a new primary health care center been built/ established in your area, or an existing service been renovated/ refurbished/ upgraded?

Building/Establishment of a new primary health care center	Frequency	Percent
Yes	472	20
No	1,928	80
Total	2,400	100

Table 8: To what extent have the quality of primary health care centers in your area improved, compared to one year ago?

Quality of primary health care centers	Frequency	Percent
Became considerably worse	211	9
Became worse	624	26
Neutral (same as was 1 year ago)	906	38
Improved slightly	560	23
Improved Considerably	99	4
Total	2,400	100

Table 9: During the past year, has a new primary school been built/established in your area, or an existing school been renovated/refurbished/upgraded?

Building/establishment or renovation/refurbishing /upgrading of a new primary school	Frequency	Percent
Yes	164	20
No	638	80
Total	802	100

Table 10: To what extent has the quality of primary education your children are receiving improved, compared to what it was 1 year ago?

Quality of primary education that children are receiving	Frequency	Percent
Became considerably worse	88	11
Became worse	244	30
Neutral (same as was 1 year ago)	294	37
Improved slightly	153	19
Improved Considerably	23	3
Total	802	100

Table 11: During the past year, did you have any direct and personal interaction/dealing with any directorate in your province? (e.g., to issue a permit, license, birth certificate, request a service, file a complaint, etc.)

Direct and personal interaction/dealing with any directorate	Frequency	Percent
Yes	758	32
No	1,642	68
Total	2,400	100

Table 12: I could easily find clear and accurate information about the services provincial directorates provide

Easily find clear and accurate information about the services	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	176	7
Disagree	1,421	59
Agree	760	32
Strongly agree	43	2
Total	2,400	100

Table 13: I could easily access [any] provincial government service I need

Easy access to [any] provincial government service needed	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	178	7
Disagree	1366	57
Agree	809	34
Strongly agree	47	2
Total	2400	100

Table 14: I got clear and accurate information and instructions about the service I was seeking

Clarity and accuracy of information and instructions about sought service	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	195	8
Disagree	1,409	59
Agree	750	31
Strongly agree	46	2
Total	2,400	100

Table 15: Provincial government staff [in the directorate] were knowledgeable and competent

Knowledgeable and competent of provincial government staff [in the directorate]	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	283	12
Disagree	1,236	51
Agree	838	35
Strongly agree	43	2
Total	2,400	100

Table 16: The service that I got from provincial directorates met my needs

Service provided by provincial directorates met needs	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	349	14
Disagree	1,240	52
Agree	760	32
Strongly agree	51	2
Total	2,400	100

Table 17: I was treated fairly * Gender * (crosstabulation)

	Response	Gender		Total
		Male	Female	
I was treated fairly	Strongly Disagree	208 (9%)	139 (6%)	347 (15%)
	Disagree	684 (29%)	582 (24%)	1,266 (53%)
	Agree	396 (16%)	344 (14%)	740 (30%)
	Strongly agree	31 (1%)	20 (1%)	51 (2%)
Total		1,319 (55%)	1,085 (45%)	2,404 (100%)

Table 18: I was treated fairly * Age Group * (crosstabulation)

	Response	Age Group					Total
		Youth (18 - 29)	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 or above	
I was treated fairly	Strongly Disagree	134 (6%)	66 (3%)	65 (3%)	51 (2%)	31 (1%)	347 (15%)
	Disagree	551 (23%)	296 (12%)	223 (9%)	132 (6%)	60 (3%)	1,262 (53%)
	Agree	322 (13%)	193 (8%)	123 (5%)	68 (3%)	34 (1%)	740 (30%)
	Strongly agree	27 (1%)	13 (1%)	4 (0%)	5 (0%)	2 (0%)	51 (2%)
Total		1034 (43%)	568 (24%)	415 (17%)	256 (11%)	127 (5%)	2400 (100%)

Table 19: I was treated fairly * Religion * (crosstabulation)

	Response	Religion						Total
		Shia	Sunni	Yazidi	Christian	I abstain	Other	
I was treated fairly	Strongly Disagree	231 (10%)	66 (3%)	1 (0%)	2 (0%)	45 (2%)	2 (0%)	347 (15%)
	Disagree	843 (35%)	277 (11%)	4 (0%)	18 (1%)	116 (5%)	4 (0%)	1,262 (52%)
	Agree	522 (22%)	147 (6%)	5 (0%)	9 (0%)	57 (2%)	0 (0%)	740 (31%)
	Strongly agree	32 (1%)	15 (1%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (0%)	0 (0%)	51 (2%)
	Total	1,628 (68%)	505 (21%)	10 (0%)	29 (1%)	222 (9%)	6 (0%)	2,400 (100%)

Table 20: I was treated fairly * Ethnicity * (crosstabulation)

	Response	Ethnicity				Total
		Arab	Kurds	Turkman	Other	
I was treated fairly	Strongly Disagree	323 (14%)	16 (1%)	8 (0%)	0 (0%)	347 (15%)
	Disagree	1,129 (47%)	51 (2%)	73 (3%)	9 (0%)	1,262 (52%)
	Agree	670 (28%)	33 (1%)	34 (2%)	3 (0%)	740 (31%)
	Strongly agree	45 (2%)	2 (0%)	4 (0%)	0 (0%)	51 (2%)
	Total	2,167 (91%)	102 (4%)	119 (5%)	12 (1%)	2,400 (100%)

Table 21: I was treated fairly * Vulnerable Groups – Self-Identification* (crosstabulation)

I was treated fairly	Response	Vulnerable Groups – Self-Identification			Total
		IDPs	Returnee	Local Resident	
	Strongly Disagree	37 (2%)	3 (0%)	307 (13%)	347 (15%)
	Disagree	130 (5%)	33 (1%)	1,099 (46%)	1,262 (53%)
	Agree	58 (2%)	13 (1%)	669 (28%)	740 (31%)
	Strongly agree	2 (0%)	0 (0%)	49 (2%)	51 (2%)
Total		227 (9%)	49 (2%)	2,124 (89%)	2,400 (100%)

Table 22: I was treated fairly * Do you have/suffer from any disability?* (crosstabulation)

I was treated fairly	Response	Do you have/suffer from any disability?		Total
		Yes	No	
	Strongly Disagree	66 3%	281 12%	347 15%
	Disagree	191 8%	1,071 45%	1,262 53%
	Agree	105 4%	635 26%	740 30%
	Strongly agree	12 0%	39 2%	51 2%
Total		374 15%	2,026 85%	2,400 100%

Table 23: During the past year, did you have any direct and personal interaction/dealing with any directorate in your province? (e.g., to issue a permit, license, birth certificate, request a service, file a complaint, etc.)

Direct and personal interaction/dealing with any directorate	Frequency	Percent
Yes	758	32
No	1,642	68
Total	2,400	100

Table 24: Ministry interacted/dealt with in the last one year (n = 758)

Ministry interacted/dealt with in the last one year	Case	Percent
Youth and Sports	235	31
Municipality and Public Works	199	26
Not applicable/Not Aware	133	18
Education	128	17
Health	95	13
Construction and Housing	69	9
Agriculture	62	8
Labor and Social Affairs	58	8

Table 25: Directorate interacted/dealt with in the last one year (n = 758)

Directorate interacted/dealt with in the last one year	Case	Percent
Water	240	32
Agriculture	229	30
Building	129	17
Municipalities	83	11
Not applicable/Not Aware	74	10
Employment and Loan	67	9
Housing	57	8
Roads and Bridges	45	6
Vocational Training Center	38	5
Labor and Social Affairs	32	4
Planning and Follow-Up	21	3
Disability and Special Needs	17	2
Sewer	16	2
National Center for Health and Occupational Safety	8	1
Municipality	6	1
Youth and Sports	5	1
Urban Planning	1	0

Table 26: Efficiency and effectiveness of directorates interacted/dealt with in performance of their duties
(n = 735)

Efficiency and effectiveness of directorate	Case	Percent
Agriculture	322	44
Water	148	20
Building	88	12
Municipalities	64	9
Housing	60	8
Employment and Loan	58	8
Vocational Training Center	33	5
Roads and Bridges	29	4
Labor and Social Affairs	26	4
Planning and Follow-Up	18	2
Disability and Special Needs	17	2
Sewer	14	2
National Center for Health and Occupational Safety	11	2
Municipality	7	1
Urban Planning	2	0

Table 27: I could easily find clear and accurate information about the services provincial directorates provide

Easily find clear and accurate information about the services	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	176	7
Disagree	1,421	59
Agree	760	32
Strongly agree	43	2
Total	2,400	100

Table 28: I could easily access [any] provincial government service I need

Easy access to [any] provincial government service needed	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	178	7
Disagree	1366	57
Agree	809	34
Strongly agree	47	2
Total	2400	100

Table 29: I got clear and accurate information and instructions about the service I was seeking

Clarity and accuracy of information and instructions about sought service	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	195	8
Disagree	1,409	59
Agree	750	31
Strongly agree	46	2
Total	2,400	100

Table 30: Provincial government staff [in the directorate] were knowledgeable and competent

Knowledgeable and competent of provincial government staff [in the directorate]	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	283	12
Disagree	1,236	51
Agree	838	35
Strongly agree	43	2
Total	2,400	100

Table 31: The service that I got from provincial directorates met my needs

Service provided by provincial directorates met needs	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	349	14
Disagree	1,240	52
Agree	760	32
Strongly agree	51	2
Total	2,400	100

Table 32: Provincial government is now more responsive to the needs of citizens than it used to be

Responsiveness of provincial government to the needs of citizens than it used to be	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	521	22
Do not know	606	25
Disagree	403	17
Agree	334	14
Strongly agree	19	1
There has been no change	517	21
Total	2,400	100

Table 33: Do you have the opportunity to have input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government, given limited financial resources

Opportunity to have input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government	Frequency	Percent
Yes	226	9
No	2,174	91
Total	2,400	100

Table 34: Did you participate in the design of an SDIP for your area/province? (Asked of the 190 who know about SDIPs)

Participation in the design of SDIPs	Frequency	Percent
Yes	42	22
No	148	78
Total	190	100

Table 35: Were you involved in the implementation of the SDIP? (Asked of the 190 who know about SDIPs)

Participation in implementation of SDIPs	Frequency	Percent
Yes	58	31
No	132	69
Total	190	100

Table 36: In your opinion, to what extent were your voice, opinions, and needs as a woman/widow/ youth/ PWD/IDP/returnee etc. that you contributed in the design/ implementation process of SDIP heard and taken into account? (Asked of the 190 who know about SDIPs)

Extent to which respondents' voice, opinions, and needs contributed in the design/implementation process of SDIP	Frequency	Percent
Not considered/taken into account	73	38
Somewhat considered/taken into account	81	43
Largely taken into account	20	11
Not sure/ Do not know	16	8
Total	190	100

Table 37: Do you have the opportunity to have input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government, given limited financial resources

Opportunity to have input in deciding what the priorities should be for provincial government	Frequency	Percent
Yes	226	9
No	2,174	91
Total	2,400	100

Table 38: Provincial government conduct their business in a more open and accountable manner than they used to

Provincial government conduct their business in a more open and accountable manner	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	542	23
Do not know	783	33
Disagree	358	15
Agree	289	12
Strongly agree	12	0
There has been no change	416	17
Total	2,400	100

Table 39: The fees/money I pay to the provincial government is used properly

Fees/money paid to the provincial government is used properly	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	745	31
Disagree	661	28
Agree	237	10
Strongly agree	13	0
Not applicable/Not Aware	744	31
Total	2,400	100

Table 40: I was treated fairly

Fair treatment	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	347	14
Disagree	1,262	53
Agree	740	31
Strongly agree	51	2
Total	2,400	100

Table 41: I was treated fairly * Gender * (crosstabulation)

	Response	Gender		Total
		Male	Male	
I was treated fairly	Strongly Disagree	208 (9%)	139 (6%)	347 (15%)
	Disagree	684 (29%)	582 (24%)	1,266 (53%)
	Agree	396 (16%)	344 (14%)	740 (30%)
	Strongly agree	31 (1%)	20 (1%)	51 (2%)
Total		1,319 (55%)	1,085 (45%)	2,404 (100%)

Table 42: I was treated fairly * Age Group * (crosstabulation)

	Response	Age Group					Total
		Youth (18 - 29)	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 or above	
I was treated fairly	Strongly Disagree	134 (6%)	66 (3%)	65 (3%)	51 (2%)	31 (1%)	347 (15%)
	Disagree	551 (23%)	296 (12%)	223 (9%)	132 (6%)	60 (3%)	1,262 (53%)
	Agree	322 (13%)	193 (8%)	123 (5%)	68 (3%)	34 (1%)	740 (30%)
	Strongly agree	27 (1%)	13 (1%)	4 (0%)	5 (0%)	2 (0%)	51 (2%)
Total		1034 (43%)	568 (24%)	415 (17%)	256 (11%)	127 (5%)	2400 (100%)

Table 43: I was treated fairly * Religion * (crosstabulation)

	Response	Religion						Total
		Shia	Sunni	Yazidi	Christian	I abstain	Other	
I was treated fairly	Strongly Disagree	231 (10%)	66 (3%)	1 (0%)	2 (0%)	45 (2%)	2 (0%)	347 (15%)
	Disagree	843 (35%)	277 (11%)	4 (0%)	18 (1%)	116 (5%)	4 (0%)	1,262 (52%)
	Agree	522 (22%)	147 (6%)	5 (0%)	9 (0%)	57 (2%)	0 (0%)	740 (31%)
	Strongly agree	32 (1%)	15 (1%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (0%)	0 (0%)	51 (2%)
	Total	1,628 (68%)	505 (21%)	10 (0%)	29 (1%)	222 (9%)	6 (0%)	2,400 (100%)

Table 44: I was treated fairly * Ethnicity * (crosstabulation)

	Response	Ethnicity				Total
		Arab	Kurds	Turkman	Other	
I was treated fairly	Strongly Disagree	323 (14%)	16 (1%)	8 (0%)	0 (0%)	347 (15%)
	Disagree	1,129 (47%)	51 (2%)	73 (3%)	9 (0%)	1,262 (52%)
	Agree	670 (28%)	33 (1%)	34 (2%)	3 (0%)	740 (31%)
	Strongly agree	45 (2%)	2 (0%)	4 (0%)	0 (0%)	51 (2%)
	Total	2,167 (91%)	102 (4%)	119 (5%)	12 (1%)	2,400 (100%)

Table 45: I was treated fairly * Vulnerable Groups – Self-Identification* (crosstabulation)

	Response	Vulnerable Groups – Self-Identification			Total
		IDPs	Returnee	Local Resident	
I was treated fairly	Strongly Disagree	37 (2%)	3 (0%)	307 (13%)	347 (15%)
	Disagree	130 (5%)	33 (1%)	1,099 (46%)	1,262 (53%)
	Agree	58 (2%)	13 (1%)	669 (28%)	740 (31%)
	Strongly agree	2 (0%)	0 (0%)	49 (2%)	51 (2%)
Total		227 (9%)	49 (2%)	2,124 (89%)	2,400 (100%)

