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EVALUATION OF THE J'AIME MON PAYS PROJECT IN COTE D'IVOIRE

Final Report

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ACRONYMS

AGR	Income generating activities
AJUA-S5	Association of United Youth of Abobo / Sector 5
APDL	Action for Peace and Local Development
APO	Political Agreements of Ouagadougou
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CDVR	Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
BDU	Space for Street Discussion
CFA F	Franc of the African Financial Community
FPI	Front Populaire Ivoirien
FRCI	Republican Forces of Ivory Coast
HACA	High Authority of the Audiovisual Communication
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JMP	J'aime Mon Pays
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
UNOCI	United Nations Operations in Cote d'Ivoire
PaD	Ready-to-Broadcast (Pre-packaged Shows)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
RDR	Republican Rally
RFI	Radio France International
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
TDR	Terms of Reference
UAO	University Alassane Ouattara
URPCI	The Union of Community (Proximity) Radios of the Ivory Coast
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The project, "J'aime Mon Pays" (JMP), implemented by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) with two-year funding from USAID, began in April 2012. Its objective was to promote peace and social cohesion by transforming the way conflicts are managed and helping communities move from confrontation to one of cooperation and respect for differences. To achieve these objectives, the project envisioned:

- That community leaders would increasingly participate in the process of national reconciliation by enhancing their capacity to manage conflicts.
- That the national dialogue on tolerance and unity would be reinforced through the mechanisms of community radio, participatory theatre and, mobile movies.

The objective of this evaluation as specified in the Scope of Work is to assess the degree of success of the mechanisms and programs undertaken in the J'aime Mon Pays project in helping to achieve peace and social cohesion at its conclusion as implemented by SFCG in ten localities in Côte d'Ivoire. The project was designed to employ a "societal approach" to transforming the conflict process and to promoting a "culture of non-violence," through the promotion of activities designed to further "dialogue, tolerance and reconciliation." The evaluation team concluded that this approach and these objectives involved social change but that two years would be too short a time to expect these higher level objectives to be fully realized. Nonetheless it could assess the project's contribution to achieving the results or intermediary outcomes that would move Ivorian society in the desired direction.

The evaluation focused on two components of the project: community level activity, and media activity.

The Community Level Activities

The community level activities of the JMP project sought to strengthen the capacity of community leaders to transform the character of conflicts and to participate in a national reconciliation process. Specifically, this component of the project set out to give these community leaders tools so that they could play a more constructive role in certain kinds of community conflicts. To achieve this, the community leaders would not only receive training, they would have to share their new knowledge with their communities and would have to participate in community solidarity events.

The evaluation of this component revealed that the quantitative goals of the project were largely accomplished. The evaluation found that the project established the following:

- The community leaders who were trained expressed the view that they did gain a greater understanding of approaches to managing conflict using more cooperative approaches. They stated that they had a better understanding of conflict and that they had acquired new techniques for resolving conflicts without the systematic resort to confrontation that protagonists had employed in the past. Nonetheless the evaluation found that at the level of the communities it was difficult to perceive the results from training the community leaders. Two factors seem to have explained this result:

- (1) The high dropout rate of leaders who were direct beneficiaries of the training, and;
- (2) The scarcity of resources needed to develop concrete actions that could have served as means to mobilizing the community as a whole.

These two limiting factors impeded the incorporation of the skills for promoting reconciliation and social peace in general, transmitted through the training.

In terms of women's participation in the peace and reconciliation process, the evaluation team noted that the participation of women was real but their level of participation remains low (both in terms of the number of women as well as the diversity of profiles of women selected).

In conducting its evaluation of progress toward the objectives of Component 1 the evaluation team noted two weaknesses in the project's methodology:

- SFCG did not clearly define the procedure for selecting community leaders. Clear procedures might have helped avoid the ad-hoc nature of the selection process that in turn contributed to the high drop-out rate; and
- SFCG did not provide a framework and a set of objective indicators that would be appropriate to measure how conflict was in reality being transformed and how social cohesion was being achieved. The evaluation found that from the project's very first concept note there was a gap in the objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs) at the outcome and the intended results levels. Given the stated objectives of the project these indicators should have at the minimum included measures of intermediary progress toward social cohesion and changes in the culture of conflict. This conceptual gap subsequently affected the project's entire monitoring and evaluation process. This in turn had three consequences:
 - Little attention was paid in the monitoring plan to measuring societal level change, particularly indicators of growing social cohesion and of a culture of non-violence. The project's indicators were essentially those

relative to the fulfillment of quantitative outcome measures of project success.

- Since SFCG limited its spectrum of interventions to feedback sessions that the trained leaders were to hold and community solidarity events. SFCG neglected to equip itself with indicators of the acquisition of new skills and tools capable of transforming conflicts and promoting reconciliation at the community level.
- The project's activities often did not take into account the specific and real sources of local conflicts, and only focused on their effects.

Overall, the project has had the desired effect on its direct targets as per the project's deliverables which consisted of training community leaders in conflict transformation. These leaders understand the core message of the training. The evaluation team concluded that community leaders who were trained by the project did acquire skills and knowledge relevant to transforming conflict and in this way the project did achieve a degree of success in one of its major objectives. SFCG therefore did deliver training and social communication outputs with an emphasis on the added value of the knowledge acquired by the direct beneficiaries. However, in terms of this resulting in greater social cohesion and the movement toward a "culture of non-violence" the results of the project's activities remain limited because there were not enough opportunities for the acquired knowledge to trickle down to the community level, an outcome implicitly expected by the project. The evaluation found that therefore impact of this strengthened capacity on the communities is not obvious.

This resulted because indicators to assess conflict transformation were not clear in the design of the project and this was the source of misunderstanding between USAID and SFCG.

The Media Component

Media Activities:

In this area, the project also achieved its quantitative goals. Typically, SFCG's intervention strategy involves radio, participatory theater and mobile cinema. This was the case for the JMP project. The systematic use of this approach has in past projects has been proven as a powerful communication channel to deal with the fears of the post-conflict period and can contribute to reconstructing the social fabric. In Cote d'Ivoire, SFCG developed a network of partners that gave it a comparative advantage in terms of its capacity to mobilize communication tools to address a variety of problems. Nonetheless, the SFCG's methodology for deploying the media does not seem to have been very innovative or adapted to the specific

post-conflict context of the Cote d'Ivoire. In terms of promoting social cohesion the team found that the SFCG needs to improve its intervention methodology in two regards:

- *Participatory theater*: According to SFCG, this is potentially a crucial tool for raising awareness of the need for social cohesion. But it still needs to improve its techniques for identifying the problems that should be addressed in participatory theater sessions. The evaluation team recommends that the methodological tools in the area of problem identification be better refined through the process of participatory theater in a way that gets at the real problems without raising cultural sensitivities. These methods designed to promote "peaceful cohabitation" seem to have reached the limits of their capacity to transform how people think. Activities to heighten awareness alone have proven to be insufficient over time to really impact on peoples' behavior and attitudes. According to the people interviewed achieving national reconciliation and social cohesion must be linked to how vital structural problems that people confront in their daily life are handled.
- *Mobilizing Support through Radio*: In terms of the radio program, the content of the training program as well as the quality of the trainers were highly appreciated. However, by project's end the impact of the radio activities in terms of peaceful cohabitation and the promoting of a national dialogue for tolerance and unity is hardly perceptible at the community level. SFCG's approach to using radio remains elitist and top-down. Although the pre-packaged shows and the round table discussions were relatively well received, they didn't create much enthusiasm nor did they produce the expected results in terms of triggering and spreading spontaneous discussions on tolerance and peaceful cohabitation. In order to disseminate its messages SFCG tried to work with local radio but still did not get sufficiently close to its potential listeners. Creating close relationships cannot be realized without a more democratic approach to the use of radio. In order to do this, it is necessary to bring radio down to the level of the people by broadcasting more in local languages. This would help increase ownership and interest of the local population in radio as a way of raising community awareness.

