Agriculture Knowledge, Learning, Documentation and Policy Project (AKLDP), Ethiopia

Feed the Future Ethiopia

EXTERNAL MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT
May 2015

This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared independently by Tufts University. The authors of the report are George Gray, Laura Kuhl and Demese Chanyalew.

Feed the Future Ethiopia

EXTERNAL MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT

USAID Contract number: AID-663-C-14-00002
Agriculture Knowledge, Learning, Documentation and Policy (AKLDP) Project

Implemented by:
Feinstein International Center
Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy
Tufts University Africa Regional Office
PO Box 1078
Addis Ababa
Ethiopia
Tel: +251 (0)11 618014
www.fic.tufts.edu

CONTENTS

Annexes

A set of annexes were submitted as a separate document to the main report as follows:
Annex A: Scope of Work
Annex B: Bibliography
Annex C: Interviews and field visits
Annex D: Results frameworks and indicators
Annex E: Statement of differences
Annex F: Curriculum vitae for team members
Annex G: Conflict of interest forms

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AGP	Agricultural Growth Program
AKLDP	Agriculture Knowledge, Learning and Documentation Project
ALT	Asset Livelihood and Transition Office, USAID
AMDe (or AGP-AMDe)	Agribusiness and Market Development (Agricultural Growth Program-AMDe)
ATA	Agricultural Transformation Agency
BCC (or SBCC)	Behavior Change Communication or Social Behavior Change Communication
CBO	Community-based Organization
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CIAFS	Capacity to Improve Agricultural and Food Security
COP	Chief of Party
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVCA	Climate Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
DAP	Development Assistance Program
DO	Development Objective
DQA	Data Quality Assurance
EGT	Economic Growth and Transformation Office, USAID
EGTE	Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise
ENGINE	Empowering New Generations to Improve Nutrition & Economic Opportunities
ETB	Ethiopian Birr
FTF	Feed the Future
FTFMS	Feed the Future Monitoring System
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEM	Global Entrepreneurial Management
GoE	Government of Ethiopia
GRAD	Graduation with Resilience and Development
HABP	Household Asset Building Program
ha	Hectare
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IR	Intermediate Result
LAND	Land Administration to Nurture Development
LUI	Livelihoods Integration Unit
LMD (or AGP-LMD)	Livestock Market Development (Agricultural Growth Program-LMD)
LOE	Level of Effort
LOP	Life of Project
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MAD	Minimally Acceptable Diet
MFI	Microfinance Institute
MOTI	Ministry of Trade and Industry
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
MTE	Mid-term Evaluation
PLI	Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative
PMP	Project Monitoring Plan
PPP	Public Private Partnership or Purchasing Power Parity
PRIME	Pastoral Resilience and Improved Market Expansion
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
P4P	Purchase for Progress
qt	Quintile
RAIN	Revitalizing Agricultural/Pastoral Incomes and New Markets
REST	Relief Society of Tigray
SMFI	Somali Microfinance Institution
SOW	Scope of Work
SPSNP	Special Productive Safety New Programme
TOPs	Transitioning out of pastoralism

UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USGS	United States Geological Survey
VESA	Village Economic and Social Association
VSLA	Village Saving and Loan Association
WATER	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Transformation for Enhanced Resilience
WEAI	Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index
ZOI	Zone of Influence

Note
In Ethiopia, a *woreda* is an administrative unit, roughly equivalent to a district in other countries. A *kebele* is equivalent to a sub-district, being the next level of administrative unit within a woreda.

Acknowledgements
The evaluation team would like to express its gratitude and sincere appreciation to the following:

- Mission staff for providing access to reports and data and describing their experience of working with FTF.
- FTF project COPs and deputies for responding to our requests for interviews and providing access to their projects.
- FTF project staff for organizing field trips and interviews and for providing first-hand experience of the impacts of interventions both within and often way beyond working hours.
- The MTE team was impressed by the consistent dedication of all stakeholders to the achievement of the overall FTF goals and is grateful for the time and assistance that was so readily made available.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation of Ethiopia's Feed the Future (FTF) Program consists of an overview and assessment of program activities and achievements to date. The evaluation was tasked to:

1. Assess progress against objectives and goals specifically the extent to which planned results (both the quantitative and qualitative) have been achieved;
2. Assess the appropriateness (or effectiveness) of USAID investments in different program components and integrated programs areas at the activity level;
3. Identify actionable recommendations for reprogramming of funds to achieve program goals;
4. Identify actionable management recommendations to maximize the impact of the existing portfolio of investments, including the interactions among activities across components and integrated programs.

The methodology applied to this evaluation has been based upon the detailed review of all documents directly associated with the program, combined with a qualitative assessment of program and project interventions through interviews and field visits. Neither a survey nor any other form of quantitative data collection was undertaken.

Ethiopia's FTF program has as its goal "*To sustainably reduce poverty and hunger in USG- assisted areas***"**. This is to be attained through achievement of two first-level objectives namely: 1) *"Inclusive agricultural sector growth"* and 2) *"Improved nutritional status (women and children)"*. The program builds upon investments under the Assets and Livelihoods in Transition office, which parallel the Government of Ethiopia's PSNP initiative, and which are also funded from FTF. Beyond these investments, the FTF program[1] has been based upon 16 core projects and a large number of smaller projects[2]. Nevertheless, achievement of the FTF results framework is largely dependent upon interventions under five main projects that utilize $214 million (78%) of the $273 million committed to the program viz. AGP-AMDe, AGP-LMD, GRAD, PRIME and ENGINE. It is these projects that are the main focus of this evaluation. An area of 149 woredas covered by these five projects is considered to be the FTF zone of influence, and it is amongst the population of this zone of influence that program impacts and outcomes are to be assessed.

In undertaking this evaluation it became clear that the FTF results framework and that of the Country Development Strategy (Development Objective 1) under which projects had been originally designed, were not the same and that an assessment of performance using the FTF indicators would differ from a performance assessment based upon the framework and indicators of Development Objective 1. Accordingly the second part of this assessment analyses the two results frameworks, considering differences between the two frameworks, the value of indicators collated by the FTF management system and the relevance of the causal logic to the immediate FTF goals.

Differences between the results frameworks suggest consequent disparities between program design and FTF priorities that reduce the likelihood of achieving first level FTF objective 1. While some FTF indicators are considered to be appropriate to the projects, others are not, and some key elements of project performance are omitted altogether if FTF indicators alone are used to assess progress.

As its contribution to the Government of Ethiopia's Agricultural Growth program (AGP), USAID has taken on the specific sub-component of agribusiness and market development (and in some areas, support to production). Nevertheless, for a program such as FTF that is focused upon vulnerable households, the direct impact of activities designed to increase productivity, and enhance marketing and trade is limited. The degree of impoverishment of Ethiopia's most vulnerable households, and in particular their limited access to land, prevents them from participating in many of the agricultural interventions proposed by AGP which the marketing component of Ethiopia's FTF program is designed to support. A typical AGP smallholder cultivates 0.8 ha of land and can access ETB 5,824 Birr for inputs. By contrast, very few vulnerable households own more than 0.5 ha of land and are able to access more

[1] Throughout this report, FTF is referred to as a "program", while AGP-AMDe, GRAD and other activities that contribute to FTF have been described as "projects".

[2] In addition to the above, the program includes four activities with FTF funding managed in other offices, six field support activities, six DCA projects, four grants to local organisations, and 21 different projects (mainly innovation laboratories) implemented through Bureau for Food Security central mechanisms.

than ETB 4,500 in loans.

The successful performance of the AGP-AMDe and LMD projects will certainly contribute to the AGP goal of agricultural sector growth, but it is not as clear that it will contribute to the FTF poverty reduction goal in the short-term. While some vulnerable smallholders may become successful entrepreneurs, job creation in the value chains targeted by AGP-AMDe and LMD - may be the only sustainable poverty reduction strategy for many of the country's poor. It is unlikely however that significant and visible progress can be made in this area within the five-year time period of FTF.

The above notwithstanding, the two results frameworks include very similar components to achieve the first level FTF objective 2 and there are no comparable challenges with translating the FTF indicators to DO1 of the CDCS.

The evaluation considers progress against indicators. From an individual project perspective, AMDe and possibly LMD are on track to achieve the majority of their objectives. Similarly, GRAD and to a lesser extent PRIME might be expected to be effective in supporting the limited number of beneficiaries in the 46 woredas in which they operate. The extent to which ENGINE may be able to influence the first level FTF objective 2 is currently a matter of expert debate[3] beyond the expertise of the MTE.

It is difficult to draw rigorous conclusions from what is essentially a qualitative review, albeit based upon both individual project mid-term evaluations, the results of the FTFMS, and the FTF MTE's own observations. It is therefore helpful that parallel assessments have recently been made that can provide some indication as to the expected impacts of FTF interventions. In particular, the World Bank survey of poverty[4] undertaken in 2014 showed that reductions in poverty that have occurred between 2005 and 2011 as a result of agricultural growth were exclusive of the most vulnerable households (those in the lower 15 percentile). The same report indicated that the positive impact of agricultural growth on poverty was only experienced by households living close to urban centers of more than 50,000 people, and that there was on average no impact on poverty from the use of improved inputs.[5] A separate report has been produced by WFP on their Purchase for Progress program (P4P) in Ethiopia[6], which has provided direct support to cooperative unions in the form of marketing contracts and facilitation of credit (working in concert in a number of cases with AGP AMDe). This showed no discernible impact of P4P interventions on four different indicators of household welfare (income, household assets, food consumption score and livestock ownership) over the period 2009-2013.

In the light of these observations, from the perspective of the goal and objectives of FTF as a whole, the MTE considers that when the mid-line and end-line survey results are compared on a rigorous basis with those of the baseline, the intermediate results, objectives, and program goals of the FTF program are unlikely to be met. This is primarily due to the dilution of individual project impacts across the entire FTF ZOI.

The process of assessing progress against indicators raised a number of concerns regarding the nature and selection of indicators themselves. These included the FTF management system's approach of combining indicator values from different projects that describe different variables, the absence of targets in some cases altogether and the observation that while business development and employment are critical to the push/pull model of development out of poverty, they are measured by only one FTF indicator in each case. Such observations suggest that the current framework of indicators does not provide a particularly strong basis for the assessment of progress towards the program IRs, Objectives and overall Goal. Program management is not facilitated by such a framework.

---

[3] The MTE was presented with two contrasting perspectives on this issue, both of which were voiced by experts in their field whose experience exceeded that of any MTE team member. Accordingly no assessment could be made on this issue by this MTE other than to note the differences in expert opinion.

[4] World Bank (2015).Ethiopia Poverty Assessment. Report No. AUS6744. World Bank Poverty Global Practice, Africa Region.

[5] Positive impacts of improved input usage on poverty reduction were evident when the weather was good, but over the long term, on average there was no significant impact.

[6] Kieger, D. (2014). The Impact of P4P on FOs and Smallholder Farmers in Ethiopia. World Food Programme, P4P Global Learning Series.

Nevertheless, overall, the MTE found no strong evidence to suggest that levels of effort and resources are not appropriately matched to the achievement of the output targets specified in the FTF management system and output indicator targets are generally on target to be met. Regarding impact and outcome targets, the picture is more variable. Targets in key areas of finance (especially for GRAD), employment (all projects) and off-farm business development (GRAD and PRIME) are less likely to be achieved. The achievement of high-level impact targets (where such exist) is more problematic still. It is unlikely that any of these targets will be met as a result of program interventions alone.

The evaluation observed that in most cases, the resources constraining project achievements have been beyond project's manageable interests. These have included inadequate production (AMDe and LMD), weak or shifting institutional counterparts (AMDe, LMD and ENGINE) as well as the limited availability of finance (all projects). Such a situation may in part reflect USAID's recognition of L' Aquila obligations to align with national programming, but it is evident counterpart capacity to perform must be realistically assessed if a program's results are dependent upon it. Experience would suggest that the contrasting approach of funding parallel interventions, as applied to both PSNP and HABP (where USAID funds independent interventions that parallel government programs) is more robust than funding complementary interventions, as within AGP.

Cross cutting issues of gender, climate change and knowledge management are assessed. Gender is being integrated into FTF through explicit strategies to promote women's empowerment as well as efforts to mainstream gender into all FTF activities. Explicit strategies include GRAD's work with VESA groups, the Women in Agribusiness Leadership Network established by AMDe and supported by LMD, and the activities of PRIME in the formation of the Somali Microfinance Institution (SMFI) (whose clients are 90% women), and support to the Women Traders Association in Jigjiga. Nevertheless, in terms of gender mainstreaming, no consistent or integrated FTF strategy could be discerned and the results appear to be more individual project outcomes, than a program level impact.

Although there are some initiatives specifically targeting youth in GRAD and PRIME, a stronger emphasis on the needs of this vulnerable group is required. Particular attention should be paid to lessons learned from the pilot projects with TOPs in PRIME, which could help inform future programming.

All project activities are designed to ensure minimal negative impacts on the environment and to address climate change. Nevertheless, only two of the five major FTF projects have a specific climate change component: GRAD and PRIME. In both cases, the primary achievement to-date has been the development of climate vulnerability assessments.

Each of the five main FTF projects has a learning and knowledge management component, but AKLDP is tasked to use experiences culled from FTF as a whole (as well as experiences from projects outside of FTF) to undertake knowledge management as a means to support improved agriculture and resilience programming, So far AKLDP knowledge management activities within FTF have focused primarily on evaluation as well as internal learning and coordination. It will be critical to ensure that a process for capturing the FTF experience and lessons learned is developed in the remaining stages of projects. The evaluation proposes a number of key areas for investigation and a possible model for knowledge management in the future. One challenge to this model is the role of AKLDP as the external evaluator for FTF projects.

The evaluation noted a number of achievements worthy of remark, as summarized below.

a) The success of GRAD in promoting the replication of its comprehensive support package across the future PSNP4 zone of influence.[7]
b) ENGINE's substantial formative research that has led to the revision of behavioral change communication modules.
c) The coordination between GRAD and LMD in the production and marketing of sheep and goats in Oromiya and Tigray.
d) The work undertaken by PRIME in developing the innovative Sharia-compliant Somali MFI.
e) The Women in Agribusiness Leadership Network supported by AMDe and LMD.
f) The support by AMDe for the construction of Ethiopia's first fertilizer blending plant for Bicho

[7] The next iteration of the PSNP is expected to expand into productive as well as food deficit woredas to meet individual household needs.

Woliso Cooperative Union and others yet to be completed.

g) The promotion by ENGINE of water-carrying by men in the village of Dembeli Keta is also a notable success that deserves further support.

The quality of FTF investments is assessed in terms of the direct impact of investments, there is little consistency amongst FTF projects in terms of financial investment procedures or the principles upon which such investments are based, leading in some cases to large investments that are expected to result in "trickle down" benefits to households, although the extent and nature of such is not always clear. This is not unexpected when project management is required to achieve a targeted rate of disbursement and it is recommended that project output targets for grant disbursement should be avoided when the desired outcome (of business development) can be measured in other more direct ways.

Evaluation of the relative cost-effectiveness of projects is confounded by the fact that different projects within the FTF have very different objectives. Nevertheless, from the narrow perspective of contributing towards the achievement of FTF objectives, the successful implementation of GRAD and its consequent replication in the new PSNP4 has enabled it to leverage relatively modest USAID funding into national level finance. From this perspective, the project can be assessed as highly cost effective. PRIME has the potential to achieve the same results as GRAD, but from the narrow and short-term FTF perspective, LMD and AMDe are unlikely to achieve the same level of cost effectiveness.[8] ENGINE is similarly compromised through its obligation to work through the Ministry of Agriculture as a development partner, which may limit its impact. This does not mean that LMD, ENGINE and AMDe are not cost effective, but within the limited scope of the FTF objectives and the lifetime of the current FTF program, the immediate contributions that these programs have made when set against the budgets that have been expended are relatively lower than those of GRAD.

It was noted however that investments made through the marketing components of FTF have been designed within a multi-year framework that exceeds the FTF five-year time frame. Both financial investments and the introduction of improved technologies will require ongoing support beyond the current program if they are to be effective in supporting the FTF objectives and goal.

In evaluating program management, the evaluation found there to be little evidence of the specific and focused management required by a program of the size and complexity of FTF. The considerable number of demands upon the time of portfolio management at the Mission level has meant that the necessary capacity for oversight and response in the event of unforeseen developments is limited. Issues associated with indicators, targets, data reporting and data management all contribute to reduce the effectiveness of monitoring and management. Recommendations to improve the flow of management information are made in each case including the provision of additional resources to portfolio M&E.

It is also suggested that the greater involvement of ALT in the oversight of the FTF program would allow that office's experience and knowledge regarding poverty and food security to provide useful direction to the FTF program, especially insofar as it relates to the immediate needs of beneficiaries in the FTF ZOI.

At the project level the performance of project management was generally professional and competent. While some concerns have been raised by individual project evaluations regarding the centralization of some projects, COPs and their managers were generally well informed of their project interventions and results and understood the causal pathways that contributed to their project goals. An understanding of the extent to which individual project goals might contribute towards the FTF objectives and goals was also both evident and realistic.

The evaluation assessed potential areas for short and long-term reprogramming. Potential areas for the immediate reallocation of funds with minimal disruption to the interventions that are already in place are suggested. These include the wheat value chain, chickpea, honey and meat export markets as well as further large scale grants. Funds freed up by curtailments in these areas could be used to

[8] While both AMDe and LMD have been instrumental in the redesign of AGPII, this has not resulted in the leveraging of funds. AGPII design documents specify that USAID is expected to continue in its role as the major donor in the area of market development.

support domestic market strengthening as well as the training and mentoring required to strengthen the long-term sustainability of interventions that are already in place.

In the longer term, a future FTF program can take advantage of FTF project participation in the ongoing design processes for key government programs, most notably the PSNP4 and AGPII. These offer new opportunities for a program based upon the following principles:

1. A primary focus upon vulnerable households. The scaling up of PSNP4 to become a national rural program covering not only less productive woredas, but high potential areas as well, will allow a future program to integrate different interventions that impact both productive and less productive households within a single geographic area, with the ultimate goal of enhancing the incomes and food security of the most vulnerable. This change would help reduce the geographic constraints that have limited the effectiveness of FTF Ethiopia's "push/pull" mechanism in the past.
2. The use of parallel as opposed to complementary programming to minimize those aspects of development beyond the manageable interest of the FTF program.
3. A stronger emphasis upon vertical integration to achieve the same end (see 5 below). Including the layering of development activities, including a) PSNP-type food or cash transfers, b) GRAD-type aspirational development, fundamental financial literacy, small business development and social transformation (VESA-type activities) and asset transfers, c) job-creation and employment facilitation, as promoted by PRIME, d) ENGINE-sponsored and directed nutritional activities covering all aspects of the stunting syndrome to achieve demonstrate the benefits of convergence, and e) AMDe/LMD market and business development to support the effective marketing of produce on the one hand and to facilitate business development and job creation on the other.
4. The restriction of all but marketing activities to a limited zone of influence commensurate with the resources available for investment, on the basis that demonstrable success can lead to wider scale replication and leverage of other donor finance. Such a restriction cannot apply to the systemic marketing components, which will require a broader ZOI if their interventions are to be effective. Nevertheless, the primary focus of such projects should remain impact the vulnerable household level
5. A strong emphasis upon training and capacity development within all projects, but recognizing that investment as asset transfer is an essential first step in the development process at the GRAD/PRIME level.

The immediate objective of such a program would be to achieve the FTF Objectives within a limited ZOI. The broader goal would be to catalyse national-level investment by government and donors so as to achieve FTF Objectives at a national level.

Overall the MTE found that while individual projects are operating effectively, the FTF program is flawed by the assumption that support to agricultural production, marketing and trade through the AGP could reduce poverty amongst vulnerable households in Ethiopia within the context of a five-year FTF program. That this does not appear to be the case does not imply that such activities are not essential to economic growth and consequent poverty reduction, or that they will not bear fruit over the long term, but they will have little impact upon the immediate Goal and Objectives of FTF. To be most cost effective, the investments made under the systemic marketing projects will require continued support beyond the initial five-year time frame.

A future FTF program to provide such support would be best provided within a limited area and would integrate the activities of current components of the FTF program in a layered approach, focused more directly upon vulnerable households and implemented in parallel with government interventions.

1. INTRODUCTION

This evaluation of Ethiopia's Feed the Future (FTF) Program[9] has been undertaken at the midpoint of the program and consists of an overview and assessment of activities and achievements to date. It is not a review or compilation of the individual FTF project mid-term evaluations that have been or are in the process of being undertaken at the moment. While this study has drawn upon the results and conclusions of those individual project evaluations where possible, the primary focus of this work has been the assessment of progress against the overarching FTF goal and objectives. The individual and coordinated contributions of projects toward FTF objectives has been the primary metric of this Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE). Its results and conclusions may therefore differ somewhat from those of individual project evaluations, reflecting the different contexts within which the different exercises have been undertaken.

1.1 Purpose

The primary objective of the evaluation is to provide a perspective on the level of progress regarding the program's planned results against stated output targets and strategic goals, the appropriateness of the Economic Growth and Transformation (EG&T) department's investments in different project components and activities, and the linkages among components and integrated programs. The evaluation is also designed to provide specific information that will feed into EG&T's Bureau of Food Security portfolio review in March and produce actionable management recommendations to aid future implementation. In line with these objectives, the evaluation is intended to achieve the following:

- An assessment of progress against objectives and goals, specifically the extent to which planned results (both the quantitative and qualitative) have been achieved.
- An assessment of the appropriateness (or effectiveness) of USAID investments in different program components and integrated programs areas at the activity level;
- The identification of actionable recommendations for reprogramming of funds to achieve program goals;
- The identification of actionable management recommendations to maximize the impact of the existing portfolio of investments, including the interactions among activities across components and integrated programs.

The scope of work for this MTE is provided in Annex A.

1.2 Methodology

The methodology applied to this evaluation has been based upon the qualitative assessment of program and project interventions through a detailed review of all documents directly associated with the program as well as to those peripheral to it (including Government of Ethiopia (GoE) policy and program documentation), in conjunction with interviews of key stakeholders in GoE counterpart institutions, program and project management and implementation as well as program beneficiaries, together with field visits to witness specific project interventions. Neither a survey nor any other form of quantitative data collection was undertaken, although extensive use was made of baseline and other annual survey data. A list of documents consulted is provided in Annex B, and a list of interviews and field visits in Annex C.

The work was undertaken in four parts:

- An initial visit to all the main project offices to discuss the key areas of interest for further investigation with Chief of Parties (COPs) and their deputies, and to request all possible program documentation. Interviews with some key stakeholders were also undertaken at this time.
- A period of literature review to assess the documents provided including project proposals, program budgets, program monitoring plans (PMPs) quarterly and annual reports and spreadsheets downloaded from the web-based Feed The Future Monitoring System (FTFMS).

[9] Throughout this report, FTF is referred to as a "program" comprising a number of "projects" including AMDe, LMD, PRIME, GRAD and ENGINE.

- A second visit incorporating a field visit to PRIME, GRAD, AMDe and LMD interventions and further interviews with COPs and key stakeholders.
- A further period of results assessment and report writing.

The evaluation has been a relatively complex process reflecting on the one hand the broad nature of the FTF program within which many different projects have been implemented, and on the other, the extensive volumes of data collected through the FTFMS that has been applied across all of those projects. The results obtained from the FTFMS were the most up-to-date that were available to the MTE team, but may not always reflect the latest data available at the individual project level. Nevertheless, it is not expected that such differences will substantially alter the conclusions in the narrative.

1.3 Background to FTF projects in Ethiopia

Ethiopia's FTF program is based upon the Mission's FTF strategy generated in 2011. That document guided the incorporation of a broad suite of projects (some entirely new in concept, others already at a planning stage) into an overall program to achieve the original Development Objective (DO): "Increased growth and resiliency in Rural Ethiopia".[10] Most FTF projects are managed under the EG&T office, but some (PSNP DFAPs and GRAD) are managed by the ALT office, reflecting both the growth and resilience aspects of FTF. The objective would be accomplished by promoting a market-based value-chain approach to increasing rural on-and-off farm productivity, expanding domestic and international market access, increasing the capacity of businesses, strengthening financial markets, improving the regulatory environment for trade, and increasing that ability of safety-net beneficiaries to participate in the market by graduating them off assistance and into productive agriculture or employment opportunities. All of the above build upon the assistance provided to vulnerable households through the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP).

The PSNP is critical to the achievement of FTF goals. USAID does not fund the PSNP directly but using FTF funds, provides parallel support to three Cooperating Sponsors mainly in the form of food, which is then transferred to targeted beneficiaries in specific woredas through interventions that mirror the GoE PSNP activities. The importance of the PSNP is two-fold, on the one hand it substantially improves the food security of targeted beneficiaries, and on the other by removing the need to make "fire-sales" to raise cash for food, it protects household assets. In this way, the PSNP and parallel USAID interventions create the environment in which households can positively respond to GRAD, PRIME, ENGINE and the more systemic marketing initiatives, AMDe and LMD.

Ethiopia's FTF projects have been implemented within the context of the PMP results framework for the DO outlined above. Section 2 highlights the differences between the USAID Ethiopia PMP results framework and that of the global FTF, the latter being more production orientated. The foundation underlying the USAID Ethiopia PMP results framework is the PSNP, which utilizes approximately US$100 million annually. The USAID Ethiopia PMP framework builds upon the impacts of the PSNP through the implementation of 16 different projects, of which nine might be considered to be the main FTF components namely Agricultural Growth Program-Agribusiness and Market Development (AGP-AMDe), Agricultural Growth Program-Livestock Market Development (AGP-LMD), Graduation with Resilience and Development (GRAD), Pastoral Resilience and Improved Market Expansion (PRIME), Empowering New Generations to Improve Nutrition & Economic opportunities (ENGINE), Capacity to Improve Agriculture and Food Security (CIAFS), Land Administration to Nurture Development (LAND), Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Transformation for Enhanced Resilience (WATER), and Agriculture Knowledge, Learning and Documentation Project (AKLDP). An additional seven projects have undertaken various interventions that have supported the achievement of the results framework, but the majority (92%) of the FTF budget and most of the interventions have fallen under these nine projects.

Both CIAFS and LAND have made important contributions towards the strengthened agricultural policy and land management, and the WATER program which ended in 2014 has improved pastoralists' access to clean and sustainable water sources, hygiene awareness, and access to

[10] This development objective differs somewhat from that of FTF, which has two objectives i.e. "Inclusive agricultural sector growth and "Improved nutritional status (women and children)".

sanitation.[11] Nevertheless, achievement of the FTF results framework is largely dependent upon interventions under the five projects listed below:

- AGP-AMDe (implemented from May 2011, budget of $49.8 million) is designed to complement the production-focused interventions of the GoE Agricultural Growth Program (AGP) through the strengthening of markets and market linkages within six specific value chains (wheat, maize, chickpea, coffee, sesame, and honey). It operates throughout 96 of the woredas in which the AGP is also functional.
- AGP-LMD (implemented from September 2012, budget of $38.0 million) is intended to achieve similar objectives to AGP-AMDe but with a focus on meat and dairy production and is similarly operational throughout 46 AGP woredas.
- GRAD (implemented from December 2011, budget of $23.4 million) works in 16 woredas of which nine are not included under the AGP, but are located close to AGP woredas, to assist households within the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) to achieve sustainable food security.
- PRIME (implemented from October 2012, budget of $52 million) works in 30 pastoral woredas (one only within the AGP) to facilitate both livestock production and marketing on the one hand and to help those transitioning out of pastoralism (TOPS) to achieve food security.
- ENGINE (implemented from September 2011, budget of $55.7 million) is mandated to work with the Ministries of Health and Agriculture to strengthen health delivery services with a specific focus upon improved nutrition and to promote nutrition sensitive agriculture through DAs, FTCs and woreda. Its Zone of Influence (ZOI) covers all AGP woredas as well as 6 GRAD and 16 PRIME woredas.

In addition to the above, AKLDP (budget of $8.5 million) is intended to support evidence-based learning as a means to improve policy and programming, drawing on both USAID-funded projects and the projects of other donors and implementers. Due to both time constraints and the economic importance of the five largest projects, this evaluation is limited to an assessment of these five projects.

The overall area of project implementation includes the 111 AGP woredas that fall under the aegis of AGP-AMDe, AGP-LMD and ENGINE and the additional 38 woredas beyond the AGP woredas where GRAD and PRIME are active. This somewhat diverse group of 149 woredas, drawn from both the most productive and some of the least productive areas altogether constitute the Feed The Future Zone of Influence (FTF ZOI) and it is the population of vulnerable households within the FTF ZOI who are the ultimate targeted beneficiaries of the FTF program.

2. RESULTS FRAMEWORK

2.1 Outline of Framework and Indicators

There are two results frameworks of relevance to the Ethiopia Feed the Future initiative: the global FTF results framework and the results framework used in the PMP for Development Objective 1 of the Country Development Cooperation Strategy (referred to as the USAID Ethiopia PMP). These are detailed together with relevant indicators in Annex D and shown diagrammatically overleaf.

Each individual project also has its own project-level results framework. This section addresses the logic of these results frameworks in terms of the likelihood that activities designed within these frameworks will achieve the two FTF goals of poverty and stunting reduction. It also looks at the compatibility of the two frameworks and the appropriateness of the FTF indicators for measuring the progress within the Ethiopian portfolio. The USAID Ethiopia PMP has many areas of complementarity with the global FTF results framework, but there are several areas where the USAID Ethiopia PMP departs from the global FTF strategy, with important implications for design, monitoring and reporting.

[11] See: USAID: Final performance evaluation of water sanitation and hygiene transformation for enhanced resiliency (WaTER) project. IMAWESA: The voice of an Agent of Change http://imawesa.info/2013/04/02/the-voice-of-an-agent-of-change/ accessed May 2015.

Development Objective 1



Feed The Future



2.1.1 First Level Objective 1: Poverty Reduction

The FTF results framework posits that within the project timeframe of five years, increasing agricultural productivity, marketing and trade will lead to poverty reduction through two main causal pathways: a) increasing productivity and resulting incomes for smallholder producers, and b) job creation in the targeted value chains. IR5 of the FTF results framework acknowledges the role of social safety nets and resilience measures for vulnerable households as necessary components of a poverty reduction strategy, but this component addresses the need for measures to maintain assets and ensure that vulnerable households don't fall into greater poverty, and are not intended to increase incomes directly. The USAID Ethiopia PMP presents a similar logic, although it is important to note that the key development objective for the USAID Ethiopia PMP is increased growth and resiliency, which is broader than the specific poverty reduction goal of FTF.

In the Ethiopian context, the validity of the first causal pathway that activities focused on increasing productivity, marketing and trade can directly lift smallholder households out of poverty (defined as below the global $1.25 per day poverty line) has to be questioned. Even in the comparably better-off AGP regions, which comprise the majority of the FTF zone of influence, the average landholding size is less than half a hectare. Analysis by AMDe of the potential for growth in Ethiopian agriculture suggests that most growth has and will continue to come from farms of at least 0.75 hectares, suggesting that efforts focusing on marketing of agricultural surpluses will primarily engage producers that are better-off than the average household, and are unlikely to impact smaller households directly. While there are opportunities for productivity initiatives to reach smallholders below the poverty line, and evidence elsewhere[12] has suggested that agricultural sector growth can lead eventually to poverty reduction[13,14], marketing initiatives such as AMDe or LMD are less likely to do so directly within the timeframe of the FTF program.

The second causal pathway to poverty reduction posited by the FTF strategy is job creation in the targeted value chains. Because of Ethiopia's high rural population density and the lack of productive potential in some parts of the country, job creation is the only sustainable poverty reduction strategy for many of the country's poor, a point emphasized in a recent report by Ethiopia's New Climate Economy Partnership (EDRI and GGGI), which stated that "urbanization will increasingly play an important role in realizing our ambition to achieve lower middle income status by 2025".[15] However, it is questionable whether efforts focused on the FTF value chains will produce enough jobs in the short-term for this to be a substantial pathway out of poverty in the 5-year time period of FTF. Empirical evidence suggests that significant increases in productivity are required before producers hire outside labor, relying first on their own household labor.[16] Indeed, with increases in productivity, there is a tendency for increased investment in labor-saving technologies, (some of which are promoted by FTF), so that the elasticity of employment of agricultural growth is often low.[17] In terms of value addition, the promotion of increased investment in processing and marketing will undoubtedly lead to increased employment opportunities, but will not occur unless the production of a reliable commercial surplus can be achieved (a key area in which the AGP has yet to fulfill its mandate) and will in any case result primarily in urban and peri-urban rather than rural employment.

In the long term, new opportunities, outside of agriculture but based upon the increased wealth of profitable agricultural producers are recognized to be the most common pathway out of poverty[18], but such developments are not immediate. They require both agricultural growth and subsequent

---

[12] Dorosh, P. and Mellor, J. (2013). Why agriculture remains a viable means of poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa: The case of Ethiopia. *Development Policy Review*, 31(4): 419-441.
[13] Irz, X., Lin, L., Thirtle, C. and Wiggins, S. (2001). Agricultural productivity growth and poverty alleviation. *Development Policy Review*, 19(4): 449-466.
[14] Thomas, G. and Slater, R. (2006). Innovation, agricultural growth and poverty reduction. *International Journal of Technology and Globalisation* 2(3/4): 279-288.
[15] Neway Gebreab (2015). "Unlocking the Power of Cities in Ethiopia". Forward in: *Ethiopia's New Climate Economy Partnership (EDRI and GGGI)*, Addis Ababa.
[16] USAID (2013). "Evaluation of the Push/Pull Hypothesis", USAID Addis Ababa.
[17] Dorosh and Mellor (2013) suggest that this elasticity is approximately 0.3.
[18] Ibid.

investment in the provision of goods and services. Such investment is very important but commercial logic dictates that it should be concentrated in peri-urban rather than rural areas.[19] Regrettably, there is no obvious short-term solution that could be expected to significantly increase the incomes of the most vulnerable smallholder households in rural Ethiopia. While small reductions in poverty can be achieved through technical, financial and social interventions, significant and sustainable reduction is fundamentally dependent upon the overall growth rate of the national economy. This is largely beyond the manageable interest of FTF and for this reason, the broad-based poverty reduction objective is unlikely to be achieved within the five-year timeframe stipulated in the program design. This is not to suggest that interventions to promote growth are not essential to addressing poverty in the long-term; indeed this analysis suggests that it likely to be the only approach to sustainably improve the incomes of the poor, but such structural changes will not be fully measurable in the timeframe of the FTF initiative.

2.1.2 First Level Objective 2: Improved Nutritional Status

FTF and DO1 of the Ethiopian Country Strategy include very similar components to achieve the nutrition goal of stunting reduction. Access to diverse foods, behavior change and utilization of maternal and child health services represent the key components of both strategies. As a result of this alignment, there are no comparable challenges with translating the FTF indicators to the USAID Ethiopia PMP. At the same time, there are several other issues with the nutrition strategy in both frameworks. The contrast between the level of complexity in the poverty reduction and the nutrition components is noteworthy. In the USAID Ethiopia PMP, four IRs contribute to the poverty reduction target, while only one IR addresses nutrition. In the global FTF framework, there are three IRs for nutrition, but none of them have any sub-IRs. Both approaches suggest that either a) the stunting target is less complex and requires fewer types of interventions to achieve, or b) the causal pathways to achieve stunting reduction are less well-understood. Evidence suggests that stunting is a multi-faceted issue.[20] The implementers of ENGINE have identified at least eight actors that may contribute to stunting including:

1. Exclusive breastfeeding
2. Complementary nutrition
3. Animal protein intake
4. Maternal age and body weight
5. Potability of water
6. Sanitation
7. Vitamin A, iron and zinc intake levels
8. Aflatoxin contamination.

The development of outcome sub-IRs which reflect progress in any or all of the above would be helpful in managing for results under objective 2.

2.2 Project Components

2.2.1 FTF in relation to the Agricultural Growth Program

The Ethiopian FTF strategy can only be understood in relation to the Agricultural Growth Program (AGP) of the GoE. AGP is a government-led, multi-donor supported initiative designed to increase the productivity of "high potential" designated regions of the country. Increased productivity in these regions is supposed to drive Ethiopia's economic growth, and is thus a central pillar of the national Growth and Transformation Plan. As its contribution to the AGP, USAID has taken on the specific sub-component of agribusiness and market development. As its name suggests, the primary goal of the AGP is agricultural growth, with a strong emphasis on exports, which is central to the country's development

[19] A view strongly endorsed by the New Climate Economy Partnership between the Ethiopian Development Research Institute and the Global Green Growth Institute in their report "Unlocking the Power of Ethiopia's Cities".
[20] Stewart, C.P., Iannotti, L., Dewey, K.G., Michaelsen, K.F. and Onyango, A.W. (2013). Contextualising complementary feeding in a broader framework for stunting prevention. *Maternal and Child Nutrition* 9 (Suppl. 2):27-45.

priorities and need for foreign exchange. While the AGP strategy seeks to ensure that such growth will be inclusive, it is important to recognize that the ultimate metric of success is agricultural growth, and thus, while complementary, the goal of AGP and of Feed the Future are not the same. The design of the AGP-AMDe and LMD projects will certainly contribute to the AGP goal of agricultural sector growth, but it is not as clear that they will contribute to the FTF poverty reduction goal in the short-term.

Due to the role of FTF within the larger AGP, a discrepancy arises between the USAID Ethiopia PMP and the global FTF results framework regarding the role of increasing productivity of the agricultural sector. The first IR of the CDCS is "Performance of the agriculture sector improved." At a superficial level, this appears very similar to the FTF IRs 1 and 2 "Improved agricultural productivity" and "Expanded markets and trade," but a key difference is that the USAID Ethiopia PMP purposefully does not address increasing productivity directly. The first Sub-IR of the USAID Ethiopia PMP: **"**Increased productivity and income *through expanded market opportunities*" explicitly identifies that the increased productivity and incomes will come from expanded market opportunities, not from efforts or activities on production. The other Sub-IRs that contribute to FTF IR 1 include: "Increased commercial viability of small and medium agribusinesses," "Increased technology transfer" and "Improved agricultural enabling environment." The only one of these that leaves an opportunity to address productivity for smallholders directly is "increased technology transfer."

While the decision to focus on these aspects of the agricultural sector is reasonable in light of the role that the government and other donor-led components of AGP are designed to take in addressing the agricultural productivity components of the agricultural sector and is in line with a division of responsibilities among the Ethiopian government and its development partners, it presents a challenge for mapping the FTF indicators to the country strategy, since a significant number of the FTF indicators fall under the FTF IR of increasing productivity. Since the Mission, in collaboration with the Ethiopian government and other donors, is not responsible for the productivity component of the AGP, it is challenging to understand how the Ethiopian FTF activities will achieve ambitious targets in those FTF indicators designed to address productivity. The approach taken by the Mission has been to place a number of these indicators under the "increased technology transfer" component of the USAID Ethiopia PMP, but it is an imprecise translation and it is not clear exactly how technology transfer for productivity fits into the agribusiness and marketing projects in the AGP geographic areas.

Neither AMDe nor LMD are well-designed to deliver on the agricultural productivity indicators of FTF. Their "middle of the value chain" interventions are not particularly well-suited to address the household-level productivity indicators included in the global FTF results framework. Such indicators fail to capture the types of "system-level" changes marketing projects like AMDe and LMD are designed to address, and instead projects are reporting on indicators that are only tangentially related to their core activities. In addition to unrealistically expecting productivity results from marketing and agribusiness projects, judging AMDe and LMD using these indicators does not do justice to the core activities of these projects, which are intended to address barriers at the "system-level" and not address productivity-focused indicators.