Table 46: I was treated fairly * Do you have/suffer from any disability?* (crosstabulation)

	Response	Do you have/suffer from any disability?		Total
		Yes	No	
I was treated fairly	Strongly Disagree	66 3%	281 12%	347 15%
	Disagree	191 8%	1,071 45%	1,262 53%
	Agree	105 4%	635 26%	740 30%
	Strongly agree	12 0%	39 2%	51 2%
Total		374 15%	2,026 85%	2,400 100%

Table 47: To what extent do you agree, or disagree, with the following statement: Improving services delivery will help resolve the Iraqi conflict/Iraq's problem/help democracy in Iraq

Perception on improving services delivery for resolving the Iraqi conflict/Iraq's problem/help democracy in Iraq	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	13	1
Disagree	249	10
Agree	1,323	55
Strongly agree	815	34
Total	2,400	100

ANNEX M: SDIP EXCERPTS TRANSLATIONS

Province	Ministry/Directorate	Service	Plan fully structured	Date plan finished	Challenges of the plan (Weakness)	Enabling Env. of the province from report (strength points)
Baghdad	MoLSA/ work and social affairs	Al-Mu_tasim Vocational Training Center	Yes	Apr-17	1. No guarantees for employing and hiring of courses' graduates in the public and private sectors. 2. Some training curricula are obsolete and do not keeping up with the labor market. 3. Some trainers need development courses to cope with the development of the labor market. 4. The lack of the training or public centers at the districts and suburbs. 5. The lack of some specialized equipment required to keep pace with the labor market (Argon welding machines). 6. Weakness of the media side. 7. There is staff shortage in some of the technical disciplines.	1. The presence of different specialized workshops and a good engineering and technical staff. 2. Give professional certification. 3. Grant the trainees a financial reward of (5000) five thousand dinars for each training day. 4. Location of geographical center. 5. The existence of an operational financial budget to sustain and continue the work of the workshops. 6. The existence of pilot courses about small business management for all interested. 7. The existence of large areas can be exploited for future expansion. 8. The presence of a voluntary teamwork.
Baghdad	MoLSA/ work and social affairs	Al-Waleed Vocational Training Center	Yes	Apr-17	1. Limited administrative and financial powers. 2. Typical training curriculum. 3. The Lack of training requirements for workshops having continuous courses with high attendance. 4. The lack of some training equipment, outdated tools and legends for some workshops. 5. The lack of specialized courses for trainers to suit labor market and technological development. 6. Not allowing trainees to participate in more than one vocational course to meet labor market needs growing of new professions and the fading of others. 7. Separation of the apprentice due absence and not allowed to participate even though the existence of a legitimate excuse. 8. Lack of support for well doing centers attracting and graduating a large number of unemployed from courses carried out during the year.	1. Successful management of human and material resources. 2. Provide an efficient training staff for all workshops. 3. Provide good training workshops equipped with means of clarification (smart board). 4. The unique geographical location of the center with gardens, plants and cafeteria. 5. To develop desired jobs at labor market and design related curriculum. 6. Availability of training courses throughout the year. 7. Provide a maintenance workshop for photocopy machines at the vocational training centers. 8. Apply occupational safety standards.
Baghdad	Education/ Karkh2	Education Karkh 2 dir.	Yes	Feb-15	1 - Interaction of tasks between sections at the Directorate and its difference at the other directorates. 2. The sections of the Directorate are scattered due to the lack of modern building for it. 3. Multiple decision-making sources. 4. The privacy of the Baghdadi community and the demographic coloration. 5. Low rates for school enrollment. 6. Lack of school buildings and the inadequate and the insufficient existing ones. 7. Poor distribution of educational and teaching staff. 8. Increased dropout among students, especially among girls at the suburbs and male at the city and the weak actions taken. 9. The vast outskirts of the Directorate and its remote from city center and its impact in the provision of all supplies and the incomplete monitoring and supervision. 10. The continued deterioration of security situation in most areas of Baghdad especially the city's border areas. 11. Limited expansion of kindergartens. 12. Weak supervision and control over foreign and private schools education. 13. Lack of evening school staff.	1. Increase of educational and teaching staff especially in females. 2. The existence of activity for foreign and private education. 3. Increased opportunities for evening education. 4. Increase in some specialties of teaching and teaching staff.
Baghdad	Education/ Rusafa2	Education Rusafa 2 dir.	Yes	Feb-15	1- Staff inflation and the lack of internal system of the Directorate. 2 - Lack for modern technology and methods used by the teacher to explain lessons in many cases sue to shortage of necessary equipment or laboratories and school libraries also the lack of computerization of the curriculum. 3 - Training courses are classic and obsolete that contain old information need to updated with modern methods (e.g. brainstorming, representation), as well as the adoption of training card for the staff which helps to take every teacher entitlement courses equally. 4 – Low numbers of schools versus the increased number of students in each class. 5 – No emergency plan (for example, the absence of an alternative educational complex in emergencies such as terrorism and others) and no action plan for teaching of the student by parents at home and follow up electronically). 6- Weak spending on educational fields and activities such as scientific research, adult education and literacy. 7 - Use of violent method in punishing students and the use of verbal guidance and psychological warfare of students in some schools. 8. Non-implementation of school health system and school feeding. 9 - The great need to train educational and teaching staff in a manner appropriate to the development of training in the world. 10 - The weakness of school and sports activity and practical application because of the lack of school buildings and therefore there is a dual and tripartite time, which leads to the lack of these activities. 11 - Lack of financial allocations from the development plan of the regions to build new schools or to add branches, also the lack of operational budget, which leads to weak maintenance of buildings and lack of equipment and fuel and others. 12- Some of the school buildings in the Directorate are old, which requires funds for restoration or its demolition and reconstruction. 13 - The reluctance of some construction companies in the implementation of school buildings.	1 - Education researches and the diagnose of all that encounter educational process. 2- Supporting the higher authorities of the Ministry of Education. 3 - The presence of highly efficient educational, teaching and engineering staff. 4 - The existence of many educational colleges and basic educational colleges, which provides the Directorate with qualified teaching staff. 5 - the existence of schools for high achievers, people with special needs and educational integration. 6. Accreditation of performance assessment by the Quality Assurance Division at the Directorate as a basis for adjusting and correcting weaknesses. 7 - Vocational education began to work on developing itself through opening workshops for car maintenance, as well as Prosthetics and the opening of new sections of computer class, all these sections in addition to the sections already exist in the institutes of vocational education contribute to attract students to study in these institutes and thus contribute In the provision of middle staff serving the community. 8. Through the technological development, the Directorate started using smart boards and computers in number of schools and also opened courses for electronic governance.

Baghdad	Education/ Karkh3	Education Karkh 3 dir.	Yes	Feb-15	1- The investment budget prepared for the construction of modern schools is not suitable for the requirements of the Directorate 2- Receiving of the investment budget and ongoing late each year 3 - Lack of training and scientific courses in the Directorate due to the lack of allocations. 4- Not exploiting of the scientific competencies and high education degrees in the development of educational work 5- Some educational curriculums are still traditional and they are not keeping up with developments in the world 6 - Lack of school numbers, which does not respond to the increase in the number of students. 7 - Lack of scientific and training scholarships established outside the country 8 - The lack of effectiveness of preparation and training section due to the lack of appropriate building for establishing of courses 9 - Not giving sufficient powers and financial abilities for school principals to solve some of the current problems without reference to the Directorate 10- There is a shortage in some specialties such as English, mathematics, educational guidance and first grade teachers despite the over presence of some other specialties	1- The existence of teaching and training staff to meet required need. 2- Existence of good management at the directorate capable on developing and follow up of educational develops. 3- Organizational structure should meet the requirements of the directorate's work. 4- Existence of international organizations like UNICEF & UNICCO to support the educational process. 5- The presence of schools for high achievers and child friendly schools where it teaches French language and provides correct nitraton to students. Hold scientific, administrative and technical courses for the educational staff benefiting from high education degrees.
Baghdad	Baghdad govt./Special needs dept.	Adhamiyah Orphanage	Yes	Feb-17	1- Some required facilities at the orphanages lack the infrastructure. 2- Insufficient vocational trainers staff. 3- Weakness at media to show how importance taking care of beneficiaries at these orphanages and to help collecting donations. 4- Low number of the teaching and service staff at some orphanages. 5- Not enough training courses for some of the staff. 6- Some current laws and regulations does not cope with society resent development.	1- Monthly salary for the beneficiaries to ensure independency and self reliable. 2- Support from the Governorate or Provincial council help to overcome difficulties when implementing solutions. 3- Provide good services according to international standards of food and clothing. The existence of some financial support from donors or international organizations.
Baghdad	Baghdad govt./Baghdad Municipalities	Improving services in Baghdad surrounding areas	Yes	Feb-15	1- Lack of garbage recycling mechanism. 2- Low number of specialized machinery for our services projects like sanitations trucks and traffic engineering trucks. 3- Weakness and crash of the infrastructure due to subside of government's role in providing municipal services during the past three decades. 4- Shortage of engineering staff working at the project's supervision committees. 5- Lack of clear communications mechanisms with the citizens and the lack o educational awareness programs.	1- The existence of experienced engineering, technical, legal, financial & administrative staff at the field of municipals. 2- Having asphalt factories, modern machineries at all field and all working projects. 3- Using modern technology in accomplishing work, mapping, identifying areas and dimensions using the geographical information system (GIS), and the information technology (IT). 4- Provide allocations for the provincial developing projects in addition to the investment allocations coming from the ministry.
Baghdad	MoMMPW/ Baghdad sewer dirc.	Sewer sector improving in Baghdad province	Yes	Feb-15	1- Lack of working projects. 2- The aging of implemented rain water drainage. 3- Lack of staff and machinery, 4- Lack of allocations. 5- No income taxes. 6- The delay of some projects under construction. 7- The need for training courses to raise up staff efficiency.	1- The availability for projects under construction. 2- Possibility to list and refer new projects that have been designed previously. 3- Availability of the engineering and technical staff. Availability of specialized machinery and equipment.
Baghdad	MoMMPW/ Baghdad Water dirc.	Water sector improving in Baghdad province	Yes	Feb-15	1- The aging of most central projects and the need for its comprehensive rehabilitation, in addition to overcapacity loading, plus the urgent need to rehabilitate water projects to ensure its efficient work. 2- The delay in some projects under construction. 3- Collecting of water tax in accordance to the general assembly of the Water and sewer no.27 year 1999. 4- The long complicated procedures to gain approvals from concerned departments regarding the establishing of central water projects or water complexes like approval for the water share, taking possession of land, etc.	1- Availability of water resources. 2- Presence of the planning and follow-up department contributing in the preparation of the current and future plans for the Directorate. 3- Presence of engineering and technical staff with competence and experience to manage and implement of central water projects, water complexes, networks and transmission lines. 4- Presence of the training and technical development center through which going the staff training of the ministry, including our directorate. 5- Presence of financial allocations. 6- Use of modern techniques in work such as GIS. 7- The existence of central water projects in most regions and districts. 8- The existence of water complexes with capacity of 200 m³ / hour in different regions and districts. 9- The presence of new water projects under construction like (Al Mahmoudiyah Central Project, Al Rashidiya Central Water Project, Al Jisr water project, Tarmiyah central Water Project, Expansion of Rashidiya Water, Expansion of Nahrwan Water, Expansion of Mahmudiyah Water, Shishbar, Ground storage lake in Al Jawadin area. 10- Completion of Abu Ghraib Water Project Central.
Baghdad	Baghdad govt./Baghdad- Rusafa-Youth and Sport dir.	Al Rusafah Youth and Sport services	Yes	Jan-17	1- Lack of clubs in regions and districts in proportion to the large increase in the numbers of young people. 2- Lack of financial resources in recent years for the Directorate and clubs by the Ministry for the purpose of implementing the activities and events. 3- Stop the implementation of some projects prepared by the Minister and the delay of some other projects because of lack of financial specialties. 4- Not benefiting from competencies with high degrees of educations (Masters and PhD). 5- Not keeping pace with progress in the world countries and maintaining the old traditional training. 6- Not delegating sufficient powers to manager of clubs. 7- Not having plans suitable for each club (considering the geographical area, the nature of the environment and the intellectual level & Cultural diversity of the region. 8- Lack of supplies of all kinds	1- The presence of training staff at the clubs with of all specialties to fill the need of these clubs. 2- There are some outstanding performance clubs that practice all the games and activities. 3- Good number of participants. 4- Large number of popular teams at the Directorate. 5- The presence of social media pages.

