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MIDLINE REPORT FOR IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE PEACE THROUGH DEVELOPMENT PHASE II (PDEV II) PROJECT IN CHAD, NIGER, AND BURKINA FASO

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Executive Summary

This report presents the results of the mid-line analysis of the impact of the Peace through Development (P-DEV II) program on a series of outcomes related to countering violent extremism and strengthening community resilience in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. We use a combination of survey data, program activity trackers and quarterly reports, and qualitative data collected in all of the zones in which the P-DEV II program was active in the three countries. The evaluation consists of the analysis of data from baseline surveys conducted in each of the three countries in 2013 along with new interviews conducted in 2015-2016 in order to determine whether P-DEV II activities led to changes in community and individual-level outcomes corresponding to the primary goals of the program: improving social cohesion, resilience to violent extremism, and improving the educational and employment outlook for youth.

The basic design of the impact evaluation consists of comparisons between core zones and non-core zones in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Core zones are areas that were designated by International Relief and Development (IRD), the implementing entity for P-DEV II, and USAID for exposure to the full array of P-DEV II program activities, while non-core zones are areas that received or were expected to receive only the program's media treatments, primarily radio programming related to good governance and countering violent extremism among youth. The program operated in a total of 83 zones in the three countries—40 core and 43 non-core. Baseline survey data was collected in 2013 on 7,720 respondents in the 83 zones, following procedures described in Finkel et al. (2014).[1] Mid-line survey data was collected in 2015-2016 on 2,577 respondents in the same 83 zones, with 2,080 representing "fresh" respondents and 497 being follow-up (or "panel") participants who were also interviewed in the baseline wave of data collection.

The longitudinal structure of the data allows for estimation of "difference-in-differences" (DiD) in program outcomes, that is, over time comparison of the changes in program-relevant outcomes in core zones and changes in program-relevant outcomes in non-core zones from the baseline interviews to the midline. The DiD represents the estimated effect that can be attributed to the non-radio potion of P-DEV II programming, This basic comparison between core and non-core zones in terms of changes over time is then supplemented with more nuanced analyses. First, we make use of the quarterly P-DEV II activity trackers to determine which zones in each country received more and less extensive programmatic activities, and we attempt to ascertain whether the intensity of P-DEV II activities is associated with stronger or weaker program impact. Second, we exploit the panel portion of the study to determine whether *individual-level* increases in exposure to activities led to changes in outcomes, i.e., whether individuals who reported increased exposure to different aspects of the program in the intervening periods of data collection showed greater impact than individuals who participated less in program activities. Third, we conduct analyses of program impact on measures of support for violent extremism that are gauged with innovative "list" and "endorsement" experimental methods designed to overcome potential social desirability biases associated with

[1] Steven E. Finkel, Reynaldo Rojo Mendoza, Cassilde Schwartz, Chris Belasco, and Aaron Abbarno. 2014. "Baseline Report for Impact Evaluation of the Peace through Development Program II (P-DEV II) in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso." Report submitted to USAID/West Africa.

responses to sensitive questions. Finally, we conducted an extensive series of qualitative interviews and focus groups in order to supplement the quantitative analyses and arrive at a more nuanced understanding of potential program impacts.

Data Collection

The survey instrument developed for the P-DEV II baseline study was used as the basis for the midline impact evaluation. Two survey instruments, one developed by IRD-InterMedia and the other by the EAS team serve as the foundation for the evaluation. The original survey was developed by IRD-InterMedia in consultation with USAID personnel, and served as the instrument for the first wave of interviews conducted in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso between March and September 2013. The EAS evaluation team designed a second survey instrument that built on the one previously designed by IRD-InterMedia in order to improve and extend the work that had already been done. The EAS survey instrument kept 65% of the items in the original IRD-InterMedia survey instrument in order to combine information from both samples into a single data set that enhances the quality of the evaluation. This survey was altered slightly for purposes of the mid-line data collection, with approximately 25 questions being eliminated in order to shorten interview time.

We selected 19 indicators, or outcome measures, for analysis, each relating to one of the three specific and measurable goals of the P-DEV II program:

Goal 1: Improvements in social cohesion through generation of the norms and networks that enable collective action as measured through groups and networks, increased trust within networks and among strangers, increased social inclusion, and improved ability of communities to communicate among each other and with other communities.

Specific Indicators related to this goal include: Interpersonal Trust, Institutional Trust, Perceptions of Inclusive Community Decision-Making, Political Participation, and Support for Interethnic Marriage.

Goal 2: Resilience to violent extremism through reduction of risk to vulnerable individuals who could become radicalized to the point of being willing to use violence by strengthening factors that enable vulnerable individuals to resist violent extremism. This includes attitudes toward violence and extremist ideologies, community leadership, social and political engagement.

Specific Indicators related to this goal include: Perceived Access to Jobs, Perceived Access to Vocational Schools, Political Efficacy, Perceived Ethnic Differences, Perceived Religious Differences, Belief in the Justifiability of Religious Violence, Belief that Violence is Effective, Belief in the Justifiability of Violence in the Name of Islam, and Belief that the U.S. is at war with Islam.

Goal 3: Improvements in youth outlook through the individual and collective vision of the future, in outlooks on: economic outcomes, participation in civil society and local decision making, attitudes toward existing and potential conflict in their societies, and expectations regarding the education and learning environment.

Specific Indicators related to this goal include: Life Satisfaction, Economic Outlook, Perceived Gender Inclusiveness of Middle Schools, Interest in Community Affairs, and Political Knowledge.

The EAS team utilized its Burkina-based partner Centre d'Etudes, de Recherches et de Formation pour le Développement Economique et Social (CERFODES) for data collection, which worked with local partners Association Tchadienne pour l'Étude de la Population (ATEP) in Chad and Cabinet d'Expertise Suivi-Evaluation (CESEV) in Niger. The EAS Team conducted follow-up survey data collection in all 83 core and non-core zones in which baseline data was collected. The initial plan was to collect interviews with 25 new ("fresh") randomly selected respondents in all zones, along with follow-up data collection in the 35 EAS zones with 25 of the same respondents ("panel") identified during the baseline wave per zone. Panel interviews were not possible in the IRD zones because of the lack of identifying information collected from respondents during the baseline phase (as follow-up interviews with the same individuals were not envisioned by IRD/USAID at that time). Unforeseen bureaucratic issues in Chad, however, led to a significant delay in the data collection, and it was decided to eliminate the "panel" portion of the study there in order to complete the midline analysis in a timely fashion. In all, 2,577 interviews were conducted in the midline phase. The table below shows the dates of data collection, the number of new interviews, panel interviews, and core and non-core zones per country.

Summary of Midline Data Collection

Country	Date	Zones		# of Interviews	
		Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
Chad	March – April 2016	15	14	376	349
Niger	Aug. – Nov. 2015	15	16	360 (Fresh) 129 (Panel)	420 (Fresh) 121 (Panel)
Burkina Faso	Aug. – Nov. 2015	10	13	252 (Fresh) 101 (Panel)	323 (Fresh) 146 (Panel)
		40	43	1,218	1,359
Total Interviews					2,577

Data collection was led by CERFODES technical lead Ms. Nacambo and supervised by Dr. Belasco. Burkina Faso data collection began August 24, 2015, and was suspended between 17 September and 23 October following the coup d'état in the country. Data collection resumed 20 October with additional interviews collected through the week of 2 November. In Niger data collection began August 31, 2016 concluded November 10, 2016 after additional interviews were conducted to ensure balance among questionnaire types and gender. Unforeseen security issues prevented data collection from occurring at the same time in Chad. Data collection there occurred for fresh interviews only from March 21-April 3, 2016.

Survey results showed that baseline and midline respondents were generally quite similar in terms of basic demographics, with the exception that midline respondents were slightly less religious (measured as the average number of days per week on which the respondent attends religious service) and somewhat more educated. These differences, however, were reflected in both core and non-core zones, so do not represent a significant confound in the statistical analyses.

Qualitative data was collected by CERFODES in Burkina Faso and by project partner Cabinet d'Analyses et d'Actions pour la Sécurité et la Paix (CASPA) in Niger. Midline qualitative data collection included 10 focus groups and 12 interviews conducted in

Burkina Faso and 10 focus groups and 21 interviews conducted in Niger among a strategic selection of actors implementing the radio, community leadership, youth leadership strengthening, Imam and Quranic school training, and vocational training activities. Given the diverse nature of the recipients, these will be complemented by external review of the training and strengthening activities.

The EAS team held separate focus groups for women, led by women, to encourage participation and free exchange of opinion. All materials including the interview and focus group field notes have been utilized to incorporate qualitative findings into the midline report.

Analysis

Scope of P-DEV II Activities

P-DEV II activity trackers indicate that as of 3-31-2015, a total of more than 1,400 zone-specific activities had been carried out, which corresponds to an average of about 33 activities per zone. (National activities that affect all zones are excluded from these totals). The minimum value of activities implemented in a core zone is two, and the maximum value is 74. There are some noticeable differences between the three countries in terms of how many activities were carried out in each. In Chad, the mean value of activities implemented in the core zones is 23, whereas this figure is 27 for Niger and 60 for Burkina Faso. There are relatively more activities relating to P-DEV II strategic objectives #1 (Youth Empowered) and #3 (Civil Society Capacity) compared to activities relating to strategic objectives #2 (Moderate Voices) and #4 (Strengthened Local Government). These differences were generally consistent across the three country contexts.

Estimation of P-DEV II Program Impact

The basic analyses consisted of standard DiD regression models to estimate the impact of P-DEV II programming in core versus non-core zones. In equation form, the DiD model is expressed as:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Core_i + \beta_2 Wave_t + \beta_3 Core_i * Wave_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where Y (a given outcome) at a given point in time is equal to: a common intercept or starting point (α), an effect (β_1) of whether the individual is in a core zone or not, an effect (β_2) of a given wave of observation (baseline versus midline) on all individuals, an interaction effect (β_3) of wave of observation with core zone status, and an idiosyncratic error term (ε_{it}). Taking differences in the above equation means that the non-core zones change over time is represented by β_2, and the core zones change over time is $\beta_2 + \beta_3$, with the "difference in differences" in the two groups being β_3. This coefficient represents the DiD causal effect of the treatment. We estimate this model for the pooled (three-country) sample in order to arrive at the overall DiD impact of P-DEV II, and we estimate an additional variant which allows country-by-country impacts to be estimated as well.

Results

We summarize the results of the quantitative analyses in the table below. We show positive significant effects of the program, i.e., in line with P-DEV II program goals, in green, and negative significant effects, i.e., in the "wrong" direction, in red. Effects that were registered in the pooled cross-country analysis are shown in bold faced capital

letters.

Summary of Results

	Core vs. Non-core	Low Intensity Core vs. Non-core	High Intensity Core vs. Non-core	Panel Analysis
Social Cohesion				
Interpersonal Trust			Chad Niger Burkina	
Institutional Trust				Burkina
Community Decision-Making	Burkina	Burkina	Chad	
Political Participation			Burkina	Niger
Interethnic Marriage	Chad	Chad POOLED	Burkina	
Resilience to Extremism				
Access to Jobs			Chad Burkina POOLED	
Access to Vocational Schools	Chad Burkina	Burkina	Chad	Burkina
Political Efficacy	Burkina	Burkina		
Perceived Ethnic Differences	Burkina		Burkina	Niger
Perceived Religious Differences	Burkina		Burkina	Niger
Justifiability of Religious Violence	Burkina	POOLED	Burkina	
Violence is Effective			Chad Burkina	Niger
Justifiability of Violence in the Name of Islam			Burkina	Niger
U.S. is at war with Islam	Chad Niger Burkina POOLED	Chad Niger Burkina POOLED	Chad Niger Burkina	Niger
Youth Outlook				
Life Satisfaction			Niger	
Economic Outlook	Burkina		Chad Niger Burkina	Burkina
Inclusiveness of Middle Schools	Chad		Chad	Niger
Interest in Community Affairs			Chad Niger Burkina	
Political Knowledge	Niger Burkina POOLED	Niger Burkina	Niger Burkina POOLED	Niger

Key: Positive Effect (Statistically Significant); Negative Effect (Statistically Significant)

The results may be summarized as follows:

When outcomes were pooled across all three countries, there were only two indicators of the 19 analyzed in which a statistically significant pooled DiD effect of core zone versus non-core zone status was found (see Section III-B). **This means that on the overwhelming majority of outcomes relevant to the goals of the P-DEV II program, there was no detectable general difference across countries in the trends over time between core and non-core zones, although, as noted, the pooled effects may mask important country-specific effects.** Positive pooled DiD effects were found on political knowledge (a two-item measure of respondent's factual knowledge about the President's length of term and the number of seats in the national legislature), and on the respondent's perception that the US is *not* at war with Islam.

An examination of the country-specific effects showed numerous significant impacts of the program, especially in Burkina Faso (see Section III-B). This may reflect the substantially greater number of P-DEV II activities carried out on average in Burkina core zones than in the two other countries. Significant DiD estimates of positive program impact were noted on eight indicators in Burkina Faso, five of which related to Program Goal 2, Resilience to Violent Extremism: access to vocational schools, political efficacy, reduced perceptions of ethnic and religious differences, and reduced justifiability of religious violence**. Burkina core zones also increased more than non-core zones on perceptions of the inclusiveness of community decision-making, political knowledge, and general economic outlook, though core zones in Burkina *increased* more on the perception that the US is at war with Islam**.

The pattern of significant results suggests null findings in Chad and Niger. There were few significant DiD impacts in Chad or Niger (see Section III-B), with three significant positive impacts for core zones differences relative to non-core zones in Chad (support for interethnic marriage, decreased perception of the US at war with Islam, and increased support for gender inclusiveness in middle schools), and two in Niger (decreased perception of the US at war with Islam and political knowledge).

Analysis of DiD impacts in "high intensity" zones – i.e., those with greater than average total P-DEV II activities – shows one additional significant pooled (cross-country) impacts of the program, on perceived access to jobs (see Section III-C). Differences over time on this indicator in the high-intensity core zones were greater than differences in the non-core zones. Two additional indicators — the (un)justifiability of religious violence and support for interethnic marriage — show significant pooled effects in *low*-intensity zones compared to non-core zones, though in both cases these effects reduce to nearly zero in the high intensity P-DEV II zones.

Country-by-country "high intensity" zone analysis showed a mixed pattern of impacts: greater numbers of indicators in Burkina were significant in the high-intensity zones, especially those pertaining to Resilience to Extremism (see Section III-C). Altogether 10 of the 19 indicators showed significant DiD impacts in Burkina Faso when comparing high intensity core zones to non-core zones. At the same time, three indicators in those Burkina Faso zones also moved anomalously in the "wrong" direction, all related to Resilience to Violent Extremism. Similarly, in Chad and Niger there were sporadic positive impacts in high-intensity zones (4 in Chad, 2 in Niger) along with effects in the "wrong" direction (5 in Chad, 4 in Niger) in terms of the goals of the P-DEV II program.

Analysis of the panel portion of the data failed to replicate the core findings of the zone-level analyses (see Section III-D), likely due to the small number of individuals in each zone who were re-interviewed from the baseline wave limiting our statistical power to detect small program effects, along with other difficulties in the panel portion of the data collection described earlier**. The results did show that individuals' experiences with activities related to countering violent extremism increased in the core zones compared to individuals in the non-core zones over time. But few of those changes were associated positively with changes in those same individuals' attitudes and perception since the baseline interviews.** Both positive and negative program effects are observed in the panel analysis in Niger and Burkina Faso, though overall pattern of results in panel analysis in the two countries probably reflect essentially null effects of the program in both countries. All of the impacts found were relatively small in substantive magnitude, with a few reaching significance in the positive direction and a few in the negative direction. Similar balance between "near significant" effects were found in the positive and negative direction as well. All of this suggests that, from the panel analysis, we obtain a picture of generally null overall impacts in Chad and Niger.

The study included two "list experiments" and one "endorsement" experiment designed to measure in unobtrusive or indirect ways the respondent's willingness to consider engaging in specific acts of violent extremism or express approval of groups which engage in violent acts (see Section III-E). **The results of these analyses suggest that there is a sizable pool of individuals in all country contexts who would support "an attack on [a] Western country's embassy that could result in military or civilian casualties" (list experiment #1), who would consider "joining a group that carries out acts of violence to defend your religion" (list experiment #2), or who would be more likely to oppose a polio vaccination program if they are told that "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Islamist group, will oppose this program" (endorsement experiment #1)**. These figures range from approximately 10-25% of the sampled populations. In general, however, there were no detectable P-DEV II core zone impacts on these outcomes, in that respondents in the core zones and non-core zones showed similar trends in these outcomes over time.

Examination of key informant interviews and focus groups in Burkina Faso and Niger showed that attitudes relating to program goals have deteriorated in the countries since the 2013 baseline data collection, providing context relating to support for toward violent extremism. While P-DEV II has targeted communities in order to build resilience against violent extremism, the rise in violent incidents that has occurred since baseline data collection may lead to increased perceptions of legitimacy for violent extremism. This is particularly true in Niger where perceptions of program effects are weaker and Boko Haram has strengthened its presence. **Community tensions exist in Burkina Faso in the struggle over land and natural resources and in inter-religious tolerance. In both countries, factors that leave youth feeling neglected also tend to facilitate extremist recruitment and draw young people into violence**. Participants in the qualitative data collection noted positive influences from P-DEV II programs in their countries but suggest that programs of this sort must be expanded reach more people, and thus to combat the problems of frustration and limited opportunity that can undermine peace.

The Context of Violence within the P-DEV II Program Area

The P-DEV II program region encountered increased exposure to violence following the baseline data collection wave. According to the Armed Conflict and Local Event Data Project only Niamey, Niger was exposed to Islamist violence prior to the baseline.[2] However, by the midline data collection, nearly 20 percent of all communes were the targets of Islamist attacks.

Between 2014 and 2016, target zones in Chad, Burkina Faso, and Niger were exposed to multiple attacks by Islamist groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamist State. Overall, 1,330 individuals died as a result of violent Islamist incidents perpetrated in target zones. Nearly three quarters of those fatalities occurred in the Nigerien cities of Diffa, Bosso, and N'Guimi. While the Islamic State and other groups such as the Al Mourabitoune Battalion and Ansar Dine were active in the region, Boko Haram was responsible for nearly 99% of all fatalities and 86% of all incidents. Most attacks (78%) were targeted at military officials and other security forces, while in 22% of all incidents civilians were the direct targets of the attack. Diffa, Niger (29%), Bosso, Niger (28%) and Bol, Chad (18%) were the three target zones most vulnerable to Islamist attacks.

In Burkina Faso, the cities of Djibo, Markoye, Ouagadougou, and Tongomayel were particularly vulnerable to Islamist attacks. The Al Mourabitoune Battalion backed by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb attacked military forces and tourists in both Ouagadougou and Djibo, while the Islamic State became active in the border town of Markoye, where they attacked military forces. Another Al-Qaeda-affiliated group, Ansaroul Islam, was active in Djibo and Tongomayel. Ansaroul Islam conducted attacks against individuals who had deserted the group, including a local imam.

In Chad, more than three quarters of the attacks that took place between 2014 and 2016 were targeted at civilians and security forces in the town of Bol, in the Mamdi Department of the Lac Region. Boko Haram was responsible for all attacks in the city. Boko Haram conducted indiscriminate attacks, including suicide bombings in a fish market and at the Bougama military post. Boko Haram occasionally used children to conduct their attacks against civilians. N'Djamena was also the target of multiple suicide bombings, targeted at police headquarters, the national police academy, but also the central market and most recently the U.S. embassy.

In Niger, most attacks were concentrated in the cities of Diffa and Bosso. In both target zones, Boko Haram was the unique perpetrator of the attacks. The group frequently set fire to victims, homes, and vehicles, as well as markets. The group also resorted to suicide bombers to attack military convoys and other military posts. In several instances, Nigerien troops managed to repel Boko Haram's attacks, and successfully killed several hundreds of the group's members.

Increased exposure to violence, particularly by Boko Haram in Chad and Niger, may affect whether changes in attitudes occurred as anticipated by the P-DEV II program. As the security situation deteriorated, worsening of attitudes seen in measures of institutional trust, life satisfaction, and political participation reflect the context of violence within the affected zones. Program activities were concentrated within certain zones countries where violence was most prevalent. While there is a possibility that violence and P-DEV

[2] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project (Raleigh *et al.* 2010).

II program implementation could be related to each other, both impact attitudes of resilience toward violent extremism. However, violence is not expected to overturn the program results. Endline analysis could control for violence in order to account for its effect when measuring program impact.

Sahel Political Context at P-DEV II Midline

Program midline evaluation coincided with election schedules in all three P-DEV II Countries, causing data collection to occur at a time of heightened political discourse.

Data collection in Burkina Faso occurred August-November 2015. These activities were interrupted during the coup d'etat launched 16 September 2015, during which 11 people died and more than 250 people were injured in attacks and political protests. Data collection resumed after 23 September after CERFODES determined that it could safely resume operations. However, we found that people were equally willing after the coup occurred as before to respond to the items in our survey. With new elections originally to be held October 11, 2015 (rescheduled to November 29, 2015).

Niger data collection occurred August-November 2015, three months prior to National Assembly and first-round presidential elections in the country. With unforeseen security issues delaying activity in Chad until March 2016, data collection concluded one week prior to the 10 April presidential election.

Increased political discourse may affect attitudes seen in measures of political participation, political efficacy, and political knowledge. With increases found in political participation, political knowledge, and interest in community affairs are in each country, survey respondents may be responding to messaging by parties and leaders during and prior to the electoral cycles in the three countries.

Implications for Future Work

The overall pattern of results found in the report has several implications for future work. First, it is clear that the P-DEV II program did not have consistent impacts across the three country contexts, as there were detectable differences in the trends over time in pooled core versus non-core zones on only two indicators out of the 19 analyzed. Instead, there was significant country-by-country variation in program impact: program effects were strongest in Burkina Faso, where positive impacts were registered in some way (core versus non-core zone, high intensity core zones versus non-core) on a majority of the 19 indicators, with substantially fewer and weaker effects registered in Chad and Niger. At the same time there were several anomalous effects in the "wrong direction" in all countries. This means future work will probably need to conduct more detailed analyses on a country-by-country basis, which will require additional numbers of interviews within each county in order to approach requisite levels of statistical power. Second, while it is possible that significant effects would be uncovered in theoretically meaningful subgroups of the population (e.g., men versus women, young versus old, rich versus poor), the fact that relatively few impacts were seen in the overall individual country samples—especially in Chad and Niger—means that detecting these potential impacts will be extremely challenging, requiring again substantially more interviews in the endline data collection phase. Finally, the lack of meaningful or consistent results emerging from the panel portion of the analysis suggests that it may not be wise to continue these efforts in subsequent data collection waves, given the low payoff relative to the high cost of

collecting data on the same individuals over time.

I. Introduction

A. Overview of Report

This report presents the results of the mid-line analysis of the impact of the Peace through Development (P-DEV II) program on a series of outcomes related to countering violent extremism and strengthening community resilience in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. We use a combination of survey data, program activity trackers and quarterly reports, and qualitative data collected in all of the zones in which the P-DEV II program was active in the three countries. The evaluation consists of the analysis of data from baseline surveys conducted in each of the three countries in 2013 along with new interviews conducted in 2015-2016 in order to determine whether P-DEV II activities led to changes in community and individual-level outcomes corresponding to the primary goals of the program: improving social cohesion, resilience to violent extremism, and improving the educational and employment outlook for youth.

The basic design of the impact evaluation consists of comparisons between core zones and non-core zones in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Core zones are areas that were designated by IRD (the implementing entity for P-DEV II) and USAID for exposure to the full array of P-DEV II program activities, while non-core zones are areas that received or were expected to receive only the program's media treatments, primarily radio programming related to good governance and countering violent extremism among youth. The program operated in a total of 83 zones in the three countries—40 core and 43 non-core. Baseline survey data was collected in 2013 on 7,720 respondents in the 83 zones, following procedures described in Finkel et al. (2014).[3] Mid-line survey data was collected in 2015-2016 on 2,577 respondents in the same 83 zones, with 2,080 representing "fresh" respondents and 497 being follow-up (or "panel") participants who were also interviewed in the baseline wave of data collection.

The longitudinal structure of the data allows for estimation of "difference-in-differences" (DiD) in program outcomes, that is, over time comparison of the changes in program-relevant outcomes in core zones and changes in program-relevant outcomes in non-core zones from the baseline interviews to the midline. The DiD represents the estimated effect that can be attributed to the non-radio portion of P-DEV II programming, and these results, presented in Section III-B below, are the core findings of this report. This basic comparison between core and non-core zones in terms of changes over time will then be supplemented with more nuanced analyses. First, we make use of the quarterly P-DEV II activity trackers to determine which zones in each country received more and less extensive programmatic activities, and we attempt to ascertain whether the intensity of P-DEV II activities is associated with stronger or weaker program impact (Section III-C). Second, we exploit the panel portion of the study to determine whether *individual-level* increases in exposure to activities led to changes in outcomes, i.e., whether individuals who reported increased exposure to different aspects of the program in the intervening periods of data collection showed greater impact than individuals who participated less in program activities (Section III-D). Third, we conduct analyses of program impact on

[3] Steven E. Finkel, Reynaldo Rojo Mendoza, Cassilde Schwartz, Chris Belasco, and Aaron Abbarno. 2014. "Baseline Report for Impact Evaluation of the Peace through Development Program II (P-DEV II) in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso." Report submitted to USAID/West Africa.

measures of support for violent extremism that are gauged with innovative “list” and “endorsement” experimental methods designed to overcome potential social desirability biases associated with responses to sensitive questions (Section III-D). Finally, we conducted an extensive series of qualitative interviews and focus groups in order to supplement the quantitative analyses and arrive at a more nuanced understanding of potential program impacts. A description of the qualitative data collection and findings can be found below in Section IV.

