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EVALUATION

Performance Evaluation of the « Réduire les Abus Contre les Talibés à Dakar » Activity

January 2017

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Performance Evaluation of the « *Réduire les Abus Contre les Talibés à Dakar* » Activity

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ACRONYMS

CAPE	Child Protection Task Force
CNLTP	National Counter-Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) Task Force
CTIP	Counter-Trafficking in Persons
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GOS	Government of Senegal
GTFC	Guele Tapée-Fass-Colobane
KII	Key informant interviews
LCM	Leadership Change Management
MEP	Monitoring and Evaluation Project
MSI	Management Systems International
PAMOD	Projet d'Appui à la Modernisation des <i>Daaras</i>
PAQUEB	Programme d'Amélioration de la Qualité de l'Enseignement de Base
SOW	Statement of Work
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
TIP	Trafficking in Persons
UCP	Project Coordination Units
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Evaluation Purpose and Evaluation Questions

This performance evaluation occurred during the second half of June and July 2016. It provides lessons learned and best practices in combatting child begging in Senegal to support the USAID/Senegal DRG team in the future design of counter-trafficking and begging-reduction programs. This team is the primary stakeholder; other stakeholders include the National Counter-Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) Task Force (Cellule Nationale de lutte contre la traite des personnes) put in place by the Government of Senegal (GOS) and the Child Protection Task Force (CAPE). This evaluation involved a broad range of international and national stakeholders and NGOs working to reduce child begging in Senegal.

The evaluation questions were as follows:

Q 1: How has the intervention changed the public dialogue (in the two municipalities) and views on the *talibés* begging issue? Did that dialogue evolve from the welfare of the *talibés* to the forced begging issue? Is that a critical pathway for attitudinal change? This includes the perceptions of the various groups involved: marabouts, commune leaders, *sérignes daaras*, *talibés*, public school directors, and mothers' association of *daaras*.

Q 2: Has the intervention reduced begging? If so, to what level?

Q 3: Has the activity been successful in achieving community buy-in? If so, has this been a helpful approach for changing attitudes toward child-begging and abuses of children in some *daaras*?

Q 4: Are there scalable activities from within the current approach that can be adopted in other municipalities or and/or at the national level? If so, what are the critical assumptions for this approach to work in other municipalities?

Q 5: Did this approach add value to the discourse and/or practices within the larger community of actors working to reduce child begging?

Project Background

In November 2013, a two-year grant for \$300,000 was awarded to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and it was extended for six months with no additional cost, ending on April 30, 2016. In addition, USAID awarded two, \$100,000 direct grants to the Dakar municipalities of Gueule-Tapée-Fass-Colobane (GTFC) and Medina for addressing the problem of child begging by working with the resident *daaras*. USAID and the mayors of each municipality signed memoranda of agreement in January 2014. The Activity was designed to assist the Government of Senegal (GOS) to reduce abuses against *talibés* and to positively impact the U.S. State Department trafficking in persons (TIP) rating of Senegal. To strengthen the capacity of national and local level actors to better respond to child trafficking in Senegal as it relates to *talibés* and begging on the streets, the Activity employed a leadership change management (LCM) curriculum. The UNODC facilitated an LCM process for key members of the CNLTP and two partner municipalities in Dakar.

Design and Methodology

This performance evaluation collected qualitative and quantitative data through document review, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and a survey of *talibés* found in *daaras* and in the streets of the two target communes. The document review included all available documentation (reports, guidance documents, directories, listings, maps, Activity documents, etc.) on the issues of *daaras* and *talibés* in the

two municipalities (for a list of documents see Annex 3 : Bibliography). National guidelines, laws, protocols and other relevant documents were also reviewed. This review phase also served as a basis for the development of data collection tools and provided data for purposes of analysis.

The quantitative approach was divided into three surveys: one administered to the *sérignes daaras*¹, one to the *talibés*² at the *daaras*³ and one to *talibés* found in the street of the municipality. The qualitative study was carried out among the various stakeholders involved or affected by the Activity.

Findings and Conclusions

Findings and Conclusions

Question 1: How has the intervention changed the public dialogue (in the two municipalities) and views on the *talibés* begging issue? Did that dialogue evolve from the welfare of the *talibés* to the forced begging issue? Is that a critical pathway for attitudinal change? This includes the perceptions of the various groups involved: marabouts, commune leaders, *sérignes daaras*, *talibés*, public school directors, and mothers' association of *daaras*.

Findings: The following features of the Activity design have been effective in changing the public dialogue and attitudes:

1. Mayors are responsible for their program and are provided direct grant funding to carry out their work;
2. The establishment of dedicated, decentralized, Project Coordination Units (UCP) within the Mayors' offices to manage the funds and field work with community members;
3. Mayors championing the combat against child begging;
4. LCM enhanced UCP activities aimed at changing the public dialogue;
5. The participatory mapping of the *daaras* at the onset of the Activity.

The activity began with two communes having very different experiences with the issue of child begging. In Medina, a tragic fire on March 3, 2013, which resulted in the death of nine children, increased public awareness on the dangers of *daaras* that keep *talibés* overnight. The commune of GTFC did not experience such a known public tragedy. The push for legislating street begging at the municipal level originated with the citizens and the Activity harnessed this momentum for change. It has also changed attitudes so that volunteer surveillance teams patrolling begging have been established. The *ndeyous daaras*⁴ are organized into recognized associations in each municipality. The *sérignes daaras* interviewed as part of this evaluation do not oppose *talibés* begging, but they hope to see it better regulated to prevent abuse. Despite the wide range of community members working in support of the Activity, the majority of *sérignes daaras* still support the idea of begging but accept that, in principle, it should be regulated. The majority of community members interviewed have changed their perception to see *talibés* begging as a form of child exploitation and abuse.

Conclusions: This Activity has five design features that are instrumental in effecting change. This type of design for this Activity's inherent approach generally contributes to increasing community

¹ Religious leader of Koranic school

² Children and youth that study in a Koranic school

³ Koranic school

⁴ Women from community that support the feeding and care of *talibés*

understanding of the need to organize themselves to address child begging and also enhances local government and civil society actors' ability to reach citizens with awareness-raising activities that contribute to the public dialogue and views on well-being of the *talibés*. The importance of organizing community members through the Mayors' offices and through UCPs is a key lesson learned for the municipalities, leading to the creation of a volunteer monitoring system in both Municipalities.

Q 2: Has the intervention reduced begging? If so, to what level?

Findings: In Medina, of the 113 *talibés* interviewed in their respective *daaras*, none of them continued to practice begging after the start of the Activity. In interviews, the *sérignes daaras*, *talibés* and Activity coordinators confirm that begging is not practiced. Medina managed to close the three *daaras* that practiced begging, using Activity funds to repatriate the *talibés* to their place of origin. This is strong evidence that the Activity helped enable the municipality to reduce begging originating from Medina *daaras* to zero. In GTFC, the activity set targets for reducing the hours that *talibés* beg in the commune. Of the three *daaras* that continued to beg, one has left the municipality, the other two are still present and still continue to practice begging. The *daara* that left GTFC did not do so because of the Activity but because it could not find space to operate and went to another location outside of the municipality.

There is no metric at baseline for measuring time spent begging after the Activity; this limits our ability to find statistically significant evidence of a reduction of begging between the situation before and after the Activity. Twenty-nine (29) of the 46 *talibés* that currently beg in the two *daaras* located in GTFC reveal that the average number of hours spent begging has not changed over the course of the Activity -- 5.34 hours before the Activity compared to 5.38 hours now.

Conclusion: The target for reduction of begging for *talibés* based in Medina is achieved. In GTFC-based *daaras*, the evaluation concludes that the Activity was unsuccessful, with the average number of hours being roughly the same as before the Activity.

Q 3: Has the activity been successful in achieving community buy-in? If so, has this been a helpful approach for changing attitudes toward child-begging and abuses of children in some *daaras*?

Findings: The communities of Medina and GTFC are engaged with and feel ownership of the municipal and community-based actions that the Activity has spurred. Mayors work in close collaboration with community groups and lead continuous and repeated awareness-raising and mobilization activities among the community. As such, residents felt like they were consistently engaged throughout the Activity. The value of the UCPs currently embedded in the mayors' offices is that they can continuously engage the community and involve them in activities, something specifically highlighted in FGDs with community members in both municipalities. In Medina, the mayor is a strong advocate for the Activity and the residents of Medina were already aligned in wanting to eliminate abuses against *talibés* due to the March 3, 2013 *daara* fire. The mayor is seen by both the public and even national and international stakeholders interviewed as a part of this evaluation as an outspoken advocate for the protection of the rights of *talibés*. His championing the cause has been critical in the Activity's success. This advocacy includes his on-going dedication to reaching the community members and involving them heavily in all aspects of the Activity. In GTFC, the strong collaboration between the municipality and the *ndeyous daaras* is highlighted as a positive factor in attempting to regulate begging.

Conclusions: Much of the success in achieving community buy-in can be linked to the Activity's direct work with the municipalities, whereby mayors are responsible for their programs and receive their funding through a direct grant. This design results in an inclusive approach that engages *ndeyous daaras*, imams, *badiénous gokh*, neighborhood associations and leaders in combatting the abuses of *talibés* begging. Community engagement is helped when there is a critical incident that marks the public psyche as in the case of the *talibés* that died in a *daara* fire in Medina. Political will is a warrantor of Activity success.

Q 4: Are there scalable activities from within the current approach that can be adopted in other municipalities or and/or at the national level? If so, what are the critical assumptions for this approach to work in other municipalities?

Findings: The five Activity features identified in the answer to first evaluation question can be replicated. The specific activities successful in Medina and GTFC are rooted in the context of these municipalities and are led by the residents of these municipalities. From the perspective of Activity design, UCP staff and community members value the *daara* mapping exercise undertaken at the outset of the Activity as it permits to establish a clear and common understanding of the environment in the *daaras* and the status of the *talibés* studying in them. Skits and talks are low cost means of reaching the population and influencing a changed in attitudes vis-à-vis begging. NGOs working on this issue note that not all mayors have the personal interest and political will to advocate for a reduction in child begging within their municipalities.

Conclusions: *Talibé* begging is a highly sensitive and very personal subject which is challenging to broach on a public level. Creating a shared, evidence-based understanding of the problem of begging *talibés* is an essential element of ensuring a replication of this Activity elsewhere. It is important to understand the incentives and interests of various community members in order properly engage with them and secure their support to the Activity. For this approach to work in other municipalities, it is critical that the mayor have the political will and independence to tackle child street begging.

Q 5: Did this approach add value to the discourse and/or practices within the larger community of actors working to reduce child begging?

Findings: There are five domains in which the Activity adds value to the discourse and practices. Firstly, the fact that the Activity works through the mayors' offices, with direct funding, frequently comes up in focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIs) as a valued change in practice. This approach is unique but only assured some success if the mayor has the political will to follow through on the issue of child begging and working with *daaras* to support improved regulation. Secondly, the Activity changes the practice and discourse of working through national entities as the decentralized approach is not only effective but also supportive of the GOS' efforts to devolve greater authority to local levels. Thirdly, the Activity has brought to the forefront the fact that there is a lack of clarity in terms of the actual role of the national government as to what services it provides to support reduction in child begging and what types of resources can be accessed by community-based activities to create improved effectiveness of local efforts. Fourthly, the Activity adds value to the discourse and, potentially, to the practice by NGOs working in this area. The community members in the two municipalities raise one large concern: the lack of clarity in addressing forced begging cases, either through legal channels to prosecute or through formal support services for the victims of trafficking. Lastly, national and international NGOs and the UNODC view the bylaw outlawing begging, created in Medina, as a unique result of the Activity that can be used as a model for other municipalities. While national laws exist, very little is done at the national level to enforce the law. International NGOs, UNODC and USAID see the creation of a bylaw at the municipality level, which is then the responsibility of the municipality to enforce, as a unique and strong statement on behalf of the local authorities.

Conclusions: This Activity, while community-based as well, reverses the approach to work directly through local authorities, in this case mayors, to build public awareness around the need to reduce child begging. As mentioned earlier, it is a unique approach and one that could work well in coordinating with international NGOs working in targeted municipalities. However, some clarifications are needed in terms of the role of national institutions and of the services and legal channels to address forced begging.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Below are selected recommendations for local governments, USAID, and the GOS. A complete list of recommendations can be found in the body of the report.

To both governments:

1. Continue to support structures put in place such as the UCP and the *ndeyous daaras* to ensure their sustainability.
2. Support the process of formalizing the citizen watch committees to ensure they are operational and sustainable.
3. Create a line item in municipal budgets to support community awareness programs and social service support to children found begging on the streets.

To GTFC municipality:

1. Continue to seek community-based approaches to providing direct support and care for *talibés*, with a focus on *talibés* that live in the two GTFC based *daaras* and are forced to beg.
2. Strengthen the by-law language to eradicate child begging in all parts of the commune.

To USAID:

1. For future interventions with municipalities, allocate adequate funds and technical personnel to conduct a valid baseline and midline research to support the long-term measurement in the reduction of begging, including metrics to measure a reduction in hours of begging and the state of begging in the streets, especially the amount that originates from outside the municipality.
2. Ensure that LCM training is adequately funded to include more follow-up coaching and mentoring. This training should also incorporate communications to equip actors, especially facilitators, charged with rolling out community awareness raising activities.
3. Before entering into other municipalities, conduct a stakeholder analysis among the community in other municipalities in order to assess various community members' readiness and incentives that would support effective Activity implementation. Look at community leaders across a range of sectors who could either make the Activity succeed or undermine it. This would focus on incentives and interests of the various key stakeholders: *sérignes daaras*, business associations, *ndeyous daaras*, mayor, community leaders, religious leaders, police, community health workers, etc.
4. Ensure that the Action Plan developed in each commune effectively uses the data from the baseline research to customize targeted interventions to the two categories of *daaras* – those that have *talibés* sleep within the daara and force begging and those that do not force begging and children return home after lessons.
5. Consider a program of twinning the mayors of Medina and GTFC with new municipalities and to coordinate on cross-border control of begging.
6. The approach of entering at a community level through the mayor's office should be used in other municipalities in Dakar, taking into account recommendations on improved management around expectations of *sérignes daaras*.

To the GOS:

1. Establish and support a multi-actor platform to fight against child street begging with a short-, medium-, and long-term action plan. This multi-actor platform will play a warning role and will manage cases of child street beggars in the municipalities across Dakar.
2. Support local government to work effectively with *sérignes daaras* in understanding the national-level efforts to regulate *daaras* and reduce abuses against *talibés*.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Evaluation Purpose and Audience

This evaluation provides insight to the USAID/Senegal DRG team on lessons learned and best practices in combatting child begging in Senegal in order to inform the Agency's future design of counter-trafficking and begging-reduction programs. In addition to USAID/Senegal's interest in this evaluation, other stakeholders, particularly the National Counter-Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) Task Force (*Cellule Nationale de lutte contre la traite des personnes or CNLTP*) put in place by the Government of Senegal (GOS), the Ministry of Women, Family and Children and the Child Protection Task Force (CAPE) will also serve as a key stakeholder for the development and results of this evaluation. This evaluation involved a broad range of international and national stakeholders and NGOs working to reduce child begging in Senegal.

Evaluation Questions

Q 1: How has the intervention changed the public dialogue (in the two municipalities) and views on the *talibés* begging issue? Did that dialogue evolve from the welfare of the *talibés* to the forced begging issue? Is that a critical pathway for attitudinal change? This includes the perceptions of the various groups involved: marabouts, municipality leaders, *sérignes daaras*, *talibés*, public school directors, and mothers' association of *daaras*.

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Q 5: Did this approach add value to the discourse and/or practices within the larger community of actors working to reduce child begging?

ACTIVITY BACKGROUND

National Legislation Affecting Child Begging

The GOS has adopted legislation affecting child begging. This Activity inserts itself in the following legal framework:

Anti-Trafficking Law:

In 2005, the Senegalese government passed Law No. 2005-06, which outlaws the practice of forced begging. Article 3 of the law states: *Whosoever organizes the begging of another in order to benefit, or hires, leads, or deceives a person in order to engage him in begging or to exercise pressure on him to beg ... will be punished by imprisonment of 2 to 5 years and a fine of 500,000 to 2,000,000 francs.* The execution of the sentence will not be stayed when the crime is committed against a minor.

Senegalese Penal Code Provisions:

Article 298 of the Senegalese penal code criminalizes physical abuse and willful neglect of children, stating: Law no. 2005-06 of May 10, 2005, relating to the fight against the trafficking of persons and similar practices and protection of victims. Whosoever willfully injures or berates a child under the age of 15, or who willfully deprives a child of food or care as to endanger his health, or who commits against a child any violence or assault, except minor assaults, will be punished by imprisonment of one to five years and fine of 25,000 to 200,000 francs.

2016 presidential decree:

On July 6, 2016 President Macky Sall issued a presidential decree to end organized child begging on the street. To achieve this goal, the prime minister organized an inter-ministerial committee to fight against begging in urban areas. This committee also includes the member associations of the *Fédération Nationale des Associations des Ecoles Coraniques du Sénégal*.

Daara Modernization:

In 2009, the Ministry of National Education (MEN) developed a three-year strategic plan to modernize *daaras* in Senegal⁵. A Directorate for Daara Inspection was created in the MEN with the objective of ensuring minimum standards and norms for *daara* operations. Since then, a law has been in development by the National Assembly that would set minimum required standards for physical conditions and services provided by *daaras* across the country. Since the creation of the Directorate, it is unclear how effective “*daara* modernization” efforts have been and the law continues to be under review by the National Assembly with limited knowledge of when and if it will be made into law.

Implementation Background

On March 3, 2013 nine children died in a fire in a *daara*, a Koranic school, in Dakar’s Medina municipality.⁶ Their marabout, a religious man entrusted with their Islamic education and well-being, had locked them in the *daara* for the night and left. While the situation of *talibés* begging in the street has been a chronic issue over the past three decades, this incident presented clearly the dangerous and negligent conditions within some of the *daaras* that house *talibés* who are separated from their families. The fire helped to galvanize a new level of discussion on how to deal with the sensitive religious and political issue surrounding human trafficking and the *talibé* phenomenon in Senegal.

In November 2013, USAID launched the *Réduire les Abus Contre les Talibés à Dakar* Activity with a total budget of \$500,000. As part of this activity, a two-year grant for \$300,000 was awarded to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The grant was extended for six months with no additional cost, and the Activity ended on April 30, 2016. The Activity was designed to assist the Government of Senegal (GOS) to reduce abuses against *talibés* and positively impact the U.S. State Department trafficking in persons (TIP) rating of Senegal. To strengthen the capacity of national and local level actors to better respond to child trafficking in Senegal as it relates to *talibés* and begging on the streets, UNODC employed a leadership change management (LCM) curriculum in working with national and local government authorities. The Activity facilitated an LCM process for key members of the CNLTP and two partner municipalities. Through an open solicitation process, the two Dakar municipalities of Gueule-Tapée-Fass-Colobane (GTFC) and Medina were selected to participate in the Activity. Each municipality was directly awarded \$100,000 to reimburse expenses for addressing the

⁵ Le Soleil, *Sénégal: Daaras modernes - Le ministère crée une inspection*, December 22, 2009

⁶ Hussain, Misha, “Senegal acts on child begging after fire kills nine in care of renegade teacher,” April 17, 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/apr/17/senegal-child-begging-renegade-teacher>.

problem of child begging by working with the resident *daaras*. The mayors of each municipality and USAID signed memoranda of agreement in January 2014.

The UNODC partnered with the Senegalese firm, Groupe Girafe, to deliver LCM training to 30 participants: 10 each from the CNLTP, the municipality of Medina and the municipality of GTFC. Together they tried to raise awareness of the issue of *talibés* begging and promote change in the municipalities. An example of an awareness raising campaign is below.



Figure 1 An advocacy campaign supported by the UNODC to fight forced child begging in Senegal. Source: <https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/senegal-forum-on-talibe.html>.

Because this Activity supported and built momentum for Senegal's activities to combat TIP, it is expected to contribute positively to Senegal's TIP ranking (currently ranked Tier 2 watch list) issued by the State Department (with Tier 1 the highest ranking and Tier 3 ranking the lowest). The second goal of this Activity is to build additional capacity of a local organization to utilize the LCM approach to effect change on difficult-to-address social phenomena such as *talibés* begging.

The GOS has created and identified key stakeholders to serve as part of the solution to the problem of child trafficking abuses. However, the actors concerned so far have not always succeeded in mobilizing and implementing decisive interventions. The LCM training process at the heart of the Activity was an opportunity to provide the CNLTP with the necessary training for its members, networking, and follow-up encouragement focused on individual change plans geared towards each participant's planned contribution to address trafficking and begging in Senegal.

Development Hypothesis, Objectives, and Key Interventions

The objective of the Activity is to reduce forced child begging through a community-based approach with local actors in the two municipalities in Dakar and to fight against the trafficking of children in their respective territories. The Activity is based on the theory LCM which aims at achieving local ownership and maximized sustainability by focusing both on competencies for change management and on leadership development. It allows key actors, with the necessary technical and policy support, to have the competencies to carry out change and inspire those around them to participate. The local actors –

the *ndeyous daaras*⁷, *sérignes daaras*, and community associations – are then empowered to lead change in their own communities.

The USAID Activity has three objectives linked to specific interventions, outlined in the table that follows.

Objective	Intervention
Prevention. Discourage abuse and trafficking of children	Map existing local trafficking projects Develop a stakeholder directory
Protection. Reduce the number of marginalized children on the streets of Dakar	Develop and support local government action plans Develop systems at the community level to support vulnerable children and linkages with GOS shelters (as required) Create a child protection referral network or enhance an existing network (e.g., if a child ends up at a police station/shelter and needs referral to a doctor or therapist, a referral network would facilitate this)
Protection/Punishment. Strengthen civil society–government linkages and system for protecting children and arresting and prosecuting offenders	Provide leader management change support to TIP Task Force Strengthen information-sharing structures/ coordination structures to identify and remove bottlenecks

The Activity provides flexibility to each municipality in determining how they define “reduction in child begging.” For the municipality of Medina, where the tragic fire occurred, the mayor chose to eradicate begging entirely from the municipality either affiliated with *daaras* in the municipality or with individual children begging in the street, not affiliated with Medina-based *daaras*. In GTFC, the Mayor banned begging in the commune but allowed begging to occur in association with religious institutions. As part of their targets set for the Activity, the GTFC UCP targeted a 50% reduction in the number of hours spent begging by *talibés* in the municipality-based *daaras*.

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITS OF THE EVALUATION

Evaluation Team

The evaluation team was comprised of a local Team Leader, who is a sociologist with extensive knowledge of the issue of *talibés* in Senegal, and an assistant involved in the collection of qualitative data. The team also included three enumerators to support the collection of survey data on the *talibés*. The Senegal MEP staff supported the evaluation team in the design, monitoring and analysis of quantitative survey data and qualitative transcript analysis. The MEP Research Officer, Data Analyst and two M&E Associates provided active support to the study and analysis.

⁷ Definitions for local terms are located in Annex VII.

Methods of Data Collection

The evaluation team used a mixed-design for this evaluation by blending, comparing and contrasting qualitative and quantitative data using the following data collection methods: document review, survey, key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Each is described below.

Document Review

The document review covers all available documentation (reports, guidance documents, directories, listings, maps, Activity documents, etc.) on the issues of *daaras* and *talibés* in the two municipalities (for a list of the documents reviewed, see Annex III). National guidelines, laws, protocols and other relevant documents were also reviewed. The document review gave some initial data to the evaluation team on the Activity targets as well as *daaras* and *talibés* populations. It also served as a basis for the development of data collection tools. Document review continued throughout the evaluation process and informed some of our findings.

Quantitative Data Collection

A group of surveys yielding quantitative data addresses the second evaluation question: has the Activity reduced begging in the two municipalities, and if so, to what extent? One survey was administered to the *sérignes daaras*, one to the *talibés* at the *daaras* and one to *talibés* found in the street of each target commune.

Sampling approach


A different sampling approach was used in the two municipalities, due to the fact that the begging *talibés* were only located in GTFC *daaras* with no begging *talibés* in all Medina *daaras*. The choice was made to focus on begging *daaras* in GTFC and to have a verification sample (5%⁸) in Medina as there was no longer begging *daaras*.

- In GTFC, the evaluation sample consists of six *daaras* which had identified *talibés* that begged in the baseline. The sample of the *talibés* surveyed out of the six GTFC *daaras* was a simple random sampling of 103 *talibés* in GTFC.
- In Medina, 14 *daaras* out of 28 were chosen as part of the evaluation sample. The sampling for the surveys was carried out in two steps. First, a weighted random sample (based on *talibés* enrollment levels in the *daaras*) of 14 out of 28 *daaras* was conducted, then a simple random sample of *talibés* from each *daara* was conducted with 112 *talibés* interviewed.

Additionally, the evaluation conducted a survey for *talibés* on the street using a random sampling approach of walking the streets and interviewing those *talibés* that they encountered. The team focused on the sites/areas mostly frequented by *talibés* (markets, bus stations, mosques, public spaces, etc.) during different hours over two different days. Originally, the Activity hoped to survey 45 *talibés* in the streets of each municipality, but this was not possible, as it was significantly more difficult to encounter *talibés* on the streets in Medina than in GTFC. In total, 64 *talibés* were interviewed, with five (5) being encountered in Medina and 59 in GTFC.

⁸ Initially, the plan was to have a sample of 10% of total number of *talibés* in Medina *daaras*, but after a meeting with the USAID/DRG AOR it was suggested to reduce the percentage from 10 to 5% as their target was to reduce begging in those *daaras* which have begging *talibés*.

In sum, the evaluation team surveyed 20 *daaras* included in the Activity in both municipalities. In each of these *daaras*, the *sérigne daara* as well as a total of 215 *talibés* were interviewed. From a total of 28 *daaras* active in Medina and 16 in GTFC, a sample of six *daaras* for GTFC and 14 *daaras* for Medina were chosen.



Qualitative Data Collection

The evaluation team collected qualitative data among the various stakeholders involved or affected by the Activity. A total of 41 qualitative data collection activities were carried out.

- Twenty-four key informant interviews with different actors involved in the Activity (coordinators, facilitators and accountants), stakeholder institutions (USAID, UNODC, DPE, CNLTP, *Inspection de Daaras*, Groupe Girafe), and *sérignes daaras*.)
- Four key informant interviews with international NGOs involved in efforts to reduce child begging in Senegal (Plan, Save the Children, ChildFund and Anti-Slavery International)
- Six focus group discussions (three in Medina and three in GTFC) with different groups (*ndeyou daaras*, members of the community, and *sérignes daaras*).
- Seven life story narratives (two in Medina and five in GTFC), of which three were with *sérignes daaras* and four were with *talibés*.

Data Analysis Methods

Quantitative Data Analysis

The data were evaluated using the SPSS 10.0 software. Descriptive statistics, including cross-analysis and pre- and post-comparison were performed. Quantitative data was specifically analyzed to address evaluation question two of this study.