Recommendations for the Community Transformation Component

Given the evaluation's findings the evaluation team recommends the following to strengthen SFCG's community transformation process:

- Undertaking an improved stakeholder mapping exercise in the selected sites and the development of a procedures manual for selecting local community leaders. This mapping should be based on a methodology of "conflict stakeholder's analysis." Such a mapping will not only allow for a better

understanding of the real sources of local conflict but also for engaging some stakeholders with a less obvious but real capacity to impede solutions in the conflict resolution process.

- Using a participatory and inclusive approach for structuring the training so as to take into account, in addition to the new knowledge being taught, the expectations of the individuals being trained with regard to the need to incorporate the conceptual tools provided into the local cultural context.
- Provide more assistance to community initiated initiatives. Programs to improve local community participation and ownership of reconciliation and social cohesion should be supported by more post-training follow up and more support for community initiatives that address the real needs perceived by community members.

Recommendations for the Media Component

In terms of its media program the evaluation recommends the following to strengthen SFCG's media program in post-conflict Cote d'Ivoire:

- Develop radio programming that draws greater involvement of the communities by encouraging local people to be directly involved in the production of programming. The evaluation team recommends a mix of approaches to bringing radio closer to the people, i.e. a broadcast combining shows produced outside the studios with the pre-packaged shows that SFCG is already doing and the organization of round tables. In its work with local radio stations, SFCG should consider a mix composed of 60% pre-packaged shows and round tables and 40% of popular, soap-opera type shows dealing with the issues of peace and national reconciliation.
- Improve the impact of participatory theater by targeting the issues of concern to the communities while retaining its role of promoting greater inter-group understanding and acceptance. This involves refining the methodological tools for identifying the issues to be addressed through participatory theater and how to address them without offending cultural sensitivities

General Recommendations:

- Situate Peace and Reconciliation programming in a broader context.

To improve the culture and conduct of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire today a program of this type must be situated in a broader context, one which addresses the underlying sources of conflict, and which begins to address them as part of an overall strategy for reducing the mistrust and hatred still present in the memory of

violent conflicts that occurred only three years ago and that still lives in the collective imagination.

- Develop a strategy for linking training and a systemic communication policy to concrete measures that can promote more cooperation in various specific social environments. This will help media programs like participatory theatre and mobile cinema move beyond their current limitations.
- Work more closely with government in implementing the communication strategy and coordinate the communication vehicles more closely with governmental programs that address the needs expressed by the communities.
- Improve the sustainability of the project and improve its consistency with similar initiatives by coordinating and harmonizing the competencies and comparative advantages of the NGOs working in the same localities by developing platforms for cooperation between humanitarian NGOs in clusters, in order to attain objectives that are very often similar.
- Increase quantitatively and qualitatively the presence of women in the conflict resolution process
- Strengthen the CDVR process to go beyond the phase of hearing victims to deal more fully with dialogue by supporting the continued functioning of the local CDVR commissions even after the mandate of the national CDVRs expires.

THANKS

The evaluation team wants to thank all the people and institutions whose frank and open cooperation made possible the realization of this report. We especially thank the SFCG project team based in Abidjan and its field agents in Bouaké, Daloa, Duékoué et Abidjan. Their thoughtfulness allowed the consultants who needed to consult the documents and obtain meetings in the field to do so in a timely manner. It would also like to express our gratitude to the administrative authorities, community leaders, opinion leaders and to the Non-Governmental Organizations and project partners whom we visited in the various project localities. We also want to thank all of the communities in the field with which it was able to hold discussions.

INTRODUCTION

PROJECT BACKGROUND

“J’aime Mon Pays” was a two-year project funded by USAID through a Cooperative Agreement (IDA-624-A-11-00002) and implemented by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) with the goal of improving the ability of communities to manage local conflicts and to cohabitate peacefully. The project started in April, 2012 at a time when Cote d’Ivoire was starting to enter a phase of socio-political stabilization almost a year to the day after the arrest of the former President, Mr. Laurent Gbagbo, one of the major players of the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011. This crisis, which was related to the outcome of the presidential elections, was in reality the violent culmination of a long period of military and political instability, which began with the death in 1993 of the first Ivorian president, Mr. Felix Houphouet Boigny.

During the two decades that followed, the daily life of the Ivorian people was marked by a blind struggle for succession between political entrepreneurs creating political violence, military belligerence and tensions at the community level. This violence in political life has continued especially around the time of elections. After the presidential elections in 2000 in which Mr. Gbagbo came into power, the next elections to be held in October 2005 did not take place as scheduled due to a division of the country by an armed rebellion. This was followed by years of chaotic co-management of state power between Laurent Gbagbo and his political and military opposition, following the Kleber Accords (better known locally under the name of the Linas Marcoussis Accords).

In 2007, the political agreements of Ouagadougou (APO) brokered by Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaoré and supposed to mark the end of the crisis, led to the organization of transparent and credible elections which should have immediately been accepted by all. However, because of disagreements on the logistics of the organization of the ballot, it was only in October 2010, after six reports that the results were finally upheld. Following a relatively calm first round, the second round between Alassane Ouattara and Laurent Gbagbo resulted in a resumption of military hostilities and led Cote d’Ivoire in a new cycle of deadly violence.

A lack of agreement between the two candidates on the ballot results led the country down the path of a military confrontation which Mr. Laurent Gbagbo lost. However, despite his arrest on April 11, 2011 and the swearing-in of Mr. Ouattara in May of the same year, the tension was still noticeable several months later. At the time of the project’s inception, security of the population remained highly volatile because of the recurrence of the attacks of the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI) and serious human rights violations. The country experienced mass execution of civilians and growing tensions between communities identifying with one or the other of the

parties in conflict. Especially in the western part of the country, land-related tensions intensified the hostility between populations.

On July 13, 2011, the new Ivorian authorities that came into power with the elections expressed their willingness to lead the country on the path of reconciliation through the creation, by ordinance No. 2011-167 of a Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR). Despite the CDVR, the socio-political atmosphere in Côte d'Ivoire from the middle of 2011 to the end of 2012 remained very tense. The exile of many officials close to Laurent Gbagbo; the massive displacement of people from the West to refugee camps in Liberia and in the middle section of the country; the resurgence of tensions related to land ownership and to the chaotic occupation of State land with or without the authorization of native populations; and the fraudulent occupation of land belonging to the displaced persons have contributed to stalling the political dialogue. It is in this context that SFCG has envisioned "J'aime Mon Pays" (JMP) in order to help bring about a return to peace by encouraging national unity and promoting dialogue, tolerance and reconciliation.

PROJECT DESIGN

SFCG implemented "J'aime Mon Pays" in 10 sites in the country. The main criteria for site selection were the magnitude, as well as the risks and consequences of violence associated to the post-electoral crisis. The selected sites are as follows:

- In the western part of the country, the departments of Duékoué, Man, Toulepleu and Danane;
- In the Mid-west, Gagnoa and Daloa were perceived as "strongholds of the former president [Mr. Laurent Gbagbo] in which there is also a need to promote ... tolerance and cooperation between communities;"
- In the South-west, the department of San Pedro which was the site of violent land-related clashes between communities;
- In the District of Abidjan, the communes of Abobo and Yopougon were selected.

A total of eight (8) prefectures and two (2) communes were selected. The main rationale was to select sites of violence during the post-electoral crisis or sites, because of the characteristics of their population, had become crucibles for political leaders manipulating their inhabitants to intolerance and lack of community cooperation.

The general objective of the project is to promote peace and social cohesion by transforming the way conflicts are managed and helping communities switch from a paradigm of confrontation to one of cooperation and respect for differences. Specifically, the project proposed:

- To increase the participation of community leaders in the process of national reconciliation in the areas that were most affected by post-electoral violence;
- To strengthen the national dialogue around tolerance and unity in diversity at the public level.

The JMP project aimed at transferring capabilities to local actors by strengthening their ability to capacity to manage conflicts. It intended by the end of the project to implant in the respective local communities agents of social change. The objective underlying this approach was to help the communities to target and overcome their political and ethnic differences so that they could engage on the path to reconciliation and mutual acceptance. To achieve these objectives, SFCG proposed to utilize a *people-to-people* approach to help the targeted communities to overcome their differences and accept each other

To accomplish this SFCG favored the following activities:

- The implementation of community activities carried out locally thought to promote mutual coexistence in the communities in conflict.
- The training of radio personalities ("journalists") to facilitate the dialogue through the media; with the idea that these radio personalities can play a more positive role towards achieving and maintaining social cohesion.
- Raising public awareness against extremism and encouraging communities to get involved in the process of reconciliation.