B. Description of the Peace through Development (P-DEV II) Program

The Peace through Development II (P-DEV II) program is a multi-year development program whose main objective is to counter extremist violence and adherence to extremist ideologies in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. P-DEV II is the largest United States Agency for International Development/West Africa (USAID/WA)-funded program specifically designed for this purpose. P-DEV II activities are organized and structured to maximize the impact of the program in achieving its purpose. Under the overarching framework of countering violent extremism (CVE) through social and political development, P-DEV II has four multi-faceted, strategic objectives (SO):

SO 1: Youth More Empowered through expanded livelihoods, vocational and entrepreneurial skills training, civic education, capacity building for youth associations, and leadership training to increase participation in local decision making by young men and women;

SO 2: Moderate Voices Increased through integrated radio, social media, civic education, and conflict resolution activities, enhanced quality and credible information, and positive dialogue;

SO 3: Civil Society Capacity Increased through formal and informal training, strengthened advocacy skills, citizen-led accountability initiatives and issue-based campaigns integrated with radio and social media and enhanced through civil society organizations (CSO) coalitions and networks;

SO 4: Local Government Strengthened through organized and enhanced community entities and CSO capacity, greater citizen participation, and training in public administration, transparency, advocacy, and government outreach, and integrated with radio and social media.

P-DEV II seeks to advance these four SO by concentrating its efforts on three more specific and measurable goals:

Goal 1: Improvements in social cohesion through generation of the norms and networks that enable collective action as measured through groups and networks, increased trust within networks and among strangers, increased social inclusion, and improved ability of communities to communicate among each other and with other communities.

Goal 2: Resilience to violent extremism through reduction of risk to vulnerable individuals who could become radicalized to the point of being willing to use violence by strengthening factors that enable vulnerable individuals to resist violent extremism. This includes attitudes toward violence and extremist ideologies, community leadership, social and political engagement.

Goal 3: Improvements in youth outlook through the individual and collective vision of the futures, in outlooks on: economic outcomes, participation in civil society and local decision making, attitudes toward existing and potential conflict in their societies, and expectations regarding the education and learning environment.

The expectation is that furthering these goals would provide the foundation for communities that are more united by tolerance rather than extreme ideology, that are less likely to experience extremist violence, and that provide a more promising future for its members. Taken together, the attainment of these goals would build stronger and more resilient communities, which would constitute a powerful deterrent against violent extremism, extremist ideologies, and support for terrorist groups.

P-DEV II conducts a range of activities in order to accomplish the program goals of social cohesion, resilience to violent extremism, and improved youth outlook. Project partners Search for Common Ground, The Salam Institute, and Equal Access subcontract implementation for these activities from IRD.

P-DEV II activities that support the strategic objective of youth empowerment include: vocational training and the provision of livelihood assistance; literacy training for adults; provision of grants and in-kind resources to community schools; training youth in leadership and the conduct of conflict resolution activities such as participatory theater and media production; and support for community events with youth participation.

P-DEV II activities that support the strategic objective of increased moderate voices include: Media outlets trained and assistance provided to radio stations in order to establish or improve broadcast capabilities; the distribution of public information through campaigns; the production of radio shows with themes of peace and tolerance; and the training of imams and the facilitation of intra-faith interreligious dialogue activities.

P-DEV II activities that support the strategic objective of increased civil society capacity to address community issues include: civil society training; citizen advocacy training, and the formation of Community Action Committees; and support for community events.

P-DEV II activities that support the strengthening local government include: Local government official capacity building; provision of grants and in-kind assistance to communities in support of development outcomes.

We will discuss the nature and scope of the P-DEV II activities conducted between baseline and midline data collection in more detail in the results (Section III-A) below.

II. Survey Data Collection Overview

This section contains summary details for the data collection periods for the baseline and midline survey data collection, sample characteristics and statistical power for the Midline analysis. Details regarding the survey data collection instrument, enumerator training and panel verification procedures as well as descriptions of data collection procedures for qualitative and activity tracker analysis are included in Appendix A.

B. Baseline and Midline Survey Data Collection

Baseline data collection was conducted in core and non-core zones in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. In 2013, two surveys were conducted in each country, one by IRD in conjunction with InterMedia, and one by the EAS Team. IRD-InterMedia went to the field for data collection in March 2013 for Chad and Niger, and in September 2013 for Burkina

Faso. The first interviews for the EAS Team were conducted in Chad on September 16 and the field period lasted until November 16. In Burkina Faso the data collection began on September 30 and the field period lasted until October 12. Due to a delay in Niger, the first official interviews occurred on November 10 and the field period lasted until November 30.

IRD-InterMedia baseline data collection was conducted in 15 target zones (8 core, 7 non-core) in Chad, 20 target zones (10 core, 10 non-core) in Niger, and 13 target zones (7 core, 6 non-core) in Burkina Faso. The EAS Team baseline data collection was conducted in 15 target zones (7 core, 8 non-core) in Chad, 10 target zones (5 core, 5 non-core) in Niger, and 10 target zones (3 core, 7 non-core) in Burkina Faso. This brings total baseline data collection to 83 target zones (40 core, 43 non-core): 30 in Chad, 30 in Niger, and 23 in Burkina Faso. Table 1 summarizes the baseline data collection timeline, the number of sampled zones, and number of interviews conducted per country and zone.

Table 1: Summary of Baseline Data Collection

Survey/Country		Date	Zones		# of Interviews	
			Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
IRD-InterMedia	Chad	March 2013	8	7	640	560
	Niger	March 2013	10	10	819	790
	Burkina Faso	September 2013	6	7	481	560
			24	24	1,940	1,910
EAS	Chad	Sept.-Oct. 2013	7	8	774	881
	Niger	November 2013	5	5	551	550
	Burkina Faso	Sept.-Oct. 2013	4	6	445	669
			16	19	1,770	2,100
Total Interviews					3,710	4,010

The EAS team utilized its Burkina-based partner Centre d'Etudes, de Recherches et de Formation pour le Développement Economique et Social (CERFODES) for data collection, which worked with local partners Association Tchadienne pour l'Étude de la Population (ATEP) in Chad and Cabinet d'Expertise Suivi-Evaluation (CESEV) in Niger. The EAS Team conducted follow-up survey data collection in all 83 core and non-core zones in which baseline data was collected. The initial plan was to collect interviews with 25 new ("fresh") randomly selected respondents in all zones, along with follow-up data collection in the 35 EAS zones with 25 of the same respondents ("panel") identified during the baseline wave per zone. Panel interviews were not possible in the IRD zones because of the lack of identifying information collected from respondents during the baseline phase (as follow-up interviews with the same individuals were not envisioned by IRD/USAID at that time). Unanticipated security issues in Chad, however, led to a significant delay in the data collection, and it was decided to eliminate the "panel" portion of the study there in order to complete the midline analysis in a timely fashion. In all, 2,577 interviews were conducted in the midline phase. Table 2 shows the dates of data collection, the number of new interviews, panel interviews, and core and non-core zones per country.

Table 2: Summary of Midline Data Collection

Country	Date	Zones		# of Interviews	
		Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
Chad	March – April 2016	15	14	376	349
Niger	Aug. – Nov. 2015	15	16	360 (Fresh) 129 (Panel)	420 (Fresh) 121 (Panel)
Burkina Faso	Aug. – Nov. 2015	10	13	252 (Fresh) 101 (Panel)	323 (Fresh) 146 (Panel)
		40	43	1,218	1,359
Total Interviews					2,577

While baseline data collection totaled 7,720 interviews with an average sample size of 93 interviews per target zone, the midline contained only 25 interviews in IRD zones and 50 interviews in EAS zones (25 new, 25 panel) due to budget constraints and to optimize statistical power. Due to budget considerations, midline data collection maximized available resources to the extent possible without sacrificing the rigor of the evaluation.

Data Collection Timeline

Data collection was led by CERFODES technical lead Ms. Nacambo and supervised by Dr. Belasco. Burkina Faso data collection began August 24, 2015, and was suspended between September 17 and October 23 following the coup d'état in the country. Data collection resumed October 20 with additional interviews collected through the week of November 2. In Niger data collection began August 31, 2015 and concluded November 10, 2016 after additional interviews were conducted to ensure balance among questionnaire types and gender. Administrative issues associated with authorization for data collection from the Chadian Department of NGOs prevented data collection from occurring at the same time in Chad.

C. Sample Characteristics, Baseline and Midline Surveys

In this section, we present a basic demographic profile of the three countries under study. Table 3 illustrates descriptive statistics for our sample, broken down by baseline/midline survey and non-core/core zone. The table shows that the sample is evenly split between men and women as well as youth and non-youth (the latter being defined as respondents above the age of 30). For these two variables, gender and age, the differences between baseline and midline survey as well as between core and non-core zones are therefore negligible. In addition, baseline and midline respondents exhibit little difference in terms of poverty. To measure poverty, we created an additive index denoting how many out of twelve possible household items such as a fridge, TV, and radio respondents have in their household. Baseline and midline respondents exhibit little difference in terms of poverty, with respondents owning between two and three of these items. For both the baseline and midline survey, respondents in the core zones are slightly richer than those in the non-core zones. In addition, respondents in the core zones are somewhat more educated (measured as the percentage of respondents who are illiterate, and the percentage of respondents who have at least completed primary education) than those in the non-core

zones, a pattern that can be observed for both the baseline and the midline. Overall, then, the baseline and midline respondents are quite similar in terms of basic demographics, with the exception that midline respondents are slightly less religious (measured as the average number of days per week on which the respondent attends religious service) and somewhat more educated. These differences, however, are reflected in both core and non-core zones.

Table 3: Demographic Profiles by Survey and Core Zone Status

	Baseline Survey		Midline Survey	
	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core
Male (%)	52.4	50.1	53.2	52.0
Age (mean)	34.1	32.9	35.2	34.8
Youth (%)	48.5	52.2	43.3	46.8
Illiteracy (%)	36.7	34.3	38.6	28.5
Primary + (%)	23.5	34.5	29.9	43.9
Religious attendance per week	5.1	5.2	4.1	4.2
Household Items (mean)	2.1	2.8	2.4	3.2

D. Statistical Power

For purposes of the evaluation, statistical power refers to the probability that, if the true effect of P-DEV II in core zones is of a given size, we will find statistically significant effects on the outcomes of interest. Statistical power is closely related to the sample size and to the number of “treatment” and “control” units included in the study (i.e., core/non-core zones or communes). As the sample size and the number of zones increases, and the lower the variance of the estimated effect of the program, the higher the power.

IRD-InterMedia and the EAS team collected baseline data in a total of 83 communes in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso (see Table 1 above). A total of 7,720 interviews were conducted with an average sample size of 93 interviews per commune. The study achieved high statistical power (>.90), given the large number of communes included in the study, even assuming relatively variable effect sizes across communes.

For the midline evaluation, the same number of communes from the baseline study (83 total) and an average sample size of 31 respondents per zone yielded lower but still acceptable levels of power. Figures 1 displays this graphically, with power generally greater than .90 depending on assumptions about effect size and variability across zones.

It should be noted, however, that the statistical power of the study is lower when considering country-specific effects, given that the number of zones per county ranges from 23 to 30. It is also the case that the relatively small number of interviews per zone is not sufficient to allow detailed and reliable sub-group analysis, for example comparing men and women, youth and non-youth, etc. The number of interviews per zone in the midline phase was curtailed due to budgetary constraints, with the likelihood that a larger number of respondents will be interviewed in the endline phase, where more extensive subgroup analysis will be conducted.



Figure 1: Midline Statistical Power by Total Number of Communes, N=31

III. Results

A. P-DEV II Program Activities, 2013-2015

We begin by providing information on the number and types of activities implemented in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso as part of the P-DEV II program. These figures were obtained from the Activity Trackers submitted by IRD and described in more detail above (Section II-E). As of 3-31-2015, a total of more than 1,400 activities had been carried out in the 43 core zones of the program (though of those, only 40 were surveyed for the midline), which corresponds to an average of about 33 activities per zone. The minimum value of activities implemented in a core zone is two, and the maximum value is 74. There are some noticeable differences between the three countries in terms of how many activities were carried out in each. In Chad, the mean value of activities implemented in the core zones is 23, whereas this figure is 27 for Niger and 60 for Burkina Faso.

Next, we break down the scope of the P-DEV II by type of activity. The activities carried out through the P-DEV II program are classified into twelve different categories. Each of these types relates to one of the four strategic objectives (SO):

SO #1: Youth more empowered

1.1. Expanded youth livelihoods
1.2. Increased access to education
1.3. Strengthened youth leadership
1.4. Increased youth mobilization

SO #2: Increased moderate voices

1.5. Increased capacity of media outlets
1.6. Increased access to quality information
1.7. Increased positive dialogue with religious leaders

SO #3: Increased civil society capacity

1.8. Increased CSO capacity
1.9. Increased citizen participation

SO #4: Strengthened local government

1.10. Improved local government capacity
1.11. Increased transparency and accountability in local decision-making
1.12. More participatory local development

Table 4 shows the average number of activities within each category implemented in the core zones. It can be seen that there are relatively numerous activities relating to strategic objectives #1 (Youth Empowered) and #3 (Civil Society Capacity), whereas those relating to strategic objectives #2 (Moderate Voices) and #4 (Strengthened Local Government) are relatively fewer. For example, in the average core zone, between three and four activities falling under category 1.3 “strengthened youth leadership” (such as participatory theater and mobile cinema) were carried out. Similarly, the average core zone saw the implementation of about six activities falling under category 1.4 “increased youth mobilization (such as the provision of sports equipment for municipalities, and youth-led awareness campaigns to promote peace/social cohesion). In stark contrast, only an average between one and two activities falling under category 2.3 “increased positive

dialogue with religious leaders" (such as imam training on peace and non-violence) were carried out in the core zones.

In addition, Table 4 reveals some interesting differences between the three countries. In Burkina Faso, each category saw the implementation of a number of activities greater than the pooled average, with the exception of category 2.3 "increased positive dialogue with religious leaders." Chad exhibits a concentration of activities relating to strategic objective #1 (Youth Empowered), and is the only country where a great number of category 2.3 "increased positive dialogue with religious leaders was implemented. In Niger, a activities were consolidated under large sub-awards at the regional level, resulting in a count of fewer commune-level activities in strategic objective #4 (Strengthened Local Government) were carried out.

Table 4: Average Number of Core Zone P-DEV II Activities Related to Each Strategic Objective

	Pooled	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso
SO #1: Youth Empowered				
1.1 Livelihood	3.116	1.857	1.158	8.600
1.2 Education	4.605	5.286	2.474	7.700
1.3 Leadership	3.814	2.500	4.000	5.300
1.4 Mobilization	6.000	4.857	5.947	7.700
SO #2: Increased Moderate Voices				
2.1 Media capacity	1.256	.286	2.000	1.200
2.2 Quality info	1.302	.714	1.632	1.500
2.3 Imam training	1.674	2.643	1.368	.900
SO #3: Civil Society Capacity				
3.1 CSO capacity	2.744	.429	1.632	8.100
3.2 Participation	4.605	1.714	5.105	7.700
SO #4: Local Government				
4.1 Local capacity	1.442	.071	.842	4.500
4.2 Transparency	1.558	1.000	.421	4.500
4.3 Development	1.163	1.429	.579	1.900

B. Difference in Differences Analysis, Core versus Non-Core Zones

This section presents an analysis of the impact of the P-DEV II program on a series of outcomes related to the program goals of social cohesion, resilience against violent extremism, and youth outlook. The goals are operationalized according to numerous indicators that, taken together, identify the main components of the program's strategic objectives. "Impact" refers to the differences in responses in the core zones between baseline and midline data collection compared to the differences in responses in non-core zones during the same time period (hence the term "difference in differences" to describe this kind of analysis). For the moment, we ignore differences in the amount of activities conducted across zones (what may be called "treatment intensity"), and focus only on the differences between core zones, those targeted for the full range of P-DEV activities, and non-core zones, where at most only P-DEV-II radio programming was implemented.

Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we present in a figure the distribution of each indicator in wave 1 and wave 2 zones within each country. Next, we present the results of statistical models to determine whether or not there are significant effects of the program on each indicator. These effects are calculated via the DiD approach: we regress goal-level indicators on dichotomous variables for core/non-core zones, wave 1/2, and country, as well as the interactions between these variables. If the program had the intended effects, we would see an improvement in core zones between wave 1 and 2 relative to the development of the indicator in non-core zones between wave 1 and 2.

In equation form, the DiD model is expressed as:

$$(1) \quad Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Core_i + \beta_2 Wave_t + \beta_3 Core_i * Wave_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where Y (a given outcome) at a given point in time is equal to: a common intercept or starting point (α), an effect (β_1) of whether the individual is in a core zone or not, an effect (β_2) of a given wave of observation (baseline versus midline) on all individuals, an interaction effect (β_3) of wave of observation with core zone status, and an idiosyncratic error term (ε_{it}). For individuals at each point in time, this equation reduces to:

$$(2) \quad \begin{aligned} &\text{Non-Core, Baseline:} && Y_{i0} = \alpha + \varepsilon_{i0} \\ &\text{Non-Core, Midline:} && Y_{i1} = \alpha + \beta_2 + \varepsilon_{i1} \\ &\text{Core, Baseline:} && Y_{i0} = \alpha + \beta_1 + \varepsilon_{i0} \\ &\text{Core, Midline:} && Y_{i1} = \alpha + \beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3 + \varepsilon_{i1} \end{aligned}$$

Taking differences means that the non-core zones change over time is represented by β_2, and the core zones change over time is $\beta_2 + \beta_3$, with the "difference in difference" in the two groups being β_3. This coefficient represents the DiD causal effect of the treatment.

We present the findings for each goal-level indicator exactly in line with these equations. The first row illustrates the average value for the respective indicator in each country's non-core zones during the first wave of the survey, i.e. before the implementation of the P-DEV II program (α). The second row shows the average difference between non-core and core zones for wave 1, and whether this difference is statistically significant (β_1). In

the third row, we present the average difference between non-core zones for wave 1 and non-core zones for wave 2, and whether this difference is statistically significant (β_2). This row can be understood as general developments in each country with respect to the indicator in question that are independent of the implementation and effects of the P-DEV II program.

The fourth row is the one in which the actual effects of the P-DEV II program are shown. Here, we take the difference between wave 2 core zones and wave 1 core zones and subtract the difference between wave 2 non-core zones and wave 1 non-core zones (i.e., β_3). If the value in the fourth row is statistically significant, it suggests that the change of the indicator in the core zones between waves is significantly different from the change in the non-core zones, which can be attributed to the implementation of the P-DEV II program. In addition to the effects for each country, the fourth row also contains a pooled treatment effect, which shows whether the program had a DiD effect when pooling all observations all three countries. For the reader's convenience, the fourth row is color-coded: coefficients representing a desired effect of the program are shown in green (i.e., effects leading to greater resistance to extremism, more positive outlooks, more social cohesion), whereas coefficients representing a detrimental effect of the program (less resistance, less positive outlooks, less social cohesion) are shown in red.

The models were run first for the pooled sample, which means that all countries were combined into a single analysis and the difference in differences for all core versus non-core P-DEV II zones was estimated, while allowing for country-specific initial levels and overall trends on the outcome between the baseline and endline. These results are shown as the "pooled" treatment effect in the tables that follow. We then interacted all of the variables in equation (1) by indicator variables corresponding to the specific countries so that, in essence, we estimate one model that characterizes the causal processes in the three different country contexts. We present the results of these analyses in separate columns for each country in the tables that follow. Standard errors for all regression coefficients are clustered by target zone, following standard procedures for grouped data of this kind.

Goal 1: Social Cohesion

Figures 2 through 6 as well as Tables 5 through 9 present the results for the series of questions related to Goal 1: Social Cohesion. Social cohesion is a broad concept that is captured through two separate indicators: 1) interpersonal and institutional trust; and 2) social inclusiveness in the community.

In summary, our DiD analysis reveals that few consistent positive social cohesion effects could be attributed to P-DEV II. There were no statistically significant pooled DiD treatment effects across the three countries for any of these indicators. Of five indicators of social cohesion, only interethnic marriage showed DiD effects that could be attributed to P-DEV II programming in the core versus non-core zones in Chad, and no DiD effects could be attributed to the program in Niger. Perceptions of ordinary people's involvement in community decision-making declined significantly less in P-DEV II core zones in Burkina Faso than in non-core zones from baseline to midline.

Interpersonal and Institutional Trust (higher values represent increased trust)

To measure interpersonal trust, respondents were asked whether they disagree or agree

that “most people are willing to help if you ask for help.” Figure 2 breaks down responses by country and wave. The figure shows that levels of interpersonal trust remained rather stable in Chad in Niger, while there appears to have been a noticeable drop in interpersonal trust in Burkina Faso, as more respondents overall disagreed with the statement.

Focus groups from Burkina Faso suggested that this drop in interpersonal trust could be a function of trends in migration and movement in the region. In Seytenga, participants noted that people (and especially younger people) often have difficulty accepting those perceived as outsiders, and patterns in climate change may be increasing the share of people perceived as such as they move to find better agricultural opportunities. Further, there is some concern—expressed, for example, in a focus group in Yatenga—that theft is becoming increasingly common, which in turn may be undermining interpersonal trust. These patterns may be viewed as broader social and environmental issues in the region that are creating greater challenges, even as the PDEV II initiative works to combat the consequences.



Figure 2: Interpersonal Trust

Table 5: Interpersonal Trust

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	2.295	2.298	2.616	X
Baseline Core Difference	.049	.025	-.229***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.016	.136	-.308***	X

Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.058	-.136	.163	-.032

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 5 shows that overall, there are no impacts in the table attributable to the P-DEV II program in terms of increasing interpersonal trust. Comparing country estimates of the treatment effect in core and non-core zones in Chad, Niger, Burkina, and the overall pooled treatment effect, we find no statistically significant differences over time.

Interpersonal trust in Burkina has declined between two waves; this decline is shown by the -.308 significant coefficient in row 3 of the table. While there was an overall decline in institutional trust in the country, in core zones there was a positive (but statistically insignificant) change in core zones. Using difference in differences analysis, we find no statistically significant differences in the core Burkina zones, indicating that the general decline in trust occurred in statistically indistinguishable ways in both core and non-core communes.

Institutional trust is measured through five individual trust items. Each respondent was presented with five separate statements: a) I trust local authorities; b) I trust the central government; c) I trust religious leaders; d) I trust NGOs; e) I trust the police. For each of these statements, they could choose among three options: disagree, neither, or agree. Figure 3 graphs the results of an additive index of the institutional trust items. It groups respondents into three categories depending on the number of institutions for which they chose the option “agree.” In all three countries, there appears to have been little change over time.

Based on feedback from interviews and focus groups, it appears that attitudes regarding institutional trust are fairly entrenched and will take some time to adjust. As the President of a Women’s Association in Niamey explained in an interview: “government actors are perceived as regularly exploiting people, and then people are faced with either confronting government and coming into conflict with leaders or going along with government and thus losing their own trustworthiness.” This vicious cycle may explain why institutional trust has not changed over a two year period, despite the introduction of PDEV II activities.



Figure** 3**: Institutional Trust

Table 6: Institutional Trust

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	2.487	2.589	2.737	X
Baseline Core Difference	-.152*	-.119*	-.251***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.008	.009	-.053	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.026	.040	.070	.028

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

The analyses in Table 6 are based on respondents' average level of trust across the five institutions. We find that the P-DEV II program had no discernible impact on respondents' level of institutional trust: the table shows that there has been little change in institutional trust between baseline and midline. The difference in differences analysis comparing core and non-core zones shows slight positive changes in Niger Burkina, and in the pooled treatment effect, but these positive changes occurred in statistically indistinguishable ways in both core and non-core communes.

Social Inclusiveness (higher values represent increased inclusiveness)

One component of social inclusiveness is the involvement of members of the community in decision-making processes. To probe this dimension, respondents were asked to what extent ordinary people from the commune/neighborhood participate when important decisions are being made. As Figure 4 shows, the percentage of respondents who

choose the option “a lot” has decreased in all three countries, suggesting a declining sense of involvement in such processes.



Figure 4: Community Decision-making

Table 7: Community Decision-making

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.947	2.190	2.518	X
Baseline Core Difference	.037	-.035	-.405***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.102	-.170	-.404***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.189	-.088	.323***	-.006

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 7 provides a more nuanced picture of this development. In Chad, Niger, and in the overall pooled treatment effect estimate the differences between core and non-core, and between baseline and midline reflect this overall decline but are not statistically significant.

In Burkina Faso, however, responses in core zones show that P-DEV II programming offsets the general decline in perceptions that ordinary people participate in the decision-making processes in the community. While we find a significant *decrease* in perceived influence in community decision making in the non-core zones from baseline to midline, respondents in core zones showed significantly *less negative* changes over time. In other

words, non-core zones decreased between baseline and midline on average by -.404, while core zones decreased by .081 (-.404 + .323= -.081), with this difference in differences being statistically significant.