Qualitative Data Analysis

For qualitative data, attention was paid to the management of the data which emerged from the in-depth interviews and focus groups, considering the volume of information that this generated. All recorded qualitative data were transcribed. After the transcription of the data, a synthesis of the individual interviews or focus groups was carried out by extracting the overall themes per evaluation questions.

Specifically, for Evaluation Question 4, MSI's scalability checklist (see Annex 5: Scaling up Evaluation Grid) was partially used to assess the potential for scaling-up in three critical dimensions.

Limits and Challenges

Inconsistent and Partial Activity Data

To answer the evaluation questions, particularly the second question regarding the reduction of begging by *talibés*, the evaluation relied on data provided by the municipalities on the situation prior to the start of the Activity. The evaluation team realized that the data provided by the municipalities posed limitations that are outlined below. To address these limits, the evaluation team built in questions regarding the situation prior to the Activity where possible and used that data for comparison, rather than relying on the provided data, if it existed.

- In both communes, Medina and GTFC:
 - There was no baseline data collected on the number of children found begging in the street in each municipality even though a reduction of *talibés* begging in the street was an Activity goal.
 - Child begging in these two municipalities occurs regularly but is not necessarily conducted by children affiliated with the *daaras* within the municipalities. The porous boundaries between the numerous municipalities of Dakar allow for easy access for *talibés* to come by public transportation into either Medina or GTFC. To address these limits, the evaluation team built in questions asking *talibés* about their *daara* of attachment and measured “hours begging” separately as well as jointly for both locally attached *talibés* and those coming from other municipalities to beg.
- In GTFC:
 - Upon collecting field data and gaining more insight into Activity activities and objectives, the evaluation team realized that the data provided by the municipalities was not very accurate or complete. GTFC's objective was to reduce the amount of time spent begging by *talibés* on a daily basis as opposed to eliminating begging outright. However, no prior numbers on hours spent begging were collected during the December 2014 baseline. The Evaluation Team was required to ask *talibés* to provide information on their current number of hours that they beg and to recall, at the outset of the Activity, how many hours they typically begged in a day.
- In Medina:
 - Because Medina closed the *daaras* that practiced begging, the need for an accurate baseline was effectively mitigated, however it is worth noting that the baseline did not identify one of the closed *daaras*, Abdou Sow, in the original baseline.

Impact and Attribution Limits

Many of the evaluation questions focus on the results obtained through this Activity. As this is not an impact evaluation as defined in the USAID evaluation policy and associated ADS stipulations, the evaluation is limited in its ability to determine attribution for any observed change, particularly given other possible confounding factors that may also have an effect on outcomes.

Respondent and recall bias when self-reporting

Given the incomplete baseline data, the evaluation relies heavily on *sérignes daaras* and *talibés* to self-report begging Activity and hours of begging during the interview from both before the start of the activity and currently. It is not possible to corroborate self-reported data with similar observations, reports, and data on *talibés* begging from the start of the Activity and its possible recollections of timing of begging prior to the Activity is inaccurate. It is also possible, especially for behavior currently practiced, that the social desirability response bias may cause respondents to under report should they feel that is what the enumerator wished to hear.

A lack of *talibés* for the street survey

Outside of the interviews with *talibés* affiliated with *daaras* within each municipality, the evaluation team hoped to interview 45 street *talibés* in each municipality. However, this was not possible in Medina due to an inability to find enough *talibés* begging. Therefore, the street survey results may only be valid for GTFC and can only be generalized to municipalities with similar measures in place.

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the findings and conclusions by evaluation question. A stand-alone sub-section groups the recommendations by audience. A summary Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations Matrix is located in Annex 9: Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations Matrix.

Question 1: Findings and Conclusions

Question 1: How has the intervention changed the public dialogue (in the two municipalities) and views on the *talibé* begging issue? Did that dialogue evolve from the welfare of the *talibé* to the forced begging issue? Is that a critical pathway for attitudinal change? This includes the perceptions of the various groups involved: marabouts, commune leaders, *sérigne daaras*, *talibés*, public school directors, and mothers' association of *daaras*.

Focus groups and key informant interviews (KIs) with community members, *sérigne daaras*, *ndeyous daaras*, *talibés*, members of the Activity team, UNODC, Groupe Girafe, and municipality mayors in both GTFC and Medina provide elements of answers to this question. The question is divided into two parts which we answer separately below.

Findings

Findings for Evaluation Question Part 1:

In answering the question “how” the intervention changed the dialogue and views, the evaluation team first identifies features of the Activity’s design that have particularly contributed to changing the public dialogue on the issue of child begging. In the second half of our answer, we describe how the policy context changed during the course of the Activity.

Activity Features:

Based on desk research and interviews with stakeholders working in the area of reduction in abuses to *talibés*, there are four main categories of interventions in which actors in this field currently engage:

1. Community-based approaches: this involves working with community groups and leaders within civil society to raise awareness of issues of abuse toward *talibés*;
2. *Daara* modernization approaches: this includes all efforts to support the idea of minimum standards being set for *daara* operations, conditions and services;
3. Legal and policy approaches: this includes all issues around advocacy for and implementation of policies and legal systems to prevent and stop abuses against *talibés*; and
4. The provision of safe houses: this focuses on immediate emergency services and support to children and youth who are living under abusive situations.

This Activity espouses the first model listed above and has the particularity of programming through the Mayors' offices. Within this model, we find that the elements that explain how the Activity changes the dialogue and the views on the issue of *talibés* begging are:

- Mayors are responsible for their program and are provided direct grant funding to carry out their work;
- The establishment of dedicated, decentralized, Project Coordination Units (UCP) within the Mayors' offices to manage the funds and field work with community members;
- Mayors championing the combat against child begging;
- LCM enhanced UCP activities aimed at changing the public dialogue;
- The participatory mapping of the *daaras* at the onset of the Activity.

First, as key informant interviews with UNDOC, Save the Children and ChildFund have highlighted, intervening through the community level is a critical pathway to reducing child begging. One additional winning condition is the presence of continued political will to work through the issue and work with *daaras* to support improved regulation. Focus groups with community members stress the importance of having a good management team within the Mayors' offices. Key informant interviews with international and national NGOs note that the Activity is uniquely designed in such a way as to render Mayors responsible for their programs and that the direct grant mechanism allows them enough flexibility to engage the sensitive issue of *talibés* begging differentially with each constituency of community stakeholders. By directly funding these governments and establishing project coordination units (UCPs) within the offices of the mayors, the municipalities had ownership of results and responsibility for the funds.

Second, the Activity supported the set-up of the UCPs within the Mayors' offices. FGDs with community members in both municipalities highlight the value of this embedded model of UCPs: they are able to continuously engage the community and involve its members in activities. The evaluation team finds that the Activity, both through the interventions of the mayors and the UCPs, successfully engages the citizens of Medina and GTFC to reduce *talibés* street begging. Interviews with both mayors and UCP members show a high level of community engagement activities and outreach events as part of the Activity's approach.

The Activity also raised awareness among residents of both municipalities through a variety of communications activities and organizing existing stakeholders. Community meetings, *niches*, *causeries*, and marches were organized to spread awareness of the problem of forced child begging. The *ndeyous daaras*, or *daara* mothers' groups, were organized by the Activity team in both municipalities and

became formal associations. The *ndeyous daaras* play an important role in terms of communication with the *sérignes daaras*. They were well positioned to help the Activity team work with all stakeholders. UCP members and community leaders noted that out the array of community outreach activities provided by the Activity. The *niches*, or skits, as well as the *causeries*, or small group discussions appeared to be the most effective in raising public awareness and mobilizing community members. The skits were noted as low cost, simply paying for a group of traditional performers to perform skits around the issue of child trafficking and begging. The performances were then held in central locations, near markets and large open public areas which attracted people to watch and participate in the performances which were free to the public. The performances were entertaining while also raising awareness, and UCP members felt that they attracted many community members, teaching them about *talibés* protection and prevention of begging and abuse of *talibés*.

Causeries, or small group discussions, organized by the mayors' offices, with groups of 15-20 community leaders, were mentioned by both the UCP members and community leaders as highly effective in terms of raising awareness and building a critical mass of change agents in support of the Activity. These meetings cost very little as they were hosted by someone in the community and included a short presentation by a UCP member followed by a discussion about how to reduce child begging and approaches that would work in the context of the municipalities. These discussions went straight to community leaders and brought them into the Activity to develop solutions together. Often these *causeries* would result in additional meetings led by the community leaders to extend the discussion to other members of the community and to secure their commitment to support their efforts to reduce child begging. These efforts are important in terms of their effectiveness and are also low cost; we will highlight this point again in response to evaluation question 4.

UCP members also noted that it is important to understand the incentives and interests of various community members to understand how to engage with them and secure their support to the Activity. For example, the project coordinators in both municipalities noted that they realized early-on in their work that the merchants' associations in their municipalities were key allies in their efforts as the local merchants are often directly impacted by child begging when *talibés* shoplift in order to make their daily quota of money to bring back to their *sérigne daara*. Merchants associations will be a critical group to engage in any subsequent efforts within these two municipalities and also in any new municipalities. The merchants not only have a direct interest in supporting the Activity but also were a part of the community-based monitoring efforts to keep an eye out for *talibés* deposited in the streets of the municipalities from other municipalities.

Third, Mayors play a critical role in shaping the public dialogue on this issue in both municipalities. In Medina, the mayor was a strong advocate for the Activity, and the residents of Medina were already aligned in wanting to eliminate abuses against *talibés* due to the March 3, 2013 *daara* fire. The mayor was seen by both the public and even national and international stakeholders interviewed as a part of this evaluation as an outspoken advocate for the protection of the rights of *talibés*. This advocacy included his on-going dedication to reaching the community members and involving them heavily in all aspects of the Activity. For example, he started with field visits, consultations, meetings, and seminars to raise awareness among the different populations residing in Medina. He engaged imams, *badiénous gokh*⁹, *ndeyous daaras*, and neighborhood delegates. He approached these stakeholders to open up a dialogue before speaking with the *sérignes daaras*. In fact, the buy-in of the *ndeyous daaras* served to facilitate positive engagement with the *sérignes daaras*, municipal authorities, and the UCP early in the Activity. He made it clear to the community stakeholders that it is a bad example to see children and youth squatting and sleeping in the street.

⁹ Women in the community who provide health services.

Fourthly, focus groups with members of the UCPs reveal that the LCM engagement techniques allowed them to approach, with greater ease, key stakeholders who were resistant to change, such as the *sérignes daaras*. The LCM engagement techniques helped participants to raise awareness of the issue of *talibés* begging, increased inclusion in community efforts, and promoted change in the municipalities. The sessions were seen as extremely helpful by the participants from the two municipalities, but they all would have preferred to have more ongoing support from Groupe Girafe to help them in implementation of their work.

Fifth, overall, the evaluation team found that UCP staff and community members valued the *daara* mapping exercise at the outset of the Activity as a tool that allowed the mayor and community to gain a clear understanding of the environment in the *daaras* and the status of the *talibés* studying in them. This gave the mayor's offices a census of the number of *daaras* operating in their respective municipalities, an understanding of the size of the *daara*, whether the *daara* kept children over-night or were only open to children for day services, and the identification of *daaras* which require child begging. This mapping provided an entry point to a closer working relationship with the *sérignes daaras* and provided an important message that all activities, even religious activities in the municipalities will be open to review as well as support from the mayor's office and the larger community members within the municipality. This was an important mind set and approach to build as part of the mapping exercise and was seen by both the mayors and the UCP members as critical to the success of the Activity. In terms of important planning at the outset of the Activity, both mayor's offices noted that it is critical to take photos of the *daaras* prior to the start of any rehabilitation work. These photos taken at the beginning of the Activity can then be compared with the post rehabilitation photos to prove the actions and quality of the interventions to improving *daara* conditions and services for *talibés*. These photos are important for the public to see for themselves the rehabilitation and support provided by the mayor's offices which shows a clear improvement in the safety of the buildings and structures in which the *daaras* operate. The UCPs in both municipalities noted that this is a very low cost but critical tool for showing the public and community leaders, the type of improvement in the *daaras'* conditions.

Policy Environment Changes

The biggest change that occurred in Medina and GTFC was the passage of bylaws on child begging (see Annex 10: Municipal Bylaws). This changed the legal framework. In Medina, the bylaw is direct and severe in its language forbidding begging and specifically identifies it as an exploitation of children. It states that any *daara* operating within the jurisdiction of the municipality will be subject to inspection and approval by the municipality to ensure that it meets required standards for operation. It goes on to note that anyone going against this bylaw will be punished by law. The GTFC bylaw is more brief and somewhat contradictory in its language. It declares that begging is not allowed in the "main streets" of the commune but then adds that an exception is made during the day within the location of religious institutions (see Annex 11 for copies of both bylaws).

The Activity stimulated conversation in the communities about the *talibés* begging in the streets through awareness raising events and group discussion. In both municipalities, the push for legislating street begging at the municipal level originated with the citizens, and the Activity stimulated and harnessed this momentum for change as noted in the quotes immediately below.

Developing Policies to Address Child Begging in Medina and GTFC

"In Medina, it was the community that made the first move by expressing their desire to eliminate begging. The community was the first to advance the idea of completely eliminating begging in their municipality. The idea came to them during all the meetings throughout the duration of the Activity following the *niche* events. Then, the project team shared the wish of the populations with the mayor, who proposed waiting and continuing to work. His final decision would be based on the results that the Activity will have in

terms of community engagement. It was on the first anniversary of the fire in Medina in 2013, following a march to commemorate this tragic event, in the presence of the press, community actors (imams, *sérignes daaras*, *ndeyous daaras*, etc.), and international organizations that are active in the fight against street begging that the mayor announced the signature of the bylaw. Medina was the first to sign a bylaw.”

–Interview with Medina focal point, Ms. Fatou Binetou Diop

“In GTFC, the process of signing the bylaw was a product of working with the people. The different segments of the population were associated with the entirety of the work with the *ndeyous daaras*, the imams, the neighborhood delegates, the *sérignes daaras*, and the municipal councilors. The *sérignes daaras* were associated with the process, as were the populations because they are the ones who provide charity. Yet, it is necessary to say that the idea of signing a bylaw comes from the executive committee of the project coordination unit. The bylaw was discussed with the municipal councilors who then asked the mayor to think about the questions before making a decision. Following this a large *niche* was organized in the presence of the project coordination unit with the committee director, the executive committee and the steering committee and community actors and the mayor and his deputies, the municipal councilors. The components of the bylaw with its potential articles were discussed in addition to identifying its support measures.

–Interview with GTFC focal point, Mr. Moussa Ndoye

Community members in both municipalities were concerned about enforcing this set of policy directives. The primary concern for community members is what to do with children found begging and living in the streets. Many of these children are not attached to municipality-based *daaras* and have no homes. There are a range of ideas from involving the police to punishing the parents to punishing the *sérigne daara* to establishing “*maisons de l’aumône*” or safe houses for the children. Community members are also concerned about how to deal with children coming into their municipality from elsewhere. To address this, the mayors’ offices in Medina and GTFC created volunteer surveillance committees to prevent *talibés* from other areas coming to their municipality to beg. The committees operate with limited means and the individuals on them donate their time.

Findings for Evaluation Question Part II:

In answering the second part of the evaluation question on the evolution of the dialogue from the welfare of the *talibé* to the forced begging issue and identifying a critical pathway for attitudinal change, the evaluation team finds that the dialogue has evolved in the direction the Activity intended. This finding is supported by the following:

Community members: In general, the majority of community member focus group participants, in both Medina and GTFC, now see current child begging practices as a form of exploitation. This point of view is not ubiquitous, however, as a minority of community members still see begging as part of a child developing humility and therefore as important to his/her religious education. There are also some community members who are not certain that the children found begging in the street are *talibés* associated with *daaras*.

“We practiced begging to train *talibés* and reduce their arrogance, which was the objective of begging. Today, it’s just exploitation.”

–Community member, focus group participant

Community members in both Medina and GTFC are concerned with the quality and authenticity of *daaras*. A sense of nostalgia for the way *daaras* used to be run emerged within the community focus groups, as noted in the quote from a focus group participant above. The evaluation team similarly found that *daaras* which encourage or require children to beg are hurting the image of Islam in their communities. One focus

group participant stated, “before the *talibés* arrived in houses [*daaras*] of their own choosing and returned to their homes at the end of the day. If a *daara* was in need, the residents knew there was a problem, and they solved the problem. But today, with what is happening, we are tarnishing the reputation of Islam.”

Sérigne daaras: It is important to remember that not all *sérignes daara* forced their *talibés* to beg prior to the Activity. The *sérignes daaras* interviewed as part of this evaluation are not fundamentally opposed to *talibés* begging, but they hope to see it better regulated to prevent abuse. A Medina-based *sérigne daara* stated, “...begging, it is a good thing, but it must be regulated. Without regulation, it is exploitation.” The majority of *sérignes daaras* in GTFC did not require their *talibés* to beg and did not have them living full-time in their *daaras*. In Medina, begging is now outlawed and no Medina-based *daaras* had *talibés* that practiced begging. Their engagement in the Activity did not turn them against begging, but, rather, they want it to be regulated where it exists at all.

Ndeyous daaras: A focus group with *ndeyous daaras* in GTFC revealed that their approach to caring for *talibés* changed dramatically as a result of the Activity, “we stopped the practice of giving money to the children. All of our charity is now in the form of goods and foodstuffs.” They served as an important conduit for working with the *sérignes daaras* to ensure the welfare of the *talibés*. Another major outcome of the Activity was its success in federating the *ndeyous daaras*, or mothers’ associations, to form a strong association to combat child begging in the two municipalities.

Mayors: The mayors both signed bylaws into effect¹⁰, and it can be said that the Activity contributed to this happening. In Medina, public opinion was already moving in the direction of taking bold action against *talibés* begging as a result of the March 3, 2013 fire.

The evaluation team attempted to identify critical pathways to attitudinal change but the data set does not reveal much beyond the following two findings. Firstly, a visualization or a vivid sensitization of the *talibés* plight is required to spark a change in attitude on the part of the community members. Secondly, this spark needs to be acted upon swiftly by a credible champion who will legitimize the issue as in the case of the Medina Mayor. Dealing with the *sérigne daaras* poses a challenge: some may harbor a financial stake in the continued exploitation of the *talibés* and the champions – either UPC staff or even the Mayor in some instances – need to deliver personalized arguments to each *sérigne daara*.

Conclusions

This Activity comprises five design features that appear to be effective in changing the dialogue on the issue of *talibés* begging. The approach of working through the Mayors’ offices, notably through the setting-up of UPCs, was singularly effective in achieving this Activity outcome. Dedicating UPC staff and time to getting them trained up in LCM to better enter into a dialogue with more resistant stakeholders is a condition of success.

By facilitating a dialogue between the Mayors’ offices and community constituencies, the Activity may have contributed to the adoption of by-laws in March-April 2016. The community was exposed to, and engaged in, outreach events which contributed to generating support for the adoption of a bylaw forbidding begging (Medina) and one regulating begging (GTFC), and volunteer surveillance teams patrolling for begging.

¹⁰ In Medina, the adoption of the municipal by-law dates March 3rd, 2016 while the one in GTFC dates from April 25th, 2016.

Having a clear “burning platform” or problem definition shared among stakeholders is a requirement for spurring change in the dialogue about *talibés* begging. The population in Medina was already motivated to take action on the issue of *talibés* street begging at the launch of the Activity.

Prior to the Activity starting, community members in Medina were galvanized into action following the March 3, 2013 fire that killed nine *talibés* who were locked in their *daara* in Medina, without the presence of the *sérigne daara*. Seizing the public’s imagination with information compelling it into action is required to ensure the intervention takes hold.

The organization of the *ndeyous daaras* into recognized associations in each municipality should be viewed as a mechanism for success. This facilitates their ability to reach citizens with awareness raising activities which contributes to the public dialogue and views on well-being of the *talibés*. The importance

of organizing is a key lesson learned for the municipalities, and has led to the creation of a volunteer monitoring system in both Municipalities.

The LCM training, provided by Groupe Girafe through the UNODC grant, developed by this Activity contributes to changing attitudes at the level of those trained who then had the ability to engage their communities more effectively.

As noted in the findings, not all stakeholders support the elimination of begging by the end of the Activity. Notably, the *sérignes daaras*, especially in GTFC, support the regulation of begging rather than its elimination.

Question 2: Findings and Conclusions

Question 2: Has the Activity reduced begging in the two municipalities, and if so, to what extent?

The question regarding the reduction in begging by *talibés* is essentially looking at two different sets of interviewees and two different ways of measuring a reduction in begging.

The two groups interviewed during the evaluation are *talibés* at *daaras* within the two target municipalities and *talibés* found begging on the street in the two municipalities. To statistically control the issue of possible “spill-over” begging by *talibés* from neighboring municipalities in Medina or GTFC, the evaluation separately measures each group for reduction in begging. The two different ways of measuring a reduction of begging includes looking at the overall number of *talibés* who beg as well as the amount of time in a day they spend begging. Reductions in either are considered to be a reduction in begging.

The *talibés* affiliated with target commune-based *daaras* are asked if they beg and if they do, during which times they currently beg as compared to two years ago. The *talibés* found on the street are asked the same questions as well as if they are attached to a *daara*; where that *daara* was located and where the children originated.

A total of 215 *talibés* attached to *daaras* in the municipalities were interviewed. In Medina 113 were interviewed and in GTFC 102 were interviewed. Additionally, the evaluation team interviewed *talibés* found in the streets in both municipalities. A total of 64 *talibés* were interviewed in both municipalities; five were interviewed in Medina and 59 were interviewed in GTFC. Therefore, a total of 279 *talibés* found in both municipalities were interviewed over the course of the evaluation.

Findings

***Talibés* attached to commune-based *daaras*:**

When *talibés* attached to target commune-based *daaras* were asked the question “Do you beg?” 103 out of 279 (36.9%) *talibés* confirmed that they continue to beg.

Type of <i>talibés</i>	Number	Percentage
Begging	103	36.9%
Non Begging	176	63.1%
Total	279	100%

In Medina, of the 113 *talibés* interviewed in their respective *daaras*, none of them continued to practice begging and the *sérignes daaras* confirmed this fact (that begging is not practiced). The mayor of Medina commented on how the Activity played a role in helping to reduce begging. “With the Activity we were able to arrive now at zero *daaras* [that practice] begging. There are no longer [many] *daaras* and those that remain teach the Koran and that we can accept.” One of the actions taken by the mayor of Medina was to close three *daaras* that practice begging and return the *talibés* to their place of origin. The three *daaras* in Medina (Daara Saliou Mballo, Daara Abdou Sow and Daara Taysirou Anzir) were each paid 300,000 FCFA to help facilitate this closure and repatriation process. Of the 20 *sérignes daaras* met with over the course of the evaluation, only two admitted that begging is still practiced by their *talibés*. Both of these *daaras* are located in the GTFC municipality and the *talibés*, *sérigne daaras* and Activity coordinators who were interviewed confirmed this.

Originally the December 2014 baseline research or *daara* mapping, identified three *daaras* in GTFC as requiring begging at the start of the Activity. In GTFC, of these three *daaras*, one has left the municipality and the other two still continue to require begging. The one *daara* that left GTFC, could not find space to operate and went to another location outside of the municipality. According to the focal point for GTFC, due to safety concerns over the dilapidated state of the house, the local government worked with the civil protection service and the owner of the house to displace the *daara*.

“Yes, it is the civil protection service of the mayor’s office. We talked with them about it and they told us that they had seen this. And we very quietly went there because you know something the people...When they hear that the mayor is going to close a *daara* they can decide to protest. We went to see the owner...and tell him that the children’s living conditions are a problem...so the *sérigne daara* does not know that it was us that started this...and today we had this closure [of the *daara*].”

–Excerpt from interview with the GTFC focal point

Nonetheless, he notes that the closing of *daaras* that practice begging was not the intention of the Activity, commenting that they did not attempt to close *daaras* or totally eradicate the begging in the municipality, but rather focused on the goal of reducing the time spent begging by *talibés*.

“We didn’t have to negotiate the departure of whoever this was. It was not part of the program.”

–Excerpt from interview with the GTFC focal point

This is confirmed by the head of the *daara* that left, who commented that he left at the request of the property owner, who wished to make improvements to the house and not at the request of the local government.

“It is someone who rented me the house. You know, I was in a street corner and the mayor reclaimed the space. But before the mayor took it from me I rented the house that was across the street from this corner. It was still under construction...I stayed there for three years. When a person rents you a place for three years and then he tells you that he needs it you are not going to put up a fight, you are just going to leave. He told us that he needed the house because it needed new tiles.”

The two remaining *daaras* in GTFC continue to conduct child begging; this was confirmed in interviews with the two *sérignes daaras* as well as interviews with *talibés* in those *daaras*. A total of 46 *talibés* out of 54 total in those two *daaras* said they currently practice begging. Within these two *daaras*, there are only two *talibés* that indicated they had begged in the past and do not anymore. The reason given for stopping the begging by one *talibé* was that they aged out of the practice and are now in charge of looking after the younger kids who conduct begging.

In the GTFC *daaras* covered by the survey, when asked if the time spent at the *daara* changed when they started begging, 24 *talibés* said “yes” and 22 said “no”, of the 24 that said yes, six indicated the time had decreased and 18 said it had actually *increased*.

In terms of a change in hours or timing of begging, the 2014 baseline in GTFC did not measure hours of begging by *talibé*. The field research teams were required to ask *talibés* in the *daaras* to recall the hours they begged prior to the Activity and currently. Looking at the 46 *talibés* that currently beg in the two *daaras* located in GTFC, 29 of them answered the question regarding hours prior to the start of the Activity. The average number of hours spent begging was approximately 5.34 hours. All but one *talibé* said they begged every day, with the other one saying he did not beg on Sunday.

For the same 29 *talibés*, the current average amount of hours spent begging each day is 5.38. This indicated roughly the same amount of hours spent begging by the *talibés* that practice begging over the course of the Activity. The peaks of begging remained the same, with 7am and 2pm being the most common begging times (around breakfast time and lunch time).




FIGURE 1: PEAK BEGGING HOURS

One of the approaches used in GTFC to reduce the amount of time spent begging was to implement learning times for *talibés* that covered additional subjects such as French and math. The idea was to provide additional learning activities for the *talibés* in order to keep them occupied and unable to spend as much time begging. According to the focal point focal of GTFC, it was through French courses that the time spent begging was reduced by 50%.

« We hear that these children are here early in the afternoon, and that they do about 10 hours per day, but what are we going to do to keep these children off the streets for a certain amount of time? So, we

negotiated a daily agenda with the *sérignes daaras*. We told them that now...all the children under age 15 must go to school Monday afternoon. Instead of being in the street, they are going to school.

--Excerpt of interview with the GTFC focal point

At the same time, a *sérigne daara* involved in the Activity commented that their *talibés* do not beg during the afternoon, the time during which extra classes are scheduled. As seen in Figure 3, the survey data do not confirm this assertion as being true for all *daaras*. Our data shows that the attempt to use additional classes for learning French and math to reduce the amount of time spent begging fails as those classes are not timed in order to target peak begging periods.