PROJECT EVALUATION

PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The objective of this evaluation as specified in the Scope of Work is to assess the degree of success of the mechanisms and programs undertaken in the J'aime Mon Pays project in helping to achieve peace and social cohesion in the project's ten localities in Côte d'Ivoire. The project was designed to employ a "societal approach" to transforming the conflict process and to promoting a "cultural of non-violence," through the promotion of activities designed to further "dialogue, tolerance and reconciliation." The evaluation team concluded that this approach and these objectives involved social change but that two years would be too short a time to expect these higher level objectives to be fully realized. Nonetheless it could assess the project's contribution to achieving the results or intermediary outcomes that could be considered contributions to moving Ivoirian society in the desired direction.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

To conduct this evaluation, the team selected a qualitative approach in which the data gathered and analyzed came primarily from semi-structured individual and

group interviews, documented information sources provided by the project team or obtained from other sources, and direct on-site observations. This methodology excludes the use of opinion polls through questionnaires.

This evaluation is based on two basic hypotheses. They are related to the two specific objectives of the project and directed the data collection policy:

Hypothesis 1: The project will be as effective in promoting community cohesion as the direct beneficiaries of the training to the extent that they believed themselves to have acquired new skills and knowledge in the matter of conflict management. Skills and knowledge that, when reinvested in the communities, would give them the feeling that their leaders are now better at anticipating and managing conflicts as a result of having participated in the SFCG activities.

Hypothesis 2: In the zones targeted by the project, the debate on tolerance and unity will be all the greater, both quantitatively and qualitatively, if, firstly, the trained radio hosts have the operational capacity to handle said issues differently in round table discussions, and if the issues are discussed within the communities through street discussion forums, for example. Secondly, this discussion will be further strengthened if the populations that have attended the participatory theater and mobile cinema productions feel that the way in which they talk about the points of conflict has changed. The question is whether they are in a better state of mind about reconciliation due to the things they have seen and heard at the cinema or learned through the theater.

In order to test these hypotheses, the data collection policy weighed the opinions of the project team, obtained through interviews or in the documentation, against those of the trained targeted populations and the final recipients of the program, which are the communities at large. Therefore, three target groups were solicited: the SFCG project team; the direct beneficiaries of the program offering (community leaders and radio hosts who received the training, theater troupes and the mobile cinema service provider); and the indirect beneficiaries, which are the communities at large.

The Evaluation Team gathered information on a sample of five localities (See Annex C for description). The sampling principle was as follows: out of the list of 10 localities involved in the project, the SFCG staff was asked to state and explain, for each of the four project components (community, radio, participatory theater facet and mobile cinema facet) and for each locality, in which locations they felt that each of the aspects of their activities had experienced (a) clear success, (b) a moderate level of interest on the part of the targeted audience, or (c) a level of disinterest that could be deemed equivalent to a lack of success.. This exercise produced a list of five localities on the basis of contexts that are specific to them. These were Yopougon and Ababa, Duekoue, Daloa and, Bouake: A discussion of the localities and their specific characteristics is provided in Annex C. In each of these localities, each component of

the project's programs (community activities and media activities) was examined from various angles.

For the "capacity building " component of the project, the Evaluation Team based its work on the assumption that reaching objectives depends on three factors:1) the quality of the structure for choosing the community leaders; 2) the quality of the training provided to the community leaders, as well as 3) the conditions under which this training is given. This is why, in order to evaluate the outcomes of the project capacity building component, the Evaluation Team included a cursory evaluation of the quality process with respect to the identified objectives. Within this context, the following aspects were reviewed:

- The quality of the human resources dedicated to training and post-training monitoring of community leaders and their conflict resolution initiatives.
- The quality of the training received by the trainers, particularly through their ability to convey a message back to the targeted audience.
- Whether the selection criteria used to choose the targeted communities/localities and the community leaders who were to receive the training was the most appropriate.
- The effectiveness of the content of the media and educational materials to help reach the project objectives.
- The conditions under which the training sessions were given.
- Whether the scheduling of the training facilitated the selection/participation of the best candidates.
- The effects of the training on the program participants.

Following the same approach that was used to evaluate the media program, particularly as it impacted the community level. The following items were addressed:

- The effect of the media with respect to the objective of building dialogue on tolerance and unity in diversity.
- The service provider selection policy (radio, theater troupes, mobile cinema).
- The quality of the human resources devoted to the media component.
- The content of the media and the educational materials.
- Whether the scheduling of the event affected the participation for the event.
- The effectiveness of the themes and terms of the services in relation to the targeted audience.
- The effects of the training on the communicators.
- The effects on the communities in terms of social change resulting from the awareness campaigns disseminated via mobile cinema and theater.

- Prospects for peace-promoting communication.

Work in the field was based primarily on a qualitative approach that included the following data collection tools: individual interviews and focus group discussions (See data collection table in Annex). The interviews were conducted with the project team (SFCG agents), community leaders, service providers (local radio stations, mobile cinema and participatory theater troupes) and communities through various social categories such as youth organizations, the *grins*¹, women's organizations, high school students and university students, religious leaders and their followers, etc.), and the potential listeners of community radio stations. The choice of these various social categories is based on a mix of the rational choice technique (primary identification of the profile of the polled people, lists provided by SFCG), of the "snowball" technique, and of the random choice technique (interviews with students near their school). The "snowball" polling technique recruits sample subjects within the relevant population from recommendations from survey participants. The use of the latter technique is justified by the need to include indirect beneficiaries of the project. Beyond the project team, 78, 71, 102, 71 individuals, respectively, were interviewed in Bouaké, Daloa, Duékoué, and Abidjan (Abobo and Yopougon), either individually, or as part of a focus group.

Specifically, to evaluate the impact on the communities of local radio broadcasts, the Evaluation Team adopted for the option of identifying radio listeners by social category such as (i) students and particularly upper level students who traditionally listen to radio and participate in radio listening groups (ii) businessmen in market places who typically listen to radio all day long and whose culture typically involves radio listening and, (iii) "grins" (informal youth discussion groups), and religious communities who are social units that spontaneously discuss current issues linked to their daily life. Since the post-electoral crisis involved to a significant extent conflict between religious communities, particularly between Muslim and Christian communities, it seemed particularly important to include them in the survey of radio listeners.

The team organized focus groups with farmers residing in rural areas within five kilometers of the radio broadcasts. It sought to determine the impact of these broadcasts by; (i) determining which broadcasts supported by SFCG in various localities were most popular, (ii) determining how much time listeners devoted to listening to SFCG sponsored broadcasts in their daily routine, (iii) whether the listeners could pinpoint changes they noted in (i) tolerance (ii) the idea of unity in diversity, (iii) peaceful coexistence and, (iv) capacity to recall the words and questions discussed on these programs, and (v) listeners views of whether these broadcasts could reassure people and help them live together. The mobile movie and participatory theatre programs were evaluated in the same manner.

¹ Street discussion forums.

Also, upstream, the use of document analysis (documents from the “J’aime Mon Pays” project, activity reports) gave the evaluation team a clearer vision into what had been done by the SCFG over the two-year span of the project.

Direct on-site observations supplemented the formal data gathering methods. It was used to verify the existence of concrete initiatives to be attributed to the results of the JMP project. The data collection and analysis operation is based on the two key hypotheses designed by the evaluation team and presented as operational objectives that were used as a basis for the development of a survey matrix (see Annex B). The data was collected in the field through note-taking and recording methods, and later analyzed according to the objectives indicated in the matrices below for each component.

Data Collection Limitations

Time was the main limiting factor in conducting this evaluation. The two (2) days allotted to each site limited the number of participants when working in the field. . Work in the field was initially scheduled over a period of ten (10) days. Two (2) days were allotted to each of the localities visited (Bouaké, Daloa, Duékoué, Yopougon and Abobo). However, three additional days were taken in order to finish collecting supplemental information in Abidjan.