Baghdad	Baghdad govt./Baghdad-Al Sadr-Youth and Sport dir.	Al Sadr Youth and Sport services	No	Nov-16	1- Lack of financial allocations to cover the activities, projects and programs implemented by the Directorate and clubs. 2- Lack of staff, which does not fit with the number of people and clubs affiliated with the Directorate taking into consideration specialization. 3- Infrastructure does not commensurate with the size of population density and the aging of some requires restoration and reconstruction. 4- Lack of equipment and supplies. 5- The transfer of land ownership to the Directorate of Youth and Sports Sadr City. 6- The delegated powers does not consistent with the ambition of work. 7- Control of financial revenues by the Ministry of Youth and Sports. 8- The reluctance of young people from the clubs due to the lack of means of attraction. 9- The instability of the security situation. The tribal conflicts.	1- Providing infrastructure (such as playgrounds, swimming pools and clubs belong to the Directorate, but not sufficient). 2 - The coordination between the Directorate and other departments. 3. Initiatives to carry out sports, art and other activities.
Baghdad	Baghdad govt./Baghdad-Al Karkh-Youth and Sport dir.	Al Karkh Youth and Sport services	Yes	Jan-17	1- No financial allocations from the Ministry. 2- Remote place of activities for youth. 3- Lack of transportation for youth to attend activities. 4- The absence of a system to collect fees that help to maximize income. 5- Lack of administrative and financial staff, especially at the clubs. 6- The suspension of most infrastructure projects, especially clubs and sport fields because of the financial deficit. 7. Lack of supplies and equipment for activities and offices.	1 - The availability of specialized staff except administrative and financial staff for the implementation of programs (Appendix D). 2- The existence of financial and administrative authority even if limited. 3- The existence of special committees for the popular teams. 4- The existence of partial Infrastructure. 5- Use of information technology and social media. 6- High coordination between the Directorate and the various departments and protocols with the Ministry of Labor, Health and Education. 7- The existence of a specialized center for women's sports. 8- Other specialized centers for women. 9- The existence of a voluntary youth centers. 10- The existence of a small projects unit for the youth. 11- Follow-up mechanism for activities 12- Presence of the Information Division.
Kirkuk	Kirkuk govt./Kirkuk Health dir.	Kirkuk Health dir.	Yes	Feb-17	1- Primary health care centers existed at Kirkuk first & second sectors for primary health care does not respond to the population of the region where population number is (800,000) up to year 2014 opposite to 30 health center, there are some health centers that serves large number o population (more than 60000) like Al Hurryia primary health care center. 2- Clear shortage of medical, health and administrative staff working at the primary health care centers which lead to weakening services providing and accomplishing of the treatment & preventive programs at these health centers like number of doctors working at the primary health care centers follows Kirkuk health department/Kirkuk sectors 1&2 is (164) which doesn't respond to population density and so on the case for all health & administrative staff working at the health care centers. 3- The need for re-training or basic training to some of the medical, health, nursing, laboratory and technical staff.	1. The existence of effective primary health care programs covering the majority of the required treatment and preventive services required for the citizens applied and implemented in the health institutions located in the two sectors (Kirkuk sectors 1&2). 2. The existence of local plans based on centralized, updated and adapted to suit the application of programs in health institutions, including all routine and emergency situations and various aspects of service. 3. The presence of medical, health, nursing, laboratory and technical staff trained and experienced in providing treatment and preventive Services 4. Dedication of medical, health and nursing staff to continue providing the best treatment and preventive services despite the obstacles facing them, especially the war on terrorism and the displacement of 250,000 displaced to Kirkuk 5. Continue to establish hospitals and specialized health center for the purpose of increasing and developing medical and health services. 6. Provision of medicines and vaccines to the primary health care sectors.
Kirkuk	Kirkuk govt./Municipalities	Waste management	Yes	Feb-15	1- Lack of working labor to cover cleaning works due to shortage of allocation. 2. Weakness of coordination with other services departments (Electricity, water, sewer, communications). 3- The negative routine used in maintenance for the machinery. 4- Shortage of specialized machinery. 5- Lack of annual allocations/ operational budget. 6- Lack of the allocation from the provincial development plan and the petrodollar. Lack of the investment allocations.	1- The existence of garbage collecting and disposing system. The existence of qualified trained staff to supervise and monitor service works.
Kirkuk	Kirkuk govt./wrok and social affairs	Kirkuk Orphanage	Yes	Jan-16	1- Lack of the asylum's staff. 2- Lack of financial and administrative power. 3- Lack of financial resources. 4- Lack of training, educational and sport programs.	1- The existence of prepared and furnished building. 2- The skills and experience of the asylum staff. 3- Good structure and coordination. 4- The provision of health services in the asylum.
Kirkuk	Kirkuk govt./Education directorate	Improving Education services in Kirkuk center	Yes	Feb-15	1- Lack of capable educational planner. 2- Lack of methods to graduate educational staff covers required rare specialties. 3- Support using human, financial, material and informational resources according to a scientific educational ways.	1- The existence of strong well to control obstacles in the educational field. 2- A suitable educational structure to ensure reaching goals. 3- Provide a mixture central & local investment budget.
Kirkuk	Kirkuk govt./Sewer directorate	Kirkuk Sewer	Yes	Feb-15	Weakness points; 1- Old transmission lines & grids needs replacements. 2- Lack of staff for sewer workers, engineers and technicians. 3- Shortage of annual allocations/operational budget of this year 2015. 4- Shortage of allocations of the provincial development and the petrodollar to establish lines and grids covers all city areas in accordance sectarian basic design.	Power points; 1- The existence of a complete sewer project approved by ministry of municipal and public works with 3 pumping stations for sewer ready for implementation. 2- Existence of a complete rain water drain project approved by the ministry of municipal and public works. 3- Existence of rain water grids for winter season covers %60 of the governorate. 4- Existence of a referred treatment station with capacity of 310 Qm serves 850 people for treating sewer for Kirkuk city center and outskirts. 5- Availability of 35 tankers and specialized staff to conduct routine maintenance for the grids and treating suffocations at all lines including at districts (Qadaa). 6- Availability of qualified unit to receive & follow up citizens complains. 7- The city enjoy the good administration for its human, material and financial resources through dividing city into 6 sectors.

Kirkuk	Kirkuk govt./Labor and social affairs directorates	Vocational Training center	Yes	Jan-16	1- Currently staff number is low, especially training staff. 2- Weakness of financial allocations for spending through the operation budget. 3- Not keeping up with equipments and apparatus technologies used currently in training along with its peers at the labor market. 4- Performance weakness of some trainers due to lack of experience, adequate rehabilitation and training.	1- Availability of qualified training staff that we could benefit in developing training process. 2- Availability of a building with spaces could be used to add additional training workshops. 3- Ability of management to coordinate with outside parties to increase logistics support.
Kirkuk	Kirkuk govt./Water directorates	Kirkuk Water	Yes	Feb-15	Weakness points: 1- The old pipe grids required replacement according to the international standard at Kirkuk as well as villages & suburbs (Nahiya). 2- Some projects, complex units and refinery units need expansion, developing and rehabilitation for some component of the project. 3- Shortage of specialized trucks like for under pavement drilling or irrigation channels. 4- Waist, leakage and trespass on drinking water's net. 4- Low income (tax) resulted from citizens reluctant to pay water fees.	Strong points: 1- Many central projects, complex units and small projects belong to Kirkuk water directorate according to attached tables, current proposals are prepared and many studies for establishing central water projects at city center and its districts (Qada, Nahiya). 2- Water nets (central, subnets) covers (%90) of the real need at city center & its districts (Qada, Nahiya). 3- All projects and compacted units supplied with equipments and test tools for (chlorine, alum ratio and a device to test turbidity). 4- Availability of a central laboratory at the Directorate equipped with the latest equipment and equipment for testing (raw water and refined) in addition to the existence of laboratories for central projects such as the Kirkuk unified water project for the purpose of monitoring the quality of water product and determine the ratios of chlorine, alum and testing most of the elements in raw and refined water of the project. 5- Availability of many tankers (different capacities) for the distribution of potable water in areas lacking basic services in the city center and villages in the districts (Qada, Nahiya). The water department in Kirkuk governorate contains many technical and engineering competencies in the field of project design, operation, pumping stations and the combined units, etc.'
Kirkuk	Kirkuk govt./youth and sport directorates	Youth and Sport services	No	Nov-16	1. The existence of a fixed structure for the administrative system at the Directorate. 2. Lack of specialized staff in cultural, scientific and financial fields. 3. Lacking the optimal use of human, financial, material and informational resources according to scientific methods. 4. The weakness of the internal media of the Directorate in spreading awareness among young people. 5. Not using technology, especially in the field of scientific care and electronic archiving in the financial, administrative and any electronic databases.	1. Provide staff to implement various youth activities. 2. Availability of infrastructure such as clubs & forums. 3. The existence of clubs and sports federations. 4. The existence of an infrastructure for youth and sports belonging to the private sector. 5. Providing staff to oversee the projects.
Diyala	Diyala govt. Education directorates	Education services in Diyala	Yes	Feb-15	strength point: 1- Centralized decisions making. 2- Weakness in activating some important educational legislations such as (compulsory education law, councils of parents and teachers). 3- Weak use of technology in education and learning. 4- Limited powers granted to administrations. 5- Weakness in accountability mechanisms at all levels. 6- The weakness of the culture of self-learning in the educational institution and reliance on classroom learning. 7- Commitment to static curricula that not suitable with the international standards and scientific development. 8- Some leaders at the management do not believe in the standards of ensuring total quality. 9- Not to benefit from research and educational studies provided in the service of the educational process. 10- Expect rapid results of the initiatives and projects applied for develop and abandon them if immediate results are not shown. 11- The weakness of the infrastructure of the schools and the existence of schools overcrowded and double and tripartite and not suitable for modern education and does not meet the simplest requirements. 12- Poor spending, which often waste a large part of the financial allocations. 13- Lack of educational opportunities and lack of interest in kindergartens. 14- Weak educational and administrative leadership. 15- Poor quality of training and failure to open sufficient courses for the development of teachers and departments. 16- The concentration of most teachers with prior university education in primary schools. 17- Weak level of non-educational service provided. 18- Slow development of curricula compared to the development of modern science and the development of technology. 19- Poor evaluation of educational bodies by their supervisors to improve performance.	strength point: 1- The existence of the Compulsory Education Law. 2- Provide educational opportunities for older people through literacy centers. 3- Free education. 4- The existence of the departments of general education, supervision, preparation, training and planning to evaluate the educational process. 5- Provide qualified national expertise of individuals and institutions without the need for external expertise. 6- Technical progress that allows the dissemination of culture of development and quality effectively. 7- Provide equal educational opportunities for all students. 8- Commitment to education for people with special needs. 9- Most teachers and school administrations are willing to take significant steps towards improving their performance.
Diyala	Diyala govt./ water directorates	Water services	Yes	Feb-15	1) Disruption of raw water source in the rivers feeding projects and water complexes in most areas of the province because of security conditions in the province. 2) The aging of some projects and complexes led to the need to rehabilitate and changing filters (gravel and sand layers) to increase their efficiency and obtain water quality required and there is a project to rehabilitate the central complex is now at the assignment phase. 3) The need to provide secondary laboratories in the districts and districts and provide them with specialists specialized in water testing as a specialty chemical and bacteriological. 4) The need to connect the central water projects to emergency power lines. 5) The current collecting water fees are according to the system Almosaqafat and not depending on the water measurements to be provided for the purpose of knowledge real water consumption. 6) Not using modern appliances in the detection of leakages and reduce waste in drinking water.	1) the existence of 3 central projects in the center of the province and throughout the province there are 26 central projects in addition to 142 Compact Unit. 2) The existence of 4 central water projects under construction at Bani Saad Water Project, Jadiadt Al Shatt Water Project, Al-Salam water project, Siraq and Mansouriyah, the water project of Al-Sada and Jabour. 3) An efficient engineering and technical staff to manage and implement central water projects, water complexes, pipe nets and transporting lines. 4) the use of modern techniques in the work, such as GIS. 5) The presence of a technical training center that trains staff at the Ministry of Municipalities and public works, including the Water Directorate. 6) The existence of a central laboratory that performs laboratory tests to monitor the quality of water supplied by the projects and water compounds to be within the required specifications. 7) The existence of an infrastructure of transporting lines and water networks covering most areas of the governorate. 8) The presence of tankers fleet 140 tanker to service villages doesn't have water network.

Diyala	Diyala govt./health directorate	Health services	Yes	Feb-15	1- Lack of all medical staff (resident, gradient, practitioner, specialty). 2- Shortage of Some health professions such as laboratory, radiology, chemical, bacteriological, computer programmer, statistician, accountant, maintenance technician, drivers, dental assistant, pharmacist assistant, examiner, store secretary). 3- Lack of infrastructure, especially the land on which the center is built. 4- Coordination between primary and secondary health care is still weak, especially in regard to the referral system. 5- The Health Information electronic system is not the level required for data collection and analysis at the regional level. 6- Weakness on the training side of the medical and health staff because of the challenges of the security situation, lack of staff, especially doctors in health centers. 7- Problems related to environmental sanitation, which have implications for the control of transitional and non-transitional diseases, especially the school environment, affecting the provision of school health services and student health. 8- The budget is not suitable with the actual need for upgrading infrastructure. 9- routinely maintenance of medical devices and services in health institutions is not the required level. 10- Administrative and supervisory skills of working staff is still below the required level. 11- The need to review the standard standards of health systems informatics to suit the reality of health work in addition to the health programs approved by the Ministry. 12- Lack of knowledge of the directors of health institutions on the programs of health information technology to adopt at work.	1- The existence of a high - level administrative system that follows all administrative controls in all health institutions. 2- To invest creative ideas and manage them well to achieve the goals in the creation of health information technology and the establishment of a health information system competing with the global health information systems. 3- Providing material and moral support to all staff and build institutions that will serve the health system in the governorate. 4- Easy access to treatment and diagnostic services leads to strengthening the health system. 5- The existence of a strategic plan for the construction and rehabilitation of primary care centers (primary and secondary). 6- Providing medical and preventive services by opening medical centers, mobile homes and clinics in remote and remote areas and villages. 7- Integrated health care strategy for child health (immunization, care). 8- The success achieved in the control of transitional diseases in general and the treatment of epidemiological waves in particular. 9- The presence of rapid response teams to deal with any epidemic or emergency health problem. 10 - Improvement in partnership with the relevant departments and agencies and civil society organizations. 11- Implementing some surveys that have helped to provide the information base needed for health planning. 12- Inclusion of hospitals with primary health care methodology (introduction of public health units or units in each hospital).
Diyala	Diyala govt./work and social affairs	orphanages services	Yes	2016	1- Lack of teaching staff. 2- Communication weakness with the governorate. 3- Not taking advantage of social media to recognize the asylum. 4- Lack of some buildings like workshops.	1- The existence of complete administrative staff. 2- Providing services (food, clothing, transportation, halls) in full. 3- Extinguished location of the asylum in central of Baquba city. 4- The existence of empty spaces in the asylum. Existence of empty land belong to the asylum.
Diyala	Diyala govt./work and social affairs	public Vocational Training center	Yes	2016	1. Lack of a special building and adequate rooms for all workshops in the current location. 2. Lack of technical and administrative staff and the need of the current staff for training. 3. No training centers at the districts of the governorate, which are far from the center of the province. 4. The high cost of the training requirements and the lack of financial support for the center from the ministry or the governorate. 5. Limited powers where the center is technically and administratively linked to the Directorate of Labor and Social Affairs in the governorate.	1. Provide a good technical and administrative staff capable of implementing training plans. 2. Provide the trainee with a professional certificate and a reward of 5000 IQD for each training day. 3. Pilot courses (life skills and business innovation) to train researchers in the management of small projects. 4. Increase number of trainees by activating the training of students during the summer vacation. 5. Linking the Directorate of Labor to the Governorate and can be used to support the Center.
Diyala	Diyala govt./Youth and Sport	Youth and Sport services	Yes	Jan-16	1. There are few specialized staff in the following areas: a. In the fields of (theater, painting, sculpture and photography). B. (Astronomy, physics, chemistry, English). C. Finance (Accounting, Auditing, Cashier). 2. Lack of infrastructure and the aging of some of them such as (forums, halls and stadiums) led to the limited implementation of planned activities. 3. Lack of supplies such as (sports equipment, technical equipment, scientific equipment, etc.). 4. The absence of financial allocations other than salaries (operational budget, investment budget) since 2014 led to the staff to spend their own funds on activities. 5. Aging of equipment for sports, technical and scientific activities. 6. The absence of development and training courses for the cadres of the Directorate and the forums in terms of administrative, financial, sports, technical and scientific, which enable them to keep abreast of the development in the field of incubation and guidance of youth. 7. Lack of service staff and specialized staff for maintenance. 8. Lack of mechanisms and availability of available mechanisms led to the limited implementation of activities and follow-up.	1 - The Directorate's Staff has the desire to work with the existing limited possibilities for the purpose of implementing the planned activities. 2. Services offered to young people are free services, which here considered a major attraction factor. 3. Despite the lack of infrastructure, it is possible to carry out part of activities planned for to sustain communicate with and embrace young people.
Diyala	Diyala govt./sewer directorate	sewer system	Yes	Feb-15	1. The crossing of works with the work of other departments which causes damage to the network when executing those Projects. 2. Problems in land acquisition. 3. Lack of specialized engineering staff and lack in experience for existing once which requires the development of all engineering staff through (dispatches, workshops, courses, studies). 4. Absence of extensive administrative and financial powers for the Director of the Department and the officials of the sewage centers to deal with Crises during flood time. 5. Not developing of full long-term plan for sewage and rainwater networks that contribute to the development Priorities. 6. Not prioritizing services for the not constructed neighborhoods. 7. Lack of specialized machinery which leads to poor service provided to the citizen. 8. The lack of raw materials such as pipes and accessories for the implementation of close link with the network. 9. Lack of financial specialties in the operational budget and investment budget and budget development of the regions 10. Lack of generators and submersed water pumps for rainwater drainage. 11. The poor security situation, which causes projects to be stopped and the maintenance work is difficult.	1. The government's interest in the sewerage sector and the expansion of services for services' weakness are clearly. 2. The existence of strategic treatment projects in the governorate under implementation 3. The possibility of coordination with the local government for the purpose of allocating funds from the development budget of the regions for the purpose of implementation Drainage projects in the governorate.