Comments from focus groups help to elucidate both the decreasing perception that ordinary people can participate in important decisions and the potential of PDEV II activities in core zones to offset that trend. On one hand, respondents in Maradi and Arlit in Niger expressed a common sentiment that local politics is too disconnected from citizens and based too much on favoritism, so ordinary people are discouraged from participating. On the other hand, an imam from Ouahigouya in Burkina Faso noted that the PDEV II activities have helped to create a formal consultation network for people in the communities, which can help not just in terms of resolving social disputes but also in terms of engendering access and confidence for ordinary people to get involved in local political matters. It is thus our sense that the scope of PDEV II activities in Burkina successfully created the foundations for beneficiaries to engage in local political matters, though the activities come amidst a tide of frustration with local politics.

A second component of social inclusiveness is political participation. To measure this dimension, respondents were asked whether or not they have engaged in any of the following three activities during the past 12 months: attended a commune/neighborhood councilor other public meeting; contacted an elected official; notified the village chief about a local problem. Figure 5 graphs the results of an additive index of these three items. It suggests minor increases in political participation in Chad and Niger, but a slight decrease in Burkina Faso.



Figure 5: Political Participation

Table 8: Political Participation

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	.229	.299	.468	X
Baseline Core Difference	.005	-.001	-.064	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	.053	.065	-.108***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.061	-.007	.057	.030

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

The analyses in Table 8 are based on respondents' average level of reported participation across the three items. We find that the P-DEV II program had no discernable impact on respondents' level of political participation, as there are no significant differences in the differences in participation rates over time between core and non-core zones between baseline and midline. The table suggests a rather low involvement in political activities across all countries, and slight increases in core zones in Chad and in the overall pooled treatment estimate occurred in statistically indistinguishable ways from changes in non-core zones over time. While there were initially somewhat higher levels of participation in Burkina, this declined between waves. The decline in participation was offset in core zones but the difference is not statistically significant.

One potential explanation is that a selection effect could be at work, whereby those who

invest fully in the PDEV II activities are the type of people who were already inclined to contact officials, engage with chiefs, and attend meetings. If so, this would suggest that PDEV II activities can be successful but that they must target behavior changes among a wider set of beneficiaries.

Interethnic Marriage (higher values represent increased support)

A last component of social inclusiveness is ethnic bias. To measure this dimension, respondents' were presented with the following statement: "I tell my children (or I will tell my future children) they should only marry people from the same ethnic group as theirs." Respondents could then choose among three options: agree, neither, and disagree. As Figure 6 shows, most respondents disagree with this statement in all three countries, and the percentage who disagree increased from baseline to midline in all three countries as well, suggesting a general increase in support for interethnic marriage (i.e. a decline in ethnic bias).

Indeed, participants in focus groups—such as those in Markoye and Seguenega in Burkina Faso—noted that ethnic tensions can sometimes be an issue but that that is typically only among youth competing for opportunities or farmers competing for land. Beyond those practical concerns, residents of the PDEV zone are moving beyond primordial ethnic dislike.



Figure 6: Support for Interethnic Marriage

Table 9: Interethnic Marriage

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	2.411	2.684	2.493	X
Baseline Core Difference	-.118	.026	.007	X
Baseline-Midline	-.127	.102	.279***	X

Difference, Non-Core				
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.385*	.043	-.001	.146

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

As Table 9 illustrates, respondents in Chad core zones indicate increased support for interethnic marriage, suggesting that P-DEV II interventions had a positive effect there. Increases also occur among respondents in Niger and in the overall pooled treatment effect estimate but the changes are too small to be statistically significant. In Burkina, support for interethnic marriage has increased in non-core and core zones alike, which suggests that this positive development was driven by factors other than the P-DEV II program.

Goal 2: Resilience to Violent Extremism

Our analysis of Goal 2: Resilience to Violent Extremism is intended to assess whether vulnerable individuals are at risk of becoming radicalized to the point of being willing to use violence. We analyze nine separate indicators for Goal 2, distinguishing between: a) *resilience indicators* related to expectations of employment, access to vocational training, and political efficacy as factors that enable vulnerable individuals to resist violent extremism; and b) *vulnerability indicators* related to perceptions of and attitudes toward violence and extremism as factors that make individuals susceptible to violent extremism.

Figures 7 through 15 as well as Tables 10 through 15 present the midline results for the series of questions related to the concept of resilience. On the nine indicators we analyze, we find a mixed pattern of results. On the three indicators of Community Resilience – access to jobs, access to vocational training, and political efficacy – we find a general decline in these orientations in Chad and Burkina Faso, with positive (or more technically, less negative) changes in Burkina P-DEV II core zones compared with non-core zones. On the six indicators of Vulnerability – questions related to ethnic and religious community divisions, and the justifiability and efficacy of violence – we find generally negative (i.e., in the "correct" direction) changes on these perceptions and beliefs in Chad and Burkina Faso, with significant differences in differences (i.e., P-DEV II program effects in the "correct" direction) on three of the indicators in Burkina. On one indicator, whether the respondent disagrees that the US is at war with Islam, we find a program impact in the "correct" direction in Chad and in the "wrong" direction in Burkina Faso. The pooled DiD treatment effect for the US at War with Islam indicator was significantly negative (i.e. in the "correct" direction), the only significant pooled effect seen among these nine indicators.

Resilience Indicators (higher values represent increased resilience)

To measure respondents' expectations of employment, they were asked how difficult it is to get a job in their respective country today. Figure 7 breaks down their answers by country and wave. It shows that expectations of employment have worsened somewhat in Chad in Burkina Faso, while there has been only little change in Niger.

In focus groups—from Markoye, Yatenga, Seguenega, Ouagadougou, Dori, and elsewhere—the lack of jobs was a common concern. Frequently, respondents discussing

the lack of employment opportunities referred to non-agricultural types of employment, which is consistent with conventional wisdom that younger people are less inclined to seek work in the fields. Opportunities may exist for PDEV II to encourage employment and innovation in domains that complement agriculture (such as value chains), but it remains the case that fewer residents of the region consider farm work in their vision of future employment.



Figure 7: Access to Jobs

Table 10: Access to Jobs

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.959	1.572	1.416	X
Baseline Core Difference	-.157	-.042	-.023	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.423***	-.020	-.163**	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.164	.051	-.027	.076

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Difference-in-difference analysis shows that the P-DEV II program had no discernable effect on respondents' expectations of employment. The results in Table 10 show changes over time in the core zones that are not significantly different from the changes in the non-core zones in Chad, Niger and in the pooled treatment effect estimate. Large declines between baseline and midline in expectations of employment in Chad and Burkina are statistically significant. This decline is especially prominent in Chad, where initial expectations of employment during wave 1 were relatively high compared to Niger and Burkina.

A second resilience indicator is Access to Vocational Schools, which was measured by presenting respondents' with the following statement: "Vocational school is accessible for

people like me." Respondents could choose among three options: disagree, neither, and agree. As Figure 8 shows, the portion of respondents who choose "disagree" has increased by more than 20% in Chad between waves, suggesting a decreased access to vocational school there. For Niger and Burkina Faso, there appears to have been little change over time.

Participants in focus groups expressed two concerns that may offset the effectiveness of vocational school promotion. One is the cost of schools in general, which dissuades youth and families from considering school an option (see Markoye focus group), and the second is the opportunity costs from school attendance, even practical, vocational school. Participants in Gorgadji noted that people often prefer to seek something that will provide benefits now rather than go through the time it takes to get trained, so vocational schools might do better if they were to incorporate in-the-field trainings, internships, and small payments for work along with the training.



Figure 8: Access to Vocational School

Table 11: Access to Vocational School

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.880	2.000	2.139	X
Baseline Core Difference	.087	.205	-.214*	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.155	-.085	-.194	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.289*	-.076	.309*	-.021

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 11 reveals a positive effect of P-DEV II activities in Burkina and a negative effect of activities in Chad: in Burkina we see improved access to vocational school in the core zones relative to the decrease seen in non-core zones, which suggests a *positive* impact of the program in this particular country, while the decrease in access to vocational school in Chad has been more pronounced in the core zones, meaning that the P-DEV II program seems to have had a *negative* effect on access to vocational school in Chad. The pooled effect of nearly zero reflects the counterbalancing of the positive program impact in Burkina and the negative program impact in Chad.

A final resilience indicator is political efficacy. Respondents were asked to what extent they agree with each of the following two statements: a) "My opinions are respected by local leaders." b) "Local government takes into account the opinions of ordinary citizens." They could then choose among three options: not at all, somewhat, and a lot. Figure 9 graphs the additive index of these two items. Respondents who chose "a lot" for none of the two items are classified as having low efficacy, those who chose "a lot" for one item as having medium efficacy, and those who chose "a lot" for both as having high efficacy. The figure shows a slight increase in efficacy in Chad, no change in Niger, and a rather steep decline in Burkina Faso.



Figure 9: Political Efficacy

The general trend of discouragement vis-à-vis local government, particularly in Burkina Faso, may be a function of the unsettled political context around the time of data collection, which came in the aftermath of a popular uprising against former president Compaore and as the transitional government faced challenges in the lead up to fresh elections.

Table 12: Political Efficacy

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.835	1.916	2.421	X

Baseline Core Difference	-.031	-.042	-.338***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	.020	-.151	-.400***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.067	-.112	.195*	-.021

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

The analyses in Table 12 are based on respondents' average level of efficacy across the two items. We find an overall decrease in efficacy in P-DEV II core zones in Chad, Niger and in our pooled treatment effect estimate, though differences are not statistically significant.

We find a positive program effect in Burkina, where core zones decline significantly less from baseline to midline than non-core zones. While respondents in Burkina perceive a decrease in efficacy in both core and non-core zones, the difference over time is statistically *less negative* in core as opposed to non-core zones.

Local political leaders may thus have been preoccupied with their own political relationships and less engaged with citizens, but despite the challenges, the effects of PDEV II activities in the core zones seemed to have a notable effect.

Vulnerability Indicators (higher values represent increased vulnerability)

Unlike other indicators in this report, the vulnerability indicators are coded in such way that *lower values are desirable*, as higher values represent increased vulnerability. This means that normatively desirable P-DEV II program effects should be reflected in *negative* coefficients in the following tables.

The first vulnerability indicator is perception of ethnic differences, which is measured by asking respondents to what extent they feel that ethnic differences tend to divide people in their village/neighborhood. Figure 10 illustrates that the percentage of respondents who answer "not at all" has increased in Chad and Burkina; Niger has experienced the opposite trend, with more respondents choosing the option "a lot."



Figure 10: Perceived Ethnic Differences

Table 13: Perceived Ethnic Differences

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.494	1.409	1.316	X
Baseline Core Difference	-.003	.012	.093	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.214***	.184**	-.043	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.014	-.003	-.172**	-.048

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Analysis in Table 13 reveals a positive program effect in Burkina. A decline in vulnerability occurs across all zones in Chad, while core zone in Niger and in the pooled treatment estimate reveal statistically insignificant differences. In Burkina, positive impact in P-DEV II core zones is shown through a significant decrease in perceived ethnic differences among respondents. Consistent with the focus group commentary noted above, the general trend seems to be away from vulnerability due to ethnic divisions, even if some ethnic tensions persist regarding practical issues like land and jobs.

In Chad, there was a significant decrease in perceived differences between baseline and midline across all zones, whereas Niger there was a general increase in perceived differences. Changes to core zones in Niger and in the pooled treatment estimate

Respondents were also asked about religious differences, i.e., the extent they feel that religious differences tend to divide people in their village/neighborhood. Figure 11 breaks down their responses by country and wave. Similar to the ethnic differences indicator, the figure suggests improvements over time in Chad and Burkina Faso, with more respondents answering "not at all." In Niger, again, there seems to be the opposite happening, with a greater percentage of respondents choosing the option "a lot."

One potential explanation for the rise in religious-based vulnerability in Niger is the struggle for control of religious narratives as extremist attacks became more common there. In the focus group discussion in Arlit, participants noted that leaders sometimes try to mastermind people's attitudes regarding social tensions, so competing narratives—both in Hausa-Tuareg ethnic terms and also in moderate-extremist religious terms—could contribute to an increased sense of vulnerability in Niger.



Figure 11: Perceived Religious Differences

Table 14: Perceived Religious Differences

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.432	1.472	1.311	X
Baseline Core Difference	.006	.036	.129*	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.204***	.155	-.066	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.028	.006	-.163*	-.037

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

The perceived religious differences results show exactly the same pattern in Table 14 as was seen for ethnic differences in Table 13: a positive impact of P-DEV II in Burkina, where the decrease in perceived religious differences is concentrated exclusively in the core zones. In Chad, there has been an overall decline in perceived religious differences among respondents across core and non-core zones, while in Niger there was more (though in this case statistically insignificant) perceived religious difference. Decreases in perceived differences in the pooled treatment effect estimate are statistically insignificant.

Another vulnerability indicator is the belief in the justifiability of religious violence. To measure this dimension, respondents were asked how often they feel that using arms and violence against civilians in defense of one's religion is justified. Respondents could then choose among three options: never, sometimes, and often. Figure 12 breaks down their responses by country and wave. In the baseline survey, a large majority of respondents in all three countries (> 70%) chooses the option "never." Over time, the portion of respondents who think that religious violence is never justified has become even greater, especially in Burkina Faso.



Figure 12: Religious Violence Is Justified

Table 15: Religious Violence Is Justified

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.449	1.266	1.199	X
Baseline Core Difference	-.059	.072	.125*	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.222**	.023	-.126***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.003	-.134	-.131*	-.083

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 15 illustrates a positive program effect for Burkina, where core zone respondents

find religious violence to be less justifiable than at baseline. In Chad a general decrease in the perceptions that religious violence is justified across both core and non-core zones. In Niger, there is a suggestion that respondent perceptions of the justifiability of religious violence declined in core zones more sharply than in non-core zones, though this difference is not statistically significant. Decreases in the justifiability of violence in the pooled treatment effect estimate are statistically insignificant, though, from a qualitative standpoint, focus group participants quite frequently noted that Islam is a religion of peace and that forgiveness and tolerance are important components of the religion (see, for example, FGDs in Tougu and Seguenega).

Respondents were also asked how often they think violence is an effective method to solve problems. Again, they could choose among three options: never, sometimes, and often. Figure 13 reveals that a majority of respondents in each country (> 65%) answers this question with "never." All three countries exhibit a positive development regarding this particular indicator, with the percentage of respondents choosing "never" becoming greater in Chad, Niger, and Burkina between the baseline and midline.



Figure 13: Violence Is Effective to Solve Problems

Table 16: Violence Is Effective to Solve Problems

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.470	1.308	1.352	X
Baseline Core Difference	-.074	.076	.179**	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.272***	.003	-.151***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.055	-.172	-.047	-.050

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 16 shows no effect for P-DEV II programming. There has been a significant decrease in the perception that violence is an effective method to solve problems from baseline to midline in both Chad and Burkina in both core and non-core zones and can therefore not be attributed to the P-DEV II program. In Niger and in our pooled treatment effect estimate, respondents' perception of effectiveness decreases in core zones, but these differences do not occur in statistically distinguishable ways from the non-core zones. According to interviews with leaders in Agadez, Arlit, and elsewhere, civil society groups, women's groups, and other actors have worked hard to stigmatize the use of violence. As a result, PDEV II activities in core areas, while likely contributing in a positive sense, do not distinguish those areas from non-core zones where other programs and activities aim to address the same issue.

Next, we asked respondents whether they disagree or agree with the statement that "violence in the name of Islam can be justified." As with the last two questions, Figure 14 reveals that a majority of respondents in all three countries (> 60%) rejects violence. The portion of respondents who choose the option "disagree" has become greater over time in all three countries.



Figure 14: Violence in the Name of Islam

Table 17: Violence in the Name of Islam

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.539	1.574	1.540	X
Baseline Core Difference	-.037	.023	-.099	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.461***	-.395***	-.411***	X

Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.050	-.028	.143	.049

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 17 shows no effect for P-DEV II programming. In all three countries, there has been a large and significant decrease in the perception that violence in the name of Islam can be justified from baseline to midline. This decrease has been happening in core and non-core zones alike and can therefore not be attributed to the P-DEV II program. Among respondents in core zones, slight increases in justifiability of violence in the name of Islam occur in Chad, Burkina, and in our pooled treatment effect estimate but these differences are statistically insignificant. Interviews again confirm that numerous actors and leaders across the region have been working to combat an association between violence and Islam, making it difficult to isolate an effect from the PDEV II activities.

A last vulnerability indicator is anti-West attitudes. This dimension is measured by asking respondents whether they disagree or agree with the following statement: “The United States is at war against Islam, not terrorism.” Figure 15 breaks down their responses by country and wave. In wave 1, a majority of respondents in Chad and Burkina disagreed with the statement, whereas the majority of surveyed individuals in Niger chose to agree with it. In all three countries, the percentage of respondents disagreeing with the notion that the U.S. is at war with Islam has increased over time, suggesting decreasing anti-West attitudes in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso.

In Niger, the focus group in Balleyara noted that Niger has been Muslim for a long time and the country has had quite good relations with the United States, so it would be shortsighted to think that the US is fighting Islam rather than the current wave of terrorism. However, respondents in Arlit and elsewhere noted that the US is also engaged in conflict with a number of other Muslim countries, which raises concerns for some. More generally, the overwhelming predominance of Islam in Niger compared to Burkina Faso and Chad, as well as the greater degree to which religion shapes sociopolitical life in Niger coupled with the constructed perception US-Muslim tensions during the period of the War on Terror, perhaps explains the greater tendency to suspect US aggression toward Islam there.



Figure 15: U.S. Is at War with Islam

Table 18: U.S. Is at War with Islam

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.398	2.061	1.659	X
Baseline Core Difference	.057	.244	-.036	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	.019	-.037	-.440***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.286**	-.712**	.266**	-.242*

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 18 shows a positive P-DEV II program effect in Chad, Niger, and in our pooled treatment effect estimate. In Chad and Niger, the decrease in anti-West attitudes is concentrated in the core zones, thus suggesting a positive effect of the P-DEV II program. However, in Burkina, the core zones exhibit a significant increase in anti-West attitudes relative to the decrease in anti-West attitudes found in non-core zones.

PDEV II activities seem to have made an important impact, however, largely through cooperation with imams (according to interviews). The apparent negative impact of PDEV II activities in Burkina Faso may again be a function of the political climate: because the US had been a strong supporter of former President Blaise Compaore, many came to view the US with suspicion, and this may have influenced their reaction to the US more broadly.

Goal 3: Youth Outlook

Figures 16 through 20 as well as Tables 19 through 23 show the results for questions related to Goal Level Index 3: Youth Outlook, defined as the individual and collective vision people have about young people in their communities. This concept is operationalized using three categories of indicators: a) *economic outlook* which evaluates attitudes toward and practical vision of future careers and economic potential; b) *educational outlook* which evaluates expectations regarding education and the learning environment; and c) *civic outlook* which comprises engagement in politics, civil society, and local decision-making. The tables in this section present the results for the full sample in each country, that is, individuals of all ages; where relevant we discuss differences in the results for the sub-sample of youth in the analysis, i.e., individuals between 18-30 years of age. We caution that this sub-sample comprises less than 50% of the total, or slightly more than 1000 respondents in the midline wave spread across three countries, so the results are less robust than those for the full sample.

Our analysis of Goal 3 Youth Outlook indicators finds a mixed pattern of results for the five indicators. On general life satisfaction and economic perceptions, average responses were worse in Chad though no different in core versus non-core zones. Economic perceptions were significantly improved in Burkina core versus non-core zones. Educational inclusiveness improved in all three countries, with significantly greater improvements in core versus non-core zones in Chad, and political interest and knowledge increased in all three countries, with greater differences in differences on knowledge in both Niger and Burkina Faso. The pooled DiD treatment effect across all countries was significant only for political knowledge among this set of indicators.

Life Satisfaction and Economic Outlook (higher values represent improved outlook)

To measure life satisfaction, respondents were presented with a card showing a ladder representing the “ladder of life.” The ladder consists of eleven steps, ranging from 0 to 10. Respondents were then asked the following question: “Let’s suppose the top of the ladder is the best possible life for you; and the bottom, the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder do you personally stand at the present time?” Figure 16 groups levels 0 through 3 into the category “low satisfaction,” levels 4 through 6 into “medium satisfaction,” and 7 through 10 into “high satisfaction.”



Figure 16: Life Satisfaction

Table 19: Life Satisfaction

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	4.624	3.842	4.250	X
Baseline Core Difference	.038	.697***	-.013	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.601**	.886***	.422	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.004	-.601	.404	-.090

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

The analyses in Table 19 a based on the full range of eleven points, and show no effect for P-DEV II programming. Among respondents, life satisfaction has decreased over time in Chad but increased in Niger. In both cases, these seem to be general developments that are independent of the P-DEV II program. A comparison of core and non-core differences over time reveals decreases in life satisfaction in core zones in Chad, Niger, and in our pooled treatment effect analysis that are statistically insignificant.

To measure perceptions of the economy, respondents were asked whether the economy

of their country is worse, about the same, or better than it was a year ago. Figure 17 breaks down their responses by country and wave. It shows that in Niger, perceptions of the economy have remained quite stable over time, whereas in Burkina and especially in Chad they have become somewhat more negative. In the midline survey, more than 40% of Chadian said their economy is worse than it was a year ago; in the baseline survey, that figure was only about 25%. The decline in economic outlook in Chad likely reflects the mismanagement of oil revenues that resulted in a broad economic crisis, while respondent's economic outlook in Burkina Faso from 2013 to 2015 was almost certainly impacted by the uncertainty over a new political regime.



Figure 17: Economic Outlook

Table 20: Economic Outlook

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	2.080	2.191	2.373	X
Baseline Core Difference	.023	.061	-.416***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.358**	.011	-.293***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.016	-.125	.392*	.059

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 20 illustrates a P-DEV II program effect in Burkina Faso, where respondents in core

zones report an improved economic outlook. In Burkina, perceptions have worsened in the non-core zones but there is a significant positive difference in difference in the core zones, suggesting a positive P-DEV II program effect. In Chad, non-core and core zone respondent perceptions of the economy have significantly worsened over time; this negative development can therefore not be attributed to the P-DEV II program. Improvements in respondent economic outlook in the pooled treatment effect estimate are statistically insignificant.

Educational Outlook (higher values represent improved outlook)

The second category of indicators with Goal 3 is respondents' educational outlook. Specifically, we measure respondents' attitudes regarding educational inclusiveness by asking whether they agree or disagree with the following statement: "Middle school is only for boys, not girls." Figure 18 shows that the vast majority of respondents disagree with this statement. Over time, respondents' attitudes regarding education have become even more inclusive.



Figure 18: Gender Inclusiveness of Middle School

Table 21: Gender Inclusiveness of Middle School

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	2.644	2.601	2.615	X
Baseline Core Difference	-.084	-.002	.087	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.049	.184**	.294***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus	.218*	-.071	-.113	.007

Non-Core				

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 21 provides additional evidence that in all three countries, attitudes regarding education have become more inclusive over time. In Chad, this positive development can be attributed to a P-DEV II program effect: improvements in attitudes toward inclusiveness are concentrated in the core zones. Small improvements in attitudes toward gender inclusiveness in in middle school in in the pooled treatment effect estimate are statistically insignificant. Given efforts to improve educational access across the region by numerous donors, international organizations, and civil society actors, it should come as little surprise that the positive effects of PDEV II in Niger and Burkina Faso are masked by improvements in non-core zones, and the PDEV impact in Chad is particularly noteworthy.

Civic Outlook (higher values represent improved outlook)

The last category of indicators we examine in this report is civic outlook. Within this category, we first look at interest in community affairs. This dimension is measured by asking respondents whether they have very little interest, some interest, or a great deal of interest in local community affairs. As Figure 19 shows, the percentage of respondents who say they have “very little interest” in community affairs has decreased over time, whereas the percentage of respondents who choose the option “a great deal of interest” has increased in all three countries.

This trend is interesting to note when taken together with the finding that fewer people feel empowered in terms of political decision making. In in-depth interviews, (for example in Ouahigouya and Seytenga in Burkina Faso), CSO leaders and imams expressed that people—youth in particular—are becoming more informed and that community efforts to establish of communication really help to reinforce both knowledge and concern over political affairs.



Figure 19: Interest in Community Affairs

Table 22: Interest in Community Affairs

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.577	1.651	2.196	X
Baseline Core Difference	.064	-.099	-.291*	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	.206***	.638***	.265*	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.018	-.003	.220	.032

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 22 provides additional evidence for the observation that there has been an increase in political interest in all three countries. Positive changes are registered in all three countries in both non-core and core zones, and do not occur between core and non-core zones so these changes cannot be attributed to the P-DEV II program.

The second component of civic outlook is political knowledge. To measure this dimension, respondents were asked two questions: a) “Do you know how long the term of office is for the President?” b) “Do you know how many seats there are in the National Assembly?” Figure 20 shows the percentages of respondents who gave none, one, and two correct answers to these questions, broken down by country and wave. Political knowledge appears to be highest in Niger, followed by Burkina, then Chad. In all three countries,

political knowledge seems to have increased between waves. Again, these findings are consistent with qualitative reports that people in the region, and especially youth, are gaining improved access to information.



Figure 20: Political Knowledge

Table 23: Political Knowledge

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	.229	.479	.331	X
Baseline Core Difference	.107***	-.048	.018	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	.094	-.032	.012	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.026	.175**	.079**	.067*

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 23 illustrates a positive effect of P-DEV II programming in Niger, Burkina, and in our pooled treatment effect estimate, as positive and significant increases occur in respondent political knowledge from the baseline to midline.