On the one hand, due to the small number of field agents (one per locality visited) and the geographical distance between the beneficiaries of the JMP project both in rural areas and in urban areas, identifying the people involved and scheduling appointments in advance of the evaluators’ arrival proved to be difficult. On the other hand, the people being interviewed sometimes had difficulty understanding the purpose of the mission. In a political context that is still fragile, with a lack of trust and varying degrees of services offered by NGOs, studies that address social cohesion and reconciliation seem to require more time in the field in order to further reassure the people being interviewed before they are willing to express themselves honestly. Allotting greater time for gathering data would have allowed evaluators to go well beyond certain public areas to better identify the more subtle driving forces behind the dynamics of the JMP project.

EVALUATION RESULTS

The results of the evaluation will be broken down according to the two main objectives identified by the “J’aime Mon Pays” project (Community Capacity Building and Media) and the specific activities implemented to attain them.

COMPONENT ONE: COMMUNITY CAPACITY BUILDING

Based on the idea that a conflict managed with a view to cooperation rather than confrontation can more effectively open the door to establishing connections and cooperation between communities, SFCG uses community activities to build the capacities of local leaders.

Therefore, the objective of the “community activities” facet of the “J’aime Mon Pays” project is increasing the participation of community leaders in promoting peace and social cohesion. To accomplish this, SFCG aims for the community leaders who are identified and then trained in the various targeted zones of the project to be well prepared with new knowledge, experience and inspiration to promote reconciliation and peacefully manage the conflicts in the communities to which they belong.

In order to reach this objective, SFCG followed a procedure structured around three major activities:

1. Organize training sessions on conflict transformation: These training sessions were to be held in each of the 10 targeted zones for the members of peace committees and community and opinion leaders. From SFCG’s point of view, by targeting this particular audience, offering this training should quantitatively and qualitatively increase the number of resource persons within the community who are capable of intervening to manage any local conflicts before they degenerate into violent situations that are more difficult to get under control. Each training session was scheduled to last two days and two training sessions were scheduled to be held in each zone: one for the members of the peace committees and another for the community and opinion leaders, including the local authorities. Each training session was to have 20 participants. The initial breakdown of these participants was as follows:
 - The peace committees for the prefecture and the local government: 20 in all, including two in each intervention zone.
 - The community leaders, including religious, political and economic leaders, community elders, young people and women who have a certain amount of influence in the community, totaling a maximum of 15 leaders in each zone.
 - Four local NGOs in each zone (or two youth organizations and two women’s organizations).

In terms of output, the project intended to generate a total of 20 training sessions with 200 peace committee members and 200 community leaders.

2. Discussion seminars on peace and conflict resolution organized cooperatively by the peace committees and the community leaders: In order to conduct this activity, SFCG planned to rely on these trained

community leaders and peace committees. Holding discussion seminars on peace and conflict resolution is presented as the framework for these participants to invite certain members of their communities to take part in the discussions on the conflicts or problems existing in their respective communities, as well as on issues such as legislative elections. The concept paper for the project mentions that the peace committees and community leaders would hold a monthly seminar over a period of ten months in each zone targeted by the project. On these occasions, other experts, such as members of the electoral committee, the police, judges and others were invited as needed.

In terms of output, it was anticipated that a total of 100 seminars would be held over the entire duration of the project.

3. Organizing solidarity events: At the end of the process, as part of this “community activities” facet of the project, SFCG worked toward mobilizing the peace committees, community leaders and local partner NGOs to organize solidarity activities in each zone targeted by the project. SFCG’s areas of focus were supposed to include collaborating with partner NGOs in organizing these activities. SFCG planned to support five solidarity activities in each of the ten targeted zones.

In terms of output, it was anticipated that 50 solidarity events would be held over the entire duration of the project.

PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTIVES

In the table below, SFCG summarizes the quantitative results obtained:

TABLE 1: Objective 1 Indicators of the “J’aime Mon Pays” Project

PROGRAM GOAL: Improving the way Ivoirians deal with conflict				
Indicator number	Output and performance indicators	Year 1 target	Year 1 achievement	Notes
0.0.1	% of conflict-affected survey respondents who note a reduction in tensions between 2 or more groups in conflict over the past 2 years because of SFCG's programming.	N/A		To be measured in the final evaluation

Objective One: <i>To increase community leaders' participation in the national reconciliation process in conflict-prone areas</i>				
1.0.1	% of training participants citing at least one concrete example of skills utilization in a local conflict following the conflict resolution trainings	75%	89%	Measured by 54 community leaders respondents
1.0.2	% of community leaders surveyed who feel more engaged in discussions of reconciliation in their community because of SFCG's programming	75%	100%	Measured during monitoring mission
IR 1.1: Leaders in targeted communities have reinforced conflict transformation skills				
1.1.1	% conflict resolution knowledge level increase of training participants	75%	76%	Measured in trainings for Yopougon, Bouaké, Daloa, and Gagnoa community leaders
1.1.2	Number (%) of training participants who successfully facilitate follow-on community workshops/dialogues.	N/A	N/A	To be measured at the end of the project, however of 163 trained leaders, there have been 74 follow-on workshops facilitated
1.1.3	Number of USG supported events, trainings, or activities designed to build support for peace or reconciliation among	18 conflict transformation trainings	9 conflict transformation trainings	

	key actors to the conflict			
1.1.4	Number of people trained in conflict mitigation/resolution skills with USG assistance	360 people trained in conflict transformation	163 trained	
IR 1.2: Conflicts in sensitive communities are effectively managed				
1.2.1	% of respondents who attribute improvements in the way they and others in their community manage conflict because of SFCG's activities.	N/A		To be measured at the end of the project
1.2.2	Number of USG-funded events, trainings, or activities designed to build support for peace or reconciliation on a mass scale	50 participatory theater sessions 80 mobile cinema screenings and discussions 22 solidarity events	51 participatory theater sessions	

With regard to community activities, on a quantitative level, the objectives of the “leader capacity building” element of the project were to a large extent reached:

- In each of the localities visited, the two-day training session for community leaders was held.
- At each of these sessions, at least 20 participants were trained.
- Report-back sessions were held.
- The five solidarity events planned per locality were held.

However, although SFCG fulfilled its mission with regard to the quantitative objectives, the Evaluation Team observed two gaps between the intent of the initial concept paper and its practical execution in the field:

- ***The non-involvement of the peace committees in the training structure:*** It was clear from the discussions with the field agents, the beneficiaries and the populations that, in the end, the peace committees were not actively involved in the process. The interviews conducted by the Evaluation Team revealed that the peace committees established in the localities targeted by the project were not stakeholders or participants in the training, even though some of the leaders who were identified to be trained were part of it on an individual basis. In place of the peace committees it was more commonly the local committees of the national Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR) who were chosen to receive training. The explanation given for this change of approach was that, the local peace committees suffered from a lack of legitimacy, multiplicity of organizations and inactivity on the part of these structures. They were established in an ad-hoc manner by certain NGOs to conduct their activities. In the end, SFCG preferred to foster a new structure instead: the local CDVR committees.
- ***The replacement of discussion seminars with report-back sessions:*** In place of the discussion seminars originally planned, SFCG opted instead for report-back sessions, with the idea of “replicating the training opportunity received in the community” rather than having the communities engage in a dialogue. The SFCG expected that the “reporting back” would broaden the range of direct beneficiaries of the training and monitor the trained leaders’ ability to transmit, and thus to apply the knowledge obtained.

The evaluation team concluded that these two gaps limited a bit the scope of the results of the project, but they did not fundamentally compromise the attainment of the project’s stated objectives at the community level.

- *These* gaps can be understood, in part, when the post-electoral socio-political context is taken into account, in which great social tension and an atmosphere of mistrust still persisted among the populations. In such a context, these adjustments were justified by an effort (a) to overcome difficulties in finding the members of the peace committees, firstly, and secondly, (b) to broaden the range of direct beneficiaries, and to do so in connection with one of the project objectives, which is to quantitatively increase the number of people who are likely to prevent and peaceably manage local conflicts.