2.2.2 Geographical categories and reaching the poor

Another challenge is the strong and explicit geographic division between the productive areas and vulnerable areas in the USAID Ethiopia PMP results framework. The global FTF strategy mirrors this distinction between productivity and vulnerability, but does not make any reference to geographic divisions. The geographic division between productivity and vulnerability present in the USAID Ethiopia PMP is driven by the political categorization of the country into PSNP and AGP woredas, but doesn't necessarily speak to the realities of the target beneficiaries of FTF. The poverty reduction targets are based on the poverty rate within the zone of influence (the majority of which is within AGP woredas, although GRAD woredas, which are PSNP, and PRIME woredas, which include both PSNP and non-PSNP woredas are also included). High levels of poverty also exist in the AGP woredas, and the achievement of the FTF poverty-reduction target is dependent upon interventions reaching the poor within the AGP woredas. The current FTF strategy however, is aligned with the CDCS, which distinguishes between productive activities (i.e. marketing and agribusiness activities) in the AGP woredas and resilience activities (i.e. livelihood activities designed to target the poor) in the PSNP woredas. This distinction essentially means that the poor (or those who are less productive) within the

AGP woredas (who comprise the majority of the poor that need to be reached to achieve the FTF goals) are not explicitly addressed by the current portfolio of FTF programs. It also means that the full range of activities undertaken by GRAD and PRIME are not captured by metrics under the resilience component of the global FTF results framework, as neither project is purely about protecting against shocks (this is the role of PSNP). PRIME, and to a lesser extent, GRAD, have important marketing and business development components.

2.2.3 Role of policy and enabling environment

Apart from these important differences in the two results framework, and corresponding development strategies, there are a number of less significant but still incongruous issues with the results frameworks and corresponding indicators. One is that under the "agricultural enabling environment," the FTF indicator on agricultural policies (4.5.1(24)) is not included, but rather placed outside the USAID Ethiopia PMP results framework, which suggests a lack of importance given to policy within the concept of the enabling environment. This limited clarity on the role of policy can also be seen in a number of projects, where policy processes are not well-integrated, nor is a sufficient evidence-base being generated in a systematic way to inform policy processes. Although a number of projects are reporting on their impact on agricultural policies others, particularly GRAD, are not, although GRAD has probably had the most impressive impact on government and donor policy through the PSNP4 redesign. In addition, the FTF indicator, which is specific to agricultural policy, provides no space for projects (particularly ENGINE) to report on nutritional policy impacts, even though this is just as central to the overall FTF goals. The policy indicator is also problematic because it focuses on the "number of policies that might be improved" irrespective of the nature of such policy improvements. These might range from the trivial to the substantial or from being controversial to being straightforward to implement, (e.g. being already agreed, requiring only technical drafting). Moreover, in some cases, targets were specified prior to the completion of the identification of policies to be addressed, counterparts to be involved, or the extent of cooperation required in each case. This is scarcely a realistic approach to either program design or monitoring and it is recommended that the empirical identification of actual policy weaknesses and counterpart needs be completed prior to the setting of future policy targets.

This critique is not intended to suggest that projects are not contributing to policy processes, but rather to note that the results frameworks and reporting mechanisms do not provide a clear logic for the role of policy reform in the achievement of the goals of FTF nor are they being reported consistently.

2.3 Assumptions and Constraints

A number of assumptions are implicit in the design of the FTF program, some of which have proved to be correct, although a substantial number have not been borne out. Many have been effectively encapsulated in the "push/pull" hypothesis, which suggests that support to agricultural development and marketing would create opportunities for production, labor and the provision of good and services that could be exploited by vulnerable households to increase their resilience. While this hypothesis may be correct in general terms, specific aspects of its implementation have proved problematic.

2.3.1 Traction of production–focused interventions amongst vulnerable households

A primary constraint which was well understood from the program outset, and which has been subsequently verified by baseline surveys, is that the most vulnerable households lack adequate productive resources (especially land) to allow them to take advantage of agriculturally focused interventions. Thus, the AGPII program design targets a smalholder of 0.8 ha and requires the investment of ETB 5,824 in crop inputs. Even in AGP woredas, a significant proportion of households have less than 0.5 ha of land[21] and MFI's will provide access to credit of no more than ETB 4,500. In order for a household producing cereal crops, such as maize or wheat, on a landholding of 0.5 ha, to rise

[21] The CSA Agricultural Survey for 2010/11 reports that 34% of smallholdings are less than 0.5 ha in size and 61% are 1.0 ha or less. A further 25.5% are between 1.0 and 2.0 ha and only 13.5% of all holdings are more than 2.0 ha in size.

above the FTF poverty line of $1.25 per person per day, yields would either need to increase by more than 100 or 200% of current yields, which would be a remarkable, if not impossible, achievement. See discussion in section 3 on IR5 for more details. This constraint together with the inaccuracy of the first assumption has meant that initiatives such as those of AMDe and LMD which rely upon the promotion of yield and strengthened markets to increase the agricultural gross margins of producers are unlikely to have any direct benefit to the most vulnerable households in the FTF ZOI. Indeed, the immediate effects of such interventions upon market dependent households may actually be to reduce food security by increasing the farm-gate prices that the poorest are obliged to pay[22], which are already among the highest in Africa.

Moreover, the assumption that a "pull" from strengthened markets for production from vulnerable households who would also be "pushed" by facilitating their capacity to produce, did not fully accommodated the costs of aggregation and of the management and coordination required to develop sustainable linkages. Neither did it allow for the geographical separation of the different projects generating the "push" and "pull".

This implies that while projects such as AMDe and LMD are essential to the overall development of the agricultural sector, their beneficial impact upon vulnerable households in the FTF ZOI will be primarily through the creation of agricultural labor and other economic opportunities to provide goods and services to an increasingly affluent section of the rural economy, i.e. smallholders with larger landholdings[23], who will be better able to take advantage of the enhanced production and marketing opportunities that AGP, AMDe and LMD can provide. The same logic underpins the emphasis on support to those transitioning out of pastoralism in PRIME. This indirect "wealth" effect is not immediate and those investing in response prefer peri-urban as opposed to rural locations for their businesses.

2.3.2 Potential for the generation of agricultural employment

General experience elsewhere in the world suggests that the employment elasticity of agricultural income is less than unity, implying that as the agricultural sector develops, the proportion of the rural population employed within it will ultimately decrease. Thus in the long term, the primary benefit of enhanced agricultural production and marketing to vulnerable households will be the indirect business and employment opportunities that the demands of an affluent agricultural sector will create. While some opportunities may develop immediately as a result of investment in adding value to agricultural products, such direct benefits should not be confused with the more general and widespread economic opportunities that will arise through the increased flow of finance to efficient producers. Indeed, such direct employment opportunities are as much drivers of rural economic development as the growth of the agricultural sector itself. Hence, while projects such as AMDe and LMD may report the number of jobs increased as a result of specific investments, in the long term these represent a relatively small proportion of the overall economic development that will be the ultimate benefit of these programs, being not so much impacts as drivers of further change.

2.3.3 Potential for off-farm income generating activities

One key assumption underpinning both GRAD and PRIME has been that off-farm income generating opportunities would be available to rural smallholders as alternatives to traditional agricultural livelihoods. This would allow income to be generated both from new small businesses and from the employment opportunities that such new businesses might generate. In practice it has been observed that such opportunities are more restricted than anticipated for four reasons:

- First, the proportion of the population willing to risk their savings in small businesses is low (the

[22] Jayne, T.S., Yamano, T., Nyoro, J. and Awuor, T. (2001). Do Farmers Benefit From High Food Prices? Balancing Rural Interests in Kenya's Maize Pricing and Marketing Policy. Tegemeo Working Paper 2B. Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and Development, Nairobi.

[23] The threshold landholding size is a matter of some debate. It has been suggested (Dorosh and Mellor, 2013) that it could be as low as 0.75 ha. While this might be possible in conjunction with other sources of off-farm income, a minimal size of 2 ha is considered necessary to sustain an exclusively agricultural livelihood.

Global Entrepreneurial Management (GEM) survey undertaken for Ethiopia in 2013[24] estimated that only 7.4% of the population were successful entrepreneurs) and may be even lower amongst poorer households, so that employment opportunities associated with such small businesses is also low.

- Second, the economic issue of services, utilities and other supports, as well as the market for new goods and services is not yet adequately developed to support much new business development.
- Third, the availability of finance necessary to develop such businesses is substantially less than current demand.
- Fourth, a significant proportion of those entrepreneurs who do obtain the necessary finance to engage in off-farm income generation immediately relocate to a peri-urban environment where the availability of both utilities and markets is far greater than in small rural communities.

For all of these reasons, the development of rural off-farm income generating activities has not proceeded at the rate anticipated at the program design stage when it was envisaged that such off-farm IGAs would contribute significantly to rural economic development in the short term. This has not occurred and the development of off-farm IGAs (other than sheep and goat rearing and/or petty trade) continues to be a challenge facing both GRAD and PRIME.

2.3.4 Timeframe of interventions and impacts

Most importantly however, the push/pull hypothesis postulates an increased demand for goods and services generated by the increased incomes of more productive farmers, which is widely recognized to be the most substantial impact of agricultural development upon vulnerable households, but this development is by no means immediate. Although various stages of development may be concurrent, there is clearly some element of sequencing. The process of increasing agricultural production will in itself take some years. The secondary process of linking agricultural growth to the development of a goods and services sector will take longer, and the tertiary process of expanding that goods and services sector to become a major source of employment may take longer still. This raises the issue of *time* as a key constraint to the effectiveness of the systemic projects (especially AMDe and LMD) whose pro-poor impacts are predicated mainly on the impacts of secondary and tertiary development outlined above.

Throughout this report, emphasis has been placed upon the extent to which various interventions are likely to meet FTF targets *within the time frame of the program time.* From this perspective, many of the systemic project interventions will yield few benefits in five years alone, but over the longer term of 10 to 15 years, the systemic changes introduced by these projects will be essential to pro-poor development. Targets set at the inception of FTF expecting change within five years were not realistic and that short time frame is of itself a constraint to the success of these projects as it might be perceived in the immediate term.

2.3.5 The importance of counterpart performance

Both AMDe and LMD were designed on the premise that smallholders would increase their yields as a result of AGP interventions and that the two marketing projects would work with increasing commercial surpluses that could be readily marketed. In practice that has not been the case. Despite two favourable seasons over much of the country[25] when yields have increased, anticipated commercial surpluses have not materialized. This suggests that the observed increases in yields may have had an impact on food security, but have not increased sales or incomes significantly. Despite the fact that agricultural production has increased by over 4.5% per annum, prices have rarely fallen below export parity so that anticipated export markets for maize, chickpeas, meat and honey have been weak, (although domestic markets as well as the market for live animal exports have been strong and farm gate prices are above those in most countries). This has hindered export marketing initiatives which have consequently been constrained in their impacts.

[24] Amha,W., Woldehanna, T.,Tamrat, E. and Gebremedhin, A. (2014) "Characteristics and Determinants of Entrepreneurship in Ethiopia". Ethiopia Inclusive Finance Training and Research Institute (EIFTRI).
[25] With the exception of north western Tigray, which experienced a poor sesame harvest in 2014.

As a consequence, possibly of the lack of production of a nature and volume suitable for export, both AMDe and LMD have extended the reach of their projects to include production-focused interventions, especially training in enhanced technologies for both crop and livestock production. While such activities may exceed the mandate of either project as they were originally conceived, they are nevertheless logical developments under the circumstances and highlight the inadequacy of the assumption that liaison with AGP production initiatives would be sufficient to develop effective and sustainable value chains. Instead, the MTE observed that there was a strong tendency for both projects to become involved throughout the full length of each value chain, to ensure both the quality and volume of produce entering the marketing chain. Observation would suggest that such vertical integration might play an important role in reducing the risk of non-performance by counterparts and enhancing the overall effectiveness of the assistance provided.

With regard to counterparts, a second assumption underlying both of the marketing projects was that there would be effective and stable counterpart institutions in place, to ensure the effective coordination of project interventions with GoE activities. In practice this has not been the case. In 2013, the GoE moved responsibility for the marketing of agricultural products from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI). This obliged AMDe to establish new linkages within MOTI. At the same time, the new Livestock State Ministry established in 2013 has been in the process of developing its own institutional infrastructure so that dialogue with LMD has been less directed than one would hope. This has reduced the extent to which either AMDe or LMD have been able to work effectively with the GoE, although the situation is now improving considerably.

2.3.6 Potential for reduction of transaction costs

The extent of market imperfections was originally judged to be sufficient that improvements in market efficiency could, by reducing transaction costs, simultaneously reduce prices to the consumer while maintaining (or even increasing) prices to the producer. In practice this has not been the case. In the case of teff[26], the disparity between producer and consumer prices has been found to amount to only 20% of the retail price allowing limited room for improved prices to either party through increased market efficiency.

This is a significant error since a reduction in prices to the consumer was considered to be a potentially major aspect of improved food security amongst the most vulnerable households who are predominantly market-dependent to complete their annual food needs. If as recent studies suggest[27] a sustainable reduction in food prices is unlikely to occur, then increased food security must be achieved through increased agricultural production or other sources of household income.

2.3.7 Other constraints

The two projects focusing on more direct support to households have also faced constraints. As noted in section 3.2, some of GRAD's target households have been unable to access finance to the extent anticipated and this has limited the speed with which graduation might be achieved, but two other constraints have been equally important. The first has been the vast predominance of shoat fattening as an off-farm income generating activity. This may reflect the desire of households to own livestock either as a stepping stone towards the purchase of an ox for draft power, as well as for the nutritional and/or economic benefits. As a result, many households who have received shoats have tended to deviate from the fattening program upon which their business plans were based towards less profitable, but more favoured shoat rearing (under which a higher proportion of the animals would be retained – thus reducing profitability). This tendency was not unexpected, but has highlighted the need for enhanced formative research to understand people's aspirations (in this case to sell fewer and retain more

[26] Although teff is not an FTF value chain, it has been extensively studied and robust data on the various margins are available. Data for other cereal crops is less robust but analyses of farm gate and retail prices provide similar results.

[27] Minten, B., Tamru, S., Engida, E. and Kumar, T. (2013). Ethiopia's Value Chains on the Move: The Case of Teff. ESSP Working Paper 52, IFPRI. http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/esspwp52.pdf accessed May 2015.

shoats) if project interventions are to achieve their targets.

The trend has also highlighted the second substantial constraint of livestock feed as a fundamental input to shoat rearing as an off-farm IGA. The widespread perception that shoats and other livestock can be find adequate feed from communal grazing lands, field and roadside margins is no longer valid. Only those households with clear rights are able to access such grazing and for the most part, shoats are either tethered or housed to be fattened and fed using the cut and carry system. Feed is a substantial cost of sheep and goat fattening[28] which is increasing as the practice becomes more prevalent and as grazing land is increasingly brought under the plough. The profitability of one of the main elements of the GRAD methodology is thus coming under increasing pressure and it will be necessary to address the issue of feed production and marketing more comprehensively if the impacts of GRAD are to be sustained.

2.3.8 Summary

Overall, the MTE found that key assumptions regarding the potential for market strengthening to enhance poverty reduction in the short term, the impact of agricultural improvement upon the most vulnerable households and the capacity of counterpart institutions have not yet been validated. While definitive results will be provided by the mid-line survey to be undertaken later this year (2015), the qualitative assessment of the market developments, impacts on vulnerable households and counterpart capacities suggest that these factors all constrain the impact of market development projects such as AMDe and LMD as far as the immediate FTF objectives are concerned. At the same time it was observed that assumptions regarding access to finance, opportunities for off-farm income generation and availability of livestock feed have also been inaccurate, limiting the effectiveness of interventions of GRAD and PRIME. Most importantly however, the push/pull hypothesis, while potentially valid in the long-term has but few examples of its successful application to date, suggesting it to be of limited relevance to short-term development objectives.

3. PROGRESS AGAINST INDICATORS

This section first considers the general progress of the FTF program before assessing progress against individual FTF indicators.

3.1 Overview of Progress To-Date

At the time of the MTE, all of the five main FTF projects had been operational for at least 28 months so that it is feasible to comment on the general progress made under the program. It is evident that from an operational perspective, AMDe, GRAD and ENGINE have been able to deploy their available human and financial resources efficiently and in line with project expectations, while LMD and PRIME have been engaged in less definitive activities as part of their learning curve. Nevertheless in all cases, the baseline survey across the FTF ZOI has highlighted the extent and depth of poverty and the substantial levels of stunting that the FTF program seeks to address. The inclusion of households outside the FTF ZOI will allow for a rigorous assessment of impact, but already shows the endemic nature of many aspects of vulnerability, which are prevalent within the productive AGP woredas as well as outside them. The baseline survey clearly indicates the considerable impacts required if project interventions are to meet the FTF program goals.

Thus it would appear that while AMDe and possibly LMD are on track to achieve the majority of their individual project objectives, they are unlikely to be as successful in achieving FTF impacts at a scale necessary to achieve program objectives. This is due in part to constraints arising from invalid assumptions made during FTF program design, (as outlined in section 2.3) and in part to the length of time required for agricultural market-focused impacts to influence the income and food security of the most vulnerable households. Conversely, while GRAD and to a lesser extent PRIME might be expected to have a direct impact in supporting the limited number of beneficiaries in the 46 woredas in which they operate, their effects will nevertheless be diluted within the overall FTF ZOI, which is three times

[28] According to data provided by GRAD, feed costs vary substantially according to circumstances from 16% to 44% of input costs.

greater in size.

The extent to which ENGINE may be able to influence the second FTF objective is currently a matter of debate beyond the expertise of the FTF MTE.[29]

It must be emphasized that this evaluation is not a quantitative assessment based upon primary data, but a qualitative exercise using whatever data has been collected to date. A rigorous quantitative assessment can be made once the mid-line data collection exercise (planned to begin in June 2015) has been completed. Nevertheless, progress achieved to date, provides only limited evidence that the capacities of component projects are adequate to achieve impacts across that same area within the program timeframe. The projects that focus directly upon vulnerable households (PRIME and GRAD) are limited in their geographic scope, while the more systemic impacts of the market-focused projects (LMD and AMDe) have yet to reach the vulnerable households that are the primary targets of FTF. As a result, when the mid-line and end-line survey results are compared on a statistically rigorous basis with those of the baseline, the intermediate results, objectives and program goal of the FTF program are unlikely to be met within the limited five-year time frame specified by the program design. In addition to providing a qualitative assessment of the likelihood that project activities will lead to the high-level FTF targets, the MTE can assess the progress toward output indicators based on project reporting. As discussed in section 2, there are some logical challenges linking progress on the outcome indicators to the likelihood of achievement of the higher-level targets, and thus the significance of success or failure for the outcome targets is dependent on the logic by which they contribute to the higher-level objectives.

3.2 Progress against Indicators

Goal: To sustainably reduce poverty and hunger in USG-assisted areas

Progress towards this goal is measured using two high-level population impact indicators:[30]

1. Prevalence of Poverty: Percent of people living on less than $1.25.
2. Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age.

Such population indicators are assessed only by the baseline, mid-line and end-line surveys. A statistically valid survey protocol, adequate to identify significant differences of 10% or more, has been developed and will be used to assess progress. The survey samples both treatment and control groups to determine the impact of interventions through a matching pair "difference in difference" methodology that allows for the impact of changes to both groups caused by factors other than the FTF interventions (provided such factors act equally upon both groups). The methodology substantially enhances the extent to which observed changes might then be attributed to the FTF interventions. This means that changes in indicators due to a nationwide increase in per capita GDP, or to a change in cereal prices (which might impact the poverty line) will be ignored.

Since the midline survey has not yet been undertaken, it is impossible to provide objective estimates of progress against the two goal indicators. Nevertheless, the baseline survey results together with some of the other lower level impact and outcome indicators allow some preliminary conclusions to be drawn, as below:

1. The target for the first indicator is to reduce the prevalence of poverty by 30% from the baseline level of 34.5% to a LOP target of 24.2%. Such a reduction could be achieved through increased agricultural incomes (due to enhanced production or farm gate prices), increased off-farm income

[29] The MTE of ENGINE concluded that the objective of reducing stunting by 20% was unlikely to be achieved. Project management disagrees, noting that convergence of many factors is reducing stunting rapidly. Both opinions are those of experts in nutrition. The FTF MTE team lacks the expertise to assess which expert opinion is more valid. The mid-line survey to be undertaken this year will provide an objective assessment.

[30] Throughout this analysis, the term impact indicator is used to denote impacts beyond the direct influence of an intervention. Outcome indicators measure the direct results of project interventions and output indicators measure the performance of the intervention itself. Thus, "number of farmers trained in new technologies" is an output indicator, "number of farmers applying new technologies as a result of training "is an outcome indicator and "increased yield due to the application of new technologies" is an impact indicator.

generating activities, or increased availability of employment. Assessment of the relevant indicators below suggests that productivity amongst the poor households will not be sufficiently improved to meet the target, that labor opportunities are limited, and that off-farm income generating activities, while moderately successful in increasing household income, are currently limited in their scope and may be constrained by external factors, so that this target is unlikely to be met. Ethiopia's target of a 30% reduction in poverty is very ambitious, and exceeds the targets set by other FTF focus countries, most of which have set a 20% poverty reduction target.

2. The target for the second indicator of the FTF Goal is not specified in the PMP. The baseline survey of the FTF ZOI indicated that in mid-2013 this prevalence was 32.1%, which is high, but not significantly different from the prevalence in non-FTF woredas. Given the observed improvement in food security that has occurred through 2013 and 2014 as a result of two consecutive good Meher harvests, it is quite probable that the prevalence of underweight children will have fallen, but it is impossible to say if the impact of the FTF program will have been sufficient to result in a significant difference between the levels within and beyond the FTF ZOI.

First-level Objective 1: Inclusive agricultural sector growth

This first-level objective is assessed by three indicators:

1. Percent change in agricultural GDP.
2. Daily per capita expenditures (as a proxy for income) in USG-assisted areas.
3. Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) Score

1. Agricultural GDP has grown substantially and continuously over the last nine years at rates of between 4% and 11%. The extent of reported agricultural growth exceeds that of all other developing countries with the exception of Egypt (which benefitted from extensive installation of irrigation systems) and the accuracy of national statistics has been questioned on more than one occasion. This impact indicator is measured at a national level and as such will be similar both within and outside the FTF ZOI so that attribution to FTF interventions will be impossible.
2. The second indicator measures the purchasing capacity of the household. This impact indicator was directly measured at the baseline survey and will be reassessed in subsequent mid-line and end-line surveys. The FTF PMP does not specify a target for this indicator. The baseline figure for mean daily expenditure in the FTF ZOI is ETB 17.49 per capita. On an adult equivalent Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis, this amounts to $2.19 per day. This mean value is 75% higher than the $1.25 specified as the poverty threshold. Indeed when disaggregated by poverty status, the average daily expenditure of the 34.5% of people below the poverty line was found to be ETB 8.1, while the average expenditure of the 65.5 % above was ETB 28.1 (i.e. 246% greater than that for the poor population). These disparities highlight the inadequacy of the indicator in measuring the impact of FTF interventions upon poverty. It may be possible to affect the incomes of the poor without raising them above the FTF poverty line, given the large gap between the current incomes of the poorest households. Given fundamentally commercial interventions, it is quite possible for mean incomes to increase substantially in the short term without measurable impact on the incomes of the poor if those interventions act primarily upon the wealthier households who have the assets and capacity to respond. This is not a concern across all of the FTF ZOI, within which both GRAD and PRIME focus specifically upon poor households. Nevertheless, both AMDe and LMD are more income-neutral in their immediate impacts and pro-poor activities are less evident in these projects.
3. The third indicator uses a specific index (Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index -WEAI) that is estimated using 6 different parameters collected by the baseline, mid-line and end-line surveys. The baseline score estimated for the FTF ZOI was 0.698. There is no PMP target. This is not unreasonable given that the WEAI has not yet been widely used and there is no body of empirical knowledge to link WEAI scores with different degrees of development of food security. As a result, it is impossible to determine what WEAI might reasonably be expected to result from the five year FTF program. Moreover, the WEAI combines scores from five different domains so that the root cause of disempowerment remains unknown unless the index is disaggregated. As a result, this

impact indicator is of limited value to current program management, although the indices used to compile it may provide useful data for future programming.

The First Level Objective 1 is supported by five intermediate Results (IRs). Progress towards each IR is assessed as follows:

IR 1: Improved agricultural productivity

There is only one indicator for this IR, along with indicators for a number of Sub-IRs, discussed below. The indicator for IR 1 is: Gross margin per hectare, animal or cage of selected product. This is measured by both AMDe and GRAD, but not by LMD, PRIME or ENGINE (although all three of the latter projects contain elements of agricultural/livestock production that can be subjected to gross margin analysis). Since gross margins can be subject to so many factors related to both productivity and price, the usefulness of this impact indicator either as a reflection of productivity, or as an indicator of project management performance is questionable.

The FTF PMP LOP targets for this indicator are: wheat $1028; maize $675; coffee $1972; sesame $1302; chickpea $770; cow $100; sheep $30; and goat $30. The baseline figures recorded by AMDe were: wheat $551; maize $387; coffee $1807; sesame $555; and chickpea $715. Those recorded by GRAD were: cow $40; sheep $10; and goat $10. Given that gross margins are subject to so many influences, it is not surprising that progress to date has been variable. AMDe results extrapolated from a recent (2014) results survey are not comparable with the baseline survey[31] and some gross margins that had exceeded targets in 2013/14 (e.g. sesame) have declined substantially in 2014/15. GRAD results show moderate progress to date. Overall, it is not possible to assess progress on the basis of available data. Nevertheless, given the limited progress achieved towards sub IRs, as measured by outcome and output indicators and described below, it is unlikely that the few targets that have been set within the PMP for this indicator will be met, but the significance of this indicator is weak.

Sub-IR 1.1 "Enhanced human and institutional capacity development for increased sustainable agriculture sector productivity" is assessed on the basis of five indicators.

1. "Number of farmers and others who have applied improved technologies or management practices as a result of USG assistance" - the LOP target for this outcome indicator is 273,022 while the actual figure to date is assessed at 341,038 i.e. substantially above target. Nevertheless, these figures should be compared with a baseline estimate of rural households within the FTF ZOI of 3,577,837, i.e. at the mid-point of the program, less than 10% of households have adopted improved technologies or management practices that might lead to an increase in gross margins. Future interventions and indeed program design would be enhanced if this indicator could be disaggregated by wealth group to determine if improved technologies being used mainly by wealthier farmers.
2. "Number of individuals who have received USG supported short-term agricultural sector productivity or food security training" - the LOP target for this output indicator is 387,954. To date, 335,883 have received training. While this number is already 86% of LOP target, it represents both agricultural (80%) and food security (20%) training, some of which is of extremely short duration (field days and cooking demonstrations). Moreover, the number of people trained is slightly less than the number that have applied new technologies, implying a remarkably high adoption rate of over 100%. Again however, the data should be compared with the total number of households within the FTF ZOI, on such a basis it is hard to see how training at a frequency of less than 10% could yet have significantly affected gross margins across the ZOI. Literature on technology adoption suggests that repeated engagement in training is necessary for adoption of new technologies or practices. Thus, one-time training is unlikely to lead to sustained changes in agricultural practices.[32,33]

[31] The annual survey sampled a population of relatively well-educated high-performing farmers, who would be expected to have higher-than-average yields, which makes it impossible to extrapolate from these results to the general population that was sampled in the baseline survey.

[32] Foster A. and Rosenzweig, M. (2010). Microeconomics of technology adoption. *Annual Review of Economics* 2, 395-424.

3. "The number of food security private enterprises (for profit), producers' organizations, water users' associations, womens' groups, trade and business associations, and community-based organizations (CBOs) receiving USG assistance" - the LOP target for this output indicator is 7,579, while the number to date is 11,542. GRAD and AMDe have substantially over performed, while LMD has achieved 71% success and PRIME has yet to make significant progress against this indicator. Unfortunately it is not possible to assess the extent to which USG assistance will impact either the sub IR or the IR itself. In some cases, a relatively low LOP has resulted in major impacts (such as the achievement of certification through LMD assistance, to permit exports from abattoirs), while in others, substantial effort has yet to provide significant benefit (such as the coordination of co-operatives for the sale of wheat to EGTE in an undersupplied market). The significance of this output is weak, especially when compared with the following indicators.
4. "Number of private enterprises, producers organizations, water users associations, women's groups, trade and business associations and community-based organizations (CBOs) that applied improved technologies or management practices as a result of USG assistance" - this outcome indicator is formally reported on by AMDe and GRAD only. In practice, LMD and PRIME are also engaged in business development and have made some progress in this area, but their individual project results are not incorporated within the FTFMS. The LOP target for the indicator is 2,825. Progress to date exceeds this target by 12%. According to the FTFMS, the result is strongly biased by the success of GRAD, although in practice, the other projects may also have had more of an impact than has been quantified.
5. "Number of people implementing risk-reducing practices/actions to improve resilience to climate change as a result of USG assistance" - the LOP target for this outcome indicator is 71,827. Only GRAD and PRIME report on this indicator and the two projects have already exceeded this target by 19%. Neither AMDe nor LMD report on this indicator. AMDe in particular might consider the impact of some of its interventions on resilience to climate change. The introduction and widespread uptake of single varieties of maize, wheat or chickpea can have potentially negative impacts upon resilience.

Sub-IR 1.2 "Enhanced technology development, dissemination, management and diffusion" is assessed on the basis of four indicators:

1. "Number of hectares under improved technologies or management practices as a result of USG assistance" - the LOP target for this outcome indicator is 2,939,600 ha. This has already been surpassed due to the reporting by PRIME of 4,862,773 ha under improved rangeland management.[34] The other project reporting (AMDe) has met 86.7% of its individual LOP target of 55,658ha. The inclusion of large pastoral areas that are extensively managed together with small areas belonging to highland smallholders generates a statistic that has little meaning. In particular, the significance of the contribution of improved land management to the Sub-IR is impossible to determine.
2. "Number of vulnerable households benefiting directly from USG interventions" - the overall FTF LOP target for this output indicator is 1,257,868, and the actual level of achievement is 1,254,787. Theoretically, the FTF LOP target has almost been met. In practice however, the bulk of these results are made up of PSNP, Pastoral Livelihood Initiative (PLI), and Peace Corps beneficiaries. GRAD and ENGINE are the only two of the main five FTF projects reporting on this indicator. The LOP target for these is 81,170. Both projects have exceeded their targets already with a combined level of achievement to date that is 73% above target. It is unclear why LMD and PRIME do not report on this indicator since they both provide some assistance to vulnerable households, but their project data is not included in the FTFMS. AMDe also impacts households through the provision of seed and training programs, but it is debatable whether or not such households are actually vulnerable.
3. "Number of technologies or management practices in various phases of development as a result of USG assistance" - AMDe is the only project of the main five FTF projects reporting on this

[33] Feder. G., Just, R.E. and Zilberman, D. (1985). Adoption of agricultural innovations in developing countries: A Survey. *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 33(2): 255-298.
[34] In this case, the inclusion refers only to the process of mapping units of rangeland.

output indicator with an LOP target of 25 different technologies and practices and a current level of achievement of 10. It would appear that LMD, GRAD or PRIME should also be reporting on the new technologies that they have developed (e.g. PRIME's work with Sharia-compliant MFIs, or LMD's work in conjunction with GRAD on livestock feed utilization), but these are not included in this indicator.

4. "Number of water resources sustainability assessments undertaken" - is reported only by the USGS Groundwater project. This project was not evaluated in detail, but is reportedly successful.

In addition to the above, it was noted that a fifth FTF indicator: "Number of climate vulnerability assessments conducted as a result of USG assistance", might also be considered. Such assessments have been conducted by both GRAD and PRIME, but no targets for this output indicator have been set and neither project is reporting upon it.

Overall, it is evident that the indicators used to assess progress towards Sub IR 1.2 do not provide a sound basis for such a determination. Reporting on some indicators is incomplete, while other data is potentially misleading. In terms of the Sub-IR itself, the MTE team assessed that there had been some diffusion of enhanced technologies, especially of improved seeds, and improved rangeland management, but neither the real extent of such diffusion nor its impact could neither be assessed from the indicators available.

Sub-IR 1.3 "Improved agricultural policy environment" is assessed on the basis of a single outcome indicator namely, "Number of agricultural and nutritional enabling environment policies completing various processes/steps of development as a result of USG assistance". This indicator is reported by AMDe, LMD and PRIME but not by GRAD. The LOP target for the three projects is 31. The actual achievement to date is substantially higher at 83, based upon the inclusion of work by CIAFS, PLI and ATA, which have together contributed an additional 46 policies, but even without this supplementation, the three main FTF projects have already exceeded the LOP target by 20%.

While this result appears impressive, counterpart stakeholders did question the process by which relevant policies were selected for "improvement" and the ultimate meaning of these statistics in the absence of final adoption is unclear. Conversely, GRAD has clearly had a substantial impact upon GoE policy as evidenced by the incorporation of many of its key principles into the redesign of the PSNP, yet this impact is not at all evident from this indicator which GRAD does not report upon. Indeed, even if it were to do so, it would be inadequate to describe the potential extent of the project's influence, which can be expected to be much greater than the addition of a single policy to this indicator could possibly convey.

It is perhaps inevitable that the simplistic numerical indicator used to describe progress towards this Sub-IR should be inadequate to capture the real extent of policy improvement, which is essentially qualitative in nature and whose progress is by not always immediately evident. This is especially the case in a country such as Ethiopia, where policies that are forward looking in nature, may be implemented from an unexpected perspective that can lead to very different results from those anticipated originally.

IR 2: Expanded markets and trade

Progress towards this IR is measured by two impact indicators, as well as indicators for various sub-IRs:

1. "Value of incremental sales (collected at farm-level) attributed to Feed the Future implementation" - this indicator could be reported upon by AMDe, LMD, PRIME and GRAD, but in practice GRAD is not reporting this data. Results for LMD are based upon detailed assessment of beneficiary sales, but for AMDe and PRIME, results are extrapolated from samples. Although current reported incremental sales are more than 97% of the LOP target, the MTE team was concerned that figures extrapolated from sampling that is not representative of the total FTF ZOI population may tend to overestimate the result reported for this indicator.
2. "Value of exports of targeted agricultural commodities as a result of USG assistance" - this indicator is reported upon by both AMDe and LMD. Currently reported incremental exports stand at 50% of the LOP target, but results to date are subject to the same concerns as the value of incremental sales, i.e. both DQA assessments and inspection of data suggest that total rather

than incremental sales are being counted in some cases at present. Moreover, given that the main export crops are sesame and chickpeas and that the production and price of sesame have both declined dramatically over the last twelve months, while exports of Kabuli chickpeas have been weak, it is quite possible that this indicator may actually decline over the course of the next year. For these reasons, while LMD estimates may be realistic, those for AMDe may not reflect the actual extent of market expansion well so that the accuracy and predictive value of the combined indicator is open to question. It is again recommended that this indicator should be reassessed more rigorously before it can be used to assess actual progress.

Sub-IR 2.3 "Improved market efficiency" is assessed by a single indicator, the "Total increase in installed storage capacity". This output is reported mainly by AMDe with an LOP target of 155,520 M^3 and a 36% achievement to date of 55,424 M^3, of which 2,504 M^3 has been generated by PLI. Given that the budget through which this increase in storage capacity has been achieved is almost exhausted, it appears unlikely that the LOP target will be met. Nevertheless, the recommendation made in the MTE for AMDe, that greater emphasis should now be placed upon the consolidation of investments made to date appears to be sound and would probably result in as great an enhancement of markets and trade as would further physical expansion of storage.

Sub-IR 2.4 "Improved access to business development and sound and affordable financial and risk management services" is assessed by one impact and two output indicators:

1. "Value of agricultural and rural loans" - is reported as an impact indicator by AMDe, GRAD and LMD. The LOP target is set at $76,838,238 and the value achieved to date is $66,109,903, i.e. 86% of target. Most of this is due to the activities of AMDe. Significantly PRIME does not report on this indicator, despite its activities in support of the Somali Micro Finance Institute, suggesting that this indicator is underreported. Overall, however, it would appear that notwithstanding difficulties experienced by GRAD in obtaining loans from MFIs, and the generally expressed reluctance on the part of MFIs to lend to PSNP beneficiaries, progress towards the achievement of the FTF LOP target has been good.
2. "Number of MSMEs, including farmers, receiving USG assistance to access loans" - is reported upon by AMDe, LMD and GRAD, but again, not by PRIME. The LOP target for this output indicator is 59,634 MSME's of which 40,499 (68%) have been assisted to date. Examination of the data shows that more than 99% of the MSMEs assisted have been GRAD beneficiaries. While progress towards the target appears good, the activities and impact of AMDe and LMD working with processors, cooperatives and small businesses are almost completely obscured in the FTF headline reporting. The impact of PRIME's work on micro finance and business development is ignored.
3. "Number of MSMEs, including farmers, receiving business development services from USG assisted sources" - is reported by AMDe and GRAD, but not LMD or PRIME. The LOP target is 64,952 and the current level of achievement is 57,740 (87.7%). This indicator is once again dominated by GRAD, which has an individual LOP target of 59,000 MSMEs and has so far assisted 51,819. AMDe has a target of only 254 MSMEs and has already assisted 223. The balance is due to the activities of PLI and other small programs.

Overall, it is evident that all four of the main agriculturally focused FTF projects have improved access to business development services. Progress towards the achievement of targets for each indicator appears good. Nevertheless, the numerical data hides three key weaknesses of the program:

- First, as remarked above, the data refers primarily to the activities of GRAD, which has assisted individual households to access loans to develop MSMEs. In doing so, the project (and indeed most of the AGP) encountered the obstacle of MFIs' refusal to make finance available until previous loans (made through the earlier Other Food Security Programme, under uncertain conditions and subject to some controversy) had been repaid. This significantly reduced the amount of finance that could be made available to loanees. Until GRAD can negotiate either the write-off or at least a moratorium on these debts, this credit constraint will remain a significant stumbling block to the access of finance.
- Secondly, the sustainability of access to loans is not yet secure. While more than 80% of all GRAD

applicants received loans in the first round of borrowing, the group collateral system[35] has meant that less than 30% have been able to borrow a second time and less than 10% a third.

- Finally, the development of business plans has been a key aspect of assistance, but there has not always been a good understanding of the process by beneficiaries. Given the high rate of illiteracy (slightly above 70%) within the FTF ZOI, this is not unexpected, but it does mean that the value of business plan preparation is limited and that smallholders may not benefit from the assistance provided to the extent expected.

IR 3: Increased investment in agriculture and nutrition-related activities

Progress towards this IR is measured by two FTF indicators:

1. "Value of new private sector investment in the agriculture sector or food chain leveraged by Feed the Future implementation"- this outcome indicator is reported by AMDe, LMD, and PRIME. The FTF LOP target is $85,577,424 and the current value of leveraged investment is reported to be $29,861,065 (34.9% of LOP target). The results suggest that the program is on-track to meet its target, although mid-term evaluations raised concerns regarding PRIME's accounting of assets provided by the project as part of the leveraged investment.
2. "Number of public-private partnerships[36] formed as a result of Feed the Future assistance"- this indicator is reported upon only by AMDe, although it might be expected that both LMD and PRIME might also be active in this field.[37] Nevertheless, for AMDe the LOP target is 90 PPPs and achievement to date is 171 (including 14 formed through the ATA). The target has therefore been comfortably exceeded, largely by the development of partnerships with USAID through the signing of innovation fund agreements. The sustainability of such partnerships beyond the life of the FTF program is as yet uncertain.