Examining P-DEV Effects with Youth Subgroup Analysis

Finally, we conducted another series of analyses on each of the five indicators in this section, limiting the sample only to youth, or people 30 years of age or younger. The results showed several anomalous results, in that core zone youth in Chad declined dramatically more on life satisfaction than non-core zone youth in Chad, and core zone

youth in Burkina declined more on Gender Inclusiveness of Middle Schools than non-core zone Burkina youth. Otherwise the same pattern is seen as in the full sample, i.e. mainly insignificant, or on occasion, weakly positive DiD program impacts.

C. The Impact of "Low Intensity" Versus "High Intensity" P-DEV II Programming

In this section, we present the impact of P-DEV II programming by dividing zones into those in which no activities were implemented, those in which a relatively small number of activities were carried out, and those in which a comparatively high number of activities were implemented. It may be, for example, that significant program effects may be found by examining those zones where more intensive programming took place, and that the null or weak effects found in the previous section may be masking important impacts for the high intensity core zones of the program. For this distinction, we rely on information provided by the P-DEV II activity tracker and discussed in Section II-D and III-A above. Non-core zones are classified as zones in which no activities were implemented. Core zones that experienced below the median number of activities per zone for each country were classified as "low treatment," and those higher than the median on total activities were classified as "high treatment." For Chad, the median number of activities per zone is 22, for Niger it is 33, and for Burkina Faso it is 65.[4]

Similar to the models estimated in Section III-B above, these effects for "low intensity" and "high intensity" zones are calculated via a DiD approach: we regress the 19 goal-level indicators on dichotomous variables for no/low/high treatment zones, wave 1/2, and country, as well as the interactions between these variables. If the program had the intended effects, we would see an improvement (a "difference in differences") in the low treatment zones relative to the non-core zones, and we would see an even greater improvement (or DiD) in the high treatment zones from baseline to midline relative to the changes in the non-core zones between waves.

In equation form, these DiD models may be expressed as:

$$(3) \quad Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 LowCore_i + \beta_2 HighCore_i + \beta_3 Wave_t + \beta_4 LowCore_i * Wave_t + \beta_5 HighCore_i * Wave_t \varepsilon_{it}$$

where Y (a given outcome) at a given point in time is equal to: a common intercept or starting point (α), an effect (β_1) of whether the individual is in a low intensity core zone, an effect (β_2) of whether the individual is in a high intensity core zone, an effect (β_3) of a given wave of observation (baseline versus midline) on all individuals, an interaction effect (β_4) of wave of observation with low intensity core zone status, an interaction effect (β_5) of wave of observation with high intensity core zone status, and an idiosyncratic error term (ε_{it}). Following the DiD logic explained above, β_4 represents the estimated impact of being in a low intensity core zone relative to a non-core zone, and β_5 represents the estimating impact of being in a high intensity core zone, relative to a non-core zone. If there are significant program effects concentrated only in high (or in low) intensity zones, we would then expect a significant regression coefficient only for β_5 (or β_4).

The tables are arranged as follows: The first row illustrates the average value for the respective indicator in each country's non-core zones during the first wave of the survey,

[4] In addition, we created a classification into no/low/high treatment zones for each of the twelve types of activities shown in Section III-A of this report. We then regressed each indicator on the type of activity it is most likely to be influenced by, rather than on the additive index of all activities. For example, the indicator "religious violence is justified" is regressed on activity type "2.3 increased dialogue with religious leaders." This did not meaningfully alter the majority of our findings reported in this section; therefore, these additional results are not included in this report.

i.e. before the implementation of the P-DEV II program (α). The second and third rows show the average difference between non-core and low (β_1) treatment zones, and then between non-core and high (β_2) treatment zones at baseline, and whether these difference is statistically significant. In the fourth row, we present the average difference between non-core zones at midline and baseline (β_3) and whether this difference is statistically significant.

The fifth and sixth rows are the ones in which the actual effects of the P-DEV II program are shown. In the fifth row, we take the difference between midline and baseline in the low treatment zones and subtract the difference between midline and baseline in the non-core zones – this difference in difference corresponds to β_4 in equation (3). In the sixth row, we take the difference between midline and baseline in the high treatment core zones and subtract the difference between midline and baseline in the non-core zones – this difference corresponds to β_5 in equation (3). In addition to the effects for each country, the fifth and sixth rows also contain a pooled treatment effect, which shows whether the program had an effect across all three countries in the given type of zone (low versus high treatment). For the reader's convenience, the fifth and sixth rows are color-coded: coefficients representing a desired effect of the program are shown in green, whereas coefficients representing a detrimental effect of the program are shown in red. Again, pooled models are estimated first, followed by variants that allow country-specific treatment effects.

Goal 1: Social Cohesion

Tables 24 through 28 present the midline results for the series of questions related to Goal 1: Social Cohesion. Social cohesion is a broad concept that is captured through two separate indicators: 1) interpersonal and institutional trust; and 2) social inclusiveness in the community.

Interpersonal and Institutional Trust (higher values represent increased trust)

To measure interpersonal trust, respondents were asked whether they disagree or agree that "most people are willing to help if you ask for help." As Table 24 shows, in the zones in which a relatively low number of activities were implemented, there are no effects of the P-DEV II program on how respondents answer this question. In the high treatment zones in Burkina, interpersonal trust has increased over time, while in both Chad and Niger, it has actually decreased between waves. These results are somewhat different from those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program had no effect on interpersonal trust. While the pooled effect is still irrelevant in these models, there appear to be offsetting positive and negative impacts in the high intensity zones across the three countries. There is no evident reason for this anomalous pattern of effects.

Table 24: Interpersonal Trust

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	2.295	2.298	2.616	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	.008	.033	-.130*	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	.105	.011	-.390***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.016	.136	-.308***	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	.157	-.086	.086	.028
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	-.273***	-.223*	.284***	-.119

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Institutional trust is measured through five individual trust items. Each respondent was presented with five separate statements: a) I trust local authorities; b) I trust the central government; c) I trust religious leaders; d) I trust NGOs; e) I trust the police. For each of these statements, they could choose among three options: disagree, neither, or agree. The analyses in Table 25 are based on respondents' average level of trust across the five institutions. It shows that there has been little change in institutional trust between wave 1 and wave 2, neither in the non-core nor in the low or high treatment zones. These results are similar to those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program has no effect on institutional trust. For both interpersonal and institutional trust, there are no pooled DiD effects, neither in the low treatment nor in the high treatment zones.

Table 25: Institutional Trust

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	2.487	2.589	2.737	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	-.125	-.046	-.192**	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	-.189**	-.240***	-.347***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.008	.009	-.053	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	.140	.002	.059	.055
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-	-.158	.099	.079	-.006

Core				

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Social Inclusiveness (higher values represent increased inclusiveness)

To measure community decision-making, respondents were asked to what extent ordinary people from the commune/neighborhood participate when important decisions are being made. Table 26 shows that in Burkina, there has been a significant increase in this measure of social inclusiveness in the low treatment zones relative to the no treatment zones. These results are similar to those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program in Burkina had a positive impact on respondents' perceptions of being included when decisions are made in their community. However, the high intensity zone effect, while similar in magnitude to the low intensity effect, does not reach the level of statistical significance.

Table 26: Community Decision-making

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.947	2.190	2.518	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	.039	-.049	-.378***	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	.034	-.012	-.447***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.102	-.170	-.404***	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	-.021	-.044	.295***	.050
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	-.336*	-.168	.366	-.087

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

To measure political participation, respondents were asked whether or not they have engaged in any of the following three activities during the past 12 months: attended a commune/neighborhood councilor other public meeting; contacted an elected official; notified the village chief about a local problem. The analyses in Table 27 are based on respondents' average level of participation across the three items. The table illustrates that in Burkina, there has been a significant increase in participation in the high treatment zones relative to the no treatment zones. These results are different from those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program has no effect on participation. When isolating high intensity treatment zones, an effect on participation relative to non-core zones becomes apparent in the Burkina context.

Table 27: Political Participation

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	.229	.299	.468	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	.009	.039	-.059	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	-.001	-.068	-.073***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	.053	.065	-.108***	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	.122	-.040	.042	.025
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	.009	.048	.085*	.038

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

To measure ethnic bias, respondents' were presented with the following statement: "I tell my children (or I will tell my future children) they should only marry people from the same ethnic group as theirs." Respondents could then choose among three options: agree, neither, and disagree. As Table 28 illustrates, respondents have become significantly more tolerant of interethnic marriage in the low treatment zones in Chad and in the high treatment zones in Burkina. These results are again different from those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program has no effect on ethnic bias. It is not apparent, however, why the Chad effect would be seen only in the low intensity zones, nor why the overall pooled effect would be significant only for low intensity zones.

Table 28: Support for Interethnic Marriage

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	2.411	2.684	2.493	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	-.187*	-.022	.050	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	.253***	.215**	-.117**	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.127	.102	.279***	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	.477**	.094	-.060	.179*
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	-.006	-.151	.153***	.001

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Goal 2: Resilience to Violent Extremism

Tables 29 through 35 present the midline results for the series of questions related to Goal Level Index 2: Resilience to Violent Extremism. This concept is intended to assess whether vulnerable individuals are at risk of becoming radicalized to the point of being willing to use violence. We distinguish between: a) *resilience indicators* related to expectations of employment, access to vocational training, and political efficacy as factors that enable vulnerable individuals to resist violent extremism; and b) *vulnerability indicators* related to perceptions of and attitudes toward violence and extremism as factors that make individuals susceptible to violent extremism.

Resilience Indicators (higher values represent increased resilience)

To measure respondents' expectations of employment, they were asked how difficult it is to get a job in their respective country today. Possible responses were "a lot," "somewhat," and "not at all." Table 29 shows that for high treatment zones, expectations of employment have significantly improved in Chad but have worsened in Burkina Faso. These results are different from those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program has no effect in any of the three country contexts on expectations of employment. Instead, there is a positive impact in one country, Chad, but an anomalous negative impact in another, Burkina. In addition, there is a positive pooled treatment effect in the high treatment zones, suggesting that the P-DEV II program has improved expectations of employment across the three countries. This pooled effect, however, is mostly driven by the positive development in Chad.

Table 29: Access to Jobs

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.959	1.572	1.416	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	-.031	.030	-.072	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	-.322***	-.161*	.116*	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.423***	-.020	-.163**	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	.047	.024	.008	.015
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	.319**	.096	-.141**	.177**

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Access to vocational school was measured by presenting respondents' with the following statement: "Vocational school is accessible for people like me." Respondents could then choose among three options: disagree, neither, and agree. As Table 30 illustrates, there has been a significant improvement in access to vocational school in low treatment zones in Burkina but a decrease in access in high treatment zones in Chad. These results are similar to those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program has a positive effect on access to vocational school in Burkina but a negative effect in Chad, though it is unclear why the impact would be concentrated among low intensity zones in Burkina.

Table 30: Access to Vocational School

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.880	2.000	2.139	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	.088	.278*	-.217	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	.087	.082	-.209	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.155	-.085	-.194	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	-.147	-.257	.357*	-.037
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	-.410**	.225	.224	.004

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

To measure political efficacy, respondents were asked to what extent they agree with each of the following two statements: a) "My opinions are respected by local leaders." b) "Local government takes into account the opinions of ordinary citizens." They could then choose among three options: not at all, somewhat, and a lot. The analyses in Table 31 are based on respondents' average level of efficacy across the two items. The results shown are similar to those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program has a positive effect on political efficacy in Burkina. The difference between the impacts in low and high intensity zones in Burkina is extremely small, which is consistent with the finding earlier that core zones in general experienced a significant positive change in efficacy.

Table 31: Political Efficacy

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.835	1.916	2.421	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	.085	.042	-.320**	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	-.046	-.180*	-.369***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	.020	-.151	-.400***	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	.086	-.142	.198*	.004
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	-.179	-.067	.187	-.051

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Vulnerability Indicators (higher values represent increased vulnerability)

Unlike other categories in this report, the vulnerability indicators are coded in such way that lower values are desirable, as higher values represent increased vulnerability. The first component of these indicators is ethnic differences, which is measured by asking respondents to what extent they feel that ethnic differences tend to divide people in their village/neighborhood. Respondents could then choose among three options: not at all, somewhat, and a lot. Table 32 shows that there has been a significant decrease in ethnic differences in the high treatment zones in Burkina over time. These results are consistent with those in Section B, which suggest that P-DEV II has an ameliorating effect on perceptions of ethnic differences in Burkina.

Table 32: Ethnic Differences

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.494	1.409	1.316	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	-.130	-.005	.035	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	.166	.041	.195**	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.214***	.184**	-.043	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	.068	.011	-.167	-.021
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	-.090	-.028	-.178***	-.095

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

To measure a second vulnerability indicator, religious differences, respondents were asked to what extent they feel that religious differences tend to divide people in their village/neighborhood. Again, respondents could choose among three options: not at all, somewhat, and a lot. As Table 33 illustrates, there has been a significant decrease in religious differences in the high treatment zones in Burkina over time. These results are similar to those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program has an ameliorating effect on religious differences in Burkina.

Table 33: Religious Differences

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.432	1.472	1.311	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	-.055	.030	.045	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	.087	.047	.273***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.204***	.155	-.066	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	-.002	.012	-.128	-.032
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	.031	-.004	-.220**	-.048

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

To measure the justifiability of religious violence, respondents were asked how often they feel that that using arms and violence against civilians in defense of one's religion if justified. Respondents could then choose among three options: never, sometimes, and often. Table 34 shows that there has been a significant decrease in the perceptions that religious violence is justified in the high treatment zones in Burkina. These results are consistent with those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program has an ameliorating effect on the justifiability of religious violence in Burkina. There is also a significant pooled treatment effect for low intensity zones, reflecting the relatively consistent negative impact across the three country contexts.

Table 34: Religious Violence Is Justified

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.449	1.266	1.199	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	.037	.123	.040	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	-.184*	-.011	.264***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.222**	.023	-.126***	X

Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	-.133	-.209	-.041	-.133*
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	.153	-.010	-.281***	-.009

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Respondents were also asked how often they think violence is an effective method to solve problems. Again, they could choose among three options: never, sometimes, and often. As Table 35 illustrates, more respondents in the high treatment zones in Chad think that violence is an effective method to solve problems, while less respondents in the high treatment zones in Burkina do so. These results are different from those in Section B, which found that the P-DEV II program has no effect on this vulnerability indicator. There are no pooled effects in either low treatment or high treatment zones, as the positive effects in some countries and the negative ones in others cancel each other out.

Table 35: Violence Is Effective to Solve Problems

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.470	1.308	1.352	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	.013	.088	.155	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	-.190**	.054	.219***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.272***	.003	-.151***	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	-.040	-.162	.050	-.049
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	.178*	-.188	-.219**	-.047

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Next, we asked respondents whether they disagree or agree with the statement that "violence in the name of Islam" can be justified. As Table 36 illustrates, the notion that violence in the name of Islam can be justified has become more popular in Burkina's high treatment zones relative to its no treatment zones, which suggests a detrimental impact of the P-DEV II program in this country. These results are different from those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program has no effect on this vulnerability indicator, and seems to run against the pattern seem thus far of positive program impacts on indicators of extremism in high intensity Burkina zones. Again, there is no pooled treatment effect in either of the zones.

Table 36: Violence in the Name of Islam

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.539	1.574	1.540	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	.011	.052	-.085	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	-.102	-.025	-.122	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.461***	-.395***	-.411***	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	.002	-.094	.125	-.001
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	.115	.085	.173*	.123

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

To measure anti-West attitudes, respondents were asked whether they disagree or agree with the following statement: “The United States is at war against Islam, not terrorism.” Table 37 shows that in both Chad and Niger, the notion that the U.S. is at war against Islam has become significantly less popular over time; this goes for low and high treatment zones alike. In Burkina, the opposite has been happening, with this notion having become more popular in both low and high treatment zones. These results are consistent to those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program decreases anti-West attitudes in Chad in Niger but increases them in Burkina. It also suggests that there are few differences in these impacts across low and high intensity treatment zones.

Table 37: Anti-West Attitudes

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.398	2.061	1.659	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	.094	.245	-.095	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	-.148***	.322**	.125	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	.019	-.037	-.440***	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	-.293**	-.636**	.309***	-.221*
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	-.269***	-.986***	.146***	-.320

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Goal 3: Youth Outlook

Tables 38 through 42 show the results for questions related to Goal Level Index 3: Youth Outlook, defined as the individual and collective vision young people have of their futures. This concept is operationalized using three categories of indicators: a) economic outlook which evaluates attitudes toward and practical vision of future careers and economic potential; b) educational outlook which evaluates expectations regarding education and the learning environment; and c) civic outlook which comprises participation in civil society and local decision making. The tables in this section present the results for the full sample in each country, that is, individuals of all ages, given that few differences were found in the less statistically robust youth-only analyses in the previous section.

Life Satisfaction and Economic Outlook (higher values represent improved outlook)

To measure life satisfaction, respondents were presented with a card showing a ladder representing the "ladder of life." The ladder consists of eleven steps, ranging from 0 to 10. Respondents were then asked the following question: "Let's suppose the top of the ladder is the best possible life for you; and the bottom, the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder do you personally stand at the present time?" As Table 38 illustrates, there has been a significant and very large decrease in life satisfaction in Niger's high treatment zones relative to its no treatment zones over time, with no changes attributable to the P-DEV II program elsewhere.

Table 38: Life Satisfaction

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	4.624	3.842	4.250	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	-.167	.606*	-.060	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	.300	.843***	.064	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.601***	.886***	.422	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	.064	-.330	.419	.068
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	-.146	-1.068**	.385	-.322

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

To measure perceptions of the economy, respondents were asked whether the economy of their country is worse, about the same, or better than it was a year ago. Table 39 shows that perceptions of the economy have significantly worsened over time in the high treatment zones relative to the non-core zones in Chad and Niger, a finding that is different from what was observed in Section B. Conversely, perceptions of the economy have significantly improved between waves in the high treatment zones in Burkina.

Table 39: Economic Outlook

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	2.080	2.191	2.373	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	.027	.048	-.325**	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	.001	.110	-.669***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.358**	.011	-.293***	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	.057	-.076	.226	.049
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	-.443***	-.292**	.875***	.111

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Educational Outlook (higher values represent improved outlook)

We measure respondents' attitudes regarding educational inclusiveness by asking whether they agree or disagree with the following statement: "Middle school is only for boys, not girls." As Table 40 illustrates, attitudes regarding education have become more inclusive over time in Chad's high treatment zones. These results are similar to those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program has a positive impact on educational inclusiveness in Chad.

Table 40: Inclusiveness of Schools

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	2.644	2.601	2.615	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	-.139	.020	.105	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	-.015	-.038	.056	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	-.049	.184**	.294***	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	.163	-.100	-.134	-.027
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	.248**	-.021	-.077	.056

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Civic Outlook (higher values represent improved outlook)

Political interest is by asking respondents whether they have very little interest, some interest, or a great deal of interest in local community affairs. Table 41 shows that interest in community affairs has significantly increased over time in the high treatment zones in Chad and Burkina. Conversely, interest in community affairs has significantly decreased between waves in the high treatment zones in Niger. These results are different from those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program has no impact on political interest.

Table 41: Interest in Community Affairs

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.577	1.651	2.196	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	.060	-.088	-.270	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	.086	-.142*	-.350**	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	.206***	.638***	.265*	X
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	-.075	.106	.123	.023
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	.330***	-.352***	.510***	.069

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

To measure this dimension, respondents were asked two questions: a) “Do you know how long the term of office is for the President?” b) “Do you know how many seats there are in the National Assembly?” The analyses in Table 42 are based on the average number of correct answers given across the two items. As the table illustrates, Niger and Burkina have experienced a significant increase in political knowledge over time in both low and high treatment zones. These results are similar to those in Section B, which suggest that the P-DEV II program has a positive impact on political knowledge in Niger and Burkina Faso. The overall pooled treatment effect is also significant for high intensity zones.

Table 42: Political Knowledge

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	.229	.479	.331	X
Baseline Low Core versus Non-Core	.124***	-.066	-.008	X
Baseline High Core versus Non-Core	.004	.025	.097***	X
Baseline-Midline Difference, Non-Core	.094	-.032	.012	X

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Difference in Differences, Low Core versus Non-Core	-.033	.167**	.086**	.056
Difference in Differences, High Core versus Non-Core	.014	.189***	.059*	.106***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

In sum, these analyses add nuance to the basic results shown in Section III-B above, but do not change the essential contours of the results already presented. As in the earlier section, there are few significant pooled cross-country effects: high intensity zones with greater amount of P-DEV II activities showed greater positive change on perceived access to jobs and political knowledge, relative to non-core zones, and low intensity zones showed greater declines in perception of the justifiability of religious violence and support for interethnic marriage. Examination of the country-by-country effects showed greater impact of the program in high intensity zones on a wider range of outcomes, especially in Burkina and especially on indicators of Resilience to Violent Extremism. This indicates that zones within Burkina with more P-DEV II activities showed the most consistent pattern of positive changes across the 19 indicators. Treatment intensity was generally less consequential for predicting positive program outcomes in Chad and Niger. Even in Burkina, however, there were anomalous findings where P-DEV II high intensity zones changed in ways opposite to the program's goals.

D. Panel Analysis

A portion of the data collection exercise consisted of a panel study in which some individuals from EAS baseline (wave 1) communes in Niger and Burkina Faso were re-interviewed in the midline survey (wave 2). The panel sample consists of 497 respondents who were randomly selected from the pool of wave 1 respondents, roughly 25 individuals per commune for 10 communes each in Niger and Burkina Faso. As noted above, logistical and budgetary issues prevented the panel portion of the study from being carried out in Chad. Surveying the same individuals allows us to examine the effects of the P-DEV II program on the various outcome measures more directly. To do so, respondents in wave 1 and wave 2 were asked whether or not they participated in any (and if so, how many times) of the following seven activities during the past year:

- A workshop or forum in your community where issues about peace or democracy were discussed
- A poetry reading or a drama about peace or democracy issues
- Training to develop ways to solve community problems
- A workshop or forum at a place other than a mosque where imams or religious leaders discussed peace or democracy with people in the community
- Trainings to help you find work or find a better job
- Trainings to help you learn how to run a business or write an application for a business development grant
- A meeting to help determine how community grant funding will be spent

These activities were selected to represent the range of activities implemented by P-DEV II program. However, it is important to note that we do not ask specifically about exposure to P-DEV directly, since the sponsorship of the activities is rarely made known to participants. We cannot therefore say with certainty that positive responses to these questions indicate direct exposure to P-DEV II programming, since there may have been other civil society or donor-sponsored programs on these themes in the given zones. We use the change in these activities at the individual-level to control for individuals' baseline level of exposure to other programs, and assume that at least some of the positive reported changes in exposure in core zones can be attributed to P-DEV II.

First, to get a general sense of the extent to which respondents participated in these activities, we created a binary index coded "0" for individuals who did not participate in any of these seven activities during the past year, and "1" for individuals who participated in at least one. Figures 21 and 22 show the percentages of panel respondents coded as "0" and "1," broken down by core/non-core zone and wave 1/2. As the graphs illustrate, there is a substantial difference between the two countries, with about 70% of wave 1 respondents in Burkina having participated in at least one activity but only about 30% of wave 1 respondents in Niger having done so. The figures also show that in both countries, there are virtually no differences between core and non-core zones for the first wave. In Niger, the number of respondents who had participated in at least one activity had increased to about 40% in the non-core zones and some 48% in the core zones by the time of the midline survey. In Burkina, the number of respondents who had participated in at least one activity had decreased to 50% in the non-core zones and some 64% in the core zones by the time of the midline survey. Therefore, the increase in respondents who reported to have participated in at least one activity in Niger is greater for the core zones than the non-core zones, and the decrease in respondents who said they had participated in at least one activity in Burkina is smaller. As noted, we cannot be certain about the source of these reported changes in activity, but it seems likely that this overall increased participation in workshops, job trainings, etc. in the core zones relative to the non-core zones reflect at least to a significant degree the implementation of the P-DEV II program.



Figure 21: Binary Activity Indicator for Niger



Figure 22: Binary Activity Indicator for Burkina Faso

Additional evidence for this assertion comes from looking at how many times respondents participated in these activities, not just whether they did at all. To this end, we created an ordinal variable for each of the seven activities, coded “0” if the respondent had not participated in it during the past year, “1” if they did once or twice, “2” if they did three or four times, and “3” if they did more than four times. We then generated an additive index summing the ordinal variables for all seven activities. Next, we broke down this index by core vs. non-core and by wave 1 vs. wave 2. In non-core zones, the mean value for wave 1 is 2.61, and the mean value for wave 2 is 1.62. In core zones, the mean value for wave 1 is 1.62, and the mean value for wave 2 is 1.93. These numbers suggest that in P-DEV

II core, individuals participate more in the types of activities listed above. In sharp contrast, the non-core zones experienced a rather steep decline in participation in the time between wave 1 and wave 2.

To shed further light on the extent to which individuals have participated in activities related to the P-DEV II program, we divide respondents into three categories: those who have participated in fewer activities in wave 2 relative to wave 1, those who have participated in the same amount, and those who have participated in more activities in wave 2 relative to wave 1. Figure 23 illustrates the percentage of respondents who fall into each category, broken down by country and zone type. It shows that in the core zones, the percentage of respondents who have participated in more activities is greater than it is in the non-core zones, and the percentage of respondents who have participated in fewer activities is smaller. This difference between core and non-core zones is especially pronounced for Burkina.