Additionally, the Activity fails to incorporate a metric for this information into its baseline, instead collecting only names and ages of those that begged by *daara*, which makes a systematic look at hours spent begging not possible.

Talibés found begging on the street in the two municipalities:

The evaluation team conducted surveys with children found on the streets in the two municipalities who were begging. It is important to note that the evaluation took place in July just following the July 6 Presidential Decree against begging. The decree resulted in systematic collection of children found begging in the street to move them to holding areas. The potential for being stopped and removed from the streets by national government officials was an identified deterrent mentioned by children surveyed as part of this evaluation.

Overall, between the two municipalities, in terms of children found begging on the street, the evaluation team had a harder time encountering children begging on the streets in Medina. Only managing to find five children begging in the street in Medina as opposed to 59 children found begging in the streets of GTFC. Because the baseline does measure how many children were on the street begging at the start of the Activity, we cannot say if five constitutes a reduction for Medina compared to before, but it is clearly far less than the 59 found in GTFC. This could be due to a number of reasons, including Activity interventions, but also concurrent efforts, such as the presidential initiative that was the reason given for ceasing to beg by the seven *talibés* interviewed in Sahm, a neighborhood of GTFC.

The difference could also be due to the difference in language used by the bylaws produced in each municipality. The Medina bylaw is direct and severe in its language while the GTFC bylaw is contradictory. While declaring begging forbidden in the commune it also states that an exception is made during the day within the location of religious institutions, which can easily be seen as an overruling of the ban for any *daara* in the municipality.

In conducting research on the streets of both municipalities, the evaluation team found it much easier to find children begging in the streets of GTFC than in Medina. There could have been a reduction in one or both locations, but it is not possible to tell because of the absence of such data in the baseline. Regardless, the evaluation team notes it was easy to find the 59 *talibés* that were interviewed in GTFC and 44% of those were local to the community.

This research with *talibés* found on the street was conducted over a one-week period with two teams of surveyors; one team dispatched to each municipality simultaneously. Additionally, of the five children found on the street begging in Medina, none originated from Medina or were associated with *daaras* in Medina, but came from *daaras* in neighboring municipalities including GTFC.

“Us, our children don’t beg in the afternoon, no, no, they don’t beg during these hours. Me, my children and the children of *daara* of Ibrahima, they don’t beg in the afternoon. They leave here around 7 or 8 in the morning and return at 10 am to learn the Koran...They leave again to get lunch...then at 3 pm they

learn the Koran until 5 pm...Then they play until 7 pm....It is for this reason that the French courses were important because if they don't have them all they do is play.”

–Excerpt of the interview with Sérigne Daara Aliou Kande (former daara of GTFC)

Of the 64 children encountered begging in the street, many came from other communities, but the largest number, 44%, came from GTFC followed by 41% from the commune of Grand Dakar. None of the *talibés* interviewed in the street came from Medina. Fifty-seven of the 64 *talibés* interviewed on the street said they beg; with the seven *talibés* encountered in Sahm, an area of GTFC, saying they did not. When asked if they had begged previously, they all said yes, and when asked why they stopped, all seven said they feared being picked up as part of the presidential initiative. Of the five children found begging on the street in Medina, two came from *daaras* in GTFC and three came from Guédiawaye in the suburbs of Dakar.




FIGURE 2: DAARA ORIGIN OF STREET TALIBÉS

FGDs conducted with community leaders in Medina showed that their feeling was that begging originating from their community had been reduced and that their primary concern was over the begging done by children who they perceive to come from outside of the municipality and how to stop that.

The average number of hours a *talibé* interviewed in the street practiced begging was much higher, 6.08 hours per day than *talibés* interviewed at their *daara*, 5.38 hours per day.

Of the 57 found on the street that said they practiced begging, 21 came from *daaras* within GTFC.

Average number of hours spent begging	
Before Activity (<i>daara</i> GTFC)	5.34
Currently (<i>daara</i> GTFC)	5.38
Currently (street/GTFC)	5.71
Currently (street/ all)	6.09

Medina managed to close the three *daaras* that practiced begging, using Activity funds to repatriate the *talibés* to their place of origin. This is strong evidence that the Activity helped enable the municipality to reduce begging originating from Medina *daaras* to zero.

In GTFC, one of the three *daaras* that practiced begging was closed due to a lack of space to operate.

As was seen in quotes from the focal point in GTFC and the *sérigne daara* that moved, this was not an intended measure taken under the auspices of the Activity, but came about due to the owner of the house asking for his property back. According to the GTFC Activity focal point, the town hall played a part, since the focal point said they collaborated with the owner of the house. However, the focal point made clear in his interview that any intervention focused on a reduction in time spent begging rather than the elimination of *daaras* that conduct begging. Therefore, it would be difficult to consider the closing of this one *daara* as a direct result of the Activity.

Conclusions

As this is a performance evaluation and not an impact evaluation, it is not possible to attribute causality of any reduction to the Activity, however the evaluation attempts to draw out any evidence that would support the idea that the Activity contributed to achieving its goals. While the evaluation found a decrease in the number of *talibés* that beg in both municipalities, only in Medina is there any evidence that it could be linked to the Activity.

The target for reduction of begging for *talibés* based in Medina is achieved, with no *talibés* that beg originating from *daaras* in Medina. The five *talibés* found begging in the streets of Medina are from other municipalities. The total reduction therefore is 100% for the municipality of Medina.

However, in GTFC, a reduction in the amount of hours spent begging in GTFC-based *daaras* could not be identified through this evaluation. The average number of hours that *talibés* begged was found to be roughly the same as before the Activity. With regards to the Activity objective of reducing begging in the streets of the community, there is clear evidence that Medina has less of an issue than GTFC. GTFC has not had as much success deterring *talibés* from other communities from begging in the streets.

Question 3: Findings and Conclusions

Question 3: Has the Activity been successful in achieving community buy-in? If so, has this been a helpful approach for changing attitudes toward child-begging and abuses of children in some *daaras*?

Findings

A facilitator of the Medina UCP confirmed community buy-in through many communications and awareness raising activities implemented with the Activity's support and seeing *ndeyous daaras* and other community services engaged for advocacy.

In GTFC, the strong collaboration between the municipality and the *ndeyous daaras* was highlighted in a focus group, "We [*ndeyous daaras*] met in the offices of the mayor...they integrated us in the Activity and we worked with Moussa Ndoeye [the UCP coordinator] and his partners." In addition, the engagement with the *ndeyous daaras* pushed the UCP to undertake community initiatives, "we organized events and invited the imams, populations, resource people, and shared and reflected about *daaras*."

Interviews with both mayors show a large community involvement in implementing the Activity. The two municipalities, in collaboration with the UCP, lead events within communities through awareness raising, small discussion groups with community leaders, public marches and public events including theatrical groups and music centered on themes of *talibés* and child protection.



Figure 3: A public skit, called a niche, on *talibé* street begging in Gueule-Tapée¹¹



Figure 4: Figure 3. A “*Journée du talibé*” was organized on the Day of the African Child on June 16, 2015. Medina and GTFC co-organized a march against the poor treatment of *talibés* in their municipalities.¹²

While the communities are clearly engaged and buy into the Activity, there are mixed findings related to changing attitudes toward child-begging and abuses of children in some *daaras*. The communities are generally supportive of the Activity, but the *sérignes daaras* present a more complicated perspective. FGDs in both municipalities found that the strong engagement of communities and awareness raising activities with the *sérignes daaras* did not change their perception of begging. While the majority of the

¹¹ Source: Rapport Annuel d'Activités Octobre 2015, Projet de Lutte Contre La Traite et la Maltraitance des Enfants

¹² Source: Année 2: Premier Rapport Semestriel, 1 Janvier – 30 Juin 2015, Projet de Lutte Contre La Traite et la Maltraitance des Enfants.

sérignes daaras in the two municipalities do not use *talibé* begging as a means to solicit funds, they are not systematically opposed to *talibés'* begging although they see the potential for abuse of *talibés* begging. They still see begging as an act that builds humility in children. The majority of *sérignes daaras* across both municipalities feel that the critical element in reducing abuse around begging is improved regulation of *daaras*. This would require oversight and inspection by local government officials to verify that conditions and services are adequate.

An added challenge in working with this critical group was that the *sérignes daaras'* expectations of what they would receive directly from the Activity, were not met. This is especially true in Medina where financial records indicate that only two of the 29 *daaras* involved in the Activity received support for reconstruction and improvements to the *daara*.

The picture in GTFC is, however, quite different. FGDs with *sérignes daaras* in this municipality reveal that all but one *daara* received support from the Activity to provide improved learning conditions, clothes, medical treatment, and French lessons for the *talibés*, and all *daaras* involved in the Activity received financial support to improve their learning environment. The majority of *sérignes daaras* from GTFC expressed an interest in having funds given directly to them for refurbishment and maintenance of the *daara* as well as to cover their salaries. Only a minority of *sérignes daaras* from GTFC agreed with and understood the practice of the mayor's office paying vendors directly for refurbishment and support services for the *talibés*. This minority did however ask for salary compensation to be paid to them directly by the mayor's office.

"We did not come to see you, rather it was you [the activity team] that came to us to ask us what we wanted. We told you what we wanted, but until now nothing at all has been received since this project has been here."

-Excerpt from FGD with the *Serignes daaras* of Medina

Conclusions

FGDs with community members from each municipality confirm that the majority of participants feel that the Activity effectively secured community buy-in to the activities and appreciate the outreach done by the Mayors' offices. The communities of Medina and GTFC are clearly engaged and feel ownership of the Activity. The mayors took what they saw as the necessary steps and amount of time to work in close collaboration with community groups. This results in the majority of the community buying in to the Activity. Importantly, residents feel like they are consistently engaged throughout the Activity because the mayors' offices lead continuous and repeated awareness raising and mobilization activities among the community. This results in an inclusive approach that engages *ndeyous daaras*, imams, *badiénous gokh*, neighborhood associations and leaders in changing attitudes and organizing volunteer groups to combat *talibés* begging.

Despite the wide range of community members working in support of the Activity, the majority of *sérignes daaras* still support the idea of begging -- as a humility-building part of Koranic education -- but accept that, in principle, it should be regulated. In addition, the *sérignes daaras'* feelings of disappointment and frustration around perceived un-met expectations suggest that there were no clear guidelines given to them about engagement and, in particular, about direct financing. This issue of addressing how to constructively work with *sérignes daaras* on the opportunity of *daara* modernization, regulation and support to *talibés* is common and one which all stakeholders working in this field are struggling with.

This performance evaluation cannot conclude unequivocally that "attitudes changed" without baseline data on attitudes in GTFC and Medina. Certainly, the vivid memory of the *daara* fire in Medina provides a compelling call to social mobilization; rarely do such tragic events happen but providing a "burning

platform” or shared understanding of a problem – talibé begging – is an essential first step in spurring buy-in for change.

Question 4: Findings and Conclusions

Question 4: Are there scalable activities from within the current approach that can be adopted in other municipalities or and/or at the national level? If so, what are the critical assumptions for this approach to work in other municipalities?

Findings

The first part of this question was answered using MSI’s scalability checklist, which includes seven characteristics to examine in order to determine scalability: credibility of the model; public observability of the model; relevance; advantage of the model over current systems and other approaches; ease of transfer in terms of human and financial resources; scientific proof of model effectiveness and; sustainable financing.

The evaluation team did not apply this checklist in its entirety but focused on identifying low cost / high impact interventions and low cost / low resource aspects that are sustainable transferable to other municipalities or national and international actors.

Our findings focus on the aspects of visibility (dimension 2 – observability) public perception of seeing change and low cost (affordability – dimension 7) aspects that are also easily transferable (dimension 5 – adoptability).

In answering evaluation question 1, we identified a number of Activity design features that could be replicated in other municipalities. These are:

1. Mayors are responsible for their program and are provided direct grant funding to carry out their work;
2. The establishment of dedicated, decentralized UCPs within the Mayors’ offices to manage the funds and field work with community members;
3. Mayors in championing the combat against child begging;
4. LCM enhanced UCP activities aimed at changing the public dialogue;
5. The participatory mapping of the *daaras* at the onset of the Activity.

In addition to these features, our data indicated that associations can be formalized into more influential spokespersons for the cause of reducing abuse against the *talibés*. The specific activities that are successful in Medina and GTFC are rooted in the context of these municipalities and are led by the residents of these municipalities. Given this, it would not be expected that a *niche* would draw on the same shared history and experiences in another municipality to teach citizens about child begging as it did in Medina.

For this approach to work in other municipalities, it is critical that the mayors have the political will and independence to tackle child street begging. If the mayor does not have the political will, then this type of approach, one that enters the community through the mayor’s office, will not resonate with the community.

The mayor of Medina is a well-known figure who is personally committed to the issue of reduction in child begging and is an outspoken advocate in the area. He has become, for many working on the issue of child begging in Senegal, a national advocate on the issue.

In terms of scaling up the Activity to other municipalities, there are critical issues that need to be reviewed prior to entering additional municipalities. The first is understanding the political will and sincerity of mayors to effectively address the issue of child begging. The second is to ensure that there is a strong team support the Activity's interventions and the third is to understand the incentives of various community stakeholders as well as their perceptions of child begging. KIs with international NGOs working in the area of *talibé* street begging reduction reveal a perceived risk in the Activity's approach of working directly with mayor's offices. All NGOs working on this issue note that not all mayors have the personal interest and political will to advocate for a reduction in child begging within their municipalities as it is a highly sensitive and very personal subject, which is challenging to broach on a public level.

Conclusions

It is critical to develop an approach that views and portrays the *daaras* in the municipality as part of the community. As such, community members have the right to examine the conditions of the *daaras* and the children who attend. This aligns with and supports the national movement toward *daara* regulation and "modernization". This Activity's approach is hyper-local, and therefore, only high-level strategy elements could be uprooted to other locales where they would evolve into similar, yet different activities if there is a capital of political will to have an effective champion (Mayor) for the cause that will make use of the UCPs.

Political will must be examined in other Dakar municipalities to make sure that mayors are willing to take a stand which may not be popular among the community and, in particular, among the *sérignes daaras*. The mayor has to be sincere and active in his/her outreach to civil society and community leaders to make them feel fully vested and engaged in the Activity. In addition, the mayors' offices must have the personnel and resources to effectively manage community outreach activities in order to ensure full community buy-in and participation.

Question 5: Findings and Conclusions

Question 5: Did this approach add value to the discourse and/or practices within the larger community of actors working to reduce child begging?

The currently identified actors working in Senegal in each of these areas are listed in Annex 8: Senegal Reduction in Begging Projects and Approaches. It should be noted that this is an active area of intervention with a large number of players and is continually growing. At a September 2016 workshop in Dakar, hosted by Anti-Slavery International with many of these same actors, a gap was identified in this sector in terms of the support to tracking and prosecution of *talibés* abuse cases.

Findings

The majority of stakeholders interviewed as part of this evaluation felt that the Activity's approach was similar to other community-based approaches working with *daaras* to improve conditions for children and adds value to the discourse and practices in five areas:

First, the Activity has one unique characteristic that could have the potential of changing programming practice: it is designed to enter into the community through the mayors' offices, providing direct funding to the mayor and direct management of the Activity by the mayor's offices. This unique approach is a critical pathway. However, all international stakeholders interviewed note that in order for this approach to succeed, it must be certain that the mayor has the political will to follow through on the issue of child begging and working with *daaras* to support improved regulation. That will is a unique advantage among national state actors, international NGOs, and multilateral institutions interviewed.

Secondly, both multilateral and bilateral donors typically work at the national level with GOS officials within the *Daara* inspectorate, the child protection services and the CNLTP to address *talibés* abuse issues. When interviewed as a part of the evaluation, all national-level GOS actors at the national level feel that they have had very little involvement in the Activity. However, they also recognize that the community-based approach to addressing the reduction of child begging provides the most immediate and tangible results. While working through a mayor's office is unique, it is also challenging to ensure consistent communication and engagement from the national level with the Activity. There is also a question as to the role of national level actors in working on locally-based initiatives. This Activity can be seen as part of an effort by USAID to support decentralization efforts and to work directly in providing assistance to local authorities. For this reason, it is understandable that the national-level actors do not feel as "engaged" and aware of the Activity's interventions. This project adds value to the donors' discourse, and the GOS', that community-based action supports national government decentralization efforts and are effective in changing the situation.

Thirdly, the Activity has surfaced a widely shared concern among international and national NGOs working to reduce child begging that there is a lack of clarity in terms of the actual role of the national government as to what services it provides to support reduction in child begging and what types of resources can be accessed by community based activities to create improved effectiveness of local efforts.

Fourthly, the Activity adds value to the discourse and, potentially, to the practice by NGOs working in this area and the community members in the two municipalities raise one large concern: the lack of clarity to address forced begging cases, either through legal channels to prosecute or through formal support services for the victims of trafficking. Community members in both Medina and GTFC note that one of their largest frustrations is knowing what to do with children found begging in their municipality who are not affiliated with *daaras* within the community but have been bused in to the municipality from other areas in and around Dakar. There is a sense of helplessness related to the lack of support services for these children in terms of where they can go to receive help. International NGOs who often use the community-based approaches raise a similar concern over a lack of legal and prosecuting capacity to pursue any type of cases against people who move these children to other areas in order to generate revenue for themselves. This theme was also identified at the September workshop hosted by Anti-Slavery International in which the gap in support for the prosecution of forced begging/trafficking cases was highlighted.

Lastly, national and international NGOs and the UNODC view the bylaw outlawing begging, created in Medina, as a unique result of the Activity that can be used as a model for other municipalities. While national laws exist, very little is done at the national level to enforce the law. International NGOs, UNODC and USAID see the creating of a bylaw, at the municipality level, which is then the responsibility of the municipality to enforce as a unique and strong statement of the behalf of the local authorities.

Conclusions

The fact that the Activity worked through the mayors' offices frequently came up in FGDs and KIs. This unique entry point has added to the discourse and practice of actors working to reduce child begging. Typically, community-based approaches focus on galvanizing public support, through community associations and traditional leaders to support the idea of reduction in child begging. A second step in that process is to then approach local authorities to advocate for their support in the reduction of child begging. This Activity, while community-based as well, reverses the approach to work directly through local authorities, in this case mayors, to build public awareness around the need to reduce child begging. As mentioned earlier, it is a unique approach and one that could work well in coordinating with international NGOs working in targeted communities on this same issue.

While the national government continues to work on its approach to reduce child begging, a community-based approach is currently the most effective and immediate way to address the issue. It can also be concluded that it is challenging to maintain regular involvement of national actors in a community-based Activity. This may be due to a lack of clarity in the roles and responsibilities of national and municipality actors in support of improving the situation with *talibés*. There are a broad range of actors working at the national or local level to adequately address cases of human trafficking/child begging.

While community-based approaches, *daara* modernization, legal and policy reforms, and the provision of safe houses are helpful, the persistent gap in how to enforce existing laws remains.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations are based on the findings and conclusions to the five evaluation questions, and they are organized by their intended audience.

To both local governments:

1. Continue to support structures put in place such as the UCP and the *ndeyous daaras* to ensure their sustainability.
3. Fully utilize and incorporate the surveillance brigades and monitoring committees by directing them to focus their efforts on the peak begging hours that closely align with meal periods. Institute clear channels of communication on who should be notified and what should be done should *talibés* from inside or outside the municipality be found begging.
4. Support the process of formalizing the citizen watch committees to ensure they are operational and sustainable.
5. Organize the *sérignes daaras* in a functional collective recognized by each municipality in order to better engage them in the Activity's approach and to encourage their ownership of the fight against street begging.
6. Create a line item in municipal budgets to support community awareness programs.
7. Mayors' offices need to communicate clearly and consistently to *sérignes daaras* that direct financial remunerations to the *sérignes daaras* are not included in the Activity. Only support to improve services and conditions will be paid for by the mayors' offices directly to vendors.
8. Organize community forums with the *ndeyous daaras*, *sérignes daaras*, imams, those interested with an aim to exchange Activity results and to reveal challenges on the question of street begging.
9. Continue with leadership training and ensure adequate time for coaching and mentoring from the leadership facilitators to provide on-going support to the UCP members.
10. Work closely with USAID to focus future efforts on advocating for improved local response systems to support *talibés*, particularly those found in the municipality but not attached to a local *daara*. Local systems should focus on both discouraging begging and social service support for the children themselves. This can include a budget line item to support child protective services and safe houses.

To GTFC Municipality:

1. Continue to seek community-based approaches to providing direct support and care for *talibés*, with a focus on *talibés* that live in GTFC based *daaras* and are forced to beg.
2. Strengthen the by-law language to eradicate child begging in all parts of the commune.

To USAID:

1. For future interventions with municipalities, allocate adequate funds and technical personnel to conduct a valid baseline and midline research exercise to support the long-term measurement in the reduction of begging and the state of begging in the streets, especially the amount that originates from outside the municipality.
2. Ensure that future leadership change management training is adequately funded to include more follow-up coaching and mentoring. This training should also incorporate communications to equip actors, especially facilitators, charged with rolling out community awareness raising activities.
3. Before entering into other municipalities, conduct a stakeholder analysis among the community in other municipalities in order to assess various community members' readiness and incentives that would support effective Activity implementation. Look at community leaders across a range of sectors who could either make the Activity succeed or undermine it. This would focus on incentives and interests of the various key stakeholders: *sérignes daaras*, business associations, *ndeyous daaras*, mayor, community leaders, religious leaders, police, community health workers, etc.
4. Ensure that the Action Plan developed in each commune effectively uses the data from the baseline research to customize targeted interventions to the two categories of *daaras* – those that have *talibés* sleep within the daara and force begging and those that do not force begging and children return home after lessons
5. Consider a program of twinning the mayors of Medina and GTFC with new municipalities and to coordinate on cross-border control of begging.
6. Replicate and focus on the *causeries* with community leaders as an effective and low cost way to incorporate and strategize with community leaders on sustainable approaches to eradicating child begging in their municipalities.
7. In selecting other municipalities, review the NGO support work being done with *daaras* to support improvements in their conditions in order to join forces in working together.
8. Consider working with *sérignes daaras* who are advocates for change and do not use child begging as part of their work. These *sérignes daaras* can be seen as not only advocates but also change agents for other municipalities.
9. Leadership in the two mayors' offices, particularly Medina, should be used to advocate with other mayors' offices for similar bylaws to be created at the municipal level.
10. The approach of entering at a community level through the mayor's office should be used in other municipalities in Dakar, taking into account recommendations on improved management around expectations of *sérignes daaras*.
11. Advocate at the national level to use lessons learned from this Activity and the approach of working at the municipal level as a potential model to be used in other municipalities.
12. Work with national-level actors to clarify any advocacy and service support they can provide to a commune-level effort. Clarity on roles should be outlined in future efforts with municipalities.

13. Work with national government actors to explore national campaigns targeting sending areas of the country (Kolda, Seydiou) to make parents aware of the conditions for their children in *daaras*.
14. Support and frame the process for creating and running a “*Maison de l’aumône*”, including its ownership by the community.

To the GOS:

1. Establish and support a multi-actor platform that is focused specifically on the eradication of child begging with a short-, medium-, and long-term action plan. The current cross-sectoral commissions (CNLTP and CAPE) are focused on a broad range of issues, one of which is child begging. A multi-actor platform specifically focused on the goal of eradicating child begging should harness multiple actors with a targeted focus on the issue.
2. Support local government to work effectively with *sérignes daaras* in understanding the national-level efforts to regulate *daaras* and reduce abuses against *talibés*.

ANNEX I: CADRE DE L'EVALUATION



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

'REDUCE ABUSES AGAINST TALIBÉS IN DAKAR' PERFORMANCE EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

MAY 25, 2016

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Management Systems International, a Tetra Tech Company, for the USAID/Senegal Mission-Wide Monitoring and Evaluation Project.

‘REDUCE ABUSES AGAINST TALIBÉS IN DAKAR’ PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

STATEMENT OF WORK

Contracted under AID-685-C-15-00003

USAID Senegal Monitoring and Evaluation Project

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ACRONYMS

AOR	Agreement Officer's Representative
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
CTIP	Counter-Trafficking in Persons
DRG	Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (USAID)
GDO	General Development Office (USAID)
GOS	Government of Senegal
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEP	Monitoring and Evaluation Project
PRM	Population, Refugees and Migration (Department of State)
SOW	Statement of Work
TIP	Trafficking in Persons
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

I. STATEMENT OF WORK DETAIL

USAID SOW Manager	Aliou Kebé, AOR, DRG
Activity COR/AOR	Aliou Kebé, AOR, DRG
MEP SOW Manager	Moussa Sy, Senior Evaluation Specialist
Activity Title	Reduce Abuses Against <i>Talibés</i> in Dakar
Activity Period	November 1, 2013-May 1, 2020
Award/Contract #	AID-685-IO-13-00002
Funding	\$500,000
Implementing Organization	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
Geographic Coverage	Dakar
Task	Final Performance Evaluation
Task Start and End Dates	May 30-August 5, 2016

2. ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

The overall USAID budget is \$500,000 funding from USAID/Washington for anti-Trafficking in Persons (TIP) activities and is a part of USAID/Senegal's democracy and governance and education portfolios. This Activity is designed to interlink with a concurrent \$200,000 anti-TIP Activity in two Dakar municipalities associated with the greatest number of *talibés* and forced begging in Senegal. The two selected municipalities received direct funding from USAID/Senegal to address TIP. Community and government members from the two selected municipalities also participated in this program.

The goal of this program is to reduce the problem of human trafficking, particularly the trafficking of vulnerable children under conditions of forced labor, by building the capacity in the Government of Senegal (GOS) to sustainably and effectively respond to this problem. This Activity is meant to complement the efforts already underway by the GOS, such the formation of a national task force and a national action plan to combat TIP by providing specific training and mentorship to key officials in relevant agencies necessary to combat trafficking in persons so they can better implement and manage activities in their areas of responsibility. Because this Activity will support and build momentum for Senegal's activities to combat trafficking in persons, it is expected to contribute positively to Senegal's TIP ranking issued by the State Department. The second goal of this program is to build additional capacity of a local organization to utilize the leadership management change approach to effect change on difficult-to-address issues like TIP.

For the purpose of this SOW, the following definitions, as used in the activity, apply:

- *Trafficking in persons* is the illegal trade of human beings for the purposes of reproductive slavery, commercial sexual exploitation, forced labor (such as begging), or a modern-day form of slavery. The United Nations adopted the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (also referred to as the Trafficking Protocol) in Palermo, Italy, in 2000; it is an international legal agreement attached to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The Trafficking Protocol is one of three protocols adopted to supplement the convention.
- *Talibé*: A talib or talibé is a student who may study in a madrasah or with a religious teacher. In Senegal, many street children are nominally *talibés*. *Talibés* traditionally live with a marabout, helping him with labor in exchange for their religious education.