As well as the two indicators listed above, IR 3 is also monitored through one of two Sub-IRs which contribute towards it, namely Sub-IR 3.2 "Increased private sector investment". The indicator for this Sub-IR is outcome impact indicator, "Number of firms (excluding farms) or Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) engaged in agricultural and food security-related manufacturing and services now operating more profitably (at or above cost) because of USG assistance", which is reported upon by AMDe alone, although both LMD and PRIME might also be expected to be able to report progress against this indicator. The LOP target is 5, but no achievements are yet recorded in the FTFMS. Such progress is surprising given the reportedly expansionary nature of the Ethiopian agricultural sector. It is remarkable that none of the AMDe interventions, including the provision of training and investment to a considerable number of cooperative unions, cooperatives and other beneficiaries should not have resulted in the more profitable operation of even a small number of businesses. It is also remarkable that none of the activities of PRIME or LMD would be considered as leading to the increased profitability of firms that could be reported under this indicator.

It is possible that it is too early in the program to witness the development of profitable agribusinesses. Nevertheless, the limited response against this indicator raises two concerns. The first is that only one of the FTF programs is reporting against what might be construed to be a central element of the "push/pull" mechanism upon which Ethiopia's FTF strategy relies. The development of profitable agriculture-based industries is also central to the GoE rural development strategy. It is therefore disconcerting to see this indicator considered relevant by only one project. If rural poverty is to be alleviated through more than agricultural production alone, the development of ancillary businesses will be essential for wealth creation and as a source of employment. The monitoring of that development should be a key aspect of the FTF strategy and should be undertaken by all projects that

[35] MFIs disburse credit to groups of GRAD borrowers, all of whom must repay before any one member of the group can access new finance.

[36] The FTF indicator definition of a PPP is much broader than the more commonly understood definition of an arrangement under which goods or services are provided by the private sector to meet the accepted responsibilities of the public sector.

[37] LMD is working with AKLDP on a PPP for a quarantine facility for live animal exports.

support business development. The second concern is that the very limited development of profitable agribusinesses that has occurred must reflect to some extent upon the other interventions that have been made both by FTF projects. If, despite all of the investment and training that has been brought to bear, it is impossible to record a single business operating more profitably than it was prior to the FTF program, then the nature and targeting of FTF interventions must be called into question.

IR 4: Increased employment opportunities in targeted value chains

Progress towards this IR is assessed through a single, critical, impact indicator "Number of jobs attributed to Feed the Future implementation", which is monitored by AMDe, LMD, PRIME and GRAD. The LOP target for these four projects is 101,481 jobs, and to date 34,671 (34%) have been created. While the basic data suggests reasonable progress towards the LOP target, there are three areas of concern over the reporting of this indicator:

- GRAD has interpreted the definition of a job in such a way as to include almost all of its beneficiaries and is consequently responsible for 80% of the LOP target. By contrast, AMDe, LMD and PRIME have adopted a more stringent definition requiring conversion of all jobs to "full time employment" equivalency, but on this basis contribute only 20% of the target. If the indicator is restricted to these three projects, the current level of achievement is 19%. In practice, a further 8,966 jobs have been created under FTF by PLI and other projects. If these are included, performance increases to 44%.
- The number of jobs reported by PLI is identical over two years.
- In a meeting of M&E managers of FTF projects, some confusion was expressed over whether or not self-employment counted towards the number of jobs and whether the indicator should be based upon jobs created or jobs filled.

Until these issues are resolved, it is hard to assess progress against this indicator. This is of concern, since the creation of employment through the development of the agricultural sector under IR4 is as critical an aspect of the push/pull strategy as the creation of profitable agribusinesses under IR3. If the FTFMS is unable to monitor this key aspect of the program effectively, it will be difficult for those responsible for the co-ordination and management of the program to operate effectively. This indicator should be revisited to ensure consistent reporting across all projects and revised historical data should be posted on the FTFMS.

IR 5: Increased resilience of vulnerable communities and households

This IR also contributes towards First Level Objective 2. Progress towards the result is assessed on the basis of four indicators, the first two of which are clearly impact indicators:

1. "Prevalence of households with moderate or severe hunger" was recorded by the program baseline survey at 4.9% for households in the FTF ZOI. It will be reassessed in 2015 and 2017. The FTFMS does not show any targets for this indicator. Given the recent good Meher harvests experienced by most households, it is quite probable that the prevalence of hunger will have declined, but whether it will be possible to detect a difference attributable to the FTF program is less certain. Given the low levels estimated both within (4.9%) and outside (4.5%) the FTF ZOI, it is unlikely that a significant difference will be observed in either the mid-line, or the end-line survey.
2. "Depth of poverty: mean percent shortfall relative to the $1.25 poverty line" was also measured by the baseline survey at 11.3%. Again, no target is shown in the FTFMS for this indicator. Since the poverty headcount ratio was 34.5%, a depth of poverty score of 11.3% implies that the actual difference between the mean income of households below the poverty line and the line itself was 33% or ETB 4.5 per capita per day. This is equivalent to ETB 6,178 per household per year, or at current prices, 14 qt of maize or 6.7 qt of wheat. In 2013, the mean daily income per adult equivalent in the FTF ZOI was ETB 21.59 and the mean area cultivated to cereals was assessed at 0.67 ha. Households at or below the poverty line can be expected to cultivate correspondingly less. On the simplistic but not unreasonable premise that income is proportional to area cultivated, the average cultivated area of a household at the poverty line would be no more than 0.39 ha. For such a household to increase its income by ETB 6,178 would require it to increase its productivity by 36 qt/ha of maize or 17 qt/ha of wheat. These

figures represent yield increases of approximately 200% and 100% over baseline yields for maize and wheat respectively. The probability of such increases being achieved within a five-year timeframe is remote.

There is not only the physical improbability of yields being increased by the required amounts, but also and perhaps more importantly, the limited propensity of smallholders to adopt techniques requiring increased investment since this is invariably associated with increased risk. Thus for smallholders on 0.5 ha, costings reported by farmers in the key maize growing area of Wellega would result in seed and fertilizer at ETB 2800, and at ETB 600, i.e. a cash investment of ETB 3400. A basic analysis indicates that if they consumed only maize, they would need about 900 kg[38], and to cover their costs they would need another 8.5 qt at ETB 400/qt[39] or 10 qt at ETB 340/qt.[40] This implies total per ha yields of 35qt/ha to 38 qt/ha. As average yields are well below these figures, and the poorer households can be expected to be in the lowest tercile of productivity, the chances of obtaining such yields are slim. By contrast, the household could go the low technology route of home-saved seed and animal manure and get a yield of 17 qt per ha without the risks associated with increased investment. Such analysis illustrates the extreme difficulty of reducing the depth of poverty through increased agricultural production alone. Instead, additional off-farm income generation will need to be facilitated if this indicator is to be significantly reduced.

3. "Number of USG social assistance beneficiaries participating in productive safety nets" is a function of USAID's participation in the PSNP. Targets for this indicator are predetermined and readily met. USAID's consistent parallel support for the PSNP over the last ten years has resulted in a degree of proficiency amongst the cooperating sponsors that allows assistance to be delivered in a timely and effective manner. The actual level of assistance might be expected to increase from 2015 onwards as the new PSNP program, designed to support a larger number of beneficiaries over a wider area than before is progressively implemented.
4. Within the narrow scope of five main FTF programs, the fourth indicator, "Number of vulnerable households benefiting directly from USG assistance" is measured only by GRAD, and ENGINE. Although PRIME works with TOPS, it has not reported on this indicator. The LOP target is 81,170 households. Actual performance to date is 75,920 (93.5%), largely due to the contribution of GRAD, which has already exceeded its target. It is quite probable that this target will be met. At a broader level, this indicator also includes all PSNP beneficiaries, as well as PLI, Peace Corps and WATER project beneficiaries so that the actual numbers recorded in the FTFMS is about six times higher than the figures for GRAD and ENGINE alone. As such, the value of this indicator as a management tool to measure the impact of the core FTF program is limited. The higher numbers obscure the level of progress that has been made by the core FTF projects. Fluctuations in the coverage of the PSNP or WATER can significantly alter the indicator result without affecting the fundamental implementation of FTF within the ZOI.

First-level FTF Objective 2: Improved nutritional status (women and children)

Progress towards this objective is measured using three impact indicators namely:

1. Prevalence of stunted children under five years of age (Baseline 50.6%)
2. Prevalence of wasted children under five years of age (Baseline 12.1%)
3. Prevalence of underweight women (Baseline 26.8%)

These indicators were assessed by the baseline survey of June/July 2013 and will be reassessed when the survey is repeated in 2015 and 2017. The baseline results for the FTF ZOI are somewhat higher than the estimate made for AGP woredas in 2011 (IFPRI 2011) of 46.2%, although similar to estimates of wasting (12.0%) from the same survey. While ENGINE targets a 20% reduction in stunting, a 15% reduction in wasting, and a 10% reduction in underweight women, FTF targets for these indicators across the ZOI are not specified.

[38] 15 kg per person per month, with five people in the household.
[39] EGTE maize price in Nekempt, March 2015.
[40] Farm-gate maize price outside Nekempt, March 2015.

It is hard to estimate progress against these indicators. First, there is no current data available. Secondly, expert opinions are divided. The target for ENGINE (the main project responding to this indicator), of a 20% reduction in stunting (to 40%) is considered feasible by project management on the basis of the converging influences of improved national agricultural production, health, education and WASH service provision, which appear to be reducing national stunting levels by 1% per year, so that in the ZOI, stunting would fall to 45% over the life of the program irrespective of FTF program interventions. Consequently a further reduction to 40% as a result of ENGINE interventions is considered plausible by project management. This view is countered by the mid-term evaluation of ENGINE, which considers that such a reduction would be unusual. Similar observations might apply to the second and third indicators.

From the perspective of FTF, if the anticipated "difference in difference" methodology is used to assess program impacts, external influences can be expected to be discounted, thereby reducing the observed impacts of ENGINE in the ZOI and limiting the possibility of reaching the targets. ENGINE project management considered that while it had developed an effective modality to change nutritional household level nutritional practices, it was still necessary for the other projects (AMDe, LMD, GRAD and PRIME) to develop complementary SBCC techniques to ensure that the extra income generated from production and sales would be used to purchase diverse and quality to improve nutrition further. This observation, together with the as yet unresolved issues associated with fasting and the limited incorporation of WASH messaging and infrastructure development within the FTF program, would suggest that the impact of ENGINE (together with the other projects undertaking BCC and SBCC activities in the ZOI) will be insufficient to achieve the targeted differences in these indicators between woredas within and beyond the FTFZOI.

The first IR contributing to First Level Objective 2 is IR 5 "Increased resilience of vulnerable communities and households", which is considered in more detail under Objective 1 above.

IR 6: Improved access to diverse and quality foods

This is the second IR contributing to Objective 2 and is measured by the following two impact indicators (with baseline results for the FTF ZOI in brackets):

1. Prevalence of children 6-23 months receiving a minimum acceptable diet (MAD): (Breast fed 1.56%, non-breast fed 0.0%)
2. Women's Dietary Diversity: Mean number of food groups consumed by women of reproductive age: (1.57)

FTF ZOI baseline results for both of these indicators are low and do not correspond with individual project data. ENGINE reported a baseline of 13% for children receiving a MAD, and a women's dietary diversity score of 2.8, while GRAD reported a prevalence of 6.6% for children receiving MAD and a women's dietary diversity score of 2.9. The disparities between these results suggest that different definitions or methodologies may have been used to assess these indicators.

The FTF target for women's dietary diversity is an average score throughout the ZOI of 4.0. This represents a 30% increase over the ENGINE and GRAD baseline results, and a 150% increase over the FTF ZOI baseline estimate that will ultimately be used on a "difference in difference, matching pair" basis to assess progress. Similarly, the LOP target of 30% for children receiving a MAD throughout the FTF ZOI represents a massive increase of 1,900% over the initial baseline to be achieved within the five-year LOP. In both cases, it appears unlikely that the targeted results will be achieved. The interventions to effect both increases comprise mainly widespread SBCC activities championed by ENGINE, together with more direct but limited nutrition interventions on the part of the other FTF projects. Given the limited geographical scope of both GRAD and PRIME, and the focus of LMD upon only 9 woredas for "deep" nutrition interventions, their contribution to these indicators will inevitably be constrained. AMDe may have a broader impact but its limited nutrition interventions are unlikely to achieve changes on the scale envisaged. It is therefore primarily ENGINE that is expected to achieve impact operating indirectly through health workers. While SBCC is recognized to be a potentially highly effective methodology for nutritional development, its level of achievement is generally more modest than that

expected of the FTF Program, particularly as such interventions typically take a long time to reach scale.[41,42]

IR 7: Improved nutrition related behaviours

This IR is measured by a single outcome indicator:

1. Prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding of children under six months of age.

This indicator has been measured for the FTF ZOI at a baseline level of 67.6% and an LOP increase of 8% was originally targeted in the ENGINE PMP. While the FTF PMP reports no specific target for the overall program, the 2014 Portfolio Review targets an increase in the number of exclusively breastfed children of 20%, so that the targeted LOP prevalence across the FTF ZOI would be 81%. UNICEF records only six countries in the world achieving over 70% exclusive breastfeeding up to 6 months[43], of which one has achieved a level above 80% (Rwanda at 85%). The target is therefore possible, but it is unlikely that the current FTF interventions which rely primarily upon BCC, indirectly mediated through health workers, will be adequate to allow this indicator to be met within the next three years across the ZOI. Indeed, given the current high levels already prevailing, the original ENGINE target of an 8% increase to 75% seems more realistic and in line with experience elsewhere, and even that might be hard to effect in the limited time available.

IR 8: Improved use of maternal and child nutrition services

This IR is measured by four indicators:

1. Number of people trained in child health and nutrition through USG-supported programs.
2. Number of health facilities with established capacity to manage acute under-nutrition.
3. Number of children under five who received Vitamin A from USG-supported programs.
4. Number of children under five reached by USG-supported nutrition programs.

FTF targets for these indicators are compiled from individual project targets. For the first indicator, the five main projects are targeted to train 80,389 people in child health and nutrition. The contributions to the total expected of different projects are somewhat variable. GRAD is targeted to contribute 2%, while ENGINE (which might be expected to contribute the most) stands at 35%, PRIME at 19% and LMD at 44%. This last figure is remarkable given LMD's focus on only 9 woredas. AMDe has no reported target.

Targets for this indicator do not appear to reflect the capacity of individual projects to undertake the required training. AMDe has no target for this indicator, the target for GRAD appears to be relatively low, while that for LMD appears relatively high.

As of November 2014, the number of people trained had reached 35% of the FTF target. GRAD has exceeded its target by 5.5%, ENGINE has achieved 40%, PRIME 24% and LMD has achieved 11% of LOP target. While overall progress has been sound, the LOP target for LMD is very high as compared with its coverage of woredas and the likelihood of this indicator being met is questionable.

The second and third indicators are entirely the preserve of ENGINE, which has already reported a total of 46 health facilities as against a target of 25. The LOP target has thus been already met. The target for the number of children receiving vitamin A is 4,205,663, as against a reported figure of 2,883,673, or 69% of target. If current rates of progress can be maintained, this target should also be met.

The final indicator in this series is also very largely driven by the activities of ENGINE, whose project target contributes 96.5% of the overall FTF program target. Currently the LOP FTF target of

---

[41] Duflo, E. (2012). Women empowerment and economic development. *Journal of Economic Literature* 50(4): 1051–1079.

[42] Lamstein, S.T., Stillman, P., Koniz-Booher, A., Aakesson, B., Collaiezzi,T., Williams, K. and Anson, M. (2014). Evidence of Effective Approaches to Social and Behavior Change Communication for Preventing and Reducing Stunting and Anemia: Report from a Systematic Literature Review. Arlington,VA: USAID/ Strengthening Partnerships, Results, and Innovations in Nutrition Globally (SPRING) Project.

[43] Data available at: http://data.unicef.org/nutrition/iycf

reaching 5.96 million children under five has been 57% achieved, and it is possible that the final figure may be reached.

Overall, the MTE team found there to be a substantial gap within the FTF results framework as regards Objective 2, in that while the indicators that are most frequently reported are output indicators under IRs 7 and 8, the most critical indicators are the impact indicators for the objective itself and for IR6, which have not yet been assessed since baseline data was first recorded. The causal pathway between the output and impact indicators may be logical, but it is by no means unequivocal. For example, trained people may still be unable to access health or nutrition services, while the physical presence of an improved-capacity health facility doesn't necessarily indicate improved use. Ideally an indicator might describe accessibility to improved health facilities and the percentage of households at risk of acute under-nutrition who can access a facility in the ZOI. Without appropriate outcome indicators that are more directly relevant to the objective, it is possible that the program might not reach its LOP targets for Objective 2 without any foreknowledge of the impending shortfall.

The FTF PMP does not provide the data necessary to assist program or project management to adjust activities to achieve FTF Program Objective 2. Differences between the assessments of management and the ENGINE MTE highlight this uncertainty, and while the mid-line evaluation might be expected to shed some light upon the rate of progress towards this objective, more frequent reporting using smaller samples would support more effective management for results.

It is broadly accepted that stunting is a multifaceted problem, being impacted by at least eight different factors including: maternal nutrition and weight at birth, prevalence of exclusive breast feeding, adequate complementary nutrition, animal protein intake, vitamin A, Zinc and iron intake levels, sanitary practices, availability of potable water and aflatoxin intake. It might be helpful to program and project management if IRs, sub IRs and indicators could be developed within the FTFMS which allowed progress with regard to these different factors to be tracked and their impact on the program objective to be assessed.

Summary

Assessment of progress against indicators was confounded by the following factors:

- The absence of targets for some indicators, especially population-based indicators determined by baseline, mid-line and end-line surveys, prevents any meaningful assessment of progress, even when it might be possible to estimate the probability of different rates of growth, since there is no framework within which to determine the significance of any observed change.
- The fact that some projects have not reported on indicators that were clearly within their manageable interest has meant that the extent of progress may have been underestimated in some cases.
- The different interpretations of indicators by different projects has rendered some statistics meaningless at the program level (e.g. numbers of jobs)
- The compilation of different sources and types of data to provide an indicator of a single number has also obscured the meaning of the result (e.g. areas under improved management)
- The extrapolation of survey data based upon samples that are not representative of the baseline has led to unrealistic assessments of progress (e.g. yield and gross margin data).
- Confusion of incremental and actual sales and exports within the FTFMS
- Eleven out of 39 indicators were of limited value in that their results were based upon data of different sources/types could not be readily interpreted, or that the attribution of impact to FTF interventions was impossible
- Eight out of 39 indicators had no targets. Under such conditions it is difficult, to determine the level of effort or resources that should be allocated to the relevant interventions, and the objective evaluation of progress is limited to positive/negative/no change.

It is also surprising that relatively little attention has been paid to the two key outcomes of business development and employment which, although critical to the push/pull model of development out of poverty, are measured by only one indicator in each case.

In the light of these concerns, it is evident that the current framework of indicators provides a weak basis for the assessment of progress towards the program IRs, Objectives and overall Goal. Program management is not facilitated by such a framework.

Nevertheless, an overall assessment of progress against indicators would suggest that output indicator targets are generally on target to be met. In some cases, initial under or over estimation of targets has meant that they have already been met or will not be met at all. In such cases, the FTFMS has been appropriately adjusted. There is no strong evidence to suggest that levels of effort and resources are not appropriately matched to the achievement of output targets.

For outcome targets, the picture is more variable. Targets in key areas of finance, employment and business development are less likely to be achieved (when such targets have been specified). This may be due to factors beyond the manageable interest of the FTF program, but it may also reflect the diffuse nature of market-based interventions and the limited coordination between such projects and more geographically focused interventions such as GRAD or PRIME.

The achievement of high-level impact targets is more problematic again, especially when considered from the perspective of a statistical analysis that uses a difference in difference methodology to ensure proper attribution of the results. Under such rigorous analysis, while it is possible that there may be significant improvement in the high level (objective, population-based) indicators to the targeted levels and beyond, it is unlikely that any of these targets will be met as a result of program interventions alone.

4. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

4.1 Gender

Gender is being integrated into FTF in two ways: explicit strategies to promote women's empowerment and efforts to mainstream gender into all FTF activities and track this progress by collecting gender-disaggregated data. It is well-known that women play a key role in agricultural production and nutrition, but frequently lack access to productive resources and decision-making authority.[44] In addition to addressing equity, empowering women is viewed as central to achieving the FTF goals of agriculture-led poverty reduction and improved nutrition. By collecting gender-disaggregated data (which is being done by multiple projects), projects should be able to identify the gendered impacts of their programming and adjust their strategies to ensure that women's needs are addressed.

The key indicator for women's empowerment, the WEAI, is only measured using the population-based surveys, so it is difficult to track the contribution of individual projects to this goal directly. A report by IFPRI examined the baseline results for the WEAI, but unfortunately, Ethiopia's baseline data was not available in time for it to be included in the global analysis. Globally, however, the largest constraint to women's empowerment was found to be access to credit, particularly for East African FTF countries.[45] Secondary education and exclusive breastfeeding were also found to be strongly correlated with women's empowerment. Women's role in household decision-making, control over productive assets, and leadership in the community and comfort speaking in public are also important components of the index, and project components that support each of these aspects is considered in our analysis.

GRAD's work with VESA groups has probably made one of the strongest contributions to women's empowerment. The VESA group model is designed to help poor households save money, gain access to loans provided by the group, and access loans from microfinance institutions. Because of the high female membership in VESA groups, this model is an ideal mechanism for improving women's access to credit and decision-making regarding spending. It also offers a forum for women to take on leadership positions and speak in the group meetings. GRAD has facilitated group discussions on women's empowerment and the role of women in household decision-making. Both men and women are present in these conversations, making them an ideal format to discuss the issues of inter-household decision-making and resource allocation that can be difficult to address simply through interventions targeting women. The VESA model, which focuses on both economic and social capital, represents an important

[44] Malapit, H.J. et al. (2014). Measuring Progress toward Empowerment: Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index: Baseline Report. IFPRI. http://www.ifpri.org/publication/measuring-progress-toward-empowerment accessed May 2015.
[45] Ibid.

departure from previous VSLA models in that it explicitly addresses intra-household dynamics and decision-making by including both husbands and wives, as opposed to the VSLA model which was more focused exclusively on women.

The Women in Agribusiness Leadership Network established by AMDe and supported by LMD is another interesting initiative to address women's empowerment. The network supports female entrepreneurs through training and mentoring, recognizing the unique hurtles women face establishing, operating, and expanding their businesses. By matching female entrepreneurs with successful, senior women in agribusinesses, the network seeks to provide women with the confidence, skills and resources they need to be entrepreneurs. Although it is too early to see the impact of the network, it is an innovative approach that should be monitored closely.

Particularly in light of the importance of access to credit, PRIME is potentially contributing significantly to women's empowerment, although some initiatives have not been undertaken as part of an explicit gender strategy. PRIME (and its predecessor RAIN) have been instrumental in the formation of the Somali Microfinance Institution (SMFI) and the newly established Afar Microfinance Institution, which are helping fill a large unmet need for Islamic finance in the Somali and Afar regions. Approximately 90% of SMFI's clients are women (compared with a national average of 41%), and SMFI has expanded rapidly since it opened in 2011, now with over 19 million birr in outstanding loans, 41 million birr in savings and almost 5,000 clients (Association of Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions (AEMFI)). These statistics suggest that there is a large demand for access to credit in the region, particularly among women. Building on the historical role of Somali women as entrepreneurs and traders could further strengthen PRIME's gender work. PRIME has begun to work with a Women Traders Association in Jijiga, connecting them to the National Women Traders Association and helping them host a trade fair. There are clear opportunities to build on this work to further strengthen this, and potentially other, groups, including through the small grants component of the project, but these opportunities have not been fully exploited to-date.

In terms of gender mainstreaming and the collection of gender-disaggregated data, it is clear that projects are taking pains to collect this data, and were aware of the targets that had been set for female participation in various project activities (for some projects it was unclear how much of this was driven by FTF priorities, and how much was driven by the GoE's mandate to have at least 30% participation of women in trainings and cooperatives). There were some concerning examples, however, that measures are being taken to ensure that targets are met that do not necessarily contribute to project objectives. For example, in order to encourage women to become members of cooperatives, AMDe gave them an umbrella or scarf for signing up, and the cooperative that signed up the most new members won an international exchange visit. While such incentives can be justified as providing visibility to women that join, one has to question whether women joined because of their inherent interest in becoming members, and if such superficial mechanisms for promoting membership will lead to lasting changes in women's empowerment. Such strategies are highly effective in helping reach project targets, but may potentially have very little actual impact.

The FTF gender component is primarily focused on women, but another vulnerable or disempowered group of particular relevance for FTF is youth. In terms of job creation, this is one of the key target groups. Due to the large number of landless youth, addressing the needs of this group will likely require initiatives outside of the agricultural sector, an area that has proven particularly challenging across FTF. Although there are some initiatives specifically targeting youth in GRAD and PRIME, overall, a stronger emphasis on the needs of this vulnerable group is needed. REST, through the GRAD project, has organized landless youth to form "cut and carry" forage businesses and beeswax businesses, but it is not clear if this is a widespread component of the program. Particular attention should be paid to lessons learned from the pilot projects with TOPS in PRIME, which could help inform future programming.

4.2 Climate Change

Two of the five major FTF projects have a climate change component: GRAD and PRIME. In both cases, the primary achievement to-date has been the development of climate vulnerability assessments. For GRAD, these assessments have helped identify risks in the value chains they were promoting, and led to a greater emphasis in the project on ways to reduce or minimize these risks. For PRIME, the

assessments were undertaken as part of the work with the rangeland management councils to help identify climate vulnerability and adaptation priorities for each rangeland unit using CARE's climate vulnerability and capacity assessment tool (CVCA).

In GRAD, climate change is one of the four issue areas addressed in the VESA groups: gender, nutrition, climate change and aspiration to graduation. According to REST, climate change adaptation is the area where they have been least successful, perhaps because many of the climate adaptation options that have been identified are in value chains that they have struggled to promote (over 85% of beneficiaries prefer to invest in shoat rearing or fattening, and it has been challenging to get clients to invest in other income-generating activities, particularly in Tigray). For PRIME, climate adaptation is the second IR of the project. According to the draft PRIME MTE report[46], the quality of the CVCA assessment was high, but now the priority should be on implementation of the recommendations that emerged from the assessments.

Although there are few explicit climate adaptation activities to-date, resilience is a key component of both projects, featuring in the project titles. Many of the activities undertaken in relation to climate change are perhaps better understood as addressing resilience rather than climate change per se. Viewed from this perspective, both projects are contributing significantly to resilience through a wide range of activities, including income diversification, savings, informal insurance (focus group participants identified informal insurance as one of the primary benefits of the VESA groups), commercial destocking systems, and natural resource management activities.

In spite of progress addressing some aspects of resilience, one key vulnerability issue stands out for PRIME and GRAD, as well as LMD and ENGINE: the issue of feed and fodder. The livelihood, marketing and nutrition activities in all four projects depend on the productivity of livestock and livestock products, which is not feasible without sufficient feed and fodder. Project staff as well as government officials have all identified the lack of feed and fodder as a barrier to the development and sustainability of the livestock sector. Each project has been marginally engaged in the feed and fodder issue, but none have addressed it as the central issue it is becoming for the sector.

In light of the new USG Executive Order on resilience[47], all future projects will need to think more critically about the role of resilience and climate change in their activities. An examination of AMDe and LMD suggests that there are opportunities for integrating a climate or resilience perspective into such projects, and opportunities to improve programming that have been missed. The geographic division of the country into productive and vulnerable areas masks the reality that all agricultural activities, particularly rain-fed agriculture, are vulnerable to climate-related shocks, including both droughts and floods, and consideration of risk-reducing measures is an appropriate component of any agricultural project.

In addition to considering climate-related risk, a resilience perspective would encourage projects to think more critically about the many risks smallholder producers face. As the COP of AMDe expressed, a project focusing on marketing of commodities, needs to have enough diversity in its portfolio, because inevitably some value chains will do better than expected and others will not. While the project has covered its own risk through diversification, it is not clear that it is encouraging the same risk-spreading among smallholder producers. In fact, in some cases it is potentially encouraging farmers to take on higher risk (albeit higher return) strategies. Hybrid maize is one such example. Although the yields associated with hybrid maize exceed local varieties, it also requires investment in more fertilizer and other inputs to be successful. In a good year, the increased cost of seed and other inputs is a good investment, but in a drier year, low-yielding local varieties may do better, or at a minimum, producers may lose less. Commercial farmers have sufficient access to finance to manage these risks, but projects need to think critically before promoting such risky strategies for smallholder producers without sufficient access to credit, savings or safety nets in the case of crop failures. While hybrid maize may potentially still benefit smallholder producers, to ensure that its adoption does not make vulnerable

[46] USAID. Mid Term Performance Evaluation of the PRIME Project

[47] In September 2014, the Obama Administration issued an Executive Order on climate-resilient international development that, "… requires the integration of climate-resilience considerations into all United States international development work." https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/executive-order-climate-resilient-international-development/ accessed May 2015.

households more vulnerable, complementary investments in increased education about the risks, risk-mitigating measures such as crop insurance, and encouragement of reinvestment of profits into livelihoods with no covariant risk are required.

Each project does not need to develop its own climate change strategy independently. A wide range of resources within the FTF global portfolio exist that can be drawn upon to help projects. For example, the FTF Innovation Lab for Collaborative Research on Adapting Livestock Systems to Climate Change[48] could provide support and technical expertise to PRIME and LMD (and potentially GRAD) in their work in the livestock sector. Another example is the Climate-Resilient Chickpea Innovation Lab, which seeks to harness traits from native chickpea strains to improve the resilience of domesticated chickpea. The Ethiopian Institute for Agricultural Research is one of the main partners in the Innovation Lab, and thus, it should be easy to establish collaboration. AMDe is working to promote Kabuli varieties of chickpea for export, but chickpea has traditionally been grown as an opportunistic crop, deriving its moisture from stored soil moisture rather than rainfall.[49] Considering the role that chickpea has historically played in the resilience of smallholder farmers, one would hope that this would factor into the decision-making to promote a non-native variety for export in AMDe, but this does not appear to have been the case. Aside from resilience concerns, the Chickpea Innovation Lab could be a helpful partner to address what AMDe has identified as a key barrier for the marketing and export of chickpeas: the insufficient size of the Kabuli varieties.

4.3 Knowledge Management

While each of the five major projects has a learning and knowledge management component, AKLDP also plays a major role in the provision of collaborative learning across the whole Feed the Future program. So far AKLDP knowledge management activities have focused primarily on monitoring and evaluation as well as internal learning. This may have been appropriate for the first half of projects, as lessons learned may just now be emerging, but it will be critical to ensure that a process for capturing the FTF experience and lessons learned is developed in the remaining stages of projects.

A wide range of activities are included in the knowledge management component of projects, including monitoring and evaluation for reporting and project management, dissemination of experiences for internal and external use, research, and policy work.

- Monitoring and evaluation: In response to the requirement to report on FTF indicators, and a perception on the part of projects that these are the indicators of greatest interest to the Mission, the M&E efforts of projects are strongly focused on the FTF indicators. Traditional activity, output and outcome indicators specific to projects have been given less priority, and in some cases, abandoned entirely. One of the key goals of M&E is to inform programmatic activities and make adjustments to project direction, focus or strategy. While in some cases, M&E efforts are contributing to this goal, the emphasis on FTF indicators has affected the ability of projects to focus on their own activities. As discussed previously, FTF indicators are not always well-aligned with direct project activities and are challenging for projects to collect, requiring a large effort on the part of project M&E teams. Some projects felt that their ability to engage in "knowledge management" was hindered by their focus on the FTF indicators.
- Dissemination of learning: Projects are beginning to document project learning, but across the board, this is not sufficiently systematic. There is a lack of commonality in terms and procedures of knowledge gathering and reporting within projects that hinders the dissemination of experience amongst them. In some cases, there appears to be a lack of distinction between "success stories," reporting for annual reports, and documentation of lessons learned. While including lessons learned and challenges in annual reports are important components of reporting, documentation of lessons learned should be a separate and distinct process, focused more on the fundamental

[48] http://lcccrsp.org/ accessed May 2015.

[49] Shiferaw, B. et al. (2007). Analysis of production costs, market opportunities and competitiveness of Desi and Kabuli chickpeas in Ethiopia. ICRISAT/EIAR. http://oar.icrisat.org/5273/1/BBBS-WorkingPaper3f.pdf accessed May 2015.

knowledge gained and experience of relevance to other projects or organizations, including the government, with a broader audience than program/project management alone.

- Research*:* A distinction needs to be made between formative research, designed to inform project design and activities, and fundamental research, designed to inform the field more broadly, and potentially future projects. Failure to distinguish between these types of research may lead to unrealistic expectations for research activities, as was seen in some projects. Some projects, most notably ENGINE, have systematically incorporated research into the project, designing research to inform policy work and project design. Other projects appear to have undertaken research in an ad-hoc fashion, as the need arose, with less strategic focus, and could benefit from clearer direction.
- Policy**:** FTF projects have an important role to play in the policy process, particularly by advocating for policy reform and providing examples of successful approaches to address key policy issues. Both roles require a strong evidence base upon which to build policy, but as yet the policy components of most projects are not drawing significantly upon the evidence bases that they themselves are developing (with the exception of ENGINE which has drawn extensively on its own formative research to develop recommendations for implementation by the NNC and others). This may be a reflection of the stage of implementation, i.e. that evidence bases are still under development. In which case, more effective policy reform might be expected in the latter half of the program.

As one of the largest FTF portfolios globally, FTF Ethiopia is in a unique position to provide lessons learned not only for future USAID Ethiopia projects, but to inform FTF more broadly. Currently neither the knowledge management components of projects, nor efforts at the Mission, are sufficient to capture these experiences and share them. AKLDP has a key role to play in capturing the knowledge and lessons learned by projects and translating them to a broader audience. AKLDP can potentially play several roles in the remainder of the project period:

1. Compiling useful project experiences, particularly on issues of relevance to more than one project. One example would be to conduct an assessment of different saving group modalities, as this has emerged as a key approach for addressing not only savings and credit interventions but also the BCC messaging at the center of the nutrition components of FTF.
2. Conducting research on issues or challenges identified by projects. For example, characterizing the feed and fodder chain would provide valuable information to multiple projects. Understanding the credit requirements and constrains for GRAD beneficiaries would inform the potential of such approaches to be scaled-up, and assessing the pro-poor impact of the various value chains would help inform both current and future FTF design. Characterising the assemblers, traders and brokers involved in all aspects of inter- and intra-Regional trade (within Ethiopia) would help to understand the needs of, and most effective project-based supports for the trading sector. Recent initiatives to establish a Livestock Working Group as well as Nutrition Working Group were highlighted by projects as a useful first step in identifying such areas of mutual interest.
3. Documenting and understanding those initiatives that have not resulted in the anticipated benefits. Recognising that failures can provide as much useful experience as successes, the documentation and analysis of such initiatives can provide useful information for future program design.

Establishing a model similar to faculty-student research mentorship could be one productive way to encourage more learning from the FTF projects. In such a model, staff in the AKLDP project could work with projects to identify research questions of broader interest to FTF, as well as project experiences that should be explored in further detail. Based on the types of questions and the capacity of the individual projects, AKLDP could then either take the lead on researching or documenting these topics, or they could play an advisory role for the projects to conduct their own research or document their own findings. Such a role would not duplicate the knowledge management components of individual projects, as AKDLP would help identify topics that are of broader interest to FTF, rather than those specifically within the scope of individual projects, and would work to bring together multiple partners if relevant. To support this work, AKLDP could potentially leverage more resources of relevance to FTF

at Tufts University than it has to-date. For example, Tufts University also hosts the Feed the Future Innovation Lab on Nutrition.[50]

One challenge to this model of knowledge management and learning is the role of AKLDP as the external evaluator for FTF projects. It is potentially detrimental to the close collaborative relationship that needs to be established if projects are going to be open about the challenges they are facing and the lessons they have learned (including failures) to have AKLDP serve as an external evaluator. Although this has not been overly problematic for the mid-term evaluations, perhaps because the learning agenda is only just getting underway, we recommend that a different arrangement be established for final evaluations.

5. INVESTMENT QUALITY

The quality of FTF investments can be considered in terms of both direct impacts and contribution toward FTF goals. The latter consideration is strongly dependent upon the validity of the causal pathway, which is considered in section 2. In this section, the MTE considers the direct impact of investments, particularly the financial investments made through the various grant processes. It was observed that there is little consistency amongst FTF projects in terms of financial investment procedures. GRAD and ENGINE beneficiaries, in keeping with principles established under HABP do not receive any financial support beyond assistance to access micro finance. AMDe, LMD and PRIME provide no grants to individuals, but community organizations and businesses may receive finance on a matching grant basis. That basis may vary according to circumstance (as for LMD or PRIME), or it may be fixed (AMDe). From a financial perspective therefore, considerations of investment quality are limited to AMDE, LMD and PRIME.

Within these three projects the MTE team found that some investments that were not fully aligned with the development principles underlying FTF. This is not unexpected when project management is required to achieve a targeted rate of disbursement. Under such circumstances it is easier for a project to invest larger sums in a small number of businesses that are better able to account for and utilize finance, rather than to seek out and train potential beneficiaries from the ranks of emergent MSMEs. The latter group can be expected to have a higher failure rate and to require a higher level of technical effort to support, but failure to encourage such emergent businesses can lead to the development of oligopolies or conversely of a restricted number of buyers, a result that directly contradicts the principles of market development for the benefit of either consumers or smallholder producers. As a consequence, while the MTE team observed that most investments were well targeted, some investments were noted that were:

1. Reportedly made for political expediency, and when the beneficiary stated to the MTE team that the finance could have been obtained from other sources (PRIME).
2. Supporting the expansion of infrastructure in the reported absence of adequate working capital to utilize the new equipment (LMD, PRIME).[51]
3. Made on the basis that "without the provision of these investments, our training would not have been effective" (AMDe).
4. Undertaken on an individual basis to promote cooperative membership (AMDe).

The above investments are somewhat akin to the use of aid to "buy economic growth", a concept that has been criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds.[52] There are also proponents of such a policy - indeed, AMDe management asserted that investment in warehouses would be the most outstanding aspect of the project for which it would be remembered in years to come. It is certainly true that training alone in the absence of resources that trainees might utilize leads nowhere, and that with the possible exception of training in financial literacy and business plan development, training of itself does little to enhance access to finance, so that an argument for some financial support can be well made.

[50] http://nutritioncrsp.org/ accessed May 2015.
[51] It was noted however, that capital assets provided through the FTF program (especially by AMDe) might then be used as collateral to obtain finance that would be otherwise impossible to access.
[52] Easterly, W. (2003). Can foreign aid buy growth? *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(3): 23-48.

AMDe reported that the call for applications for grant finance received over 400 applicants with a total value of over $40 million for an available fund of $14 million. These statistics may demonstrate a high demand for finance, but the situation is complex. A preceding USAID program (Agribusiness and Trade Expansion Program) implementing a similar but smaller investment facility was similarly inundated proposals for funding, but many were assessed as non-viable. At the same time, it was noted by that where financial assistance or other support had enabled beneficiaries to obtain loans[53], the disbursement rates were significantly lower than rates of loans approved. This was reportedly due to the inherent risk management of SMEs and cooperatives and bank loan officers who only disbursed loans as they were needed and could be absorbed. Such a pragmatic approach reflects the limited real capacity of the agricultural sector to absorb finance *even though it is severely underfinanced.* The capacity of institutions to absorb, utilize and account for funds effectively is still relatively underdeveloped. This results in those businesses or institutions that can respond appropriately being often targeted by a number of different projects in their search for effective and potentially successful beneficiaries.