It must be noted, however that the adjustments raise several questions about the extent that they might well have limited the results achieved.

- Did the replacement of the discussion seminars with report-back sessions represent a lost opportunity to broaden and deepen the dialogue process? Much more than simply reporting back, which, in

many cases, was done in limited circles (the leaders of community organizations reported back to their members about the essence of the training received, and not the tools or terms of its implementation), the discussion seminars, open to a broader community, could have provided a local forum for free expression and the constructive debate of opinions. The communities agree that there is a lack of real, constructive dialogue among them as an opportunity to assess the driving forces behind conflicts and to form a consensus on which challenges should be addressed, as well as how to go about doing so. While it is true that SFCG does not have the capacity to facilitate this type of dialogue, it could have partnered with other structures that work in this segment of peace consolidation to assist with the process. The benefit for the communities could have been much greater than a report-back session.

- Did the replacement of the Peace Committees with local CDVR committees represent a missed opportunity to reinforce a peace structure, the effectiveness of which concerns many donors? An increasing number of donors question the legitimacy and effectiveness of the peace committees as a peace structure. This project could have been a good way for SFCG to work on a local map of these structures and to identify a few of them (those that are working and those that are no longer operating) to work on their re-legitimization and improve their strengths. Thus, the real problem here was the fact that, in the complexity of existing peace structures, it was difficult to identify the most pertinent ones for pursuing the activity in question.

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COMMUNITY LEADER TRAINING: STRUCTURE AND SELECTION METHODOLOGY

Many community leaders chosen for the training were already in a position, due to their status, to mediate or manage conflicts. Moreover, the some ten years of the Ivorian crisis generated a massive influx of "peace offerers" who have all strived to build the capacities of these leaders. Consequently, there was a risk that the SFCG training offering would be perceived as nothing more than "just another training." Yet, by introducing the concept of "Conflict Transformation" as a foot in the door, it managed to give a new dimension to its capacity building offering. In addition, as pointed out by some of the beneficiaries, in such matters, "new knowledge couldn't hurt." It ends up being a sort of individual alchemy in which each training recipient must create, from everything he receives in training, a personal base of knowledge to

be called upon as the opportunity arises. Therefore, clearly, the structure of the training offered, which consists of one module on reconciliation and another on conflict management which is designed to meet certain objectives,² is relevant. From the point of view of the participants encountered, their opinions are highly positive.

While SFCG supported its choice for targeting the localities based on the effects and risks associated with the political violence occurring during the post-election crisis, its approach for targeting the beneficiaries (community leaders) was less clearly established.

As mentioned above, SFCG played more a supportive role in choosing the localities to host the project rather than actually selecting specific communities based on objective criteria. In fact, it was the personality of the leaders being trained that seemed to be the priority rather than the community to which they belonged. However, the fact remains that an effort was made to choose leaders from a variety of appropriate origins; they included chiefs of the main communities in the locality, and representatives of women's groups or youth groups. SFCG made a significant effort to include socio-demographic diversity from the targeted localities in the group of leaders trained.

With the selection of the leaders, the team of evaluators observed a significant loss rate of the trained individuals. By "loss" we mean the disaffection or lack of lasting engagement of the trained individuals in the survival of the spirit of the project, following receipt of the training. It was not uncommon, in the localities where the project was carried out, for the number of leaders who were active after the training not to reach the threshold of 50%. When questioning the method that governed the choice of leaders, the Evaluation Team noticed that, in comparing the project sites, each field agent had to improvise, since, from one locality to another, the approach for identifying participants was not the same. Some agents relied partially on the local authorities and partially on their partner NGO networks to "designate" leaders. It was thus reported to the Evaluation Team that a variety of criteria seemed to have supported the recruitment of leaders, such as participation in prior projects pursued by other structures, and the effort to extend activities to rural zones. As mentioned by one of the leaders in Bouaké, "Everyone had their own way of being recruited. Me, through my activities, through certain relationships, I had previously worked with the UNDP, with CARE International. I was recommended by those structures." (- N. N., Bouaké)

The consequences of this were that the basis of recruitment of leaders was based more on their status than on their engagement in local community issues/conflicts.

² These objective were: 1) Enabling participants to identify, analyze and understand the origins of conflicts in society; 2) Develop the ability to reconcile theories on peaceful conflict resolution with the realities of social, political and cultural life and their contextualization and; 3) Enable the participants to develop and popularize a new culture of peace in their respective environments and to promote non-violence.

On top of this, another unwanted effect with which all community-related projects were confronted was the double problem of a lack of volunteers and of representation. The community leaders hoped and intended to derive a financial benefit from their involvement, without ever expressing this openly. The same "leaders" appointed themselves as community brokers in several projects at once, in the hope of deriving some benefit from each one. The fact that they did not obtain the expected benefit ended up leading to their departure from the project, a decrease in their engagement in it, or a lack of initiative or even a wait-and-see attitude, once the hoped-for income from being recruited by an NGO was lessened or delayed.

The evaluation team concluded that the combination of these two factors – the lack of an established protocol for identifying leaders and the double problem of a lack of volunteers and representation – was at the root of the high loss rate of the leaders involved in the JMP project. On this basis, the Evaluation Team categorized the state of engagement on the part of the leaders into three groups: trained individuals who are engaged; trained individuals who are latent and; trained individuals who drop out. The latter two categories account for over 50% of the community leaders, regardless of locality.

Clearly, for the community component of the project, one of the limitations of the design of the JMP project remains its selection methodology. Specifically, the project lacked a procedural manual that could have been used as a reference for field agents to identify leaders based on a more realistic mapping of the stakeholders. This stakeholder mapping could have served as a basis for selecting individuals that met the criteria and helped with a more innovative selection of leaders.

On the other hand the content of the training modules in the SFCG project and the way they were taught received positive feedback from the participants. In the theory of training, for the learners, no training is ever too much. But in the particular case of the modules that were taught to them, the points on the definition of conflicts, the various types of conflict and the approaches and techniques for managing conflict were particularly well appreciated. For the leaders, in addition to broadening their understanding of conflict, this training gave them the opportunity to learn new methods of managing conflicts, particularly through an individualized approach and by listening to the parties to the conflict and analyzing objective and less visible sources, as well as practical methods of managing conflicts. In addition, another positive aspect recognized in the training was the didactic approach that put participants into situations and seminar discussions. Another positive point mentioned by participants with many demands on their time was the training duration (2 days) which they felt was more appropriate than some trainings offered by other organizations and projects.

COMMUNITY ACTIVITY SCHEDULING

As the project was structured, a series of “discussion seminars” was scheduled for after the training, followed by a specific number of solidarity events for each locality. The original ambition of SFCG in scheduling the seminars was to “share the SFCG conflict transformation approach with the greater population, to begin a process to facilitate dialogue and discussion among the various stakeholders in the community (ethnic, political and urban-rural divisions).” These seminars were to be held at the same time as the series of five solidarity events planned for each prefecture/district. SFCG believed that these joint events offered the advantage of “effectively engaging the communities” by giving them a forum for talking to one another and discussing the problems in their communities before the “party,” which is the solidarity event. The other advantage was to broaden the range of beneficiaries. However, it appears that over the course of the last year these seminars took on the form of report-back sessions. During these sessions, SFCG’s focal points were to support the trained community leaders in leading local sessions in order to share their new conflict transformation skills and to develop a platform for mobilizing the general population toward social cohesion.

In addition to what has already been stated above regarding this “change” to the project, the project scheduling seems to have presented a certain number of problems for the leaders, as well as for the field agents:

- The rigidity in the format of the project (five events) meant that there were no resources to assist with other community initiatives that could be marketed as improving community reconciliation.

Although presented as a “simple contribution” from SFCG, for many beneficiaries, the financial support provided by SFCG remains low. They criticize SFCG for not offering financial support that could have allowed them to extend the training through concrete initiatives intended for the communities. For the trained and still engaged leaders, they ask SFCG the question they considered central: what had it planned apart from the solidarity events, for activities post-training? The fact that leaders whose communities were not chosen to host this specific activity were not always included in it, further limited the involvement of communities even when these activities were held in their locality.