Diyala	Diyala govt./Municipal Directorate	Municipality service	Yes	Feb-15	1. Weakness of the infrastructure or its collapsed due to the decline in the role of the State in the provision of municipal services during the last three decades and the neglecting of the municipal sector in general. 2. The absence of a regular sanitary landfill and the absence of a recycling mechanism. 3. Lack of machinery belong to the Traffic Engineering Unit in the Urban Planning Division. 4. The lack of our engineering staff working in project supervision committees. 5. Lack of clear mechanisms to communicate with citizens and sensitize them (lack of a special website for the Municipality of Baquba Municipality, lack of educational programs and awareness of citizens.	1. The use of modern technology in the completion of work, completion of maps, the identification of areas and dimensions using GIS, GPS and information technology department. 2. Continuous coordination with the provincial council, the planning department and the contracts department in the governorate, which contribute to the planning process of the projects and obtaining the approvals. 3. The existence of a comprehensive and extensive database that can be used in the projects executed and submitted to investors. 4. The existence of large and open land can be acquired and exploited according to the basic designs updated and their uses. 5. The presence of good revenue growth and can be used to strengthen the activities of the Directorate and the development of the reality of services and strengthen the operational budget.
Babil	Hilla Municipality	Hilla Municipality services	Yes	Jan-15	1. Lack of permanent workers working in the field of cleaning and agriculture. 2. Lack of experienced workers who have been temporarily employed and are not permanently working resulting in insufficient performance. 3. Lack of financial allocations for the city's many needs. 4. Few mechanisms and specialized machinery working in achieving the goals 5. Illegal random housing scattered. 6. The absence of a waste recycling plant and a typical landfill site	1. The existence of experienced staff capable of doing the work. 2. Availability of equipment, machinery, asphalt plants and concrete laboratories capable to work. 3. The existence of good revenues can be used accomplishing of goals. 4. The existence of basic and sectarian designs and a good and effective contribute to the achievement of goals. 5. The existence of land added to the limits of the basic design can be exploited to provide housing sections, industrial sections and commercial sections. 6. The municipality acquires more than one nursery and a good area to provide agricultural seedlings that can achieve the goals. 7. The presence of modern slaughterhouse opened recently contribute to the implementation of the desired objectives. 8. The presence of several squares belong to the Directorate of the municipality of Hilla can be presented as investment opportunities.
Babil	Hilla Sewer dir.	Sewer services	Yes		1. Inadequate powers to improve performance of the province Directorate of the sewerage for the provision of services are not sufficient and need for other powers, for example; - a- Extend director's authority to spend on maintenance work without going back to other parties ensuring the completion of maintenance works and maintenance of working machinery. - b- Extend director's powers to reward workers for the difficulty of sewerage and its risk. - c- Grant powers to the director to give employees' allowances according to the degree of work risk without complications. 2. Lack of financial allocations for the maintenance of stations, networks for rainwater and sewage water. 3 - Lack of machinery such as suction of heavy water vehicles, opening sewer blockages vehicles. 4 - Frequent trespass on rain networks and lack of health awareness by the citizen. 5- Weak infrastructure of the center 6- lack of staff where it does not fit with the many tasks carried out by the directorate. 7- The directorate lack for maintenance stations at the districts. 8- Not completing directorate's annual plan within time limit due to budget approval and financial allocations.	1. The directorate has 9 centers at the districts administratively and financially linked to the directorate and in the intention to establish buildings to these centers and expanding its admin and technical staff giving it more powers. 2. The existence of specialized expertise. 3. To benefit from generated leftovers at the sewage stations. 4. The existence of studied designed sewage projects for the city under construction. 5. Good possibilities to sustain fuel required for operation sewage stations. 6. The availability of modern technology at the directorate like the GIS. 7. Constant coordination with local government and the ministry at all directorate's work.
Babil	Hilla Water dir.	Water service	Yes	Jan-15	1) The existence of transporting lines and old networks require replacement. 2) The outage of some water projects operating in the province, which requires either rehabilitation or the establishment of new projects. 3) the presence of waste in water production in networks and transporting lines. 4) Lack of specialized machinery. 5) The delay of construction companies in implementing projects and its weakness, there are 31 projects lagging behind. 6) Lack of annual allocations and operational budget for maintenance and to ensure the operating requirements of fuel and sterilization materials. 7) Lack of allocations from the Regional Development Plan for the establishment and replacement of water networks. 8) Insufficient fuel to operate operating generators.	1) The existence of projects with different capacities of potable water production, number is 354 project and water complex. 2) The existence of networks that ensure the delivery of drinking water to citizens, coverage of water networks in urban and rural areas are 877.5. 3) The existence of a central laboratory in the Directorate to inspect raw & produced water to ensure its matching to the standard specifications, there are three laboratories in the province of Babylon and major one in the center of the province of Babylon and two sub-sections. 4) The existence of 111 tankers that distribute water to citizens of remote villages not serviced. 5) The existence of 5 strategic projects under implementation. 6) The existence of accumulated experience in the water sector can be utilized, especially to raise the capacity of new staff. 7) There are good potentials for securing water resources needed for drinking water projects.
Babil	Babil Youth and Sport dir.	Youth and Sport services	No	2017	1 - They do not cover population density through the clubs. 2- Lack of allocations for development, programs, land acquisition and construction of enterprises (ministerial or local). 3- Organizational and administrative structure is not suitable for achieving objectives and benefiting from the powers, the administrative level of the Directorate and its powers (Section level). 4. Not implement the E-government system.	1- The presence of human resources with expertise and skills to implement youth and sports activities. 2- The existence of plots of lands that can be utilized in the construction of new infrastructure and strategic projects. 3- The possibility of implementing youth and sports initiatives based on self efforts.

Babil	Babil Education dir.	Education sector	Yes	Feb-15	1. Lack of a school map. 2. Continuous changes in organizational structure. 3. Weak reliance on the outputs of research and studies. 4. Lack of number and limited quality of training courses. 5. Lack of engineering staff and service personnel. 6. Aging and worn out of many school buildings. 7. The lack of school buildings and the existence of two and three shifts in one building. 8. Lack of land in some city centers designated for educational purposes within the limits of the municipality. 9. Lack of some specialties at the educational staff. 10. Lack of educational and explanatory means and scientific laboratories used in education in many schools. 11. Many teachers do not keep up with effective and active teaching methods. 12. There is a lack of some educational specialties. 13. The lack of time allocated for one class in dual and triple shifts schools. 14. There is overcrowding in many schools, especially in city centers. 15. Aging and the monotony of engineering designs and lack of recreational facilities in the school which makes the school environment not attractive. 16. The limitations of tests methods and examinations in determining the comprehension and understanding of students. 17. Lack of scientific techniques used in the educational process (e.g. E-learning).	1. Providing lands for educational purposes in most rural areas. 2. Availability of technical and engineering competencies. 3. Provide an integrated database in the Planning / Statistics Section. 4. The existence of an integrated organizational structure at the Directorate. 5. The existence of private schools education. 6. The presence of training leaders and competencies. 7. the availability of surplus educational staff in some specialties. 8. The existence of good success rates for previous years.
Babil	Babil Health dir.	Primary health care sector	Yes	Feb-15	1) Low number of primary health centers and all medical personnel (gradation, practitioner, specialty, such as: family medicine and x-ray and Sonar), Services Sector - Plan for Improving Services for Primary Healthcare Sector - Babylon. 2) the lack of some health titles such as laboratory assistant, radiographer, computer programmer, statisticians, Accountant, Maintenance Technician, Assistant Dentist, Pharmacist Assistant. 3) Lack of financial allocations by the ministry or the general budget to show interest in such a sector. 4) Coordination between primary and secondary health care is still weak, especially regarding to referral system. 5) The distribution mechanism of medical staffs controlled by the ministry and the imbalance in the period of rotation, residence and gradation of new doctors. 6) weakness in the training side of medical and health staff because of the challenges of the (security situation, lack of staff, especially doctors In health centers). 7) Aging of buildings belong to the health institutions. 8) The way of maintenance for service equipments and medical equipments in health institutions is not at the required level. 9) Administrative and supervisory skills for staff working in health centers are still not at the required level. 10) The need to review the unified standards of health information systems commensurate with the reality of health work in addition to Health programs approved by the Ministry. 11) The absence of integrated health system, which in turn leads to the lack of quality, efficiency and quality of the primary health care services. 12) The free medicine and the large number of sound people taking advantage of the system lead to exhaustion of health institutions and waste in medicine and medical services. 13) Not working with management system of health centers in accordance with the principles of modern human resources management where the director of the health center should be (Specialist in the management of primary health care centers or holds a certificate in the management of institutions).	1) The existence of good numbers of some health and nursing staff can be used in the process of expanding coverage for primary health care in the governorate center. 2) Initial approvals for the opening of a number of primary and secondary health centers to ensure coverage increase. 3) The existence of programs prepared by the Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization supported centrally in addition to a high administrative system follows all administrative controls in all health institutions. 4) Material and moral support for all the staff and building health institutions that will serve the health system in Governorate. 5) The Easy access to therapeutic and diagnostic services leads to strengthening the health system. 6) The existence of a strategic plan for the construction and rehabilitation of primary care centers (primary and secondary). 7) The existence of acceptable numbers of health centers and health houses (26 health houses) distributed to Areas according to the approved ministerial regulations contribute to the provision of treatment and preventive services and the raising of coverage indicators. 8) The existence of an integrated child health care strategy (immunization, care, school health, effective epidemiological surveillance). 9) The success achieved in the fight against transitional diseases in general and dealing with epidemiological waves in particular. 10) the presence of rapid response teams to deal quickly with any epidemic or emergency health problem. 11) Inclusion of hospitals in the primary health care methodology (introduction of public health units or units hospital).
Babil	Work and Social affairs dir.	Improving services in province orphanages	Yes	Dec-16	1- Lack of service and professional staff. 2- Lack of teachers with scientific competence. 3- The low number of beneficiaries in terms of absorptive capacity. 4- Lack of training courses for some staff. 5- Lack of allocations in some sections of spend. 6- Insufficiency of some foodstuffs (bread, rice).	1- Availability of workshops to build the capacity and talents of beneficiaries. 2- Good building. 3- Provide beneficiaries with pocket money of (\$1000 IQ) monthly. 4- The presence of efficient staff. 5- Availability of Services like clothing and equipment etc. 6- There are two separate houses, one for males and the other for females.
Babil	Work and Social affairs dir.	Improving services in AlAskandary a vocational training center.	Yes	Dec-16	1- Lack of financial support. 2- Poor technology. 3- Weak media. 4- Lack of communication between the generations. 5- Laws and regulations are not proper for the labor market requirements.	1- Providing expertise and skill. 2- Good reputation of our center. 3- Integrated infrastructure of the center. 4- The efficiency of human resources (financial and planning staff). 5- Availability of transportation. 6- Giving of professional certification.
Karbala	Sewer Directorate	Improving Sewer services	Yes	2016	1- Lack of financial allocations. 2- Lack of specialized machinery and the high maintenance costs. 3- Weak revenues compared to the cost of services provided. 4- The aging of some of the facilities belonging to the Directorate. 5- Inability to provide service to areas northeast of the city. 6- The reluctance of applicants to work in the sanitation sector, particularly network maintenance.	1- Availability of infrastructure through the entry of new projects into service in addition to the existing infrastructure. 2- Availability of skills and expertise and the presence of specialized staff (engineering, technical, administrative). 3- The possibility of benefiting from the results of treated water provided by the new projects. 4- Arrival rate of completion of the projects of processing units to very advanced stages up to %90.