Under such circumstances where, real absorptive capacity is limited, it would appear that pressure to achieve disbursement targets has resulted in a tendency towards the "purchasing of growth", and it is recommended that project output targets for grant disbursement should be avoided when the desired outcome (of business development) can be measured in other more direct ways. It is also quite evident that the need still remains for the development of private sector business capacity to the point where the absorption of funds is not focused upon a limited number of beneficiary institutions or businesses.

5.1 Successful Investments

Notwithstanding the above criticisms, the MTE also noted a number of substantial achievements that demonstrated the quality of specific investments. These were generally associated with investments in training and mentoring rather than financial support. In particular the following stood out:

1. The success of GRAD in demonstrating the effectiveness of the comprehensive support package, including especially savings and loans groups (aka: VSLAs/VESAs/Development Groups), but also the concept of training in business development together with ongoing support and mentoring: The methodology adopted by GRAD has been taken up to a considerable extent by the GoE in the redesign of the PSNP/HABP program that will run from 2015 onwards indicating that GRAD has been effective in influencing policy, This has not been well captured by the FTF indicators, and yet it is exactly the result that a focused program such as GRAD is designed to achieve. Being limited to only 65,000 households, the GRAD project could never significantly affect rural poverty on a large scale directly, but it could achieve a much wider impact through its demonstration effect. This is indeed what has occurred, and as a result the limited investment in the GRAD project (the smallest of the main five FTF programs) can be considered to have been well justified. Budget restrictions may prevent the expansion of GRAD to cover a wider area, but there is considerable scope to build upon key principles of GRAD, namely incorporating PSNP support and development assistance, working closely with GoE staff and MFIs, and focusing on development in a limited area that is largely within manageable interest. Such developments are considered further in section 5.2.2.
2. In a similar manner, ENGINE has instrumental in incorporating nutrition into both PSNP 4 and AGP 2. It has also worked successfully with UNICEF and others to improve the policy environment for multi-sectoral nutrition, while both AMDe and LMD have influenced the design of the upcoming second AGP program.
3. The ENGINE project has undertaken substantial formative research that has led to the revision of behavioural change communication modules. This again is not well reflected in FTF indicators, but has led to a significantly improved understanding of the social and religious constraints to an adequate diet that is not only being incorporated into BCC programs but has also led to positive discussions with religious leaders. Such formative research could play a similar role in the development of appropriate BCC to address such issues as low rates of

[53] AMDe for example reported that it had facilitated access to over $90 million in loans, although a significant proportion of this was not disbursed.

livestock off-take and low adoption of improved agricultural technologies.

4. The coordination between GRAD and LMD in the production and marketing of sheep and goats in Oromiya and Tigray is an example of a successful push/pull dynamic that can inform other situations. Although the end-buyers of the animals were in both cases outside the GRAD woredas, geographical disparities were overcome through the development of a close working relationship between GRAD and LMD project staff who were together able to support the entire length of the value chain (from feed production through livestock fattening to end marketing). Situations where a similar dynamic might prevail could be limited in number, but the success of this interaction between the two projects has provided a demonstration of what can be achieved and some lessons as to the extent of the cooperation needed to achieve it. Other efforts at coordination and joint implementation are in the works, and project teams appeared to have a genuine interest and commitment to such efforts, but geographical and institutional challenges have made it more complicated than originally envisioned in the FTF design.
5. The work undertaken by PRIME in developing the Somali MFI has been a groundbreaking success that was initially viewed with a degree of skepticism by MFI experts in Ethiopia, but has now won their admiration. The speed with which this MFI has developed over less than two years to the point where it is already the 19th largest MFI in Ethiopia reflects the effectiveness of the project's support. Perhaps the strongest indication of the value of this intervention is the fact that the initiative is already being independently replicated. This MFI, whose clients are predominantly women, will substantially improve access to finance for MSMEs in Somali Region. It will be interesting to see if this success will also be replicated in PRIME's recent work with the Afar Microfinance Institute.
6. One aspect of PRIME that is poorly reflected in the FTF PMP, but is critical to success in the long-term is the learning nature of many of its interventions. While support to pastoral producers has been undertaken by previous projects (e.g. PLI I and II and RAIN), the provision of support to facilitate the transitioning out of pastoralism into new commercial activities or employment is a new development that has to date received little attention either in Ethiopia or elsewhere in the Horn of Africa. The different project interventions designed to promote employment creation, to enhance skills development and to bring together employers and potential employees, as well as those designed to promote and support small business development, form a range of activities designed to facilitate transition that will ultimately include both successes and failures. Experience would suggest that the failures will initially be greater in number than the successes, but it is important to recognize that PRIME represents the first in a series of projects designed to assist TOPS. That series will increasingly refine the suite of appropriate interventions necessary to achieve success, in a manner similar to that, which has been achieved by the project series: SPSNP - PSNP Plus - and now GRAD. As such, PRIME is working with innovation and already with some successes to lay the foundation for future projects that will be critical for the support of TOPS.
7. The Women in Agribusiness Leadership Network supported by AMDe and LMD), while unlikely to be of direct impact to the most vulnerable households, has nevertheless created an impetus for gender equity that can spread from the top down. The network has proven extremely successful in mobilizing businesswomen throughout the FTF ZOI. This would appear to be a sustainable initiative that can be used in the future for gender-based advocacy, for training and perhaps more importantly for the development of aspiration amongst women. If in the remaining period of the AMDe project, the Women in Agribusiness Leadership Network can be provided with the necessary support to ensure its long term stability, it is possible that this more than any other development will be the most remarkable achievement of the AMDe program.
8. The support by AMDe for the construction of Ethiopia's first fertilizer blending plant for Bicho Woliso Cooperative Union is an exciting development, and the availability of improved fertilizers along with complementary activities of soil testing, research, field demonstrations and stakeholder meetings on the topic of fertilizer distribution will undoubtedly benefit

commercial producers. Past experience[54] suggests that campaigns to increase and improve the use of fertilizer are prone to unsustainability and that it is the complementary activities that AMDe has initiated that will in the long term be more critical to the success of this initiative. It will be necessary for AMDe to ensure the sustainability of its investment through both training and if possible, the institutionalization of its soil testing, demonstrations and stakeholder meetings to ensure that these complementary activities can be continued and adoption is sustained after the project has ended.

9. One last notable achievement which, although small in its immediate impact is potentially of far-reaching significance, has been the promotion by ENGINE of water carrying by the men of the village of Dembeli Keta. This development allows the women of the village significantly more time both to relax and to look after the rest of their families and so impacts both gender equity and nutrition. If only 1% of the FTF budget were to be focused on ongoing support to this single activity and the promotion of its replication elsewhere, it might have no impact at all, but could equally have an impact out of all proportion to the costs involved that would be the defining characteristic of the first Ethiopian FTF program.

In addition to the above, it must be noted that FTF through AMDe in particular, has supported a range of technical innovations including new seeds, blended fertilizer and diverse support to the activities of the ATA. All of the above represent progress towards an enhanced agricultural sector. Nevertheless, the potential of such investments can only be realized if ongoing support is provided for their effective management over at least the next five years and possibly beyond. Past experience in southern Africa has shown that technical innovations even when supported by extensive trials and demonstrations are rarely enough to promote sustainable development. Continued training and reiteration of the promotion of improved technologies will be required if these extensive efforts are to have the impacts upon agricultural production required to eventually generate opportunities for economic improvement amongst the most vulnerable households.

5.1.1 Resource Constraints

In almost all cases, the resources constraining project achievements have been beyond project's manageable interests, varying according to methodology. While this is an inevitable reality of working in collaboration with government-led initiatives and in a country with a strong development partner landscape, it presents challenges for the implementation of FTF. Both AMDe and LMD rely upon increasing production as well as sustainable markets for their focus value chains. These aspects have not always been present. Sesame yields and prices have fallen substantially in the last few months. Wheat markets have been distorted by GoE intervention and chickpea production has failed to achieve export quality. Similarly, abattoirs working with LMD have reported that their targeted export markets are unable to match domestic market prices. For these and a number of other reasons, both AMDe and LMD have broadened their scope to include not only marketing, but also various aspects of production in response to the fundamental constraint of inadequate or unprofitable production volumes, but it remains evident that a lack of progress in the production component of AGP has constrained the achievements of both AMDe and LMD.

In the case of the LMD, progress has been limited by the lack of a clear counterpart within the GoE. Staff within the newly created State Ministry for Livestock were confident that as the new Directorates become increasingly operational, this constraint might be expected to diminish.

GRAD has faced two resource constraints. The intensity of the interventions has required a substantial number of trained facilitators in order to apply the GRAD methodology effectively so that it has not been possible to extend the project beyond16 woredas. The same concern may become evident for PRIME in its support to TOPS, but it is too early to identify such a trend. This is primarily a budgetary issue and does not affect the replicability/efficacy of overall project designs. More fundamentally however, the availability of MFI credit for small business development has been

[54] Not only in Ethiopia where the Sasakawa Global 2000 initiative was initially highly successful, but subsequently experienced high dis-adoption rates. Similar experiences have been recorded over the last 50 years in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi all of which have seen fertilizer usage rise and fall in line with the introduction and subsequent cessation of various promotional interventions.

significantly less than anticipated. This has been partly due to previous non-performing loans, but it was also reported that MFIs remain reluctant to avail credit to PSNP participants, preferring instead to finance larger MSMEs and/or sectors outside of agriculture. This issue will continue to constrain the graduation of PSNP beneficiaries unless alternative sources of finance can be found.

While ENGINE has a clear institutional framework to work with in MOH at all levels, the project has faced the constraint of an unclear counterpart institutional framework within the Ministry of Agriculture at the Federal level that has limited the effectiveness of its outputs at the household level. The project has been proactive in seeking to resolve such confusion through its activities as the secretariat of the National Nutrition Planning Committee, but the institutional challenges of multi-sectoral programming will take a long time to resolve.

5.1.2 Relative Cost-Effectiveness of Projects

The MTE is required to comment on the relative cost-effectiveness of projects. Such an assessment is confounded by the fact that different projects within the FTF have very different objectives. Moreover, some projects are more self-contained than others, although all depend to some extent upon developments that are beyond their manageable interest. Nevertheless, from the narrow perspective of contributing towards the achievement of FTF objectives, some assessment of cost-effectiveness can be made.

The support by FTF of interventions that parallel the PSNP has been evaluated on a number of occasions with a general consensus that the interventions contribute substantially to the enhanced food security of targeted households. On average PSNP-type interventions have reduced the number of months of food insecurity for targeted households by 1.5, which has made a substantial difference to the protection of household assets. The cost per household exceeds US$350 per household, an amount that must be continually reinvested each year, and it is evident that investment in complementary programs such as GRAD that would allow households to graduate out of the PSNP by becoming sustainably food secure is a much needed development. Nevertheless, FTF support for PSNP-type interventions has not only had a clearly beneficial direct impact in the past, but would also be an essential component of projects such as GRAD in the future, since the provision of a "consumptive stipend" remains critical to the early development of the beneficiaries of such projects.

GRAD has been successful in its area of operation. It is meeting its targets and has a clear impact upon vulnerable households, even though its influence over the entire FTF ZOI can be expected to be small. Given the number of households (65,000) that have been targeted for change, and at a cost of approximately US$23.4 million, the level of investment per household appears large at US$ 360 per household, especially when compared with more systemic projects such as AMDe or LMD. Nevertheless, from a purely financial perspective, such a level of investment is entirely realistic, if not optimistic. Few businesses achieve greater than a 25% annual return on their investment, yet the expectation of GRAD, which aims to increase household income by US$365 per year, is that annual returns on GRAD's investment per household should slightly exceed 100% - this is potentially a very impressive result, but requires further monitoring.

There remain a number of concerns over GRAD which may temper this assessment in the future. The fact that so many beneficiaries have opted for a production-based approach to increased income (focusing so heavily on sheep and goat fattening) is a concern given the limited availability of feed, and the restricted availability of finance from a system that is strongly risk averse also raises doubts about the scaleability and sustainability of the GRAD approach. The limited extent to which GRAD has been able to develop other off-farm income generating activities, also suggests that the broad-based rural economic development that it was intended to foster amongst vulnerable households in its target woredas is not so easily achieved. From these perspectives, GRAD appears to be more of a step toward economic empowerment than the actual achievement of that goal, and there is clearly a need for further interventions to build upon the foundation that a program such as GRAD has created.

Nevertheless GRAD has achieved a key objective of providing a successful model that is now in process of replication through PSNP4, leveraging funds from other donors. By doing so, it has justified the limited and intensive approach to development. PRIME has the potential to achieve the same results as GRAD; its overall budget of US$52 million results in 25% lower level of investment when applied to the 194,000 households targeted to receive USG assistance (i.e. US$268 per household). Many of the

PRIME interventions are also more systemic in nature and it inevitable that some of these will be more cost effective than others. Given that PRIME is breaking new ground in its TOPS-focused interventions, (especially those addressing employment creation) it is too early to judge what may be most cost effective at this stage.

LMD has worked effectively in a limited number of areas, but the fact that the project is entirely new (as opposed to GRAD or PRIME, which were able to build upon PSNP Plus and PLI/RAIN respectively) and an observed high level of rigor in its reporting appears to have contributed to lower than average achievement of targets. The differences in reporting across projects means that while LMD has not contributed as much numerically to targets as some other projects, this is not necessarily indicative of its actual on-the-ground impact. At the same time, staff noted that it had not been easy to identify beneficiaries and interventions that might contribute directly towards the immediate FTF objective of reaching those below the poverty line other than through partnership with GRAD. ENGINE has similarly worked well to strengthen national nutrition policy but has itself recognized that in terms of developing the successful BCC programs to promote the second FTF objective, there are still obstacles that remain to be overcome to influence income utilization in support of improved behaviors. Finally, AMDe has achieved much in terms of economic development in selected areas and value chains. The project has reached 650,000 SHF households using strict definitions, and by a somewhat broader definition over 1.7 million SHF households have received significant support through capacity building, training, investments, loan and market facilitation to over 50 FCUs, but its primary emphasis upon those households that can participate in agricultural marketing and value chain development ignores the majority of vulnerable households within the FTF ZOI.

This does not mean that LMD, ENGINE and AMDe are not cost effective, but within the limited scope of the FTF objectives and the lifetime of the current FTF program, the immediate contributions that these programs have made when set against the budgets that have been expended are relatively lower than those of GRAD. For AMDe and LMD, this situation may be quite different when viewed from a long-term perspective. It is widely accepted that supporting equitable economic development will ultimately reduce rural poverty and that in the absence of significant growth in services, industry or manufacturing, the agricultural sector is the only candidate for such support. Systemic marketing initiatives that are begun now may well bear fruit in 5 to 10 years, but cannot be expected to impact poverty in a shorter timescale. For ENGINE, the limiting factor is that of manageable interest. It is widely recognized that the use of BCC can be an extremely cost-effective tool[55], but for as long as the project is prevented from working directly with health workers or households, it will be difficult for it to develop effective BCC models that could be replicated elsewhere.

All of the above imply that from an immediate FTF perspective GRAD has been the most cost-effective program to date. This finding may appear counter-intuitive given the high cost of household level interventions as compared with a more systemic marketing approach. Basic economic modeling suggests that the level of investment required to achieve the targeted increment in income is inevitably high, whether this be provided through commercial investment or (as a stop gap, pending the availability of such investment) through programs such as GRAD. BRAC's experience in Bangladesh shows that when combined with a market development approach, household level interventions can be perfectly sustainable. Under the current circumstances both are required, especially when targeting the most vulnerable households and looking for results within five years.

Nevertheless, the comparison is of relatively limited significance. What is significant however is the recognition of the limitations faced by each project that have reduced their immediate cost effectiveness so that future program designs can allow for these constraints.

---

[55] Bhutta, A.Z., Das, J. K., Rizvi, A., Gaffey, M. F., Walker, N., Horton, S., Webb, P., Lartey, A., and Black, R.E. (2012). Evidence-based interventions for improvement of maternal and child nutrition: what can be done and at what cost? *The Lancet* 382: 452.

5.1.3 Summary

The analysis above would suggest that the most effective investments have been those that have focused upon human development, within a limited area and where factors beyond the project's manageable interest have been minimal. Under such circumstances, project activities have achieved their goals. Infrastructural investments, while potentially positive in their long-term impact have yet to demonstrate immediate benefits, while evidence to date shows that a strong reliance upon counterpart performance can lead to a reduction in investment impact. As emphasized throughout the report, an analysis of cost effectiveness is highly dependent on the goals considered. For this MTE, achievement of the high-level FTF goals by the end of the 5-year program is the ultimate measure of success, but this perspective is obviously limited and an analysis of a broader set of development objectives might come to slightly different conclusions.

5.2 Opportunities for Reprogramming

5.2.1 Immediate Reprogramming

Some areas exist where immediate reprogramming and reallocation of resources within the FTF portfolio could enhance the probability of reaching the FTF goals and the sustainability of progress made to date.

The following recommendations are designed to minimize disruption to initiatives already in place and are feasible in the remaining timeframe of existing projects without additional allocation of budgeting. Based on the concerns raised earlier in this section on the investment grant component of several projects, but particularly AMDe, we recommend ending the allocation of new large grants. Small grants targeted in specific projects to address key barriers are still appropriate (such as the PRIME grants to private veterinary pharmacies). Sufficient investments have now been made, as noted in the mid-term evaluation, and future efforts should focus on strengthening the capacity of grantee institutions to maximize the effectiveness of the grants and ensure their sustainability and profitability. As identified in the AMDe mid-term evaluation, the balance between financial investments in grants and capacity-building has been heavily skewed towards grants, and significant increases in capacity-building is required for those grantees in the remaining lifetime of the project. A number of grants have already been awarded, and are currently in the process of being dispersed, which likely are politically infeasible to halt, but very clear processes (potentially drawing on the experiences of PRIME and LMD) should be employed to ensure grantees meet certain milestones and targets before receiving more money. PRIME's experience suggests that grants can be allocated based on performance, and additional components of the grant can even be provided to other members of the supply chain, further distributing the benefits of the investment grants and ensuring a more competitive and sustainable supply chain.

Efforts in the wheat value chain are also unlikely to contribute significantly to the FTF goals, and we recommend suspending activities in this value chain. AMDe has recognized that there are fewer opportunities in the wheat value chain, and has allocated fewer resources to it, which is appropriate, but remaining resources would be more effectively allocated elsewhere. Wheat production remains below national targets, but national prices are approximately double the international price of wheat, suggesting that marketing initiatives will not lead to increased production, and indeed, if the market allowed, imported wheat would be sourced by many processors at a lower price. The price of bread is also controlled by government, leaving little room for agribusinesses to operate profitably in the wheat value chain.

In the chickpea value chain, although the Kabuli variety has been strongly promoted as an export crop by AMDe, problems appear to remain regarding the quality of the Kabuli varieties currently being produced. Although larger than the Desi varieties, the product is still too small for the international market. AMDe staff expressed the opinion that more research is needed to improve the seed quality before Ethiopian Kabuli chickpea is ready for export markets. At the same time, the project has provided a number of cooperatives with the quality cleaning and grading equipment required for export, which appears inappropriate considering the production challenges. We recommend that AMDe focus on production for the domestic market rather than promoting export of chickpea, at least until the quality issues have been resolved, which may take a number of years, and stop distributing equipment

that is only required for export production. The domestic market for Kabuli varieties of chickpea appears strong, but if marketing and agribusiness opportunities for domestic consumption are limited, chickpea activities should be scaled back in light of the export quality challenges. Concerns about quality should be communicated to the Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Climate-Resilient Chickpea and potential for collaboration should be explored.

For a number of export-focused value chains, most notably honey and meat, particularly in the highlands, a key challenge is that the domestic price far exceeds the international price (This is especially the case when the domestic market contains a large element of informality, as in the case of meat, for which formal processing adds substantially to the final price of the product, reducing its competiveness). Both AMDe and LMD designs are focused on export marketing strategies for these value chains, but have struggled to find sufficient supply for their export processors. Rather than trying to force the market towards export production, efforts would be better directed towards ensuring that smallholder producers and those below the poverty line are able to participate in the market, locally or nationally. Both honey and small ruminants are among the strongest pro-poor value chains in the FTF portfolio, but the poor are not currently prepared to produce in the quality and consistency required by the export market, nor does the market pay a sufficient premium for such producers to be attracted to these markets. Based on local market conditions there are important marketing opportunities and constraints in these value chains that could have immediate pro-poor benefits, and resources would be better spent working on these aspects of the value chain rather than on export promotion.

Budget resources freed up from the investment grants and wheat value chain should be reallocated to strengthen the cooperatives and other businesses that have already received grants, and on linking smaller producers to markets. As grantee businesses expand, their training needs will shift, and continued training, capacity-building and mentoring are essential to ensure sustainability. As the AMDe mid-term evaluation highlights, efforts for the remainder of the project should focus on deepening and strengthening progress, rather than seeking to expand the projects reach more broadly. This is particularly true for AMDe, but is an important lesson for other projects that are not yet as far along.

In addition to reallocating budgets to strengthen existing investments and focus on more pro-poor aspects of value chains, it may be appropriate to reconsider the division of effort between ENGINE and other projects. While in AGP woredas it may have been appropriate for ENGINE to engage directly in livelihood activities to promote nutrition-sensitive agriculture, (since LMD and AMDe are not designed to work directly at the household level), the project is now poised to expand into woredas where GRAD and PRIME both have direct contact with vulnerable households, allowing new and potentially more synergistic approaches to collaboration to be developed. The GRAD/ENGINE collaboration appears to have a clear division of labor that would allow each project to focus primarily upon its core competencies, but to nevertheless work together to ensure both effective SBC and resilience. The collaboration between ENGINE and PRIME is still in the early stages, but could be developed on the same basis. In particular it is important that lesson's such as those derived from "Milk Matters"[56] should be successfully incorporated into PRIME's market-oriented activities, in a way that can ensure the commercial sustainability of the desired nutritional outcomes, especially in relation to the development of the feed and fodder value chain.

5.2.2 Redesign

In addition to opportunities for immediate reprogramming, the MTE team offers several recommendations for the redesign of future FTF programs. These recommendations are based on our understanding of the goals and objectives of FTF as well as the unique opportunities and constraints in the Ethiopian context. The recommendations build on both the successes and lessons learned to-date

[56] Sadler, K., Mitchard, E., Abdullahi Abdi, Yoseph Shiferaw and Catley, A. (2012). *Milk Matters: The Impact of Dry Season Livestock Support on Milk Supply and Child Nutrition in Somali Region, Ethiopia.* Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, Addis Ababa. http://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Milk-Matters-2.pdf accessed May 2015.

from FTF.

When designing future FTF programming, several principles should inform the design:

- Re-orientate to a genuine pro-poor focus
  FTF programming should explicitly target poor households and projects should be designed to recognize the unique risks these households face, which can be very different from the challenges of better-off households. The introduction of improved technologies to increase yields is of little benefit to the most vulnerable households if they are unwilling to adopt those technologies. Experience has shown that this can often be the case and the importance of formative research to understand barriers to adoption of improved technologies amongst the most vulnerable cannot be underestimated. Such an approach likely requires interventions targeted at the household level, as well as interventions designed to address systemic barriers to economic development. A strong pro-poor focus would recognize that the underlying causes of poverty and under-nutrition are deep-seated. There are no "silver bullets" or easy wins, and targets should reflect this reality. While programming will necessarily engage households beyond the most vulnerable, progress against indicators should measure results for this population, and targets should be set accordingly.
- Quality is preferable to quantity
  One of USAID's greatest strengths is the ability to demonstrate strategies that can be scaled-up by government and other donors. Particularly in the Ethiopian context where there are many development partners and government programs, as well as a very large population of relevance to FTF, tradeoffs have to be made between program depth versus breadth. It is not possible for FTF to engage directly with all vulnerable households, a reality acknowledged in the current strategy. Instead of attempting broad coverage, or high numerical targets, FTF investments will be more sustainable if efforts are more concentrated to ensure high quality. USAID Ethiopia experience has shown that when USAID introduces new innovations, government and other development partners are receptive to these new approaches. Through its role in government program and development partner platforms, USAID is well-positioned to transfer best practices and experiences to government for scale-up, but first their effectiveness must be demonstrated through FTF.
- Build on complementary programs
  To maximize the overall impact of investments, FTF should build on strong, existing programs with synergistic objectives. The newly designed PSNP4 program provides a clear opportunity for this approach. In addition to supporting the same target population, FTF could benefit from the logistical and institutional experience of implementing partners locally if these programs were to be co-located.

The current FTF Ethiopia portfolio contains a range of projects designed to address key constraints in the agricultural system and contribute to government programs, particularly the AGP, and to some extent, the PSNP. While the current design includes important enabling environment initiatives, market development, and livelihoods support for the poor and vulnerable, the portfolio is widely dispersed, both geographically and in terms of objectives, diluting its impact, and the pro-poor targeting of the program is not as direct as it could be. Feed the Future II should seek to deliver a more integrated, targeted pro-poor program.

Ongoing design processes for key government programs, most notably the PSNP and AGP, but also SLMP and the new Livestock program, offer new opportunities for the next phase of Feed the Future. Key developments include:

- Expansion of PSNP from selected woredas to become a national rural safety net program
- Integration of the PSNP and HABP program, expanding the scope of PSNP from a asset-maintenance to an asset-building program
- Expansion of AGP woredas, including more overlap with the new PSNP coverage area
- Inclusion of new value chains in the AGPII, such as pulses, horticulture, and poultry, that have potential for a pro-poor focus.

Each of these developments represents an opportunity for USAID to support government priorities in new ways that are closely aligned with FTF priorities, and will alleviate some of the constraints

currently faced by FTF. The geographic expansion of PSNP4 will allow for overlap of PSNP and AGP interventions, and creates the opportunity to layer Food for Peace and FTF funded interventions beyond those of GRAD alone in the same geography. Similarly, with the merging of PSNP and HABP, the previous focus of PSNP on asset-maintenance will expand to asset-building, which aligns much more closely with FTF objectives, and offers even greater synergies between FTF and Food for Peace activities than have existed before.

While the geographic expansion not only of PSNP but also AGP will stretch resources and may potentially dilute government's ability to deliver the full programs, it provides an opportunity for USAID to engage in both market-focused and livelihood-focused interventions in the same areas. Opportunities also arise from the expanded scope in AGPII to cover additional value chains that may have greater potential to raise the incomes of poor households with limited land holdings[57]. This expanded scope will allow USAID to focus on those interventions that are strongly pro-poor while still supporting AGP priorities.

A potential FTF redesign could build on the strengths and successes of USAID with the PSNP, using a model similar to PSNP+ and GRAD, in which USAID projects influence national policy through example, while simultaneously contributing to government program objectives in specific geographic areas.[58] Such a program would include both highland and pastoral coverage, with tailored programming to the socio-cultural, economic and environmental realities of different regions. Title II Food For Peace funding would provide the foundation to ensure that assets are maintained and the poor can begin investing in increased productivity and income-generating activities. Layered on top of this would be a series of programs funded by FTF including:

- Household interventions focused on production (including technical assistance, land management and inputs), access to finance, market linkages and pro-poor employment, Mechanisms such as the VESA group model have been proven to be effective for promoting a wide range of agriculture and non-agriculture-based interventions in a scalable fashion, and can be designed to link closely with the asset protection offered through Food for Peace support and the market-facilitation interventions. Household interventions should focus on a diverse range of income-generating activities, and not be limited to specific value chains (although certain value chains will necessarily feature prominently in household strategies based on their resources and market demand). Particularly for the target population of FTF, most of whom own less than 0.5 ha of land, it is probable that multiple income streams will be required to meet income targets.
- The programming of household-focused interventions would also allow the implementation of activities designed to influence stunting directly (as opposed to indirectly through the Health Army). The experience of ENGINE in BCC could be used to combine proven BCC/SBCC with the critical elements of WASH, vitamin fortification and all of the eight different factors affecting stunting could be combined within a single project and in a limited area to demonstrate the benefit of convergence for subsequent replication by other parties.
- Demand-driven market facilitation interventions focusing on pro-poor agricultural, livestock and non-agricultural opportunities, as well as the supply and marketing of key inputs needed to ensure livelihood sustainability, particularly feed and fodder can be layered on top of household-level interventions. These marketing initiatives would target the poor as their beneficiaries but would engage a broader range of actors in order to strengthen markets and ensure that all linkages in the value chain are supported. Systemic support for nutrition outcomes, including better sanitation and healthcare facilities is also needed for a holistic approach. Such interventions would build on the experience with AMDe and LMD, but would be tailored to cover the geographic areas of overlap between AGP and PSNP, and the agricultural, livestock, and non-farm value chains which poor households are engaged in.

[57] While the examples of pulses, horticulture, and poultry look promising from a pro-poor perspective, a comprehensive analysis of the pro-poor potential of each opportunity is needed.

[58] Reference to a "PSNP+ or GRAD model" is not intended to suggest that all activities would resemble a GRAD project. Rather, the example is given to highlight the model of working intensively in a limited geographic area to achieve results that are then replicated by government. FTF can effectively serve as a pilot for holistic demand-driven agricultural and nutrition focused development programming.

- Policy, coordination, and enabling environment support, as well as technical assistance for key government institutions, including the Ministries of Agriculture, Trade and Health would constitute the final "layer" of FTF programming. While specific interventions targeting the poor are necessary to lift households out of poverty in the short-term, long-term development requires economic growth and stronger agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. These interventions, while not large in number or financial resources, would strategically address capacity and policy priorities that need to be addressed to ensure the sustainability of FTF investments.

The conceptual framework for such a redesign is shown below:



6. MANAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES

The Ethiopian FTF program is conceptually simple, but complex in its implementation, requiring a substantial LOE dedicated to its management if it is to be effective. The size of the program is sufficient to justify its own management structure and tools both within the Mission and amongst the implementing partners. Nevertheless, evidence of such specific and focused management is limited. Instead, it would appear that FTF management is one of the many activities that occupy different mission staff, while coordination amongst implementing partners, although occurring regularly amongst COPs, does not always occur at the level of implementation and is in fact only specified in the SOW of one of the five main projects. Under such circumstances, the capacity of management to achieve the necessary oversight and to respond in the event of unforeseen developments is limited. The following sections highlight issues of management that were observed by the MTE team and the opportunities for improvement that exist.

6.1 Portfolio Management

Causal pathways: The value chain approach to development features strongly as an element of the causal pathways of DO1 and much of FTF. This is appropriate when the target group has the capacity to participate effectively in those value chains, but many of the most vulnerable households are unable to do this. Nevertheless, while this suggests a need to modify the causal pathways to account for the specific needs and capacities of the target group, there is little evidence that management has

attempted such modification. The MTE suggest that a greater emphasis upon formative research to validate and amend the causal pathway and the flexibility to do so would assist in the management of what is after all an innovative program.

Indicators and targets: While some FTF indicates had well-specified targets, the MTE team was unable to determine the targets set for some potentially critical indicators (see section 3.2). The absence of such targets makes it impossible to determine the adequacy of resources to meet the overall FTF objectives and goal. Even though some targets might have been impossible to set until the baseline data had been collected, the opportunity now exists to specify targets based upon both baseline data and experience in implementation.

Data reporting and management: The quality of the reported data assessed by the MTE team varied considerably from rigorous counts to broad extrapolations from samples. The definitions applied by different projects were not always consistent and the aggregation of different types of data has tended to obscure the real nature of achievements. Portfolio management could strengthen the quality of data reported by coordinating with individual project M&E managers to ensure consistency in data collection procedures and in definitions.

The MTE team was provided with an FTF PMP, which although described as a "living document" was apparently last updated in 2010 and has been effectively superseded by the FTFMS. This is a web-based spreadsheet record of targets and actual performance for each indicator disaggregated as appropriate. Its structure (running to over 5,000 lines of data on a single worksheet) does not facilitate either the accessibility or the interpretation of data, and it is not surprising that the MTE encountered numerous contradictions between FTFMS data and that provided by individual projects in their own PMP matrices. The FTFMS as it was supplied to the MTE team does not facilitate an assessment of progress or any other management requirement. It would be more useful if it could be presented as a structured workbook that would allow both headline reporting and drilling down to individual IRs so that information could be shared in an accessible form.

The size and complexity of the quarterly compiled FTF data set does not lend itself to immediate comprehension by Mission staff. As a result, although data is compiled and dispatched to FTF management in Washington, its accuracy and/or significance is not always immediately understood at Mission level. This can lead to overstating expectations[59] or simple inaccuracies[60] in reports and presentations. It can also result in under reporting if indicators are not used to capture relevant developments on the ground.[61] In all cases, the effectiveness of management is compromised.

Use of M&E resources: The MTE team found that the M&E resource available for portfolio management is under-utilized so that management's appreciation of developments on the ground is limited as is capacity to react to such developments or to external changes. The role of the M&E manager does not extend much beyond the collection and compilation of data. There is little evidence that M&E management is able to feed its analysis of data into ongoing portfolio management in a manner that might facilitate proactive program management.

Coordination with ALT: Given that one of the five main FTF programs is managed by ALT (GRAD), it would be helpful to overall portfolio management if there were to be greater involvement of ALT in the oversight of the FTF program. Much of the strategy that originally guided Ethiopia's FTF was based upon the observations made through ALT projects, especially RAIN, SPSNP and the LIU, which led to the recognition that many vulnerable households had a) limited capacity to engage in agriculture and were in fact net buyers of food, and b) become destitute not as a result of a specific shock, but due to the pressure of inexorable population growth acting within a limited resource (land). As such, the perspective on poverty and food security that has been developed within ALT can provide useful direction to the FTF program, especially insofar as it relates to the immediate needs of beneficiaries in the FTF ZOI.

---

[59] E.g. the anticipated 300% increase in yield of chickpea based upon a variety that is recognized to be generally unsuited for the export market.

[60] The distribution of "frost" resistant wheat seed that was expected to increase wheat production was in fact "rust" resistant wheat, and was susceptible to the entirely new variety of rust that emerged in Ethiopia in 2014.

[61] Comments from the Mission highlighted the fact that LMD in particular was undertaking a considerable number of activities that were not captured by relevant FTFMS indicators.

Portfolio management would be further strengthened if adequate resources could be provided to M&E to ensure the collection of accurate data, to allow the analysis of compiled results, and to generate succinct reports on ongoing developments that can allow portfolio management to make informed decisions. Portfolio management itself appears to be under-resourced and requires the dedicated capacity to manage the overall FTF program if it is to be effective.

6.2 Project Management

Coordination between individual FTF projects at the COP level is considered to be good, but the MTE team found there is nevertheless a focus on individual project targets that overrides or at least ignores the overarching FTF objectives and goal. Given that the individual SOW's of each project do not focus on these objectives or goal and (with the exception of LMD) do not require co-ordination between projects, this is to be expected. To enhance program coordination, future project SOW's might not only specify such cooperation, but might also stipulate the LOE required to achieve it.

Coordination between projects at the level of implementation is not always as effective and the MTE found occasional examples where individual project staff were not implementing coordinated activities that had been agreed at COP level.

Nevertheless, overall, the MTE concurred with individual project mid-term evaluations who found only minor issues of management and noted that overall that the performance of project management was professional and competent. COPs and their managers were generally well informed of their project interventions and results and understood the causal pathways that contributed to their project goals. An understanding of the extent to which individual project goals might contribute towards the FTF objectives and goals was also both evident and realistic.

7. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following section summarizes the main conclusions of the MTE and presents recommendations (in italics) where appropriate.

<u>Progress to date</u>

An overall assessment of progress against indicators suggests that output indicator targets are generally likely to be met. There is no strong evidence to suggest that levels of effort and resources are not appropriately matched to the achievement of output targets. Impact and outcome targets in key areas of finance, employment and business development are less likely to be achieved (when such targets have been specified). This may be due to factors beyond the manageable interest of the FTF program, but it may also reflect the diffuse nature of market-based interventions and the limited coordination between such projects. The achievement of objective-level impact targets is more problematic still. While it is possible that there may be significant improvement in indicators to the targeted levels and beyond, it is unlikely that any of these targets will be met as a result of program interventions alone.

Although AMDe and possibly LMD are on track to achieve the majority of their individual project objectives, they are unlikely to be as successful in achieving FTF impacts at a scale necessary to achieve the program objectives. Similarly GRAD and to a lesser extent PRIME might be expected to be effective in supporting the limited number of beneficiaries in the 46 woredas in which they operate, but their effects will be diluted within the overall FTF ZOI. The extent to which ENGINE may be able to influence the second FTF objective is currently a matter of debate beyond the expertise of the MTE.

Because the application of the goal and objectives of the FTF program across the entire FTF ZOI is not aligned with the capacities of the component projects to achieve impacts across that same area, the intermediate results, objectives and goal of the FTF program are unlikely to be met. *Evaluation of the FTF contribution of each project should be restricted if possible to those woredas in which each project is operational. Evaluation against FTF targets across the entire ZOI will have little meaning.*

The success of GRAD within its operational area has not been well captured by performance indicators. Nevertheless, the project has made a significant impact upon GoE policy, sufficient to achieve replication via PSNP4 over a substantially greater area than the project itself. *The example of GRAD is a strong argument for the development of future programs over a limited area with the necessary resources,*

focus and scope to achieve measurable success within the timeframe of programs such as FTF. This does not suggest that programs such as AMDe or LMD are unnecessary. They serve an essential purpose, but will achieve results over a longer time frame and through a target group that is not the direct focus of FTF. While there is little point in simply scaling up GRAD, there is considerable scope for developing new programs around similar project design, but extending the scope to focus not only on vulnerable households but on the development of the markets with which those households might interact, in a manner similar to the coordination between GRAD and LMD.

Program design

The USAID Ethiopia DO1 and FTF development strategies have not been completely aligned and as a result, the causal pathway linking project interventions to the FTF objectives and goal is not always robust.

Because a significant proportion of households in the ZOI have less than 0.5 ha of land, initiatives such as those of AMDe and LMD to increase the agricultural gross margins of producers are unlikely to have any direct benefit to the most vulnerable households in the FTF ZOI and may actually reduce their food security in the short term. *Program design should take the economic characteristics of households within the ZOI into account prior to designing interventions. A baseline survey undertaken across the ZOI after program design has been completed and the work begun has little formative value and is useful mainly for monitoring. Ongoing formative research into vulnerable household needs and preferences regarding pathways for development is required to inform program design. In particular, barriers to the adoption of new technologies need to be understood and addressed with appropriate measures (e.g. crop insurance).*

Reliance upon AGP counterpart programs has constrained the impacts of AMDe and LMD interventions which have been limited by factors beyond their manageable interest, especially factors associated with the increased production of commercial surpluses that have not generally materialised. Similarly, institutional changes in counterpart organizations have restricted the ability of both AMDe and LMD to coordinate effectively with GoE. *FTF projects should align with GoE guidelines, but should endeavour to ensure that all aspects essential to successful development are incorporated within the manageable interest of each project, or - given effective coordination between projects - of the program overall. Observation would suggest that vertical integration might play an important role in reducing the risk of non-performance by counterparts and enhancing the overall effectiveness of the assistance provided. GRAD has demonstrated how a project may align with the principles of the GoE HABP program, and yet be independent of it. PRIME has the opportunity to follow the same path. If this is not the case, (i.e. key factors affecting the success of a project lie outside the control of the implementing agency, then chances of success are compromised, and USAID must make a determination as to whether or not the investment is worthwhile.*

Overall, the MTE found that key assumptions regarding the potential for market strengthening to immediately enhance food security, the impact of agricultural improvement upon the most vulnerable households and the capacity of counterpart institutions to achieve expected levels of production have not been validated, so that, although systemic market development projects might be successful in their own right, their impact upon FTF objectives was weakened. At the same time it was observed that assumptions regarding access to finance, opportunities for off-farm income generation and availability of livestock feed have also been inaccurate, limiting the effectiveness of interventions of GRAD and PRIME. Most importantly however, the push/pull hypothesis, while potentially valid in the long-term has but few examples of its successful application in the short term, suggesting that while push/pull may be a key driver of long-term poverty alleviation, it is unlikely that many benefits of push/pull will be realized within the short time frame of a five year program.