“There are no other activities for follow-up. We are left wanting more. We have the desire to go very far to reach our objectives. I am talking about the basics. The camps, the villages, les neighborhoods, etc. [...] We would like to be given the resources to take things much further. Because there is a real problem.”

“Social cohesion is a process that requires constant attention: Cohesion is like a fire. When you stop blowing on it, it goes out.”
- *N. N., Bouaké*

Finally, a number of leaders complained that apart from solidarity events no effort was made to foster the development of other initiatives that could support on-going cooperation among communities such as supporting local development and income generating activities that could evoke more general community interest.

GENDER PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMUNITY COMPONENT

The Evaluation Team noted a disproportion in the men-women parity in both the project staff on this component as well as community participation. Out of the six recruited field agents, only one was a woman. For some this called into question whether gender related issues were considered as part of the conflict training. However, regarding the composition of the leadership groups, it must be indicated that an effort was made by the field agents to involve as much as possible the main sociological components of the population, including women, in the group of direct beneficiaries of the training. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the original proposal to USAID for the project did not define the conditions and proportions for their selection. The lists of trained leaders seem to indicate varying rates of women's participation.

TABLE 2: Proportion of Women's Involvement

Town	Number of women	Total number of trained targets	Proportion of women in the total number
Community leaders			
Bouaké	7	20	35%
Daloa	3	20	15%
Duékoué	3	20	15%
Yopougon	2	18	11%
Abobo	2	21	9.5%
Total			17%
Radio hosts			
Duékoué	1	12	8%
Yopougon	3	14	21%
Abobo	3	9	33%
Daloa	4	24	16.6%
Total			19.6%

Source: Evaluation Mission, December 2013

These percentages vary from one targeted town of the project to another, from 9% to 35% for community leaders, and from 8% to 33% for radio hosts. In general, the average level of women's involvement in the training is 17% for community leaders (generally, they are presidents of inter/intra-ethnic solidarity or commercial associations, for example) and 19.6% for trained radio hosts. This corresponds to an overall women's involvement of approximately 20% of the direct targets. To conclude, one can therefore assert that the level of women's involvement is substantial, but still inadequate (in terms of not only the rate, but also the diversity of profiles of the selected women).

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION CAPABILITIES

The community component was intended to train local leaders in conflict transformation and to give them some autonomy to lead community discussion seminars (or community report-backs). SFCG's objective is not only to ensure that they possess the knowledge and tools, but that they have the ability to use this knowledge. SFCG's idea is therefore that the discussion seminars serve to put these tools to use within the context of the project. However, the switch to report-back sessions and the structure of the solidarity events seem to have significantly limited the scope of what is possible in terms of documenting and monitoring the effects and results of the project. In fact, it became apparent from the evaluation interviews that the effects of the project appear more clearly among its direct beneficiaries: improvement of their knowledge base that should positively impact their individual conflict management practices. Yet, this improved and strengthened knowledge did not appear to be translated to the community level where these effects remain somewhat intangible and difficult to isolate from the effects of the many other programs developed to promote social cohesion in all of the localities visited. When the community inhabitants were asked what had changed in the way in which the trained leaders engaged or did not engage in the promotion of social cohesion and reconciliation, they had difficulty in reporting a perception of real transformation occurring in the way in which conflicts are resolved by their leaders. The people themselves reported that they do not feel closer to one another as a result of the leaders' actions.

CAPACITY BUILDING: COMMUNITY LEADERS

From a strictly personal point of view, the leaders who received training feel that their knowledge base about conflicts grew and that their mastery of conflict resolution techniques was improved. For the most part, they report that the new knowledge

they acquired included a broader definition of conflict, a more refined typology of conflicts and techniques for approaching conflict transformation. This information can be considered what was gained from the training. Moreover, the training offer broadened the scope of their understanding of conflict:

"Before, we had a very limited concept of conflict. With this training, we now know that there can be all kinds of conflicts, because for us, we had only seen conflict through war." - P.K., Community Leader, Bouaké.

"Before, when people talked about conflict, I saw it as related to war. But the training taught me that I can be in conflict with myself. This showed me what conflict is. And this has even enabled us to manage a few things in the neighborhood." - J. V., Community Leader, Daloa.

"The training helped me to better understand and see the difference between a mediator and a facilitator. I had always confused them." - P. F., Community Leader, Yopougon.

The other benefit of the training lies in the new perceived ability regarding conflict management. According to one of the leaders:

"This training gave us a scientific approach to address conflicts, because any intervention must be preceded by an analysis of the conflict. We are now more sensitive to the stakeholders-- that is to say, all those who without being directly involved, fuel the conflict. We also know how to pay attention to the secondary parties: They can be managers, priests, opinion leaders, influential people who play on the conflict. As long as those people have not been identified in order to understand the interests they are pursuing, then you are going to fail in your mission." (- N. N., Bouaké).

To put it clearly, the conflict management technique suggested by SFCG seems to have offered the leaders a formal, more structured framework for handling conflicts. For some of the participants, it seems to have allowed for more effective interventions. Thus, for one of the leaders who received the training "in other words, to go beyond simply resolving the conflict, to transform it." Another stated that *"Now, when there is a conflict, unlike the others, I look for what is behind it. What is said, very often is not the subject of the conflict; and yet, the subject itself is hidden. So you have to be able to uncover that and see who has an interest in having the conflict persist." - B. G. L., Guitrozon*

To illustrate his statements, he gave an example of conflict resolution between a married couple. In the resolution process, he relied upon the lessons he learned in the training (See box).

“My older brother and his wife were having an argument. She was even saying that she was going to pack her bags and leave. But I knew what to do; I was trained. Because what she was claiming was that my brother was looking around for girls. But my older brother, it’s true that he looks, but these are not girlfriends; so she sees him being active a lot. But her approach was to put on makeup because my older brother will not allow her to do that kind of thing. So it was about makeup. She wants to put on makeup, she wants to look like a young girl. Now, when we try to resolve it, there is her mom, instead of telling her the truth, she’s down there saying, “My daughter is young and you want her to look that way.” So the training allowed me to make sense of all that, putting each person in their place and then telling the mom, “Look, this is what you should tell your daughter,” and telling the girl, “This is what you should do instead.” That allowed everyone to see where they stood and then everything went back to normal. But if I had not been through that training, I would not have been able to find what was underneath the matter: That in reality the mom was preparing her daughter and the daughter wanted to put on makeup, wear flashy clothes.” - B. G.L., Guitrozon

While this example demonstrates the perceived benefit of the training, it also shows a slight lack of understanding of what conflict transformation really is. Almost none of the leaders were able to give a definition that was close to the one that is the basis for SFCG’s philosophy for taking action. For example, according to one of the leaders, “Transforming a conflict consists of identifying all the individuals who have an interest in the conflict.” If, by extrapolation, that can be accepted, this understanding of conflict transformation nevertheless remains partial, and tends to be

confused with a simple conflict management approach, which is far removed from SFCG’s philosophy for taking action.

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION INDICATORS

One of the weaknesses of the SFCG program plan is that it is not equipped with the sufficient tools to evaluate the real impact of the training provided in terms of conflict transformation. Aside from self-perceived indicators of a broadened knowledge base and the feeling expressed by the trained leaders that new skills were acquired, no other set of objective indicators was established by SFCG that measured program participants’ performance in how well they implement the training received. In fact, SFCG’s monitoring and evaluation mechanism measures the performance of the NGO but struggles to capture the reality of the changes made at the individual level (direct beneficiaries) and the collective level (indirect beneficiaries of the project). Simply accounting for the activities conducted and measuring satisfaction, as well as listing isolated testimonials from the direct beneficiaries, are not enough to document the impact of the project with respect to the behavior at the societal level.

The conversion of this knowledge into tools for conflict transformation and their qualitative impact on the life of the communities should also have been documented. This is all the more true since, throughout the evaluation, the communities consulted

had difficulty perceiving changes in their leaders' approach to conflict management, or even, more generally, in their behavior. This is even more serious since in our interviews, many leaders had trouble isolating from the pile of concepts about the practice and understanding of conflict taught to them in the SFCG training sessions.