Figure 23: Change in Program Participation

In the next section, we turn our attention to the effects of participating in these seven activities on the 19 indicators used to operationalize the P-DEV II program goals. For each goal, we created a separate table, with each row representing one particular indicator. The coefficients represent the effect of the difference in program participation (i.e., the number of activities participated in during the year prior to the midline survey minus the number of activities participated in during the year prior to the baseline survey) on the respective indicator, controlling for the prior value of the outcome variable as well

as baseline differences between Niger and Burkina.[5] This means that we attempted to link the *changes* in outcomes at the individual level from baseline to midline with the *changes* in exposure to the activities sponsored by P-DEV II (though without having absolute certainty that these changes are from the P-DEV II program). Again, for the reader's convenience, the coefficients are color-coded: coefficients representing a desired effect of the program are shown in green, whereas coefficients representing a detrimental effect of the program are shown in red. The analyses were run two separate times: once for all zones, and once for core zones only to maximize the chances that the activities respondents participated in were actually part of the P-DEV program.

Goal 1: Social Cohesion

Table 43 shows the results for the panel analysis of the indicators relating to Goal 1: Social Cohesion. The table illustrates that the majority of coefficients for these indicators are small and size and statistically significant, suggesting that participating in a greater number of activities over time has no effect on them. There are two exceptions to this pattern: institutional trust in Burkina and political participation in Niger (only in the "all zones" specification). However, the former effect goes in the wrong direction: with each individual activity a respondent has participated in, their average level of trust in the five institutions mentioned above decreases by .011 (.028) points on a three-point scale. Conversely, for every additional activity a respondent has participated in, their average level of engagement in the three different types of political participation increases by .020 points on a two-point scale. Overall, there is little difference between the results for the "all zones" specification and the "core only" specification.

Table 43: Panel Analysis for Goal 1: Social Cohesion

	Niger (all zones)	Niger (core only)	Burkina (all zones)	Burkina (core only)
Interpersonal Trust	.007	.009	.003	-.006
Institutional Trust	-.006	.002	-.011*	-.028**
Community Decision-making	.003	-.017	-.006	.021
Political Participation	.020***	.012	.001	.015
Interethnic Marriage	-.003	.004	-.005	-.009

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Goal 2: Resilience to Violent Extremism

Table 44 shows the results for the panel analysis of the indicators relating to Goal 2: Resilience to Violent Extremism. Many of the coefficients for these indicators are small in size and statistically insignificant. This is especially true for Burkina, where increased participation in activities over time affects only one (two) of the indicators. For Niger, several coefficients relating to the resilience and vulnerability indicators are significantly influenced by the difference in program participation, but most of them suggest a *detrimental* effect of the P-DEV II program. Again, the results for the panel analyses remain largely the same, regardless of whether they are run on all zones or on the core

[5] The complete regression tables are included in the Appendix.

zones only.

Table 44: Panel Analysis for Goal 2: Resilience to Violent Extremism

	Niger (all zones)	Niger (core only)	Burkina (all zones)	Burkina (core only)
Access to Jobs	-.001	-.035*	.005	.029*
Access to Vocational School	.004	.019	.034**	.026
Political Efficacy	.006	-.030	-.002	.004
Ethnic Differences	.038**	.044**	.005	-.001
Religious Differences	.041*	.048**	.007	-.001
Religious Violence Justified	-.003	.020	-.001	-.001
Violence Effective	-.027*	.018	.007	.002
Violence in the Name of Islam	.011*	.014	.007	-.001
Anti-West Attitudes	.022**	.031*	.014	.047**

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Goal 3: Youth Outlook

Table 45 shows the results for the panel analysis of the indicators relating to Goal 3: Youth Outlook. Again, the table illustrates that the majority of coefficients for these indicators are small and size and statistically significant, suggesting that participating in a greater number of activities over time has no effect on them. Increased participation in activities over time appears to negatively affect respondents' economic expectations in Burkina and attitudes toward educational inclusiveness in Niger. Conversely, it seems to have a positive impact on respondents' life satisfaction in Burkina (only in the "core only" specification) and political knowledge in Niger (only in the "all zones" specification). Again, the coefficients for the "all zones" specification and the "core only" specification are largely the same in terms of direction and significance level.

Table 45: Panel Analysis for Goal 3: Youth Outlook

	Niger (all zones)	Niger (core only)	Burkina (all zones)	Burkina (core only)
Life Satisfaction	.004	-.035	.044	.198**
Economic Outlook	-.002	-.024	-.025**	-.044*
Inclusiveness of Schools	-.014*	-.031**	.001	.009
Interest in Community Affairs	-.005	.020	.007	-.002
Political Knowledge	.009*	.004	.004	.002

*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Unfortunately, the panel portion of the study was unsuccessful in linking program exposure to outcomes at the individual level. In almost every instance, individuals who

reported greater exposure to the kinds of activities that P-DEV II implemented between baseline and midline showed either no difference over time on outcomes relevant to program goals or showed changes in the "wrong" direction. To this extent, we could not replicate the results of the zone-level analyses shown in earlier sections of the report at the individual level. This is likely due to the relatively few numbers of people who were re-interviewed in each zone from the EAS baseline zones, which already were a limited number of zones in which the P-DEV II program was active.

E. Experimental Evidence

The indicators discussed in the previous sections share the common feature that they all request direct answers or "self-reports" concerning personal perceptions of violence that may occur in their communities, the extremist violence that may occur beyond their communes, and various justifications for using violence to solve problems or in the name of religion. However, researchers cannot often be confident that these types of questions yield honest or externally valid responses from respondents.

The first concern about self-reported responses relates to the honesty of the response. In fact, it is well-known in public opinion and social psychology research that survey respondents tend to answer questions in a way that they believe will please enumerators or, more relevant to this report, provide desirable responses to sensitive items because they conform to a particular set of societal norms. The second concern is the external validity of the response. Are these findings generalizable to political problems in the real world? Because the self-reported items are framed in abstract terms, it is not clear they capture genuine intentions to use violence. That is, such items identify approval of violent behaviors for vaguely-defined circumstances, but they do not measure willingness to support specific violent reactions to clearly-defined policies.

For these reasons, the EAS team devised innovative evaluation instruments that measure attitudes toward violent extremism unobtrusively, that is, minimizing the potential for untruthful answers. These techniques attempt to mitigate social desirability bias and improve internal validity of measures of vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism. They also improve external validity of measures by providing specific and realistic stimuli and relevant violent reactions. By doing so, these items capture the willingness to use violence in concrete, policy-based terms.

List Experiment # 1

The list experiment procedure is straightforward. Respondents are presented with a hypothetical scenario and a series of instructions, read to them by the survey enumerator:

"Imagine that you hear on the radio that a Western newspaper has published offensive images of the Prophet Mohammed committing a crime. You could respond to this affront in many ways. I'm going to read you a list of possible responses now. *Please listen to them and then tell me how many of the following reactions you would support*."

The sentence in italics represents the core of the list experiment because respondents are instructed to reveal only the number of responses they would support but not which responses they would support. Half of respondents in a given target zone were randomly assigned to a "control group" to whom the survey enumerator lists only three potential responses:

1) A peaceful protest at the Western country's embassy;

2) Your government demands an apology from the Western country;

3) Your government declaring war against the Western country.

Responses 1-2 are likely unobjectionable. The third item is designed to be more radical so that that most respondents do not necessarily respond affirmatively to all three control items. This is referred in the literature as a ceiling item or a low-prevalence item that minimizes design effects when comparing control and treatment groups. The other half of respondents in a target zone were randomly assigned to a "treatment group," to which the survey enumerator lists the three potential responses listed above as well as a fourth, sensitive item:

4) An attack on the Western country's embassy that could result in military or civilian casualties.

Again, respondents only reveal the total number of potential responses to the hypothetical scenario that they would support and they do not reveal to the survey enumerator which ones. Assuming that the randomization process for assigning treatment and control groups was effective, the difference between the average number of items that respondents in the treatment group report and the average number of items that respondents in the control group report therefore yields a measure of the percentage of the sample that agrees that "An attack on the Western country's embassy that could result in military or civilian casualties" is an appropriate response to the publication of an offensive image of the Prophet Mohammed.

For our analyses of the first list experiment, we model the respondent's answer as a linear function of his/her treatment assignment and the control covariates. These OLS regressions predict the count of violent acts provided by respondents with a dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not the respondent received the sensitive item (attacking the embassy). Under the conditions of randomization, the treatment groups and control groups are equally likely to support all three non-sensitive items. Given that the groups are identical on every measure except for the addition of a fourth item on the list, any differences between the groups may be attributed to the addition of the sensitive item. Specifically, differences between the groups may be interpreted as the proportion of respondent who support an attack on an embassy that may result in military or civilian casualties. This difference between the treatment and control groups is referred to as the "average treatment effect."

Table 46: List Experiment #1 – Percentage of Respondents Who Choose the Sensitive Item

	Pooled	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso
Midline, Non-core	16.6***	16.8**	19.3***	13.6**
Midline , Core	18.6	17.4	23.5	12.3

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

First, we analyze the responses by all individuals interviewed during the second wave of the survey. The results are shown in Table 46, broken down by country and zone type. The first row shows the proportion of respondents in non-core zones who support an attack on an embassy that may result in military or civilian casualties, and whether this number is significantly different from zero. In all three countries, a significant portion of respondents in non-core zones in all three countries supports such an attack. The table also reveals differences between the country, with Niger exhibiting the greatest portion of

respondents who choose the sensitive item and Burkina exhibiting the least. The second row shows the proportion of respondents in core zones who support an attack on an embassy that may result in military or civilian casualties, and whether this number is *significantly different from the results for the non-core zones*. In all three countries, the difference is insignificant, meaning that midline respondents in core and non-core zones are statistically indistinguishable in terms of their level of support for such an attack.

Second, we analyze and compare the changes in baseline and midline responses among individuals *only* in EAS zones, following the difference in difference logic utilized to estimate P-DEV II program effects in earlier portions of the report. The reason we restrict this analysis to respondents who are residing in a zone that was part of the baseline EAS survey is that during the baseline wave, respondents in zones surveyed by IRD were not asked the questions relating to the experiments. Therefore, it was not possible to measure *changes* among IRD zones from baseline to midline, nor to link these changes to core versus non-core P-DEV II status.

Table 47: List Experiment #1 – Percentage of Respondents Who Choose the Sensitive Item

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso
Baseline, Non-core	10.9*	3.2	1.8
Baseline, Core	10.9	9.3	10.2
Midline, Non-core	6.0	17.5	8.6
Midline, Core	28.4	13.0	8.9

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 47 illustrates the results of the analysis of EAS zones over time. The first row shows the proportion of baseline respondents in non-core zones who support an attack on an embassy that may result in military or civilian casualties, and whether this number is significantly different from zero. Only in Chad, the proportion of respondents who support such an attack is large enough to reach statistical significance. In Niger and Burkina, only a small percentage of respondents choose the sensitive item; these numbers are so small that they are statistically indistinguishable from zero. The second row shows the proportion of respondents in core zones who support an attack on an embassy that may result in military or civilian casualties, and whether this number is significantly different from the results for the baseline non-core zones. In Chad, the figures for core and non-core zones are virtually the same. In Niger and Burkina, the proportion of respondents who choose the sensitive item is larger in the core zones than it is in the non-core zones, but not large enough to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

The third row shows the proportion of midline respondents in non-core zones who support an attack on an embassy that may result in military or civilian casualties, and whether this number is significantly different from the results for the baseline non-core zones. In non-core zones in Niger and Burkina, the proportion of respondents who support such an attack has increased over time, while Chad exhibits the opposite trend. This suggests increased support for violent acts against Western civilians in the former two countries and decreased support in the latter, although it should be added that these differences are statistically insignificant. The last row shows the proportion of midline respondents in core zones who support an attack on an embassy that may result in military or civilian casualties. In core zones Chad and Niger, support for such an attack has increased over time, while Burkina exhibits the opposite trend. However, even in Chad where the

percentage of respondents who choose the sensitive item increases from 10.9 to 28.4, the difference does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

List Experiment #2

For the second list experiment, respondents are presented with another hypothetical scenario and a series of instructions, read to them by the survey enumerator:

“Now to change the subject, I am going to read you a list of things that people in this area may have considered doing. Please listen to them and then tell me how many you would consider doing. *Please, do not tell me which ones, only how many*.”

The sentence in italics represents the core of the list experiment because respondents are instructed to reveal only the number of responses they would support but not which responses they would support. Half of respondents in a given target zone were randomly assigned to a “control group” to whom the survey enumerator lists only four potential responses:

1) Donating clothes or money to someone in need;

2) Voting for a candidate who is a strong supporter of homosexual rights;

3) Reporting an official who has taken bribes;

4) Going on the Hajj.

The other half of respondents in a target zone were randomly assigned to a “treatment group,” to which the survey enumerator lists the four potential responses listed above as well as a fifth, sensitive item:

5) Joining a group that carries out acts of violence to defend your religion.

Again, respondents only reveal the total number of potential responses to the hypothetical scenario that they would support and they do not reveal to the survey enumerator which ones. Assuming that the randomization process for assigning treatment and control groups was effective, the difference between the average number of items that respondents in the treatment group report and the average number of items that respondents in the control group report therefore yields a measure of the percentage of the sample that agrees that “Joining a group that carries out acts of violence to defend your religion” something that people in this area may have considered doing.

To analyze the second list experiment, we again model the respondent’s answer as a linear function of his/her treatment assignment and the control covariates. The questions relating to the second list experiment were not included in the questionnaire during the baseline wave of the survey, which is why we cannot make any comparisons over time. Still, the second list experiment can provide us with important information about the extent to which terror groups may find potential recruits in each of the three country at the time of the midline survey.

Table 48 illustrates the results of our analysis, broken down by country and zone type. The first row shows the estimated proportion of respondents in non-core zones who would consider joining a group that carries out acts of violence to defend your religion, and whether this number is significantly different from zero. In non-core zones in Chad and Burkina, virtually no respondents think that this is the case; in stark contrast, 41.5 percent of the respondents in non-core zones in Niger choose the sensitive item.

Table 48: List Experiment #2 – Percentage of Respondents Who Choose the Sensitive Item

	Pooled	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso
Midline, non-core	14.0*	0.0	41.5***	0.0
Midline, core	11.7	8.2	6.8*	20.5

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

The second row shows the proportion of respondents in core zones who may have considered joining a group that carries out acts of violence to defend your religion, and whether this number is significantly different from the results for the non-core zones. In Chad and Burkina, the percentage of respondents who do think that this is the case is higher in the core zones than in the non-core zones, but these differences are insignificant. In Niger, the percentage of respondents choosing the sensitive item is 6.8, which is substantially and significantly smaller than the 41.5 percent exhibited in the non-core zones.

Overall, the results of our second list experiment suggest that there is a non-negligible pool of individuals who may consider joining groups that would carry out acts of religious violence; this pool is largest in non-core zones in Niger and core zones in Burkina Faso.

Endorsement Experiment

We also implement an endorsement experiment that measures support for the extremist group Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The endorsement experiment follows a similar structural logic as the list experiment, though its aim is to measure sympathy with active radical and extremist groups in the region, as opposed to approving of extremist violence (Bullock et al. 2011).

For our endorsement experiment, respondents are randomly assigned to receive one of two prompts. In the control condition, the survey enumerator reads:

“The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal polio vaccinations across {Burkina Faso/Chad/Niger}. How much do you approve of such a plan – not at all, somewhat, or quite?”

Treatment subjects, by contrast, encounter one additional detail:

“The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal polio vaccinations across {Burkina Faso/Chad/Niger}. **It is likely that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Islamist group, will oppose this program**. How much do you approve of such a plan – not at all, somewhat, or quite?”

The baseline expectation is that individuals in the treatment group who sympathize to some extent with AQIM will be more likely than individuals in the control group to oppose the WHO program.

Table 49 displays the percentage of all midline respondents who report to disapprove of the nation-wide vaccination program. The control group contains the individuals who evaluate the vaccination program on its own, with no group endorsement heuristic. Of these individuals, opposition to the program ranges from 14.9% in non-core zones in Burkina to 38.2% in core zones in Chad. The treatment group contains individuals who evaluate the vaccination program with the additional knowledge that AQIM opposed the program. Of these individuals, opposition to the program ranges from 27.3% in non-core

zones in Burkina to 62.2% in core zones in Chad. From these figures, two patterns emerge. First, there are significant differences between countries in terms of how receptive individuals are to cues from extremist groups, with respondents in Chad being the most receptive and those in Burkina the least. Second, such differences also exist between non-core and core zones, with respondents in the latter being more receptive to cues from extremist groups.

Table 49: Endorsement Experiment #1 – Percentage of Midline Respondents Who Disapprove of Vaccination Program

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core
Control Group	24.9	38.2	24.1	30.9	14.9	10.24
Treatment Group	54.1	62.2	49.8	56.3	27.3	36.31

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

We also analyze the responses by individuals interviewed during the second wave of the survey who are residing in a zone that was part of the wave 1 EAS survey, and compare their responses to those by individuals interviewed during the first wave of the survey. Again, the reason we restrict this analysis to respondents who are residing in a zone that was part of the wave 1 EAS survey is that during the first wave of the survey, respondents in zones surveyed by IRD were not asked the questions relating to the experiments. The results are shown in Table 50.

The first row shows how more likely baseline respondents in non-core zones are to oppose the program if it is also opposed by AQIM than if it is not, and whether this number is significantly different from zero. Respondents are roughly 11% (Chad), 22% (Niger), and 22% (Burkina Faso) percentage points more likely to oppose the program if it is also opposed by AQIM than if it is not. Following the logic of the experiment, these individuals' decisions appear to reflect positive evaluations of the extremist group.

Table 50: Endorsement Experiment #1 – DiD Analysis

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso
Baseline, non-core	11.4**	21.5***	22.0***
Baseline, core	16.6	23.7	21.9
Midline, non-core	20.5	34.2*	12.6**
Midline, core	24.8	32.9	27.8

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

The second row shows how more likely baseline respondents in core zones are to oppose the program if it is also opposed by AQIM than if it is not, and whether this number is significantly different from the results for the baseline non-core zones. In all three countries, the difference between non-core and core zones is insignificant, meaning that the differences between the two are negligible. The third row shows how more likely midline respondents in non-core zones are to oppose the program if it is also opposed by AQIM than if it is not, and whether this number is significantly different from the results for the baseline non-core zones. In non-core zones in Niger, the percentage of respondents who base their decision on a positive evaluation of the extremist group has increased significantly 34.2%, while in Burkina this number has decreased to 12.6%. The fourth row shows how more likely midline respondents in core zones are to oppose the

program if it is also opposed by AQIM than if it is not, and whether the DiD is statistically significant. In all three countries, positive evaluations of the extremist group have increased over time in the core zones, but these differences do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Therefore, while we can say that there was a general increase in support for AQIM in Niger and a general decrease in Burkina, we cannot attribute these changes to the activities carried out by the P-DEV II program.

IV. Observations from Qualitative Data

This section outlines the common themes and key commentary from the qualitative data collected by CERFODES in Burkina Faso and CASPA in Niger. The overall context surrounding P-DEV II activities in the two countries presents deteriorating conditions within the two countries. However, key differences exist, which support the country-by-country results in the DiD analysis above. Burkina Faso showed positive attitudes toward social cohesion and resilience to violent extremism, particularly in perceived ethnic and religious differences and rejection of violence from extremists. Niger showed negative attitudes toward social cohesion, particularly in religious tensions between Islamic sects. In resilience to violent extremism, some respondents accepted activities of Al Qaeda but not Boko Haram, showing support for some forms of violent extremism. Other notable differences stand out across the two countries, particularly in terms of women's autonomy and the effectiveness of P-DEV II activities.

Both Burkina Faso and Niger cited weakening conditions that support youth outlook: employment, attraction to extremism and conflict, and ease of manipulation. In general, many of the themes that emerged during this phase of qualitative interviews and focus groups reinforce findings from the quantitative data.

The methodology for qualitative data collection centered on focus group discussions with groups of seven to twelve participants. Groups were intentionally varied in composition, in order to include the views of a range of local residents: youth, educated women, Muslim men, young women, rural men, illiterate rural women, etc. Importantly, the research teams employed a strategy of *in vivo* coding, whereby facilitators started with questions related to the core themes of the research but then allowed sub-themes to emerge naturally through participant responses. Interviews with individuals complemented the focus groups; in each country, the partner organizations conducted ten focus groups and fifteen interviews.

A. Burkina Faso

Commentary was largely optimistic. Several of the focus groups finished by noting that they are hopeful in the future of their communities and that they foresee the current challenges facing their communities eventually being resolved.

Exposure to P-DEV II

P-DEV II programs were not well known to all groups, but the groups that were familiar with the programs thought highly of them, noting contributions to: peace; sensitization; positive behaviors; local governance; conflict resolution; consultations; discussion of problems in the community; and resource management. A trend in the data is that focus groups cited the importance of trainings for young people. Media messaging was cited often as well: Participants in Ouagadougou, Ouahigouya, and Gorgajdi cited participatory theater and cinema, while in Dori, Gorgajdi, and Ouahigouya, participants mentioned the

role of radio programming.

Respondents found that P-DEV II Community Action Committees in Ouagadougou, Ouahigoya, and Seguenega and theater groups in Seytenga contributed to conflict resolution. In Ouagadougou, a group of young males shared the following sentiment:

We know the P-DEV II programs. They contribute to peace here, which is a tremendous contribution. The program especially supports associations that raise awareness.

However, there is less familiarity with the programs in other areas, and sensitivity around the programs exists. A respondent expressed a concern about the identity of P-DEV II, which is seen as “American” and which may thus handicap the program. A respondent in Dori expressed a concern that there is no incentive associated with the program for residents to actually take action; they are focused instead on awareness. A respondent in Gorgajdi expressed concerns about the weakness of the radio grid, which hampered the effectiveness of the radio programs.

Goal 1: Social Cohesion

Systematic communal tensions and conflict do not arise as a function of religious differences in Burkina. In many zones, respondents were also quick to point out that ethnic conflict does not frequently exist, as noted in Markoye, Seguenega, Tougo, and Yatenga.

Instead, to the extent that communal tensions persist, the roots seem to be in competition between agriculturalists and pastoralists. Members of the Fulani (Peuhl) ethnicity are the principally pastoralists, so they are often involved. Because of this overlap in livelihood activities and ethnicity, however, those tensions often take on an ethnic guise. Furthermore, because the Fulani people are typically Muslim, the same competition over land can aggravate religious tensions.

Resource conflict and disputes between pastoralists and sedentary farmers occur especially during periods of grazing shortage, as noted by respondents in Ouagadougou, Markoye, Tougo, and Yatenga. Violence associated with mining and group conflict over jobs was also noted by participants in Ouahigouya, Gorgajdi, Markoye, and Yatenga.

Women and men clearly do not see the contributions of women in the same way: women cite their “enormous responsibilities,” whereas men see the role of women in a more simple and straightforward way. Male respondents in Burkina Faso do articulate a fairly strong recognition of the importance of female autonomy, however. Respondents in Ouagadougou noted that domestic violence occurs between men and women over the retrieval of water.

Tellingly, to the extent that women do enjoy empowerment and autonomy, those efforts seem restricted to taking care of the family. Several male respondents in Namissiguima expressed the following:

Women now hold jobs to support their families. In reality women have incomes but often it is to look after their families as their husbands have abandoned that to improve their personal living conditions. It is difficult to talk about women's empowerment in these conditions.

Respondents expressed widespread frustration with and lack of trust in political leaders and local government. Conversely, several focus groups expressed that they “put faith in their traditional and religious leaders to help resolve local problems.” This is particularly true regarding conflict management resources and strategies for addressing land disputes, as expressed by focus group participants in Ouagadougou, Ouahigoya, and Seguenega, and by local officials interviewed in Seguenega, Seytenga, and Yatenga. Respondents also cited the use of religious authorities to help build social cohesion in Seguenega, and noted that women made a contribution to cohesion in Ouahigouya.

Despite the absence of overt religious conflict in Burkina, inter-religious intolerance has posed a challenge to social cohesion. Respondents in Ouagadougou noted that churches are often noisy and disruptive in places where churches and mosques are located near each other. Muslims can cause difficulty for Christian groups too, as noted in Yatenga, where Muslims of certain sects do not accept the offer of Christians’ food during holidays. This, in turn leads the Christians to reject the Muslims.

Goal 2: Resilience to Violent Extremism

Groups expressed a strong sentiment against extremism. Terrorist groups are systematically viewed as incompatible with Islam, and respondents see no meaningful difference between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda. Respondents in Markoye, Ouagadougou, Ouahigouya, Seytenga, Tougo, and Yatenga, thought of these groups as equally evil. Respondents in Seytenga noted that they reject all forms of terrorism. Muslim respondents in Namissiguima unanimously expressed the following:

Islam contributes to the promotion of peace…There is no difference between Al Qaeda and Boko Haram. They are not Muslims because the things they do (killing, assassination, rape, robbery) are condemned by Islam.

There is growing concern over influence from across borders in terms of extremist threats. Participants in Ouagadougou, Ouahigouya, Seytenga, and Markoye were concerned about threats from outside of the country. Respondents from Ouahigouya, Seytenga, Markoye, and Yatenga cited terrorist influences from Niger, Mali, and across the Sahel, noting that being geographically close to extremists in other countries threatened their safety.

Furthermore, the women's group in Ouagadougou expressed growing fears of religious violence because "we don't know who is who" (in reference to the ability of extremists to blend into the community). Respondents in Seytenga refused to integrate an Islamic sect from Niger out of concerns of terrorism. However, not all communities felt threatened by exposure to terrorist threats. Respondents in Gorgajdi, Markoye, Ouahigouya, and Tougo found security to be acceptable in their communities.