Program management

The introduction of a coordinated interdepartmental FTF program should have been undertaken in parallel with the introduction of a dedicated portfolio management system. This did not occur and as a result, the capacity of management to achieve the necessary oversight and to respond in the event of unforeseen developments has been compromised. *Portfolio management needs to be strengthened through support to dedicated M&E to ensure the collection of accurate data, the analysis of compiled*

results, and the generation of succinct reports on ongoing developments that can allow portfolio management to make informed decisions. Portfolio management itself appears to be under-resourced and requires dedicated capacity to manage the overall FTF program if it is to be effective.

Program monitoring

The value of reported data for FTF program management is compromised by a number of factors. There are no PMP targets for a number of FTF indicators, which limits the usefulness of such indicators and prevents direct assessment of the extent to which available resources are adequate to meet program objectives. Some indicators aggregate data from sources that do not bear strict comparison, while others are subject to varying interpretations by different projects. Still others may be incorrectly entered into the FTFMS. *Indicators should be revisited by Mission program monitors in conjunction with project M&E staff to ensure consistency and accuracy of data entry. Those indicators that inappropriately aggregate data from different sources should be reported on a disaggregated basis. Where targets are missing, they should be agreed upon and set as a matter of priority.*

The majority of indicators for nutrition are only collected based on the population-based surveys. Thus it is difficult to monitor progress towards the ultimate goal of stunting reduction or change the course of activities if progress is not being made. *A clear plan for the types of outputs and outcomes needed to achieve the high-level indicators was not well-defined at the time the strategies were developed.*

The lack of targets for some key indicators makes it impossible to monitor performance or to allocate an appropriate level of resources to achieve the desired result. It may even suggest that management does not know what exactly it is trying to achieve. *Using experience to date, targets should be set for all indicators.*

Project coordination

Much of the strategy that originally guided Ethiopia's FTF was based upon the observations made through ALT projects, especially RAIN, SPSNP and the LIU, which led to the recognition that many vulnerable households had a) limited capacity to engage in agriculture and were in fact net buyers of food, and b) become destitute not as a result of a specific shock, but due to the pressure of inexorable population growth acting within a limited resource (land). *Given that one of the five main FTF programs is managed by ALT (GRAD), it would be helpful to overall portfolio management if there were to be greater involvement of ALT in the oversight of the FTF program. The perspective on poverty and food security that has been developed within ALT can provide useful direction to the FTF program, especially insofar as it relates to the immediate needs of beneficiaries in the FTF ZOI*.

Specific interventions

A number of other developments have occurred within FTF, which although not well captured by indicators may nevertheless result in significant positive change. These include the development of the Somali MFI, substantial formative research, the development of the Women in Agribusiness leadership Network and the promotion of water carrying by men in Dembeli Keta. *Ongoing support should be provided to all of the above initiatives for the remaining duration of the program, and in particular that the successes achieved should be replicated in other projects where possible.*

ENGINE has undertaken a considerable body of formative research which has illuminated the issues surrounding stunting. *The skills and approach that ENGINE has developed in this area should be used in other aspects of FTF projects, including the understanding of low rates of livestock off take and barriers to the adoption of new technologies.*

The predominant off-farm IGA (sheep and goat fattening) is highly susceptible to feed constraints. *A detailed assessment of the feed and forage supply sub sector should be undertaken and additional program interventions to strengthen this aspect of the value chain should be undertaken if necessary.*

Investment

Some investments are potentially vulnerable to the criticism that aid has been used "buy economic growth", a concept that has been criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds.[62] While such a

[62] Easterly (2003), Ibid.

policy can sometimes be justified, nevertheless, it would appear that pressure to achieve disbursement targets has resulted in a tendency towards the "purchasing of growth" reducing the long term impact of the investments made. *Project output targets for grant disbursement should be avoided when the desired outcome (of business development) can be measured in other more direct ways. The allocation of new large grants should be discontinued. Small grants targeted in specific projects to address key barriers are still appropriate (such as the PRIME grants to private veterinary pharmacies). Sufficient investments have now been made, and future efforts should focus on strengthening the capacity of grantee institutions to maximize the effectiveness of the grants and ensure their sustainability.*

Improved technologies have been introduced by a number of projects, and it is tempting to consider these as ends in themselves. Nevertheless, the application of such technologies elsewhere in the past has shown that their full impact is only realized if ongoing support to their effective utilization and management can be sustained over a period of at least five years. *Resources should be programmed for the ongoing support over at least another five years, of those initiatives to introduce improved technologies that have been undertaken to date.*

Cross-cutting issues

Although there is a consistent gender component throughout FTF and despite the fact that all data was gender disaggregated, it was not always evident that the gender concerns were fully addressed. In some cases, when indicators showed female participation in activities to be lower than planned, project teams did not appear to have reflected on why this had occurred, and whether the activities they were promoting met female needs.

GRAD's work with VESA groups has probably made one of the strongest contributions to women's empowerment. The VESA group model is designed to help poor households build social and human capital and therefore save money, gain access to loans provided by the group, and access loans from micro-finance institutions (build financial capital). *Because of the high female membership in VESA groups, this model is an ideal mechanism for improving women's access to credit and decision-making regarding spending.*

As one of the largest FTF portfolios globally, FTF Ethiopia is in a unique position to provide lessons learned not only for future USAID Ethiopia projects, but to inform FTF more broadly. Currently neither the knowledge management components of projects, nor efforts at the Mission, are sufficient to capture these experiences and share them. *AKLDP can play a key role to play in capturing the knowledge and lessons learned by projects and translating them to a broader audience. AKLDP can potentially play several roles in the remainder of the project period including the compilation of useful project experiences, particularly on issues of relevance to more than one project and the undertaking research on issues or challenges identified by projects*.

Opportunities for immediate reprogramming

In the short term, opportunities exist to curtail work on the wheat value chain, reduce the emphasis on meat and chickpea export market development, and concentrate instead upon meeting domestic market needs. There is also the opportunity to cease any further large scale grant disbursements and concentrate resources on smaller grants and increased training and mentoring to ensure the sustainability of progress achieved to date.

Long-term reprogramming

The fact that systemic projects such as AMDe and LMD are unlikely to have greatest impact within a five-year timeframe suggests the need for a longer-term programmed approach to the development of food security. Evidence in other countries over the last 40 years suggests that the impact of a five-year systemic program will be lost unless it can be reinforced by continued intervention (although this might be on a reduced basis) to ensure that policy and institutional changes are maintained. There is little evidence to suggest that programs such as AMDe or LMD can be expected to generate significant and sustainable change unless they are able to exert an influence over a period of at least 10 years. Similarly, it is evident that programs such as GRAD and PRIME are only able to impact a small number of beneficiaries during the course of a five-year program and in the longer term, such programs may need to be developed further to enhance outreach and improve targeting.

This perspective strongly suggests that a long-term layered approach to the challenges of FTF, in which direct interventions with beneficiaries are undertaken in conjunction with more systemic market development initiatives might provide a more robust solution than has been seen to date. Such an approach would also include a direct nutritional component that addressed each of the eight different factors affecting child nutrition (and especially stunting). An opportunity now exists through the introduction of PSNP4 to build upon both the successes and lessons learned to date, through the implementation of a model similar to GRAD that could influence national policy through example. Such a program would include both highland and pastoral coverage, with tailored programming to the socio-cultural, economic and environmental realities of different regions. Title II FFP funding would provide the foundation to ensure asset maintenance and food security, while layered on top of this would be a series of projects funded by FTF including:

- *Household-level interventions to strengthen production and income*
- *An integrated approach to nutrition, incorporating response to all the various facets of the stunting syndrome*
- *Demand-driven market facilitation interventions targeting both the poor as well as others necessary to ensure the viability of value chains*
- *Policy and enabling environment support, as well as technical assistance for key government institutions.*

Such an approach, by minimizing factors beyond the manageable interest of the program and focusing resources upon a limited number of beneficiaries would be most likely to achieve success. Such success can then be used to leverage other donor and GoE resources necessary to achieve program replication at a scale that would otherwise be impossible through the use of FTF resources alone.

FEED THE FUTURE ETHIOPIA

EXTERNAL MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT

May 2015

Annexes

Annex A. Scope of Work

Annex B: Bibliography

Annex C: Interviews and Field Visits

Annex D: Results Frameworks and Indicators

Annex E: Statement of Differences

Annex F: CVs

Annex G: Disclosure of Conflict of Interest

Annex 1

STATEMENT OF WORK:
ANNUAL FEED THE FUTURE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN ETHIOPIA

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2009, President Obama pledged at least $3.5 billion dollars over a period of three years as part of Feed the Future (FTF), a global initiative to improve agricultural development and food security in 19 countries in need. Through Feed the Future, the U.S. supports the Government of Ethiopia's commitment to country-led development programs that facilitate economic growth and development. These initiatives also provide USAID and collaborating U.S. Government agencies with a unique and promising opportunity to assist in implementing a transformative food security strategy aligned with Ethiopian objectives.

In line with the overall objectives of FTF globally and with a total investment portfolio of about $370 million, USAID/Ethiopia's Economic Growth and Transformation (EG&T) and the Alternative Livelihoods and Transition Office (ALT) works to reduce poverty and childhood stunting measurably with its geographic zone of influence. To do this, EG&T works in three project components: (1) agriculture growth enabled food security; (2) linking the vulnerable to markets; and (3) fostering policy and capacity improvements. EG&T links these three components with the "push-pull" framework, which seeks to catalyze market growth in productive agricultural areas while building viable economic links to vulnerable populations in less productive areas. Four complementary integrated programs also support the larger initiative in Ethiopia, which are Nutrition, Climate Change and Adaption, Private Sector Development, and Humanitarian Assistance.

EG&T, on behalf of USAID/Ethiopia, expects the annual FTF performance evaluation to provide feedback on the level of progress regarding the initiative's planned results (both the quantitative and qualitative) against stated objectives and goals, the appropriateness of EG&T's investments in different project components and activities, the linkages among components and integrated programs. The evaluation will provide specific information that will feed into EG&T's Bureau of Food Security portfolio review in March and produce actionable management recommendations to aid future implementation. The analysis will cover area 4.6 Agriculture activities funded with 150 account funds, as defined in the USAID Standardized Program Structure, but not activities that Title II majority funds.

USAID's evaluation policy encourages independent external evaluation to increase accountability to inform those who develop programs and strategies, and to refine designs and introduce improvements into future efforts. In keeping with that aim, this evaluation will be conducted to review and evaluate the performance of the entire FTF portfolio in Ethiopia. The evaluation will focus on assessing the program's mid-term performance (May 2011 through November 2014) in achieving its goals, objectives, and results.

II. BACKGROUND

USAID/Ethiopia's Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) goal—"***Ethiopia's Transformation to a Prosperous and Resilient Country Accelerated"—***is aligned with the

Government of Ethiopia's (GOE's) five year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), which builds on the significant expansion of the economy and basic services over the past five years. The USAID/Ethiopia CDCS comprises three Development Objectives (DOs) and one Support Objective. The Economic Growth and Transformation (EG&T) office, in coordination with the Alternative Livelihoods and Transition (ALT) office, implements DO1 (Increase economic growth with resiliency in rural Ethiopia). As shown in the DO Results Framework (see annex I), the achievement of this DO depends upon the combined success of five interdependent intermediate results (IRs). The strategy will demonstrate the potential of market-based agricultural development to reduce poverty and promote sustainable livelihoods for chronically food insecure households.

The Feed the Future (FTF) Strategy, which is the key component of DO1, aims to sustainably reduce poverty and hunger through investments in the performance of the agricultural sector, in improved nutrition and the improved capacity of vulnerable households to meet their food needs. FTF investments will lead to improvements in food availability, access and utilization. A better performing agriculture sector should improve both food availability and access, while improved food access and utilization will improve nutrition. The strategy demonstrates the potential of market-based agricultural development to reduce poverty and promote sustainable livelihoods for chronically food insecure households. The strategy utilizes a *Push-Pull* Model that seeks to build the capacity of vulnerable and chronically food insecure households to participate in economic activity (the *"push"*), while mobilizing market-led agricultural growth to generate relevant economic opportunity and demand for smallholder production, labor, and services (the *"pull"*).

In Ethiopia, over twenty-six direct implementing partners conduct activities in support of the initiative's goal to reduce extreme poverty by 30 percent and childhood stunting by 20 percent in the geographic zone of influence. Progress against these ambitious goals is tracked at multiple levels. At the highest level, EG&T conducts a population-based survey (PBS), which is a cross-sectional survey of over 7200 households in the zone of influence and statistically matched control groups that lie outside of the zone of influence. The first wave of the survey was in 2013. The subsequent waves will occur in 2015 and 2017. Congress, USAID, and other stakeholders will ultimately judge FTF in Ethiopia on the results of the 2017 survey wave compared to the relevant survey control groups.

In addition to the PBS, all of the largest FTF activities in Ethiopia collect rigorous (albeit sometimes inconsistent) baselines, including, in some cases, baseline data on counterfactuals. ENGINE and PRIME are prime examples. Finally, EG&T collects 86 annual output indicators. EG&T collects these indicators every November. In practice, EG&T typically combines activity expenditure data, output data, performance evaluations, and technical judgment to inform resource allocation decision in the absence of rigorous impact evidence.

Since its inception, FTF has produced notable achievements against output targets. In 2013, for instance, FTF achieved the following:

- Reached 1.675 million children with nutrition interventions
- Leveraged $70 million USD in new investments into the agricultural sector
- Stimulated over $20 million in new lending
- Created more than 30,000 new jobs among vulnerable people

Results Framework

The results framework below illustrates FTF's anticipated results in Ethiopia.



III. PROJECT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

In line with the overall objectives of the global FTF strategy, USAID/Ethiopia's FTF objective is to reduce extreme poverty by 20 percent ($1.25 USD 2005 at PPP) and to reduce childhood stunting by 20 percent with the zone of influence, which is an area that includes about 19 million people. The population-based survey will measure the size of these effects against statistical controls in the survey. To accomplish this, the initiative consists of three components and four integrated programs. Component and integrated program has associated activities and output metrics. Each out-put metric has baseline data and targets. All told, the assumption is that the output level targets will be sufficient to achieve DO1 and the poverty and stunting reduction targets.

For the analysis, EG&T will make available a full list of all activities and their associated output metrics.

IV. PURPOSE AND USE OF THE EVALUATION

FTF in Ethiopia is entering a critical time. The initiative has less than three years to show dramatic results in the last wave of the PBS. To do this, EG&T will need to make intelligent new investments, get the maximum impact out of its existing investments, and make some very difficult management decisions. This annual performance assessment will be a key input into all these difficult tasks.

EG&T expects the annual FTF performance evaluation to provide a new perspective on the level of output targets and strategic goals, the appropriateness of EG&T's progress regarding the initiative's planned results (both the quantitative and qualitative) against stated investments in different project components and activities, and the linkages among components and integrated programs. The evaluation will provide specific information that will feed into EG&T's Bureau of Food Security portfolio review in March and produce actionable management recommendations to aid future implementation.

Specifically, the evaluation will:

1. Assess progress against objectives and goals specifically the extent to which planned results (both the quantitative and qualitative) have been achieved;
2. Assess the appropriateness (or effectiveness) of USAID investments in different program components and integrated programs areas at the activity level;
3. Identify actionable recommendations for reprogramming of funds to achieve program goals;
4. Identify actionable management recommendations to maximize the impact of the existing portfolio of investments, including the interactions among activities across components and integrated programs.

V. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

A. Performance Results

1. **To what extent is the FTF Initiative progressing against its outcome and portfolio review targets?** The evaluation should analyze actual results versus the targets outlined in the FTFMS and the intermediary targets established in the 2013 BFS portfolio review, including identifying the activities and approaches that are succeeding or failing relative to their budget expenditures.

2. **Are the Initiative's outcome targets and intermediary BFS targets sufficient to achieve the higher level poverty and stunting reduction targets?** The evaluation should provide some perspective on the ability of USAID to affect its higher level targets given its approach, targets, and funding levels.

B. Investment Quality

3. **Has EG&T made cost effective investments with its budget?** The evaluation should analyze the relative cost effectiveness vis-a-vis output targets and higher level goals of different activities across program components.

4. **Are there clear opportunities (perhaps identified in question 3) to improve the chances of accomplishing output targets and higher level goals by reprogramming funding among activities?** The assessment should make clear recommendations about the reallocation of scarce resources, especially budgets, moving forward. The assessment's recommendation should take into consideration constraints, such as directed fund categories and the time associated with reprogramming.

C. EG&T Portfolio Management

5. **Are there clear management changes at the portfolio or activity level that EG&T can execute to improve its chances of success?** The assessment should make clear recommendations about portfolio, component, and activities management changes that would increase FTF chances of accomplishing high-level objectives and the BFS intermediary goals. EG&T is especially interested in management changes that would better help us better coordinate with activities that fall outside of this evaluations' scope, such as USAID Global Health Programs and the Productive Safety Net Program, and changes that would advance gender-intelligent programming approaches.

6. **How should USAID refine the push-pull hypothesis?** The assessment should revisit the push-pull model and make recommendations about improving the link between the "push" and the "pull." As part of that analysis, the assessment should consider interventions not traditionally associated with agriculture, such as interventions in the financial or macroeconomic sectors.

VI. EVALUATION METHODS

A recommended evaluation design and data collection methods are presented below. However, the evaluation team will be responsible for refining the design as recommended below or proposing an alternative design for consideration and approval by USAID. The evaluation strategy and data collection methodologies should include mixed approaches for better triangulation and validation of findings. The team should present an evaluation questions matrix showing the source of data, method of data collection and also the tool to be used to answer each of the evaluation questions. The methodology will be presented as part of the draft work plan as outlined in the deliverables below, approved by USAID/Ethiopia and included in the final report. The evaluation team will have available for their analysis a variety of program implementation documents, baseline surveys and reports. With the exception of classified materials, the team will have access to internal USAID reports. Methodology strengths and weaknesses should be identified as well as measures taken to address those weaknesses.

All data collected and presented in the evaluation report must be disaggregated, as appropriate, by gender, geography and value chain.

(a) EVALUATION DESIGN

It is recommended that a non-experimental design be used that will focus on measuring project results before and after project implementation using project monitoring and survey data. The before project data should be drawn from the baseline survey report produced by the implementing partners. The evaluation team is expected to strengthen this design to make it as rigorous as possible or propose alternative evaluation designs for consideration.

(b) DATA COLLECTION METHODS

As stated above, the evaluation team will be responsible for proposing an appropriate evaluation design and data collection methods. The team should consider mapping the research questions against the quantitative and qualitative data in a matrix/table to show how each research question will be answered. However, it is also recommended that the data collection methods should include the following:

Use of quantitative data should include, but are not limited to:

- Comparison of current indicator values to baseline data for select output and outcome indicators.
- Map out the project results against performance measure indicators to show the total number of indicators under each result and whether performance is met/on target (90-100%), exceeded (>100%), or not achieved (</=70)
- Use of cost benefit analysis modeling to develop some rough order of magnitude activity impacts
- If possible, use of economy-wide models to link outcomes indicators with goals
- Analysis of existing survey data, including the population-based survey and activity baselines

Approaches to collect qualitative data could include but are not limited to:

- Document Reviews
- Key Informant Interviews
- Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

The size of the potential pools of respondents for key informant interviews and focus group discussions as well as the citeria for selection , random , purposive, mixed, should be of sufficient size to make meaningful but not necessarily statistically significant conclusions and as determined by AKLDP and the consultant.

VII. EXISTING PERFORMANCE INFORMATION SOURCES

The consultants will review the following documents:

a) FTF Strategy for Ethiopia
b) USAID/s country strategic plan for Ethiopia
c) 2013 PPT for the BFS portfolio review

d) FTF Population Based Survey report
e) Activity level baseline data
f) Project Descriptions and Modifications
g) Project Work Plans
h) Quarterly Reports
i) Annual Reports
j) Budget and financial reports
k) PMP and other M&E documents
l) Baseline surveys and formative research
m) Project performance data
n) Activity evaluations
o) Cost benefit analysis models
p) Project-generated assessments
q) GOE reports on AGP and other related documents.
r) Project performance data
s) Relevant external evaluations from other sources (e.g., other donors)

A data analysis plan should be developed by the evaluation team based on specific USAID expectations included in this scope of work. Limitations of the design and methodology should be reflected in the evaluation report.

VIII. TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team shall consist of three independent international experts, including the AKLDP Chief of Party who will serve as the team lead and primary coordinator with USAID. AKLDP should also consider acquiring additional expertise in data analysis and economic modeling. The team should also include at least two high level Ethiopian experts, at least one of whom can also serve as an interpreter. All team members must have professional-level English speaking and writing skills.

The technical team members must all have significant experience in agriculture, agri-business/ /agriculture commercialization, and food security related programs. They should have Ethiopian country or East Africa regional experience, along with comparative experience in budgeting and administration, access to finance, agriculture policy related programming in other countries or regions of the world.

Sound experience in conducting evaluations or research is expected of all members, and experience in developing strategies would be useful. Ability to conduct interviews and discussions in local languages and provide accurate translations into English for at least one team member is essential.

A statement of potential bias or conflict of interest (or lack thereof) is required of each team member.

USAID may propose internal staff members from USAID/Ethiopia as well as from Washington under one of the following conditions: (1) where USAID contributes a unique expertise; and (2) for USAID capacity building. If any USAID staff is proposed to participate on the evaluation team, their role may include some or all of the following functions:

- Provide, when asked, background information on the activity and to respond to questions from the external evaluators;
- Contribute to data collection and analysis efforts;
- Observe field visits
- Review and comment on the final evaluation report for its accuracy.

The evaluation team lead will be responsible for ensuring the integrity of the external evaluation, including alerting the Mission Program Office if any USAID participants on the evaluation team are overstepping their role.

IX. EVALUATION SCHEDULE

The estimated time period for undertaking this evaluation is a maximum of 80 work days for all the team with the exception of the Team leader who will have 100 working days. The ideal arrival time is November 1, 2014; however, the arrival date will be finalized between USAID and AKLDP.

The team is required to travel to selected woredas in where project activities are being implemented. The evaluation team will prepare an exit briefing and presentation of the findings, which it will deliver to USAID staff before February 25th. Also, the evaluation team will submit a draft report 48 hours in advance of the exit briefing for review and comments by USAID. Comments from USAID will be incorporated before the submission of the final draft.

The final report with USAID and consultants revisions should be submitted by March 1, 2015, assuming the field work starts as planned on November 1, 2014.

The Contractor is expected to submit a detailed LOE estimate.

Travel over weekends may be required during site visits. Note that November 11, November 27, 2014, and December 25, 2014 are national holidays and thus the US Embassy and USAID are closed on these days.

X. DETERMINATION ON THE TECHNICAL PROPOSAL

USAID/Ethiopia will determine the soundness of proposal based on the contractor's overall technical understanding and approach, proposed team members, and cost realism, reasonableness, completeness, and allowability.

XI. USAID MANAGEMENT

Roles and Responsibilities

USAID: USAID is responsible for approving the evaluation SOW; reviewing and approving evaluation team member candidates; approving the work plan, including LOE; providing feedback and comments to refine the final report, while always maintaining the objectivity of the evaluation findings and ensuring feasibility of the recommendations. From a technical management perspective, the evaluation team will

work closely with the COR for AGP-AMDe Project. In order to maintain objectivity, all final decisions about the evaluation will be made by the Program Office.

AKLDP: The management of the evaluation will be handled by AKLDP. AKLDP is responsible for recruiting and managing the evaluation team; developing contracts for the evaluation team; managing finances related to the evaluation team's expenses during the evaluation; refining data collection tools; and participating in review sessions on the draft and final evaluation report.

XII. LOGISTICS

The USAID funded AKLDP Project will provide the administrative and logistics support.

XIII. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND DELIVERABLES

A. Description and Timeline of Deliverables

1. In-briefing: Within 48 hours of arrival in Addis Ababa, the evaluation team, will have an in-brief meeting with USAID/Ethiopia's Program Office and the EG&T Office for introductions; presentation of the team's understanding of the assignment; initial assumptions; review of the evaluation questions, survey instruments, and initial work plan; and adjustment of the SOW, if necessary.

2. Evaluation Work Plan: Prior to their arrival in-country, the evaluation team shall provide a detailed initial work plan to the Program Office and EG&T Office and a revised work plan three days after the in-briefing. USAID will share the revised work plan with GOE for comment, as needed, and will revise accordingly. The initial work plan will include (a) the overall evaluation design, including the proposed methodology, data collection and analysis plan, and data collection instruments; (b) a list of the team members indicating their primary contact details while in-country, including the e-mail address and mobile phone number for the team leader; and (c) the team's proposed schedule for the evaluation. The revised work plan shall include the list of potential interviewees, sites to be visited, and evaluation tools.

3. Mid-term Briefing and Interim Meetings: Schedule a mid-term briefing with USAID to review the status of the evaluation's progress, with a particular emphasis on addressing the evaluation's questions and a brief update on potential challenges and emerging opportunities. The team will also provide the COR of AGP-AMDe Project with periodic written briefings and feedback on the team's findings. Additionally, a weekly 30 minute phone call with the Program Office and the EG&T Office and Team Leader will provide updates on field progress. If there are any problems these should be immediately addressed and not to wait for the phone calls. .

4. PowerPoint and Final Exit Presentation to USAID and other relevant partners that will include a summary of key findings and key conclusions as these relate to the evaluation's questions and recommendations to USAID and the implementing partners. To be scheduled as agreed upon during the in-briefing, and five days prior to the evaluation team's departure from Addis Ababa. A copy of the PowerPoint file will be provided to the USAID's EG&T and the Program Offices prior to the final exit presentation.

5. **Draft Evaluation Report:** The content of the draft evaluation report is outlined in Section XIII.B, below, and all formatting shall be consistent with the USAID branding guidelines and 508 compliance. The focus of the report should be answering the evaluation questions and may include factors the team considers to have a bearing on the objectives of the evaluation. Any such factors can be included in the report only after consultation with USAID. The draft evaluation report will be submitted by the evaluation team leader to the USAID's EG&T, Program Office, and TU/AKLDP 24 hours in advance of the exit briefing for review and comments by USAID. USAID's Program Office and EG&T will have ten business days in which to review and comment and the TU/ AKLDP shall submit all comments to the evaluation team leader.

6. **Final Evaluation Report will** incorporate final comments provided by the TU/AKLDP. The length of the final evaluation report should not be more than 30 pages, not including Annexes and the Executive Summary. USAID comments are due within ten days after the receipt of the initial final draft. The final report should be submitted to the USAID's EG&T and Program Office within three days of receipt of comments by the evaluation team leader. All project data and records will be submitted in full and shall be in electronic form in easily readable format; organized and fully document for use by those not fully familiar with the project or evaluation; and owned by USAID and made available to the public, barring rare exceptions, on the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse (http://dec.usaid.gov).

7. **One-page briefer** on key qualitative and quantitative findings and conclusions relative to the evaluation questions for each municipality is included in the evaluation's scope—to be given to the appropriate government counterpart(s) so that they have the opportunity to review evaluation findings and share them with the larger community. Each briefer will be reviewed by the Program Office and EG&T prior to distribution and will be translated into Amharic.

B. Final Report Content

The evaluation report shall include the following:

1. Title Page

2. Table of Contents (including Table of Figures and Table of Charts, if needed)

3. List of Acronyms

4. Acknowledgements or Preface (optional)

5. Executive Summary (3-5 pages)

The executive summary should succinctly capture the evaluation purpose and evaluation questions; project background; evaluation design, methods; and limitations; and the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

6. Introductory Chapter

a. Brief description of FTF intervention areas
b. A description of the project evaluated, including goals and objectives.

c. Brief statement on purpose of the evaluation, including a list of the main evaluation questions.
d. Brief statement on the methods used in the evaluation such as desk/document review, interviews, site visits, surveys, etc.
e. Explanation of any limitations of the evaluation—especially with respect to the methodology (e.g., selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.)—and how these limitations affect the findings.

7. **Findings:** This section should include findings relative to the evaluation questions. The information shall be organized so that each evaluation question is a sub-heading. Any findings examining group differences (i.e. sex, region, etc.) should indicate instances in which differences are statistically significant.

8. **Summary and Conclusions:** This section must answer the evaluation questions based upon the evidence provided through the Findings section. The information shall be organized so that each evaluation question is a sub-heading.

9. **Recommendations and Next Steps:** Based on the conclusions, this section must include actionable statements that can be implemented into the existing program or included into future program design. Recommendations are only valid when they specify who does what, and relate to activities over which the USAID program has control. For example, recommendations describing government action is not valid, as USAID has no direct control over government actions. Alternatively, the recommendation may state how USAID resources may be leveraged to initiate change in government behavior and activities. It should also include recommended future objectives and types of specific activities based on lessons learned. The information shall be organized so that each evaluation question is a sub-heading.

10. **Annex:** The annexes to the final evaluation report should be submitted as separate documents—with appropriate labels in the document file name (e.g., Annex 1 – Evaluation SOW), and headers within the document itself—and may be aggregated in a single zipped folder.

a. Evaluation Statement of Work
b. Places visited; list of organizations and people interviewed, including contact details.
c. Evaluation design and methodology.
d. Copies of all tools such as survey instruments, questionnaires, discussions guides, checklists.
e. Bibliography of critical background documents.
f. Meeting notes of all key meetings with stakeholders.
g. "Statement of Differences"
h. Evaluation Team CV's
i. Disclosure of Conflict of interest (signed by each member.)

C. REPORTING GUIDELINES

- The format of the report shall be consistent with the USAID branding guidelines and 508 compliance.

- The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well-researched and well- organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the project over the given time period, what did not, and why.
- Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the statement of work.
- The evaluation report should include the statement of work as an annex. All modifications to the statement of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology, or timeline need to be agreed upon in writing by the Program Office.
- Evaluation methodology shall be explained in detail and all tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists and discussion guides will be included in an annex in the final report.
- Evaluation findings will assess outcomes and impact on males and females, and data will be disaggregated by gender, age group, and geographic area wherever feasible.
- Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).
- Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence, and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people's opinions. Findings should be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative and/or qualitative evidence.
- Sources of information, including any peer-reviewed or grey literature, will be properly identified and listed in an annex.
- Recommendations will be supported by a specific set of findings. They will also be action-oriented, practical, and specific, with defined responsible parties for each action.

ANNEX B: BIBLIOGRAPHY

ACDI/VOCA. 2012. AGP-AMDe Annual Report May 2011-September 2012.

ACDI/VOCA. 2012. Agriculture Growth Program- Agribusiness and Market Development (AGP-AMDe) Project: Baseline Report, Household Survey. Submitted to USAID October 31, 2012.

ACDI/VOCA. 2012. Agriculture Growth Program- Agribusiness and Market Development (AGP-AMDe). Year Two Annual Work Plan October 2012- June 2013. Submitted to USAID September 30, 2012.

ACDI/VOCA. 2014. AGP-AMDe Annual Survey. Submitted to USAID July 2014.

ACDI/VOCA. 2014. Agriculture Growth Program- Agribusiness and Market Development (AGP-AMDe). USAID FY2014 Annual Report July 1, 2013- June 30, 2014. Submitted to USAID August 1, 2014.

ACDI/VOCA. AGP-AMDe PMP. Excel File.

ACDI/VOCA. AMDe Results Framework. Excel File.

ACDI/VOCA. IPTT. Excel File.

Agriculture Knowledge Learning Documentation and Policy Project. 2014. Feed the Future - Quarterly Coordination Meeting: Nutrition Theme. Summary Report. Tufts University. Submitted November 2014.

Amha,W., Woldehanna, T.,Tamrat, E., & Gebremedhin, A. 2014 "Characteristics and Determinants of Entrepreneurship in Ethiopia": Ethiopia» Inclusive Finance Training and Research Institute (EIFTRI)

Asmare, E. Takele, Y. Tilahun, F. Crenn, B. Allen, H. and De Vries, M. 2014. Graduation with Resilience to Achieve Sustainable Development (GRAD) Mid_term Evaluation. AKLDP. Submited to USAID October 2014.

Asmare, M. Yifrashewa, N. and Chane, M. 2013 Data Quality Assessment FY2013 for various indicators: AGP AMDe. Submitted to USAID 2013.

Asmare, M. Yifrashewa, N. and Chane, M. 2013 Data Quality Assessment FY2013 for various indicators: AGP LMD. Submitted to USAID 2013.

Asmare, M. Yifrashewa, N. and Chane, M. 2013 Data Quality Assessment FY2013 for various indicators: ENGINE. Submitted to USAID 2013.

Asmare, M. Yifrashewa, N. and Chane, M. 2013 Data Quality Assessment FY2013 for various indicators: GRAD. Submitted to USAID 2013.

Bachewe, F. Berhane, G. Hirvonen, K. Hoddinott, J. Hoel, J. Tadesse, F. Tafesse, A.S. Woldehanna, T. Worku, I. Yimer, F. Yohannes, Y. Abay, K. Yigesu, B. Beyene, H. Abebe, Y. and Meshewa, N. 2013. Feed the Future (FtF) of Ethiopia - Baseline Report. ESSP and IFPRI. 2013.

Barichello, R. Miklyaev, M. Pankowska, K. Jenkins, G. P. 2012. Cost Benefit Analysis of the GRAD Honey Value Chain. Submitted to USAID November 2012.

Bennett, C. Barichello, R. Leung, L. Fuje, H. Jenkins, G. and Dadzie C. 2012 Agricultural Growth Project - Agribisiness and Market Development (AGP-AMDe) Project Coffee Value Chain: Cost Benefit-Analysis of *Interventions.* Submitted to USAID October 2012..

Berhane, G. Dereje, M. Hoddinott, J. Koru, B. Nisrane, F. Tadesse, F. Tafesse, A.S. Worku, I. and Yohannes, Y. 2011. Agricultural Growth Program (AGP) of Ethiopia - Baseline Report 2011. IFPRI. 2011.

Bhutta, A.Z., Das, J. K., Rizvi, a.,Gaffey, M. F., Walker, N., Horton, s., Webb, P., Lartey, A., and Black, R.E. (2012) Evidence-based interventions for improvement of maternal and child nutrition: what can be done and at what cost?. The Lancet 2013; 382: pp 452-The Lancet Nutrition Interventions Review Group, and the Maternal and Child Nutrition Study Group

Bogale, S. 2013. Graduation with Resilience to Achieve Sustainable Development Baseline Report from Fifty Focus Groups in : Hawassa Zuria, Zeway Dugda, Lay Gayint and Enda Mahoni woredas. CARE. Submitted to USAID May 2013.

CARE et al. Various. The Graduate (newsletter) various monthly editions. Published by CARE

CARE, REST, CRS, ORDA, SNV and Tufts University. 2011. USAID Ethiopia/ Graduation with Resilience to Ahieve Sustainable Development (GRAD) Cooperative SAgreement no. AID-663-A-12-00001 GRAD Program Technical Proposal. Submitted to USAID 2011.

CARE. 2013/2014. Quarterly Narrative Reports and supporting PMP spreadsheets.

CNFA. 2013. Agricultural Growth Program-Livestock Market Development Project. Annual Report September 17, 2012-June 30, 2013. Submitted to USAID August 15, 2013.

CNFA. 2013. Agricultural Growth Program-Livestock Market Development Project. Work Plan April 1, 2013-June 30, 2014. Submitted to USAID August 6, 2013.

CNFA. 2014. Agricultural Growth Program-Livestock Market Development Project. Annual Report July 1, 2013-June 30, 2014. Submitted to USAID July 31, 2014.

CNFA. 2014. Results Tracking Table Oct-Dec 2014. Excel File.

CNFA. 2015. Agricultural Growth Program-Livestock Market Development Project. Performance Management Plan Amendment No. 1. Submitted to USAID January 26, 2015.

CNFA. AGP-Livestock Market Development Innovation Grants Fund Grantees Fact Sheet.

CNFA. Results framework and contribution of indicator to results. Word Document.

Davis, K. Swanson, B. and Amudavi, D. 2009. Review and Recommendations for Strengthening the Agricultural Extension System in Ethiopia. IFPRI 2009.

Dorosh, P. &Mellor, J. (2013) Why Agriculture Remains a Viable Means of Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Ethiopia. Development Policy Review, 31 (4): pp419-441.

Duflo, E. Women Empowerment and Economic Development. Journal of Economic Literature 2012, 50(4), 1051–1079

Easterly, W. (2003). Can foreign aid buy growth?. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(3), 23-48.

Ethiopian Development Research Institute and Global Green Growth Institute. 2015. Unlocking the Power of Ethiopia's Cities. The New Climate Economy, Addis Ababa 2015.

Feder G, Just RE, and Zilberman D. 1985. Adoption of Agricultural Innovations in Developing Countries: A Survey. *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 33(2): 255-298.

Fintrac. 2013. Asessment of the s/Pull Hypothesis, Final Report. Capacity to Improve Agriculture and For Security (CIAFS). Submitted to USAID December 2013.

Foster A., Rosenzweig M. (2010) Microeconomics of technology adoption. Annual Review of Economics 2, 395-424

Fox, J, Ghizaw, A, Alemayehu, N, Teshome, A. 2015. Agriculture Growth Program-Agribusiness and Market Development (AGP-AMDe) External Mid-term Performance Evaluation Report. Agricultural Knowledge, Learning, Documentation and Policy Project, Tufts University. Produced for USAID Ethiopia.

G8 Cooperation Framework to Support The "New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition" in Ethiopia. Available at: feedthefuture.gov/sites/default/files/resource/files/Ethiopia_web.pdf

Ghosh, S. Suri, D. Hiko, D. Fentahun, N. Griffiths, J. 2014. Factors Associated with Stunting in Ethiopian Children Under Five. ENGINE, Tufts University, Jimma University. 2014.

Government of Ethiopia: AGP II Draft Project document

Hirvonen, K. and Hoddinot, J. 2014. Agricultural Production and Children's Diets: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia. Ethiopia Strategy Support Program. December 2014.

Hughes C. 2012. USAID Ethiopia Feed The Future Strategy Overview. Presentation for Sustainable Intensification Workshop ILRI Ethiopia. January 2012.

IFPRI. 2012. FTF Combined Questionnaires A-X. Compiled May 2012.

IMAWESA: The voice of an Agent of Change (http://imawesa.info/2013/04/02/the-voice-of-an-agent-of-change/)

Irz, X., Lin, L., Thirtle, C., & Wiggins, S. (2001). Agricultural productivity growth and poverty alleviation. *Development policy review*, *19*(4), 449-466;

Jayne T.S, Yamano T, Nyoro J, and Awuor T. (2001) Do Farmers Benefit From High Food Prices? Balancing Rural Interests in Kenya's Maize Pricing and Marketing Policy. Tegemeo Working Paper 2B. Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and Development, Nairobi.

Jenkins, G. P. Barichello, R. Miklyaev, M. Pankowska, K. 2012. Cost Benefit Analysis of the GRAD Meat Value Chain. Submitted to USAID October 2012.