Karbala	Education Directorate	Improving Education services	Yes	2016	1- Poor reliance on the outputs of research and studies submitted by advanced staff. 2- The organizational structure is rigid and closed to the surrounding environment. 3- The administrative centralization, which makes the Directorate restricted to development. 4- Poor attention to non-classroom activities. 5- Lack of financial allocations for the maintenance of school buildings. 6- Complex routine in completing the transactions of payment of maintenance advances for school buildings. 7- Increased dropout and repetition rates at primary levels. 8- The criteria for assessing the performance of human resources are formal and modular. 9- Stick to bureaucratic methods in the administration of the Directorate.	1- The existence of a positive organizational climate that elevates the morale of the employees of the Directorate qualifies them to improve their performance. 2- The existence of information systems and database of educational, teaching and admin staff. 3- Availability of specialized engineering capabilities in addition to the availability of transportation to follow-up projects. 4- The existence of investment in the education sector through the presence of private schools. 5- Closer relations with the community surrounding the school and child-friendly schools. 6- Continuing courses for all staff through courses in the preparation and training section. 7- Activate the role of parent and teacher councils in accordance with the law prepared accordingly. 8- Commitment to education for people with special needs. 9- Equal opportunities for all students and for all levels of study.
Karbala	Karbala Municipality directorate	Improving Municipalities services in Hussainya town (Waste management)	Yes	Mar-16	1- Few cleaners workers. 2- Few machinery. 3- The municipality does not have a central station to collect waste.	1- The existence of locations to establish local centers for recycling of waste according to what is listed in the structural plan of the province 2- Human resources. 3- Approving of the district's new design.
	Karbala Municipality directorate	Improving Municipalities services in Kerbela City (Waste management)	Yes	Jul-05	1- Weakness of the infrastructure due to the lack of attention of previous regimes. 2- High functional flabbiness at the departments of the Directorate. 3- The middle human staff does not have the knowledge to improve environmental services. 4 - Poor provision of cleaning services to citizens because of the lack of specialized machinery. 5- Lack of consultants engineers and designers. 6- Financial limits and controls of the Department. 7- Lack of workers' number at the department. 8- The temporary employment of workers leads to a lack of stability of work, which negatively affects the efficiency of performance. 9- The large number of unpaved and unqualified streets. 10 - Municipality's lack of proper planning and development of visions and strategies. 11- Lack of solid waste recycling factory and intermediate stations (transformation). 12- Lack of mechanism for processing and recycling of solid waste. 13- Lack of clear mechanisms to communicate with citizens and raise awareness and the absence of educational programs and awareness.	1- The presence of capable staff for technical development. 2- Availability of a number of modern specialized machinery. 3- The possibility of using modern technology in municipal work, such as the machinery sterilization appliances. 4- The presence of producing nurseries. 5- The existence of a plant to produce trash bags. 6- The department has diversity. 7- The presence of good revenues that can be used in the municipality's activities. 8- Flexible regulatory structure. 9- Possibility of direct contact with local government. 10- The city of Karbala is attracting for investments.
Karbala	Labor and social affairs Dir.	Karbala Orphanage	Yes	Jan-16	1. Staff working at the house are not specialized. 2. Lack of human resources. 3. Lack of financial resources, especially for maintenance and operation. 4. Lack of infrastructure like (playground, workshop, atelier, etc.). 5. Lack of media coverage to promote for the House.	1. A good location for the house where people can reach easily. 2. The ability of the House to accommodate a larger number of beneficiaries. 3. Availability of furniture and equipment for beneficiaries. 4. Good building does not require any major maintenance. 5. Current staff have acquired experience to deal with beneficiaries.
Karbala	Health Directorate	Kerbela Primary health care sector	Yes	2016	1. Lack of specialized medical staff. 2. Lack of number of practicing physicians. 3. Lack of administrative and service staff. 4. Political interference in transferring staff between Health institutions. 5. The many Pilgrimage going through the Governorate. 6. The aging legislation. 7. The aging of the health system law and its inappropriate for the current situation. 8. Lack of clear job description directory. 9. Immigration of medical staff and leaving work.	1. The Ministry support. 2. The availability of specialties at other institutions of the Department to close part of the gap. 3. The existence of financial resources on the contracts and daily wages to close gap. 4. Availability of many scientific staff to benefit from in closing the gap for some specialties. 5. The senior management at the ministry heading towards decentralization. 6. The presence of staff to benefit of training of some staff for the closing the Gap in some competencies. 7. Karbala governorate is considered one of the most staff wining governorate. 8. Transporting powers of the governorates increases of the decentralization and local legislation. 9. Existence of Infrastructure in sub-centers 10. Availability of adequate media.
Karbala	Kerbela labor and social affairs dirc.	Kerbala Vocational training center	Yes	Jan-16	1. Trainer's lack of competence. 2. Weak media coverage. 3. Weakness of powers granted to the Center. 4. Lack of training requirements. 5. Lack of financial allocations. 6. Weak training curricula. 7. Lack of space to establish halls for the development of new professions.	1- The center is considered an official department affiliated to the Ministry of Labor. 2- Giving official Certificates. 3- The existence of independent specialized integrated buildings. 4- Provide 9 professional workshops for basic training containing equipment And modern machines. 5- Provide 3 pilot and educational workshops. 6- Provide suitable trainers number for the available workshops. 7- The possibility of studying the labor market and identifying the popular professions.
	Karbala Water di	Karbala wate	Yes	2016	1. Not keeping up with modern systems of operation in distribution and control. 2. Internal distribution network of different diameters needs to change the distribution pattern according to the basic design of the city and the nature of use. 3. Lack of numbers of specialized machinery. 4. Putting legislation regarding violations. 5. The weakness of the tax collection mechanism. 6. Lack of technical staff and lack of skilled and unskilled labor.	1. Having good experienced technical staff (engineers, technicians). 2. Relatively good revenues. 3. Having a good reputation in the market to ensure the maintenance work after the availability of the necessary funding. 4. Transporting lines and internal networks that can be controlled. 5. Different materials in the warehouses of the Directorate could be used. 6. The existence of machinery could be relatively benefiting of.

Karbala	Karbala Youth and Sports dir.	Youth and Sport services	Yes	2016	1. Lack of financial allocations. 2. No structural organization at the directorate. 3. No sections for studies and researches available. 4. No supplies. 5. Lack of administrative staff for the clubs. 6. Lack of machinery to rehabilitate play grounds and yards. 7. Many un accomplished projects. 8. Lack of media channels. 9. No abroad scout / activities available. 10. No specialized staff in women activities and the lack of related infrastructure. 11. Difficulty for implementing women activities due to claims of society structure and the religious situation at the province. 12. Not adequate admin, financial, legal and technical powers.	1. Providing specialized experienced staff for program implementation. 2. Providing infrastructure like clubs, playground halls and yards. 3. Increased teams & public committees and else of youth gatherings. 4. Initiatives to implement sports, arts, educational and scientific activates. 5. Possibility to activate collecting of figurative fees for entering clubs and sport establishments.
Najaf	Water Direct.	Water services	Yes	N/A	• The need to review laws in the Directorate. • Lack of powers granted to directors of water dpt. (centralization). • Low wages collected from tax collection. • Lack of salaries and lack of incentives for staff in the Directorate. • The Directorate does not have an independent personality. • Lack of maintenance mechanisms.	• Successive development plans and projects. • Starting the E-government work. • The existence of the Geographic Information Unit (GIS). • Experiences and efficient staff members. • Cooperate with all official and civil society sectors. • Relative safety and ease of movement and communication within the province. • Owning the department to laboratories and specialized staff. • Ability to set up development courses within the Directorate.
Najaf	Sewer Directorate	Sewer services	Yes	Feb-15	• The need to enact additional laws to reduce violations. • Lack of opportunities to train workers outside the country. • Weakness of directorate's buildings. • Lack of financial allocations to the sewage sector. • Lack of staff and machineries and the need to develop them.	• High coverage of sewer and rain networks. • The existence of the Geographic Information Unit (GIS). • Availability of experiences and staff of high efficiency in administrative and technical aspects. • The existence of specialized machineries of different tankers, blockages openers and sensors. • Acquiring laboratories by the department and staff specialized in the tests. • Ability to establish development courses within the Directorate. • Continuous coordination with the governorate horizontally and the ministry vertically for the implementation of future projects.
Najaf	Health Directorate	Primary health care sector	Yes	Feb-15	1 - Quantitative and qualitative shortage of human staff in various disciplines. 2. Lack of financial resources allocated to our department compared to services provided and workload. 3. Weak use of resources. 4. Resistance to changes. 5. Poor information system of health and none health. 6. Focus on the therapeutic side versus the preventive side. 7. Provide job description guide. 8. Weak evidence and aging of instructions of work procedures. 9. Weaknesses in the system of wages and incentives.	1. Health institutions distributed appropriately to ensure access to health services for most areas in the province. 2. New orientation towards the adoption of quality standards. 3. The presence of a medical city belonging to our district. 4. The desire for change by most of the staff at our department. 5. Large projects implemented by the ministry and the governorate. 6. Easy connects horizontally and vertically. 7. Orientation to computerization of most works. 8. Availability of medical, health and administrative staff with high experience. 9. availability of internal training courses and all disciplines and staffing.
Najaf	Labor and social affairs Dir.	orphanages services	Yes	N/A	1. Lack of adequate financial resources. 2. Lack of financial and administrative powers for the Director of the House. 3. The absence of a typical building for the house. 4. Lack of information technology to keep up with ongoing development. 5. Old regulations in regards to the orphanages. 6. Weakness in the system of salaries and incentives. 7. Lack of specialized educational staff. 8. No recreational facilities in the house.	1. The existence of human resources with competence and experience. 2. The existence of a solid organizational structure. 3. Availability of expertise for the orphanage staff. 4. Possibility for training courses for staff. 5. The staff desire to keep pace with the progress in service provision.
Najaf	Municipality dir.	Municipality service	Yes	Feb-15	(1) Weak provision of cleaning services to citizens due to lack of specialized machineries. (2) The technical projects are delayed due to internal technical matters. (3) The municipality's lack of rapid and precise implementation due to administrative routine. (4) Lack of green spaces because of little financial allocations. (5) The absence of parks and gardens in the sense. (6) Weak of maintenance. (7) The multitude of unpaved and unqualified streets. (8) The lack of planning and the development of visions and strategies. (9) Working by traditional means. (10) Lack or weakness of care among many workers. (11) resistance to change by employees. (12) The absence of laboratory for the recycling of solid waste and substrates (transformation). (13) Lack of slaughterhouse, there is no modern style slaughterhouse. (14) The absence of a vegetables market on a regular basis. (15) Lack of land to be allocated for housing of people covered by the distribution. (16) Weak media.	(1) Availability of qualified technical staff. (2) Availability of specialized machineries of all kind. (3) Availability of lands acquired by the directorate for multiple use in accordance to the basic design map. (4) Existence of consist administration on the executive level. (5) Existence of 2nd largest cemetery in the world and what it contains of revenues from selling graveyards.

Najaf	Labor and social affairs Dir.	Vocational Training center			Weakness points; 1. The center's small space. 2. Retarded technology. 3. Skill weakness. 4. Aging equipments. 5. The lack of human resources 6. Aging buildings.	Strong points; 1- The skills and experience of the staff. 2- The center good reputation. 3- The center have equipped training halls. Availability of training materials.
Najaf	Youth and	Youth and Sport services	Yes	Jan-16	1. The Directorate lacks to the administrative, technical and specialized personnel. 2. Lack of financial resources allocated to our department. 3. Failure to apply the electronic governance system in real terms through correspondence and mail and the absence of a rule strict data in the work of the Directorate and its forums. 4. Focus on activities, not qualities. 5. The organizational and administrative structure is not suitable to achieve the objectives and benefit from the powers. 6. Weak evidences and provided regulations of work procedures. 7. Weakness in the system of wages and incentives. 8. The existence of delayed projects. 9. Forums does not provide services that meet youth needs and aspirations. 10. The Directorate lacks a specialized unit for research and studies. 11. The forums do not have the infrastructure to qualifies to attract the youth. 12. The facilities and supplies necessary for the activities are not available in the forums to hold activities. 13. Total quality programs in the Directorate below the required level. 14. Not taking youth's views and their participation in the preparation of activities and programs in the annual plan. 15. Youth's lack of awareness of the activities offered by the forums.	1. Locating Youth and sports forums within appropriate geographical areas. 2. The presence of a sufficient number of members with the desire to change by most of the members of our department. 3. There are mechanisms for cooperation between youth forums with schools and universities. 4. Encouraging youth forums to volunteer work. 5. Going towards the work with performance indicators. 6. The presence of a number of employees with academic ability to give human development courses. 7. There are enough specialized women's forums.
Najaf	Education dir.	Education services	Yes	Feb-15	1. Lack of a school map. 2. Continuous changes in organizational structure. 3. Weak coordination and cooperation between departments of the Directorate. 4. Weak reliance on the outputs of research and studies. 5. Non-possession of the Directorate of the independent moral personality. 6- Lack of service staff. 7- Lack of maintenance staff .	1. Availability of technical and engineering competencies. 2. A database in the Statistics Division provides the planning department programmatically 3. The existence of an integrated organizational structure in the Directorate 4. The existence of private schools education. 5. Presence of training leaders and competencies. 6. The Directorate of Education in Najaf to be considered a General Directorate. 7. Continues courses for all staff through the training and preparation section. 8. Establish regular and orderly parent meetings.
Thiqaar	Thiqaar Municipalities	Municipality services in Souq al shiouxh	Yes	Jan-16	1. Lack of the annual financial allocations for the vocational training center. 2. The remote location of the vocational training center from the city resulted the reluctance of many beneficiaries to attend training workshops. Lack of human resources at the training center.	1. Availability of specialized training workshops. 2. Availability of qualified and experienced training staff. 3. Free of charge training courses for beneficiaries. 4. Availability of efficient media unit inside the training center. 5. Existence of some volunteers working at the workshops. 6. Existence of good management with vast good relation with the local government and other departments.
Thiqaar	Labor and social affairs Dir.	orphanages services	Yes	Jan-16	1. Little power & mandates delegated from the ministry to the department. 2. The section is lacking medical staff and specialized teacher. 3. Shortage and aging of the State's house (playgrounds, workshop, atelier, additional dormitory).	1. Availability of basic services for beneficiaries free of charge with allocated annual budget devoted for buying basic needs of food etc. 2. Availability of general teaching staff. 3. The existence of good management that have solid relationship with the government's departments. Giving the beneficiaries monthly salary of 50,000 IQD.
Thiqaar	Youth and sport dir.	Youth and Sport services	Yes	Mar-17	1. Lack of adequate financial allocations for program implementation. 2. Weak experience in the middle management, especially those transferred from the Ministry of Industry. 3. Lack of trainers in some specialties and forums. 4. Lack of machineries for activities. 5 - Lack of a specialized planning division to prepare plans and programs in accordance with clear strategies and objectives.	1. Existence of financial and administrative authority. 2. The existence of partial infrastructure. 3. Having good equipment and equipment to carry out the activities. 4. The existence of cumulative experience of some specialized staff. 5. The existence of statistical databases. 6. The existence of an integrated system for electronic communication (Internet system). 7. The Directorate owns plots of land designated for the construction of projects.
Thiqaar	Education dir.	Education services	Yes	Mar-16	1. Weakness in the infrastructure of the schools at large number of schools crowdad with students in double and triple shifts. 2. Weakness in financial allocations. 3. Poor quality of training and failure to open courses for the development of teachers and managements. 4. Lack of interest in kindergartens. 5. Most primary school teachers with under-academic achievement. 6. The weakness of developing and the development of innovations in education. 7. Weak services in educational institutions. 8. Poor communication between parents and students. 9. Lack of interest in outside activities. 10. Low scientific level of some university graduates of new teachers. 11. There is a lack of working hours for three shifts schools with an average working hours of only three hours. 12. Poor skills of educational staff.	1. Free of charge education for all levels. 2. Compulsory education represented in the compulsory education law and the law of the Ministry of Education amended. 3. Literacy through the provision of adult education opportunities. 4. Provide qualified expertise to manage the educational and educational process. 5. Provide equal educational opportunities for all students. 6. Provide educational opportunities for people with special needs. 7. Availability of educational staff. 8 - Provides a complete database on the numbers of pupils and educational and administrative staff.