- *Talibé Abuses* that are most commonly documented in Senegal include: forced begging on the streets, violations of the rights to food, physical development, and health, sexual abuse, denying contact with family, and denying the right to play or adequate shelter (housing and sleeping conditions).
- *Daara*: A non-formal, religious education institution in Senegal.
- *Child Trafficking*: The United Nations Trafficking in Persons Protocol (Trafficking Protocol), Article 3, states: (c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons”.
- *National Actors* are individuals who are directly or indirectly a member of the Senegal National Task Force Combatting TIP. The GOS, USAID/Senegal, and other partners in combatting TIP have recognized them as individuals who are interested in addressing the TIP problem and have the potential to influence real and systemic change in their agency that positively impacts human trafficking in Senegal. This includes members of civil society organizations and members of the ministries of Education, Family and Interior (including police) and members of social service agencies and religious institutions.
- *Local Actors* refers to individuals who work in municipalities that receive direct funding from USAID/Senegal to combat TIP and have been identified as critical partners in better understanding, preventing and prosecuting TIP cases in their coverage area. This can include local police, local legal officials, local representatives of the ministries, school officials and religious leaders.
- *Change Plans* are individual guidance documents that provide relevant and tangible tasks for participants to positively impact human trafficking in their coverage areas. The emphasis on “change” (as opposed to “action”) emphasizes the importance of choosing activities that will have measurable and sustaining impacts on human trafficking in Senegal.

3. DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS AND IMPLEMENTATION

As noted, the activity’s goal is to strengthen the capacity of the National Task Force, with local actors from two municipalities in Dakar addressing child trafficking in their coverage areas. The activity is based on a theory of leadership change management to ensure maximum ownership and sustainability. This approach, which focuses on both change management and leadership development, is useful because it empowers key actors by providing them with the necessary technical and political support needed to successfully implement change. The GOS has already identified *who* needs to be part of the solution to the problem of child trafficking abuses; however, the relevant actors thus far have been unsuccessful at mobilizing and implementing interventions. The leadership change management training process is an opportunity to provide Task Force members training, networking, and follow-up encouragement focused around individual change plans geared toward each participant’s planned contribution to address TIP in Senegal.

The activity has three objectives, outlined in the table that follows.

Objective	Activity
Prevention. Discourage abuse and trafficking of children	-Map existing local trafficking projects -Develop a stakeholder directory

Objective	Activity
Protection. Reduce the number of marginalized children on the streets of Dakar	-Develop and support local government action plans -Develop systems at the community level to support vulnerable children and linkages with GOS shelters (as required) -Create a child protection referral network or enhance an existing network (e.g., if a child ends up at a police station/shelter and needs referral to a doctor or therapist, a referral network would facilitate this)
Protection/Punishment. Strengthen civil society–government linkages and system for protecting children and arresting and prosecuting offenders	-Provide leader management change support to TIP Task Force -Strengthen information-sharing structures/ coordination structures to identify and remove bottlenecks

4. EXISTING PERFORMANCE INFORMATION SOURCES

For this evaluation, several sources of information were consulted when designing the evaluation with the Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) team. These resources will be consulted again when the evaluation team develops its tools, creates a detailed work plan, analyzes data, and writes the technical report.

The performance information sources identified are listed in the following table:

N°	Type/ Document title	Date
01	UNODC-Grant No.AID-685-IO-13-00002	November 1 st , 2013
02	Modification of Assistance	November 1 ^{er} , 2013
03	Memorandum of Agreement to reduce abuses against <i>talibés</i> in the municipality of Medina	January 28, 2014
04	Memorandum of Agreement to reduce abuses against <i>talibés</i> in the municipality of Gueule Tapée-Fass-Colobane	January 28, 2014
05	Document de référence sur la mendicité dans la commune de Medina	July 2015
06	Annual Progress report SENZ20-Renforcer la lutte contre la traite des personnes au Sénégal à travers une approche basée sur le changement de comportement positif et le leadership	January à December 2015

N°	Type/ Document title	Date
07	Plan d'action municipal Medina	2014
08	Plan d'action de la maltraitance des enfants Gueule Tapée-Fass-Colobane	2014
09	Rapport d'activités- Projet de lutte contre la traite et la maltraitance des enfants USAID / municipalité de Gueule Tapée –Fass –Colobane	January 1 st – September 30, 2014
10	Projet de lutte contre la mendicité des enfants USAID/municipalité de Medina année I : Deuxième rapport semestriel	July 1 st - 31 December 2014
11	Projet de lutte contre la mendicité des enfants USAID/municipalité de Medina année I : Premier rapport semestriel	January 1 st – June 30, 2015
12	Projet de lutte contre la traite et la maltraitance des enfants USAID / municipalité de Gueule Tapée –Fass –Colobane : Rapport annuel d'activités	October 2015
13	Programme de renforcement des capacités pour les bénéficiaires du projet sur le leadership et le changement de comportement positif (SENZ20): Rapport 1 ^{ère} session	October 2014
14	Programme de renforcement des capacités pour les bénéficiaires du projet sur le leadership et le changement de comportement positif (SENZ20): Rapport 2 ^{ème} session	December 2014
15	USAID/SENEGAL Program description Building capacity to reduce trafficking in persons (TIP)	August 12, 2011

5. TASK PURPOSE, AUDIENCE AND INTENDED USES

This evaluation is being conducted to provide insight to the DRG team on lessons learned and best practices in combatting child begging in Senegal. The results of this evaluation will support future design of counter-trafficking and begging-reduction programs. In addition to USAID/Senegal's interest in this evaluation, other stakeholders, particularly the National Counter-Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) Task Force (*Cellule Nationale de lutte contre la traite des personnes*) put in place by the Government of Senegal (GOS) will also serve as a key stakeholder for the development and results of this evaluation. The Child Protection Task Force (*Cellule d'Appui à la protection de l'enfant*) within the Office of the President is also interested in the results of this evaluation and will be invited to participate in the evaluation as well as the presentation of findings at the completion of field work. It is hoped that this evaluation will involve a broad range of stakeholders and NGOs working in the area of child begging reduction.

6. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

- How has the intervention changed the public dialogue (in the two communes) and views on the talibé begging issue? Did that dialogue evolve from the welfare of the talibé to the forced begging

issue? Is that a critical pathway for attitudinal change? This includes the perceptions of the various groups involved: marabouts, commune leaders, *responsables de daraas*, *talibés*, public school directors, and mothers' association of daraas.

4. Has the activity reduced begging in the two communes, and if so, to what extent?
5. Has the activity been successful in achieving community buy-in? If so, has this been a helpful approach for changing attitudes toward child-begging and abuses of children in some *daaras*?
6. Are there scalable activities from within the current approach that can be adopted in other communes or and/or at the national level? If so, what are the critical assumptions for this approach to work in other communes?
7. Did this approach add value to the discourse and/or practices within the larger community of actors working to reduce child begging?

7. GENDER DISAGGREGATION AND GENDER DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS

This evaluation will examine the number, status and role of girls in *daraas*. A false perception exists that girls in *daraas* are not allowed to beg on the streets. Their role, as defined by their gender, will be examined in terms of the situation of the girls, their access to education and their treatment. The level of power and control over *talibé* issues by women's groups that come together to provide support and services for *talibés* will also be examined.

8. APPROACH

Design

The main source of data for this final performance evaluation will be derived from the main stakeholders in the project, primarily direct beneficiaries and community members within the two target communes of Medina and Gueule Tapée-Fass-Colobane. Target respondents will include commune leaders, activity coordination units, heads of *daraas*, traditional leaders, child guidance centers community group and *talibés* themselves.

The evaluation team will measure the program's outcomes through a review of program documentation and interviews with USAID, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the beneficiaries.

This statement of work requires that the evaluation team develop and submit for approval a work plan with proposed methodology within the first seven days of the evaluation schedule. The following should be included in the team's methodology:

- Completion of a document review prior to the launch of a team planning meeting (TPM);
- The evaluation team will employ at least three data collection methods to address each of the identified evaluation questions to triangulate data. These tools will include surveys, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and mini-ethnographies. Document and secondary data review will also support the analysis.
- A random verification survey of 20 percent of the *talibés* in the commune databases. The survey will verify the reduced begging status of the *talibés* and their general living conditions, particularly the level of time spent on Koranic studies. Other beneficiaries may be included in the key informant or focus group interviews.

- A convenience sample of individual stakeholders, including the staff/volunteers of the daraas, community centers and child guidance centers and municipal authorities, will be included as key informant interviews.
- The three methods (surveys, key informant interviews and focus group interviews) will be coded separately.
- The survey questionnaire will be analyzed using statistical software.
- Qualitative data will be coded.
- Gender, geographic location and role (beneficiary, implementer, community service provider) disaggregation will be included in the data analysis where applicable.

Data Collection Methods

The methodology to be used by the team will consist of three phases:

Phase I: Document Review

The team will review a wide range of documentation, including the original grant agreement, modifications, commune action plans, work plans and progress reports, commune databases on *talibés* and reports as means of understanding and comparing both expected and actual performance.

A secondary information analysis on current policies, initiatives and interventions working to address the issue of child begging in Senegal will be needed. This review will contribute to the desk analysis of the complementarity of programming with other GOS initiatives and NGO projects and approaches.

Phase 2: Quantitative and Qualitative Field Research

As part of its qualitative research, the team will use the following research instruments:

- Beneficiary survey: Closed and some open questions to determine beneficiary situation, access to health services and time spent on Koranic studies or other activities.
- Key informant interviews: Open questions for interviewing program stakeholders: UNODC commune mayors, project staff, National CTIP Task Force and USAID. The Evaluation Team will share, study and document these interviews at the end of every day.
- Focus or discussion groups: Focus or discussion groups with commune action committees, traditional leaders, heads of daraas, and staff at the child guidance centers to discuss program effects on individuals and institutions. The evaluation team will share, study and document these discussions at the end of every day.
- Life stories or mini-ethnographies: Stories that profile individual beneficiaries and their community constructs about experience, participation, fragments of biographies, etc., allowing for analysis of context, meaning and roles to understand the collective practices and social, cultural and political dynamics that inform experiences. The team will collect four stories of persons affected by the program, two from *talibés* involved in the activity and two from heads of daraas to understand changes in perceptions, processes and knowledge around child begging. These may include interviews, observation or other data capture, depending on the story being researched.

By interviewing, surveying and studying key stakeholders, the team will be able to understand the constraining and facilitating factors contributing to degrees of effectiveness.

Phase 3: Reporting and Dissemination

The evaluation team will construct a data analysis plan (see section below) during the team planning meeting at the start of the evaluation. Following this plan, the team will carry out the qualitative and quantitative analyses necessary to answer the evaluation questions. Draft and final reports and briefings will be presented to USAID per the Deliverables section below, with responses and comments from USAID and other invitees considered and, as appropriate, incorporated.

9. DATA ANALYSIS

Prior to the start of data collection, the evaluation team will develop and present for USAID/DRG and the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) review and approval a data analysis plan that details how focus group interviews will be transcribed and analyzed; what software and analysis plan will be utilized for the survey; what procedures will be used to analyze qualitative data from key informant and other stakeholder interviews; and how the evaluation will weigh and integrate qualitative data from these sources with quantitative data from survey responses, indicators and project performance monitoring records to reach conclusions about the effectiveness of the implemented approach.

Data Analysis Plan					
Research Questions	Type of Answer Needed	Data Collection Method(s)	Data Source(s)	Sampling Selection Criteria or	Data Analysis Method(s)
	• Descriptive • Comparative (normative)				
	• Descriptive • Comparative (normative)				

Data Disaggregation

The evaluation team will analyze information collected to identify correlations and identify the major trends and issues. The basic unit of analysis will be the direct beneficiaries of the program activities (*talibés*). Data will be disaggregated by gender, ethnicity, age and geographical origin to identify whether and how project inputs are benefiting *talibés*.

10. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS

This evaluation will use a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. The involvement of key stakeholders (activity coordination units in Medina and Gueule Tapee, UNODC, CTIP Task Force) in the statement of work (SOW) design process is considered a strength in the evaluation's approach. The participatory approach to this evaluation will continue throughout the fieldwork and is considered essential in terms of the practical use of this evaluation and its findings.

In terms of limitations, the evaluation will not be able to gather primary data on child-begging at commune levels. It will, however, conduct a verification of 20 percent of randomly selected *talibés* from the commune databases to assess the living conditions and daily activities of these beneficiaries.

II. DELIVERABLES

The evaluation team will provide the following deliverables:

- Work Plan: Detailed work plan indicating activities, methodology, data analysis and tools necessary for the elaboration of the evaluation. The work plan will be submitted to the monitoring and evaluation project (MEP) contracting officer's representative (COR) and the USAID/DRG agreement officer's representative (AOR) for approval.
- Progress Reports: A written and/or electronic report of the data collection progress made in the field covering key scheduled activities, status of completion and constraints of the data collection process. This will be submitted to MEP on a weekly basis and shared with the MEP COR and USAID/DRG AOR.
- Initial presentation: A PowerPoint presentation on initial findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. The presentation should not be more than 15 slides.
- Draft evaluation report: The team will submit a draft report to the USAID MEP COR and USAID/DRG AOR, who will provide preliminary comments.
- Final report: A written and electronic document that includes an executive summary, table of contents, methodology, findings, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations. As the evaluation team is led by a Senegalese national, the report will be submitted in French and translated into English once it is approved. The final report should include an annex that contains a database with all collected information and statistical analyses. An evaluation report template is attached in Appendix VIII.
- Evaluation data: All data collected from the verification process, interview notes and focus group transcripts will be provided electronically to USAID.

12. TEAM COMPOSITION

Mr. Mamadou Moustapha Wone will serve as the Team Leader for this evaluation. Mr. Wone is a senior level researcher with specialization in the issue of child begging. He will coordinate and communicate the evaluation's progress regularly with USAID's General Development Office (GDO) team, and consult with the team before setting out on fieldwork; section 13 outlines the main points of coordination. The MEP team will support Mr. Wone in terms of development of tools, moderator guides and coordination of focus groups. Specifically, the Mr. Wone will be guided by the MEP senior evaluation specialist and will guide a team of four enumerators: two teams of two for each commune during field interviews and focus groups. The MEP research officer will support the system of verifying reported data on begging reduction in the two communes. As an outside consultant, Mr. Wone will provide a signed statement attesting that they have no conflict of interest in conducting this evaluation.

Dates	Task/Deliverable	Team Leader's Level of Effort (Days)
June 6–10, 2016	Desk review	4
June 13, 2016	Technical planning meeting with in-brief from USAID/DRG	1

Dates	Task/Deliverable	Team Leader's Level of Effort (Days)
June 15, 2016	Initial briefing with the USAID/DRG team	1
June 14–16, 2016	Development of tools, work plan and approach using the Getting to Answers matrix.	2
June 17, 2016	Presentation of work plan and tools to USAID/DRG and PRM	1
June 20–30, 2016	Fieldwork in Dakar	9
July 1–8, 2016	Data analysis and development of findings, conclusions and recommendations	5
July 11, 2016	Presentation of initial findings, conclusions and recommendations to USAID/DRG and PRM	1
July 12, 2016	Presentation of initial findings, conclusions and recommendations to IPs and GOS partners	1
July 13–22, 2016	Data analysis and report writing	7
July 29, 2016	Submission of draft report	-
August 12, 2016	Consolidated comments received from USAID on draft report	
August 23, 2016	Finalization of the report	5
Estimated Level of Effort (LOE)		37

13. PARTICIPATION OF USAID STAFF AND PARTNERS

It is expected that the USAID/Senegal DRG team will provide an initial in-brief with the evaluation team during the team planning meeting. Upon completion of the work plan and tool development, USAID/DRG will be expected to quickly review the work plan and tools. As part of the evaluation, USAID/DRG and key stakeholders will also be interviewed including the National CTIP Committee and UNODC. At the completion of the field work, it is expected that USAID, UNODC and other stakeholders in the movement to reduce child begging will participate in a presentation of the evaluation's initial findings, conclusions and recommendations.

14. SCHEDULING AND LOGISTICS

MEP Senegal will arrange all logistics for fieldwork. MEP Senegal (for the USAID/Senegal DRG Team) will request introductory communications for the evaluation team. All appointments will be made by MEP Senegal staff and team members.

15. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

It is expected that this report will be drafted and finalized in French and then translated into English. The report itself should not be longer than 25 pages total, excluding the annexes. A draft evaluation report template is attached to this SOW in Annex VIII, which is based on the USAID evaluation report template and guidance (<http://usaidearninglab.org/library/evaluation-report-template>) and How-To Note on Preparing Evaluation Reports (<http://usaidearninglab.org/library/how-note-preparing-evaluation-reports>). The report includes Appendix I, the Mandatory Reference on Evaluation. The report will be branded with standard USAID branding requirements and will be formally submitted to the DEC upon approval. Additional copies of the final report in French will be made available to all stakeholders participating in the initial findings workshop. Copies in English will be shared with relevant USG offices

within USAID (DRG Center) State Department (Office to Monitor Trafficking in Persons), Department of Labor (Office of Child, Forced Labor and Trafficking) and Department of Justice.

16. ATTACHED REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Please check all that apply below.

☒	Gantt Chart
☒	Document Review Matrix
☒	Results Framework
☒	Response Matrix
☒	Budget
☒	CV
☒	USAID Evaluation Policy
☒	Evaluation Report Structure

17. AUTHORIZATIONS

The undersigned hereby authorize the following items (checked below) for the Statement of Work (SOW) described above:

☒	Completion of the SOW, as described above;
☒	SOW staffing, as described above;
☒	Concurrence with Contracting Officer's Travel Approval for the Consultant(s), requested above (if received prior to review).


[COR to either sign below or indicate approval in a return email]

_____	_____
Contracting Officer's Representative (COR)	Date
Roy Geiser, or designate	

_____	_____
Office Director	Date

APPENDIX I.I: GANTT CHART

This chart follows the LOE and deliverable chart in the SOW.



APPENDIX I.II: DOCUMENT REVIEW MATRIX

N°	Questions d'évaluation	Résultats pertinents/réponses partielles trouvés dans les documents	Titre du document	Page	Insuffisances à combler par le travail de terrain
Q 1					
Q2					

APPENDIX I.III: RESULTS FRAMEWORK

Question de l'Evaluation	Résultats	Conclusions	Recommandations
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			

APPENDIX I.IV: RESPONSE MATRIX

Questions d'Evaluation	Type de réponse/ Evidences nécessaire (Cochez un ou plusieurs, si approprié)		Méthodes pour la Collecte des données, Ex. Enregistrement, Observation Structurée, Entrevues avec des informateurs clés, Mini-enquête ¹³		Echantillonnage ou approche de la sélection, (si nécessaire)	Méthode d'analyse des données. Ex. Méthodes d'analyse des données Fréquence des Distributions, Analyses des tendances, Cross-Tabulations, Analyse des Contenus
			Source(s) de données	Méthode		
		Oui/Non				
		Description				
		Comparaison ¹⁴				
		Explication ¹⁵				
		Oui/Non				
		Description				
		Comparaison				
		Explication				
		Oui/Non				
		Description				
		Comparaison				
		Explication				

¹³ Les données issues des évaluations sont des livrables et les méthodes doivent indiquées comment les données seront collectées, ex., pour les focus groups USAID requiers une transcription.

¹⁴ Comparaison – à la situation de référence, plans/cibles ou autres standards ou normes

¹⁵ Explication – pour les questions qui demandent « pourquoi » ou sur les attributs d'un effet à une intervention spécifique (causalité)

APPENDIX I.V: BUDGET

[Erased for publication]

APPENDIX I.VI: CV

Mamadou Moustapha Wone – Chef d'Équipe – Team Leader

Summary

M. Mamadou Moustapha Wone est titulaire d'un DEA en sociologie obtenu à l'Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar. Il capitalise plus de 10 ans d'expériences de travail sur la problématique de la mendicité des enfants et de l'éducation en général. Ses sujets d'intérêt sont principalement les enfants mendiants (*Talibés*) et les écoles coraniques (*Daaras*), les enfants de la rue et la santé communautaire. Il a effectué plusieurs recherches et études pour le compte d'organisations nationales et internationales (Word Vision, UNICEF, OXFAM), notamment sur la formation spirituelle des enfants, la documentation des bonnes pratiques parentales de soins et de protection de l'enfant au Sénégal, les *Talibés* de Soufoupoint, la situation des *Daaras* et également sur la recrudescence du phénomène des enfants de la rue à Dakar.

M. Wone occupe les fonctions de Responsable Technique au Global Research and Advocacy Group (GRAG), Spécialiste de la recherche qualitative. A ce titre, il a été co-chercheur sur la Dynamique Communautaire pour le bien être de l'Enfant au district de Vélingara et chef de la mission d'évaluation finale de l'« Approche Santé à l'Approche basée sur les droits : Lutte contre les Mutilations Génitales Féminines (MGF) en Gambie, en Guinée, au Mali et au Sénégal ».

Par ailleurs, M. Wone a publié plusieurs articles scientifiques sur la Mendicité, l'excision au Sénégal, la description et l'analyse de la situation de la santé communautaire et sur la sécurité alimentaire.

Education

DEA, Sociologie; Université Cheick Anta Diop de Dakar, Sénégal; 2000

Maîtrise, Sociologie; Université Cheick Anta Diop de Dakar, Sénégal; 1998

Licence, Sociologie; Université Cheick Anta Diop de Dakar, Sénégal; 1996

Experience

Consultances

Etude sur les motivations et les barrières à l'utilisation des ouvrages d'assainissement améliorés en milieu rural; Nov-Dec 2013

- Responsable technique et superviseur : Etude menée pour le compte d'ADEMAS.

Etude Sahel phase II : Evaluation des impacts des expériences positives « success stories » dans le domaine de la Gestion des Ressources Naturelles en Afrique de l'Ouest; Jan-Mai 2013

- Co-chercheur : Etude menée avec le ministère de l'environnement, pour le compte du CILSS.

Chercheur Principal, Recherche formative ; World Vision Sénégal ; Nov 2012 – Mars 2013

- Formation spirituelle des enfants dans les ADP ; étude menée pour le compte de World Vision Sénégal

Programme communautaire de micro finance centré sur l'épargne au Sénégal; 2012

- Responsable technique : Etude menée avec le cabinet RSP pour le compte de l'ONG britannique OXFAM.

Chercheur Principal (évaluation mixte) ; Direction de la Jeunesse et de la Vie Associative (DJVA/Ministère de la Jeunesse) ; Juin-Oct 2011

- Partenariat avec les CRETF de Thiès et de Saint-Louis pour la formation qualifiante de 100 JFD (Fonds des Nations Unies pour la Population)

Co-chercheur (revue documentaire) ; Jan-Avril 2011

- Documentation des bonnes pratiques parentales de soins et de protection de l'enfant au Sénégal (étude menée pour un cabinet privé éthiopien à Addis-Abeba)

Octobre 2010-Janvier 2011 : Déterminants de l'utilisation du sel iodé dans le département de Fatick

- Co-chercheur : Etude menée avec l'IPDSR pour le compte de la Cellule de Lutte contre la Malnutrition (CLM).

Recherche formative pour développer la stratégie et les supports de communication dans le cadre du projet NETS; Fev-Juin 2010

- Co-chercheur : Etude menée avec le cabinet Afrique Communication pour le compte de la Cellule de Lutte contre la Malnutrition (CLM) de la Primature.

Elaboration du Plan Local de Développement de la communauté rurale de Ndiayène Pendao (PLD); Juillet 2009- Mars 2010

- Chercheur principal et chef d'équipe en collaboration avec le cabinet d'études Fedde Services Développement (FSD)

Excision au Sénégal : sens, portée et enseignements tirés de la réponse nationale »; Juin-Aout 2008

- Co-chercheur : Etude commanditée par l'UNICEF Sénégal.

Chercheur Principal (diagnostic participatif) ; UNICEF ; Juin 2007

- Diagnostic participatif « Les *talibés* (mendiants) de Soufoupont » (étude menée pour le compte de l'Association les enfants d'abord)

Description et analyse de la situation de la santé communautaire à Ziguinchor; Jan-Avril 2007

- Responsable technique : Etude menée pour le compte du cabinet d'étude Hélite/ IPS.

Evaluation à long terme du programme de Tostan; Fev-Aout 2006

- Co-chercheur : Etude menée par l'ONG Population Council pour le compte de Tostan.

Enquête de base sur la santé maternelle et infantile (SMI) dans les zones de Saint-Louis/ Diourbel/ Louga/ Dakar; Mai 2005

- Superviseur : Etude menée par le Programme Alimentaire Mondial (PAM).

Chercheur Principal (diagnostic participatif) ; World Vision Kaffrine ; Jan-Avril 2005

- Analyse de la situation des *daaras* et de l'enfant talibé dans la zone de Kaffrine (étude menée pour le compte de World Vision)

Co-chercheur (revue documentaire) ; OXFAM/GB ; Oct-Dec 2004

- Étude sur la recrudescence de phénomène des enfants de la rue à Ddakar (étude menée par le Cabinet ADIRA)

Etude qualitative sur les mutuelles de santé et la santé reproductive au Sénégal; Avril-Mai 2004

- Superviseur : Etude menée par Partenars For Health Reform plus (Phr. plus, un programme de l'USAID).

Le travail des enfants dans l'agriculture et l'élevage (zone des Niayes); Nov 2002

- Responsable technique : Etude menée par l'ISRA en partenariat avec le BIT.

Etude des perspectives socioprofessionnelles dans le cadre de l'éducation et de la formation en Afrique : le cas du Sénégal; Juillet-Aout 2002

- Co-chercheur : Etude menée par le Centre d'Etude Supérieurs en Gestion (CESAG).

Etude sur la mutation et la restructuration des CNC en CDC (centre de nutrition communautaire en centre de développement communautaire); Mars-Avril 2002

- Superviseur et animateur / Etude menée par le Programme de Nutrition Communautaire (PNC) qui s'est muté en Programme de Renforcement de la Nutrition (PRN).

Identification et diagnostic des organisations communautaires de base de développement dans la communauté rurale de Diakhao-Sine; Fev-Juin 2002

- Co-chercheur / Etude menée avec l'ONG World Vision en partenariat avec l'ASADEL.

Etude sur les périmètres maraîchers du département de Mbour; Dec 2000 – Avril 2001

- Chercheur principal et encadreur : Etude menée pour l'Association Jeunesse et Développement (JSD) à Sandiara (Mbour).

Evolution du foncier local dans le contexte actuel; Avril – Juin 2000

- Co-chercheur Etude menée par le réseau Agriculture Paysannes et Modernisation/ Sénégal (APM/ Sénégal).

Salarié

Responsable Technique, Spécialiste de la Recherche Qualitative; Global Research and Advocacy Group (GRAG) ; Nov 2012 – Present

Co-chercheur/Gestion et Analyste des données ; University of Washington

- Dynamique Communautaire pour le Bien Etre de l'Enfant (District de Vélingara); 2014-2015

Research Team Member, Analyste des données ; Counterpart International

- Etude de Base du Projet RCLES (Reducing Child Labor Through Education and Services) : Travail des enfants dans les champs de coton et les mines d'or au Burkina Faso

Coordonnateur pour le Mali/Analyste ; Save the Children International

- Evaluation finale de l'Approche Santé à l'Approche basée sur les Droits : Lutte contre les Mutilations Génitales Féminines (MGF) en Gambie, en Guinée, au Mali et au Sénégal

Superviseur Départemental des activités de santé communautaire ; AcDev, Gossas, Sénégal; 2008-2009

- Projet santé communautaire BAD II.