Goal 3: Youth Outlook

In Burkina Faso, respondents noted that youth were negatively affected by a lack of political integration, dominance by elders, and lack of authority. Respondents in Ouagadougou cited a lack of authority, monitoring, and mentoring, and in both Ouagadougou and Seytenga, the neglect of youth evoked animated discussion. There was disagreement over whether youth are neglected among respondents in these zones and those in Ouahigouya.

A consistent concern is that the youth of Burkina Faso are "easy to manipulate." This is especially true of youth who lack opportunities. Some suggest a rising tide of delinquency among young people, and that youth who lack steady activities, jobs, or opportunities are more likely to fall victim to the temptations of joining in illicit activities.

The drivers that affected attraction to extremism and conflict among youth were similar across focus groups and interviews. Respondents perceived that youth were attracted to extremism by easy access to money in Ouagadougou and Yatenga, and by the lack of economic alternatives in Ouagadougou. Concerns relating to unemployment included idleness, as noted in Ouahigouya, Markoye, and Seytenga, and unease and nervousness among youth who do not work, cited by respondents in Markoye.

Respondents expressed related concerns about the drivers of youth conflict, including vulnerability and lack of jobs or employment, as noted by participants in Ouahigouya and Yatenga, and attraction to easy money, noted in Yatenga.

Respondent perceptions of youth attraction to extremism extended beyond economic drivers to neglect, weak faith, lack of authority or oversight, ease of manipulation and bad governance. Respondents in Ouagadougou cited weak religious faith, and in

Ouahigouya, respondents widely agreed that youth were persuaded by Muslim preachers "who brainwash" youth.

Governance also influenced youth attraction to extremism, as noted by respondents in Ouagadougou. Shortcomings in education and illiteracy, they argued, can lead to the ease of indoctrination.

B. Niger

Commentary was notably less optimistic in Niger. Respondents devoted more attention to problems and were more likely to assign blame to targeted actors. In particular, responses in Niger were generally less favorable to the West and American interests, particularly concerning terrorism related questions.

Exposure to P-DEV II

P-DEV II programs were known to several of the groups. Respondents who were familiar with P-DEV II interventions were appreciative of the program, citing the contributions of vocational training to small- and medium-sized enterprises and to economic activity; they also highlighted the awareness campaigns as a positive outcome of the program. Respondents in Balleyara, Diffa, Tahoua, and Zinder noted vocational training. Respondents in Tillaberi acknowledged support for Koranic Schools and the distribution of resources to schools, as well as participatory theater and mobile cinema. In Zinder, respondents stressed the value of workshops and trainings, and in Tahoua respondents cited radio broadcasts, lectures, and sports and cultural activities.

However, a consistent problem cited by respondents in Niger was that the programs do not reach enough people to really be effective. Respondents noted limitations on reaching youth, where "a minority of beneficiaries" was perceived as having access to the program. One respondent expressly criticized the program, claiming that little consultation was occurring. Respondents in Zinder expressed the following:

The P-DEV II workshops and trainings are effective programs in fighting against extremism and violence. The problem is that the programs do not reach a large enough number of people; they need to be expanded.

Goal 1: Social Cohesion

Respondents from several areas pointed out that ethnic conflict does not exist in their communities, including in Agadez, Balleyara, Diffa, Maradi, Tillaberi, and Zinder. However in Arlit, respondents described regular conflict between the Hausa and Tuareg ethnicities. Respondents noted that direct clashes rarely occur.

Men expressed a more conservative view of women's autonomy in Niger compared to Burkina Faso. One group of men, in Maradi, expressed that it is the man's role to set limits on the woman, while the women's group in Balleyara stated that women "are treated as inferior." Groups regularly cited that the women's place is in the home, and there seemed to be little enthusiasm for women engaging in public matters.

Respondents identified a number of local conflict management resources: civil society, noted in Agadez, Niamey, and Tahoua; local authorities, noted in Agadez, Balleyara, and Zinder; elected officials, noted in Maradi and Zinder; and religious leaders, noted in Niamey, Tahoua, and Zinder. A large number of respondents stressed the role of women as potential mediators; this view was expressed in Agadez, Ballyara, Diffa, Maradi,

Tahoua, and Tillaberi.

Respondents in Niger asserted that Islam is a religion of peace that helps to promote social awareness. They were more favorable toward Sharia law and viewed Koranic schools and imams more favorably than did respondents in Burkina. The group of youth in Arlit noted that Sharia and active imams can help to "reduce the influence of the West," which they viewed as a positive trend. Another group, in Tillabery, noted that Sharia can serve as a way to combat favoritism and injustice. Sharia was a solution that participants perceived to be favored by youth to combat injustice, noted in Arlit, Tillaberi, and Zinder.

Differences within Islam weaken social cohesion in Niger. Those differences include opposing interpretations of the Koran by sects with distinct views—between the Izala and Tidjania in Balleyara, for example, and between Darika followers and Izala Sunnites in Zinder. Respondents in Tillaberi acknowledge that increasing religious fundamentalism is a factor in the expanding threat of Islamic terrorism. However, a Christian preacher in Tillaberi noted that his group is welcomed by Muslims, and he preaches coexistence.

There is some sentiment among the respondents in Niger that the United States is in a war against Islam. A focus group of men in Diffa cited as evidence the fact that the U.S. only seems to attack countries that are majority Muslim. The Tillabery group expressed a similar opinion. Challenges to Western influence extend beyond the United States' battle with terrorism: respondents in Maradi also noted that sometimes religious leaders boycott practical, Western-led initiatives such as vaccination campaigns.

Goal 2: Resilience to Violent Extremism

Respondents acknowledge that adaptation to terrorism has become "a compulsory reality" in the country. Even respondents located in areas that, so far, have not been affected by extremist violence, such as Tahoua, note that terrorism is "a true threat even though it hasn't occurred here."

In Niger, focus groups cited a difference between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda. For example, in Tahoua and Tillaberi, Al Qaeda was described as acting for "political reasons" or, according to one group, "combatting miscreants." Conversely, Boko Haram was described as "barbarous," particularly because they kill Muslims. It should be noted that local Nigeriens have frequently been targeted by Boko Haram in the time period since the baseline data collection in 2013. Residents of Burkina Faso have not been targeted in the same way; the terrorist activity there has largely been aimed at foreign (Western) targets. This likely explains the difference of opinions across the two countries regarding comparisons of Al Qaeda and Boko Haram.

Respondents cite cross-border extremist influences as a real problem, as in Burkina Faso. A respondent in Niamey noted that terrorism has "relocated to Niger." This was particularly true in Maradi and Diffa, which is close to the border with northeastern Nigeria and a frequent target of Boko Haram attacks. Respondents there also expressed unease regarding refugees from Nigeria who lack identity papers, suggesting an increased vulnerability from those coming across the border. Across Niger, concerns of regional terrorist threats were palpable; a respondent in Arlit noted that the geographic proximity of Niger to Mali, Algeria, and Libya posed a particular threat to safety.

Goal 3: Youth Outlook

Regarding youth, respondents roundly expressed that youth are disorganized, dependent, and neglected, though opinions differed as to why. Some suggested that youth are subject to discrimination. Respondents in Arlit, Balleyara, Maradi, and Niamey noted that youth lack autonomy and face abandonment. This isolation extends to consultation on decision-making and lack of political opportunities, acknowledged by respondents in Maradi.

Economic challenges to youth included the perception among respondents that youth lack opportunities and do not effectively take advantage of the few opportunities they do have, as noted in Balleyara, Diffa, Maradi, and Tillaberi. Youth widely face unemployment and joblessness, noted by respondents in Agadez, Balleyara, Tahoua, Tillaberi, and Zinder, as well as poverty, noted in Diffa, Maradi, and Zinder.

Respondents found that youth participation in extremism and conflict are linked to unemployment and drug consumption. They also offered details regarding the links between youth and conflict, including: disagreements over women, poverty, and the need for belonging, as noted in Tillaberi, Zinder, Diffa, and Maradi. Youth become involved in political disputes when soliciting assistance from wealthy patrons, a problem noted Niamey. This leads to participation in the political opposition, cited as a source of youth participation in conflict.

Respondents also expressed concerns about drugs and also about unwarranted harassment from police, particularly in Agadez. Furthermore, several groups noted that the youth “have a poor grasp of Islam” and lamented the declining influence of Imams among young people. Female respondents in Balleyara tied together some challenges facing youth in the following way: Young people here lack opportunities and end up just loitering around with nothing to do. They are also sometimes favorable to extremism because of their ignorance regarding Islam.

C. Summary

The results from the qualitative data lend insight into worsening conditions in the two countries. The context surrounding the P-DEV II program goals has shifted since the collection of baseline data in 2013. These findings support the DiD analysis, as youth outlook worsened and increased violent extremist activity affected attitudes of support, particularly in Niger. Positive attitudes toward social cohesion and resilience to violent extremism are found in Burkina Faso while in Niger, where greater communal divisions and exposure to the threat of a strengthening Boko Haram together present greater challenges for achieving program effectiveness.

In both countries, factors that leave youth feeling neglected also tend to facilitate extremist recruitment and draw young people into violence. Participants in the qualitative data collection express some positive influences from the P-DEV II programs but suggest that programs of this sort must be expanded reach more people, and thus to combat the problems of frustration and limited opportunity that can undermine peace.

V. Conclusion

We summarize the results of the quantitative analyses in Table 51. As in previous tables, we show positive effects of the program, i.e., in line with P-DEV II program goals, in green, and negative effects, i.e., in the “wrong” direction, in red. Effects that were registered in the pooled cross-country analysis are shown in bold faced capital letters.

Table 51: Summary of Results

	Core vs. Non-core	Low Intensity Core vs. Non-core	High Intensity Core vs. Non-core	Panel Analysis
Social Cohesion				
Interpersonal Trust			Chad Niger Burkina	
Institutional Trust				Burkina
Community Decision-Making	Burkina	Burkina	Chad	
Political Participation			Burkina	Niger
Interethnic Marriage	Chad	Chad POOLED	Burkina	
Resilience to Extremism				
Access to Jobs			Chad Burkina POOLED	
Access to Vocational Schools	Chad Burkina	Burkina	Chad	Burkina
Political Efficacy	Burkina	Burkina		
Perceived Ethnic Differences	Burkina		Burkina	Niger
Perceived Religious Differences	Burkina		Burkina	Niger
Justifiability of Religious Violence	Burkina	POOLED	Burkina	
Violence is Effective			Chad Burkina	Niger
Justifiability of Violence in the Name of Islam			Burkina	Niger
U.S. is at war with Islam	Chad Niger Burkina POOLED	Chad Niger Burkina POOLED	Chad Niger Burkina	Niger
Youth Outlook				
Life Satisfaction			Niger	
Economic Outlook	Burkina		Chad Niger Burkina	Burkina
Inclusiveness of Middle Schools	Chad		Chad	Niger
Interest in Community Affairs			Chad Niger Burkina	
Political Knowledge	Niger Burkina POOLED	Niger Burkina	Niger Burkina POOLED	Niger

Key: Positive Effect (Statistically Significant); Negative Effect (Statistically Significant)

The results may be summarized as follows:

Of the 19 indicators analyzed, only two demonstrated a statistically significant pooled DiD effect of core zone versus non-core zone status. This means that on the overwhelming majority of outcomes relevant to the goals of the P-DEV II program, there was no detectable difference across countries in the trends over time between core and non-core zones. Positive pooled DiD effects were found on political knowledge (a two-item measure of respondent's factual knowledge about the President's length of term and the number of seats in the national legislature), and on the respondent's perception that the US is *not* at war with Islam. All other indicators relating to, for example, trust, participation, access to jobs and vocational training, beliefs in the justifiability or efficacy of religious violence, life and economic satisfaction, and interest in community affairs, showed insignificant pooled DiD impacts of the P-DEV II program.

An examination of the country-specific effects showed numerous significant impacts of the program, especially in Burkina Faso (see Section III-B). This may reflect the substantially greater number of P-DEV II activities carried out on average in Burkina core zones than in the two other countries. Significant DiD estimates of positive program impact were noted on eight indicators in Burkina Faso, five of which related to Program Goal 2, Resilience to Violent Extremism: access to vocational schools, political efficacy, reduced perceptions of ethnic and religious differences, and reduced justifiability of religious violence**.** Burkina core zones also increased more than non-core zones on perceptions of the inclusiveness of community decision-making, political knowledge, and general economic outlook, though core zones in Burkina *increased* more on the perception that the US is at war with Islam.

The pattern of significant results suggests null findings in Chad and Niger. There were few significant DiD impacts in Chad or Niger (see Section III-B), with three significant positive impacts for core zones differences relative to non-core zones in Chad (support for interethnic marriage, decreased perception of the US at war with Islam, and increased support for gender inclusiveness in middle schools), and two in Niger (decreased perception of the US at war with Islam and political knowledge).

Analysis of DiD impacts in "high intensity" zones – i.e., those with greater than average total P-DEV II activities – shows one additional significant pooled (cross-country) impacts of the program, on perceived access to jobs (see Section III-C). Differences over time on this indicator in the high-intensity core zones were greater than differences in the non-core zones. Two additional indicators — the (un)justifiability of religious violence and support for interethnic marriage — show significant pooled effects in *low*-intensity zones compared to non-core zones, though in both cases these effects reduce to nearly zero in the high intensity P-DEV II zones.

Country-by-country "high intensity" zone analysis showed a mixed pattern of impacts: greater numbers of indicators in Burkina were significant in the high-intensity zones, especially those pertaining to Resilience to Extremism. Altogether 10 of the 18 indicators showed significant DiD impacts in Burkina when comparing high intensity core zones to non-core zones. At the same time, three indicators in those Burkina zones also moved anomalously in the "wrong" direction, all related to Resilience to Violent Extremism. Similarly, in Chad and Niger there were sporadic positive impacts in high-intensity zones

(4 in Chad 2, 2 in Niger) along with effects in the "wrong" direction (5 in Chad, 4 in Niger) in terms of the goals of the P-DEV II program.

Analysis of the panel portion of the data failed to replicate the core findings of the zone-level analyses (see Section III-D), likely due to the small number of individuals in each zone who were re-interviewed from the baseline wave limiting our statistical power to detect small programeffects**.** The results did show that individuals' experiences with activities related to countering violent extremism increased in the core zones compared to individuals in the non-core zones over time. But few of those changes were associated positively with changes in those same individuals' attitudes and perception since the baseline interviews. Both positive and negative program effects are observed in the panel analysis in Niger and Burkina Faso, though overall pattern of results in panel analysis in the two countries probably reflect essentially null effects of the program in both countries. All of the impacts found were relatively small in substantive magnitude, with a few reaching significance in the positive direction and a few in the negative direction. Similar balance between "near significant" effects were found in the positive and negative direction as well. All of this suggests that, from the panel analysis, we obtain a picture of generally null overall impacts in Chad and Niger.

The study included two "list experiments" and one "endorsement" experiment designed to measure in unobtrusive or indirect ways the respondent's willingness to consider engaging in specific acts of violent extremism or express approval of groups which engage in violent acts (see Section III-E). The results of these analyses suggest that there is a sizable pool of individuals in all country contexts who would support "an attack on [a] Western country's embassy that could result in military or civilian casualties" (list experiment #1), who would consider "joining a group that carries out acts of violence to defend your religion" (list experiment #2), or who would be more likely to oppose a polio vaccination program if they are told that "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Islamist group, will oppose this program" (endorsement experiment #1). These figures range from approximately 10-25% of the sampled populations. In general, however, there were no detectable P-DEV II core zone impacts on these outcomes, in that respondents in the core zones and non-core zones showed similar trends in these outcomes over time.

Examination of key informant interviews and focus groups in Burkina Faso and Niger showed that attitudes relating to program goals have deteriorated in the countries since the 2013 baseline data collection, providing context relating to support for toward violent extremism. This is particularly true in Niger where perceptions of program effects are weaker and Boko Haram has strengthened its presence. Community tensions exist in Burkina Faso including interreligious tensions, and struggle over land and natural resources. In both countries, factors that leave youth feeling neglected also tend to facilitate extremist recruitment and draw young people into violence. Participants in the qualitative data collection noted positive influences from P-DEV II programs in their countries but suggest that programs of this sort must be expanded reach more people, and thus to combat the problems of frustration and limited opportunity that can undermine peace.

The overall pattern of results found in the report has several implications for future work. First, it is clear that the P-DEV II program did not have consistent impacts across the three country contexts, as there were detectable differences in the trends over time in pooled core versus non-core zones on only two indicators out of the 19 analyzed. Instead,

there was significant country-by-country variation in program impact: program effects were strongest in Burkina Faso, where positive impacts were registered in some way (core versus non-core zone, high intensity core zones versus non-core) on a majority of the 19 indicators, with substantially fewer and weaker effects registered in Chad and Niger. (At the same time there were several anomalous effects in the "wrong direction" in all countries). This means future work will probably need to conduct more detailed analyses on a country-by-country basis, which will require additional numbers of interviews within each county in order to approach requisite levels of statistical power. Second, while it is possible that significant effects would be uncovered in theoretically meaningful subgroups of the population (e.g., men versus women, young versus old, rich versus poor), the fact that relatively few impacts were seen in the overall individual country samples – especially in Chad and Niger -- means that detecting these potential impacts will be extremely challenging, requiring again substantially more interviews in the endline data collection phase. Finally, the lack of meaningful or consistent results emerging from the panel portion of the analysis suggests that it may not be wise to continue these efforts in subsequent data collection waves, given the low payoff relative to the high cost of collecting data on the same individuals over time.

VI. Appendix

A. Methodology

1. Survey Instrument

The survey instrument developed for the P-DEV II baseline study was used as the basis for the midline impact evaluation. Two survey instruments, one developed by IRD-InterMedia and the other by the EAS team serve as the foundation for the evaluation. The original survey was developed by IRD-InterMedia in consultation with USAID personnel, and served as the instrument for the first wave of interviews conducted in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso between March and September 2013. The EAS evaluation team designed a second survey instrument that built on the one previously designed by IRD-InterMedia in order to improve and extend the work that had already been done. The EAS survey instrument kept 65% of the items in the original IRD-InterMedia survey instrument in order to combine information from both samples into a single data set that enhances the quality of the evaluation. This survey, included in the Appendix to this report, was altered slightly for purposes of the mid-line data collection, with approximately 25 questions being eliminated in order to shorten interview time.

The EAS survey instrument improved upon the original IRD-InterMedia survey in terms of comparability, reliability, and social desirability biases. The new survey combined the most powerful items from the original instrument with items that have been used in other comparable surveys in the region. The EAS survey instrument also takes advantage of new tools available to researchers for capturing the true feelings and attitudes of respondents faced with sensitive questions. These measures do not rely solely on respondent self-reports of attitudes and beliefs, and hence overcome much of the “social desirability” biases that can confound measures of sensitive items in the survey context, such as those regarding sympathy for violent and extremist groups and ideas, trust in local leaders, and antipathy towards women. The EAS survey instrument overcomes this problem through the addition of unobtrusive measures of support for violent extremism. Specifically, it includes a “list experiment” to capture levels of support for terrorist actions which may involve the deaths of civilians, as well as an “endorsement experiment” to measure sympathy for extremist groups operating in the Sahel region.

From those survey items, we selected 19 indicators for analysis. In selecting and constructing these indicators, the EAS team was guided by recommendations in the current scholarly literature on violent extremism, described more fully in the baseline report.

Five related to Goal 1 Social Cohesion: Interpersonal Trust, Institutional Trust, Perceptions of Inclusive Community Decision-Making, Political Participation, and Support for Interethnic Marriage.

Nine indicators related to Goal 2, Resilience to Violent Extremism: Perceived Access to Jobs, Perceived Access to Vocational Schools, Political Efficacy, Perceived Ethnic Differences, Perceived Religious Differences, Belief in the Justifiability of Religious Violence, Belief that Violence is Effective, Belief in the Justifiability of Violence in the Name of Islam, and Belief that the U.S. is at war with Islam.

Five indicators related to Goal 3, Youth Empowered: Life Satisfaction, Economic Outlook,

Perceived Gender Inclusiveness of Middle Schools, Interest in Community Affairs, and Political Knowledge. A more detailed description of each of these indicators can be found in the results section (Section III-B) of this report.

2. Survey Data Collection Interviewer Training

Interviewer training or data collection occurred in Burkina Faso from August 6-18, 2015 for the training of CERFODES and in Niger for August 18-30, 2015 for the training of local partner CESEV. EAS Team Survey and Regional Specialist Social Scientist Dr. John McCauley led five-day training seminars to enumerators and supervisors to explain the survey objectives, panel verification, experimental methodology and survey versions, and conduct practice sessions for administering the interviews. CERFODES technical lead Kadisso Nacambo was present at both of these trainings and led a follow-up training with additional enumerators from August 25-30 in Niger. Quality Control representatives Bintou Sanou (Burkina Faso), Adamou Hamadou (Niger), and Dr. Douzounet Mallaye (Chad) also attended the trainings, with Dr. Mallaye traveling to Niger, given security challenges that prevented travel to Chad at the time. Following the training, these provided assurance that data collection was proceeding appropriately in each country according to procedure.

Since security issues prevented travel to Chad, Dr. Mallaye led an initial training from September 1-6, 2015. A refresher training was administered by Ms. Nacambo from March 18-20, 2016. This refresher training was attended by Aristide Mabali, who served as quality control representative after delays prevented further participation from Dr. Mallaye.

Training for qualitative data collection occurred March 3-5, 2016 in Niger and March 5-7, 2016 in Burkina Faso. Dr. McCauley served as the lead trainer in each country, introducing interview and focus group methodology and data recording techniques, as well as targeting focus group and key informant interviews based on a preliminary analysis of survey data collection there occurred for fresh interviews only from March 21– April 3, 2016.

Procedures for “Fresh” Interviews

The EAS Team collected 25 interviews with new randomly selected respondents in each zone, following random route procedures as described in the baseline report (Finkel, et al. 2014). This enabled analysis in zones where IRD collected baseline data as it had not retained information from baseline respondents to conduct panel data collection. In the zones where EAS collected data, the team combined observations collected in the panel with new observations to guard against any biases related to panel attrition or conditioning that may confound the analysis.

Panel Procedures and Verification

A portion of the data collection exercise consisted of a panel study in which individuals from selected communes in Niger and Burkina Faso who had been interviewed in the baseline survey (wave 1) were re-interviewed in the midline survey (wave 2). The sample consists of 500 respondents who were randomly selected from the pool of wave 1 respondents, 25 individuals per commune for 10 communes each in Niger and Burkina

Faso. There are four different versions of the questionnaire; meaning that in each commune 6 to 7 respondents received each version. EAS provided supervisors with a list of 25 pre-selected respondents per commune. Every household/respondent interviewed in the first wave of the survey was assigned an ID number. This ID number is the unique identifier that allows data for the same household/respondent to be known. To facilitate identification, the cover sheet of the questionnaire contained the address as well as any information available on the specific location and description of the household.

To ensure that the exact same individuals who had been interviewed in wave 1 were re-interviewed in the second wave, a panel verification protocol was developed which served as a guideline for the panel study. This panel verification protocol consists of a three-stage verification process: the first respondent verification was made by the enumerators, the second verification by an EAS Quality Control Representative, and a third verification via random back-checks conducted by CERFODES. The protocol also entails the specific scenarios under which substitutions can and should be made when pre-selected respondents cannot be re-contacted and/or verification is unsuccessful.

For the first stage of the verification process, enumerators were instructed to reach out to the exact same person interviewed in the first wave. Enumerators were asked to not interview another person under any circumstance. The cover sheets provided to enumerators contained the name of the respondent with her/his contact details (or those of a contact person), as well as the following information to help locate and verify the respondent: 1) sex, 2) age, 3) level of education, 4) nickname of respondent, and 5) name of the head of household. Enumerators were instructed to physically locate the selected respondent and confirm that the person in front of her/him is the same one that was interviewed in the first wave using the following verification protocol:

1. Collect data in Section RV of the questionnaire (sex, age, level of education, nickname of respondent, and name of head of household).
2. Before proceeding with the survey, verify that the person you are interviewing is the same person interviewed in the first wave. Cross-check the collected data from section RV with the information provided in the cover sheet:
    a) If there are two or more discrepancies with the information provided in the cover sheet, end interview and report back to supervisor.
    b) If there are two or more discrepancies with the information provided in the cover sheet, but to the judgment of the enumerator it is the same person interviewed in wave 1, the enumerator should write down detailed verification information justifying it and proceed with the interview.
    c) If the respondent's name and at least four of the five characteristics correspond with the information provided in the cover sheet, proceed with the interview.

For the second stage of the verification process, supervisors were instructed to provide information collected by enumerators (demographics and other variables) to the EAS Quality Control Representative in each country. These representatives cross-checked information from wave 1 with the information provided by the supervisors to verify that the person interviewed is the same one that was interviewed in the first wave. If EAS were to find discrepancies, it would notify the supervisors that the interview was unsuccessful and that the respondent should be substituted. This procedure was conducted as follows:

1. After completing each interview, enumerators filled in the final sheet of the questionnaire with the following pieces of information: respondent's name, sex, age, level of education, nickname, religion, ethnic background, language spoken at home, name of the head of household, household item: radio, and household item: inside or outside WC. This set of information is called the "Level 2 Verification sheet."
2. Supervisors were instructed to call the EAS Quality Control Representative at the end of each day of data collection and report the information on the Level 2 Verification sheet.
3. The EAS Quality Control Representatives were responsible for making a determination about whether the respondent can be verified as being the same person as was interviewed in wave 1.
4. The EAS Quality Control Representative noted whether the respondent was verified or not at the bottom of the Level 2 Verification sheet.
5. Unverified interviews were retained and made available to EAS.