In addition, for a few of the leaders, the "top-down" approach used to recruit leaders to participate in the training program is sometimes a source of tension for them. In fact, the new concepts taught to them sometimes come into "conflict" with their realities and daily practices as traditional chiefs. Indeed, they have to promote concepts (children's rights, for example) in societies that are not always open to receiving them.

Indicators of changing behavior of leaders

As mentioned above, the expected behavioral change among the leaders is perceptible only at a strictly individual level and only based on self-perceived indicators of acquiring new techniques for how to approach conflicts. Beyond the new "scientific basis" given to them by SFCG to approach and judge disputes, the leaders do not seem to be demonstrating improved behavior and a new state of mind in the eyes of the members of their respective communities. Moreover, among the monitoring indicators established by SFCG (Table 3), there is no provision for assessing this dimension. As a result, we were unable to document any observable explicit behavioral change established and attributable to this Project. Although, certain trained leaders stated that they now had a greater tendency to come together³ to conduct joint activities or that there was sensitivity on the part of some to achieve greater inclusiveness in forming their associations and groups,⁴ at the community level this remained almost imperceptible.

TABLE 3: Community Activities Indicators

1.2.3	Number of people participating in USG-supported events, trainings, or activities designed to build mass support for peace and reconciliation.	5000 participants at theater performances 16000 participants at mobile screenings	10322 participants at theater performances
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³ In Bouaké, a few religious leaders came together to pursue joint initiatives.

⁴ A few leaders mentioned that the training made them more sensitive to the issue of representation of all segments of society in their associations. Thus, more and more, these leaders made it a point of honor to have women or young people in their associations and in their decision-making bodies.

		6600 participants at solidarity events	
1.2.4	Number of USG-supported facilitated events geared toward strengthening understanding among conflict-affected groups	48 at problem-solving workshops	74 at problem-solving workshops
1.2.5	Number of people attending facilitated events that are geared toward strengthening understanding among conflict-affected groups that were supported with USG assistance	1440 participants at problem-solving workshops	2520 participants at problem-solving workshops

Source: SFCG, **Launching societal post-conflict transformation in Côte d'Ivoire**, 4th Quarterly Report to USAID

CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE COMMUNITY PROGRAM COMPONENT

The purpose of this component was to endow community leaders with new skills for conflict transformation and to equip them to better manage conflicts in the targeted communities. To this end, in addition to training sessions, the trained community leaders had to report back to their communities and participate in solidarity events.

An evaluation of this project component revealed the following:

- The knowledge base on the topic of conflict and more cooperative approaches to conflict management seem, from the point of view of the community leaders who received the training, to have been strengthened. They state that they have a better understanding of conflict and have acquired new techniques for resolving disputes that does not systematically involve a confrontation between the protagonists, as has always been done in the past.
- Nevertheless, it is difficult to perceive the effects of the leadership capacity building effort at the community level for two reasons: (i) the high dropout rate among the beneficiaries observed after the training; (ii) the scarcity of resources that didn't allow them to develop concrete actions which could have been used as a vehicle for mobilizing the community. These two factors limited the

conversion of the knowledge acquired in the training into tools to promote reconciliation and social peace in general.

- The Evaluation Team observed two methodological weaknesses of the project. The first helps explain the high drop-out rate mentioned in the text above. From the outset of the project the SFCG did not clearly define the procedure for selecting leaders. Such a procedure would have provided some structure for the work of the field agents and could have avoided the ad hoc manner at the heart of their choices and of the dropout rate that ensued. The second methodological weakness stems from the fact that, from the outset, SFCG did not give itself a framework and objective tools for monitoring the actual outcome of the “conflict transformation” expected as a result of the training.
- The Evaluation Team noted that in the concept paper for the project, the matrix of monitoring indicators was already vague in the distinction between outputs of the project and the expected outcomes. The outcomes should have been focused on the social change obtained through the transformation of conflicts. This lack of conceptual clarity was then carried over to the monitoring methodology for the project. This resulted in two consequences:
 - Very little place was accorded to measures of social change in the design and organization of the self-evaluation and the indicators retained related primarily to the quantitatively measurable performance of the project.
 - The activities that were conducted often did not specifically address the real causes of local level conflict and seemed to focus only on the effects of the conflicts themselves.

Also, by limiting the range of initiatives to be monitored to simply “reporting back” and solidarity events, SFCG did not equip itself with monitoring instruments that could track how well the leaders converted their newly acquired into tools for transforming conflicts and promoting reconciliation at the community level.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE COMMUNITY ACTIVITY COMPONENT

Based on the foregoing, the evaluation team recommends that the following be incorporated into an extension of this project or future projects of this sort:

- Create a better mapping of the stakeholders in the localities targeted and the production of a procedural manual for identifying community leaders. This mapping must be based on the conflict stakeholders’ analysis methodology. A

map of the stakeholders based on such a methodological framework might make it possible, in addition to addressing the real driving forces behind local conflicts, to involve certain stakeholders in the local conflict transformation process who have an unsuspected capability to cause trouble (i.e. "spoilers") although this capability is not immediately apparent.

- Use a participatory and inclusive approach for structuring the offering of training offering so as to take into account, in addition to the new knowledge to be dispensed, the expectations of the people being trained in terms of the need to incorporate the conceptual tools provided into the local culture.
- Offer a better explanation in the training program of the specific characteristics of the "conflict transformation" suggested by SFCG.
- Reach an agreement with the donor on the qualitative indicators of social change to better monitor the results of the project at the intermediary and higher levels of its objectives.
- Share the competencies and comparative advantages of the NGOs working in the same localities by developing platforms for collaboration between the humanitarian NGOs in order to attain common objectives. In the course of conducting this evaluation the team tested this concept with other humanitarian NGOs and even with the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI). All of them accepted the idea as feasible, given the good reputation that SFCG enjoys in the eyes of these potential partners. The feasibility of this idea, however, still needs further thought. This idea of sharing particular skills could be particularly valuable in Western Côte d'Ivoire where number of initiatives flourish that have similar objectives with different ways of working with communities but where there is an absence of dialogue among the donors. In such contexts, SFCG, which is an experienced leader with a significant network of partners especially in the area of communications could help develop a mechanism and share its capabilities with NGOs that specialize more in basic socio-economic assistance for communities: development of programs for income-generating activities, water and purification programs, and even the implementation of community infrastructure programs. It is increasingly established in the literature that promoting social cohesion and re-forging social bonds after violent conflicts has little chance of succeeding if the protagonists are not at all mobilized around community socio-economic issues that actually offer opportunities for interaction and cooperation, while at the same time offering a social context for

rediscovering a shared humanity. This is moreover consistent with the SFCG philosophy, which is “unity in diversity.”

COMPONENT TWO- MEDIA ACTIVITIES

In the analysis of the socio-political crisis that shook Côte d’Ivoire, the media was blamed as being one of the vectors for exacerbating the political and inter-community violence. The JMP project intended to correct this situation by transforming the radio into a vector for peace. At the same time as it was working with radio stations this project also used mobile cinema and participatory theater as tools for raising awareness about building a peaceful “togetherness” as well as promoting the national discussion about the issues of tolerance and unity in diversity. The idea was eventually to promote the return of social cohesion and reconciliation among the communities by pursuing collaborative initiatives to accelerate the re-weaving of the social fabric.

For each tool chosen to promote tolerance, reconciliation and social cohesion, the project deployed a specific corresponding media approach.

RADIO

SFCG explains the choice of radio as a methodology to reduce conflict because it has tested the effectiveness of this tool in other post-conflict contexts and on other issues.