Jenkins, G. P. Barichello, R. Miklyaev, M. Pankowska, K. 2012. Cost Benefit Analysis of the GRAD Red Haricot Beans Value Chain. Submitted to USAID August 2012.

Jenkins, G. P. Barichello, R. Miklyaev, M. Pankowska, K. 2012. Cost Benefit Analysis of the GRAD Vegetables Value Chain. Submitted to USAID October 2012.

Jenkins, G. P. Barichello, R. Miklyaev, M. Pankowska, K. 2012. Cost Benefit Analysis of the GRAD White Haricot Beans Value Chain. Submitted to USAID August 2012.

Jenkins, G. P. Barichello, R. Miklyaev, M. Pankowska, K. and Fuje, H. 2012. Cost Benefit Analysis of a Honey Value Chain in Ethiopia (AGP-AMDe Project). Submitted to USAID October 2012.

Kieger, D. 2014. The Impact of P4P on FOs and Smallholder Farmers in Ethiopia. World Food Programme, P4P Global Learnning Series.

Kleiman, S. 2013. Lessons for Effective Resilience Programs: A case study of the RAIN program in Ethiopia. MercyCorps. August 2013.

Lamstein, S.,T. Stillman, P. Koniz-Booher,A.Aakesson, B. Collaiezzi,T.Williams, K. Beall, and M.Anson. 2014. Evidence of Effective Approaches to Social and Behavior Change Communication for Preventing and Reducing Stunting and Anemia: Report from a Systematic Literature Review. Arlington,VA: USAID/ Strengthening Partnerships, Results, and Innovations in Nutrition Globally (SPRING) Project

Land O'Lakes. 2010. The Next Stage in Dairy Development for Ethiopia, Dairy Value Chains, End Markets and Food Security. Submitted to USAID November 2010.

Levinson, J. Admassu, B. Trevors, T. and Teshome, A. 2014. Empowering New Generations to Improve Nutrition and Economic Opportunities (ENGINE), Ethiopia External Mid-Term Performance Evaluation Report. Feinstein International Centre. Submitted to USAID September 2014.

Levinson, J.F. Balarajan, Y and Marini, A. 2013. Addressing Malnutrition Multisectorally: What have we learned from recent international experience? Case Studies from Peru | Brazil | Bangladesh. MDG Achievement Fund August 2012.

Malapit, H.J. et al. 2014. Measuring Progress toward Empowerment: Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index: Baseline Report. IFPRI. Available at: http://www.ifpri.org/publication/measuring-progress-toward-empowerment

Mason, J. Barichello, R. Miklyaev, M. Pankowska, K. and Fuje, H. 2012. Cost Benefit Analysis of Cereal Value Chains in Ethiopia (AGP-AMDe Project). Submitted to USAID December 2012.

Mason, J. Buttari, J. Jenkins, G. 2013. Cost Benefit Analyses of AMDe Interventions in Selected Value Chains: Chickpeas. Submitted to USAID January 2013.

Masters, W.A. Webb, P. Griffitrhs, J.K. and Deckelbaum, J. 2014.Agriculture, nutrition, and health in global development typology and metrics for integrated interventions and research. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1331 pp. 258-269.

Mercy Corps. 2013. Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion (PRIME) Project. Year 2 Workplan October 1, 2013- September 31, 2014. Submitted to USIAD November 2013.

MercyCorps. 2012. Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion (PRIME) Project Technical Application Narrative. Submitted to USAID August 2012.

MercyCorps. 2013. PRIME PMP Final. Excel Document.

MercyCorps. 2014. Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion (PRIME) Project. Labor Market Assessment of the Pastoralist Areas in Ethiopia. September 2014.

MercyCorps. 2014. Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion (PRIME) Project. Year 2 Report October 2013- September 2014. Submitted to USAID October 31, 2014.

MercyCorps. 2014. PRIME Monitoring and Evaluation Plan. June 2014.

MercyCorps. Master Indicator List. PRIME M&E Indicators. Excel File.

Ministry of Agriculture, Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector, Food Security Coordination Directorate. 2014. Productive Safety Net Programme 4 Design Document. Government of Ethiopia November 2014.

Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock Resources Development Sector, LMP Team. 2014 Draft Livestock Master Plan. Government of Ethiopia July 2014.

Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Development Planning and Research Directorarte. 2012. Ethiopia's Progress Towards Eradicating Poverty: An interim Report on Poverty Analysis Study (2010/11).

Minten B, Tamru S, Engida E, and Kumar T: 2013, Ethiopia's Value Chains on the Move: The Case of Teff

Optimal Solutions Group, LLC. and Cambridge Resoiurces International Inc. 2013. Cost Benefit Analysis of AMDe, GRAD, LMD and PRIME Projects Interventions in Selected Value Chains: Summary Report. Submitted to USAID August 2013.

Sadler, K. and Catley, A. (2009). Milk Matters: the role and value of milk in the diets of Somali pastoralist children in Liben and Shinile, Ethiopia. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and Save the Children, Addis Ababa.

Save the Children USA and MercyCorps. 2011. Urban Livelihoods and Peace Study Summary Report for Degehabur, Gode, and Dolo Ado Towns. Submitted to USAID 2011.

Save the Children. 2011. Empowering New Generations to Improve Nutrition and Economic Opportunities (ENGINE) . An integrated Nutrition Program in response to USAID/Ethiopia RFA 663-11-000012. Revised Technical Application. Submitted to USAID August 2011.

Save the Children. 2013 Overview of FtF ay-nut pathway and FtF partners coordination or convergence. Presentation to USAID October 2013.

Save the Children. 2013. Final ENGINE Performance Monitoring Plan. Submitted to USAID August 2013.

Save the Children. 2014. ENGINE: Empowering New Generations to Improve Nutrition and Economic Opportunities ear III Semi Annual Progress Report. Submitted to USAID April 2014.

Save the Children. Investing in People: Empowering New Generations to Improve Nutrition and Economic Opportunities ENGINE. Fact Sheet for USAID.

Shiferaw, B. Jones, R. Silim, S. Teklewold, H. and Gwata E. 2013. Analysis of production costs, market opportunities and competitiveness of Desi and Kabuli chickpeas in Ethiopia. Improving Productivity and Marketing Success (IPMS) of Ethiopian Farmers Project Working Paper No. 3 Available at: www.ipms-ethiopia.org

Steen, M and Shiferaw, M. 2014. Draft LMD Pro-Poor/Push-Pull Case Study. Triggering the poor to work for the market. November 2014.

Stewart CP, Iannotti L, Dewey KG, Michaelsen KF & Onyango AW. Contextualising complementary feeding in a broader framework for stunting prevention. Maternal and Child Nutrition 2013;9(Suppl 2):27-45.

Stockton, G. Greene McMillin, J. Desta, S. Beyero, M and Tadele A. 2012. Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of the Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative Phase II, Submitted to USAID July 2012

Tefera, M. 2014. Graduation with Resilience to Achieve Sustainable Development (GRAD) Intermediate Result Assessment Report for 2014. CARE, October 2014.

Thomas G and Slater R. 2006. Innovation, agricultural growth and poverty reduction. *Int. J. Technology and Globalisation* 2(3/4): 279-288.

Trevors, T. 2014. External Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID Ethiopia's Empowering New Generations to Improve Nutrition and Economic Opportunities (ENGINE) Project. Intermediate Result 4:Rigorous and Innovative Learning Agenda Adopted. Submitted to USAID August 2014.

Tufts University. 2014. Tracking Progress Against Work Plan October 2014- September 2015. Submitted to USAID January 2015.

USAID Ethiopia 2012.Performance Management Plan DO1: Increased Economic Growth with Resiliency in Rural Ethiopia. September 2012.

USAID Ethiopia. 2009. Global Food Security Response: Draft Implementation Plan. Submitted to USAID September 15 2009.

USAID Ethiopia. 2010. Feed The Future Strategic Review. Presented October 2010

USAID Ethiopia. 2011. Feed The Future Ethiopia Multi Year Strategy (2011-2015). Published June 2011.

USAID Ethiopia. 2012. Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2011-2015 Accelerating the Transformation Toward Prosperity. Published March 2012.

USAID Ethiopia. 2012. Development Objective 1 - from the Country DevelopmentCooperation Strategy - Master List of Indicators. Updated November 2012.

USAID Ethiopia. 2014. Feed The Future Portfolio. Updated November 2014.

USAID: Final performance evaluation of water sanitation and hygiene transformation for enhanced resiliency (WaTER) project.

USAID. 2014. Feed the Future M&E Guidance Series Frequently Asked Questions: Feed The Future Monitoring and Evaluation Approach. Updated February 2014.

USAID. 2014. Feed The Future Management System: Query Response - Historical Data Report on all Ethiopian indicators. Updated November 2014.

USAID. 2014. SPS Indicator Guidance Sheets for FtF Goal, Objectives 1 and 2, Intermediate Results 1 through 8 and Sub IRs 1.1 - 1.5 and 2.1, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7. Updated 2014.

Webb, P. and Kennedy, E. 2012. Impacts of Agriculture on Nutrition: Nature of Evidence and Research Gaps. Tufts University, Nutrition CRSP Research Briefing Paper No.4.

White, S, Gebru, G, and Aklilu Y. 2015. Pastoralist Areas Resilience. Improvement through Market Expansion (PRIME), Ethiopia External Mid-term Performance Evaluation Report. Agricultural Knowledge, Learning and Documentation Project, Tufts University. Submitted to USAID January 2015.

World Bank (2105) Ethiopia Poverty Assessment. Report No. AUS6744. World Bank Poverty Global Practice, Africa Region.

World Bank. 2010. Ethiopia - Agricultural Growth Project (AGP) Project Information Document (PID) Appraisal Stage. Report N0. AB5416. World Bank 2010.

World Bank. 2014. Review of Graduation from the Productive Safety Net Programme through the Household Asset Building Programme. Presented January 2014.

ANNEX C: INTERVIEWS AND FIELD VISITS

Addis Interviews

December 2014

- Vanessa Adams and Mengesha Tagesse, CoP and Policy Team Leader, AMDe
- Bart Minton, Director, ERDI, Manager, IFPRI baseline study
- Teshome Lemma, CoP, CIAFS
- Berhanu Admassu, livestock expert, member of ENGINE evaluation team, AKLDP
- Mirafe Marcos, Chief of Staff, ATA
- John Meyer, CoP, GRAD
- Marc Steen and management team, LMD
- Dan Swift, Mission Economist, USAID
- Sarah Berry and ALT team, USAID
- Mohamed Abdinoor, USAID
- Adam Silagi, USAID
- Teklu Tesfaye, AGP Coordination, World Bank
- Kerry Burns and Diana Picon, CoP and DCoP, PRIME
- Dan Abbott and Mohamed Mamu, DCoP and Operations Manager, ENGINE
- Jim Levinson, Lead Consultant, Mid-term Evaluation, ENGINE

January/February 2015

- Mary Harvey, USAID
- Habtamu Fekadu and Dan Abbott, CoP and DCoP, ENGINE (2 times)
- John Graham, Save the Children
- Ato. Tadesse, Director, Livestock Directorate, MoA
- Birhane Hailu, General Manager, EGTE
- Value chain leads for Maize, Honey and Coffee, AMDe
- Cullen Hughes, USAID
- Semachew Kassahun, USAID
- Berhanu Michael, Food Security Coordination Directorate, DRMFSS
- Mulugeta Berhanu, Head REST Liaison office
- Teka Reda, Sesame Value Chain expert, made
- Sean White, Lead Consultant, Mid-term Evaluation, PRIME
- Adrian Cullis, CoP, AKLDP
- Wolday Amha, Executive Director, Association of Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions
- Focus group with M&E experts from AMDe, LMD, GRAD, PRIME and ENGINE
- Usman Surum, Director of Cooperative Directorate, Ministry of Agriculture
- Marc Steen, CoP, LMD
- Vanessa Adams, CoP, AMDe
- John Meyer, CoP, GRAD
- Mohamed Abdinoor, USAID
- Ato Kabaru, AGP Coordinator, Ministry of Agriculture
- Director, Livestock Marketing Directorate, Ministry of Trade
- Director, Crop Marketing Directorate, Ministry of Trade
- Regional Coordinator, Oromia, ENGINE

Field Visits

Somali Region- PRIME

- Discussions with natural management, nutrition and value chain and productivity staff
- Focus group with rangeland management council and visit to see pond construction
- Focus group with nutrition BCC health volunteers
- Interview with Mohamed Abdirahman Malin, General Manager, Somali MFI
- Interview with CFO and tour of the JESH slaughterhouse
- Focus group with the Women's Trader Association
- Interview with Mohamud Omer, TVET Program for TOPs Skills Training
- Interview with Director, One Stop Centers
- Interview with owner and tour, Milk Processing Center
- Meeting with Mohammed Sheikh, Regional Director

Oromia- AMDe

- Discussions with Girma Bekele, Sr. Agricultural Marketing Specialist, and Mengesha Tagesse, Policy Lead
- Interview and tour of the fertilizer blending plant with Dejene Hirpa, General Manager, Becho-Woliso Farmers Cooperative Union
- Interview and tour with Ayansa Erana and team, General Manager, Liben Cooperative Union
- Interview and tour with Taddalag, General Manager, Lume Adama Cooperative Union

SNNPR, AMDe, LMD and GRAD

- Interview, Regional Director for SNNPR, AMDe
- Interview and tour with Sisay Yohannes, General Manager, Sidam Elito Cooperative Union
- Interview with Regional Coordinator and Fekele Gebre, M&E Associate for SNNPR, LMD
- Interview and tour with Owner, Dairy Processing Center, LMD
- Interview and tour with Woman Entrepreneur, Dairy Farm Owner, LMD
- Focus group with GRAD VESA group members in Shebedino woreda
- Visit to honey value chain, rope and washer pump participants, and agrodealer
- Discussions with CARE staff

Tigray- GRAD. LMD, and AMDe

- Discussions with Samson Abraha, GRAD Coordinator, REST
- Focus group with VESA group members
- Tour of feed cooperative group
- Interview and tour of feed processing plant with Darge Kebede and team, General Manager and Board of Directors, Bokera Cooperative Union
- Interview with Mulugeta Berhane, General Manager, Abergelle International Livestock Development Plc.
- Discussions with Meskerem Shiferaw, Pro-Poor Value Chain Senior Advisor, LMD
- Interview with Department Head of Environmental Rehabilitation and Agricultural Development and REST staff involved in LMD and GRAD
- Interview with Regional Director, AMDe

ANNEX D: RESULTS FRAMEWORKS AND INDICATORS

USAID Ethiopia Country Development Cooperation Strategy Results Framework

DO 1: Increased Growth and Resiliency in Rural Ethiopia

1. 4.5(2) Number of jobs attributed to Feed the Future implementation (AMDe, LMD, PRIME, GRAD)
2. 4.5(9) Daily per capita expenditures (as a proxy for income) in USG-assisted areas (high-level indicator)
3. 4(17) Prevalence of Poverty: Percent of people living on less than $1.25/day (high-level indicator)
4. 4.5(19) Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index Score (high-level indicator)
5. 3.1.9.1(3) and 4.7(4) Prevalence of households with moderate or severe hunger (high-level indicator)

IR 1: Performance of the agriculture sector improved (focus on productive areas)

1. 4.5(16,17,18) Gross margin per hectare, animal or cage of selected product (AMDe)
2. 4.5(3) Percent change in agricultural GDP (high-level indicator)
3. 4.5.2(7) Number of individuals who have received USG supported short-term agricultural sector productivity or food security training (AMDe, LMD, PRIME, GRAD, ENGINE)
4. 4.5.2(23) Value of incremental sales (collected at farm-level) attributed to Feed the Future implementation (AMDe, LMD, PRIME)
5. 4.5.2(11) Number of food security private enterprises (for profit), producers organizations, water users associations, women's groups, trade and business associations, and community-based organizations (CBOs) receiving USG assistance (AMDe, LMD, PRIME, GRAD)
    - Sub-IR 1.1 Increased productivity and income through expanded market opportunities
        1. 4.5.2(38) Value of new private sector investment in the agriculture sector or food chain leveraged by Feed the Future implementation (AMDe, LMD, PRIME)
        2. 4.5.2(36) Value of exports of targeted agricultural commodities as a result of USG assistance (AMDe, LMD)
    - Sub-IR 1.2 Increased commercial viability of small and medium agribusinesses
        1. 4.5(10) Total increase in installed storage capacity (m3) (AMDe)
        2. 4.5.2(30) Number of MSMEs, including farmers, receiving USG assistance to access loans (AMDe, LMD, GRAD)
        3. 4.5.2(37) Number of MSMEs, including farmers, receiving business development services from USG assisted sources (AMDe, GRAD)
        4. 4.5.2(43) Number of firms (excluding farms) or Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) engaged in agricultural and food security-related manufacturing and services now operating more profitably (at or above cost) because of USG assistance (AMDe)
    - Sub-IR 1.3 Technology transfer increased
        1. 4.5.2(2) Number of hectares under improved technologies or management practices as a result of USG assistance (AMDe, PRIME)
        2. 4.5.2(5) Number of farmers and others who have applied improved technologies or management practices as a result of USG assistance (AMDe, LMD, PRIME)
        3. 4.5.2(39) Number of technologies or management practices in one of the following phases of development: *in Phase I*: under research as a result of USG assistance, *in Phase II*: under field testing as a result of USG assistance, *in Phase III*: made available for transfer as a result of USG assistance (AMDe)
        4. 4.5.2(42) Number of private enterprises, producers organizations, water users associations, women's groups, trade and business associations and community-based organizations (CBOs) that applied new technologies or management practices as a result of USG assistance (AMDe, GRAD)
    - Sub-IR 1.4 Agricultural enabling environment improved

1. 4.5(12) Percentage of national budget allocated to agriculture (high-level indicator)
2. 4.5.1(22) Number of rural hectares mapped and adjudicated

IR 2: Livelihood transition opportunities increased (focus on vulnerable areas)

1. 4.5.2(23) Value of incremental sales (collected at farm-level) attributed to Feed the Future implementation (PRIME)
2. 4.5.2(14) Number of vulnerable households benefiting directly from USG assistance (GRAD, ENGINE)
3. 4(TBD8) Depth of Poverty: Mean percent shortfall relative to the $1.25 poverty line (high-level indicator)
    - Sub-IR 2.1 Human capacity, skills and development enhanced in target communities
        1. 4.5.2(5) Number of farmers and others who have applied improved technologies or management practices as a result of USG assistance (GRAD, PRIME)
        2. 4.5.2(7) Number of individuals who have received USG supported short-term agricultural sector productivity or food security training (GRAD, PRIME, ENGINE)
    - Sub-IR 2.2 Employment and self-employment opportunities increased among target households and/or communities
        1. 3.3.3(15) Number of social assistance beneficiaries participating in productive safety nets
    - Sub-IR 2.3 Household financial resources increased
        1. 4.5.2(37) Number of MSMEs, including farmers, receiving business development services from USG assisted sources (GRAD)

IR 3: Private sector competitiveness increased (feeds into IRs 1-2)

1. 4.5.2(12) Number of public-private partnerships formed as a result of Feed the Future assistance (AMDe)
    - Sub-IR 3.1 Increased access to financial sector instruments
        1. 4.5.2(29) Value of agricultural and rural loans (AMDe, LMD, GRAD)
        2. 4.5.2(30) Number of MSMEs receiving USG assistance to access loans (AMDe, LMD, GRAD)
    - Sub-IR 3.2 Improved public and private sector capacity to promote private sector growth

IR 4: Resiliency to and protection from shocks and disasters increased

1. 4.5.2(34) Number of people implementing risk-reducing practices/actions to improve resilience to climate change as a result of USG assistance (PRIME, GRAD)
    - Sub-IR 4.1 Disaster risk management, response and adaptation strengthened
        1. 4.5.1(21) Number of climate vulnerability assessments conducted as a result of USG assistance
    - Sub-IR 4.2 Community infrastructure improved
        1. 4.5.1(17) Kilometers of roads improved or constructed
        2. 4.5.1(28) Hectares under new or improved/rehabilitated irrigation and drainage services as a result of USG assistance
    - Sub-IR 4.3 Natural resource management improved
        1. 4.5.2(41): Number of water resources sustainability assessments undertaken
    - Sub-IR 4.4 Household assets maintained during shocks

IR 5: Nutritional status of women and young children improved

1. 3.1.9(11) Prevalence of stunted children under five years of age (high-level indicator)
2. 3.1.9(12) Prevalence of wasted children under five years of age (high-level indicator)
3. 3.1.9(13) Prevalence of underweight women (high-level indicator)
4. 3.1.6(16) prevalence of underweight children under five years of age (high-level indicator)
    - Sub-IR 5.1 Improved access to diverse and quality foods
        1. 3.1.9.1(1) Prevalence of children 6-23 months receiving a minimum acceptable diet (high-level indicator)
        2. 3.1.9.1(2) Women's Dietary Diversity: Mean number of food groups consumed by women of

reproductive age (high-level indicator)

- Sub-IR 5.2 Improved nutrition-related behaviours
    1. 3.1.9.1(4) Prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding of children under six months of age (high-level indicator)
    2. 3.1.9(1) Number of people trained in child health and nutrition through USG-supported programs (LMD, GRAD, PRIME, ENGINE)
- Sub-IR 5.3 Improved utilization of maternal and child health and nutrition services
    1. 3.1.9.2(2) Number of health facilities with established capacity to manage acute undernutrition (ENGINE)
    2. 3.1.9.2(3) Number of children under five who received Vitamin A from USG-supported programs (ENGINE)

3.1.9(15) Number of children under five reached by USG-supported nutrition programs (LMD, GRAD, PRIME, ENGINE.

Global FTF Results Framework

Goal: Sustainably reduce global poverty and hunger

1. 4(17) Prevalence of Poverty: Percent of people living on less than $1.25/day (high-level indicator)
2. 3.1.6(16) Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age (high-level indicator)

Objective 1: Inclusive agricultural sector growth

1. 4.5(3) Percent change in agricultural GDP (high level indicator)
2. 4.5(9) Daily per capita expenditures (as a proxy for income) in USG-assisted areas (high-level indicator)
3. 4.5(19) Women's Empowerment Index (high-level indicator)

IR 1: Improved agricultural productivity

1. 4.5(16,17,18) Gross margin per hectare, animal or cage of selected product (AMDe)e
    - Sub-IR 1.1 Enhanced human and institutional capacity development for increased sustainable agriculture sector productivity
        1. 4.5.2(5) Number of farmers and others who have applied improved technologies or management practices as a result of USG assistance (AMDe, LMD, PRIME, GRAD)
        2. 4.5.2(6) Number of individuals who have received USG supported long-term agricultural sector productivity or food security training
        3. 4.5.2(7) Number of individuals who have received USG supported short-term agricultural sector productivity or food security training (AMDe, LMD, PRIME, GRAD, ENGINE)
        4. 4.5.2(11) Number of food security private enterprises (for profit), producers organizations, water users associations, women's groups, trade and business associations, and community-based organizations (CBOs) receiving USG assistance (AMDe, LMD, PRIME, GRAD)
        5. 4.5.2(27) Number of members of producer organizations and community based organizations receiving USG assistance (Ethiopia not tracking)
        6. 4.5.2(34) Number of people implementing risk-reducing practices/actions to improve resilience to climate change as a result of USG assistance (GRAD, PRIME)
        7. 4.5.2(42) Number of private enterprises, producers organizations, water users associations, women's groups, trade and business associations and community-based organizations (CBOs) that applied improved technologies or management practices as a result of USG assistance (AMDe, GRAD)
    - Sub-IR 1.2 Enhanced technology development, dissemination, management and diffusion
        1. 4.5.1(28) Hectares under new or improved/rehabilitated irrigation and drainage services as a result of USG assistance
        2. 4.5.2(2) Number of hectares under improved technologies or management practices as a result of USG assistance (AMDe, PRIME)
        3. 4.5.2(13) Number of rural households benefiting directly from USG interventions (Ethiopia not tracking)
        4. 4.5.2(39) Number of technologies or management practices in one of the following phases of development: *in Phase I*: under research as a result of USG assistance, *in Phase II*: under field testing as a result of USG assistance, *in Phase III*: made available for transfer as a result of USG assistance (AMDe)
    - Sub-IR 1.3 Improved agricultural policy environment
        1. 4.5.1(24) Number of agricultural and nutritional enabling environment policies completing the following processes/steps of development as a result of USG assistance in each case: a) Analysis, b) Stakeholder consultation/public debate, c) Drafting or revision, d) Approval (legislative or regulatory), e) Full and effective implementation (S) (AMDe, LMD, PRIME)
        2. Number of national policies supporting regionally agreed-upon policies for which a

national-level implementation action has been taken as a result of USG assistance (Ethiopia not tracking)

IR 2: Expanded markets and trade

1. 4.5.2(23) Value of incremental sales (collected at farm-level) attributed to Feed the Future implementation (AMDe, LMD, PRIME)
2. 4.5.2(35) Percent change in value of intra-regional trade in targeted agricultural commodities (Ethiopia not tracking)
3. 4.5.2(36) Value of exports of targeted agricultural commodities as a result of USG assistance (AMDe, LMD)
    - Sub-IR 2.1 Enhanced agricultural trade
    - Sub-IR 2.2 Property rights to land and other productive assets strengthened
        1. 4.5.1(25) Number of households with formalized land (Ethiopia not tracking)
        2. 4.5.1(22) Number of rural hectares mapped and adjudicated
    - Sub-IR 2.3 Improved market efficiency
        1. 4.5.1(17) Kilometers of roads improved or constructed
        2. 4.5(10) Total increase in installed storage capacity (m3) (AMDe)
    - Sub-IR 2.4 Improved access to business development and sound and affordable financial and risk management services
        1. 4.5.2(29) Value of Agricultural and Rural Loans (AMDe, LMD, GRAD)
        2. 4.5.2(30) Number of MSMEs, including farmers, receiving USG assistance to access loans (AMDe, LMD, GRAD)
        3. 4.5.2(37) Number of MSMEs, including farmers, receiving business development services from USG assisted sources (AMDe, GRAD, PRIME)

IR 3: Increased investment in agriculture and nutrition-related activities

1. 4.5.2(12) Number of public-private partnerships formed as a result of Feed the Future assistance (AMDe)
2. 4.5.2(38) Value of new private sector investment in the agriculture sector or food chain leveraged by Feed the Future implementation (AMDe, LMD, PRIME)
3. 4.5.2(43) Number of firms (excluding farms) or Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) engaged in agricultural and food security-related manufacturing and services now operating more profitably (at or above cost) because of USG assistance (AMDe)
    - Sub-IR 3.1 Increased public sector investment
        1. 3.1.9.3(1) Percentage of national budget allocated to nutrition (high-level indicator)
        2. 4.5(12) Percentage of national budget allocated to agriculture (high-level indicator)
    - Sub-IR 3.2 Increased private sector investment
        1. 4.5.2(43) Number of firms (excluding farms) or Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) engaged in agricultural and food security-related manufacturing and services now operating more profitably (at or above cost) because of USG assistance (AMDe)

IR 4: Increased employment opportunities in targeted value chains

1. 4.5(2) Number of jobs attributed to Feed the Future implementation (AMDe, LMD, GRAD, PRIME, ENGINE)

IR 5: Increased resilience of vulnerable communities and households (also contributes to Objective 2)

1. 3.1.9.1(3) and 4.7(4) Prevalence of households with moderate or severe hunger (high-level indicator)
2. 3.3.3(15) Number of USG social assistance beneficiaries participating in productive safety nets
3. 4(TBD8) Depth of Poverty: Mean percent shortfall relative to the $1.25 poverty line (high-level indicator)
4. 4.5.2(14) Number of vulnerable households benefiting directly from USG assistance (GRAD, ENGINE)

Objective 2: Improved nutritional status (women and children)

5. 3.1.9(11) Prevalence of stunted children under five years of age (high-level indicator)
6. 3.1.9(12) Prevalence of wasted children under five years of age (high-level indicator)
7. 3.1.9(13) Prevalence of underweight women (high-level indicator)

IR 5: Increased resilience of vulnerable communities and households (also contributes to Objective 1- see for indicators)

IR 6: Improved access to diverse and quality foods

1. 3.1.9.1(1) Prevalence of children 6-23 months receiving a minimum acceptable diet (high-level indictor)
2. 3.1.9.1(2) Women's Dietary Diversity: Mean number of food groups consumed by women of reproductive age (high-level indicator)
3. 4.5.2.8(TBD1) Prevalence of women of reproductive age who consume targeted nutrient-rich value chain commodities (high-level-indicator)
4. 4.5.2.8(TBD2) Prevalence of children 6-23 months who consume targeted nutrient-rich value chain commodities (high-level indicator)
5. 4.5.2.8(TBD3) Total quantity of targeted nutrient-rich value chain commodities produced by direct beneficiaries that is set aside for home consumption (Ethiopia not reporting)

IR 7: Improved nutrition-related behaviors

1. 3.1.9.1(4) Prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding of children under six months of age (high-level indicator)

IR 8: Improved use of maternal and child health and nutrition services

1. 3.1.9(1) Number of people trained in child health and nutrition through USG-supported programs (LMD, GRAD, PRIME, ENGINE)
2. 3.1.9(6) Prevalence of anemia among women of reproductive age (Ethiopia not reporting)
3. 3.1.9(14) Prevalence of anemia among children 6-59 months (Ethiopia not reporting)
4. 3.1.9(15) Number of children under five reached by USG-supported nutrition programs (LMD, GRAD, PRIME, ENGINE)
5. 3.1.9.2(2) Number of health facilities with established capacity to manage acute undernutrition (ENGINE)
6. 3.1.9.2(3) Number of children under five who received Vitamin A from USG-supported programs (ENGINE)

ANNEX E: STATEMENT OF DIFFERENCES

A Statement of Differences was received from USAID Ethiopia on 22nd July 2015 as follows:

Overall, USAID/Ethiopia found the Feed the Future (FTF) mid-term evaluation (MTE) to be very useful on both a programmatic and "big picture" level and we have already taken steps to incorporate most of the key findings into our current programs as well as future project designs. We found it to be generally fair, though many points were not backed up with specific examples and/or citations and therefore we disagree on some of the more theoretical points of the study.

The main finding of the FTF MTE was that overall, project indicator targets are generally likely to be met for much of the program. They found that there is no strong evidence to suggest that levels of effort and resources are not appropriately matched to the achievement of project targets. The five major activities that account for 85% of the FTF program in Ethiopia were found to be "cost-effective" and GRAD was found to be the most cost-effective as investments per household should exceed 100% annually (investments of $360 per household to increase household incomes by $365 per year permanently). PRIME was found to have the potential to achieve the same result and rate of return as GRAD. LMD and AMDe were also found to be "likely cost effective" yet these investments will only likely bear fruit in 5-10 years' time, given that they are focused on "system level" reforms and impact. Indeed, our own cost-benefit analysis of each value chain intervention of AMDe and LMD demonstrates very high estimated rates of return from our investments.
All five major activities that support USAID/Ethiopia's FTF portfolio (AMDe, LMD, PRIME, GRAD and ENGINE) also had their own external MTE to provide outside, unbiased information to assist with course-correction in order to achieve the largest impact with the time remaining for each activity. The LMD project, for example, implemented by CNFA, has reached the end of its third year work plan implementation and a MTE was completed in April 2015, which provided positive feedback on the projects' performance and progress, as well as for recommendations on the way forward for year four and year five.[1] While specifics of each of these can be found in the final MTE for each project, it should be noted that they are all being taken very seriously to help us and our partners achieve our highest level impact goals.

One of the main findings of the FTF MTE was that the program was unlikely to achieve the high level FTF program targets of reducing extreme poverty by 30% (defined as those living on less than $1.25 per day) and malnutrition by 20% (defined by stunting rates) over five years. Since the FTF portfolio was evaluated in isolation of and without considering the USG's Title II investments (i.e. "Food for Peace") and the leveraged funding from other donors in the Agricultural Growth Program (AGP), Household Asset Building Program (HABP) and the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), the Mission understands how the evaluator could have concluded that the FTF portfolio cannot be

[1] The MTE concluded that CNFA and its partners are making a credible effort to implement the project, with some very notable positives such as: 1) Technical, business, and policy trainings, 2) Women's entrepreneurship training, leadership training, and level of involvement in project activities, 3) Business-to-business training, 4) Dairy Value Chain sector development, 5) Regional Livestock Working Group were highlighted. Besides the positives for the activity, the MTE identified several areas for improvement to assure the project will meet Performance Management Plan (PMP) targets during the project period. Following the MTE recommendations for improvement, CNFA worked closely with USAID concerning the way forward. CNFA and USAID agreed to implement seven of the key recommendations in order to have greater impact in our Zone of Influence (ZOI) and be aligned to achieve our FTF goals of reducing poverty and chronic malnutrition. These areas included working more on the "middle of the value chain" (i.e. improving access to markets for producers), improving the enabling environment by working more with government regulators, scaling up innovation grants, and providing more technical assistance support.

expected to impact extreme poverty in the relatively short timescale envisioned by the first iteration of the FTF program. The FTF Ethiopia program is able to focus primarily on agricultural productivity, not the poorest of the poor, because of the existing massive investment using Title II funds that target those living below $1.25 per day. Therefore, FTF's annual $50 million investments are in part programed to complement the existing $110 million of annual investment of Title II funding in the Government of Ethiopia's (GOE) PSNP. In addition, Title II investments are further leveraged by the contribution of the GOE and other donors, which collectively contribute over $350 million a year in addition to the USG's programs which more directly target the extreme poor. Despite not considering Title II investments, the key reasons cited in the MTE for the potential failure of our programs to achieve the high level FTF goals are (1) Lack of sufficient time and geographical focus for the investments to achieve statistically measurable impact on extreme poverty; (2) Unclear link between intermediate level project outcome indicators with FTF high level goals; and (3) Flawed initial assumptions, mostly related to the relationship between agricultural productivity and poverty reduction, which they see as tenuous. We generally agree with (1) and agree in part on (2), but generally disagree on (3).

We generally agree on (1) because of the reasons cited in the report. The geographical reach of our programs is indeed broad, and we agree that it is unlikely that statistically significant changes vis-à-vis control areas will show up in our forthcoming mid-term impact surveys that utilize difference in difference estimation techniques. The MTE states that impacts on extreme poverty as a result of our program are likely to take more time to materialize in a statistically significant way. This is fine because our FTF program is focused not on achieving short-term gains but sustainable reductions in extreme poverty, which we agree takes time. It also allows us at this time to identify those efforts with greatest potential to be scaled in a responsible way to better meet those targets. We also agree that the geographical reach of our programs (our "Zone of Influence") is likely too large. However, the large FTF Zone of Influence in Ethiopia is a result of USAID contributing to the GOE's AGP andHABP Programs under the aid effectiveness principles of L'Aquila to support host-country programs. By supporting these larger GOE-led, donor supported programs which have defined targeted districts, FTF has been able to leverage significant resources, including the World Bank's $250 million plus trust fund for AGP and the GOE's HABP. While we will try and strategically reduce the geographical scope of our programs going forward in order to improve the ability to quantitatively evaluate our projects, this will be politically sensitive since the GOE's AGP-II Program is expanding both geographically and financially and they are expecting USAID's parallel contribution will expand as well.

We also largely agree on (2), especially with the finding that "overall, many successes are not well reflected in any of the FTF indicators." The MTE provides numerous examples of successful demonstrations and scalable interventions that are not well reflected by the FTF indicator framework, including, for example, the success of GRAD and ENGINE in demonstrating the effectiveness of the comprehensive support package that will form the foundation of the next PSNP. We also agree that focusing on one-dimensional quantitative indicators that simply count the number of things done (e.g. trainings conducted, jobs created, hectares 'improved') without regard to quality and impact can be both useless as well as lead to serious distortions in program implementation. We agree on the need to develop better custom performance monitoring indicators to measure outcomes and impacts of intermediate level project activities. We also agree on the need to focus more on outcomes, such as sales and income at the farmer level after one or

more years of program sponsored training and to develop our own methodologies for measuring impact.

However, we noted that no strong alternatives for current project level indicators were offered. While indeed many of our project level indicators need to be reconsidered, the theoretical link among most of these indicators to the outcome level impact of poverty reduction remains strong, albeit with some lag time. For example, indicators like per capita expenditures, yields, increase in access to improved technology, access to finance, and private sector investment leveraged are all sound indicators and our projects, which the MTE points out, are meeting targets and often exceeding them. We still have little reason to believe that the achievement of the majority of the project level indicators will not translate into the higher level goals sought by FTF.

We generally disagree on (3), since we believe that agricultural productivity is indeed critical to longer run poverty alleviation. While GRAD and PRIME constitute the "push" of our approach to poverty reduction, AMDe and LMD form the "pull" that ultimately generates the growth that creates on and off farm employment opportunities that sustainably lift people out of poverty. The MTE argues that the "causal pathway" from the Mission's Development Objective 1 (focused on marketing and production) to FTF (focus on poverty) is flawed. The MTE claims that we cannot hope that focusing efforts on agribusinesses, marketing, and productivity will help lift the smallholder out of poverty directly because their plots (estimated average size of 0.39 ha for those below the $1.25 line) are simply not large enough to realistically increase production by any significant amount[2]. FTF average plot size is 0.8 ha and the mean income of our value-chain programming beneficiaries is around $1.67/day in AGP woredas.

While $1.67/day is not "extreme poor", it is poverty nonetheless as defined as under $2/day. The MTE itself admits that "It is widely accepted that supporting equitable economic development will ultimately reduce rural poverty...". There is also a wide-ranging literature that supports the link between agricultural productivity and the generation of off-farm employment that benefits the poorest. The 2008 World Development Report by the World Bank concludes that "growth in agriculture is on average at least twice as effective in reducing poverty as growth outside agriculture." A 2015 report by the World Bank states that "since 2005 agricultural growth has been responsible for a reduction in poverty of 4 percent a year, and thus has been the key driver in Ethiopia's recent progress against poverty."[3] Dorosh and Mellor (2013) find significant elasticity of non-farm wage employment to agricultural productivity in Ethiopia specifically. The MTE oddly suggests (p.14) that increased yields and strengthened markets could mean an increase in food prices that hurt the poorest, but no mechanism is offered for such a counter-intuitive outcome. The MTE also oddly suggests (p.15) that opportunities for off-farm employment opportunities are limited, but then praises the success of GRAD at cost-effective job creation, most of which is off-farm. AMDe and LMD have made impressive impacts related to improving productivity in their respective sectors and we firmly believe that these gains will spill over in a large way to the poorest in the near to medium term, creating the "pull" envisioned by the FTF program.

[2] Based on research by Dorosh and Mellor (2013), the MTE estimates that agricultural growth comes primarily from farmers who have 0.75 ha and above. GoE Farm management data indicates that this is about 62% of all smallholders, so 38% (5.8 million out of 13.9 million) – will get "left behind" by an ag-focused strategy in the five year time frame of FTF, according to the MTE.

[3] Ethiopia Poverty Assessment 2014, World Bank, January 2015.