Thiqar	Health Directorate	Primary health care sector	Yes	Mar-16	1. Lack of preparation of primary health centers and lack of suitability to population densities. 2 - The lack of the number of medical staff (rotator, practitioner, specialty, family medicine, radiology and sonar). 3 Shortage of some health functions such as (laboratory assistant, radiographer, computer programmer, statistician, accountant, pharmacist, dental assistant, pharmacist assistant, eye examiner). 4 lack of financial allocations by the ministry or the general budget to interest in such a sector. 5 mechanism of distribution of medical staffs controlled by the ministry and the imbalance in the period of residence and periodic gradation of new doctors. 6 The weakness of the medical and health staff because of (security challenges, lack of staff, especially doctors in health centers). 7 The aging of some buildings of health institutions and the possibility of expanding them. 8 Methodology for maintenance of medical services in health institutions is not at the required level. 9 Administrative and supervisory skills for staff working in health centers are still not at the required level. 10 The need to review the standard standards of the information systems for health to suit the reality of health work in addition to the health programs approved by the ministry. 11 Lack of an integrated health system This in turn leads to a lack of integration of quality, efficiency and quality of primary health care services. 12 Problems related to environmental sanitation, which have implications for the control of transitional and non-transitional diseases, especially the school environment, affecting the delivery of school health services and health of students.	1. The existence of effective primary health care programs covering the majority of the treatment and preventive services required for citizens to be applied and implemented in health institutions located in the two sectors (Nasiriyah 1 and 2). 2 - The existence of local plans based on plans centralized, updated and modified to fit the mechanism of application programs in health institutions and include all the usual cases and emergency and different aspects of service. 3 The presence of surplus in some staff, especially nursing can be rehabilitated to perform the tasks of other titles. 4. The presence of medical, health, nursing, laboratory and technical staff trained and experienced in the provision of treatment and preventive services. 5. The dedication of medical, health and nursing staff to provide the best treatment and preventive services despite the obstacles facing them. 6. Providing medicines and vaccines to the primary health care sectors on an ongoing basis by the Ministry of Health. 7 Implementing some surveys that have helped to provide the information base needed for health planning. 8 Inclusion of hospitals in primary health care methodology (introduction of public health units or units in each hospital).
Thiqar	Municipality dir.	Nassriya waste management	Yes	Mar-16	1 Insufficient funds allocated for cleaning project. 2. Inadequate specialized mechanisms for cleaning purposes. 3 Administrative Routine. 4 Too many streets that are not qualified and difficult to clean, especially when the fall of rain. 5 No systematic landfill and waste recycling plant.	1 There are a number of specialized and non-specialized mechanisms that can be used during Cleaning process. 2 The presence of a staff with good news in cleaning.
					1 - Intersection of sewerage with other service departments, causing damage to the network when executing works of projects from other departments. 2. The existence of problems in the acquisition of land through the need to obtain approval from the official departments (12) department, which must be approved by the ministries of Baghdad. 3 Lack of cars and specialized equipment to match the existing networks. 4 The presence of pipelines and networks requiring replacement, as well as sewage stations need to be maintained. 5 Shortage of annual allocations for 2015. 6 - stop projects in the development of regions and ministerial projects. 7 - Lack of income obtained from tax collection.	1 Availability of engineering and administrative staff in the Directorate with good experience. 2- The existence of specialized mechanisms in the Directorate of tow cars, blockage opening and all other equipment. 3 The presence of a ministerial project in the center of the city, which is the project of Nasiriyah Al Kabir will serve the city of Nasiriyah fully for the design of the foundation for the year 2003. 4 The existence of certified basic designs under which different projects are implemented. 5 Access to allocations from the development of regions to implement new projects. 6 The presence of four treatment units in Nasiriyah, Shatrah and Rifai with advanced completion rates 7 Increasing governmental interest in the sewage sector. 8 Coverage of the center of the city of Nasiriyah sewer networks and rain water above. 9 The presence of GIS department in the Directorate helps to maintain and identify networks.
Thiqar	Water Dirc.	Water services	Yes		1. The need to review the laws in the Directorate and to open an accounting unit in each center. 2. Lack of powers granted to water managers (centralization). 3. The aging of some complexes and networks and their need for rapid maintenance and rehabilitation as well as for Nasiriyah Consolidated Project. 4. Weak operating budget, which has a negative impact in repairing the faults and saving fuel Where the total operational budget of Dhi Qar Water Directorate for the year 2015 except Salaries are 1000731354 dinars, while the Directorate needs an operational budget of 18314894000 dinar other than salaries. 5. The low collected taxes are deducted from the collection the collection of 77% of the estimated amount of 2015. 6. The salaries are low and there are no incentives for employees in the Directorate. 7. The Directorate does not have an independent moral personality. 8. The need for the means of transport for follow up and the specialized machineries for better completion of maintenance work in networks and projects. 9. Not putting the design plan for the networks and transporting lines in accordance with the design of the foundation in tune with population expansion. 10. The need to appoint specialized staff and work in projects and network maintenance. 11. The old networks overlap and there is no clear database for old networks and no lift or Most of them are canceled while implementing new networks. 12. The lack of modern equipment and the use of advanced technologies in pre-crash detection and control operation of projects and complexes. 13. Conflicts and bottlenecks in networks.	1. Successive development plans and projects. 2. The presence of the Basra River as a source of water. 3. The existence of (GIS). 4. The presence of expertise and efficient elements within the Directorate's staff. 5. The presence of water project Nasiriyah No.1 where it can raise the operational capacity from 6000 to 10,000 cubic meters per hour which is its design capacity and thus raise the share of the city Nasiriyah from 3000 cubic meters per hour to 4000 cubic meters per hour. 6. The presence of water project Nasiriyah - I stage II capacity of 10000 cubic meters per hour Which is currently under construction and the amount of water allocated to the city of Nasiriyah from this project to 4400 cubic meters per hour as well as projects complexes and networks under implementation (Projects under implementation) 7. The presence of water project in Nasiriyah united with the capacity of 2000 cubic meters per hour. 8. The Directorate has a central laboratory, a subsidiary and a specialized staff. 9. The ability to establish development courses within the Directorate to own a training center within the Directorate.
Muthana	Education dir.	Elementary schools services	Yes	Mar-16	1. Lack of school buildings. 2. There are falling buildings falling or falling classes. 3. Lack of competence teachers in Mathematics. 4. Lack of educational guidance. 5. Lack of resources of the Directorate of Finance. 6. Lack of service staff and guards. 7. Lack of engineering and technical staff. 8. The need to maintain financial allocations more than allocated according to the proportion of the population for a large governorate area being the second large province by area. 9. Lack of current school health groups and existing totals need maintenance and rehabilitation. 10. Lack of laws and legislation, their aging and none relevance to fact.	1. There is surplus in educational staff (teachers) in the center of the city of Samawah. 2. An integrated information base regarding school buildings and planning. 3. Exploitation of the school buildings in which the ranks of the fallen and the campaign to repair them and added to the working school buildings. 4. Integration of the structure of the Directorate. 5. The existence of international organizations working in the province to support the educational process. 6. The readiness of the parents of the students to contribute to support the educational process. 7. Issuing legislation to support the educational process and encourage private education and encourage parentsw contributions.

Muthana	Health Directorate	Improving services in Samawa	Yes	Mar-16	1. Severe shortage of medical staff. 2. Weakness in achieving the goals of immunization and care. 3. Lack of awareness of large segments of society. 4. Lack of budget for health programs in health centers. 5. Lack of general budget allocated to the Department which helps to expand the health centers.	1. The presence of trained medical, health and administrative staff. 2. Application of electronic programs in the work of health centers. 3. Medical devices are available and sufficient. 4. The existence of adequate sub-health centers referring to the major.
Muthana	Municipality dir.	Improving waste management in Samawa	Yes	Mar-16	1) The lack of financial allocations for the actual need to cover the costs of providing services. 2) The power for funds transfer is not currently available. 3) The absence of a waste recycling plant and typical healthy landfill. 4) Lack of specialized machineries for cleaning services. 5) Lack of experience of workers who are employed temporarily, which leads to the lack of efficiency in completion of work. 6) Lack of specialized working staff in the software field and the lack of middle staff. 7) The weakness of the infrastructure or its collapses or reject in the provision of municipal services due to government role reduction during the last few decades and neglect of the municipal sector in general. 8) Weak coordination with other service departments (water, sewage, electricity, communications). 9) Lack of environmental awareness and weak media role and lack of awareness programs and awareness of citizens.	1) The presence of engineering, technical, legal, financial and administrative staff with experience in the field of municipal business administration and with multiple specializations. 2) The existence of good revenues can be utilized in the implementation of the goals. 3) Owning asphalt plants and possessing marginal mechanisms in all projects and in all fields capable of business. 4) The existence of allocations for projects from the investment's allocations received from the Ministry. 5) The existence of large and open land can be acquired and exploited by the basic designs of different uses to provide residential, commercial and industrial plots. 6) The presence of several yards belonging to the Directorate of the Municipality of Samawah can be displayed and exploited for investment. 7) Acquiring a trash bag factory in good production capacity that can be expanded in the future in order to increase production to cover actual need. 8) The existence of websites and a Facebook page. 9) The existence of the law of (Musataha) allows the directorate of financial resources.
Muthana	Labor and social affairs Dir.	orphanages services	Yes	2016	1. Some staff lack of experience. 2. Buildings are not enough to occupy all required tasks. 3. Weak possibility for communicating with society. 4. Internal laws and regulations designed for centralized administration.. 5. Relatively large gap in provided services.	1. Availability of relatively sufficient staff at all specialties. 2. Availability of a building that can accommodate 50 beneficiaries. 3. Availability of number of cars.
Muthana	Sewer dir.	Sewer services	Yes	Mar-16	1 - Lack of operational and investment financial allocations. 2 - Do not cover the white areas for being outside the basic design. 3 - the lack of specialized machineries for water suction and blockage opening. 4 - Low salaries and allowances for workers in the sewer sector. 5- Sewage projects are of high cost, since all equipment and equipment are of international origin. 6- Lack of modern technology in the field of sewage projects in general. 7- Non activation of laws to lift violations on water network of rain, where there are some citizens surpass rainwater network especially in areas not served in the sewage network. 8 - The designs of sewer projects in general, where the ability to discharge rainwater is calculated to rain intensity to ten previous years In the context of climate change, especially in the previous two years, it was observed that rainfall is very heavy and must be repeated designs in order to absorb the amount of heavy rain.	1 - The existence of engineering and specialized expertise in the field of supervision and operation of sewage projects and treatment plants. 2 - There are designs and maps of sewage networks and treatment plants for all districts and sub districts and small area. 3 - The presence of modern technologies in the Directorate, for example GIS 4 - The existence of sites owned by lift stations and treatment plants. 5 - The existence of continuous coordination with the Office of the province in all the work of the Directorate.
Muthana	Water dir.	Water service	Yes	Mar-16	1. Weakness of tax collecting. 2. Maps for old grids not available. 3. Lack of staff in some sections (maintenance, tax collecting). 4. The breakdown of some specialized machineries and miss distribution of others. 5. Lack of experience of wages staff . 6. Lack of sub ground tanks, pumping stations, transporting lines from the center to districts and new housing compounds suit with population growth in the city. 7. Existence of old grids and warn transporting lines must replaced. 8. Accumulated directorate's debts for contractors and local market due to the suspension of financial grants from the general directorate. 9. Not installing of houses water gages and using the system of (Musaqafat) for counting water fees. 10. Unavailability of modern systems used in the world like SKADA system for monitoring the pressure in the pipes and identifying surpluses and cracks.	1. The availability of young eager staff for work of engineers, technicians and administrative. 2. The existence of great experience for some staff represented in equipment maintenance, execute and maintain water grids. 3. Existence of cooperation spirit and partnership in taking decisions between manager, heads of sections and the staff of the directorate for taking decisions of the directorate's interest. 4. Existence of GIS section contain of good devices and staff could be used in drawing the grids and transporting lines. 5. The existence of 3 centralized projects on Rumetha river. 6. Existence the number of 100 water complexes and 45 refinery stations. 7. Existence of central lab and other 2 sub districts labs at Rumetha and Al Kudher. 8. Existence of Samawa grand project under construction hoping to close the gap of produced water when its operational. 9. The chance available for establishing a project on Euphrates of water refinery under preparation of basic design using Japanese loan. 10. The existence of staff training center belong to same ministry could be used in developing capacities in theory field like training on computer and developed programs.
Muthana	Youth and sport dir.	Youth and Sport services	Yes	Feb-17	1. Lack of a structure for the directorate. 2. Lack of researches and studies sections. 3. Lack of required supplies for implementing activities (supplies of sport, art, scientific and transportation). 4. Lack of adequate staffs for some specialties (scientific, media, fine art, sports). 5. Lack of financial allocations. 5. Lack of financial incentives for the directorate staff. 7. Not using technology in official correspondents. 8. Lack of administrative staff for the clubs. 9. Lack of technical staff to maintain the directorate and the clubs. 10. Lack of special mechanisms at the directorate to rehabilitate play grounds and yards. 11. The warn of directorate infrastructures. 12. Lack of women clubs at the province.	1. Availability of infrastructure like playgrounds, clubs, women's club, yards, halls, theaters, swimming pools. 2. Availability of public teams and committees. 3. Availability of specialized staff for implementing programs in %80. 4. Existence of initial base for technology work like electronic devises and computers. 5. The working time at the clubs and sport institutions day and night. 5. Existence of database for the directorate and clubs visitors and public teams. 7. Women turnouts for participating in various women activities. 8. Existence of administration boards includes districts' elders and districts councils.

Diwaniya	Youth and sport dir.	Youth and Sport services	Yes	Jan-17	1. Lack of financial allocations. 2. The lack of infrastructure such as the large stadiums, swimming pools and gymnasiums in a suits the population 3. The absence of a complete and stable structure and the absence of an internal system. 4. Not using technology to develop youth skills. 5. Lack of sports, educational, cultural and artistic requirements. 6. Not involving young people in making decisions that concern the youth. 7. Lack of mechanisms to rehabilitate playgrounds and squares. 8. The existence of incomplete projects. 9. Lack of land allocated for youth and sports projects. 10. There are no youth forums in the governorate 11. Weak of powers granted to the Youth and Sports Directorate	1. The availability of administrative and specialized staff to implement youth and sports programs. 2. The existence of halls and theaters that provide services free of charge for youth and are exploited by governmental institutions and civil society organizations to conduct their activates in them. 3. The existence of a number of forums and sports stadiums and dirt yards throughout the province.
Diwaniya	Education dir.	Education services	Yes	Feb-15	1. The weak link between education plans and comprehensive development plans. 2. Focusing on quantitative development rather than qualitative development and horizontal expansion in building schools instead of vertical expansion. 3. Weak financial spending on fields and activities of education such as the fields of scientific research, adult education and literacy. 4. Teachers use traditional oral methods and traditional teaching techniques in teaching their students. 5. The curricula and programs are more theoretical approaches than practical and classical decisions lack for modernism, which calls for boredom, alienation and lack of attraction for the teacher and the student. 6. The educational process in our schools and institutes is a provisional process that depends on the book based only and depends on the ideal exams as a measure to save students the educational material for academic achievement. 7) The educational process is a unilateral process by the teacher only and therefore lacks interaction from other parties (teacher, students, curriculum and management). 8. Lack of school preparation and increasing classroom density. 9. Low level of living level of the teachers. 10. Weak school activity and practical application. 11. Use of violence for punishing students in some schools. 12. Non implementation of school health system and school feeding system. 13 The great need to train the teaching staff in a way that suits the development of training in the world. 14. Lack of an atmosphere to practice extra curricular activities (sports artistic cultural). 15. Neglect the preparation of teachers and their rehabilitation and not providing them with renewable capabilities in the field of work, not give them social value and appreciation, and to provide them with job protection.	1. The existence of the Compulsory Education Act. 2. Free education. 3. The presence of adequate number of teachers. 4. The presence of the preparation and training section and the Department of supervision in order to evaluate the educational process. 5. Existence of schools for high achievers and schools for special needs.
Diwaniya	Water dir.	Water services	Yes	Feb-15	1. The lack of filtering and sterilization materials and its supplied centrally by the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works, resulting in the risk of arrival of these materials due to the current situation of the country. 2. The aging of some water networks and conveyor lines. 3. The need for comprehensive rehabilitation of some projects and water complexes due to its aging. 4. Lack of budget amounts allocated to the water sector, whether on the regional development grant or investment plan. 5. The delay by the company executing the water project of Shameya Energy 400 m / h within the work of the investment plan of the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works. 6. Lack of specialized staff in water tests such as biology and chemical specialization. 7. Lack of machineries specialized enough to all operating and collection centers in the districts, as well to the center of the city of Diwaniyah. 8. Lack of modern laboratory equipment to enable the central laboratory in our directorate to work more efficiently and effectively. 9. The large pollution currently taking place in the Diwaniyah River, which affects the quality of the produced water. 10. Not linking some of the central water projects and water complexes capacity of one hundred thousand gallons of electric emergency lines.	1. Partial completion of the Diwaniyah water project with a capacity of 4000 m3 / hour. The actual service has reached 12,000 m3 / h of the total project capacity. 2. The existence of working central water projects of (17) projects. 3. The presence of different water complexes with capacities (295). 4. The existence of strategic projects currently under implementation of 3 water projects (Shinafiyah capacity of 4000 m3 / hour, Shameya capacity 4000 m3 / hour, Gamas modern capacity 1000 m3 / hour). 5. Starting the work of the conveyor lines with a total length of 100 km to connect the pumping stations No. 2 of Diwaniyah water project mentioned above to complete the capacity on which the project was built for as part of the numbered enterprise work (Regional Development no. 2014/65). 6. The Diwaniyah River, which cuts the city into two halves. 7. The existence of the University of Qadisiyah, which is considered as a research center with respect to studies and related research. 8. The presence of a highly qualified engineering and technical staff in the management of projects, complexes and networks. 9. The presence of the planning and follow-up department, conducting field visits to projects and works in progress, and contributing to the preparation of current and future plans of the Directorate. 10. Diwaniyah Water Directorate is in the process of completing a study by referring one of the water complexes for investment of operation and collecting fees or to the private sector.