Chargé de Cours en Sociologie des Organisations; Institut Supérieur de Gestion des Ressources Humaines (ISGRH); 2006-2008

Chargé de Cours en Sociologie Générale et en Sociologie de la Santé; Institut Santé Services Dakar (ISS-FO.P); 2002-2005

Allocataire de recherche; Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles (ISRA); 2003

- Étude : «Problématique de la « sécurité alimentaire » et de sa mise en pratique dans le Delta du fleuve Sénégal ».

Secrétaire Administratif - cellule permanente d'administration; Université Paysanne Africaine (UPAFA), Dakar; 2001-2003

- Chargé d'organisation lors du démarrage du premier module d'enseignement de l'Université Paysanne Africaine (UPAFA). Une université dont la vocation est la formation de leaders paysans africains.

Assistant de recherche au niveau du Centre d'Orientation et d'Information sur la santé des jeunes (COIN/jeunes); Université Paysanne Africaine (UPAFA), Dakar; 1999-2001

- Concepteur et superviseur du projet de recherche intitulé : Problématique de la santé de la reproduction des étudiants de l'université de Dakar.

Assistant de Recherche – Centre de Sensibilisation et d'Information sur les Drogues à Thiaroye (CSID/JC); 1996-1997

- Problématique de recherche : La toxicomanie chez le genre féminin.

Languages

French, Wolof, Pulaar (excellent); English (bien)

APPENDIX I.VII: USAID EVALUATION POLICY

Criteria to Ensure the Quality of the Evaluation Report

- The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well-researched and well organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the project, what did not and why.
- Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the scope of work.
- The evaluation report should include the scope of work as an annex. All modifications to the scope of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology or timeline need to be agreed upon in writing by the technical officer.
- Evaluation methodology shall be explained in detail and all tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists and discussion guides will be included in an Annex in the final report.
- Evaluation findings will assess outcomes and impact on males and females.
- Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).
- Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people's opinions. Findings should be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.
- Sources of information need to be properly identified and listed in an annex.
- Recommendations need to be supported by a specific set of findings.
- Recommendations should be action-oriented, practical and specific, with defined responsibility for the action.

APPENDIX I.VIII: EVALUATION REPORT TEMPLATE AND STRUCTURE



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

SENEGAL

PLEASE PLACE MEANINGFUL PHOTO HERE

REDUCE ABUSES AGAINST TALIBÉS IN DAKAR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT

July 2016

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by USAID Senegal Mission Wide Monitoring and Evaluation Project.

REDUCE ABUSES AGAINST TALIBÉS IN DAKAR

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

USAID/Senegal

Contracted under AID-685-C-15-00003

USAID Senegal Monitoring and Evaluation Project

DISCLAIMER

This evaluation is made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the sole responsibility of Management Systems International and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to thank [].

Cover Photo

[Describe what is depicted in the photo]

Photo by [].

ACRONYMS

[Examples below] [update based on acronyms used in the report]

ADS Automated Directives System

DEC Development Experience Clearinghouse

FY Fiscal Year

SOW Statement of Work

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Executive Summary should stand alone as a summary of the key sections of the report, and should summarize the content of the full report without adding new information. The Executive Summary should ideally be no more than three to four pages.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS

This should set out the overarching purpose of the evaluation, and how the findings are expected to be used to inform decisions. This section also describes the Evaluation Questions (which should be limited to just a few key questions). It can also identify key audiences for the evaluation.

PROJECT BACKGROUND

Enough information should be provided to give sufficient context. However in the Executive Summary this section can receive less emphasis than it might in the overall report so that more attention can be given to the evaluation purpose, design, limitations, and findings. In the main report it should describe the problem being addressed by the project, and the project logic for why it will lead to better outcomes. This could include a logical framework for the project if one exists, and the development hypothesis, or causal logic, of the project or program of which the project is a part.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS, DESIGN, METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

This section describes the overall design, specific data collection and analysis methods linked to the evaluation questions, and limitations of the data, methods, or other issues that affected the findings.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

This section should report those findings based on evidence generated by the evaluation data collection and analysis methods. Findings should be fact-based and not rely only on opinion, even of experts. Conclusions are drawn directly from findings and help summarize the “so what” of the findings. Several findings can lead to one or more conclusions. Whenever possible, data should be presented visually in easy to read charts, tables, graphs, and maps to demonstrate the evidence that supports conclusions and recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

EVALUATION PURPOSE & EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Evaluation Purpose

The evaluation purpose should be clearly defined at the beginning of the report. It should describe in about one to two pages why the evaluation is being conducted now, how the findings are expected to be used, what specific decisions will be informed by the evaluation, and who the main audiences are for the evaluation report.

Evaluation Questions

The evaluation questions are linked to the purpose, and should be listed here. Good practice is to limit the questions in the original statement of work to three to five that are clear, focused, and that will directly inform specific decisions.

[PROGRAM/PROJECT/ACTIVITY] BACKGROUND

In one to three pages, this section should clearly outline the project (or program) being evaluated, including the original problem or challenge the project is designed to address and the underlying development hypothesis, or causal logic, of the project or the broader program of which the project is a part. If a results framework (for strategies, objectives or programs) or logical framework (for projects) is available, this should be included here. For projects designed under the [project design guidance](#) released in 2011, the evaluation team should have access to the final Project Appraisal Document and relate annexes (which includes a logical framework and original monitoring and evaluation plans, among other things). This information provides important context for understanding the evaluation purpose, questions, methods, findings and conclusions.

DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM

USAID Activity Strategy

Intended Results

EVALUATION METHODS & LIMITATIONS

This section should provide a detailed description within one to three pages of the evaluation methods and why they were chosen. Additional detailed information on the methods should be provided in an annex. The reader needs to understand what the evaluation team did and why to make an informed judgment about the credibility of the findings and conclusions and the underlying evaluation design including the data collection and analysis methods.

Evaluation methods should correspond directly to the questions being asked and should generate the highest quality and most credible evidence possible, taking into consideration time, budget and other practical considerations.

Provide information on all aspects of the evaluation design and methods, including trade offs that led to selection of specific data collection and analysis methods, a description of data availability and quality, and sampling strategies (purposeful or random), including how interview subjects or site visits were selected. Just as important as describing the evaluation methods is describing any limitations in data collection and analysis, data quality or access to data sources and that may result in bias. To show the relationship between the evaluation questions and methods, it is useful to include a chart that lists each evaluation question, the corresponding evaluation method to be used for data collection and analysis, data sources, sample sizes, and limitations.

Data Collection Methods and Sources

Data Analysis Methods

Limitations

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

This section is the main body of the report, synthesizing what was learned during the evaluation and presenting it in an easy to understand and logical fashion. Whenever possible, data should be presented visually in easy to read charts, tables, graphs, and maps to demonstrate the evidence that supports conclusions and recommendations. Depending upon the evaluation, it may make sense to discuss findings, conclusions and recommendations by question, all together, or describe findings and conclusions by question, but group recommendations together.

Question #

[Insert question]

Findings

Findings are empirical facts based on data collected during the evaluation and should not rely only on opinion, even of experts.

Conclusions

Conclusions synthesize and interpret findings and make judgments supported by one or more specific findings.

Recommendations

Recommendations are included if requested in the evaluation statement of work. They are specific actions the evaluation team proposes be taken by program management that are based on findings and conclusions. The reader should be able to discern what evidence supports the conclusions and recommendations.

ANNEXES

[All evaluation reports must include the following as annexes: 1) the Evaluation Statement of Work, 2) Detailed description of the evaluation design and methods, 3) copies of the actual data collection tools such as survey or interview questions, 4) a list of information sources (including documents reviewed, sites visited, and key informants, assuming they gave permission to be identified), and, 5) disclosure of any conflicts of interest by evaluation team members . Additional annexes such as any Statement of Differences if applicable, can be included at the discretion of the evaluation team and USAID, and in some cases implementing partners.]

ANNEX I: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

[The final Evaluation Statement of Work that guided the evaluation team should be included as an annex.]

ANNEX II: EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

Replace this text with the full details of the methods used for data collection and analysis should be presented here. Explain why decisions were made to use certain methods and how those methods were the best available given the evaluation questions and resources. Provide details related to how data sources were selected, including sampling methods. If statistical analysis was used, explain the power calculation to determine the sample size and confidence level. If qualitative methods were used, give details such as whether interviews were structured, how informants were selected, how sites were selected for direct observation, etc.

If an experimental or quasi-experimental impact evaluation, provide detailed information on the methods used to randomize or to define treatment and control groups through other means, and how data was collected from both groups at baseline, midline and/or end line.

Make sure to include a full and transparent discussion on any limitations to the data or conclusions from that data that may be due to the methods themselves, data quality issues, bias, logistical or security constraints, or any other limitations.

ANNEX III: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

[Include any data collection instruments such as surveys, interview questionnaires, focus group moderator guides, direct observation checklists, or any others.]

ANNEX IV: SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Replace this text with lists of any documents reviewed, people interviewed, sites visited, or any other information sources accessed for the evaluation.

Note: Remember to get the permission of individuals who are interviewed to use their name in the report. If a promise of confidentiality requires that people interviewed not be identified by name, then list the number of interviewees and their relationship to the project or program being evaluated (e.g., 20 clinic patients that benefited from the project; 10 doctors that participated in the project; 3 local government officials; 10 implementing partner employees; 15 local community members who did not participate in the project but were eligible to do so; etc.).

ANNEX V: DISCLOSURE OF ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

[The Evaluation Policy requires that evaluation reports include a signed statement by each evaluation team member regarding any conflicts of interest. A suggested format is provided below.]

Name	
Title	
Organization	
Evaluation Position?	☐ Team Leader ☐ Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	☐ Yes ☐ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to: 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated	

or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	
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I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
-----------	--

Date	
------	--

ANNEX VI: [INSERT TITLE]

[Other information, such as a Statement of Differences, can be provided as an annex as appropriate, and as determined by the evaluation team, USAID, or, in some cases, the implementing partner.

[Provide contact information on the back cover. This can be USAID headquarters information, or specific to the USAID mission or operating unit that commissioned the report.]

ANNEX 2: PARTICIPANT LIST

Liste des participants

- Acteurs communautaires
 - 02 Focus group avec Ndéyus *daaras* à GTFC (12 participants) et à Médina (08 participants)
 - 02 Focus group avec membres de la communauté à GTFC (10 participants) et à Médina (12 participants)
- Bénéficiaires du projet
 - 02 Focus group avec sérignes *daaras* à GTFC (08 participants) et à Médina (09 participants)
 - 07 récits de vie avec sérignes *daaras* (03) et *talibés* (04)
- Acteurs institutionnels
 - 01 entretien avec un représentant de l'ONUDC
 - 01 entretien avec deux représentants de l'USAID
 - 01 entretien avec maire de Médina
 - 01 entretien avec adjoint maire de Médina
 - 01 entretien avec maire de GTFC et son adjoint
 - 01 entretien avec secrétaire administratif de la municipalité de GTFC
 - 01 entretien avec Plan International
 - 01 entretien avec Save the Children
 - 01 entretien avec Anti-Slavery International
 - 01 entretien avec ChildFund
 - 01 entretien avec adjoint directeur de la direction de la protection de l'enfance (DPE)
 - 01 entretien avec deux (02) représentants de la Cellule Nationale de Lutte contre la Traite de Personnes
 - 01 entretien avec le commissaire de Police de Médina
 - 01 entretien avec le Médecin du centre Elisabeth Diouf de GTFC
 - 01 entretien avec deux (02) représentants de l'inspection des *daaras*
 - 01 entretien avec la coordinatrice des programmes du Groupe GIRAFE
- Acteurs de mise en œuvre (UCP)
 - 01 entretien avec la coordinatrice du projet de Médina avec son adjoint
 - 01 entretien avec le comptable du projet à Médina
 - 01 entretien avec un des animateurs du projet à Médina

- 01 entretien avec le coordonnateur du projet à GTFC
- 01 entretien avec l'animateur du projet à GTFC
- 01 entretien avec la comptable du projet à GTFC
- 01 discussion de groupe avec les coordonnateurs du projet et les représentants de l'inspection des *daaras*

ANNEX 3 : BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bibliographie consultée

1. Cartographie des *daaras* dans la commune de Gueule Tapée-Fass-Colobane (GTFC), USAID/commune de GTFC, décembre 2014
2. Projet de lutte contre la mendicité des enfants, USAID/commune de Médina, deuxième rapport semestriel, année I, 1 juillet-31 décembre 2014
3. Program description building capacity to reduce trafficking in persons (TIP), USAID/Sénégal
4. Projet de plan d'action communal de lutte contre la traite et la maltraitance des enfants, commune d'arrondissement de Gueule Tapée-Fass-Colobane
5. Plan d'action communal de lutte contre la traite et la maltraitance des enfants, commune d'arrondissement de Médina
6. Programme de renforcement de capacités pour les bénéficiaires du projet sur le leadership et le changement de comportement positif (SENZ20), Programme GIRAFE, rapport première session , octobre 2014
7. Programme de renforcement de capacités pour les bénéficiaires du projet sur le leadership et le changement de comportement positif (SENZ20), Programme GIRAFE, rapport deuxième session , décembre 2014
8. Projet de lutte contre la mendicité des enfants, USAID/commune de Gueule Tapée-Fass-Colobane (GTFC), Rapport annuel, octobre 2015
9. Projet de lutte contre la mendicité des enfants, USAID/commune de Gueule Tapée-Fass-Colobane (GTFC), Rapport d'activités du 1^{er} janvier au 30 septembre 2014
10. Projet de lutte contre la mendicité des enfants, USAID/commune de Gueule Tapée-Fass-Colobane (GTFC), Rapport à mi-parcours
11. Projet de lutte contre la mendicité des enfants, USAID/commune de Gueule Tapée-Fass-Colobane (GTFC), Rapport d'activités du 1^{er} mai au 15 octobre 2015
12. Document de référence sur la mendicité, USAID/commune de Médina, juillet 2015, document par Mouhamed Diankha, expert consultant
13. Enfants mendiants dans la région de Dakar, Understanding Children's Work, Project Working Paper Series, Novembre 2007
14. Cartographie des écoles coraniques de la region de Dakar, Cellule Nationale de Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes en particulier des Femmes et des Enfants (CNLTP)
15. Les *Talibés* au Sénégal, le pour et le contre, Points de vue de Josué Barbosa, EBS-Floreffe, octobre 2006
16. Analyse du dispositif de lutte contre la traite des personnes, en particulier des femmes et des enfants, au Sénégal, en lien avec les acteurs des secteurs public, privé et de la société civile, Document préparatoire à l'élaboration du Plan National d'Action de lutte contre la traite des personnes, UNICEF, France Coopération, juin 2008

ANNEX 4: RESPONSE MATRIX

MATRICE DES REPONSES

Questions d'Evaluation	Type de réponse/ Evidences nécessaire (Cochez un ou plusieurs, si approprié)		Méthodes pour la Collecte des données, Ex. Enregistrement, Observation Structurée, Entrevues avec des informateurs clés, Mini-enquête ¹⁶	Echantillonnage ou approche de la sélection, (si nécessaire)	Méthode d'analyse des données. Ex. Méthodes d'analyse des données Fréquence des Distributions, Analyses des tendances, Cross-Tabulations, Analyse des Contenus
			Source(s) de données	Méthode	
Q1 : Comment l'intervention a-t-elle changé le dialogue public (dans les deux communes) et les points de vue sur la mendicité ?		Oui/Non	Acteurs municipaux ou prestataires :	Un échantillon de commodité des acteurs individuels sera fait sur la base de l'obtention de la saturation. Concernant les focus group de discussion, il est prévu 08 participants en moyenne à chaque rencontre.	Analyse de contenu : Après codification thématique, l'analyse de contenu se fera sous le modèle SEPO (Succès-Echec-Potentialités-Obstacles) ----- Analyse de contenu : Après codification thématique, l'analyse de contenu se fera sous le modèle SEPO (Succès-Echec-Potentialités-Obstacles) Analyse de contenu : Après codification thématique, l'analyse de contenu se fera sous le modèle SEPO (Succès-Echec-Potentialités-Obstacles)
	x	Description	Unité de coordination du projet (UCP)		
	x	Comparaison ¹⁷	Comité de Pilotage du projet (CP)		
	x	Explication ¹⁸	Animateurs, maires Acteurs étatiques et non étatiques : ONUDC, CNLTP CAPE Inspection des <i>daaras</i> , Directeurs d'école, Centre de guidance, Société civile		

¹⁶ Les données issues des évaluations sont des livrables et les méthodes doivent indiquées comment les données seront collectées, ex., pour les focus groups USAID requiert une transcription.

¹⁷ Comparaison – à la situation de référence, plans/cibles ou autres standards ou normes

¹⁸ Explication – pour les questions qui demandent « pourquoi » ou sur les attributs d'un effet à une intervention spécifique (causalité)

Questions d'Evaluation	Type de réponse/ Evidences nécessaire (Cochez un ou plusieurs, si approprié)		Méthodes pour la Collecte des données, Ex. Enregistrement, Observation Structurée, Entrevues avec des informateurs clés, Mini-enquête ¹⁶	Echantillonnage ou approche de la sélection, (si nécessaire)	Méthode d'analyse des données. Ex. Méthodes d'analyse des données Fréquence des Distributions, Analyses des tendances, Cross-Tabulations, Analyse des Contenus
			Source(s) de données	Méthode	
Q2 : L'intervention a-t-elle réduit la mendicité ? Si oui, jusqu'à quel niveau ?	x	Oui/Non	Acteurs bénéficiaires : Maîtres coraniques, <i>Talibés</i> Acteurs communautaires : Chefs religieux Chefs de quartier Ndeyou <i>daaras</i> Notables des quartiers		
	x	Description	Acteurs municipaux ou prestataires :		
	x	Comparaison	Unité de coordination du projet (UCP)		
	x	Explication	Comité de Pilotage du projet (CP) Animateurs, maires Acteurs étatiques et non étatiques : ONUDC, CNLTP, CAPE, Inspection des <i>daaras</i> , Directeurs d'école, Centre de guidance, Société civile Acteurs bénéficiaires : Maîtres coraniques, <i>Talibés</i> Acteurs communautaires : Chefs religieux	Questionnaires : (exclusivement administrés aux <i>Talibés</i> et aux Maîtres coraniques) Focus group : (exclusivement avec les acteurs communautaires et les maîtres coraniques) Récits de vie (exclusivement administrés aux <i>Talibés</i> et aux Maîtres coraniques)	20% des <i>talibés</i> de l'effectif total des <i>daaras</i> à mendicité et 5% de l'effectif des <i>talibés</i> des <i>daaras</i> non mendiants
					Tris à plat, analyse croisée et comparaison avant/après Analyse de contenu : Après codification thématique, l'analyse de contenu se fera sous le modèle SEPO (Succès-Echec-Potentialités-Obstacles) Analyse de contenu : Après codification thématique, l'analyse de contenu se fera sous le modèle SEPO (Succès-Echec-Potentialités-Obstacles)

Questions d'Evaluation	Type de réponse/ Evidences nécessaire (Cochez un ou plusieurs, si approprié)		Méthodes pour la Collecte des données, Ex. Enregistrement, Observation Structurée, Entrevues avec des informateurs clés, Mini-enquête ¹⁶	Echantillonnage ou approche de la sélection, (si nécessaire)	Méthode d'analyse des données. Ex. Méthodes d'analyse des données Fréquence des Distributions, Analyses des tendances, Cross-Tabulations, Analyse des Contenus	
			Source(s) de données	Méthode		
			Chefs de quartier Ndeyou <i>daaras</i> Notables des quartiers	Entretiens individuels		
Q3 : Est-ce que l'intervention a réussi à atteindre la communauté ? Si oui, cela a-t-il été une approche utile pour un changement d'attitude envers les abus contre les enfants et les <i>talibés</i> mendiants dans		Oui/Non	Acteurs municipaux ou prestataires : Unité de coordination du projet (UCP) Comité de Pilotage du projet (CP) Animateurs, maires Acteurs étatiques et non étatiques : ONUUDC, CNLTP CAPE Inspection des <i>daaras</i> , Directeurs d'école, Centre de guidance, Société civile	Entretiens individuels Entretiens approfondis Focus group : (exclusivement avec les acteurs communautaires et les maitres coraniques)	Un échantillon de commodité des acteurs individuels sera fait sur la base de l'obtention de la saturation. Concernant les focus group de discussion, il est prévu 08 participants en moyenne à chaque rencontre.	Analyse de contenu : Après codification thématique, l'analyse de contenu se fera sous le modèle SEPO (Succès-Echec-Potentialités-Obstacles) Analyse de contenu : Après codification thématique, l'analyse de contenu se fera sous le modèle SEPO (Succès-Echec-Potentialités-Obstacles)
	x	Description				
		Comparaison				
	x	Explication				

Questions d'Evaluation	Type de réponse/ Evidences nécessaire (Cochez un ou plusieurs, si approprié)		Méthodes pour la Collecte des données, Ex. Enregistrement, Observation Structurée, Entrevues avec des informateurs clés, Mini-enquête ¹⁶	Echantillonnage ou approche de la sélection, (si nécessaire)	Méthode d'analyse des données. Ex. Méthodes d'analyse des données Fréquence des Distributions, Analyses des tendances, Cross-Tabulations, Analyse des Contenus
			Source(s) de données	Méthode	
certaines daaras ?			Acteurs bénéficiaires : Maîtres coraniques, <i>Talibés</i> Acteurs communautaires : Chefs religieux Chefs de quartier Ndeyou <i>daaras</i> Notables des quartiers		

Q4 : Y-a-t-il des activités susceptibles de passer à l'échelle à travers l'approche actuelle et qui peuvent être adaptées dans d'autres communes et/ou au niveau national ? Si oui, quelles sont les hypothèses		Oui/Non	Acteurs municipaux ou prestataires :	Entretiens individuels Entretiens approfondis Focus group (exclusivement avec les acteurs communautaires et les maîtres coraniques)	Un échantillon de commodité des acteurs individuels sera fait sur la base de l'obtention de la saturation. Concernant les focus group de discussion, il est prévu 08 participants en moyenne à chaque rencontre.	Analyse de contenu : Après codification thématique, l'analyse de contenu se fera sous le modèle SEPO (Succès-Echec-Potentialités-Obstacles) Analyse de contenu : Après codification thématique, l'analyse de contenu se fera sous le modèle SEPO (Succès-Echec-Potentialités-Obstacles) Utilisation de la grille d'évaluation de la mise à l'échelle de MSI L'équipe étudiera le potentiel pour l'échelle horizontale en termes de possibilités d'augmentation de la prestation de services ou de son extension à d'autres communes. La mise à l'échelle verticale en termes d'action et de politique
	x	Description	Unité de coordination du projet (UCP)			
		Comparaison	Comité de Pilotage du projet (CP)			
	x	Explication	Animateurs, maires Acteurs étatiques et non étatiques : ONUDDC, CNLTP CAPE Inspection des <i>daaras</i> , Directeurs d'école, Centre de guidance, Société civile			

critiques pour que cette approche marche dans d'autres communes ?			Acteurs bénéficiaires : Maitres coraniques, <i>Talibés</i> Acteurs communautaires : Chefs religieux Chefs de quartier Ndeyou <i>daaras</i> Notables des quartiers			nationales sera également explorée.
Q5 : L'approche a-t-elle eu une plus-value sur les discours et/ou les pratiques au sein des acteurs évoluant autour de la réduction de la mendicité des enfants dans certains <i>daaras</i> ?		Oui/Non	Acteurs municipaux ou prestataires : Unité de coordination du projet (UCP) Comité de Pilotage du projet (CP) Animateurs, maires Acteurs étatiques et non étatiques : ONUDC, CNLTP CAPE Inspection des <i>daaras</i> , Directeurs d'école, Centre de guidance, Société civile Acteurs bénéficiaires : Maitres coraniques, <i>Talibés</i> Acteurs communautaires : Chefs religieux Chefs de quartier Ndeyou <i>daaras</i> Notables des quartiers	Entretiens individuels Entretiens approfondis Focus group (exclusivement avec les acteurs communautaires et les maitres coraniques)	Un échantillon de commodité des acteurs individuels sera fait sur la base de l'obtention de la saturation. Concernant les focus group de discussion, il est prévu 08 participants en moyenne à chaque rencontre.	Analyse de contenu : Après codification thématique, l'analyse de contenu se fera sous le modèle SEPO (Succès-Echec-Potentialités-Obstacles)
	x	Description				
	x	Comparaison				
	x	Explication				

ANNEX 5: SCALING UP EVALUATION GRID

		A		B		C
Caractéristique du modèle		☺✓	La mise en échelle est plus facile	☹✓	La mise en échelle est plus difficile	☹✓
Est-ce que le modèle est crédible?	1		Preuves solides		Peu ou pas de preuves solides	
	2		Evaluation externe et indépendante		Pas d'évaluation externe et indépendante	
	3		Il y a des preuves que le modèle marche dans différents contextes sociaux		Il n'y a pas de preuves que le modèle marche dans différents contextes sociaux	
	4		Le modèle a le support d'individus et institutions éminents		Le modèle n'a pas le support les individus et les institutions éminents	
Les résultats du modèle peuvent-ils être observés?	5		L'impact est très visible à l'œil nu; tangible		Impact peu visible; difficile à communiquer au public	
	6		Clairement associé à l'intervention		Pas clairement associé à l'intervention	
	7		Témoignages et documents existent avec un attrait émotionnel certain		Peu ou pas d'évidence, peu d'attrait émotionnel	
Quelle est la pertinence du modèle ?	8		Résout objectivement un problème significatif et persistant		Résout un problème qui affecte peu de personnes ou d'impact limité	
	9		Résout un problème qui est actuellement l'une des priorités politiques		Résout un problème qui n'est pas une priorité politique	

	10		Répond à un besoin fortement ressenti par les bénéficiaires potentiels		Répond à un besoin peu ressenti par les bénéficiaires potentiels	
Le modèle offre-t-il des avantages relatifs par rapport à la pratique actuelle ?	11		Les solutions actuelles pour cette question sont jugées insuffisantes		Les solutions actuelles sont jugées adéquates	
	12		Efficacité supérieure par rapport aux solutions actuelles		Peu ou pas de preuve objective de la supériorité par rapport aux solutions actuelles	
	13		Efficacité supérieure par rapport aux autres modèles novateurs mis en place		L'efficacité supérieure par rapport aux autres modèles novateurs n'est pas établie	
Est-il facile d'adopter et de transférer le modèle ?	14		Mise en œuvre au sein des systèmes présents, de l'infrastructure et des ressources humaines		Nécessite des systèmes, infrastructures, ou ressources humaines nouveaux et/ou supplémentaires	
	15		Contient des éléments qui s'ajoutent facilement aux systèmes présents		Est un paquet complet ou exhaustif de plusieurs composants	
	16		Proche des pratiques et comportements actuels de la population ciblée		Grand départ par rapport aux pratiques et comportements actuels de la population ciblée	
	17		Proche des pratiques actuelles et de la culture de l'organisation (s) qui est en train d'adopter le modèle		Grand départ par rapport aux pratiques et culture de l'organisation (s) qui est en train d'adopter le modèle	
	18		L'accord de seulement quelques décideurs est nécessaire pour l'adoption du modèle		L'accord de nombreux décideurs est nécessaire pour l'adoption du modèle	