For the third stage of the verification process, field supervisors were instructed to conduct back-checks by re-contacting households/respondents that have been successfully interviewed as well as by calling unsuccessful interviews. More specifically, field supervisors were required to back-check 10% of successful re-contacts. Out of this, 100% were back-checked by asking 11 key questions to make sure that the right respondent interviewed. Similarly, field supervisors were instructed to contact 10% of unsuccessful interviews. If in the process of back-check, a previously unsuccessful contact was reached, the person doing the back-check arranged an interview with an enumerator. The outcome of every back-check was recorded in the QC update sheet, which was completed at the end of each day and sent to the project manager.

These procedures were successful in so far as only eight respondents in the panel could not be verified as being the same respondent who was interviewed at baseline. These respondents were excluded from all analyses in the panel portion of the evaluation.

3. P-DEV II Activity Tracker Data Collection

In order to achieve a more fine-grained evaluation of how program implementation affects outcomes, the midline study utilized data on activities conducted in each commune from the P-DEV II Activity Tracker and Quarterly Reports prepared by IRD. The EAS Team collected program data from IRD recorded on a quarterly basis from the onset of the program. This data was then merged with the survey data aggregated at the commune level for further analysis. These procedures enabled the EAS Team to determine whether the extent of P-DEV II activities in a given zone is related to program impact, such that communes with more intense P-DEV II "treatments" showed larger differences in outcomes between baseline and midline than communes with less treatment intensity. This analysis augments the basic DiD analysis of program effects between core and non-core communes over time.

The EAS Team carried out this activity in a similar manner as it had done for preliminary analysis conducted and incorporated into the Appendix of the Baseline Report. The team aggregates all activities by commune in each country so that it can obtain measures of: the total number of program activities undertaken in each target zone and the type of

activities that were conducted in order to understand the nature and intensity of the program.

Using the activity tracker data, the team analyzed the effect of changes in implementation on the changes in outcomes, measuring program intensity to estimate the effect of different intensities on changes in program-relevant outcomes over time. In the baseline report, this was conducted by comparing the program effects on zones matched by level of program intensity. In the midline report, this analysis was conducted with a DiD analysis.

4. Qualitative Data Collection

The midline study includes qualitative data from focus groups and interviews with key informants in order to provide an in-depth understanding of the context of violent extremism, P-DEV II experience, and attitudes relating to the program goals, in addition to answering questions raised by survey data analysis.

For the baseline, nine (9) focus groups and eight (8) key informant interviews were conducted in Burkina; nine (9) focus groups and eight (8) key informant interviews were conducted in Niger; and six (6) focus groups and 15 key informant interviews were conducted in Chad.

Qualitative data were collected by CERFODES in Burkina Faso and by project partner Cabinet d'Analyses et d'Actions pour la Sécurité et la Paix (CASPA) in Niger. Midline qualitative data collection included 10 focus groups and 12 interviews conducted in Burkina Faso and 10 focus groups and 21 interviews conducted in Niger among a strategic selection of actors implementing the radio, community leadership, youth leadership strengthening, Imam and Quranic school training, and vocational training activities. Given the diverse nature of the recipients, these will be complemented by external review of the training and strengthening activities.

The EAS team held separate, woman-led focus groups for women to encourage participation and free exchange of opinion. All materials, including the interview and focus group field notes, were used to incorporate qualitative findings into the midline report.

During training, Dr. McCauley and the project partners selected key zones for qualitative data collection based on preliminary data analysis of program effects at the community and individual levels. Following training, the teams initiated qualitative data collection in Burkina Faso on March 8 and in Niger on March 5. A list of qualitative data collection zones detailing focus groups and interview data collection is included in the Appendix.

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

B. Questionnaire

Peace through Development II (P-DEV II)

EXERCISE 1 MIDLINE SURVEY [MONTH] 2015 PANEL

Question numbers in BLUE correspond directly to items in the original P-DEV II baseline study.

Section 0. RESPONDENT IDENTIFICATION		
Note: This section must be pre-filled before taking the survey to the field.		
ID1. Questionnaire ID:		
ID0. Questionnaire version:		
F2	Name of respondent:	
O7	Sector/Quarter:	
O8	Respondent/household complete address:	
O4	New localization of the respondent (for those who declared they could change the household):	
G4	Contact information for someone who could be able to help to find the respondent:	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

O9	Respondent mobile number:	

ID2. Country
Chad 1
Niger 2
Burkina Faso……..3

IDW. Wave of Interview ☐

ID3. Province Code ☐☐
(See location codes on page 2.)

ID4. Target Zone Code ☐☐
(See location codes on page 2.)

ID5. Neighborhood Name

_____
(write in)

ID7. Day of interview:

	Single code
Monday	1
Tuesday	2
Wednesday	3
Thursday	4
Friday	5
Saturday	6
Sunday	7

ECode	Name of Wave 2 Enumerator	Signature	ID7b. Date of Wave 2 Interview (dd/mm)
			____/_____/2015
SCode	**Name of Wave 2 Supervisor**	**Signature**	**ID8b. Date Completed Wave 2 Check (dd/mm)**
			____/_____/2015

F6	Record interview start time using 24 hour clock _____:_____ (hour:minute)
F7	Estimated direction from start point:
F8	Estimated distance from start point (in M):

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

LOCATION CODES CHAD	
Province	
Barh El Gazal 01	Kanem 04
Batha 02	Lac Tchad 05
Borkou 03	N'Djamena 06
Target Zones	
Am Djamena Bilala 01	Ngouri 07
Assinet 02	Nokou 08
Baga-Sola 03	Ntiona 09
Chadra 04	Oum-Hadjer 10
Doum-Doum 05	Wadjigui 11
Melea 06	Yao 12
Commune 1 N'Djamena 13	Am Sileb 15
Am Doback 14	Commune 7 N'Dajamena 16
LOCATION CODES NIGER	
Province	
Agadez 01	Tahoua 05
Diffa 02	Tillaberi 06
Maradi 03	Zinder 07
Niamey 04	
Target Zones	
Ballayara 01	Niamey 4 07
Bosso 02	Matameye 08

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

G. Roumdji 03	Tébaram 09
Iféreouane 04	Tessaoua 10
Mayahi 05	Zinder I 11
N'guigmi 06	
LOCATION CODES BURKINA FASO	
Province	
Kadiogo 01	Soum 04
Oudalan 02	Yatenga 05
Seno 03	Zondoma 06
Target Zones	
Boussou 01	Oursi 07
Gorgadji 02	Séguénéga 08
Markoye 03	Seytenga 09
Ouagadougou Arrondissement 4 04	Tongomayel 10
Ouahigouya 05	Tougo 11

Responses from Wave 1 Questionnaire for cross checking and verification		
A1_W1	Sex of respondent	Male 1 Female 2
A2_W1	Age of respondent	years old
A3_W1	Respondent's educational level	
O5	Respondent's Nick name as known in his/her neighborhood	
O11	Name of head of household	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

OPENING TEXT
Good day. My name is _____. I am from CERFODES, an independent research organization, and I'm here to speak with [INSERT NAME OF RESPONDENT]. Is he/she available? We conducted an interview here two years ago, and he/she told me it would be okay to return at a later date for a follow-up. If you are happy to proceed, then let's begin. NOTE: DO NOT BEGIN THE INTERVIEW UNLESS THE RESPONDENT GIVES HIS/HER CONSENT. IF THE RESPONDENT REFUSES, LEAVE THE HOUSE AND RECORD THE REFUSAL. If consent is granted: Thank-you. As a reminder, please know that your answers will be confidential. They will be put together with the responses of over 1000 other people we are talking to, to get an overall picture. It will be impossible to pick you out from what you say, so please feel free to tell us what you think. This interview will take about forty minutes. As we go through the questions, please keep in mind that you may say 'I don't know' to any question when you do not know the answer, and you may say 'pass' to any question when you do not feel comfortable answering. You may also terminate the interview at any time. Do you understand? [Proceed with interview only if answer is positive]. Let's begin.

Section RV. Respondent Verification			
Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic
A1	Sex of Respondent Do not ask. Observe. Single Code	1…..Male 2…..Female	
A2	How old are you?		Below

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	WAIT FOR RESPONSE WRITE IN NUMBER. (If age not known, ask respondents to estimate in years, ask them whether they were born before or after an important and widely recognized event, such as a drought. After the interview, or before, if you know you are in an area where respondents are unlikely to know their age, establish with local informants the names of prominent droughts and the approximate years they took place. Estimate the respondent's age.)	_____ years old	15 or more than 68 years old STOP THE INTERVIEW
A3	What is the highest level of school that you have completed?	1…illiterate/none 2…no formal schooling 3…primary incomplete 4…primary complete 5…secondary incomplete 6…secondary complete 7…University/Poly incomplete OND 8…University/Poly complete HND	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

		9…Post University incomplete 10…Post University complete	
O5	Respondent's Nick name as known in his/her neighborhood		
O11	Name of head of household		

RESPONDENT VERIFICATION			
	<u>INTERVIEWER:</u> Before proceeding with the survey, verify that the person you are interviewing is the same person interviewed in the first wave. Cross-check the data from Section RV with the information provided in the cover sheet: 1. If there are 2 or more discrepancies with the information provided in the cover sheet, record **<u>code 1</u>**, end survey, and report back to supervisor. 2. If there are 2 or more discrepancies with the information provided in the cover sheet but to your judgement this is the same person interviewed in wave 1, record **<u>code 2</u>**, write down detailed verification, and proceed with the survey. 3. If the respondent's name and at least 4 demographic characteristics correspond with the information provided in the cover sheet, record **<u>code 3</u>** and proceed with the survey.		
RV1	What can you say about the respondent?	1… two (2) or more answers from Section RV **<u>do not</u>** correspond with the information provided in the cover sheet. I cannot verify that this person is the same one interviewed in the first wave of the survey. 2… two (2) or more answers from Section RV **<u>do not</u>** correspond with the information provided in the cover sheet, but I can verify that this person is the same one interviewed in the first wave of the survey. 3… four (4) or more answers from Section	If code 1 end survey and report to supervisor; If code 2 go to →RV2; If code

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

		RV correspond with the information provided in the cover sheet. I can confirm with certainty that the person in front of me is the one interviewed in the first wave of the survey.	3 go to → Section A.
RV2	Please provide detailed verification information		Go to → Section A.

Section A. Demographics			
A4	Are you currently employed or unemployed?	1…Employed 2…Unemployed 88…Don't know 99…Refused	If code 2 go to →A5; Else go to →A6
A5	If you're not working, what is your status? WAIT FOR RESPONSE	1…Student 2…Non-working pensioner or invalid 3…Housewife/maternity leave 4…Looking for work 5…Not looking for work 6…Waiting for work to start 7…Other non-working, specify 88…Don't know 99…Refused	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

A6	I'm going to read a list of items and amenities that you may have inside or around your house. Please tell me whether you have or do not have each item. READ OUT ITEMS. CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY	a. Fridge/freezer b. Computer or iPad c. Video or DVD player d. Satellite dish e. TV f. Radio g. Telephone (land) h. Telephone (mobile) i. Air conditioning j. Washing machine k. Car l. Gas or electric cooker m. Inside or outside WC n. Inside or outside pipe borne tap	
A7	Speaking now about religion, which religion are you? AWAIT REPLY. Circle ONLY ONE religious group	Muslim.....1 Shia .....2 Ismaili .....3 Izala/Wahabit.....4 Sunni Muslim .....5 Maliki .....6 Hanafi .....7 Shafi'I .....8 Kadria .....9 Hanbali .....10 Tidjaniya.....11 Christian .....12 Catholic .....13 Protestant .....14 Orthodox .....15 Other Christian .....16 Jewish .....17 Buddhist.....18	

		Hindu .....19 Traditional beliefs .....20 Baha'i .....21 I don't belong to any religion .....22 Other…. .....23a If other, specify:……23b Don't know 88 Refused 99	
A8	How important is religion in your personal life? Is it very important, somewhat important, or not very important? SHOW CARD 01	1…not very important 2…somewhat important 3…very important 88…Don't know 99…Refused	
A9	How often do you attend religious services? READ OUT REPONSES. SINGLE CODE.	1… Several times a day 2… Once a day 3… Several times per week 4…Once a week 5… Once a month 6… Only for religious holidays or special occasions 7… Rarely or never 88…Don't know 99…Refused	
A10	How often do you	1… Several times a day	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	pray? WAIT FOR RESPONSE SINGLE CODE	2… Once a day 3… Several times per week 4…Once a week 5… Once a month 6… Only for religious holidays or special occasions 7… Rarely or never 88…Don't know 99…Refused	
A11	And what is your ethnic background? WAIT FOR RESPONSE MULTIPLE CODES		

CHAD	NIGER	BURKINA FASO
Arab 1	Arab 1	Mossi 1
Kanembou 2	Toubou 2	Fulani (Peul) 2
Gourane 3	Haussa 3	Bobo/Dioula 3
Peuls 4	Fulbe 4	Senoufo 4
Moussei 5	Zarma/Songhai 5	Goumantche 5
Sara 6	Gourmantche 6	Lobi 6
Zaghawa 7	Tuareg 7	Gurunsi 7
Kanuri 8	Kanuri 8	Dagaaba 8
Boudouma 9	Beriberi 9	Tuareg 9
Moundang 10	Boudouma 10	Other, Specify 12
Massa 11	Manga 11	Don't know 88
Other, Specify 12	Other, Specify 12	Refused 99
Don't know 88	Don't know 88	
	Refused 99	

	Refused 99			
A12	Which language do you speak most at home? WAIT FOR RESPONSE SINGLE CODE			
	CHAD	NIGER	BURKINA FASO	
	French 1 Arabic 2 Kanembou 3 Fulfulde 4 Gourane 5 Kanuri 6 Sara 7 Zaghawa 8 Boudouma 9 Moundang 10 Massa 11 Other, specify 12 Don't know 88 Refused 99	French 1 Arabic 2 Haussa 3 Fulfulde 4 Gourmanchema 5 Kanuri. 6 Zarma/Songhai 7 Tamashek 8 Toubou 9 Tagdalt. 10 Other, specify 12 Don't know 88 Refused 99	French 1 Mooré 2 Fulfuldé 3 Dioula/Bambara/ Malinké 4 Gourmanchema 5 Lobiri. 6 Gurunsi 7 Dagaare 8 Hausa 9 Tagdalt. 10 Tuareg/Berber 11 Other, specify 12 Don't know 88 Refused 99	
A13	How many other languages do you understand well enough to listen to a	0….None 1…One other language 2…Two to four other languages		

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	radio broadcast in that language?	3…Five to seven other languages 4…More than seven other languages	

Section B. Participation, Community Decision Making, Groups, and Trust							
Q#	Question			Response Code			Skip Logic
B1	Now I would like to ask you some questions about how decisions are made in your community. When important decisions are made in this commune/neighborhood/village/camp, how much **DO** the following people participate: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES USE SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE IN EACH ROW						
		Not at all	Somewhat	A lot	DK	Refuse	
	a) Ordinary people from the commune/ neighborhood	1	2	3	88	99	
	b) Youth	1	2	3	88	99	
	c) Women	1	2	3	88	99	
	d) People from your own tribe or ethnic group	1	2	3	88	99	
	e) People who share your religious views	1	2	3	88	99	
	And how much do you think the following people **SHOULD** participate						

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

B2	when important decisions are made in this commune/neighborhood/village/camp? READ OUT RESPONSES USE SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE IN EACH ROW						
		Not at all	Somewhat	A lot	DK	Refuse	
	a) Ordinary people from the commune/ neighborhood	1	2	3	88	99	
	b) Youth	1	2	3	88	99	
	c) Women	1	2	3	88	99	
	d) People from your own tribe or ethnic group	1	2	3	88	99	
	e) People who share your religious views	1	2	3	88	99	
B3	Are you satisfied, neutral, or dissatisfied with the way decisions are made in your community? READ OUT RESPONSES. USE SHOWCARD 02a SINGLE CODE	1…Dissatisfied 2…Neutral 3…Satisfied 88…DK 99…Refused					
B4	Now I'd like your opinion on some governance issues. I'm going to read a list of statements, and I'd like you to please tell me whether you agree with the following statements: not at all, somewhat, or quite.						

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

SHOW CARD 02a

	Not at all	Somewhat	Quite	DK	Refuse
a) My opinions are respected by local leaders	1	2	3	88	99
b) Local government takes into account the opinions of citizens in decision-making processes	1	2	3	88	99
c) I feel well-prepared for participating in political life	1	2	3	88	99
d) People like me have no say in what the government does	1	2	3	88	99

B5 I'm going to list a number of activities. Please tell me whether you have or have not done each activity in the past 12 months.

Single Code in Each Row

	Yes	No	DK	Refuse
a) Attended a commune/neighborhood councilor other public meeting	1	2	88	99
b) Met with an elected official, called him/her, or sent a letter	1	2	88	99
c) Notified the village chief about a local problem	1	2	88	99
d) Voted	1	2	88	99
e) Participated in community development activities	1	2	88	99
f) Joined a protest or demonstration	1	2	88	99

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

B6 Speaking about your role in the community, I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are a member or not a member?

SHOW CARD 03

	Not a member	Active member	Inactive member	DK	Refuse
a) A religious group (e.g. a mosque, church)	1	2	3	88	99
b) A trade union or farmers association	1	2	3	88	99
c) A professional or business association	1	2	3	88	99
d) A community or self-help association	1	2	3	88	99
e) A youth group	1	2	3	88	99
f) Some other voluntary association or community group. **SPECIFY**_____	1	2	3	88	99

B7 ASK B7 IF CODE 2 HAS BEEN CHOSEN FOR AT LEAST ONE OF THE QUESTIONS IN B6; IF NOT GO TO B8.

Thinking about the members of the group(s) to which you belong, do any of the groups…

	Yes	No	DK	Refuse
a) Include both men and women?	1	2	88	99
b) Include people of different religious views?	1	2	88	99

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	c) Include people of different ethnic groups?	1	2	88	99	

B8 I will now read you two statements about your neighborhood. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with these statements.

SHOW CARD 04

	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	DK	Refuse
a) Most people are willing to help if you ask for help	1	2	3	88	99
b) It is naïve to trust people	1	2	3	88	99

B9 Now I would like to ask you about the trust you have in different groups of people. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements.

READ OUT RESPONSES.

USE SHOWCARD 04.

	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	DK	Refuse
a) I trust local authorities	1	2	3	88	99
b) I trust central government	1	2	3	88	99
c) I trust religious leaders	1	2	3	88	99

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	d) I trust non-governmental organizations	1	2	3	88	99	
	e) I trust the police	1	2	3	88	99	
	g) I trust the military	1	2	3	88	99	

B10	On how many days out of the last 7 did you…				
		Number of days	DK	Refuse	
	a) talk to someone who lives in a different community		88	99	
	b) talk to someone with different religious view		88	99	
	c) talk to someone from a different ethnic group from yours		88	99	

B10B	How strongly do you feel you belong to your immediate community/neighborhood?	1…Very strongly 2…Fairly strongly 3…Not very strongly 4…Not at all strongly 88…DK 99…Refused	

B11	In elections, Nigeriens/Chadians/ Burkinabe often vote for candidates from their own ethnic group. Which of the following statements is closer to your view? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 05 Circle ONLY ONE CODE	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	1. It is normal to want to elect someone from your ethnic community 2. Voters should place much less emphasis on ethnic considerations.	1…Selects statement 1 2…Selects statement 2 88…DK 99…Refused	
B12	Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I tell my children (or I will tell my future children) that they should only marry people from their same ethnic group READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 04	1…Disagree 2…Neither agree nor disagree 3…Agree 88…DK 99…Refused	

Section C. Life Satisfaction, Political Interest, Media Use, Economic and Services Evaluation			
Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic
C1	Here is a ladder representing the “ladder of life.” Let’s suppose the top of the ladder (10) is the best possible life for you; and the bottom (0), the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder do you personally stand at the present time? USE SHOWCARD 06. SINGLE CODE. Worst Life …..…… Best Life 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Don’t know…88 Refused… 99		

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

C3	And on which step do you think you will stand in the future, say two years from now? USE SHOWCARD 06. SINGLE CODE. Worst Life …..…… Best Life 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Don't know…88 Refused… 99		
C4	Thinking first of your community, would you say you have a great deal of interest, some interest, or very little interest in local community affairs? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 07 Circle ONLY ONE CODE	1…very little interest 2…some interest 3…a great deal of interest 88…DK 99…refused	
C6	In general, would you say that the economy of [COUNTRY] is better, worse, or about the same than it was a year ago? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 08 Circle ONLY ONE CODE	1…worse 2…the same 3…better 88…DK 99…refuse	
C6 A	In general, would you say that your household financial situation is better,	1…worse	

	worse, or about the same than it was a year ago? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 08 Circle ONLY ONE CODE	2…the same 3…better 88…DK 99…refuse	
C7	In general, would you say that the country is headed in the right direction or the wrong direction? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 09 Circle ONLY ONE CODE	1…right direction 2…wrong direction 88…DK 99…refused	

C8 Now I would like to ask you about services that are available in your community. Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your access to…

READ OUT RESPONSES
SHOW CARD 10
Circle ONLY ONE CODE IN EACH ROW

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	DK	Refuse
a) Education/Schools	1	2	88	99
b) Health services/clinics/ hospitals	1	2	88	99
c) Access to water, electricity, and other services	1	2	88	99
d) Government legal services (courts)	1	2	88	99

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

C10	Now I would like to ask you some questions specifically about middle school and vocational school Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements... READ OUT RESPONSES. USE SHOWCARD 04. SINGLE CODE IN EACH ROW.						
		Disagree	Neither	Agree	DK	Ref.	
	a) Education is only for boys, but not for girls	1	2	3	88	99	
	b) Vocational training is accessible for people like me	1	2	3	88	99	
C11	How difficult is it to get a job in [COUNTRY] today: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 Circle ONLY ONE CODE	1…Not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot 88…DK 99…Refused					
C13	Now I would like to ask you a few questions about how politics works in [YOUR COUNTRY]. Do you know how long the term of office is for the President of [Country]? That is, after he is elected, how many years does he stay in office before the next election? [All countries = 5 years]	1…correct answer given 2…incorrect answer given 88….DK 99…Ref					

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

C14	Do you happen to know how many seats there are in the National Assembly? [Burkina Faso = 127] [Chad = 188] [Niger = 113]	Number given by respondent [ ] 88…DK 99…Ref	

C15 How well would you say the government is managing the following matters?