Diwaniya	Health Directorate	Health services	Yes	Feb-15	1. The presence of drop-outs from primary health care services. 2. Lack of means of health awareness and lack of educational programs, which leads to weak relationship between health service providers and members of society because there is no permanent contact between them. 3. Job description is not in the required level. 4. The aging regulations and legislations currently followed by the Ministry of Health, most of which need to be reviewed. 5. Lack of all medical staff (resident, graduate, practitioner, specialist) and some other health and administrative titles such as laboratory assistant, radiology photographer, chemist, bacteriologist, computer programmer, statistician. 6. The budget is not suitable with the actual need to upgrade the infrastructure. 7. Lack of support for the primary health care personnel and lack of allocations for the training program in the health institutions of the trainees and the lack of finding replacements for the purpose of training in the event of transfer of assets. 8. Lack of infrastructure and number of buildings of primary health care institutions. 9. Coordination between primary and secondary health care providers remains weak, especially the referral and feedback system. 10. The health information system is not at the level required for collection and analysis of information's. 11. Lack of implementation of electronic information system and non-implementation of the electronic governance system. 12. The need to review the unified standards of the health information systems commensurate with the reality of health work in addition to the health programs approved by the Ministry. 13. Most medical, health and administrative staff in health institutions do additional work (duplication of work between the public and private sectors), which leads to dispersion of efforts and thus weak work. 14. The weakness of the training of medical and health staff because of (security challenges, lack of staff, especially doctors in health centers).	1. The medical, health and nursing staff are keen to provide the best diagnostic, therapeutic and preventive services. 2 - Continue to establish public hospitals and specialized centers and primary health care centers for the development and increase of diagnostic, therapeutic and preventive services. 3. Commitment of senior management and decision-makers to support human resources through their central appointment as graduates of medical and vocational colleges - Health and nursing. 4 - Provide treatment and preventive services through the opening of medical centers and health houses and mobile clinics in remote areas and villages. 5. The existence of an integrated child health care strategy immunization. Care . School Health. (Epidemiological monitoring) 6 - Success achieved in the fight against transitional diseases in general and dealing with epidemiological waves in particular. 7 - the existence of rapid response teams to deal quickly with any epidemic or emergency health problem. 8 - Improvement in partnership with the relevant departments and bodies and civil society organizations. 9 - Implementation of some surveys that helped to provide the database for health planning. 10- Inclusion of hospitals in primary health care methodology The creation of public health units or units in each hospital.
Diwaniya	Labor and social affairs Dir.	orphanages services	Yes	Jan-16	1. - Lack of database on the number of orphans in the governorate. 2. Lack of staffing in educational competencies as well as instability due to the frequent transfer of staff. 3. Lack of financial allocations for young orphans to complete their studies. 4. Lack of training programs for supervisors based on modern educational systems and methods. 5. The lack of clarity in the vision of the terms of acceptance and the severance of the relationship by some officials affect the chances of acceptance and cut relationship to beneficiaries. 6. Lack of financial allocations to meet the shortage of food table items and clothing.	1. The possibility of receiving new numbers of beneficiaries. 2. There is a monthly salary for beneficiaries who achieve independence and self-reliance. 3. The presence of a medical unit. 4. The presence of modern transport modes in the role of the transfer of beneficiaries to schools. 5. Existence of good media unit.
Diwaniya	Labor and social affairs Dir.	Vocational Training center	Yes	Jan-16	1. Some training programs do not meet the requirements of the labor market in the governorate. 2. Not to exploit the existence of loans for unemployed and small businesses. 3. Most of the training facilities are old and do not keep pace with modern development. 4. Lack of specialized technical staff. 5. Lack of quality control division, follow-up and evaluation system within the structure. 6. Weak cooperation between the Center and the entities in the labor market. 7. Lack of training programs for trainers based on modern bases & methods.	1. The possibility of receiving new numbers of male and female trainees. 2. Provide free training for various disciplines. 3. Provide support and guidance for trainees throughout their training at the center.
Diwaniya	Sewer dir.	Sewer services	Yes	Feb-15	1. Lack of financial allocations for the maintenance of stations and networks of rainwater and sewage. 2. The lack of machineries such as the withdrawal of heavy water and the opening of the blockage (rocket). 3. Aging of network. 4. Lack of a career staff where it is not commensurate with the many tasks done by the directorate. 5. Frequent trespassing on rain networks and the lack of health awareness of the citizen. 6. Little amount of allocation for the sewage sector projects. 7. Our directorate lack to maintenance centers in the districts. 8. Lack of income revenues for sewage services compared to the size of services. 9. Not updating of laws and legislation to replace the old laws for the purpose of dealing with problems in line with the new phase laws.	1. The presence of efficient staff in the implementation of projects. 2. The central government should provide financial support and increase allocations for such projects. 3. The existence of the IT and GIS departments, the Ministry's support, the central government's orientation to benefit from modern technologies.
Maysan	Youth and sport dir.	Youth and Sport services	Yes	Jan-17	1. Lack of financial allocations. 2. Lack of transportation means for transporting youth. 3. Lack of administrative staff for forums. 4. Not involving young people in making decisions. 5. Incomplete projects. 6. Lack of supplies. 7. Lack of trainers for women's sports and the handicapped.	1. Providing specialized staffing for program implementation. 2. The existence of financial and administrative authority, even if limited. 3. The presence of teams and popular committees. 4. The existence of partial infrastructure. 5. Use of information technology and social media. 6. High coordination between the Directorate and the various departments. 7. Coordination of local government.
Maysan	Labor and social affairs Dir.	orphanages services	Yes	Apr-16	1. The building is weak and about to fall. 2. Sending trained staff to the other accommodation houses.	1. Provide the land for the orphanage. 2. Availability of trained administrative staff. 3. The availability of trained staff for education and has been assigned to other houses can be used and transferred when needed.

Maysan	Labor and social affairs Dir.	Vocational Training center	Yes	Jan-16	1. The organizational structure of the center was reduced and the sections of the center merged. 2. Suspension of training allowances for trainees. 3. Lack of polarization in the center. 4. Suspending the Center's petty cash since 2014, which led to the accumulation of malfunctions. 5. Lack of efficient training provided by the Center. 6. Lack of training requirements for some workshops or its been consumed and outdated. 7. Lack of stores and use of workshops as training areas. 8. Absence of development courses for trainers. 9. The weakness of the training curriculum and the equipment used. 10. Weak trainers. 11. Weak media aspect. 12. Remote center location of the city, there is no public transport on the road. 13. Lack of training staff and assigning the trainer to other administrative functions. 14. Suspension of the law (apprenticeship) for another notice since 2008. 15. Transfer of powers from the ministry to the provincial council. 16. Stability of the security situation in the province.	1. The existence of a building and number of workshops and store / 1. 2. The road leading to the center is paved with a parking lot. 3. The presence of staff trained and experienced at the same time. 4. The presence of new equipment is not used in the center storage. 5. The existence of training materials for some courses. 6. Availability of generators and discharge of fuel. 7. Presence of experienced maintenance staff. 8. The existence of a statistical system with the presence of data on the affairs of trainees for all groups with a monthly update of these rules. 9. Availability of social networking sites.
Maysan	Sewer dir.	Sewer services in Amara	Yes	Feb-16	1. Lack of financial resources (investment and operational budget). 2. Few trades (workers and operators). 3. Lack of treatment units. 4. Failure to reach the Department's entitlements from the collection amounts allocated to the Department. 5. Lack of incentives and financial rewards for employees.	1. The presence of engineering, technical and administrative staff trained for the possibility of direct implementation and volunteering for the purposes of the awareness campaign. 2. The existence of a training center for the training of technical and administrative staff. 3. Use social networking sites to communicate with citizens 4. The existence of specialized machineries (tractors, blockage openers and excavators).
Maysan	Health Directorate	Health services in Amara	Yes	Feb-16	1 - The great shortage of medical staff and some health personnel. 2. The significant decrease in the number of health centers. 3 - Failure to apply the organizational structure and job description. 4. Lack of financial resources. 5. weak administrations. 6. High resistance to change among staff. 7. Non-application of clinical evidence and clinical evidence. 8. Poor distribution of health personnel.	1. Distribution of equitable health centers in the governorate center (Annex 1). 2. Provision of vaccines and most essential medicines. 3. Increasing the proportion of nursing staff (men 615%, women 154%). 4. Use of information technology in the Department. 5. Effectively implement the health visitor program. 6. Existence of secondary and tertiary supportive care (Appendix 1). 7. training center for staff in the Department of Health. 8. Having a good database.
Maysan	Water Direct.	Water services in Amara	Yes	Feb-16	1. Lack of specialized machineries and reserve materials for trucks and projects 2. There is a large amount of daily wages workers and contracts with ministerial wages without financial cover. 3. To stop the disbursement of funds from the investment and operational budget 4. Low collection of taxes collected from citizens 5. Lack of advanced programs for monitoring the operations of water stations and the remote movement of machineries. 6. The lack of sufficient number of measurements and the lack of funds for installing them. 7. Insufficient quantity of alum and chlorine for filtration and sterilization. 8. Provide water stations and their need for periodic preventive maintenance. 9. Poor technical efficiency of complex operators.	1. The presence of the design division with ready-made designs that can be implemented when resources are available 2. The existence of a wireless network (Motorola) to facilitate streamlined procedures. 3. Introduce the Electronic Governance Division to facilitate streamlined procedures 4. The presence of expertise and competence of the engineering and technical staff to enable self-implementation of projects using available capabilities 5. The presence of financial resources from the investment of RO stations and renting of tankers. 6. Existed laws for imposing fines on transgressors 7. Facebook page, ads and website 8. The existence of a training center qualified to train and develop staff. 9. A water project with a capacity of 16000 m³ / h with an advanced completion rate (84%)
Maysan	Education dir.	Education services	Yes	Feb-16	1 - Lack of financial allocations for the establishment of new schools sufficient in the city center to dismantle the momentum of these schools, in addition to the lack of allocations within the budget of the Directorate General, as well as the lack of financial allocation to buy health caravans and also in the section of incentives. 2. Lack of sufficient space in densely populated areas 3 - lack of numbers of engineers and technicians, which causes the pressure of implementation and control of projects for the Directorate. 4. Lack of equipment and mechanisms for the maintenance of school buildings 5. There is no authority for transferring budgets between the doors of the financial budget of the Directorate. 6. Lack of coordination by the Division of Property in our directorate with other departments in the allocation of land on which schools are built. 7. Lack of mechanisms and specialized equipment in the maintenance of the health unit. 8. The need to qualify educational staff in the scientific disciplines. 10 - The absence of a special center in the numbers and training section for the establishment of training courses and accommodating the staffing of the large number of educational bodies.	1. The potential of vertical construction in the construction of schools in the center of the province, to address the lack of land allocated to schools. 2. The existence of spaces in the new residential neighborhoods for the purpose of establishing schools. 3. The existence of sufficient educational staff in primary schools in the center of the governorate, and the provision of adequate service staff to all schools. 4. the existence of some of the powers delegated to the Directorate to conduct the settlement of the staff and address the surplus and vacancies in schools, and the existence of powers for the Director General and the head of the school in the distribution of tasks between the service and commissioning staff. 5. The building is occupied by Al-Imam Al-Sadiq University to the Directorate of Education according to legal frameworks. 6. Opening of new schools because of new school buildings 7. The presence of a training center in the building of numbers and training section 8. The presence of the Division of Educational Sciences in the Directorate 9. The possibility of benefiting from schools fronts in increasing and maximizing the financial resources of the Directorate.
Maysan	Municipality dir.	Municipalities services in Amara	Yes	Feb-16	1. Lack of investment in the municipal sector 2. No waste recycling plant 3. No systematic landfill 4. Lack of machinery and workers reduces the efficiency of waste removal 5. The existence of determinants of income spending. 6. Lack of workers' wages, lack of work hours and delay in salaries 7. Contradiction with the work of other departments such as sewerage 8. Lack of an integrated information center	1. The possibility of self financing of land revenues and rental of shops. 2. The presence of modern technology to facilitate the collection of waste. 3. The existence of websites and a page on Facebook. 4. The existence of factories for the production of trash bags. 5. Existence of experience among the central staff in lifting waste. 6. The existence of laws imposing fines and penalties on offenders and violators. 7. Municipal revenues are increasing, which is confirmed amounts and not allocations from the Ministry of Finance. 8. The existence of lands that can be invested in favor of the private sector for wages.