Despite the disagreement with this particular finding, the Mission realizes the need to bridge the gap and better integrate its "push" and "pull" focused activities. Going forward, the Mission will pay greater attention to the differential impacts our programs have on groups by income level and in fact we are already working with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), our impact survey implementing partner, to better analyze our beneficiaries' poverty status. The Mission will also focus more on connecting the poor to markets through the vertical integration of our projects (e.g. coordination between GRAD and LMD in shoat marketing) and engage in both market-focused and livelihoods-focused activities in the same areas (i.e. in overlapping AGP and PSNP woredas). We will work harder to identify the sectors, policy reforms, geographic areas, and activities that are most effective in benefiting the poorest and women in particular while also having a macro-level impact, and scale those up. For example, we will look toward smaller sized grants that build capacity and away from financing capital equipment where it does not clearly crowd in additional investment. We will also expand support for Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) in rural areas that are closer to producers (first point of sale) through Business Development Services (BDS) provision and refocus support on value chains that benefit the poorest and women. In sum, we appreciate that the FTF MTE found that all our interventions are meeting most of their project level indicators and that they were all found to be cost-effective. Most of the recommendations in the MTE are well taken and in fact have already been integrated into our forthcoming project designs while our current projects have been reoriented. We believe that the FTF program in Ethiopia will be significantly improved as a result of the FTF MTE as well as the other MTEs completed this year.

Annex F: Curriculum vitae of team members

- Dr. George Gray
- Laura Kuhl
- Dr. Demese Chanyalew

GRAY, GEORGE RICHARD

Nationality: British, (Canadian Landed Immigrant)
Civil Status: Married, two children
Contact Details: g.gray57@gmailcom

KEY QUALIFICATIONS:

George Gray is an experienced manager/consultant with 31 years in public sector and private sector endeavors. His skills portfolio includes project evaluation, market analysis and development, planning, administration, policy development, and communication capabilities set against a background of agronomic expertise and experience in food security/nutrition and agricultural development.

Dr. Gray has worked in the Middle East, the Caribbean, Africa, and CIS countries, in both agricultural management and agricultural policy formulation. He has extensive project management experience both of ILA Projects in the Windward Islands, and both Eastern and Southern Africa, and of private sector projects in Zambia, Uzbekistan, and Saudi Arabia.
His experience includes leading teams to conduct:

- Project and program evaluation, including evaluations of:
  - Graduation under the Ethiopian Safety Net and Asset Building Programs.
  - The USAID Cambodia HARVEST Program
  - The USAID "Push/Pull" Hypothesis for rural development in Ethiopia
  - The performance of the USAID East Africa office in meeting its strategic objectives for regional food security.
  - The USAID Eastern and Southern African Market Linkages Initiative
  - The long-term performance of Asset Building Groups in Ethiopia and South Sudan
  - The USAID/Ethiopia Program for Land Title Administration (ELTAP)
  - The USAID LINKS program supporting agriculture and trade in Sierra Leone
  - Support to the PSNP program in Ethiopia 2006.
- Strategy Development, including
  - The EGAD strategy for USAID/Zimbabwe in 2009
  - The Global Food Security Response (Now Feed the Future) initiative for USAID/Ethiopia in 2009
  - The Post Drought Recovery Program for Pastoral areas in Ethiopia 2012
  - Marketing and Investment strategy for agricultural diversification in St. Vincent.
- Market and production analyses, including four national crop production and food security assessment missions in Ethiopia (2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013/14) and Zimbabwe (2012).
- Bellmon analyses in Bangladesh (2009), Ethiopia (2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2012/13), South Sudan (2009), Bangladesh (2009) and Rwanda (2005)
- Assessment of Cross Border Trade of CIP Crops in Rwanda.

Dr. Gray has also been a team member of four AgCLIR and two MicrCLIR assessment missions, as well as two World Bank agricultural risk assessment teams

His last posted experience was as Team Leader of the Saint. Lucia based project, Restructuring the smallholder based Banana Industry in the Windward Islands, where he undertook an evaluation of the Farm to Market chain and supervised the development of national and regional strategies for the banana industry.

As Executive Director of the ZNFU Dr. Gray managed the Zambia National Farmers' Union affairs at the national level, formulated Union policy based upon members' submissions and board decisions, and liased with the National Government.

EDUCATION:

- 1984 Ph.D., Oxford University, Oxford, U.K.
- 1984 M.A., Oxford University, Oxford, U.K.
- 1978 B.A. Agricultural Sciences, Oxford University, Oxford, U.K.

EXPERIENCE RECORD:

o	2006-present	Independent Consultant, Cambridge, Ontario, Canada
o	2004-2006	Senior Advisor, Emerging Markets Group Ltd., Washington, DC Independent Consultant, Cambridge, Ontario, Canada
o	2001-2004	Senior Manager, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Emerging Markets Group, Guelph, Ontario, Canada
o	1998-2001	Team Leader, Restructuring the Windward Islands Banana Industry, (Deloitte Emerging Markets), St. Lucia
o	1994-1998	Executive Director, Zambia National Farmers Union, Zambia
o	1994	Associate Director, Mano Consultancy Services, Zambia
o	1993	General Manager, GMT Agriservices, Zambia
o	1991-1993	Operations/Projects Manager, Masstock Zambia Ltd.
o	1987-1989	Project Manager, Masstock, Zambia
o	1984- 1987	Operations Manager, Masstock International, Saudi Arabia

PUBLICATIONS: Zambia's Agricultural Comparative Advantage: Keyser J., Gray G., and Scott G. World Bank Publication .1996.

Agricultural Recovery for Resilience: V. Letelier and G. Gray., USAID 2008.

EXPERIENCE DETAILS:

Ethiopia: 2013/14 Production and Market Assessment September'14 May'15

- Lead consultant, undertaking a field assessment of production and agricultural markets jointly with Agridev Consulting for Tufts University. The work required eight teams of enumerators travelling throughout Ethiopia. Undertook questionnaire design and field assessments, including the assessment of international trade levels. Produced a final report including a food balance based upon an assessment of national production some 25% below Government estimates and observations of subsequent market behavior to support the revised estimates.

Tanzania: Booz Allen Hamilton Assessment of Food Security Information Systems: June-July '14

- Team leader of a four person team tasked with the assessment of information systems used by the MUCHALI framework to evaluate food security in rural Tanzania.
- Inventoried all relevant parallel data collection systems as well as efficiently functioning systems that might be used as models for future information systems management (e.g. the Health Management Information System). The inventory included data collected as well as data flows, reports generated and the hardware and software used to support each system
- Assessed the MUCHALI framework data collection tools and undertook a SWOT analysis of the MUCHALI process.

- Made recommendations to streamline data collection using existing systems including a training needs assessment and addressing the feasibility of including the Food Basket Methodology as an additional tool for the selection of food insecure districts.

Timor Leste: FHI 360 Assessment of Financial Sector Supports to the Agricultural Sector.: May-June '14

- Provided agricultural expertise to a two-person team tasked with evaluating all aspects of financial support to agricultural value chains in Timor Leste. The work required the identification of the main value chains and players within them followed by the interviewing of selected stakeholders as well as representatives of all types of financial institutions in the country (ranging from savings and loan groups to commercial banks)
- Compiled a "balance sheet" that compared estimated demand for finance with actual availability and made recommendations for the broadening of financial inclusion.

Senegal: World Bank Agricultural Risk Assessment March-April '14

- Provided agricultural expertise to a five person World Bank team evaluating the impact of risk on agricultural production in Senegal.
- Compiled the report chapter on cash crop production and market risks, determining both the extent of ex post losses and evaluating potential ex ante risk impacts.
- Assisted in the editing and production of the complete draft report, including recommendations for measures both to reduce risk and to improve risk management.

Rwanda: World Bank Agricultural Risk Assessment: January - February '14

- Provided agricultural expertise to a seven person World Bank team evaluating the impact of risk on agricultural production in Senegal, and prioritizing risks accordingly..
- Compiled the report chapter on staple crop production and market risks, determining both the extent of ex post losses and evaluating potential ex ante risk impacts.

Ethiopia: World Bank Assessment of Graduation under the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) and Household Asset Building Programs (HABP): November '13 - January '14

- Worked with an Ethiopian consultant to assess progress in the graduation of households benefitting under the PSNP and HABP for the World Bank. The work included a review of international best practices in the field of graduation, a field assessment of progress under the PSNP and HABP, including key constraints and challenges faced (based on interviews and focus group discussions) and recommendations for modifications to the safety net and household asset building programs to promote successful graduation in the future.
- Recommendations were presented to the Government in a three day workshop at which the proposals were refined before final submission.

Cambodia: Evaluation of USAID Cambodia HARVEST program: October-December '13

- Led an eight-man team in the mid-term evaluation of the USAID Cambodia HARVEST program. This wide ranging program included aspects of natural resource management, policy development, food security and agricultural and horticultural development, all of which were evaluated by the team. The report highlighted areas of success, of significant progress, and of key lessons learned for future programming and for implementation over the last two years of the program. Suggestions for improved implementation in other areas were also presented.

Ethiopia: Fintrac Evaluation of the "Push/Pull" Hypothesis for Rural Development in Ethopia: August-October '13

- Led a three-man team conducting a theoretical and practical assessment of the Feed the Future "Push/Pull" hypothesis as it applied to rural development in Ethiopia. Work included a literature review, examination of economic models, assessment of current USAID programming and primary data collection from interviewees and focus discussion groups.
- The analysis suggested that agriculture was the de facto driver of rural development, but that employment was the primary goal of many households rather than small business development. The results showed the pragmatism behind "dependency syndrome" which focus groups suggested to be more a reflection of limited employment opportunities and an uncertain business environment than of dependency per se, and emphasized the importance of workforce development and urban migration to successful rural development.

Ghana/Nigeria: Fintrac Assessment of Strategic Grain Reserves **June '13**

- Undertook an assessment of the strategic grain reserves in Ghana and Nigeria in terms of both policy, institutional capacity and opportunities for public/private partnership development. Conducted a desk study of five African countries before visiting Ghana and Nigeria to ground truth key issues. Participated in an international workshop at which the results of the assessment were discussed.

Ethiopia: Market Analysis **May '13**

- Undertook an assessment of market opportunities and developed a marketing strategy for the NGO CHF (now Global Communities) in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia: Fintrac Bellmon Analysis **March – June '13**

- Conducted the Bellmon analysis in Ethiopia including an assessment of 2012 Meher harvest production levels and of the subsequent market development. Assessed the relative merits of food and cash disbursements within the context of the Productive Safety Net Program.

Rwanda: Fintrac Cross Border Trade Assessment **October- December '12**

- Team Leader of a 3-person team that undertook a field assessment of cross border trade between Rwanda and its four neighbouring countries (Burundi, the DRC, Tanzania and Uganda). Visited border areas in Rwanda and neighboring countries and assessed local market potential for 10 agricultural commodities in each country. Supervized the collection of data from different sources and directed the analysis of statistics. Prepared a report highlighting areas of potential export market development and recommendations to promote growth in these areas.

Zimbabwe: Weidemann Associates Food Security Assessment **June-August '12**

- Team Leader of a 5-person team that undertook a field assessment of food security and its underlying causes in four Provinces of Zimbabwe. Supervized questionnaire design, field logistics, data collection procedures and the final analysis. Lead author of the report that emphasized the role of enhanced food utilization in food security in these four areas.

Ethiopia: 2011/12 Production and Market Assessment **May-June '12**

- Lead consultant, undertaking a field assessment of production and agricultural markets jointly with Agridev Consulting for USAID/Ethiopia. The work required eight teams of enumerators travelling throughout Ethiopia. Undertook questionnaire design and field assessments, including the assessment of international trade levels. Produced a final report including a food balance based upon an assessment of national production some 20% below Government estimates and observations of subsequent market behavior to support the revised estimates.

Papua New Guinea: Booz Allen Hamilton AgCLIR Assessment **Jan - Feb '12**

- Agricultural economist providing input to the 8-person team undertaking the PNG AgCLIR assessment, focusing on starting a business and dealing with licenses. Undertook field analysis and wrote

the chapters on these two aspects of the enabling environment in PNG, including recommendations for increased efficiency and enhanced agricultural development.

Ethiopia: Development of a Post-Drought Recovery Program for Pastoral Areas December '11-January '12

- Short-term consultant to the USAID/Ethiopia mission, assisting in the development of a strategy for post-drought engagement in pastoral areas in Ethiopia, including elements of governance, education, rangeland management, health and nutrition and social support. Engaged with USAID missions for Kenya and East Africa to ensure the regional integration of all proposed interventions and prepared outline budgets for all program elements.

Ethiopia and South Sudan: CHF, Survey of Asset Building Groups September and November '11

- Worked in partnership with Agridev Consult and CHF staff to conduct a survey of CHF Asset Building Groups. Designed questionnaires, oversaw logistical planning and participated in survey processes and focus discussion groups in both Ethiopia and South Sudan, including data entry for South Sudan.

Zimbabwe: Weidemann Associates, Assessment of Agricultural Finance October '11

- Agricultural economist in an eight-man team tasked to assess the supply and demand for agricultural finance within selected value chains in Zimbabwe and to make recommendations to facilitate the flow of finance into each sub-sector. Carried out interviews of stakeholders throughout the ten selected value chains and in the financial sector. Assessed levels of actual and potential demand and determined the key constraints to finance. Made recommendations specific to each value chain and for the sector overall.

East and Southern Africa: USAID, Evaluation of Regional Market Linkages Initiative July/August '11

- Team Leader of a four person team evaluating the USAID funded regional Market Linkages Initiative program in Kenya, DRC, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and Malawi. Coordinated the assessment of performance, impact and potential for scaling up in the future. Presented findings to USAID and contractors and wrote/edited a report on all findings including recommendations for the further development of the initiative.

Ethiopia: USAID, Assessment of 2010/11 Meher production and Markets May/June '11

- Worked in partnership with Agridev Consult to conduct a rapid rural appraisal in high potential areas, canvassing farmers and traders on the extent of the 2010/11 Meher production. Determined that official yield estimates had been exaggerated. Conducted a market assessment to assess future price movements and impact on food security and nutrition. Also undertook an assessment of current production assessment methodologies in Ethiopia.

Mali: Fintrac MicroCLIR Assessment Team Member March/April '11

- Provided short-term input to the team focusing on the identification of marketing and licensing constraints to the development of the livestock, sorghum and millet, and rice subsectors. Assessed the impact of licensing on the enabling environment for business and made recommendations both in this area and regarding potential market developments to reduce transaction costs and improve market linkages for each of the commodities studied.

Democratic Republic of Congo: Booz Allen Hamilton AgCLIR Assessment Team Member October/November '10

- Provided short-term input to the team, focusing on the identification of constraints to food security and nutrition, and the supply of Agricultural Inputs. Conducted stakeholder interviews, assisted in

the facilitation of a closing workshop and prepared a chapter on the two topics for the overall AgCLIR assessment report together with pertinent recommendations for the USAID Mission, DRC Government, and business community.

Ghana: CHF International Poverty Assessment Team Member August/September '10

- Part of a team that assessed the incidence and causes of food insecurity in Ayidiki, New Town, an underdeveloped area in central Dhaka and made recommendations to improve food security. The study involved numerous focus group discussions and household interviews, and was undertaken as part of the development of a guide to the assessment of urban food insecurity and development of effective interventions. Contributed to the guide and summarized the situation in Ayidki as one case study for the document.

Uganda: Booz Allen Hamilton AgCLIR Assessment Team Member June/July '10

- Provided short-term input to the team, focusing on the identification of constraints to food security. Conducted numerous interviews of stakeholders, assisted in the presentation of team results at a closing workshop and prepared a chapter on the topic for the overall AgCLIR assessment, introducing a new perspective for the assessment of food security and nutrition together with pertinent recommendations for the USAID Mission.

Zimbabwe: Weidemann Associates Market Survey Team Leader May '10

- Led a team of six consultants undertaking a market survey of agricultural products in Zimbabwe. Identified those products with potential for growth and made recommendations as to how markets could be developed to promote rural development in a non-exploitative environment.

Tanzania: Booz Allen Hamilton MicroCLIR Assessment Team Member March/April '10

- Provided short-term agricultural advice to the team focusing on the identification of constraints to the development of the maize and rice subsectors. Made recommendations regarding the storage and marketing of both commodities to reduce transaction costs and improve levels of national and household food security.

Tanzania: Booz Allen Hamilton AgCLIR Assessment Team Member January/February '10

- Provided short-term input to the team, focusing on the identification of constraints to starting a business and to dealing with licenses. Conducted numerous (over 30) interviews of stakeholders, assisted in the presentation of team results at a closing workshop and prepared two chapters on these topics for the overall AgCLIR assessment report together with pertinent recommendations. Also prepared two single page briefing documents for the USAID Mission.

Ethiopia: USAID, Assessment of 2009/10 Meher production January/March '10

- Work undertaken for the ALT department of USAID Ethiopia in two visits, to design and validate a survey of productive areas, canvassing farmers and traders on the extent of the 2009/10 Meher production. Work was undertaken in association with Agridev Consult. Determined that contrary to official data, yields had fallen significantly below previous levels.

US and Italy: Assistance in the development of preparedness to respond to Food Security-based RFPs October/December '09

- Provided short-term assistance to Booz Allen Hamilton in the development of food security/nutritional response capacity to complement existing information gathering and management skills and methodologies developed by the company for other USG clients.

Ethiopia: Lead Consultant for the development of the USAID/Ethiopia Global Food Security Response Strategy August/September '09

- Short-term, PSC Consultant to the Ethiopian USAID Mission, responsible for the development of a GFSR strategy, including program development, timelines and budgeting. Worked with mission staff and other consultants to prepare an implementation plan supported by detailed analysis supporting

the strategy together with a breakdown of each program area, including staffing and costs. All deliverables were submitted within the stipulated timeframe.

Bangladesh: Bellmon Analyses of Monetization Food Aid and Distribution June/July '09

- Team Leader of the five man Bellmon Analysis team, working in Bangladesh to provide input into the design of future food aid and nutritional programming and to identify potential disincentive effects of Food For Peace Title II future food aid monetization and distribution programs.

South Sudan: Bellmon Analyses of Monetization Food Aid and Distribution April/May '09

- Team Leader of the three man 2009/10 Bellmon Analysis, working in South Sudan to assess the impact of existing food aid initiatives, to provide input into future program design including the mitigation of potential disincentive effects of future Food For Peace Title II food aid distribution programs.

Zimbabwe: Design of Economic Growth and Development Strategy January/February '09

- Team Leader of seven-man unit tasked with the design of an economic growth and development strategy for USAID/Zimbabwe, together with associated Activity Appraisal Documents for programs in the areas of humanitarian response, macroeconomic development, private sector development, and agriculture & agribusiness. Responsible for the coordination of all activities in the field, compilation and editing of deliverables. Produced an overarching strategy, linking humanitarian responses with private sector development in the context of the unique situation in Zimbabwe, where short term humanitarian interventions are necessary, but should not be allowed to crowd out the private sector response to an enabling environment.

Ethiopia: Bellmon Analyses of Monetization Food Aid and Distribution December '08

- Team Leader of the 2008/09 Bellmon Analysis, working in partnership with an Ethiopian company to identify potential disincentive effects of Food For Peace Title II food aid monetization and distribution programs.

Georgia: Design of a USAID "Request For Task Order Proposal" (RFTOP) Document June '08

- Agricultural economist/institutional development specialist in a three-man team designing a project to enhance agricultural competitiveness within the Georgian agricultural sector. The work required an assessment of the existing environment for business development, government policy and the current state of the agricultural sector. A program was designed to enhance private sector growth and institutional development.

Ethiopia: Evaluation of the USAID Ethiopian Land Tenure Adminsitration Program Jan-Feb '08

- Team Leader of a three-man unit tasked with evaluating the USAID project strengthening land tenure administration and reform in Ethiopia. Undertook a detailed assessment including field visits to all regions where the program was being implemented. Noted the achievements and constraints and made recommendations for the follow-on program.

Ethiopia: Bellmon Analyses of Monetization Food Aid and Distribution Nov '07– March'08

- Team Leader of the 2007/08 Bellmon Analysis, working in partnership with an Ethiopian company to assess the national food balance and identify potential disincentive effects of Food For Peace Title II food aid monetization and distribution programs. This project included a follow up visit to verify results and predictions undertaken in March 2008.

St. Vincent: Investment Component of Agricultural Diversification Program October '07

- Team Leader of a four-man unit reviewing existing infrastructural and institutional investments relevant to agricultural diversification in St. Vincent. Identified investment needs and opportunities and made recommendations for a regional approach to key infrastructural and institutional requirements.

St. Vincent: Marketing Component of Agricultural Diversification Program July- August '07

- Team Leader of a four-man unit tasked with identifying constraints and opportunities in the marketing of diversified agricultural production within and from St. Vincent. Reviewed production options and concluded that economies of scale mitigated against a traditional 'enabling environment' approach, recommending instead that the government take steps to develop existing entrepreneurial skills and foster already nascent industries.

Sierra Leone: Evaluation of LINKS Program **May – June '07**

- Team leader of a 4-man team evaluating the implementation by the CORAD consortium of Cooperating Sponsors of a series of development initiatives designed to promote market-oriented agriculture and trade in the conflict-affected areas of Sierra Leone. The work required travel through three Districts and the holding of more than 30 focus discussion groups. The evaluation highlighted the effectiveness of the focused, integrated and participatory approach inherent in all aspects of the program, and gave recommendations for future programs that would support ongoing development in the same areas.

Ethiopia: Review of Inflation Study **April – June '07**

- Commissioned by the US Agency for International Development to participate in and to review an inflations study conducted by a group of donors led by DFID and the World Bank to asses the causes of grain prices rises in Ethiopia over the last two years. Provided detailed information of grain production, institutional interactions and yield assessment procedures and reviewed successive drafts of the report as it was prepared. Made comments to the USAID mission on the relevance and accuracy of the arguments advanced.

Ethiopia: Support to the Development of Warehouse Receipts System **August'06 – April '07**

- Consultant to the "Agribusiness and Trade Expansion" Project managed by Fintrac for USAID in Ethiopia. Worked closely with the Minsitry of Agriculture, Ethiopian Grain Trading Enterprise and Commodity Exchange development team to identify existing constraints and potential areas of intervention to stimulate the development of a WRS. Held workshops to sensitize growers and traders to the potential of the WRS. Identified traders and growers to serve as leaders/examples in the utilization of warehouse receipts and facilitated the development of exemplary transations. Developed proposals for the use of warehouse receipts as part of donor-funded local purchase programs and worked with WFP and USAID to put in place guarantees necessary to underpin performance.

Ethiopia: Evaluation of Livelihood Interventions funded through USAID Famine Fund Support to the Productive Safety Net Program **September – November '06**

- Team leader of a 3-man team evaluating the implementation by Cooperating Sponsors of livelihood diversification initiatives designed to assist safety net beneficiaries move towards household food security and improved nutrition. The work required extensive travel in the field and a detailed analysis of responses from 480 interviewees. The results indicated that the responses and needs of the target group were significantly different from that either of food aid beneficiaries or of conventional development aid recipients and that specifically designed interventions are required to bridge the gap between relief and development. It also highlighted both the usefulness of Cooperating Sponsors in augmenting the Government's development networks and the limitations/changes required in the outlook of Cooperating Sponsors more used to working in relief scenarios.

East Africa: Evaluation of USAID East Africa **June '06-August'06**

- Team leader of a 6-man team evaluating the performance of the USAID regional office for East Africa over the last five years and making recommendations for strategy development and implementation over the next five years (2006-1010). The work required travel to Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and Rwanda. The valuation concluded that although significant regional institutional development had occurred, this had not contributed to an increase in regional food security due to a lack of linkage with, and support by national institutions. Recommendations were made for increasing link-

ages with bilateral missions to develop a more coordinated program that would allow the regional office to build upon initiatives being conducted at a national level.

Rwanda: Bellmon Analysis FY'07 **April 2005**

- Team leader of a 3-man team undertaking a Bellmon analysis of potential disincentive effects arising from the proposed distribution of food aid by three NGO's in Rwanda. The work required detailed interaction with NGO's, Government staff in Ministries of Planning, and of Agriculture and in the Office of the President and with donors, in addition to field assessments to determine the extent of self-monetization.

Ethiopia: Bellmon Analyses of Monetization Food Aid and Distribution **Sep '05– May '06**

- Team Leader of the 2005/06 Bellmon Analysis, worked with an Ethiopian subcontracting company to assess the national food balance and identify potential disincentive effects of Food For Peace Title II food aid monetization and distribution programs. This project included two follow up visits to verify results and predictions in January and May 2006.

Ethiopia: Bellmon Analyses of Monetization Food Aid and Distribution **August–October 2004**

- Team Leader of the 2004/05 Bellmon Analysis, worked with an Ethiopian subcontracting company to assess the national food balance and identify potential disincentive effects of Food For Peace Title II food aid monetization and distribution programs. This work provided the necessary evaluation and analysis for a Belmon determination to be made by the US Government.

Windward Islands: Design of an Impact Monitoring System **July –August 2005**

- Team Leader of mission to design an Impact Monitoring System for the European Commission to monitor Stabex and SFA-funded projects in the Windward Islands. A standard system was designed that could be customized by each Island to produce objective indicators on a regular basis using existing resources with minimal additional expenditure. The system covered both economic and social development indicators, using electronic data where available and a modified CWIQ (Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire) approach. The system was specifically tailored to the capacity of each Island. Recommendations were made on the most appropriate institutional framework for effective monitoring and on the additional manpower, training, hardware and software requirements for each Island.

Ethiopia: Development and Review of Opportunities for the use of Food Aid to Develop Commercial Marketing Channels **June –July 2005**

- Team Leader of a mission that first designed a range of potential options for USAID to stimulate market development through the selective use of commodity monetization, then visited key stakeholders in Ethiopia to refine and develop a single mechanism that would be practicable and effective. The concept was validated on the ground and supportive private sector stakeholders were recruited. Implementation has not yet occurred.

East Africa: Fact-finding Mission for Prospective Investors **January – February 2005**

- Agronomist on a fact-finding team of five consultants investigating long-term investment possibilities for Danish pension funds and DANIDA in Kenya and Tanzania. Assessed the nature of the private sector enabling environment including investment legislation, taxation and utility costs, labour costs and legislation and other aspects of competitive advantage. Identified potential companies for investment and prioritized investment possibilities.

Ethiopia: Bellmon Analyses of Monetization Food Aid and Distribution **August–October 2004**

- Team Leader of the 2004/05 Bellmon Analysis, worked with an Ethiopian subcontracting company to assess the national food balance and identify potential disincentive effects of Food For Peace Title

II food aid monetization and distribution programs. This work provided the necessary evaluation and analysis for a Belmon determination to be made by the US Government.

Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Emerging Markets **2001-2004**

Senior Manager – Agribusiness and Trade Unit. As Senior Manager of Deloitte Emerging Markets Agribusiness and trade practice unit, Dr. Gray provided professional services in project management and agricultural policy formulation combined with his agronomic expertise and experience in agricultural development.

Ethiopia Concept Note Design and Verification **April –May 2004**

- Worked with USAID Food For Peace and Global Development Alliance to evaluate a concept note for the introduction of international business interests into the economic framework of the Ethiopian grain trade. Undertook subsequent field analysis and determined that the concept was limited by current legislation.

Ethiopia - Market Stabilization Study **November 2003**

- Based upon radically conflicting assessments of the national food balance, was asked to reassess the prevailing cereal market situation in Ethiopia and to predict market developments, making suitable recommendations for short and long term measures for market stabilization. Analysed the market and determined that it was stable and required minimal intervention. Potential short and long term measures were recommended for implementation, including detailed recommendations for the development of a warehouse receipt mechanism and inventory credit as one way of stabilizing seasonal price fluctuations. Subsequent market developments showed analysis to be accurate.

Ethiopia: Bellmon Analyses of Monetization Food Aid and Distribution August–September '03

- Team Leader of the 2003/04 Bellmon Analysis, worked with an Ethiopian subcontracting company to assess the national food balance and predicted (accurately) future price increases. Identified potential disincentive effects of Food For Peace Title II food aid monetization and distribution programs and provided the necessary evaluation and analysis for a Belmon determination to be made by the US Government.

Windward Islands: Feasibility and Design Study of a Challenge Fund **2003-2004**

- Reviewed options for the disbursement of funds to mitigate existing business development constraints in the Windward Islands. Designed, through a process of dialogue with public and private sectors, an appropriate challenge fund and associated promotional mechanism to promote external business linkages and market development, including recommendations for implementation and management.

Windward Islands: Regional Technical Assistance for Support Services Sector **2002-2004**

- Managing Regional Technical Team for Support Services to the Windward Islands in the areas of rural economic diversification and banana commercialization. These projects include the development of infrastructure to provide necessary efficiencies for the survival of the industry, the initiation of rural economic diversification programs, and the establishment of national safety nets to assist commercially marginalized producers in the rural sector. The project provides technical support in each of these areas and in the financial management of the various projects.

Ethiopia: Bellmon Analyses of Monetization Food Aid and Distribution **2001-2002**

- The Bellmon Analysis required an evaluation as to whether or not monetized commodities would have a disincentive effect on participants in the domestic agricultural production and marketing chain, and whether there were sufficient storage and handling facilities to reassure the U.S. Govern-

ment that donated commodities were not at risk of spoilage. Deloitte undertook the 2003 Bellmon Analysis both for the monetization program and also for the distribution program.

Jamaica: Provision of Agricultural Support Services **2002-2004**

- Managing services supply contract for the Ministry of Agriculture in Jamaica, including an analysis of competitiveness data assessment capabilities. This program is to enhance the competitiveness of Jamaican agriculture in domestic and global markets making a substantial contribution to the goal of increasing the incomes of agricultural producers. Deloitte Emerging Markets has signed an MOU with the Ministry of Agriculture to provide support services upon request in areas such as the development of a competitiveness assessment framework, specific agronomic services (e.g.: Papaya entomology), the implementation of standards (including HACCP and ISO standards), institutional and legislative reform, and veterinary and related services. Short-term inputs are provided in response to specific terms of reference.

Windward Islands **1998-2001**

- Team Leader of the St. Lucia based project, Restructuring the Banana Industry in the Windward Islands. Responsible for the daily management of this multi-year EU funded project to increase the capacity of the banana industry's institutional structures and strengthening fruit quality adherence and control systems.

Zambia **1994-1997**

Executive Director for the Zambia National Farmers' Union. Duties comprise the management of Union affairs at a national level, advocacy, formulation of Union policy, direction and management of Union staff, liaison/negotiation with government, and provision of assistance to the farming community on an ad hoc basis. Dr. Gray acted as Vice Chairman of the national Agricultural Sector steering committee, Secretary to the Agricultural Wages Negotiation Committee, Director of the Zambia Export Growers Association, Director of the Tobacco Association, Member of the National Coffee Board, Director of the Environmental Conservation Association, Sitting Member of the Lands Tribunal and Agricultural Representative to the President's Economic Advisory Committee. Represented the agricultural sector in making annual submissions to the National Budget, in taking part in trade negotiation missions to South Africa, Zimbabwe and other southern African countries, in discussions with the Zambia National Revenue Authority on taxation policy, and with the Ministry of Energy regarding electricity tariffs for the agricultural community, in submissions to the Government in general and the Ministry of Trade in particular regarding trade concessions, dumping and non-tariff barriers as experienced by exporters.

Under the direction of Dr. Gray, the ZNFU was specifically involved in the mobilization of small farmer resources, including the development of an improved agricultural marketing network, through the setting up of the first Zambian Agricultural Commodity Exchange (ACE), through the provision both in print and a biweekly radio program of local commodity price information and through the facilitation of domestic and export marketing contracts. Small farmer group membership schemes were introduced to allow greater access to the Union for small farmers and rural information posts were developed to serve as contact points for small farmers in remote rural areas. In conjunction with the World Bank, Dr. Gray initiated the Conservation Farming Unit within the Union (now active in Malawi and Zimbabwe) and in conjunction with the Soil Association (UK), he developed the local capacity to certify Organic Production Systems to the standards required by the Soil Association.

Zambia **1994**

- Worked in conjunction with Mano Consultancy Services to prepare a "Maize Chain Study" for the EU. This considered all aspects of maize production and marketing together with production aspects of wheat and soya. Prepared a World Bank Publiucation in conjunction with John Keyser and Dr. Guy Scott on the competitiveness of Zambian agriculture.

Zambia **1993**

- Set up GMT Agriservices to provide agronomic and project management services to the agricultural sector in Zambia. Projects to date include Consultant to Deloitte & Touche for wheat production at Gwembe Valley Development Company; wheat consultancy for a number of farms based around Lusaka; assessment and selection of farms for purchase by a foreign investor; formulation of investment proposal for a local farmers' co-operative.

Zambia **1991 - 1993**

- Worked with the Commercial Farmers Bureau (now Zambia National Farmers' Union) to negotiate the annual wheat pricing index with National Milling. This involved a number of meetings with the top management of National Milling over the course of each year as part of the ZNFU negotiation team.

Zambia **1992-1993**

- Took on the position of projects manager with particular responsibility for the assessment and sourcing of potential farm acquisitions. During this period, more than 10 farms were assessed in some detail, as a result of which became particularly involved in the design of a 400 ha low cost extension to the Chiawa project, and in the planning and design of expansion programs for both York and Kashima Farms. In all cases, this work involved detailed costings and cash flows together with basic risk analyses. In the case of the latter farms, it also involved the collection of extensive geological and hydrogeological information relating to the potential for underground water extraction on each farm.

Uzbekistan **1992**

- Investigation of management and policy constraints to profitable cotton production on the Hungry Steppe. The work involved a detailed assessment of water distribution policies, export marketing and controls and input supply policies insofar as these affected the private development of previously state-owned enterprises.

Zambia **1990 -1992**

- Assumed the role of operations manager for the Chiawa project described below, co-coordinating the purchase and supply of inputs (including consultancy) providing technical support to and overseeing the work of the on-farm manager, and developing budgets and cash flows for the farm as required by the financial manager. During this period, wheat yields increased from 2.7 - 4.8 tons per ha and cotton yields from 1.9 - 3.2 tons per ha. A marigold project was also initiated and brought to the level of commercial production over 350 ha.

Zambia **1989-1990**

- Employed as project manager on the Chiawa project, to plan, design, and oversee the construction of a further 800 ha of irrigated land growing cotton and wheat. This project was developed from virgin bush. Over and above the planning and design work, the position called for the management of bush clearing teams, the purchasing and laying of 26 km. Of pipe work and the installation of 13 center pivot irrigation systems. The project was successfully installed with a budget overrun of less than 10%.

Zambia **1988**

- Design of a pilot irrigation project covering 150 ha in the Zambezi Valley

Zambia **1987-1988**

- Assessment of cropping potential of various sites in the Zambezi Valley for the irrigated production of wheat and cotton.

Thailand **1988**

- Assessment of local cropping potential and design of a 600 ha arable unit to supply a 1500 cow diary farm in Northern Thailand.

Saudi Arabia **1984-1987**

- Operations Manager - was responsible for co-coordinating the purchase and supply of all inputs to, and the transport of, the produce from 10,000 ha of arable land divided into 11 farms in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Also provided technical support to the farm managers of these farms, together with those of another 9 dairy farms, carrying 14,000 milking cows. Support ranged from the preparation of budgets to the designing of dairy rations. Yields at this time averaged 7,000 liters per cow per lactation.
- Senior Farm Worker/Crop Foreman on a 350 ha arable unit (1985)
- General Farm Worker of the same unit (1984)

Selected Previous Relevant Assignments:
Zambia **1994**

- Appointed as Director of Midlands Growers Ltd., a farmer owned and controlled company set up to maximize producer prices and minimize costs. Work included the setting up of the company, formulation of objectives and policies and trading in soya. Management was supplied by GMT Agriservices.

U.S.A. **1988**

- Establishment of an export supply company to supply American goods to sister companies elsewhere.

U.S.A. **1988**

- Design and procurement of a 400 ha center pivot irrigation and sewage disposal system to supply fodder for two 1000 cow dairy units in Georgia, U.S.A. This system was only the second of its kind in the United States and has been working successfully for the last five years since installation.

U.K. **1982 - 1984**

- Farm Manager of a farm comprised of 400 acres of beef, sheep, and cereals. Productivity was increased by 25% over the period. Responsibilities included the preparation of budgets, purchasing of inputs, management of staff and day-to-day supervision and working of the farm.

LAURA KUHL

2561 Massachusetts Ave, Apt 3, Cambridge, MA 02140, (508) 308-1137, laura.kuhl@tufts.edu

EDUCATION

The Fletcher School, Tufts University **Medford, MA**
PhD Candidate, International Relations expected December 2015

- Pre-doctoral Fellow, Energy, Climate & Innovation Program, The Fletcher School (2013-2015)
- Fellow, National Science Foundation IGERT Water Diplomacy Program, Tufts University (2011-2013)
- Comprehensive exams: Intl Environment & Resource Policy; Development Economics (October 2012)
- Dissertation: "Innovation and Technology Transfer for Climate Change Adaptation in Agriculture"

Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy May 2011

- Fields of Study: International Environment & Resource Policy, Development Economics, Human Security
- Certificate: Water: Systems, Science and Society (WSSS)
- Thesis: "From Disaster Response to a Culture of Adaptation: Flooding & Climate Change in Honduras"

Middlebury College **Middlebury, VT**
Bachelor of Arts, magna cum laude 2003 - 2007

- Majors: Environmental Studies (Conservation Biology) and Sociology/Anthropology
- Thesis: "Losing a Stigmatized Commons: Identity & Community Solidarity for Clam Collectors in Ecuador"
- Study Abroad: School of International Training, Comparative Ecology & Conservation, Ecuador, Fall 2005

RESEARCH/PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

USAID Honduras -ACCESO **Honduras**
Dissertation Fieldwork Fall 2013 and Fall 2014

- Conducted 100 interviews with farmers who are clients in USAID's Feed the Future Initiative
- Conducted 90 interviews with key stakeholders in government, donors, NGOs, and academics on adaptation, innovation and technology adoption in the agricultural sector
- Participated in USAID Feed the Future Latin America and Caribbean Region workshop on Climate-Smart Agriculture and Best Practices and presented findings to USAID staff and partners
- Wrote a report for USAID documenting the process of technology adoption, barriers, and recommendations, including a focus on climate change adaptation

Environmental Resources Management Inc. **Houston, TX**
Consultant Summer 2014

- Synthesized technical case studies of adaptation planning in the urban water and sanitation sector in Managua, Nicaragua and La Ceiba, Honduras and identified lessons learned and policy recommendations
- Produced a Technical Note for the Inter-American Development Bank entitled: "Adaptation Planning for the Water and Sanitation Sector: Lessons and Insights from Experiences in Two Central American Cities"

USAID-Ethiopia- Feed the Future Initiative **Ethiopia**
Dissertation Fieldwork Spring 2014

- Conducted over 100 interviews with project partners, donors, government officials, NGOs and academics involved in USAID Feed the Future Initiative projects, as well as other key programs and initiatives in the agriculture and climate change sectors to identify approaches to adaptation, the process of technology selection, innovation and transfer, and barriers to adaptation in agriculture
- Focused specifically on the government's Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) and multiple pilot initiatives to mainstream climate adaptation into this program

Social Sciences Dept, Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science & Technology **Zurich, Switzerland**
Visiting Research Fellow Spring 2013

- Collaborated with researchers in the Innovation Research in Utilities Sector group
- Conducted comprehensive literature review on innovation systems for developing countries
- Assisted with "IST2013: 4th International Conference on Sustainability Transitions"

Center for International Environment and Resource Policy, The Fletcher School **Medford, MA**
Pre-doctoral Research Fellow 2011-present

- Supervised four undergraduate research assistants coding field interviews from Honduras and strategy documents from USAID and other donors. Mentored one student to develop a successfully-funded research proposal for fieldwork conducted with an NGO in Guatemala (2013-2015)
- Analyzed technology transfer in adaptation projects funded by the Global Environment Facility (2012)
- Conducted fieldwork for case studies: "Coping with Drought & Climate Change" in Ethiopia, "Integrated National Adaptation Plan" in Colombia, and "Adaptation to the Impact of Rapid Glacier Retreat in the Tropical Andes Project" in Peru. Conducted 56 interviews with key stakeholders including project staff, government officials, NGO partners, academic experts, community leaders, and project beneficiaries. (2012)
- Presented research findings to GEF staff in Washington, DC (August 2012)
- Assisted with review manuscript on The Energy Technology Innovation System (2011)

Coastal Flooding & Env. Justice: Strategies for Adapting to Climate Change (NOAA Grant) **Boston, MA**
Research Assistant 2009-2011

- Conducted interviews with government officials and residents regarding climate change adaptation, sea level rise, disaster preparedness, and planning (in English & Spanish)
- Participated in stakeholder meetings in environmental justice communities and presented evacuation plans
- Wrote report on evacuation as an adaptation strategy for environmental justice communities

Fundación Cuero y Salado (FUCSA) **La Ceiba, Honduras**
Research Fellow Summer 2010

- Conducted research on flooding and climate change adaptation in Honduras including over 100 interviews with government officials, international and local NGOS, and residents
- Guest lecture on Climate Change in Honduras, Agricultural Economics Department, UNAH
- Served as translator for the Director of FUCSA and US scientists to plan FUCSA's research program

Center for Outcomes Research and Evaluation, Maine Medical Center **Portland, ME**
Research Assistant 2007 - 2009

- Wrote, edited & designed websites to help patients make informed medical decisions on women's health
- Assisted with grant preparation, including a $15 million contract on the health and environment of children
- Developed and supervised a summer intern program for college students interested in clinical research.
- Managed recruitment, retention & data analysis for a randomized controlled trial (RCT) of female smokers
- Conducted analyses of medical evidence, prepared manuscripts and presented findings at scientific meetings

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Tufts University, Environmental Studies Department 2014 - 2015
Guest Lecturer and Thesis Advisor

- Facilitator, Negotiation simulation, Food for All summer session course
- Guest lecturer on climate change and development for Development in Latin America (interdisciplinary undergraduate course)
- Thesis Committee, Environmental Studies Honors Thesis, "Nourishing the "Men of Maize": Maize Protein Composition and Farmer Practices in the Q'eqchi' Maya Milpa"

The Fletcher School, Tufts University Fall 2011- Fall 2014
Guest Lecturer

- Guest lectured on climate change adaptation, technology transfer for adaptation, Global Environment Facility adaptation projects, and adaptation in Africa for various environmental courses

The Fletcher School, Tufts University Fall 2011- Spring 2012
Teaching Assistant, Elements of International Environment & Resource Policy, Sustainable Development Diplomacy, Climate Change and Clean Energy Policy

- Helped substantially revise syllabi, updated negotiation simulation materials and graded problem sets
- Coordinated course websites, including announcements to students and preparation of reading materials
- Introduced weekly reflection components and developed discussion questions based on the readings

- Helped facilitate visits for multiple high-level guest speakers, including the VP of Sustainable Development at the World Bank, the Special Envoy for Climate Change at the World Bank, and others
- Taught review sessions for students on Climate Science, Climate Economics, and Climate Policy

PEER-REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS

Moomaw W, Bhandary R, Kuhl L, Verkooijen P. The Principles of Sustainable Development Diplomacy. *Global Environmental Change.* Submitted.