	19		Le modèle a un nombre limité de contrôle et de supervision		Le modèle a un nombre élevé de contrôle et de supervision	
	20		Efficacité démontrée dans divers contextes organisationnels		Efficacité démontrée que dans un contexte organisationnel	
	21		Peu de sophistication technique des composantes et activités du modèle		Grande sophistication technique des composantes et activités du modèle	
	22		L'innovation majeure est une approche claire et facile à reproduire, par exemple, le vaccin		La mise au point du modèle n'est pas une technologie facile à reproduire	
	23		Peu de complexité; simple avec peu de composants qui s'ajoutent facilement aux systèmes existants		Complexité élevée avec de nombreux éléments; ensemble intégré	
	24		Demande peu de supervision et de surveillance		La réalisation demande beaucoup de supervision et de surveillance	
Le modèle peut-il être testé?	25		Peut être testé par une organisation ou une institution sur une échelle limitée		Ne peut être testé par l'utilisateur sans être adopté à grande échelle	
Y-a-t-il une source de financement durable ?	26		Supériorité coût-efficacité démontrée par rapport aux solutions existantes clairement établie		Peu de preuves de supériorité en termes de coût-efficacité	
	27		Nécessite un petit engagement de fonds à l'échelle		Demande un grand engagement de fonds à l'échelle	

	28		Le modèle peut générer son propre financement interne (par exemple, les frais d'utilisation) ou de la dotation		Problème d'autofinancement ; le modèle dépend de source de financement externe	
Nombre total de contrôles						

ANNEX 6: DATA COLLECTION TOOLS

Questionnaire Serigne Daara			
N°	Questions	Réponses	Saut
	A. Identification		
	Sexe	1. Homme 2. Femme	
	Commune :	1. Medina 2. Colobane Fass Gueule Tapée	
	Nom daara :		
QA04	Nombre de <i>talibés</i>	Total.....	
QA05	Nombre de <i>talibés</i>	Fille.....	
QA06	Nombre de <i>talibés</i>	Garçon.....	
	B. Mendicité		
QB01	Parmi les <i>talibés</i> , y'en a-t-il qui mendient ?	1. Oui 2. Non	Sinon-> aller à QC01
QB02	Nombre <i>talibés</i> pratiquant la mendicité au total	Total..... (contrôle)	
QB03	Nombre <i>talibés</i> filles pratiquant la mendicité	Fille	
QB04	Nombre <i>talibés</i> garçons pratiquant la mendicité	Garçon.....	
QB05	Quelles sont les raisons de cette mendicité ?		
QB06	Heures de la mendicité (multiple)	(01h à 24h) Matin : Après-midi : Soirée :-----	

QB07	Combien d'heures en moyenne les <i>talibés</i> mendient par jour ?	heures	
QB08	Jours de mendicité	1. Tous les jours 2. Autres	Si 1->aller à QB10
QB09	Si autres quels jours ?	Lundi Mardi Mercredi Jeudi Vendredi Samedi Dimanche	
QB10	Parmi les <i>talibés</i> mendiants qui sont dans le daara, y'en a-t-il qui viennent d'une autre région (hors de Dakar) ?	1.Oui 2. Non	Sinon-> aller QB19
QB11	Region1 : Si Oui, spécifier les régions	-----	
QB12	Effectif1	___/	
QB13	Region2 : Si Oui, spécifier les régions	-----	
QB14	Effectif2	___/	
QB15	Region3 : /Si Oui, spécifier les régions	-----	
QB16	Effectif3	___/	
QB17	Région autre : Oui, spécifier les régions	-----	
QB18	Effectif autre	___/	
QB19	Parmi les <i>talibés</i> qui mendient, y'en-a-t-il qui viennent d'autres pays?	1.Oui 2. Non	Sinon-> aller à QC01
QB20	Si oui quels pays?	Gambie	

		Guinée Bissau Guinée Conakry Mali Autre :	
	C. Abandon mendicité		
QC01	Si aucun des <i>talibés</i> ne pratique la mendicité actuellement, est-ce que dans le passé les <i>talibés</i> de votre daara la pratiquaient ?	1. Oui 2. Non	Sinon-> aller QD01
QC02	Si oui, depuis quand les <i>talibés</i> du daara ont-ils arrêté de pratiquer la mendicité ?	Mois : Année :	
QC03	Expliquer les raisons de ce changement (arrêt de la mendicité)	 (autofinancement ,appui externe, récolte, projet CTIP,) autresà préciser.....	
QC04	Expliquer les alternatives à la mendicité utilisées pour la prise en charge des <i>talibés</i> et du serigne daara depuis son abandon	 (autofinancement ,appui externe, récolte, projet CTIP,) autresà préciser.....	
QC05	Y a-t-il des <i>talibés</i> qui n'ont jamais mendié dans votre daara ?	1.Oui 2. Non	Filtre (apparaît si QB01=oui)
QC06	Si oui quelles sont les raisons ?		
	D. HISTORIQUE DE LA MENDICITE DANS LE DAARA		
QD01	Au démarrage du projet CTIP dans votre daara, y'avait-il des <i>talibés</i> qui mendiaient dans votre daara ?	1. Oui 2. Non	Sinon aller QE01
QD02	Si oui, préciser ici le nombre de <i>talibés</i> qui mendiaient dans votre daara au démarrage du projet CTIP ?		
QD03	Quels étaient les horaires de mendicité des <i>talibés</i> dans le daara au démarrage du projet ?	Matin en heures : 06h à 12h Après-midi heures : 13h à 19h	

		Soirée en heures : 20h à 05h	
	Combien d'heures en moyenne les <i>talibés</i> mendient au démarrage du projet?	___/ heures	
QD04	Quels étaient les jours que les <i>talibés</i> pratiquaient la mendicité au démarrage du projet ?	1. Tous les jours 2. Autres	SI 1-> aller à QE01
QD05	Si autres quels jours ?	Jours : Lun Mar Mer J V S D	
	E. Internat, Aide, Origine		
QE01	Les <i>talibés</i> sont-ils en internat ?	1. Oui 2. Non	Sinon-> aller QE05
QE02	Nombre de <i>talibés</i> total en internat	Total	
QE03	Nombre de <i>talibés</i> filles en internat	Fille	
QE04	Nombre de <i>talibés</i> garçons en internat	Garçon.....	
QE05	Le daara reçoit-il de l'aide ou un appui quelconque de la part de l'Etat, des parents, de la communauté, des ONGs, etc	Appuis parents des <i>talibés</i> Appui Communautés Appui Etat Appui ONG ou Projets Autres appuis : Daara ne bénéficie d'aucun appui	
QC06	Région d'origine du Serigne daara (Pas du Oustaz mais du Serigne <i>daaras</i>)	1.Dakar 2. Autre région (Préciser) : 3. Autre pays (Préciser) :	

Questionnaire Taliha

	Questions	Codes	Saut
	A. Identification		
	Coordonnées GPS	Latitude..... Longitude.....	
	Sexe	1. Garçon 2. Fille	
	Âge	: ____/ ans	
	Commune :	1. Medina 2. GTFC	
QA04	Lieu d'enquête :	1. Daara CTIP..... 2. Autres à préciser.....	Si QA04=1 aller à QA08
QA05	Mendiant dans la rue : Fréquente un daara	1. Oui 2. Non	Sinon-> aller à QB01
QA06	Si oui nom du daara :		
QA07	Localité d'implantation du daara :		
QA08	Depuis quand fréquentez-vous ce daara ?	1. Moins de 1 an 2. 1-3 ans 3. 4-6 ans 4. 7 ans et +	
QA09	Logez-vous (dormez-vous) dans ce daara ?	1. Oui 2. Non	Si oui aller à QA11
QA10	Si non, avec qui habitez-vous (multiple) ?		
QA11	Où vivent vos parents?	1. Dakar	

		2. Banlieue dakaroise 3. Autre région du Sénégal : 4. Autre pays (Préciser) : 2.	
	B. Pratique de la mendicité		
QB01	Est-ce que vous mendiez ?	1. Oui 2. Non	Sinon-> aller à QB17
QB02	Si oui, pour quelles raisons mendiez-vous ? (réponse multiple) (pas de suggestion)	1. Le marabout me l'a demandé 2. A la recherche d'argent pour ma famille 3. A la recherche d'argent pour moi-même 4. Aider une personne handicapée 5. NRP 6. Autres	
QB02_Autres	Autres à préciser		
QB03	Où mendiez-vous ? (réponse multiple)(pas de suggestion)	1. Rue 2. Maisons/Concessions 3. Transports/Arrêts bus/gares cars 4. Ecoles/Université 5. Bâtiments publics 6. Marchés/Magasins 7. Mosquée et autres lieux de cultes 8. Autres	

QB03 _Autres	Autres à préciser		
QB04	Depuis combien de temps avez-vous commencé à mendier ?	 Années mois	
QB05	A quelles heures mendiez-vous ? Horaires de la mendicité :	Matin en heures : 06h à 12h Après-midi heures : 13h à 19h Soirée en heures : 20h à 05h	
QB06	Quels sont les jours de mendicité	1. Tous les jours 2. Autres	Si -2 aller à QB07
QB07	Sinon quels jours:	L M M J V S D (intégrer)	
QB08	Produits de la mendicité (pas de suggestion)	1.Nourriture/Repas 2. Produits alimentaires (sucre, biscuits, riz, etc.) 3. Argent 4. Vêtement 5. Autres :	
QB08 _Autres	Produits de la mendicité : Autres à préciser		
QB09	Quel usage vous faites des produits de la mendicité		
QB10	Y'a-t-il un montant qui vous est exigé à verser par jour ?	1. Oui 2. Non	Sinon aller à QB12
QB11	Si oui, quel montant	 FCFA	
QB12	Depuis que vous avez commencé à mendier dans ce daara est-ce que le temps que vous y passez a changé ?	1. Oui 2. Non	Sinon->aller à QB14
QB13	Si oui, dans quel sens a-t-il changé ?	1. Augmenté 2. Diminué	

QB14	Quels sont les jours durant lesquels vous pratiquiez la mendicité au début ?	1. Tous les jours 2. Autres	Si QB14=1 ->aller à QB16
QB15	Sinon quels jours	L M M J V S D	
QB16	Quelles heures mendiiez-vous à cette période :	matin : 06h-12h Après-midi : 13h-19h Soirée : 20h à 05h	
QB17	Est-ce que vous avez mendié dans le passé ? (filter s'il mendie actuellement)	1. Oui 2. non	Sinon-> aller à QC01
QB18	Si oui quand ? (filter s'il mendie actuellement)	 Mois année	
QB19	Pour quelles raisons avez-vous arrêté de mendier ? (filter s'il mendie actuellement)		
	Autres activités/reactions		
QC01	En dehors de la mendicité y a-t-il d'autres activités que vous menez qui vous rapporte de l'argent à reverser	1. Oui 2. non	
QC02	Si oui quelles sont les activités ?	1. Porter des bagages 2. Ramasser les poubelles 3. Laver la vaisselle 4. Laver les vitres d'auto 5. Vendre des cartes téléphoniques 6. Petit commerce 7. Autres à préciser.....(nettoyage)	

Guide d'entretien Acteurs communaux/Prestataires du projet
(Maires, UCP, CP, animateurs, ndéyu *daaras*, conseillers municipaux)

Section 1 : Identification

Date : Région : Commune :
Sexe Répondant :
Rôle et place dans le projet : Années d'expériences dans le projet :
Interviewer : Assistant :
Heure début () Heure fin ()
Durée de l'Entretien : H.....mn

Section 2 : Impacts du projet

- Impact du projet sur le dialogue public et la communauté

Quels sont les objectifs/résultats du projet ?

Quelles sont les principales activités mises en œuvre ?

Quel est votre niveau d'implication dans le projet ?

Qu'est-ce que le projet a changé au niveau de la communauté de manière générale ?

Quelles sont les difficultés rencontrées dans la gestion du projet ? (système de suivi, processus de prise de décision, etc.)

- Réduction et points de vue sur la mendicité

Quelles observations faites-vous de la situation des *daaras* et de l'enfant talibé ?

Comment appréciez-vous l'approche d'intervention du projet et les résultats obtenus en rapport avec la mendicité ?

Avez-vous noté des changements de perception sur la mendicité ? Si oui, lesquels ?

Section 3 : Réplicabilité des activités du projet

Quelles sont les activités susceptibles d'être adaptées dans d'autres communes et/ou au niveau national ?

Quelles sont les mesures à prendre pour que cette approche marche dans d'autres communes ?

Section 4 : Plus-value de l'approche communale du projet

Comment appréciez-vous l'approche d'intervention du projet par rapport aux approches antérieures ?

Qu'est-ce qu'elle a de plus significative ?

Quelles sont les barrières ou contraintes que vous avez relevées dans cette approche communale ?

Nous vous remercions de votre aimable participation

Guide d'entretien Acteurs institutionnels

(CNLTP, ONUDC, ONG, IEF, Services d'Hygiène, Sous-préfet, Services de santé, Police, Cabinets et prestataires privés, GIRAF)

Section I : Identification

Date : Région : Commune :

Sexe Répondant : Rôle et place dans le projet :

Années d'expériences dans le projet :

Interviewer : Assistant :

Heure début () Heure fin ()

Durée de l'Entretien : H.....mn

Section 2 : Niveau de connaissance du projet CTIP/Talibé

Quels sont les objectifs/résultats attendus du projet ?

Quelles sont les principales activités mises en œuvre ?

Quel est votre niveau d'implication/d'information sur le projet ?

Le projet CTIP-Talibé a-t-il fait l'objet d'une présentation/discussion à l'occasion d'une de vos séances de travail ?

Section 3 : Missions/rôles et responsabilités

Quelle est la mission de votre structure (Mairies, ONUDC, Unités de Coordination) .

Quelles sont les actions que vous avez menées en rapport avec les missions dévolues ?

Quelles sont les forces que vous avez relevées dans les actions menées contre la mendicité ?

Quelles sont les limites que vous avez relevées dans les actions menées contre la mendicité ?

Existe-t-il une plateforme des acteurs spécifiques à la mendicité ? Si oui, veuillez donner les détails.

Section 3 : Mendicité des enfants

Quels sont les principaux instruments institutionnels et juridiques de lutte contre la mendicité au Sénégal ?

Quelle est la place de la lutte contre la mendicité dans vos missions et actions ?

Quelles sont les actions que vous avez menées pour prendre en charge le phénomène de la mendicité ?

Comment appréciez-vous l'approche d'intervention du projet et les résultats obtenus en rapport avec la réduction de la mendicité ?

Quelles sont les forces de l'approche d'intervention du projet ?

Quelles sont les faiblesses de l'approche d'intervention du projet ?

Quelle approche proposerez-vous pour mettre fin à la mendicité des enfants ?

Nous vous remercions de votre aimable participation

Guide de focus-group avec les Maitres coraniques

Cibles : Maitres coraniques, association des maitres coraniques

Commune :

Quartier :

Date du FGD:

Nom de l'interviewer :

Nom de l'assistant (e) :

Heure de début du FGD :

Heure de fin du FGD :

Section I : Identification

N°	Nom et prénom du serigne daara	Age	Nom du daara	Nombre de talibés	Types d'enseignement	Provenance géographique
01						
02						
03						
04						
05						
06						
07						
08						
09						
10						

Section 2 : Impacts du projet

- Impact du projet sur le dialogue public et la communauté

Quelles sont les principales informations que vous avez du projet mis en œuvre par la municipalité (GTFC ou Médina) pour les *daaras* et les *talibés* ?

Quelles sont les principales activités mises en œuvre ?

Quelle appréciation faites-vous de votre implication dans le projet ?

Qu'est-ce que le projet a changé pour les *daaras* et les *talibés* ?

Qu'est-ce que le projet a changé au niveau de la communauté de manière générale ?

- Réduction et points de vue sur la mendicité

Que pensez-vous de la mendicité des *talibés* ?

Quelles observations faites-vous de la situation des *daaras* et de l'enfant talibé avec le projet ?

Est-ce que les *talibés* mendient toujours ? Si oui pourquoi ?

Si non, comment se passe la gestion quotidienne du daara ?

Quel changement de perception sur la mendicité avez-vous noté, avec l'avènement du projet ?

Section 3 : Plus-value de l'approche communale du projet

Que pensez-vous du fait que le projet soit confié aux mairies ?

Pensez-vous que la gestion municipale des problèmes des *daaras* a apporté un plus par rapport aux acteurs que vous avez connus jusqu'ici ?

Qu'est-ce qui vous a semblé le plus marquant positivement dans vos relations avec la municipalité ?

Qu'est-ce qui vous a le plus posé problème dans ces relations ?

Section 4 : Recommandations générales

Que suggérez-vous pour une meilleure prise en charge des problèmes des *daaras* et de l'enfant talibé ?

Quelle place devrait-on donner aux responsables de *daaras* dans cette perspective ?

Nous vous remercions de votre aimable participation.

Guide de focus-group avec les acteurs communautaires

(Leaders communautaires, leaders religieux, GPF, Ndeyu daara, ASC, chefs de quartier)

Caractéristiques socio démographiques des participants

Commune :

Quartier :

Date du FGD:

Nom de l'interviewer :

Nom de l'assistant (e) :

Heure de début du FGD :

Heure de fin du FGD :

N°	Nom et prénom	Age	Sexe	Statut Matrimonial	Niveau d'instruction
01					
02					
03					
04					
05					
06					
07					
08					
09					
10					

Section 2 : Impacts du projet

- Impact du projet sur le dialogue public et la communauté

Quelles sont les principales informations que vous avez du projet mis en œuvre par la municipalité (GTFC ou Médina) pour les *daaras* et les *talibés* ?

Parlez-nous des principales activités mises en œuvre ?

Quelle appréciation faites-vous de votre implication dans le projet ?

Comment voyez-vous l'appropriation du projet par les *daaras* et les *talibés* ?

Qu'est-ce que le projet a changé au niveau de la communauté de manière générale ?

- Réduction et points de vue sur la mendicité

Quelles observations faites-vous de la situation des *daaras* et de l'enfant talibé ?

Que pensez-vous de la mendicité des *talibés* ?

Pensez-vous que les *talibés* mendient toujours autant qu'avant ? Si non, quelles en seraient les raisons ?

Est-ce que les avis sur la mendicité ont changé dans votre communauté ? Si oui, comment cela a-t-il changé ?

Avez-vous noté des changements de perception sur la mendicité avec le projet ? Si oui, lesquels ?

Section 3 : Recommandations générales

Que suggérez-vous pour une meilleure prise en charge des problèmes des *daaras* et de l'enfant talibé ?

Quelle place devrait-on donner aux acteurs communautaires dans cette perspective ?

Nous vous remercions de votre aimable participation.

ANNEX 7: DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Lexique des termes locaux utilisés dans le rapport

Talibé : Le *talibé* est généralement un enfant, confié ou sous l'autorité d'un maître coranique censé lui dispenser l'enseignement du coran. Cet apprentissage a lieu dans un *daara* (école coranique).

Daara : Le mot *daara*, renvoie ici au lieu d'apprentissage du coran.

Sérigne daara : Le *sérigne daara* (maître coranique) est la personne chargée d'apprentissage le coran au « talibé ». Il est parole morale du *daara* et peut, dans certains cas, être aidé par dans cette tâche par des assistants chargés de l'enseignement des *talibés*.

Ndeyou daara : Le concept de *ndeyou daara* désigne un regroupement de femmes sensibles à la situation des *talibés* et engagées à leur apporter un soutien psychologique, moral ou matériel. Elles apparaissent le plus souvent comme des « marraines » ou « tutrices » des *talibés*.

Badiénous gokh : Women's communities who provide health services to populations.

Imam : Dignitaire musulman, qui, dans une mosquée, tient le rôle de chef de la prière.

ANNEX 8: SENEGAL REDUCTION IN BEGGING PROJECTS AND APPROACHES

Organization	Regions	Currently Active	Summary
Community-based Approach			
Tostan	Thiès	Yes	Work at community level to get agreement on principles of human rights to be adhered to by the community. Work with <i>daaras</i> to improve conditions and provide additional medical and education services. Communities also agree to stop child begging practices.
Anti-Slavery International	Kaolack, Thies, Mbour, Fouta	Yes	Supporting work of Tostan and RADDHO to promote awareness of child rights and advocate for a stop to child begging. Leading advocacy at international level to promote daara modernization model and encourage international pressure/support.
Plan International	Pikine and St. Louis	No	Ran <i>Lutte Contre la Mendicte Forcée</i> project from 2013-2016. Worked directly with civil society and community groups to develop a critical mass to lobby local authorities for reduction of child begging. Currently working on law enforcement training.
Save the Children	Guediawaye, Kolda, Ziguinchor	Yes	Run “children on the move” and “children on the street” programs targeting <i>talibés</i> and street children. Focus on providing care for the children and improving services within <i>daaras</i> . Work directly with communities to create child protection committees.
ENDA Jeunesse-Action	Kolda, St. Louis	Yes	Working on developing child protection committees to identify and report trafficking cases between Kolda (source) and St. Louis (destination).

Free the Slaves	Kolda, St. Louis	Yes	Working on developing child protection committees to identify and report trafficking cases between Kolda (source) and St. Louis (destination).
Legal/Policy Work			
RADDHO			Working at national and regional levels to guide and accelerate implementation of effective daara reform and regulation (advocacy with Daara Inspectorate, Ministry of Education, parliamentarians, work on Modern Daara Bill, delivery of training for daara inspectors, work with national media and artists/musicians to raise awareness and encourage buy-in, advocacy with African Union (specifically ACERWC) to increase pressure to adopt and implement policy.
Ministry of Family	National	Yes	Coordinated the recent August, 2016 presidential initiative sweep of children begging in the streets. Advocates for support services for families in need.
CONAFE	National	Yes	Coalition of 212 NGOs working on the rights of children. Advocate for enforcement of child protection laws
OHCHR	National	Yes	Promoting enforcement of 2005 anti-trafficking laws and Code of the Child with the nation-level ministries.
Safe Houses			
SAMU Social	Ouakam	Yes	Community-based organization that does nightly round-up of street children and gives them a safe place to sleep.
Action Enfance Senegal	Guediawaye	Yes	Child protection, education, provide residential services for vulnerable children and provide services for children with cognitive disability.

Empire des Enfants	Dakar	Yes	Working for 15 years in providing care and support for children living in the street.
Maison de la Gare	St. Louis	Yes	A shelter offering food, clothes and some vocation training activities to <i>talibés</i> and run-aways. Roughly 1,300 children come through their doors each week; only 9 reside there temporarily. Work with <i>daaras</i> to talk about standards of operation and report cases of abuse to police. Has returned over 200 children to their families.
SOS Village d'Enfant	Kaolack, Kolda, Louga, Pikine	Yes	Provide support services to street children and orphans. Provide support services to families and help to find adoptive homes for children.
Village Pilote	Pikine	Yes	Prevention and protection of children in the street including re-unification with families and social service support.
Maison Rose	Guediawaye		Manage a safe house in Guediawaye for girls.
Association pour le sourire d'un enfant	Thiès	Yes	Run a juvenile delinquency support program which includes former <i>talibés</i>
La Lumière	Kolda and Kedougou	Yes	Provide support services through women's groups (<i>epargne pour le changement/savings for change</i> (EPC). Work in mines in Kedougou to support children's ability to attend school and stop mining.
Daara modernization			
GTZ	National	Yes	GTZ funded research to develop a national database of <i>daaras</i> and Franco-Arabe Schools. Currently the database consists of roughly 5,749 <i>daaras</i> and schools and is being finalized with the MEN/DPRE.

ChildFund	Thies, Diourbel	Yes	Ran a model modern daraa in Mékhe, Thiès. Looking to create a modern daraa in Diourbel
UNICEF	St. Louis, Kedougou and Tambacounda	Yes	Currently developing a model daara for pre-schoolers ages 3-5 in St. Louis. Piloting a re-entry program for children ages 9-12 to transition back into school in Tambacounda and Kedougou.
World Bank		Yes	Funding as part of the <i>Programme d'Amélioration de la qualité et de l'équité dans l'Education de Base (PAQEEB)</i> . PAQEEB includes a daara modernization program with the Ministry of National Education's (MEN) Daara Inspection Division. Focused on creating a minimum set of standards and support for <i>daaras</i> across the country. Want to include French and math lessons in <i>daaras</i> . Daars must commit to no begging in order to participate.
Daara Inspection/MEN	All regions	Yes	Responsible for setting standards for <i>daaras</i> and regulating <i>daaras</i> . Currently implementing 100 modern <i>daaras</i> across the country. Includes daara renovation, canteens and access to medical services. <i>Daaras</i> that meet the national standards will be considered "modern <i>daaras</i> "
Mozdahir International	National	Yes	Construct modern <i>daaras</i> that provide instruction in other subjects. Currently building a large complex in Kolda for up to 400 children.
Secours Islamic	Dakar	Yes	Working in 15 <i>daaras</i> in Dakar to improve conditions and services for <i>talibés</i> .
Islamic Development Bank	All regions	No	Responsible for funding <i>Projet d'appui à la modernisation des daaras (PAMOD)</i> a daara modernization program that would construct 64 model modern <i>daaras</i> . Project has been slow to take-off and is not currently active.