	Very badly	Fairly	Very well	DK	Ref
a) Improving living standards	1	2	3	88	99
b) Keeping the community safe	1	2	3	88	99
c) Improving public services	1	2	3	88	99
d) Dealing with violent groups in the region	1	2	3	88	99

C16 Now, I would like to ask you about rights of citizens.
In your view, how well does the government protect the following rights:

	Not at all	Somewh at	Very well	DK	Ref
a) Freedom of expression and opinion	1	2	3	88	99
b) Protection from arbitrary arrest and ensuring fair trials	1	2	3	88	99
c) Protection from torture	1	2	3	88	99

	and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment						
	d) Equal treatment before the law	1	2	3	88	99	

C17	Please tell me how much you agree that women should be equal to men regarding the following matters.							
		Disagree strongly	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree strongly	DK	Ref	
	a) In family and household matters	1	2	3	4	88	99	
	b)With regards to owning property and receiving inheritance	1	2	3	4	88	99	
	c) With regards to employment	1	2	3	4	88	99	
	d) Being a candidate in local, parliamentary, and presidential elections	1	2	3	4	88	99	
	e) Being a clan chief	1	2	3	4	88	99	

C18	In your opinion, how often do Nigerien/Chadian/Burkinabe government officials who commit crimes [break the law] get punished?	1…Always 2…Rarely 3…Never 88…DK 99…Refuse	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

C19	In your opinion, over the past year, has the level of corruption in Niger/Chad/Burkina Faso increased, decreased, or stayed the same?	1…Increased 2…Stayed the same 3…Decreased 88…DK 99…Refuse	

Section D. Violence and Extremism			
Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic
D1A	Now I would like to ask you about your community. Differences often exist between people living in the same village/neighborhood. To what extent do you feel that ethnic differences tend to divide people in your village/neighborhood? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02B	1…Not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot 88…DK 99…Refuse	
D1B	Do ethnic divisions in your village/neighborhood ever lead to violence?	1…yes 2…no 88…DK 99…Refuse	
D2A	To what extent do you feel that religious differences tend to divide people in your village/neighborhood? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02B	1…Not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot 88…DK 99…Refuse	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

D2B	Do religious divisions in your village/neighborhood ever lead to violence?	1…yes 2…no 88…DK 99…Refuse	
D2C	How often have you or members of your family ever been unfairly treated because of your ethnic background?	1…Often 2…Sometimes 3…Never 88…DK 99…Refused	
D2D	How often have you or members of your family ever been unfairly treated because of your religious views?	1…Often 2…Sometimes 3…Never 88…DK 99…Refused	
D2E	In the past 12 months, have you or has someone else in your household been physically attacked?	1…Yes, me. 2…Yes, someone in my household. 3…Yes, both me and someone in my household. 4…No 88…DK 99…Refused	
D3	When do you think that violence is an effective method to solve problems:	1…Often 2…Sometimes	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	often, sometimes, or never? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 11	3…Never 88…DK 99…Refused	
D4	Some people think that using arms and violence against civilians in defense of their religion is justified. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that using arms and violence against civilians in defense of your religion can be often justified, sometimes justified, or never justified? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 11	1…Often 2…Sometimes 3…Never 88…DK 99…Refused	
D6	Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 04 Circle ONLY ONE CODE		

	Disagree	Neither	Agree	DK	Ref
a) Violence in the name of Islam can be justified	1	2	3	88	99
b) The United States is at war against Islam, not terrorism	1	2	3	88	99
d) The government should work with western countries to fight terrorism	1	2	3	88	99
e) Al Qaeda's violent actions are permitted under Islamic law	1	2	3	88	99

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

D7	Which of these three statements comes closest to your own opinion? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 12 Circle ONLY ONE CODE	
	a) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government b) In certain situations, a nondemocratic form of government can be preferable c) It doesn't matter to me what form of government we have	1…Selects A 2…Selects B 3…Selects C 88…DK 99…REF

D8 Some people say we would be better off if the country was governed differently. What do you think about the following options? Do you agree or disagree that…

READ OUT RESPONSES

SHOW CARD 04

Circle ONLY ONE CODE IN EACH ROW

	Disagree	Neither	Agree	DK	Ref
a) we should get rid of elections so that a strong leader can decide everything	1	2	3	88	99
b) We should be governed by Sharia Law	1	2	3	88	99
c) we should let the military rule the country	1	2	3	88	99
d) we should only have one political	1	2	3	88	99

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	party						
D9A	Now, I would like to ask you again about your community. In the last 12 months, has there been violence in your community associated with:					If code 1 for any go to → D9B Else go to → D10	
		Yes	No	DK	Ref		
	a1) A strike or protest	1	2	88	99		
	b1) Conflict over land	1	2	88	99		
	c1) Another type of conflict	1	2	88	99		
D9B	Do you think that the violence associated with these events was justified?	1…Yes 2…No 88…DK 99…Refused					
	Respondents will be split for question D10. Half of the respondents will respond to D10: Control Group, and the other half will respond to D10: Treatment Group.						
D10: Control	CONTROL GROUP ONLY If respondent answers to D10 Control, skip directly to D11.						
	Imagine that you hear on the radio that a Western newspaper has published offensive images of the Prophet Mohammed committing a crime. You could respond to this affront in many ways. I'm going to read you a list of possible responses now. Please listen to them and then tell me how many of the following reactions you would support. Please, do not tell me *which* options are	a. A peaceful protest taking place at the Western country's embassy b. Your government demanding a formal apology from the Western country c. Your government declaring war against the Western country					

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	necessary, only *how many.* READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 14 WRITE THE NUMBER OF OPTIONS	DK 88 Refuse 99	
D10: Treatment	TREATMENT GROUP ONLY Only ask item below if respondent did not receive control group item		
	Imagine that you hear on the radio that a Western newspaper has published offensive images of the Prophet Mohammed committing a crime. You could respond to this affront in many ways. I'm going to read you a list of possible responses now. Please listen to them and then tell me how many of the following reactions you would support. Please, do not tell me *which* options are necessary, only *how many.* READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 15 WRITE THE NUMBER OF OPTIONS	a. A peaceful protest taking place at the Western country's embassy b. Your government demanding a formal apology from the Western country c. Your government declaring war against the Western country d. An attack on the country's embassy that could result in military or civilian casualties DK 88 Refuse 99	
	Respondents will be split for question D11. Half of the respondents will respond to D11: Control Group, and the other half will respond to D11: Treatment Group.		
D11: Control	CONTROL GROUP ONLY If respondent answers D11 Control, skip directly to D12.		
	The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal polio vaccination across {Country}. How much do you approve of such a plan? READ OUT RESPONSES	1…not at all 2…somewhat 3…quite 88…DK	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	SHOW CARD 02a CIRCLE ONE CODE	99…Refuse	
D11: Treatment	TREATMENT GROUP ONLY Only ask item below if respondent did not receive control group item		
	The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal polio vaccination across {Country}. It is likely that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)/Boko Haram, an Islamist group, will oppose this program. How much do you approve of such a plan? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02a CIRCLE ONE CODE	1…not at all 2…somewhat 3…quite 88…DK 99…Refuse	
	Respondents will be split for question D13. Half of the respondents will respond to D13: Control Group, and the other half will respond to D13: Treatment Group.		
D13: Control	CONTROL GROUP ONLY If respondent answers D13 Control, skip directly to Section E.		
	OK. Now to change the subject, I am going to read you a list of things that people in this area may have considered doing. **Please listen to them and then tell me how many YOU would consider doing.** Please, do not tell me *which* ones, only *how many.* READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD D13C	a. Donating clothes or money to someone in need b. Voting for a candidate who is a strong supporter of homosexual rights c. Reporting an official who has taken bribes d. Going on the Hajj 88…DK 99…Refuse	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	WRITE THE NUMBER OF OPTIONS		
D13: Treatment	TREATMENT GROUP ONLY Only ask item below if respondent did not receive control group item.		
	OK. Now to change the subject, I am going to read you a list of things that people in this area may have considered doing. **Please listen to them and then tell me how many YOU would consider doing.** Please, do not tell me *which* ones, only *how many.* READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD D13T WRITE THE NUMBER OF OPTIONS	a. Donating clothes or money to someone in need b. Voting for a candidate who is a strong supporter of homosexual rights c. Reporting an official who has taken bribes d. Going on the Hajj e. Joining a group that carries out acts of violence to defend your religion 88…DK 99…Refuse	

Section E. Peace and Tolerance Radio Module			
Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic
E1	Generally speaking, how often have you heard messages or conversations about peace and tolerance? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 11 CIRCLE ONE CODE	1…Often 2…Sometimes 3…Never 88…DK 99…Ref	
E2	How often within the last month have you…		

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

READ OUT RESPONSES
SHOW CARD 17
CIRCLE ONE CODE IN EACH ROW

	Rarely	Once a month	Several times a week	Every day	DK	Ref
a) watched television	1	2	3	4	88	99
b) read a newspaper	1	2	3	4	88	99
c) used the internet	1	2	3	4	88	99
d) made or received voice calls on a mobile phone	1	2	3	4	88	99
e) sent or received an SMS (text message) on a mobile phone	1	2	3	4	88	99
f) listened to the radio	1	2	3	4	88	99

E3	What do you usually listen to on the radio? READ OUT RESPONSES. CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.	a) Music b) News c) Drama d) Religious Program e) Youth Programs f) Governance Programs g) Peace and Tolerance programs h) Other (specify) i) DK j) Ref	

CHAD

Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic
E4a	Have you ever listened to the radio program Dabalaye (the meeting place)?	1…Yes 2…No	If code

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	IF RESPONDENTS SAY THEY DON'T KNOW THE PROGRAM, READ OUT: It's a governance program with presenters Mahamouth and Allamine	88…DK 99…Ref	2, 88 or 99 go to E11a
E5a	**IF YES AT E4a:** How often would you say you listen to the program? USE SHOWCARD 18. SINGLE CODE.	1… Several times a week 2… Once a week 3… Once a month 4… Less than once a month 88…DK 99…Ref	
E6a	How much do you like [Dabalaye]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE	1…not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot 88…DK 99…Ref	
E7a	How much do you trust the information you hear on [Dabalaye]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE	1…not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot 88…DK 99…Ref	
E8a	How many people have you spoken to about things you heard on the radio show [Dabalaye]? No one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 19 SINGLE CODE	1…no one 2…one or two people 3…three or four people 4…more than four people 88…DK 99…Ref	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

E10a	Generally, when you listen to [Dabalaye], can you tell me who you are with when you listen? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?	1… alone 2… with some friends 3… with family 4… in a formal listening club 88… DK 99… Ref	
E11a	How many people have spoken to you about things they heard on the radio show [Dabalaye]? Yes (how many times) or No? READ OUT RESPONSES	1…no one 2…one or two people 3…three or four people 4…more than four people 88…DK 99…Ref	Go to E4b

Now I would like to talk about the radio program Chabab Al Haye

E4b	Have you ever listened to the radio program Chabab Al Haye (Youth Alive)? **IF RESPONDENTS SAY THEY DON'T KNOW THE PROGRAM, READ OUT:** It's a youth program with presenters Djamila and Abdelfatha	1…Yes 2…No 88…DK 99…Ref	If code 2, 88 or 99 go to E11b
E5b	**IF YES AT E4b:** How often would you say you listen to the program? USE SHOWCARD 18. SINGLE CODE.	1… Several times a week 2… Once a week 3… Once a month 4… Less than once a month 88…DK 99…Ref	
E6b	How much do you like [Chabab Al Haye]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?	1…not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE	88…DK 99…Ref	
E7b	How much do you trust the information you hear on [Chabab Al Haye]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE	1…not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot 88…DK 99…Ref	
E8b	How many people have you spoken to about things you heard on the radio show [Chabab Al Haye] in the last year? no one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people ? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 19 SINGLE CODE	1…no one 2…one or two people 3…three or four people 4…more than four people 88…DK 99…Ref	
E10b	Generally, when you listen to [Chabab Al Haye], can you tell me who you are with when you listen? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?	1… alone 2… with some friends 3… with family 4… in a formal listening club 88… DK 99… Ref	
E11b	Has anybody spoken to you about things they heard on the radio show [Chabab Al Haye]? Yes (how many times) or No? READ OUT RESPONSES	1… Yes, several times 2… Yes, a few times 3… No 88…DK 99…Ref	Go to Section F

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

NIGER			
Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic
E4a	Have you ever listened to the radio program Sada Zumunci (Solidarity)? **IF RESPONDENTS SAY THEY DON'T KNOW THE PROGRAM, READ OUT:** It's a governance and religious affairs program with presenters Mairo and Abdou	1…Yes 2…No 88…DK 99…Ref	If code 2, 88 or 99 go to E11a
E5a	**IF YES AT E4a:** How often would you say you listen to the program? USE SHOWCARD 18. SINGLE CODE.	1… Several times a week 2… Once a week 3… Once a month 4… Every three months 88…DK 99…Ref	
E6a	How much do you like [Sada Zumunci]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE	1…not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot 88…DK 99…Ref	
E7a	How much do you trust the information you hear on [Sada Zumunci]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE	1…not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot 88…DK 99…Ref	
E8a		1…no one	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	How many people have you spoken to about things you heard on the radio show [Sada Zumunci] in the last year? No one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 19 SINGLE CODE	2…one or two people 3…three or four people 4…more than four people 88…DK 99…Ref	
E10a	Generally, when you listen to [Sada Zumunci], can you tell me who you are with when you listen? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?	1… alone 2… with some friends 3… with family 4… in a formal listening club 88… DK 99… Ref	Go to E4b
E11a	Has anybody spoken to you about things they heard on the radio show [Sada Zumunci]? Yes (how many times) or No? READ OUT RESPONSES	1… Yes, several times 2… Yes, a few times 3… No 88…DK 99…Ref	Go to E4b

Now I would like to talk about the radio program Gwadaben Matassa (Youth Boulevard)

E4b	Have you ever listened to the radio program Gwadaben Matassa (Youth Boulevard)? **IF RESPONDENTS SAY THEY DON'T KNOW THE PROGRAM, READ OUT:** It's a youth program with presenters Djamila and Abdelfatha	1…Yes 2…No 88…DK 99…Ref	If code 2, 88 or 99 go to E11b
E5b		1… Several times a week	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	IF YES AT E4b: How often would you say you listen to the program? USE SHOWCARD 18. SINGLE CODE.	2… Once a week 3… Once a month 4… Less than once a month 88…DK 99…Ref	
E6b	How much do you like [Gwadaben Matassa]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE	1…not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot 88…DK 99…Ref	
E7b	How much do you trust the information you hear on [Gwadaben Matassa]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE	1…not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot 88…DK 99…Ref	
E8b	How many people have you spoken to about things you heard on the radio show [Gwadaben Matassa] in the last year? no one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 19 SINGLE CODE	1…no one 2…one or two people 3…three or four people 4…more than four people 88…DK 99…Ref	
E10b	Generally, when you listen to [Gwadaben Matassa], can you tell me who you are with when you listen? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening	1… alone 2… with some friends 3… with family	Go to Section F

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	club?	4… in a formal listening club 88… DK 99… Ref	
E11a	Has anybody spoken to you about things they heard on the radio show [Gwadaben Matassa]? Yes (how many times) or No? READ OUT RESPONSES	1… Yes, several times 2… Yes, a few times 3… No 88…DK 99…Ref	Go to Section F

BURKINA FASO			
Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic
E4a	Have you ever listened to the radio program *Malegr Sooré* (Voices of Change)? **IF RESPONDENTS SAY THEY DON'T KNOW THE PROGRAM, READ OUT:** It's a youth program in Mooré with presenters Angèle and Eric.	1…Yes 2…No 88…DK 99…Ref	If code 2, 88 or 99 go to E11a
E5a	**IF YES AT E4a:** How often would you say you listen to the program? USE SHOWCARD 18. SINGLE CODE.	1… Several times a week 2… Once a week 3… Once a month 4… Less than once a month 88…DK 99…Ref	
E6a	How much do you like [*Malegr Sooré*]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES	1…not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot 88…DK	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE	99…Ref	
E7a	How much do you trust the information you hear on [*Malegr Sooré*]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE	1…not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot 88…DK 99…Ref	
E8a	How many people have you spoken to about things you heard on the radio show [Malegr Sooré] in the last year? No one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 19 SINGLE CODE	1…no one 2…one or two people 3…three or four people 4…more than four people 88…DK 99…Ref	
E10a	Generally, when you listen to [*Malegr Sooré*], can you tell me who you are with when you listen? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?	1… alone 2… with some friends 3… with family 4… in a formal listening club 88… DK 99… Ref	Go to E4b
E11a	Has anybody spoken to you about things they heard on the radio show [Malegr Sooré]? Yes (how many times) or No? READ OUT RESPONSES	1… Yes, several times 2… Yes, a few times 3… No 88…DK 99…Ref	Go to E4b

Now I would like to talk about the radio program Pinal Sukabè (Youth Awakening)

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

E4b	Have you ever listened to the radio program Pinal Sukabè (Youth Awakening)? **IF RESPONDENTS SAY THEY DON'T KNOW THE PROGRAM, READ OUT:** It's a youth program in Mooré with presenters Issouf and Kady.	1…Yes 2…No 88…DK 99…Ref	If code 2, 88 or 99 go to E11b
E5b	**IF YES AT E4b:** How often would you say you listen to the program? USE SHOWCARD 18. SINGLE CODE.	1… Several times a week 2… Once a week 3… Once a month 4… Less than once a month 88…DK 99…Ref	
E6b	How much do you like [Pinal Sukabè]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE	1…not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot 88…DK 99…Ref	
E7b	How much do you trust the information you hear on [Pinal Sukabè]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE	1…not at all 2…Somewhat 3…A lot 88…DK 99…Ref	
E8b	How many people have you spoken to about things you heard on the radio show [Pinal Sukabè] in the last year? No one, one or two people, three or four people,	1…no one 2…one or two people 3…three or four people 4…more than four people	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	or more than four people? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 19 SINGLE CODE	88…DK 99…Ref	
E10b	Generally, when you listen to [Pinal Sukabè], can you tell me who you are with when you listen? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?	1… alone 2… with some friends 3… with family 4… in a formal listening club 88… DK 99… Ref	Go to Section F
E11b	[Ask only if E4b is 2, 88, or 99] Has anybody spoken to you about things they heard on the radio show [Pinal Sukabè]? Yes (how many times) or No? READ OUT RESPONSES	1… Yes, several times 2… Yes, a few times 3… No 88…DK 99…Ref	Go to Section F

Section F. Experience with P-DEV II Programming		
F3	Please tell me how many times over the past year you have attended any of the following kinds of events or activities: Read out Responses Use Show Card 20 Single Code in Each Row	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	Never	One or two times	Three or four times	More than four times	DK	Refuse
a) An organized workshop or forum in your community where issues about peace or democracy were discussed	1	2	3	4	88	99
b) A poetry reading or a drama about peace or democracy issues	1	2	3	4	88	99
c) Training to develop ways to solve community problems	1	2	3	4	88	99
d) An organized workshop or forum at a place other than a mosque where imams or religious leaders discussed peace or democracy with people in the community	1	2	3	4	88	99
e) Trainings to help you find work or find a better job	1	2	3	4	88	99
f) Trainings to help you learn how to run a business or write an application for a business development grant	1	2	3	4	88	99
g) A meeting to help determine how community grant funding will be spent	1	2	3	4	88	99

Section O: Panel Follow-up Instructions and Respondent Location

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	Thank you for taking the time to answer our survey. We may return in 2 years to ask you some more questions. I hope that I will be the person who will return, but it may be another person in my place. Because I may not be the same person, may I ask you a few more questions just to make sure we find you again?		
G2	Would you be willing to speak with us again in the next few years to we can see how you're doing?	Yes……1 No…….2	
G4	Could you give us the contact information for someone who you expect will be able to help us find you in the next few years?	[WRITE NAME AND PHONE NUMBER OF CONTACT]	
O1	Can we find you the same time of day during the week?	Yes……1 No…….2	
O2	Which is the best time to reach you?		
O3	Can we find you again in the next two years here?	Yes……1 No…….2	
O4	If No, where can we find you and what is the best way to get there? Interviewer: note the precise location and instructions for finding the house for the next wave:		
O6	Respondent's occupation/profession		

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

O7	Sector/ Quarter		
O8	Respondent/household complete address :		
O9	Respondent mobile number :		
O10	Respondent position in the household		

Section G: Interviewer Data Entry			
G5	Record interview end time using 24 hour clock	_____:_____ (hour:minute)	
	FOR INTERVIEWER COMPLETION ONLY --DO NOT ASK RESPONDENT! PLEASE COMPLETE THIS SECTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER YOU HAVE LEFT THE RESPONDENT'S HOME.		
G6	Length of interview	_____ Minutes	
G7	Sex of interviewer	Male……..... 1 Female……..…… 2	
G8	In what language was the interview conducted?	French 1 Arabic 2 French and Arabic 3	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

		Kanembu 4 Haussa 5 Zarma 6 Tamashek 7 Gourane 8 Other, specify _____ 9			
G9 [Afr Bar]	Were there any other people immediately present who were listening during the interview?	No one.....1 Spouse only.....2 Children only.....3 A few others.....4 Small crowd.....5			
G10 [AfrBar]	What was the respondent's attitude toward you during the interview?				
	A. Was he or she	Friendly 1	In between 2	Hostile 3	
	B. What he or she	Interested 1	In between 2	Bored 3	
	C. Was he or she	Cooperative 1	In between 2	Uncooperative 3	
	D. Was he or she	Patient 1	In between 2	Impatient 3	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	E. Was he or she	At ease 1	In between 2	Suspicious 3	
	F. Was he or she	Honest 1	In between 2	Misleading 3	
G11 [Afr Bar]	What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty answering?		All ..... 1 Most .....2 Some .....3 Few .....4 None 5		
G12	On which attempt was the interview completed?		First attempt..... 1 Second attempt.....2 Third attempt.....3		
G13	Please note any questions that caused particular difficulties for the respondent: [CONTRACTOR: Do not code this list for the data set. Only provide summary of problem questions in the Technical Report]. _____ _____ _____				

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	_____ _____	

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

Peace through Development II (PDEVII)

LEVEL 2 Verification Sheet

REPORT TO SUPERVISOR ONLY

PLEASE TABULATE IN FRENCH

Responses from Wave 2 Questionnaire for cross checking and verification		
ID1	Questionnaire ID	
F2	Name of Respondent	
A1_W1	Sex of respondent	Male 1 Female 2
A2_W1	Age of respondent	years old
A3_W1	Respondent's educational level	
O5	Respondent's Nick name as known in his/her neighborhood	
O11	Name of head of household	
A3	Education Level	
A7	Religion	
A11	Ethnic Background	
A6F	Household Item: Radio	Non…0 Yes…1
A6M	Household	WC Inside or Outside

ID1	Questionnaire ID	

	Item: Inside or Outside WC	

NOTE FOR EAS TEAM QUALITY CONTROL REPRESENTATIVE ONLY:	
RV3 :	Verified…… 1 Not Verified ….2

B. Regression Tables for Panel Analysis

Table 52. Panel Analysis for Interpersonal Trust

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	-.262
differenced no. of activities	.003
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	.004
lagged dependent variable	-1.148***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	.210**
constant	2.538***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 53. Panel Analysis for Institutional Trust

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	-.161
differenced no. of activities	-.011*
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	.005
lagged dependent variable	-.872***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	.034
constant	2.306

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 54. Panel Analysis for Community Decision-making

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	-.226
differenced no. of activities	-.006
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	.009
lagged dependent variable	-.965***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	.068
constant	2.059

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 55. Panel Analysis for Political Participation

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	.045
differenced no. of activities	.001
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	.019**
lagged dependent variable	-.851***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	.024
constant	.311***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 56. Panel Analysis for Interethnic Marriage

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	.235
differenced no. of activities	-.005
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	.002
lagged dependent variable	-.914***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	-.075
constant	2.612***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 57. Panel Analysis for Access to Jobs

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	.495***
differenced no. of activities	.005
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	-.006
lagged dependent variable	-1.000***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	-.064
constant	1.235***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 58. Panel Analysis for Access to Vocational School

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	.506**
differenced no. of activities	.034**
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	-.031
lagged dependent variable	-.889***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	-.261**
constant	1.792

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 59. Panel Analysis for Political Efficacy

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	-.118
differenced no. of activities	-.002
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	.008
lagged dependent variable	-.927***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	-.059
constant	1.789

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 60. Panel Analysis for Ethnic Differences

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	.519***
differenced no. of activities	.005
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	.033
lagged dependent variable	-.908***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	.008
constant	1.097***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 61. Panel Analysis for Religious Differences

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	.460**
differenced no. of activities	.007
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	.035
lagged dependent variable	-.922***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	.088
constant	1.111***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 62. Panel Analysis for Religious Violence Is Justified

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	.303***
differenced no. of activities	-.001
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	-.002
lagged dependent variable	-.975***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	-.030
constant	.994***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 63. Panel Analysis for Violence Is Effective to Solve Problems

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	.233
differenced no. of activities	.007
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	-.034**
lagged dependent variable	-.899***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	-.150
constant	1.155***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 64. Panel Analysis for Violence in the Name of Islam

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	-.097
differenced no. of activities	.011*
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	-.004
lagged dependent variable	-.978***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	.047
constant	1.113***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 65. Panel Analysis for Anti-West Attitudes

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	.592**
differenced no. of activities	.022**
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	-.007
lagged dependent variable	-.993***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	-.095
constant	1.377***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 66. Panel Analysis for Life Satisfaction

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	1.164***
differenced no. of activities	.044
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	-.040
lagged dependent variable	-.998***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	-.148*
constant	4.346***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 67. Panel Analysis for Economic Outlook

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	.013
differenced no. of activities	-.025**
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	.023
lagged dependent variable	-.819***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	.054
constant	1.573***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 68. Panel Analysis for Inclusiveness of Schools

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	.152
differenced no. of activities	.001
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	-.015
lagged dependent variable	-.920***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	-.111
constant	2.661***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 69. Panel Analysis for Interest in Community Affairs

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	-.140
differenced no. of activities	.007
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	-.012
lagged dependent variable	-.868***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	.002
constant	2.208***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 70. Panel Analysis for Political Knowledge

Variable Name	Coefficient
Niger dummy	.077*
differenced no. of activities	.004
differenced no. of activities*Niger dummy	.005
lagged dependent variable	-.774***
lagged dependent variable * Niger dummy	-.016
constant	.321***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

C. Qualitative Data Collection Focus Group and Interviews

Burkina Faso

Data Collection Zones	Core/Noncore	Data Collection
Dori	Core	Interview: Radio Commentator
Gorgadji	Noncore	Focus Group: Men Interviews: Female Director of Community Action Committee Catholic Priest
Ouagadougou Arrondissement 9	Core	Focus Group: Women, urban, educated Focus Group: Young Men, urban, educated Ministry Official Parliamentary Assistant
Ouahigoya	Core	Focus Group: Urban Women Interviews: Civil Society Organization Leader Radio Commentator Imam Youth Leader
Ouahigoya	Core	Focus Group: Men
Markoye	Core	Focus Group: rural men Interview: Administrative Authority
Namissiguima (Yatenga)	Noncore	Focus Group: Muslim men Interviews: Administrative Authority
Séguénéga	Non-Core	Focus Group: Men
Seytenga	Core	Focus Group: Women Muslims
Zondoma		Focus Group: Women, rural, non-educated

Niger

Data Collection Zones	Core/Noncore	Data Collection
Agadez	Core	Focus Group: Women Interviews: Civil Society Activist Local Authority
Arlit	Core	Focus Group: Youth Interviews: Civil Society Activist Local Elected Official Religious Leader
Balleyara	Core	Focus Group: Women Interviews: Local Elected Official
Diffa	Core	Focus Group: Men Interviews: Civil Society Activist Traditional Leader Religious Leaders
Maradi	Core	Focus Group: Men Interviews: Civil Society Activist Religious Leader Local Elected Official
Niamey Gamkallé	Core	Focus Group: Women Interviews: Local Elected Official President of Women's Society Youth Association
Niamey Talladjé	Core	Focus Group: Men
Tahoua	Core	Focus Group: Men Interviews: Religious Leader
		Civil Society Activist
Tillaberi	Core	Focus Group: Youth Interviews: Local Elected Official Religious Leader
Zinder	Core	Focus Group: Youth Interviews: Local Elected Official Religious Leader (Pastor)

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