Read, L and Kuhl L. 2015. Bringing the elephant into the room: Integrating risk into interdisciplinary water programs. *Journal of Contemporary Water Research and Education* 155: Accepted.

Kuhl L, Kirshen PH, Ruth M, Douglas E. 2014. Evacuation as a Climate Adaptation Strategy for Environmental Justice Communities. *Climatic Change*. Issue 3-4: 493-504.

Biagini B, Kuhl L, Gallagher KS, Ortiz C. 2014. Technology Transfer for Adaptation. *Nature Climate Change.* 4(9) 828-834.

Gallagher KS, Grubler A, Kuhl L, Nemet G, Wilson C. 2012. The Energy Technology Innovation System. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 37: 137-62.

Politi MC, Pieterse AH, Truant T, Borkhoff C, Jha V, Kuhl L, Nicolai J, Goss C. 2011. Interprofessional education about patient decision support in speciality care. *Journal of Interprofessional Care* 25(6): 1469-9567.

Kuhl L and Sheridan M. 2009. Stigmatized property, clams and community in coastal Ecuador. *Journal of Ecological Anthropology* 5(1): 17-38.

Kuhl LN, Ettinger B, Rosen CJ, Col NF. 2009. Questioning the accuracy of a recent review of osteoporosis medications. *Annals of Internal Medicine* 150: 423-424.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Kuhl L, Jiménez R, Vega A, Krallis G, Obregón, O. 2014. "Adaptation Planning for the Water and Sanitation Sector: Lessons and Insights from Experiences in Two Central American Cities" Inter-American Development Bank.

Kuhl L. 2014. Restorative Development: Cautious Optimism. *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*. Available at: http://www.fletcherforum.org/2014/02/17/kuhl/.

Karl HA, Scarlett L, Kirshen P, Dell R, Ibrahim H, Kuhl L, Mosher T, Navarro B, Rising M and Towery N. 2012. "Adapting to Changing Climate: Exploring the Role of the Neighborhood" in *Restoring Land- Coordinating Science, Politics and Action: Complexities of Climate and Governance.* Eds. Karl HA, Scarlett L, Vargas-Moreno JC and Flaxman M. Springer, The Netherlands.

Kuhl L and Tirrell A. 2011. Reflections on The Hague Conference on Agriculture, Food Security and Climate Change. *IDEAS Journal (International Development, Environment and Sustainability)* Issue 7.

PRESENTATIONS

"Adaptation, environmental justice and evacuation: a case study in East Boston" Invited Presentation, Boston Climathon 2015- Hacking Resiliency, Climate-KIC (Knowledge and Innovation Community), Boston, MA, June 2015

"Innovación, transferencia y adopción de tecnologías para adaptación en la agricultura: un análisis de USAID ACCESO en Honduras" Invited Presentation at the USAID Feed the Future Latin America and Caribbean Region workshop on Climate-Smart Agriculture and Best Practices, Gracias, Honduras, November 2014

"Technology Transfer for Adaptation: An analysis of the GEF Adaptation Funds." Presentation at the 12th IAS-STS (Institute for Advanced Studies on Science, Technology and Society) Annual Conference, Graz, Austria, May 2013.

"Technology Transfer and the Innovation System for Climate Change Adaptation." Invited Presentation, Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology (Eawag), Zurich, Switzerland, February 2013.

"You Can't Cook if There's Nothing to Cook: The Emerging Energy Access/Adaptation Nexus". Presentation at *Anticipating Climate Disruption: Sustaining Justice, Greening Peace,* Tufts University, October 2012.

"From Burden Bearing to Opportunity Sharing: Reframing Environmental Negotiations," Panel discussion at the *United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20),* Rio de Janiero, Brazil, June 2012.

"Drought Management & Agriculture in the ACF Basin: An analysis of management options under climate change." Poster at *The Glass Half Full: Valuing Water in the Twenty-first Century*, Tufts University, April 2012.

"Evacuation as an Adaptation Option in Environmental Justice Communities: Challenges and Best Practice Guidelines." Presentation at *The National Evacuation Conference*, New Orleans, LA, February 2012.

"From a culture of disaster response to a culture of adaptation: flooding in Honduras". Presentation at *Moynihan Post Disaster Recovery Conference*, Syracuse University, April 2011 & Poster at *Water in 2050: The Infrastructure to Get There: Interdisciplinary Water Conference,* Tufts University, Medford, MA April 2011.

"Institutional arrangements for resilience in the face of climate change: An analysis of disaster preparedness & response in La Ceiba, Honduras." Presentation at *Resilience 2011 Conference*, Phoenix, AZ March 2011.

"Challenges implementing decision support at point-of-care for young female smokers." Poster at the *5th International Shared Decision Making Conference*, Boston, June 2009.

"Smoking and drinking patterns and beliefs among young female smokers" Poster at the *5th International Shared Decision Making Conference*, Boston, MA, June 2009.

"A novel approach to tailoring physician-delivered smoking cessation messages to young women" Presentation at the *Society of General Internal Medicine Annual Meeting*, Pittsburgh, June 2008.

"Tailoring web-based interventions to young female smokers using audience segmentation." Poster at the *Society of General Internal Medicine Annual Meeting*, Pittsburgh, June 2008. (Presenting Author, Award-winning Poster)

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Nancy Anderson Prize, Best Environmental Studies Thesis, Tufts University (Undergraduate), Mentor 2015

ROGUE (Research Opportunities for Graduate and Undergraduate Exchange) Fellowship to support four undergraduate research assistants 2014-2015

Tufts Summer Scholars Fellowship (Undergraduate), Mentor 2014

Tufts Institute for the Environment Research Grant 2010, 2014

Fletcher Dean's Research Grant 2014

Fletcher PhD Dissertation Research Grant 2012, 2014

IGERT Water Diplomacy Research Grant on "Extreme Events, Risk and Decision-Making" 2014

Hitachi Center for Technology and International Relations Research Grant 2013

Water: Systems, Science, and Society Research Grant 2010

Fellowship for The Hague Conference on Agriculture, Food Security & Climate Change, The Netherlands 2010

Fellowship for The GLOBE Student Seminar: Developing International Regimes for Global Warming, France 2010

Fellowship for the Intl Program on the Mgmt of Sustainability & Sustainable Dev Diplomacy, The Netherlands 2010

Frank C. & Christel Nichols Scholarship, The Fletcher School, Tufts University 2009-2011

Fellowship for the Summer Institute for Informed Patient Choice, Dartmouth College 2008

Innovations in Practice Management Award, Society for General Internal Medicine 2008

Best International Thesis, Rohatyn Center for International Affairs, Middlebury College 2007

Academic Outreach Endowment Grant, Alliance for Civic Engagement, Middlebury College 2006

LEADERSHIP AND ACTIVITIES

The Fletcher School, Tufts University (2009-2014)

- Panel speaker on the process of publishing at PhD Colloquium (2014) and preparing for comprehensive exams (2013)
- Coordinated weekly Research Colloquium for PhD students to present research in progress and receive feedback from fellow students and faculty (2011-2012)
- Spoke on numerous panels for perspective, current students and alumnae, presenting the environmental work and opportunities at Fletcher (2010-2012)
- Organized an alumnae networking dinner in Rio de Janiero, Brazil in conjunction with the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) (2012)
- Coordinated a panel entitled **"**Beyond Rio: The Future of Sustainable Development" for the *Fletcher PhD Conference* that brought prominent environmental alumnae back to campus to share their insights (2012)
- Assisted Economics Department Chair prepare for a search for an environmental economist and served on the Student Advisory Committee, providing recommendations to the faculty search committee (2010-2011)

Water: Systems, Science and Society (WSSS), Tufts University (2009-2015)
- Met with potential applicants from across multiple disciplines to the NSF-funded Water Diplomacy program to promote the program and advise them on career/academic goals (2012-2014)
- Invited panel speaker on participatory engagement in water diplomacy (2013)
- Student representative to the Water Diplomacy Steering Committee (2011-2012)
- Co-chair, 2nd annual WSSS Symposium, *Water in 2050: The Infrastructure to Get There.* (2010-2011)
- Student representative to the advisory board of WSSS (2010-2011)
- Served as the WSSS representative to the Fletcher School (2009-2011)
- Panel Coordinator, Adaptation and Water, for the first annual WSSS symposium (2010)

Journal Reviewer (2011-2015)
- *Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Change* (2011-2014)
- *WIRES Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change* (2013-2014)
- *Urban Climate* (2014-2015)

Gulf of Maine Research Institute (2009)
- Volunteered with administrative tasks and welcomed visitors to the Center
- Assisted with research on lobster industry economics and landing prices in Maine

Friends of Casco Bay (2008-2009)
- Volunteered as a citizen water quality monitor, collecting water quality data monthly at two sites
- Assisted with data preparation for yearly submission to the EPA

Middlebury College (2003-2007)
- Conducted admissions interviews as part of the Alumnae Admissions Committee (2008-2014)
- Co-President of the Middlebury College Chapter of Habitat for Humanity (2006-2007)
- Co-Chair of the Logistics Committee of the Middlebury College Relay for Life (2005-2007)
- Layout Editor for student newspaper *The Campus* (2003-2007)

Resume

DEMESE CHANYALEW

Dr. Demese Chanyalew is a highly-regarded independent consultant based in Addis Ababa with over 25 years of research and consulting experience covering agriculture sub-sectors, and agriculture sector-wide analysis and policy. His clients include UNECA, USAID, World Bank, COMESA, EU, AfDB, international NGOs, UNDP and FAO. Dr. Chanyalew's analysis and reviews have shaped the Ethiopia CAADP program, and he remains a key resource person for REDFS and donors involved in agricultural development and food security in Ethiopia. Dr. Demese also has a long and eminent academic career, covering research, teaching, and university management and administration.

EDUCATION AND QUALIFICATIONS

- Doctor of Philosophy (Economics/Agricultural Economics), Kansas State University, 1990.
- Master of Science (Agricultural Economics), Oklahoma State University, 1986.
- Certificate, The Economic Institute, 1984.
- Bachelor of Science (Agricultural Economics), Addis Ababa University/Alemaya College of Agricultural Ethiopia, 1980.

ASSOCIATION OFFICES, PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

- Professional Competence Certificate of Consultants, Ethiopian Management Institute.
- Member of Synergos' Advisory Group on the Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA) from June 2012.
- Secretary, Professional Advisory Group, Higher Education Strategic Center, FDRE-MOE.
- Chairperson, Misrak-Gerji Community Association (*Edir*).
- Board Member and Policy Focal Person, Link ProVaMP Yegeberewoch Akim Ginbata Mahber (a Legally Registered Professional Association), 2004 to 2007.
- Chairman, Board of Directors, Organization for the Preservation of Ethiopian Environmental, Cultural and Historical Heritage (OPEECHH), a Legally Registered NGO, 2003 to 2005.
- Member, Ethiopia Association of Agricultural Professionals.
- Member, Agricultural Economics Society of Ethiopia.
- Member, Ethiopian Economic Association (2000-2009).
- Member, Crop Science Society of Ethiopia.
- Member, Link ProVaMP Yegeberewoch Akim Ginbata Mahber.
- Associate Member, Soil Science Society of Ethiopia.
- Member, American Agricultural Economics Association (1986-1990).
- Member, The Honor Society for Agriculture, Gamma Sigma Delta. Kansas State University (1986-1990).

CAREER HISTORY (summarized)

- General Manager and Founder of DeMar Ethio-Afric P.L.C.
- General Manager and Founder of Hibre-Berhan P.L.C., August 2001 to July 2011
- Secretary, Ethiopian Association of Agricultural Professionals (EAAP), April 2004 to July 2007
- General Manager and Founder of Lead-Wedeb, P.L.C., November 2003 to August 2005
- Academic Staff, Economics Department, United University College, October 2000 to October 2003
- Dean, Faculty of Business and Economics (FBE), Unity University College, August 2002 to December 2002

- Dean, Bole Campus Unity College, February 2002 to July 2002
- Member, the Academic Commission, Senate and Advisory Board of Unity University College, February 2002 to December 2002
- President, Agricultural Economics Society of Ethiopia, December 1999 to August 2002
- Part-time lecturer, graduate students supervisor at Alemaya University, Wondo Genet College of Forestry (per the request of the institutions), October 1998 to December 2004
- Head, Planning and Projects Department, and Researcher, Agricultural Economics and Policy Research, Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization (EARO), October 1998 to September 2000
- Member, The Agriculture Sub-Committee of the National Committee (and Chairman of the Sub-group which studied the Agreement on Agriculture), July 1999 to December 1999
- Established to study the ''Impact of the World Trade Organization Agreement on the Economic Policy, Sectoral Strategies and Regulations in Ethiopia.''
- Co-coordinators, Pre-implementation Consultant Groups for the Agricultural Research and Training Project of the Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization, September 1998 to March 1999
- Funded by the World Bank (IDA), IFAD, and the FDRE Government
- Senior Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics and Business Management, Egerton University, Kenya, December 1994 to March 1998
- Member of the Senate and its different sub-committees, Egerton University, Kenya, January 1995 to February 1997
- Dean, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS), Egerton University, Kenya, January 1995 to February 1997
- Member of the Joint Admission Board of Public Universities, Kenya, August 1995 to February 1997
- Head, Department of Agricultural Economics and Business Management, Egerton University, Kenya, January 1995 to December 1995
- Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics and Business Management (DAEBM), Egerton University, Kenya, January 1991 to November 1994
- Member of various committees of FASS and DAEBM, Egerton University, January 1992 to March 1998

CONSULTANCY ASSIGNMENTS (summarized)

- Consultant, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, FSSD Division, October 8 2012 to November 7 2012; to support the work on the non-recurrent publication on *"Rethinking African Agriculture and Rural Transformation in the Global Context".*
- Lead Trainer, Arba Minch University (AMU), Improving Capacity of AMU Leaders and Managers on Decision Making Related to Research Processes, March 11-23, 2012.
- Consultant, Together for a Better Future: Ethiopia's Food Security in a Resource Constrained World, Oxfam America, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, December 22, 2011 to February 15, 2012; to produce and make a paper presentation during the panel discussion.
- Team Leader, Annual Review Exercise of the "Ten Years Agriculture Sector Policy and Investment Framework of Ethiopia," Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Agriculture (in collaboration with its development partners through RED&FS SWG Secretariat), November 28 2011 to January 31, 2012; Team Leader for national and international consultants.
- Lead Trainer, AMU Senior Staff, November 24-December 3, 2011.
- Consultant, AUC/ECA/AfDB Consortium, July 2011 to January 2012; consultant to conduct a feasibility study for the establishment of an African fund for land policy.

- Consultant, John Mellor Associates, Inc., 801 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, PH-18, Washington, DC 20004, from September 5 2011; specifically, assisting the AGP-AMDE/USAID Project Enabling Environment Sub-Component.
- Lead Trainer, Jimma University (JU) Senior Staff, April 15 to 22, 2011; trainer on research projects preparation, review, evaluation and consultancy services vending.
- Consultant, Action-Aid International via Overseas Development Institute, Futures Agriculture Consortium, UK, March 2011; consultant to conduct desk study on "CAADP Country Review-Ethiopia."
- Consultant, WFP-Liberia 2011-2015 Country Strategy Formulation for *Social Safety Nets Inclusive Food Security and Nutrition* Component, Monrovia, Liberia, November 3 to December 15 2010.
- Team Leader, " Ten Years Policy and Investment Framework (PIF) Preparation for Ethiopia's Agriculture Sector," MoARD and REDFS SWG Joint Undertaking, December 2009 to August 2010; Team Leader of national and international staff. Follow up effort of CAADP Ethiopia Compact.
- Senior Consultant, Implementation of "Strengthening the Ethiopian Agriculture Extension System Project," December 2009 to September 2010. Funding: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
- Consultant, Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, UK, September 2009 to December, 2009.
- Local Consultant, "Global Food Security Response (GFSR)" Country Implementation Plan Preparation, USAID-Ethiopia, July 27 to September 18 2009.
- Team Leader, "Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) Ethiopia Study", NEPAD-AU Initiative, September 2008 to August 2009.
- Team Leader, "Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development-Mountains Region: The Case of Amhara and Tigray NRS," November 2008 to May 2009.
- Nutrition Expert, "Terminal Evaluation of the Nutrition Support Project (FOOD/2006/120350)," December 2008 to March 2009.
- Lead Trainer, Southern Agricultural Research Institute, March 2009.
- M&E Concept Note Writing and Trainer, UNDP Democratic Institutions Programme Implementing Partners, July 2008 and April 2009.
- Team Leader, "Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Land Tenure Administration," Ethiopian-Land Tenure and Administration Program (ELTAP) of MoARD, February 2008 to October 2008.
- Lead Trainer, MoARD Agricultural Extension Directorate, July 2008.
- Member of Consultant Team for Ethio-Agri-CEFT Plc., October-January 2007.
- Team Leader, "Assessment of Rural Land Valuation and Compensation Practices In Ethiopia," Ethiopian-Land Tenure and Administration Program (ELTAP) of MoARD, February 2008 to October 2008.
- Consultant, African Development Bank (AfDB), October 15th to December 8 2006.
- Trainer, Jimma University College of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine, June 26 to July 2, 2006.
- Lead Coordinator, Canadian Physicians for Aid & Relief (CPAR)-Ethiopia, January to March, 2006 .
- Team Leader, UNICEF-Ethiopia, December 2005 to April 2006; evaluation of BSF Supported Projects in Tigrai and Oromia Regions specifically in Tselemti, Samre, Bedeno, and Boke Woredas.
- Team Leader, UNDP Ethiopia, 2006; for the Review of CCF2 [2002 to 2006].
- Trainer, Awassa Chamber of Commerce on Taxation, November 18 to 25 2005.
- Trainer, Berhanna-Selam Printing Press, June 2005.

- Team Leader, Christian Aid, June 2005 to August 2005; Team Leader for Ethiopia study on "Livelihoods Insecurity and Vulnerability in Ethiopia: What NGOs Could Do."
- Team Leader, Christian Aid, June 2005 to August 2005; Team Leader for Ethiopia study on "Assessment and Analysis of Economic Injustice in Ethiopia."
- Member of Consultant Team, UNICEF, June 2005 to November 2005; member of consultancy coordinated by UNICEF to prepare Ethiopia's National Nutrition Strategy to undertake the "Assessment and Analysis of Food Security as an Underlying Determinant of Malnutrition in Ethiopia"
- Team Leader, FAO-AU, January 2005 to June 2005; Team Leader for FAO-AU Project, "Assistance for the Establishment of a Common Market for Basic Food Products"-TCP/RAF/3007(F).
- Member of the Consultant Team, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), Ethiopia; served as part of a consultant team for a Millennium Development Goals Macro Synthesis and Synergy project, coordinated under the Special Services Agreement with the UNDP and MoFED.
- Lead Consultant, UNDP and MoFED, Ethiopia, September 2004 to December 2004; Lead Consultant for the Rural Development Sector of the Millennium Development Goals' Needs Assessment Study in Ethiopia (*Focus on Agricultural Marketing and Access to Food Component of Food Security*) under the Special Services Agreement with the UNDP and MoFED.
- Team Leader and Agricultural Marketing Specialist, Wondo Genet College of Forestry, September 2004 to November 2004.
- Consultant, ACTS, Nairobi, Kenya; consultant for the "The Assessment of Competence Gaps in Linking Agricultural Production with Value-Adding and Marketing in Ethiopia and Kenya."
- Consultant, Agricultural Economist/Research Development Expert: "Evaluation and Assessment of the Agricultural Research and Training Project" of the Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization (EARO), Ethiopia, April 2004.
- Consultant, Addis Ababa University, December 2003.
- Resource Person, CRDA (Christian Relief and Development Association) workshop on "Fair Trade for Poverty Reduction and Development," November 26 2002.
- Team leader, Critical Analysis and Translation of The Government of The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, "Rural Development Policies, Strategies, and Instruments", June 2002 to July 2002.
- Consultant Economist, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, December 2001; consultant Economist and Agricultural Marketing Specialist for the "Analysis of Market and Socio-economics Situations Affecting In-Situ Biodiversity Conservation in Ethiopia."
- Agricultural Economist, MESH Management and Business Consultancy, Training and Research Center, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 2000.
- Consultant, Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization, December 1998; consultant to prepare the "Socioeconomic Research Strategy."
- Principal Investigator, Kenyan Pastoralists Forum (KPF – an NGO) Study of Pastoral Economy in Mandera and Kajiado Districts, Kenya.
- Team Member, Egerton University, Kenya Agricultural Research Institute and University of Maryland, Eastern Shore.
- Team Member and Workshop Coordinator, Vegetable Oils/Proteins Systems Kenya.
- Team Leader, United Nations Center for Regional Development (UNCRD), Africa Office: Research Project on Small Urban Centres, Project No. RES 571/93 Phase III; Team Leader of the study, "The role of Agriculture on the Small Urban Centers Economic Performance: A Case of Naivasha and Molo in Nakuru District, Kenya."

- Principal Investigator, "Computer Applications in Agricultural Economics and Business Management in Kenya," FAO.
- Resource Person, Oil Seed Development Workshop, Egerton University, Kenya, June 1996.
- Resource Person, Teaching Materials Embedding Workshop, Egerton University, Kenya, November 8 to 10 1993.
- Resource Person, "Optimum Crop Yield Management" Course, Agriculture Resource Center, Egerton University, Kenya, May 10 to 21 1993.

PUBLICATIONS

Journal publications

Demese Chanyalew, and Abenet Belete, "Statistical Analysis of Demand for Beef, Mutton/Goat, Pork and Chicken in Kenya: 1961-1991," Journal of AGREKON, Vol.36, No.1, March 1997.

Abenet Belete, B.K. Acquah and Demese Chanyalew. "The Export Trend of Fresh Fruits, Vegetables and Cut flowers in Kenya 1968 to 1991," Egerton Journal Vol.1. No.2. 1996.

Owour,J.O., Demese C. and E.Sambili, "Economic Analysis of Sugercane Growing and Household Food Insecurity in Mumias, Kenya," Journal of Eastern African Research and Development, Vol.26, 1996.

Demese Chanyalew, Allen M. Featherston, and Orlan H. Buler "Groundwater Allocation in irrigated Crop Production," Journal of Production Agriculture Vol.2, No. 1, January- March, 1989.

Demese Chanyalew, "Economic Transformation and Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa: A Review Article on John Markakis(ed) Conflicts and the Decline of Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa," Per the Request of the Editor of the Journal of Modern African Studies (Unpublished).

Demese Chanyalew and Mutai J.K., "Smallholder Milk Marketing Problems in Waldia Location, Kericho District Kenya," Unpublished paper, but was Submitted to the journal, Discovery and Innovation.

Allan L., I,K,Rop and Demese C., "Smallholder Tea Leaf Transportation in Kiambu District, Kenya," Paper Submitted to East Africa Agriculture and Forestry Journal.

Theses and dissertations

Demese Chanyalew, "Industry Structure in Rural America: The Effect of change in Industry Structure on job Loss in the Rural Counties of the North Central Region," unpublished PhD Dissertation, Kansas State University Manhattan, Kansas, 1990.

Selected papers and miscellaneous

Demese Chanyalew. Importance of Agriculture to the Growth of Ethiopian Economy. In the Proceedings of the Conference on Climate Risk Transfer Solutions for Sustainable Agriculture in Ethiopia. Commissioned by Oxfam America, Swiss Re, REST and WFP. July 19-20, 2011, UNECA Conference Center, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Abera Deressa, Wondirad Mandefro, Demese Chanyalew, Getinet Gebeyehu, Goshu Mekonen and Yadessa Dinssa. "The Recent Performance of Ethiopia's Agriculture Sector and the CAADP Framework" in the Proceeedings of the 12th Annual Conference of Agricultural Economics Society of Ethiopia (AESE), August 14-15, 2009, Ghion Hotel, Addis Ababa .

Demese Chanyalew, "A New Paradigm for Agricultural Water Development and Management: Analyzing Ethiopia's Position in Africa" in the Proceeedings of the 10th Annual Conference of Agricultural Economics Society of Ethiopia (AESE), May 2008.

Demese Chanyalew, "Transforming Ethiopian Agriculture and the Rural Sector: The Role of Agricultural Professionals and Professional Associations including Academia as Drivers of Change in Growth and Development of Agricultural Innovations." In: the Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Conference the Ethiopian Association of Agricultural Professionals (EAAP),

Addis Ababa, 23-24 November, 2007.
Demese Chanyalew, “Rural-Urban Linkage and the Role of Small Urban Centers in Enhancing Economic Development in Ethiopia,” Gete Zeleke, Peter Trutmann, Aster Denekew (eds.) in the Proceedings of a Planning Workshop on Thematic Research Area of the Global Mountain Program (GMP), August 2006.
Demese Chanyalew, “Millennium Development Goals Needs Assessment: Growth Centered Versus Pragmatic Approaches.” Paper Presented at the 3rd International Conference on Ethiopian Economy, at UN Conference Center, Addis Ababa, 2-4 June 2005.
Demese Chanyalew, “Agricultural Policy and Farm Price Support in Ethiopia.” Lead WeDeB, Printed by Commercial Printing Enterprise, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 2004.
Dereje Alemu and Demese Chanyalew, "The National Extension Intervention Program (NEIP) and Sustainable Agricultural Development: An Exploratory Assessment to Guide the Public-Private Debate," In the Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society of Ethiopia (AESE), August 2003.
Demese Chanyalew, "The Cessation of the Agricultural Economics First Degree program in Ethiopia: Policy and Professional Challenge," Paper Presented at the Panel Discussion of the 7th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society of Ethiopia, Africa Hall, Addis Ababa, August 2003.
Demese Chanyalew, “Globalization and Possible Implications of WTO’s agreement on Agriculture on Ethiopia’s SDPRP,” paper presented at CRDA’s workshop on “Fair Trade for Poverty Reduction and Development, Global Hotel, Addis Ababa, November 26, 2002.
Demese Chanyalew and Abeje Biru, “The Tertiary Education Policy and The Fate of Agricultural Economics First Degree Program in Ethiopia,” Paper Presented at the Ethiopian Chapter of OSSREA Third Annual Workshop April 26-27, 2002 Imperial Hotel, Addis Ababa.
Demese Chanyalew, “Colonialism in Absentia and Economic Development in Africa: Theory and Practice in Disarray.” In Tadesse Beyene (ed). The Proceedings of The First Multidisciplinary Conference of Unity College, July 5-7, 2002. Unity University College Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Demese Chanyalew, Presidential Welcome Address (A Quantified Facilitator For Ethiopia's Agricultural Policy Debate). Agricultural Economics Society of Ethiopa (AESE). 2003. Agricultural Policy n Ethiopia's Economic Development: Scopes, Issues and Prospects. Prceedings of the 6th Annual Conference of AESE, 30-31 August 2002, Addis Ababa.
Demese Chanyalew, "Improved Crop Varieties, Food Deficit, Seed and Land use in Ethiopia: Trend and Gap Analysis." Crop Science Society of Ethiopia (CSSE).2004. Sebil. Vol.10. Proceedings of the Tenth Conference, 19-21 June 2001, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Demese Chanyalew, "Trade Agreement on Agriculture, Domestic Support and future position of Ethiopia in the WTO” in the Proceedings of the 5th Annual Conference of Agricultural Economics Society of Ethiopia, 22-23 December 2000, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Demese Chanyalew, "Overview of Ethiopia's Agricultural Research System;" in Proceedings of the Workshop on ' Institutionalizing Gender Planning in Agricultural Technology Generation and Transfer Processes', EARO, Addis Ababa, 25-27 October 1999.
Demese Chanyalew, “Project Approach and Budgeting in EARO,” Working Paper, PPD EARO, January 1999.
Demese Chanyalew, “Agricultural Research Project Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation in EARO,” Paper Presented at Experience Exchange Workshop – ILRI and EARO, EARO Headquarters, Addis Ababa, 3-4 December, 1998.
Demese Chanyalew, “Agricultural Research and training Project: NARPPP and the Concept of Client Centered – Demand Driven Agricultural Research,” Paper Presented at EARO/ARTP Project Launch Workshop, EARO Headquarters, 19-22 October, 1998.

Mwakubo S.M and Demese C., "Economic Valuation of Parks in the Dynamics of Town Growth and Spoilage of Scenic Beauty: The case of Lake Nakuru National Park, Kenya." Paper Presented at the Regional Workshop on Economic Valuation of Marine and Coastal Resources and the Environment; Zanzibar, Tanzania, 6-9 December, 1997.

Demese Chanyalew, "Demand Driven Production to Consumption System Research and Domestic and International Networking." Paper Presented at the ASARECA CDs Meeting, Entebbe Uganda 20-23 May, 1997. (ASARECA = Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa).

Demese C., Isaac K.Rop and H.K.Maritim, "Vegetables Oils/Proteins Production to Consumption System Analysis in Kenya." In the Proceedings on Vegetables Oils/ Proteins System in Kenya: Production to Consumption and Policy Alternatives Workshop, Egerton, University, Njoro Kenya, 29-30th April, 1997.

Isaac K.Rop, H.K.Maritim and Demese C., "The Policy Environment of the Vegetable Oilseed Sub-sector in Kenya." In the Proceedings on Vegetables Oils/Proteins System in Kenya: Production to Consumption and Policy Alternatives Workshop, Egerton University, Njoro, Kenya 29-30th April, 1997.

Demese Chanyalew. "Philosophy, Methodology and Fear in Social Science Research and Publication," Staff Seminar Paper, Department of Agricultural Economics and Business Management Egerton University, September 1997.

Demese Chanyalew and J.O. Owuor "Implications of Cash Cropping to Household Food Security in Western Kenya," Symposium Proceedings, 14th international Symposium on Sustainable Farming System, Colombo, Sri-Lanka, 11-16 November, 1996.

Demese Chanyalew, "Economic Development Models and the Persistence of Under development in Africa: A Historical Perspective," Paper presented at OSSREA(K) Conference, Kitale, Kenya, July 1996.

Demese Chanyalew and Mohammed Suleiman S. "Kenya's Pastoral Economy and The Macro – Micro Linkage: The Case of Kajiado and Mandera Districts." Paper Presented at KPF (Kenyan Pastoralists Forum) Workshop, Nairobi, July 1996.

Demese Chanyalew. "Rural-Urban Linkages and The Role of Small Urban Centers in Economic Recovery and Regional Development: A case of Naivasha and Molo in Nakuru District, Kenya." In Proceedings of a Seminar on Rural-Urban Linkages and the Role of Small-urban Centers in Economic Recovery and Regional Development held in Nyeri, Kenya, 25-27 March 1996, UNCRD, Project No RES/571/93, Phase III.

Demese Chanyalew, "Economic Development and Entrepreneurship: Concept and Measurement," Occasional Paper, Presented at End of Academic Year Seminar, Department of Agricultural Economics and Business Management, Egerton University, Njoro, Kenya, May 25, 1995.

Demese Chanyalew, and Issac K. Rop, "Computer Applications in Agricultural Economics and Business Management-Manual," Egerton University, Njoro, Kenya, November 1994.

Member of the Team, which published "The Future Direction of Kansas Agriculture and Agribusiness: A Blueprint Study." Conducted by Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State University, for the Kansas State Board of Agriculture, 1988.

Annex G: Disclosure of Conflict of Interest

- Dr. George Gray
- Laura Kuhl
- Dr. Demese Chanyalew

Disclosure of Real or Potential Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluations

Instructions:

Evaluations of USAID projects will be undertaken so that they are not subject to the perception or reality of biased measurement or reporting due to conflict of interest.[1] *For external evaluations, all evaluation team members will provide a signed statement attesting to a lack of conflict of interest or describing an existing conflict of interest relative to the project being evaluated.*[2]

Evaluators of USAID projects have a responsibility to maintain independence so that opinions, conclusions, judgments, and recommendations will be impartial and will be viewed as impartial by third parties. Evaluators and evaluation team members are to disclose all relevant facts regarding real or potential conflicts of interest that could lead reasonable third parties with knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances to conclude that the evaluator or evaluation team member is not able to maintain independence and, thus, is not capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues associated with conducting and reporting the work. Operating Unit leadership, in close consultation with the Contracting Officer, will determine whether the real or potential conflict of interest is one that should disqualify an individual from the evaluation team or require recusal by that individual from evaluating certain aspects of the project(s).

In addition, if evaluation team members gain access to proprietary information of other companies in the process of conducting the evaluation, then they must agree with the other companies to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished. [3]

Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:

1. Immediate family or close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant/material though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.
3. Current or previous direct or significant/material though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.
4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.

---

[1] *USAID Evaluation Policy (p. 8); USAID Contract Information Bulletin 99-17; and Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Part 9.5, Organizational Conflicts of Interest, and Subpart 3.10, Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct.*
[2] *USAID Evaluation Policy (p. 11)*
[3] *FAR 9.505-4(b)*

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	George Gray
Title	Dr.
Organization	
Evaluation Position?	■ Team Leader ☐ Team member
Evaluation Award Number *(contract or other instrument)*	663-13-000006
USAID Project(s) Evaluated *(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)*	Feed the Future Ethiopia Program Mid-Term Performance Evaluation
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	○ Yes ● No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* 1. *Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 2. *Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* 3. *Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* 4. *Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 5. *Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 6. *Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	G. R. Gray
Date	24 July 2015

Disclosure of Real or Potential Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluations

Instructions:

Evaluations of USAID projects will be undertaken so that they are not subject to the perception or reality of biased measurement or reporting due to conflict of interest.[1] *For external evaluations, all evaluation team members will provide a signed statement attesting to a lack of conflict of interest or describing an existing conflict of interest relative to the project being evaluated.*[2]

Evaluators of USAID projects have a responsibility to maintain independence so that opinions, conclusions, judgments, and recommendations will be impartial and will be viewed as impartial by third parties. Evaluators and evaluation team members are to disclose all relevant facts regarding real or potential conflicts of interest that could lead reasonable third parties with knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances to conclude that the evaluator or evaluation team member is not able to maintain independence and, thus, is not capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues associated with conducting and reporting the work. Operating Unit leadership, in close consultation with the Contracting Officer, will determine whether the real or potential conflict of interest is one that should disqualify an individual from the evaluation team or require recusal by that individual from evaluating certain aspects of the project(s).

In addition, if evaluation team members gain access to proprietary information of other companies in the process of conducting the evaluation, then they must agree with the other companies to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished. [3]

Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:

1. Immediate family or close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant/material though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.
3. Current or previous direct or significant/material though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.
4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.

---

[1] *USAID Evaluation Policy (p. 8); USAID Contract Information Bulletin 99-17; and Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Part 9.5, Organizational Conflicts of Interest, and Subpart 3.10, Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct.*
[2] *USAID Evaluation Policy (p. 11)*
[3] *FAR 9.505-4(b)*

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Laura Kuhl
Title	PhD Candidate
Organization	The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Evaluation Position?	☐ Team Leader ■ Team member
Evaluation Award Number *(contract or other instrument)*	663-13-000006
USAID Project(s) Evaluated *(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)*	Feed the Future Ethiopia Program Mid-Term Performance Evaluation
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	☐ Yes ■ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* 1. *Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 2. *Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* 3. *Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* 4. *Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 5. *Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 6. *Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	Laura Kuhl
Date	7/28/15

U.S. Governmental Evaluator

CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Conflict of Interest Form	
Source Selection Name:	RFA Number:
Please review the list of prime contractors and their subcontractors who are offering proposals in response to the Request for Application for the source selection identified above with the Contracting Officer. After reviewing the list, check the appropriate boxes, fill in the information requested, and sign.	
☑ I certify that neither I nor my immediate family, to the best of my knowledge, possess any financial interest whatsoever in any company, parent or subsidiary, which is proposing on the acquisition identified above now being considered by the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) of which I am a member or advisor. Should any company in which I or my immediate family has a financial interest submit a proposal to my source selection team, I will reveal immediately such interest to the TEC Chairperson and Contracting Officer.	
or	
☐ I do possess a financial interest in a company that is proposing on or is in a way involved in the acquisition identified above now being considered by the TEC of which I am a member or advisor. (If you have checked this box, please provide a description of your financial interest on the reverse side of this form.)	
I further acknowledge my obligation to disclose any friendships; family or social relationships; past, present, or planned employment relationships, or any other type of relationship, such as housing or transportation arrangements which might be perceived as compromising my independent judgment in connection with the Source Selection. (Please, make any disclosures on the reverse of this form.)	
Name (print): Demese Chanyalew	
Organization: USAID/Ethiopia	Phone: 0911241925
Signature:	Date: 05/08/15