						b. The existence of the law allows the Directorate to bring financial resources.
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Basra	Labor and social affairs Dir.	Orphanages services	Yes	Jan-16	1. Lack of specialized staff. 2. Extreme administrative centralization, which makes the house restricted to development. 3. Lack of financial allocations for the maintenance of buildings and cars. 4. Criteria for assessing the performance of human resources formality and stereotyping. 5. Weak reliance on the outputs of research and studies, which are considered as specialized staff. 6. Transportation in the house is very old and %100 not workable.	1. The location of the house in the city center as pictured in page 3. 2. Good Quality of service provided as table in page 6. 3. The existence of a certified decision of the provincial council to include the preparation of basic designs for the construction of a certified orphanage under which various projects will be implemented, including the orphanage in the modern style, Appendix C. 4. The possibility of obtaining allocations from the development of the provinces to implement the typical village SOS.
Basra	Education dir.	Education services in Basrah city	Yes	Mar-16	1. Lack of financial resources. 2. Lack of qualified school buildings. 3. Poor distribution of teaching staff. 4. The acute shortage of school buildings. 5. Weak use of modern technology in education. 6. Non-possession of the General Directorate of moral personality. 7. Lack of maintenance staff in schools.	1. The existence of an integrated electronic database. 2. The presence of trained staff (technical and administrative). 3. The existence of modern school buildings of large capacity. 4. Law for the compulsory education. 5. The presence of competent training leaders. 6. Existence of International Computer Driving License Center: (ICDL) 7. The training courses of the Training section continued. 8. The existence of educational competencies from holders of higher degrees (Masters and PhDs).
Basra	Labor and social affairs Dir.	Vocational Training center	Yes	Jan-16	1. Aging of the infrastructure of the center and the lack of conformity with the standards set for workshops. 2. Not keeping pace with some training curricula for technological development. 3. Limited financial and administrative powers. 4. Lack of training staff. 5. There is no one to follow trainees who graduated (survey).	1. A distinct geographic location in the governorate center. 2. Attracting trainees in large numbers. 3. Having a qualified and efficient training staff. 4. The existence of modern and sophisticated equipment. 5. Flexibility in using the training staff according to the requirements of the work. 6. Grant a training certificate to the trainee after graduation.
Basra	Sewer dir.	Sewer services	Yes	Mar-16	1. Lack of wages and salaries for the staff of the sewage department and their demand equality with their peers in neighboring countries. 2. Lack of human resources. 3. Lack of knowledge of modern technology. 4. Lack of database. 5. Lack of operational financial resources. 6. Lack of conveyer lines. 7. Incomplete infrastructure and the aging of the existing ones. 8. Delay implementation of projects. 9. Lack of specialized machineries.	1. Specialized expertise. 2. GIS. 3. Specialized machineries. 4. Provide drainage points for rainwater. 5. Treatments Project. 6. The existence of a fuel station for vehicles. 7. Quick response by the maintenance teams to citizens' complaints.
Basra	Water Dir.	Water dir.	Yes	N/A	1) Weak powers 2) Lack of financial allocations 3) Lack of service buildings. 4) The need to train middle staff. 5) Weak revenues. 6) Long and complex procedures to obtain the approvals of the relevant departments for the establishment of central projects and the acquisition of land. 7) Lack of technical and engineering staff	1) The presence of an integrated central laboratory. 2) the existence of qualified stores for the spare parts. 3) The existence of a training and technical development center, which is conducted through the training of staff of the ministry, including our directorate
Basra	Municipality dir.	Basrah Municipality (waste managment)	Yes	Feb-16	- A . The lack of workers on the permanent staff. - S . The lack of lands required for the use of medium stations. - C . The none enforcement of law for the protection of the employee intended to encourage the staff to perform their duties without any fear. - D . There is no coordination between the government departments when implementing projects. - T . Lack of specialized machineries. - e . The lack of waste recycling plant.	- A . The availability of specialized trained staff and technicians for field monitoring and follow-up. - S . The existence of different and modern specialized machineries. - C . The presence of a paper advising in the preventive maintenance. - D . There is a sanitary landfill with technical conditions outside the city. - T . Presence of the GPS as a follow-up mechanism. - e . The existence of the unit of rivers and drainage. - D . The existence of a fuel station. - s . The existence of the media unit.
Basra	Health Directorate	Primary health care sector	Yes	Mar-16	1. A relatively large gap in the buildings of the centers, staff and equipment 2. Some of the centers' buildings need rehabilitation to add x-ray and dental equipment 3. The law of medical gradation prevents the stability of trained staff in their place of work and causes annual movement of the staff. 4. Free therapeutic services and loss of health insurance system 5. Lack of separation between work in the public and private sectors 6. Not linking of the monthly salary of the owners to the size of the work	1. The possibility of using the same buildings and staff for an evening shift. 2. The regulations imposing the need for fencing the land allocated for the construction of health centers 3. Provide staffing and experience to complete the construction of health centers and employment contracts national and foreign 4. Provides a map that specifies the staffing requirement by tide and location 5. A competent and supportive primary health care administration
Basra	Youth and sport dir.	Youth and Sport services	Yes	N/A	1 The possibility of distributing of staff. 2. Lack of transportation means for transporting youth. 3. Lack of administrative and accounting staff. 4 Weak media marketing activities for society and youth .. 5. Lack of supplies, equipment and machinery. 6. Lack of land for acquisition and construction of projects	1. availability of specialized staffing for program implementation. 2 The existence of partial infrastructure. 3. Use of information technology and social media. 4 The existence of administrative structure 5. Evolutionary activities and programs (initiatives)
Wasit	Municipality dir.	Municipality	Yes	Feb-15	1. The absence of a special waste treatment mechanism. 2. Minority or lack of specialized machineries for our service projects such as cleaning machines and traffic engineering.	1. The presence of technical, legal, accounting and administrative cadres with experience in the field of municipal administration and with multiple specialties and provide specialized laboratories for the production of asphalt, concrete and gravel quarries in Badra. 2. The existence of a basic design for the city of Kut prepared by the Directorate of Urban Planning in Wasit, which determines the uses of the land and the lengths and width of the streets and how to implement it. 3. Owning asphalt plants and modern machineries at all projects and all fields. 4. Use of modern technology in the completion of the work and mapping and the identification of objects and dimensions using GIS and information technology department. 5. The existence of allocations of regional development projects in addition to the allocations received from the ministry. 6. There is continuous coordination with the provincial council and the planning department and contracts department in the province. 7. Having 2 nurseries in the municipal enterprise produces approximately 10,000 seedlings annually.

Wasit	Labor and social affairs Dir.	orphanages services	Yes	Jan-17	1. Lack of availability of professional trainer, mentors and educators 2. Non-availability of teachers in scientific specialties 3. Weakness in the adequacy of some foodstuffs. 4. The absence of curricula in which the researcher is identified in his work 5. The restaurant area does not conform to the approved standards. 6. Lack of polarization in the number of beneficiaries. 7. The weakness of the media aspect and the electronic communication. 8. Lack of craft workshops 9. Not keeping pace with the laws and regulations currently in force for the development of society.	1. Having a good building. 2. Availability of financial allocations. 3. The location of the house in the center of the city. 4. Grant the beneficiary monthly salaries from the ministry (50,000) thousand and another from the Council (60000). 5. Providing good services according to international standards of food and clothing 6. Current staff have experience.
Wasit	Education dir.	Education services	Yes	Feb-15	1 - The absence of lands allocated for educational purposes in the center, districts and areas. 2 - The difficulty of the procedures to allocate lands where land donors for the purposes of education visit about 13 departments to get approvals. 3 - Increase the fees imposed on private schools, students which leads to the reluctance of investors, knowing that the ministry did not establish wage controls. 4 - Poor coordination between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education in terms of inputs and outputs. 5 - the lack of buildings and the increasing density of students, which resulted in duplication of school attendance. 6 - Not all schools have school nitration system. 7 - the arrival of allocations amounts for construction and restoration is late, which makes performing repairs and maintenance during the school working period which affects educational process. 8 - The aging of some school buildings in the Directorate, which requires funds for rehabilitation or amounts for demolition and reconstruction. 9 - Not counting on solid companies for the construction of schools. 10 - lack of employment degrees in proportion to the new schools opened. 11 - Lack of service staff, which negatively affects the delivery of service to the student 12 - Non-activation of the Compulsory Education Law 118 of 1976. 13. Inadequate numbers of teachers in certain specialties.	1 - the existence of a strict law and test system. 2 - the presence of educational and teaching staff of higher education. 3. The presence of the EMIS database. 4 - the presence of schools for high achievers and people of special needs. 5 - Adopting of performance assessment performed by the Quality Assurance Division of the Directorate as a basis for adjusting and correcting weaknesses. 6 - presence of engineering and technical staff. 7 - The end of clay schools in the province. 8 - Security stability in the province. 9 - the presence of the Department of preparation and training to train educational and teaching staff.
Wasit	Health Directorate	Primary health care sector (kut1 & Kut2)	Yes	Feb-15	1. Lack of medical staff (resident, gradient, practitioner and specialist). 2. The budget of the department is balancing doors and not balancing programs. 3. Weak system of incentives, wages and central evaluation. 4. The regulations and legislations currently in force are submitted by the Ministry of Health, most of which need to be reviewed. 5. Some health-related titles such as (Laboratory assistant, x-ray photographer, chemical, bacteriological, computer programmer, statisticians, accountants, maintenance technician, drivers, dental assistant, pharmacist assistant, visual examiner and store secretary. 6. The shortage of infrastructure, especially the land on which the health centers are built and the land ownership. 7. Coordination between primary and secondary health care is still poor, especially in regards to the referral system. 8. Lack of sufficient experience when importing medical equipment. 9. Poor qualification of staff and weak programs of medical education and continuing nursing. 10. The electronic health information system still not at the required level for data collection and analysis at the district level. 11. Poor training of medical and health staff and other professions, especially in health centers. 12. Problems related to environmental sanitation, which have had an impact on the control of transitional and non-transitional diseases, in particular the school environment, which provides for the provision of school health services and the health of students. 13. The budget is not commensurate with the actual need to upgrade infrastructure, equipment and capacity of building. 14. Methodology of maintenance of service and medical equipment in health institutions is not at the required level. 15 . The managerial and supervisory skills of the working staff are still not at the required level. 16. The managers of health institutions are not informed about the health information technology programs for	1. The existence of a high-level administrative system that follows all administrative controls in all health institutions. 2. The existence of the control teams of the department to diagnose the various types of activities. 3. The relatively good security situation for Iraq. 4. Investing creative ideas and managing them well to achieve the goals of finding a healthy information and creating a health information system Compete with global health information systems. 5. Provide material and moral support to all medical, health and other professions that will serve the health system in Wasit Governorate. 6. Easy access to therapeutic and diagnostic services leads to the strengthening of the health system. 7. The existence of a strategic plan for the construction and rehabilitation of primary health care centers (primary and secondary). 8. The location of the province in central Iraq and its proximity to the capital added it to its borders with other provinces and its external borders. 9. The existence of an integrated child health care strategy (immunization, Care). 10. The success achieved in the fight against transitional diseases in general and dealing with epidemiological waves in particular. 11. The presence of rapid response teams to deal quickly with any epidemic or emergency health problem. 12. Improvement in partnership with relevant departments and agencies, civil society organizations and places of worship. 13. Implementing some surveys that have helped to provide the information base needed for health planning. 14. Inclusion of hospitals in primary health care methodology (introduction of public health units or units in each hospital).

Wasit	Sewr dir.	Sewer services	Yes	Feb-15	1. The work intersection with other department's services causing damages to the grid with implementing these projects through excavations performed other departments like communications and damages resulted for house connections. 2. Problems in acquiring lands. 3. Getting formal approvals of concerned departments (12 department) where most of these departments raise the acquiring paperwork to Baghdad for reviewing and final approval. 4. Lack of financial allocations necessary for the land acquiring. 5. Lack of land donor where procedure is done by following procedures and approvals, then it referred to the Ministry of Finance, after the land property is transferred to the department donated for. 6. The existence of sectarian committee in council of ministers responsible for allocating lands which takes long time for getting these approvals. 7. There are projects under within the projects of provincial development are implemented after getting full or partial approvals from concerned parties, the lack of finance allocations for acquiring lands is a problem where ministry refuse to pay considering its not responsible for the project and the governorate does not have enough allocation to pay for. 8. Ministry of Finance high estimates in paying for the acquiring value depending on market value. 9. Lack of specialized machineries & equipment. 10. Lack of specialized engineering staff and the lack of experience of existed staff requiring the development of all engineering staff through (dispatches ,workshops, courses, studies). 11. Lack of administrative and vast financial powers for director of the department and heads of sewer stations to deal with crisis during floods.	• The existence of approved basic designs in which used for implementing of different projects and others under study could be used in implementing sewer and rainwater grids. • Possibility for getting allocations from governorate's provincial allocations.
Wasit	Labor and social affairs Dir.	Vocational Training center	Yes	Jan-17	1. No assurance for course courses graduates in private or government sectors. 2. The aging of some educational curriculum and keeping pace with the jobs market. 3. Some trainers need developing courses to keep up with jobs market advance. 4. Lack of training or public centers at districts. 5. Lack of some specialized equipment required to keep up with jobs market (welding engine, argon). 6. Weakness of media. 7. Lack in some technical competencies. 8. The small areas of some workshops.	1. Availability of different specialized workshops and a good technical engineering staff. 2. Giving of vocational certificate. 3. Give trainees financial reward of (5000) dinar for each training day. 4. Center's geographical location in central city of Kut. 5. Availability of operational budget to maintain and continuity of workshops. 6. Availability of pioneer workshops to train seekers of managing small projects. 7. The existence of vast areas could be used for future expansion. 8. Availability of volunteered teamwork.
Wasit	Water dir.	Water services	Yes	Feb-15	1. High difficulties for the employment of new operational and technical staff where the current staff is not enough comparing the expanding happened with establishment of complexes and water projects. 2. Low allocations where specialized machineries (tankers, drillers, Heap) are little and do not meet the needs. 3. Not distributing of allocations according to the need but most are going for establishing of projects and new complexes without share for rehabilitation and constructing of buildings. 4. Not installing of gauges at the houses, which result of low taxes income. 5. Lack of modern appliances for tracing of leakage and decrease wasting of drinking water. 6. Lack of monthly grants for the departments. 7. The aging of some working water projects in the province requiring either rehabilitation or the establishing of new projects. 8. Existence of wasting of produced water in the grids and conveyer lines. 9. Delay of construction companies in implementing projects and weak performance. 10. Low of annual allocations/operational budget for maintenance and ensuring operation requirements of fuel and sanitizers materials. 11. Little allocations of the provincial development plan to establish and replace of water grids. 12. Insufficient fuel to operate working generators.	1. Interest of official in water sector from the ministry of the province because of the close link of this sector with citizen's life and health, by providing necessary allocations to hold projects and water complexes, also providing the projects operational requirement, sanitizer's materials and filtering. 2. Existence of Kut central water project in addition to other 5 complexes of different capacities. 3. Existence of project under implementation of Kut grand water project with capacity of 10000 m3/hour designed for year 2030. 4. Existence of engineering & technical staff specialized in water works which give our department the possibility of supervising and following the construction of projects and complexes. 5. Existence of accumulated expertise in water sector possible to benefit from especially for improving new staff capabilities. 6. Existence of special section care for new technologies at work like the GIS system. 7. Availability of 3 central laboratories in Kut, Sewara and Hay districts.
Wasit	Youth and sport dir.	Youth and Sport services	Yes	2016	1. Little financial allocations. 2. Lack of sufficient financial & administrative powers. 3. Lack of approved administrative structure in addition for job description. 4. Poor staff distribution. 5. Lack of laboratories supplies. 6. Not activating of researches unit. 7. Not including the youths in decision-making. 8. Lack of building for the women forum. 9. Lack of machineries for playgrounds and yards rehabilitation. 10. Centralized employment.	1. Availability of programs specialized staff by %75. 2. Availability of infrastructure like playgrounds and youth centers by %80. 3. Preparing plans and programs related to implementing activities by the directorate.