ANNEX 9: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS MATRIX

November 15, 2016

Updated November 23, 2016 based on comments from discussion with Program Office and DRG Team

Updated on December 8, 2016 based on supplementary interviews with project stakeholders

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
Q 1: How has the intervention changed the public dialogue (in the two communes) and views on the talibé begging issue? Did that dialogue evolve from the welfare of the talibé to the forced begging issue? Is that a critical pathway for attitudinal change? This includes the perceptions of the various groups	F.1.1. The majority of community member focus groups in both Medina and GTFC now see current child begging practices as a form of exploitation. F.1.2. Some community members in the focus group, although not the majority, still see the importance of allowing children to beg as part of developing humility. In spite of this, they still believe that the majority of children found begging in the street are not <i>talibés</i> associated with <i>daaras</i>. This was the case in both the Medina and GTFC community focus group discussions. F.1.3. Many community members are concerned with the quality and authenticity of <i>daaras</i> today. They spoke of the way that <i>daaras</i> were operated in the past: Quote from community member on the current situation of	FGD with the community members in both communes. FGD with the community members in both communes. FGD with the community members in both communes.	C.1.1 While the majority of community members now see child begging as exploitation; there still remains a minority sentiment that child begging brings humility to children and can be a positive element in their upbringing, but that it must be regulated and not allowed to go unchecked. (F.1.1., F.1.2, F.1.3., F.1.4. and F.1.9) C1.2 The majority of community members see a clear distinction between begging done in the past, which they perceive to be acceptable, and the current begging which they see as unacceptable and exploitative. (F1.3, F1.1, F1.2) C.1.3 Le projet a pu organiser les femmes en association de Ndeyous	R.1.1 Soutenir et encadrer le processus de création et de fonctionnement de la « Maison de l'aumône » incluant en intégrant son appropriation par les acteurs communautaires (C.1.5) R.1.2 Mettre en place et appuyer le fonctionnement d'une plateforme multi-acteurs de lutte contre la mendicité des enfants assorti d'un plan d'action à court, moyen ou long terme. Cette plateforme multi-acteurs jouera un rôle d'alerte et aura pour responsabilité de gérer les cas de traite repérés dans les communes. (C.1.3, C.1.4). R.1.3. Renforcer la dynamique organisationnelle et le leadership

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
involved: marabouts, commune leaders, serigne <i>daaras</i> , <i>talibés</i> , public school directors, and mothers' association of <i>daaras</i> .	<i>daaras</i>: In talking about the past: "On pratiquait la mendicité pour former les <i>talibés</i> et diminuer leur orgueil, c'était ça l'objectif de la mendicité. Aujourd'hui, c'est l'exploitation" (community focus group member) F.1.4. Other members felt that the current situation of child begging has larger consequences for the image of Islam: "Avant les <i>talibés</i> entraient dans des maisons bien choisies et rentraient directement chez eux. Si un daara était dans le besoin, les habitants savaient qu'il y'avait des problèmes dans tels daara et on réglait le problème. Mais actuellement, avec ce qui se passe on est en train de ternir la réputation de l'islam » (community focus group member). F.1.5. Le projet a permis la désignation de Ndeyou <i>daaras</i> qui jouent un rôle important en termes de communication avec les maîtres coraniques. Elles assurent une fonction de relais à travers des séances d'informations/sensibilisation et servent de tampon entre les UCP et les maîtres coraniques de même que dans la prise en charge des <i>talibés</i>. C'est grâce au projet que les Ndeyou <i>daaras</i> ont été fédérées pour former une association solide pour la lutte contre la mendicité dans les 2 Communes.	FGD with the community members in both communes. FGD with Ndeyou <i>Daaras</i> in both communes. Interviews with UCP and Mayors	<i>Daaras</i> ce qui a contribué à mieux toucher les populations autour d'activités de mobilisation et de sensibilisation sur le projet. Leurs activités ont donc eu des effets positifs sur le dialogue public au sein de la communauté. (F.1.5) C.1.4. This project has contributed to increasing community understanding of they need to organize themselves in order to address child begging. The activity has contributed to the creation of a volunteer monitoring system in both Communes. (F.1.6.) C.1.5. Le dialogue au sein de la population a eu des effets positifs en poussant la communauté vers des propositions de solution avec l'idée de création d'une « Maison de l'aumône » qui, une fois créée, pourrait réduire la mendicité dans les rues et les artères des deux communes. (F.1.11, F.1.12.) C.1.6. Du côté des Serignes <i>daaras</i>, leur enrôlement dans le projet et les sensibilisations n'ont pas permis un engagement automatique à plaider contre la mendicité. Ils ne sont pas contre la mendicité et demandent plutôt sa réglementation. Mais ce ne sont pas tous les Serignes <i>daaras</i>	des Ndeyou <i>daaras</i> pour qu'elles puissent davantage jouer un rôle de médiation auprès des Serignes <i>daaras</i> en vue de leur conscientisation pour un arrêt total de la mendicité (C.1.1, C.1.2, C.1.3) R1.4 Support the process of formalizing the citizen watch committees to ensure they are operational and sustainable (C.1.6) R1.5 Encourager une meilleure organisation et une institutionnalisation des comités de veille dans les deux communes (C.1.4) R 1.6 Elaborer une feuille de route avec des actions claires à mener pour une bonne application des arrêtés signés par les 2 Mairies (C.1.8) R 1.7 Explorer les possibilités d'implication du cabinet chargé de la formation des acteurs pendant la mise en œuvre du projet pour un accompagnement/réajustement dans une perspective de suivi des

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	F.1.6. Les changements de points de vue restent mitigés et varient d’une catégorie d’acteurs à une autre. Selon les propos des Maires et des UCP, les comités de veille font partie du dispositif initié par les 2 communes pour empêcher la venue de nouveaux <i>talibés</i> dans leurs localités, même si leur rôle est limité par un manque de moyens logistiques. Cette posture témoigne en fait d’après eux d’un changement de point de vue à travers l’esprit d’alerte qu’ils ont adopté. Ces entités non formalisées sont destinées à surveiller, repérer ou référer les <i>talibés</i> de la rue. Il faut souligner que ces groupes de soutien travaillent encore de manière bénévole et qu’aucun contrat formel ne les lie avec les UCP. F.1.7. The majority of the Serigne <i>daaras</i> in Medina never required their talibés to beg and did not have <i>talibés</i> that stayed overnight in their <i>daaras</i>. “Moi j’ai fait mon daara depuis 1977, mais je ne l’ai jamais fait mendier personne. Mes apprenants venaient du quartier et rentraient chez eux après leurs cours... Chaque parent qui me donne en charge son enfant pour son apprentissage, je lui dis toujours de le mettre également à l’école française à un certain âge. » (serigne daara focus group member) F.1.8. A la Médina les Serignes <i>daaras</i> ne sont pas contre l’idée de faire mendier les enfants mais souhaite que cela mieux réglementé. Dans	FGD with Serignes <i>daaras</i>, Récit de vie avec des maîtres coraniques FGD with Serignes <i>daaras</i>, Récit de vie avec des maîtres coraniques	qui faisaient mendier leurs <i>talibés</i> avant l’avènement du projet. Il existait dans les 2 Communes des <i>daaras</i> qui avaient une orientation exclusive pour l’apprentissage du coran sans faire mendier leurs <i>talibés</i>. (F.1.7, F.1.11) C.1.7 The project came at an opportune time in Medina. It was introduced following the tragic fire that killed 9 <i>talibés</i> sleeping in a <i>daaras</i> in Medina. This event was a catalyst for raising awareness and anger over the treatment and living conditions for <i>talibés</i>. The project created synergy with this increased public awareness which allowed the commune of Medina to have the courage to ban begging completely from all <i>daaras</i> and in all parts of the commune. (F.1.12 and 13) C.1.8 L’approche développée à travers ce projet a contribué au « changement d’attitudes » au niveau des 2 communes surtout grâce à la formation en leadership transformationnel qui a changé les paradigmes au niveau des acteurs formés qui ont ensuite transmis leurs acquis au niveau de leur environnement.	acquis en matière de leadership transformationnel. (C.1.9) R 1.9 Inclure les « techniques de communication » conjointement aux modules de la formation en leadership transformationnel pour outiller les acteurs, notamment les animateurs chargés de dérouler les niches et les actions de sensibilisation au niveau des communautés. (C.1.11) R 1.10 Organiser les Serignes <i>daaras</i> en collectif fonctionnel reconnu au niveau de chaque commune afin de mieux les enrôler dans la philosophie du projet et de les pousser à s’approprier réellement la lutte contre la mendicité. (C.1.6)

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	le focus group avec les Serignes <i>daaras</i> à la Médina, un d'entre eux a souligné que « ...La mendicité c'est quelque chose de bien mais il faut le réglementer. Sans réglementation, c'est de l'exploitation. » Extrait du focus group avec les maîtres coraniques de la Médina F.1.9. Les entretiens avec les UCP, les Maires, les Ndeyous <i>daaras</i> montrent que les points de vue ont changé au niveau de la communauté et ceux-ci se reflètent sur leurs actions à l'endroit des <i>talibés</i> « <i>Nous avons rompu avec le fait de donner de l'argent aux enfants, toutes nos aides se font avec du matériel et des vivres</i> » Extrait du FG avec les Ndeyous <i>Daaras</i>.(GTFC) F.1.10. Focus group discussions with community members showed a great deal of concern toward the issue of how to deal with the children coming into their commune from other communes; regions and even countries to beg. "L'autre jour, j'ai demandé à un talibé où il habite et il m'a dit qu'il habitait Guinée Bissau. Je lui ai dit est-ce que tu sais qu'on ramasse les enfants et il me répond oui et qu'il voulait rentrer chez ses parents » (community member in focus group) F1.11. The primary concern for community members is what to do with children found begging and living in the streets. Some community members suggested the idea of a	Interviews with UCP, Mayors and Ndeyous <i>daaras</i> FGD with the community members in both communes. FGD with the community members in both communes.	C.1.8 Les arrêtés signés par les 2 Mairies peuvent être cités comme étant des éléments qui témoignent du changement au niveau du dialogue public. (F.1.14.) C.1.9 The leadership training sessions organized by GIRAFE were seen as extremely helpful by the participants from the two communes, but they all would have preferred to have more ongoing support from GIRAFE to help them in implementation of their work. (F.1.15., F.1.16. F.1.17. F.1.18. F.1.19. F.1.20) C.1.10 Les techniques d'enrôlement acquis par les UCP durant la formation en leadership transformationnel ont permis aux équipes du projet d'aborder avec plus de facilité certains acteurs notamment les serignes <i>daaras</i> qui étaient réticents au début du processus comme ce fut le cas à GTFC. (F.1.15 ; F.1.21) C1.11 Both commune project coordinators and staff felt that the topics for the training were relevant and useful but both noted	

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	commune-based police to handle the issue of child begging. Many felt that involving the police would not resolve the problem if it is only addressed at the child level, when in fact, the root of the problem is with the parents and the serigne that allows the begging to happen, “Est-ce qu’on pourrait rendre l’enfant à ses parents directement parce que je me suis dit pour punir l’enfant ou pour punir le serigne daara pourquoi pas punir le père de l’enfant qui donne son enfant dans ces conditions là.”. Others proposed the idea of child sponsorship: Both communes have proposed to create des « Maisons de l’aumône » ont vu le jour dans le cadre d’échanges entre les différents acteurs au sein des communes notamment entre les Ndeyous <i>Daaras</i>, les UCP, les maires et les maîtres coraniques. F.1.12. Community members from Medina noted that the timing of the project was good as it came right after an incident where nine <i>talibés</i> burned to death in a daara in Medina. This occurred in March, 2013 and was a shock to the commune of Medina and Dakar. It was well covered in the national news. So the project came at a time when the population in Medina was ready to do something to change things, “Ainsi, il faut aussi dire que l’incendie a été un choc qui a bouleversé nos habitudes. Avant, à chaque coin de rue, on implantait un daara. Maintenant tout cela est réglementé. (community member focus group)	FGD with the community members in Medina. Individual interview with GIRAFE	that communication is a critical area that they would have liked to have training to better support their ability to engage different approaches to communicating with different target groups in their commune. (F1.18; F1.19)	

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	F.1.13. GIRAFE, which conducted the leadership training with the two communes at the launch of the project; noted that they had to treat the two communes differently as Medina had recently the fire on March 3 2013 and people were much more aware and ready to mobilize for change on this issue. F.1.14. As a result of this project, the two Mayors' offices signed an "arrêté" creating a bylaw to regulate child begging. In Medina the bylaw forbids any child begging and in GTFC the bylaw regulates the hours in which children are allowed to beg during the day if they are attached to a daara in GTFC. L'arrêté à Medina, en son article 1, stipule « l'interdiction de la pratique de la mendicité de jour comme de nuit sur les grandes artères ainsi que les lieux publics de la commune ». F.1.15. Basé sur les échanges eues avec les UCP des 2 communes, l'ONUDC et le cabinet GIRAFE la formation a globalement eu des effets positifs sur les participants. D'après les entretiens de groupe réalisés avec les UCP des 2 communes, c'est grâce aux séances de formation en leadership transformationnel que les équipes ont pu mieux aborder les acteurs communautaires sur le terrain changeant du coup le dialogue public. « <i>La formation nous a permis de mieux comprendre le projet et de pouvoir démultiplier les informations...les enseignements appris sur le terrain ... Ça nous a</i>	Arrete from the 2 communes Interviews with UCP communes of Medina and GTFC Interview with ONUDC Interview with GIRAFE		

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	<i>permis de pouvoir aborder les gens avec qui devions travailler surtout les marabouts, les acteurs communautaires et les décideurs...Et tout cela nous a permis de mieux décliner pratiquement notre travail sur le terrain. ».</i> Extrait de l'entretien de groupe avec l'UCP de la Médina. « Certains ont effectivement eu des comportements nouveaux et ont pris des engagements qu'ils ont respectés. Certains en sont ressortis complètement ragaillardis. Cela s'est traduit par des prises de positions publiques, l'organisation d'activités innovantes et la mobilisation d'autres personnes pour l'atteinte des résultats du projet. » Extrait de l'entretien de groupe avec Mr Saka de l'ONUDC « par la formation individuelle on a demandé à chaque participant comment il pratiquait sur le terrain, et moi dans ma commune personnellement ceux qui ont eu à me parler du projet ou du programme c'est les participants qui ont parlé à ces gens-là de ce qu'on faisait et ils étaient tellement intéressés » Extrait de l'entretien individuel avec Mme Sy du cabinet GIRAFE F.1.16. Les discussions avec les points focaux dans les 2 Communes ont également montré un sentiment de satisfaction et une appréciation positive par rapport à la formation. Les UCP ont clairement soutenu des avantages dans le rôle joué par la formation dans la mise en œuvre du projet. « <i>La formation avec le cabinet</i>	Interview with UCP commune of GTFC Interview with UCP communes of Medina		

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	<i>GIRAFFE nous a beaucoup aidé dans la mise en œuvre et dans l'effectivité de la question de l'enfance sur le terrain surtout au niveau des changements de comportements positifs et le changement de paradigmes... Même en interne cela a amélioré notre fonctionnement »</i> Extrait de l'entretien de groupe avec l'UCP de la Médina. A GTFC, les avis n'ont pas varié sur la formation. Là aussi les perceptions sont très positives et reconnaissent sa pertinence pour aborder les différents acteurs sur le terrain : <i>« avec la formation nous avons eu à connaître diverses approches selon la cible que nous avons en face... Ce sont des approches que nous avons eues à apprendre sur comment aborder un sujet concernant la cible que nous avons en face pour orienter la discussion ».</i> Extrait de l'entretien de groupe avec l'UCP de la GTFC F.1.17. L'intérêt pour la formation est certes ressorti dans les discussions mais selon l'UCP de la Médina ils sont encore <i>« sur leur faim. La majorité des participants était sur leur faim...Ils voulaient qu'on puisse continuer la formation...Il y'avait beaucoup de modules qui restaient mais bon c'était le contrat ».</i> Extrait de l'entretien de groupe avec l'UCP de la Médina. F.1.18 D'après l'UCP Medina tout le contenu de la formation était important alors qu'à GTFC l'UCP pense que les modules portant sur l'intelligence émotionnelle et le développement	Interview with UCP Medina. Interview with UCP communes of GTFC.		

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	personnel ont été les plus importants. « <i>Les contenus les plus pertinents nous les avons eus... c'était avec le développement personnel c'est fondamental c'était un objectif spécifique... Apprendre aussi à pratiquer les compétences de l'intelligence émotionnelle parfois les gens pour un rien ils sont prêts à tout gâter parce ce qu'ils se disent ces gens c'est des ennemis de l'islam donc comment arriver à reconvertir leurs mentalités</i> ». F1.19 Toutefois, des points d'amélioration pour la formation ont été soulevé par les participants qui jugent que « la communication est fondamentale...si on avait la communication les choses allaient se parfaire... le projet en lui-même compte beaucoup sur la communication surtout les divers supports de communication parce que les cibles sont un peu variées...donc il faut essayer de trouver un système communicationnel pouvant attirer tout le monde ». Extrait de l'entretien de groupe avec l'UCP de la GTFC.			

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
QE 2: Has the intervention reduced begging?	The question regarding the reduction in begging by talibé is essentially looking at two different sets of interviewees and two different ways of measuring reduction in begging.	Quantitative surveys with <i>talibés</i> in the commune <i>daaras</i> and interviews with	C 2.1 There has been a decrease in the number of <i>talibés</i> that beg in both communities, though only in	R.2.1. In Medina, implement strategies to ensure the sustainability of the achievements in reducing begging through acknowledgement and motivation

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
If so, to what level?	The two groups interviewed during the project are <i>talibés</i> at <i>daaras</i> in the local community and <i>talibés</i> found when walking the street in the community. This enabled the evaluation team to account for the porous communal borders and the potential case that <i>talibés</i> begging in the street originate from outside the community. The two different ways of measuring a reduction of begging includes looking at the overall number of <i>talibés</i> who beg as well as the amount of time in a day they spend begging. Reductions in either are considered by the project, to be a reduction in begging. The <i>talibés</i> at the <i>daaras</i>, were asked if they beg and if they do, at what times they currently begged compared to two years ago. The <i>talibés</i> found on the street were asked the same questions as well as if they were part of a <i>daara</i> and where that <i>daara</i> was located and where they originated. A total of 215 <i>talibés</i> attached to <i>daaras</i> in the communes were interviewed. In Medina 113 were interviewed and in GTFC 102 were interviewed. Additionally, the evaluation team interviewed <i>talibés</i> found in the streets in both communes. A total of 64 <i>talibés</i> were interviewed in both communes; 5 were interviewed in Medina and 59 were interviewed in GTFC.	children begging in the streets of the two communes. Interviews with the mayors Interviews with the UCP of Medina and GTFC FGD with community members	Medina is there a clear link with project activities. (F2.1-F2.23) C 2.2 Medina managed to close the three <i>daaras</i> that practiced begging, using project funds to repatriate the talibé to their place of origin. The project has effectively reduced begging originating from Medina <i>daaras</i> to zero. (F.2.5, F.2.7, F.2.8, F.2.9, F.2.10) C 2.3 In GTFC, one of the three <i>daaras</i> that practiced begging was closed due to a lack of space to operate. While this can be seen as an over 50% decrease in talibé begging in GTFC, it is not clear that this is a direct result of the project's interventions. (F.2.6, F.2.11, F.2.12, F.2.13, F2.24) C.2.4 In terms of a reduction in the amount of hours spent begging, something targeted by the GTFC Mayor's office in their by-law, results show this was unsuccessful, with the average number of hours being roughly the same as before the project. The attempt to use additional learning of French and math to reduce begging times failed as those classes were not timed correctly in order to target peak	(symbolic gifts) and continue to run targeted advocacy regarding the issues of child begging with the community. (C.2.2) R. 2.2 Continue to support structures put in place such as the UCP and the Ndeyous <i>Daaras</i> to ensure their sustainability. (C2.2, C2.5) R.2.3. Provide support to care for talibé and link support allocation based on key indicators of improved living conditions of the talibé such as their learning performance of the Koran, their attendance at additional French and math classes, overall hygiene and health, and participation in leisure activities, such as sports. (C.2.3, C.2.4, C.2.6) R.2.4. Make sure to have an effective system of warning and monitoring over new <i>daaras</i> in Medina to ensure begging does not return. This could be done through the Inspection de <i>Daaras</i>, who could work with community groups to check on the conditions of various <i>daaras</i> should flags be raised in the community regarding an increase of begging in the streets. (C2.2, C2.4, C2.5)

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations												
	Therefore, a total of 279 <i>talibés</i> found in both communes were interviewed over the course of the evaluation. F.2.1 When asked the question « Do you beg? », 103 out of 279 (36.9%) <i>talibés</i> confirmed that they continue to beg. <table><tr><th>Type of talibé</th><th>Number</th><th>Percentage</th></tr><tr><td>Begging</td><td>103</td><td>36.92</td></tr><tr><td>Non Begging</td><td>176</td><td>63.08</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>279</td><td>100.00</td></tr></table> Source: Field surveys f 2.2 In Medina, of the 113 talibé interviewed, none of them continued to practice begging and the serigne <i>daaras</i> confirmed this fact (that begging is not practiced). F 2.3 Of the 20 serigne <i>daaras</i> met with over the course of evaluation, only two admitted that begging is still practiced by their <i>talibés</i>. Both of these two <i>daaras</i> are located in the GTFC community and the <i>talibés</i> who were interviewed confirmed this as only <i>talibés</i> from those <i>daaras</i> said they continued to beg. Originally the project identified seven <i>daaras</i> in GTFC as practicing begging at the start of the project, however three of those six <i>daaras</i> were	Type of talibé	Number	Percentage	Begging	103	36.92	Non Begging	176	63.08	Total	279	100.00		begging periods. (F.2.15, F.2.16, F.2.17) C 2.5 In terms of reducing begging in the streets of the community, there is clear evidence that Medina has less of an issue than GTFC. Because no baseline attempt was made to see how many children were on the street begging at the start of the project, we cannot say if five is a reduction for Medina compared to before, but it is clearly far less than the 59 found in GTFC. Additionally, the evaluation team found it much easier to find children begging in the streets of GTFC than in Medina. (F.2.9, F.2.10, F.2.21, F.2.23) C 2.6 GTFC has not had as much success deterring <i>talibés</i> from other communities from begging in the streets. 26 out of the 59 <i>talibés</i> that reported begging were from the neighboring community of Grand Dakar. Again, as there is no baseline on talibé begging on the street from other communities prior to the project, there could have been a reduction, but it is not possible to tell. Regardless, the evaluation team noted it was rather easy to find the 59 talibé that were interviewed in GTFC and 44% of	R.2.5. Work with the Serigne <i>daaras</i> who still practice begging to identify their incentives continue the practice and identify suitable alternatives. (C.2.3, C.2.9) R.2.6. Enhance motivation and commitment of the Ndeyous <i>Daaras</i> so they can continue to play their role (technical support and training i.e. income generating activities) (C.2.5, C.2.6) R.2.7. Ensure that the additional lessons are adjusted in GTFC for better retention of <i>talibés</i> by making them coincide with their begging hours (07H00-09H00 for morning and 13.00-15.00 in the afternoon) (C.2.4) R.2.8. Sensitize the surveillance brigades and monitoring committees to focus their efforts on the peak begging hours as talibé from outside the community adhere to the same begging schedule that closely follows meal hours in Senegal. This will allow them to report talibé that are begging quickly and act as a deterrent to talibé from other communities entering in order to beg. (C.2.4, C.2.5, C.2.6, C.2.7, C.2.8)
Type of talibé	Number	Percentage														
Begging	103	36.92														
Non Begging	176	63.08														
Total	279	100.00														

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	found to not have formally practiced begging, two of them ever and one that stopped prior to the project start. f 2.4 The mayor of Medina commented on how the project played a role in helping to reduce begging. “With the project we were able to arrive now at zero <i>daaras</i> [that practice] begging. There are no longer [many] <i>daaras</i> and those that remain teach the Koran and that we can accept.” f 2.5 One of the actions taken by the Mayor of Medina was to close three <i>daaras</i> that practice begging and return the <i>talibés</i> back to their place of origin. The three <i>daaras</i> in Medina (Daara Saliou Mballo, Daara Abdou Sow and Daara Taysirou Anzir) were each paid 300,000 FCFA to help facilitate this process. F.2.6 In terms of children found begging on the street in the two communes, the evaluation team had a harder time encountering children begging on the streets in Medina. Only managing to find five children found begging in the street in Medina as opposed to 59 children found begging in the streets of GTFC. This was conducted over a one-week period with two teams of surveyors; one team dispatched to each commune simultaneously. F.2.7 Of the five children found on the street begging in Medina, none originated from Medina or were associated with <i>daaras</i> in		those were local to the community. (F.2.18, F.2.19, F.2.21) C 2.7 La réduction du temps de mendicité ne peut pas être accordée à GTFC du fait que l’emploi du temps pour les cours de français (lundi, mardi et mercredi de 15H à 17H) ne coïncide pas réellement avec les heures de mendicité des enfants qui le font généralement entre 7h et 13h. (F.2.12, F.2.13) C 2.8 La fermeture du daara de la GTFC et le déménagement du Serigne daara ne peuvent pas être reliés aux actions du projet. En triangulant les différents propos, la conclusion qu’on peut en tirer c’est que c’est le propriétaire de la maison qui, de manière légitime, a demandé au serigne daara de lui rendre sa maison. (F.2.10, F.2.11, F.2.17, F.2.18) C 2.9 Les serignes <i>daaras</i> n’ont pas pris conscience du délit de mendicité au Sénégal qui est passible de poursuites judiciaires. A GTFC, que ce soit pour le daara qui a quitté la commune comme pour les 2 autres <i>daaras</i> qui sont encore là-bas, la mendicité est toujours pratiquée. (F.2.8 ; F 2.13)	R.2.9 Allocate adequate funds and technical personnel to conduct a valid baseline to help measure reduction, including the status of begging <i>talibés</i> in the streets that could come from outside the commune. (C.2.3) R.2.10 Faire un plaidoyer au niveau de la mairie de GTFC pour les inciter à modifier leur arrêté pour un arrêt total de la mendicité dans la commune. (C.2.4) R.2.11 Faire comprendre aux serignes <i>daaras</i>, en utilisant les mairies et les services de protection civile communaux de même que la DPE ou encore les services départementaux en charge de ces questions et la CLNTP, que la mendicité est considérée comme un crime au Sénégal (risque d’emprisonnement de 2 à 5 ans et d’une amende de 500 000 francs à 2 000 000 francs) (C 2.9)

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	Medina, but came from neighboring communes including GTFC. F.2.8 In GTFC of the three <i>daaras</i> that continued to beg, only one has left the commune, the other two are still present and still continue to practice begging. The one daara that left GTFC, could not find space to operate and went to another location outside of the commune. F.2.9 Cependant, selon ses propos, c'est après constat de l'état de délabrement avancé d'un daara qu'il a collaboré avec le service de la protection civile de la mairie et avec le propriétaire de la maison pour la fermeture du daara : <i>« Oui c'est le service de la protection civile de la mairie. On a discuté avec eux et ils nous ont dit qu'ils avaient vu cela. Et on y est allé de façon très subtile parce que tu sais parfois les populations...Lorsqu'ils entendent que c'est la mairie qui va fermer un daara, elles peuvent lever un bouclier. Nous on est allé voir le propriétaire...et lui dire que les enfants sont dans des conditions qui posent problème...Donc le maître coranique ne sait pas que c'est nous qui avons démarché cela...Et aujourd'hui on a eu cette fermeture-là »</i> Extrait de l'entretien individuel avec le Point focal de la GTFC F 2.10 D'après le maître coranique qui a quitté la commune de GTFC, son départ n'a pas été suscité par l'UCP mais plutôt par le propriétaire de la maison qu'il occupait avec les enfants : <i>« c'est quelqu'un qui m'avait prêté la maison.</i>			

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	<i>Tu sais j'étais dans un coin de rue et la mairie a repris cet endroit. Mais avant qu'elle ne le reprenne on m'a prêté la maison qui était en face. Elle était encore en construction...Je suis resté là-bas 3 ans. Quand une personne te prête un endroit 3 ans et qu'il vienne après te dire qu'il en a besoin tu ne vas pas t'y opposer tu vas juste sortir. Il nous a dit qu'il voulait qu'on lui rende la maison parce qu'il devait carreler. »</i> Extrait de l'entretien individuel avec le Serigne daara Aliou Kande (Ex daara de la GTFC) F.2.11 D'ailleurs, les propos du point focal du projet à GTFC montrent qu'ils ne sont pas allés dans le sens de fermer des <i>daaras</i> ou d'éradiquer totalement la mendicité dans la commune mais plutôt de poursuivre le but du projet de réduction de 50% du temps du phénomène : « <i>nous n'avions pas à négocier le départ de qui que ce soit. Ce n'était pas dans le programme.</i> » Extrait de l'entretien individuel avec le Point focal de la GTFC F 2.12 Pour le point focal de la GTFC, la réduction du temps de mendicité des enfants a été atteint grâce aux cours de français organisés les après-midis : « <i>On s'est dit que les enfants-là les après-midis ils sont là très tôt, ils font à peu près 10 heures par jour, mais qu'est-ce qu'on va faire pour permettre à ces enfants-là de ne pas être dans les rues à un certain moment. Alors on a négocié un emploi du temps avec les serignes daaras. On leur a dit que maintenant vous savez</i>			

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	<i>que tous les enfants qui n'ont pas 15 ans doivent aller à l'école les lundi après-midi, au lieu d'aller dans la rue ils vont à l'école. »</i> Extrait de l'entretien individuel avec le Point focal de la GTFC F 2.13 Parallèlement, un serigne daara enrôlé dans le projet a soutenu durant l'entretien que : <i>« nous, nos enfants ne mendiaient pas les après-midis, non non ils ne mendient pas à cette heure-là. Moi mes enfants et le daara d'Ibrahima aussi ces enfants, ils ne mendient pas les après-midis. Ils sortent d'ici vers 7H ou 8H et reviennent à 10H pour apprendre le coran...Ils repartent pour chercher le déjeuner...Ensuite à 15H ils apprennent le coran jusqu'à 17H...Ensuite ils vont jouer jusqu'à 19H...C'est pour cela que les cours de français étaient importants pour nous parce que s'ils ne le font pas ils ne feront que jouer ».</i> Extrait de l'entretien individuel avec le Serigne daara Aliou Kande (Ex daara de la GTFC) F 2.14 The two <i>daaras</i> remaining in GTFC that continue to conduct child begging was confirmed in interviews with the two serigne <i>daaras</i> as well as interviews with the <i>talibés</i>. A total of 46 <i>talibés</i> out of 54 total in those two <i>daaras</i> said they currently practice begging. Within these two <i>daaras</i>, there are only two <i>talibés</i> that indicated they had begged in the past and do not anymore. The reason given for quitting by one talibé was that they aged out of			

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	the practice and are now in charge of looking after the younger kids. F 2.15 Interestingly, when asked if the time spent at the daara changed when they started begging, 24 <i>talibés</i> said “yes” and 22 said “no”, of the 24 that said yes, 6 indicated the time had decreased and 18 said it had increased. F 2.16 Sur la base des propos du point focal de la commune de GTFC, c’est à partir de l’introduction des cours de français dans l’emploi du temps des enfants qu’ils sont parvenus à réduire le temps de mendicité des <i>talibés</i> de plus de 50% : « <i>On s’est dit que ces enfants-là les après-midis ils sont là tôt, ils font à peu près 10 heures par jour, mais qu’est-ce qu’on va faire pour permettre à ces enfants-là de ne pas être dans les rues à un certain moment. Alors on a négocié un emploi du temps avec les serignes daaras. On leur a dit que maintenant...tous les enfants qui n’ont pas 15 ans doivent aller à l’école les lundi après-midi, au lieu d’aller dans la rue ils vont aller à l’école.</i> » Extrait de l’entretien individuel avec le Point focal de la GTFC F 2.17 In terms of a change in hours or timing of begging, <i>talibés</i> in the <i>daaras</i> were asked what hours they begged prior to the project and currently. Looking at the 46 <i>talibés</i> that currently beg in the two <i>daaras</i> located in GTFC, 29 of them answered the question regarding hours prior to the start of the project. The average number of hours spent begging was			

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	approximately 5.21 hours. All but one talibé said they begged every day, with the other one saying he did not beg on Sunday. F 2.18 For the same 29 <i>talibés</i>, the current average amount of hours spent begging each day is 5.38. This indicated an increase in the hours spent begging by the <i>talibés</i> that practice begging over the course of the project. The peaks of begging remained the same at 7am and 2pm being the most common begging times (around breakfast time and lunch time). F 2.19 One of the approaches used in GTFC was to implement learning times for <i>talibés</i> that covered additional subjects such as French and math. The plan was to provide these learning times during peak begging hours so as to keep the children away from begging. However, this hasn't been realized as the teaching time didn't correspond to peak begging times. F 2.20 Of the 64 children encountered begging in the street, many came from other communities, but the largest number came from GTFC 47.5% followed by 45.6% in Grand Dakar. None of the <i>talibés</i> met in the street came from Medina. F.2.21. 57 of the 64 talibé interviewed on the street said they beg; with the seven talibé encountered in Sam, an area of GTFC, saying they did not. When asked if they had begged, they all said yes, and when asked why the			

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations								
	stopped, all seven said they feared being picked up as part of the Presidential initiative. F.2.22. Of the five children found begging on the street in Medina, two came from <i>daaras</i> in GTFC and three came from Guédiawaye in the suburbs of Dakar. F.2.23. FGDs conducted with community leaders showed that their feeling was begging originating from their community had been reduced and that their primary concern was over the begging done by children who they perceive to come from outside of the commune and how to stop that. F.2.24. The average number of hours a talibé interviewed in the street practiced begging was much higher than talibé interviewed at their daara, with the average amount of 6.08 hours a day with 75% begging every day. F.2.25. Of the 57 that said they practiced begging, 21 came from the project community of GTFC and the average amount of hours spent begging by those 21 was 5.7 hours, roughly a third of an hour higher than their counterparts that were interviewed at their <i>daaras</i>. <table><tr><th colspan="2">Average number of hours spent begging</th></tr><tr><td>Before project (daara GTFC)</td><td>5.21</td></tr><tr><td>Currently (daara GTFC)</td><td>5.38</td></tr><tr><td>Currently (street/GTFC)</td><td>5.71</td></tr></table>	Average number of hours spent begging		Before project (daara GTFC)	5.21	Currently (daara GTFC)	5.38	Currently (street/GTFC)	5.71			
Average number of hours spent begging												
Before project (daara GTFC)	5.21											
Currently (daara GTFC)	5.38											
Currently (street/GTFC)	5.71											

Evaluation Question	Findings		Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	Currently (street/ all)	6.09			
	F.2.26 A reduction in begging talibès is total in Medina, with no talibès that beg originating from <i>daaras</i> in Medina. However, in GTFC, the reduction in numbers is somewhat difficult to ascertain due to inconsistencies in their project baseline. The numbers provided for the <i>daaras</i> did not match the data collected when interviewing the Serigne <i>Daaras</i> . However, regardless of whether the Serigne <i>Daaras</i> numbers are used as the baseline or the project's baseline is used, the displacement of the homeless daara out of the community reduced the number of talibès who beg by over 50%.				

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
QE 3: Has the activity been successful in achieving community buy-in? If so, has this been a helpful approach for changing attitudes	F.3.1 Les entretiens effectués avec les 2 Maires montrent une grande implication de la communauté dans la mise en œuvre de l'approche du projet. Plusieurs activités ont été menées par les 2 municipalités, en collaboration avec les UCP, à l'endroit des communautés à travers des sensibilisations, des mobilisations	Entretiens avec les 2 Mairies, Entretiens avec les UCP	C3.1. In the implementation of the project's activities, the two Mayors' offices worked in close collaboration with community groups which resulted in the majority of the community buying-in to the project. (f.3.1, f.3.2, f.3.3, f.3.4)	R 3.1 Create a budget line item in the communal budgets to support on-going community awareness programs. (C3.1., C3.2.) R 3.2 Organiser des Foras communautaires avec les Ndeyous

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
toward child-begging and abuses of children in some <i>daaras</i> ?	populaires et des causeries publiques avec les niches. F.3.2 D’après les propos du Maire de la Médina, sa démarche a commencé par « la consultance, les visites de terrain, les réunions et les séminaires ». Il soutient que les populations ont bien adhéré au projet parce qu’il a impliqué le collectif qui intégrait les imams, les badiénous gokh¹⁹, les délégués de quartier, les Ndeyous <i>daaras</i>, les grands décideurs ». F.3.3 Pour réussir l’adhésion de la communauté, le Maire de la Médina a une approche particulière en commençant par « le dialogue pour préparer les populations avant d’aller parler aux marabouts. » Pour lui, il s’agit d’abord « de parler aux délégués de quartiers, aux imams, aux badiénous gokh et leurs dire vous voyez c’est un mauvais exemple de voir des jeunes qui squattent et qui dorment dans la rue, donc on doit trouver une politique pour promouvoir l’apprentissage du coran et d’éviter l’exploitation des jeunes. »	Entretiens avec le Maire de la Médina Entretiens avec le Maire de la Médina	C3.2 It is critical for community buy-in, to first approach a broad range of community members including, Ndeyou <i>daaras</i>, imams, badié nous gokh, neighborhood associations and leaders before beginning activities. (f.3.2, f.3.6, f.3.7) C 3.3 In order to support community buy-in, the Mayors’ Offices led continuous and repeated awareness-raising and mobilization activities among the community. (f.3.4, f.3.5) C 3.4 Despite the wide range of community members working in support of the project, the majority of serigne <i>daaras</i> still support the idea of begging but accept in principle, that it should be regulated. (f.3.10, f.3.11, f.3.12, f.3.13) C 3.5 The serigne <i>daaras</i> involved with the project have expectations to receive financial support for their participation in the project. This expectation has resulted in a	<i>daaras</i>, les Maires, les maîtres coraniques, les imams, les intéressés en vue d’échanger sur les résultats du projet et sur les défis à relever sur la question de la mendicité (C3.2.) R 3.3 Mayors’ offices need to communicate clearly and consistently to Serigne <i>daaras</i> that financial remunerations are not included in the project although support to improve conditions in the <i>daaras</i> will be included. (C3.3., C3.4., C.3.5) R 3.4 Mayor’s offices should consider a strategy of token offerings or motivation that can be given to the serigne daara for their participation in the project. (C3.5.)

¹⁹ Women in the community providing health services

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	F.3.4. D'après l'entretien avec un animateur du projet membre de l'UCP de la Médina, « un nombre pléthorique d'activités sur le plan de la communication et de la sensibilisation a été fait. Les services des Ndeyous <i>daaras</i> et d'autres services communautaires pour le plaidoyer ». F.3.6 Dans le cadre de ce projet, il y'a une bonne collaboration entre la municipalité de GTFC et les Ndeyous <i>daaras</i>. « Nous nous réunissons dans les locaux de la Mairie... On nous a mis dans le projet et nous travaillons avec Moussa Ndoye et ses collaborateurs ». F.3.7. Dans la commune de GTFC, l'adhésion des Ndeyous <i>daaras</i> au projet les a poussés à prendre des initiatives communautaires : « on organise des causeries dans lesquelles on invite les imams, les populations, les personnes ressources et c'est des séances de partage et de réflexion sur les situations des <i>daaras</i> ». F.3.8. Based on focus group discussion with community members in both communes, the majority feel that the project effectively secured community buy-in to the activities and appreciate the outreach done by the Mayors' offices.	Entretien avec un Animateur de l'UCP de Médina Entretien avec un Animateur de l'UCP de Médina FGD with Ndeyous <i>Daaras</i> of GTFC FGD with Ndeyous <i>daaras</i> GTFC FGD with community members from the	sense of disappointment and frustration on the part of a majority of serigne <i>daaras</i>. (f.3.13, f.3.14, f.3.15, f.3.16, f.3.19 et f.3.20)	

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	F.3.9. Reasons given by the majority of community focus group participants for the community buy-in to the project focus on the importance of having a good management team within the Mayor's office that reaches out continuously with the community and directly involves them in all aspects of the work. F.3.10. La forte adhésion des communautés et les sensibilisations faites auprès des Serignes <i>daaras</i> n'ont pas changé leur croyance sur la mendicité. (voir à ce propos le résultat f.1.9 de la Q 1). F.3.11. Les Serignes <i>daaras</i> ont développé des attentes par rapport au projet et celles-ci n'ont pas été satisfaites. « Nous on n'a pas été vous voir, c'est vous qui êtes venus vers nous pour nous demander ce que nous voulons. On vous a dit ce qu'on voulait, mais jusqu'ici rien du tout, depuis que le projet est là. » <u>Extrait du FGD avec les Serignes <i>daaras</i> de la Médina</u> F.3.12. Le FGD avec les Serignes <i>daaras</i> de la Medina montre que beaucoup d'attentes, surtout sur le plan financier ont été nourries mais sans suite : « Combien de fois nous a-t-on conviés en réunion, mais pour dire, on n'a rien vu. Peut-être que les ambitions sont là, et on prie le bon Dieu de vous aider à les concrétiser. » F.3.13. Based on financial records from Medina, only two of the 29 <i>daaras</i> involved in	Communes of Medina and GTFC FGD with community members of Medina and GTFC communes FGD with Serignes <i>daaras</i> FGD with Serignes <i>daaras</i> from Medina FGD with Serignes <i>daaras</i> from Medina		

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	the project received financial support for reconstruction and improvements. F.3.14. Based on focus group discussions with serigne daraas from GTFC, all but one, say that they received support from the project to provide improved learning conditions, clothes, medical treatment and French lessons for the <i>talibés</i>. F.3.15. Based on project records, all daraas involved in the project received financial support to improve learning environment. F.3.16. The majority of Sergine daraas from GTFC expressed an interest in having direct funds given to them for refurbishment and maintenance of the daraa as well as for their salaries. However, a minority of serigne daraas from GTFC agreed with the idea of the money going from the Mayor's office to pay for refurbishment and support to talibés. They did however ask for salary compensation to be paid to them by the Mayor's office. F.3.17. D'après les Serignes <i>daaras</i> des campagnes de sensibilisation sont menées auprès d'eux par les Ndeyous <i>Daaras</i> et ils ont été impliqué durant le processus de mise en œuvre notamment à l'entame du projet. Ce qui a	Financial documents and receipts from Medina FGD with Serignes <i>daaras</i> from GTFC Financial documents from GTFC FGD with Serignes <i>daaras</i> from GTFC		

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	beaucoup facilité le dialogue entre eux, les autorités municipales et les UCP.			

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
QE 4: Are there scalable activities from within the current approach that can be adopted in other communes or and/or at the national level? If so, what are the critical assumptions for this approach to work in other communes?	This question was answered through the scalability checklist developed by MSI²⁰ which includes 7 characteristics to examine in order to determine scalability. These include, credibility of the model, public observability of the model, relevance, advantage of model over current systems and other approaches, ease of transfer in terms of human and financial resources, scientific proof of model effectiveness and sustainable financing. Within the current CTIP/Talibé activity, the evaluation team explored low-cost/high impact aspects and low-cost/low resource aspects that are sustainable and therefore easy to transfer to other communes and or national and international actors. F4.1 International NGOs working in the arena of talibé reduction, see a risk to this approach which requires that the Mayor have the political will to tackle the issue of child begging. F4.2 Community members and project staff felt that the daara mapping exercise was critical to	Key informant interviews with Childfund, Plan International and Save the Children	C 4.1 A critical assumption to transfer this model to another commune is to verify the courage and independence of the Mayor. This is critical and not always easy to find in other communes. Political will must be examined in other Dakar communes so make sure that Mayors are willing to take a stand which may not be popular among the community and in particular, serigne <i>daaras</i>. C 4.2 Mayors need to be sincere and active in their outreach to civil society and community leaders in order to make them feel fully vested in the activity. C 4.3 A critical assumption is that Mayor's offices will have the personnel and resources to effectively manage community	R 4.1 Before entering into other communes, conduct a political economic analysis of other communes in order to assess stakeholder readiness and incentives that would support an effective program. This would focus on incentives and interests of the various key stakeholders: serigne <i>daaras</i>, business associations; nedyou <i>daaras</i>; community leaders; religious leaders; mayors; police; community health workers, etc) (C.4.1, C.4.2) R 4.2 Consider a program of twinning the Mayors of Medina and GTFC with new communes selected and to coordinate on cross-border control of begging. (C.4.1, C.4.2) R 4.3 Dupliquer dans d'autres communes certaines activités pertinentes de l'approche comme les niches communautaires, la projection

²⁰ <http://www.msiworldwide.com/wp-content/uploads/MSI-Scaling-Up-Toolkit.pdf>

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	tackling the issue of children begging. It allowed the Mayor and the community to have a clear sense of the environment in the <i>daaras</i> and the situation of the children. F 4.3 Photos taken before and after support services are also inexpensive and essential tools in demonstrating improvement in the <i>daaras</i>’ conditions. F4.4 The theater “sketches” were seen as very effective elements of the project, and were not costly. They attract the attention of the community, while teaching them about child protection and prevention of begging. F4.5 targeting the business associations in the commune to organize around the issue of child begging is important and low-cost. There is a vested interest from the local merchants to assist with monitoring and support. F 4.6 Both the project coordinators and leaders in the community noted that the “causeries” or small group discussions organized by the Mayors’ offices, with groups of 15-20 community leaders were highly effective in terms of raising awareness and building a critical mass of people in support of the project. These meetings require little cost but have a high impact in terms of the ripple out effect of spreading information on child begging. F4.7 It is critical to develop an approach that the <i>daaras</i> in the commune are part of the community and as such community members	FGD with the community, UCP members Key informant interviews with UCP members Key informant interviews with UCP members Key informant interviews with the project coordinators Key informant interviews with the project coordinators and community leaders Key informant interviews with the project coordinators, key informant	outreach activities in order to ensure full community buy-in and participation. C 4.4 The mapping of <i>daaras</i> at the outset of the project is a critical element to implement in any new project as well as documenting through photos, the before and after situation of <i>daaras</i> and <i>talibés</i> to show change and support continued community support. C 4.5 Low cost but high impact community mobilization activities include the creation of Ndeyou daara associations; small group discussions with community leaders; and street theatre performances in the community.	de film comme le « Le cheval blanc », les théâtres populaires, la formation en leadership transformationnel des acteurs mais en insistant sur les points relatifs à l’intelligence émotionnel et en y intégrant les techniques de communication (C 4.5) R 4.4 Continue with leadership training and ensure adequate time for coaching and mentoring from the leadership facilitators to provide on-going support to the UCP members. (C1.9; C1.11) R 4.5 Replicate and focus on the “causeries” with community leaders as an effective and low cost way to incorporate and strategize with community leaders on sustainable approaches to eradicating child begging in their communes. (C4.5) R4.6 Replicate not only the baseline situation of <i>daaras</i> and their conditions but also take photos of the conditions of the <i>daaras</i> to then compare to photos taken after renovations and improvements are provided to the <i>daaras</i>. (C4.4) R4.7 In moving to other communes, review NGO support work being done with <i>daaras</i> to support improvements in their conditions in order to join

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	have the right to examine the conditions of the <i>daaras</i> and the children who attend.	interview with community health care doctor in GTFC		forces in working together. (C5.1; C5.2) R4.8 Consider working with Serigne Daara who are advocates for change and do not use child begging as part of their work. These serignes <i>daaras</i> can be seen as not only advocates but also change agents for other communes. (C.1.6) R 4.8. Identifier une meilleure approche à dérouler au moment des rencontres d'information avec les Serignes <i>daaras</i> pour éviter le biais que pose la question financière à leur niveau. (C.3.5)

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
QE 5: Did this approach add value to the discourse and/or practices within the larger community of actors working to reduce child begging?	F5.1 The majority of stakeholders interviewed as part of this evaluation, felt that the activity's approach was similar to other work based on the community level approach in working with <i>daaras</i> to improve conditions for children.	Key informant interviews with Plan International; Anti-Slavery International, ChildFund, Inspection des <i>daaras</i>, UNODC	(f1,2,3, 6) C 5.1 While the CTIP/Talibé approach is similar to other projects that work at a community-level with citizens and <i>daaras</i>, this project has the added value of working directly through the Mayor's offices as the primary point of entry.	f1,2,3,5) R 5.1 Leadership in the two Mayor's offices, particularly Medina, should be used to advocate with other Mayor's office for similar by-laws to be created at the local level. (C.5.1)
	F5.2 The majority of stakeholders working in this arena felt that this project had one unique characteristic in that it entered into the community directly through the Mayor's offices; providing direct funding to the Mayor and direct management of the activity by the Mayor's offices.		(f3,4, 5) C 5.2 While the national government continues to work on its approach to reduce child begging, a community-based approach is currently the most effective and immediate way to address the issue.	(f1,2,3,4) R 5.2 The approach of entering at a community level through the mayor's office should be used in other communes in Dakar, taking into account recommendations on improved management around expectations of serigne <i>daaras</i>.
	F5.3 The political will of the Mayor's offices to tackle this issue is seen as a unique advantage among national state actors, international NGOs and multilateral institutions interviewed.		(f4) C 5.3 Given the various and diverse actors working at the national and local level on reduction of child begging, it is challenging to maintain regular involvement of national actors in a local community based activity.	(f4, f7) R 5.3 For future activities, USAID should advocate at the national level to use lessons learned from this activity and the approach of working at the commune level as a potential model to be used in other communes.
	f5.4 The majority of GOS actors at the national level (CNLTP, DPE, Inspection des <i>daaras</i>) felt that they had very little involvement in the activity.	Key informant interviews with CNLTP, DPE, Inspection des <i>daaras</i>		
	F5.5 The majority of state actors and NGOs recognize that the community-based approach to addressing the reduction of child begging provides the most immediate and tangible results.		(f7) C 5.4 There is a lack of clarity in the roles and responsibilities of national and commune actors in support of improving the situation with <i>talibés</i>. There are a broad range of actors working at different levels within and/or processes at	(f7) R 5.4 The two target communes should work closely with USAID to focus future efforts on advocating for improved local response systems to support <i>talibés</i>, both in terms of prosecution and social service
	F5.6 National and international NGOs and UNODC all see the by-law outlawing begging, created in Medina as a strong result of the project that can be used as a model for other communes.			

Evaluation Question	Findings	Sources	Conclusions	Recommendations
	F5.7 One concern raised by NGOs working in this arena and also the community itself was around the lack of clarity to address trafficking cases; either through legal channels to prosecute or through formal support services for the victims of trafficking. f.5.8. Project stakeholders and international NGOs noted that working through the Mayor's office is a critical pathway however, in order for this approach to succeed, it must be certain that the Mayor has the political will to follow through on the issue of child begging and working with <i>daaras</i> to support improved regulation.	community members in both Medina and FGTC Key informant interviews with UNODC, Save the Children, ChildFund	the national or local level to adequately address cases of human trafficking/child begging.	support for the children. This can include a budget line item to support child protective services and safe houses. (C5.4) R5.5 Clarity around national-level actors and the service support they can provide to a commune-level effort should be outlined in future efforts with an eye to exploring national campaigns targeting sending areas of the country (Kolda, Seydiou) to make parents aware of the conditions for their children in <i>daaras</i>. (C5.4)

ANNEX 10: MUNICIPAL BYLAWS

Medina bylaw regarding Daaras and begging

REPUBLIQUE DU SENEGAL

N°.....00213.....MCM/SM

Un Peuple - Un But - Une Foi

COMMUNE DE MEDINA



Arrêté : Décision Portant création de Daaras

Vu la Constitution ;
Vu la loi 2013-10 du 28/12/2013 portant Code Général des Collectivités Locales ;
Vu le décret 66-510 du 04 Juillet 1966 portant régime financier des collectivités Locales ;
Vu le décret n°306-2014 du 17 Mars 2014 portant nomination du Sous Préfet de Dakar-Plateau ,
Vu le procès-verbal de la réunion du Conseil Municipal du 27 Aout 2014 portant élection du Maire et des Adjoints au Maire ,
Vu le procès Verbal de constat de la Police et du Service d'Hygiène aux conditions et états des Daaras ;

Le Maire décide :

Article Premier : Il est interdit dans le périmètre communal de la Médina, la mendicité publique, la maltraitance et l'exploitation des enfants.

Article 2 . Les Daaras clandestines et irrégulières ne répondant pas aux normes sécuritaires et sanitaires en vigueur seront sommées de fermer leur établissement.

Article 3 . Toute création d'une nouvelle daara fera l'objet d'une étude suivie d'autorisation de la Commune après vérifications de toutes les conditions préalables.

Article 4 . Toute personne morale ou physique ne respectant pas ces décisions seront punies conformément à la loi en vigueur.



Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba FALL

REPUBLIQUE DU SENEGAL

VILLE DE DAKAR

COMMUNE DE GUEULE TAPÉE
FASS- COLOBANE



Le Maire

0 00 08 0 1 5 MC.GT.F.C/SM

Dak. n° 25 AVR 2016

Analyse : Arrêté portant interdiction d'actes de mendicité
dans la Commune de Gueule Tapée-Fass- Colobane

Le Maire de la Commune de Gueule Tapée Fass Colobane

- Vu la Constitution ;
- Vu la Loi n°75-77 du 09 Juillet 1975 interdisant la mendicité sur la voie publique ;
- Vu la loi 2005-06 du 10 Mai 2005 sur l'exploitation de la mendicité d'autrui ;
- Vu le plan cadre national de prévention et d'élimination du travail des enfants au Sénégal;
- Vu le Procès verbal de la réunion pour l'élection du Maire et de trois Adjoints au Maire du 21 Juillet 2014 ;
- Vu la délibération n° 01/MC.GTFC/SM du 28 Décembre 2012 portant adoption du projet de lutte contre la Traite et la Maltraitance des enfants;
- Vu la dernière délibération n°01/MC.GTFC/SM du 29 Janvier 2016 portant adoption du budget de 2016 ;
- Vu l'exposé des motifs relatifs aux résultats satisfaisants produits au courant de l'exécution du projet contre la traite et la maltraitance des enfants.

ARRETE

ARTICLE 1: Il est interdit la pratique de la mendicité de jour comme de nuit sur les grandes artères ainsi que les lieux publics de la Commune de Gueule Tapée-Fass-Colobane.

ARTICLE 2: Une dérogation est accordée pendant le jour dans les lieux de cultes de la Commune.

ARTICLE 3: Des mesures coercitives seront prises à l'encontre des contrevenants conformément à la législation en vigueur.

ARTICLE 4: Le présent arrêté prend effet à compter de la date de signature, sera enregistré et communiqué partout où besoin sera. /

Monsieur Ousmane NDOYE

Adresse :HLM FASS Ancien Pavillon Universitaire BP 12641 Dakar-Colobane Tel:77 632 22 76 77 946
11 11 fax :33 8238734 email :ousmane.ndoye@cityofsenegal.sn