For five years, SFCG has been collaborating with a network of forty radio stations. The JMP project’s partner radio stations were chosen from among those stations that share the common characteristic of, firstly, meeting the requirements of the Haute Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle (HACA)⁵ and, secondly, of having among the largest audiences⁶ in the localities where they are established, according to a study conducted internally. In addition to the two criteria mentioned above, the radio station must be apolitical or, at least, not belong to a sponsor with a stated political affiliation. Upstream, the collaboration between SFCG and the *Union des radios de proximité de Côte d’Ivoire* (URPCI) [Union of Local Radio Stations of Côte d’Ivoire] helped to identify partner radio stations. Thus, in the ten geographical zones⁷ covered by the JMP project, the experience of a prior partnership with SFCG or other

⁵ This is the national authority responsible for monitoring the compliance of the operating principles of radio stations with the laws governing this business sector in Côte d’Ivoire after these stations obtained approval or a receipt of a submitted application for approval.

⁶ Also evaluated, among other things, according to the extent of the coverage zone.

⁷ Duékoué prefecture, Man prefecture, Toulepleu prefecture, Danané prefecture, Daloa prefecture, Gagnoa prefecture, San-Pedro prefecture, Bouaké prefecture, Abobo district, Yopougon district.

NGOs also supported the selection of certain stations such as the radio station “Phénix” in Bouaké, “La Voix du Guémon” in Duékoué and “Radio *Tchrato*” in Daloa.

Within each partner radio station, the choice of the direct beneficiaries of the training was internal. On-site training generally reached all stakeholders: radio hosts, technicians, and producers. However, for training outside of the radio station’s premises each community radio station was responsible for designating its own participants.

Once the conditions were met, an agreement was signed between the station and SFCG. According to the terms of the agreement, SFCG:

- Provides training in holding round table discussions (on-site) for one week;
- Strengthens capacities in terms of radio equipment (H4 recorders, headsets, computers);
- Provides financial support for the production of round tables (1 million CFA francs⁸).

In exchange, the partner station:

- Produces and broadcasts 20 round tables, after the radio host responsible for producing them is trained;
- Broadcasts shows proposed by SFCG: broadcast-ready shows and spots (short programs).

The round tables are structured primarily around topics related to reconciliation and social cohesion. At these round tables, community or political leaders with opposing viewpoints, religious leaders or any other resource person chosen at the host’s discretion are invited. The topics chosen for the production of round tables are based on the specific issues in each locality, but generally approach the central issue of nationwide reconciliation.

PARTICIPATORY THEATRE

This is also one of the key tools used by SFCG to promote social cohesion. In each locality, before scheduling an activity the troupe makes a visit to the field in order to identify factors contributing to the deterioration of social cohesion. The play is then partially set up to address one of the problems identified as such. The participatory aspect comes in when the troupe takes a planned break. This break gives the audience an opportunity to take part in acting out the play, on the one hand, by doing a critical analysis of the roles in the story, and on the other hand, by correcting

⁸ The financial assistance is disbursed in installments of 250,000 francs per quarter, and takes into account the station’s adherence to the round table production schedule.

the role of the actors whose behavior they disapprove of after taking the place of that actor in the play, to complete the story being acted out, while making the role more positive. At the end of the performance, discussions are started with the audience about the topic addressed by the play.

The villages and neighborhoods that will host the event are chosen by the field agent, taking into account, in his opinion, the cohesion problems that exist there. The sites where the shows are to be held are always, according to the field agents, "neutral public spaces," which is to say places that are not within the territory of a particular community. Prioritization and scheduling are a function of the urgency of the issue being addressed. SFCG takes care of the logistical aspects. During the entire selection and scheduling process, the field agent works closely with the theater troupe.

MOBILE CINEMA

According to SFCG, the objective pursued by choosing mobile cinema is to raise local awareness. More specifically, by taking the screening of films on topics geared toward the promotion of peace and moving them outside the theater setting, the aim is to promote a closer connection between the populations in the neighborhoods and villages around a fun activity. Within the context of the JMP project, mobile cinema was deployed according to two different methods: mass screenings and focus groups. Intended for the general public, mass screenings take place in a public square. The focus group is a screening that takes place in a room, for community leaders, and is followed by a discussion.

MEDIA MOBILIZATION STRATEGIES

Within the context of the evaluation for the media component of the project the Evaluation Team based its work on the following assumption: The project cannot attain its objectives to promote discussion on tolerance, reconciliation and unity in diversity unless the media mobilization strategy is based on a policy that is appropriate for the objective being pursued by the project. In addition, this mobilization strategy should be supported by a network of well-trained, competent partners whose messages meet the expectations of the local populations.

SELECTION OF SERVICE PROVIDERS: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

The JMP project, for the media facet, relied on various service providers, for the community radio stations and for the participatory theater productions and mobile cinema. The selection of these service providers was based on principles defined by SFCG.

Radio Stations

The Evaluation Team observed that the procedures and principles that SFCG had set forth for structuring the selection of radio stations and hosts who would receive the training were followed. The method of choosing the community radio stations and hosts was also described as being objective by those who received the training. Moreover, a quick survey among the populations in the localities also validated the choice of stations and hosts who, in each locality, were perceived as indeed being the most influential.

Theater Troupes

For all of the sites to which the evaluation pertained, the theater troupes for the JMP project were recruited through coopting. SFCG automatically re-hired the troupes from its *network of partner troupes* that it had trained for other projects and which have, with regard to participatory theater, a well-established methodology. By working this way, over the years, SFCG seems to be capitalizing on several years of investments in training these troupes, while at the same time developing a significant network and social marketing tools. This also offers the benefit of reducing the risk of improvised procedures that can limit the effectiveness of this communication tool.

In theory, the plays that are produced for the participatory theater activities are "custom made." In each locality, the topics addressed are identified after a survey of the community. But in reality, what passes for a survey is generally limited to the following question asked in the communities: "What are the problems in your village?" Most often, the responses given are so far from the expected answers and the subjects that the troupes are prepared to address, that they end up choosing to produce plays around the topics that are on their checklist and most importantly, in their contracts with SFCG. By leaving the initiative to each troupe without equipping them with an explicit, specific methodological framework for identifying the problems to be addressed and for handling controversial topics in certain cultural environments, SFCG loses control of the problem identification process. Leaving too much maneuvering room has sometimes led to a wide-ranging selection of topics that, while interesting, stray too far from the purpose of the project (for example, forced marriage in Tolakouadiokro and in Sokoura).

This lack of a minimal methodological structure can sometimes explain why, in places, the plays focus either on subjects for which the link to the promotion of social cohesion is not obvious, or on subjects on which the community maintains a veil of modesty (for example, forced marriage in Tolakouadiokro and in Sokoura, or even the topic of female circumcision, which was finally abandoned in Gbintou - Bouaké). Whenever such situations have arisen, SFCG has not supervised the choices made by the troupe in order to avoid a counterproductive effect related to the risk of turning the populations against them. And in some cases, the fact that they did not take into

account this social risk or that they improperly identified the key problems, caused negative reactions (Tolakouadikro). The participatory theater was instead perceived as an intrusion in the internal affairs of a community or even as outsiders taking liberties with problems that the communities were in no way open to discussing. Giving his opinion, for example, on the method of identifying topics, one youth association president said, "We had the impression that they had pre-determined topics." (K. M., Tolakouadiokro).

Mobile Cinema Production

The mobile cinema facet relied on the series *L'équipe* produced by Common Ground Productions, an internal unit of SFCG. In this series, various topics are addressed, such as land ownership conflicts, the identity of populations, at-risk children, HIV/AIDS, prostitution, religious intolerance, favoritism, poverty, etc. Mobile cinema screenings in the field were entrusted to the NGO *Action pour la Paix et le Développement Local* (ADPL) [Action for Peace and Local Development], which was selected through a call for proposals. Once again, as was the case for participatory theater, the service provider's close relationship with SFCG was a point in its favor, since the manager of ADPL was once, himself, a field agent for SFCG and in that capacity received training on the expectations for mobile cinema. For cinematic production as a social marketing medium, we are still in the process of consolidating a network of partner service providers around SFCG, which seems, over time, to be a positive approach.

PARTNERSHIP AND OPERATING METHODS

Radio

Within the context of the JMP project, the collaboration between SFCG and local radio stations is based on two contract types: a standard annual agreement to broadcast radio spots produced by SFCG and another for the production of round table discussions on the issue of reconciliation and social cohesion.

An effort to make adaptations for the specific ethnic and linguistic characteristics of the localities was observed. In addition to the use of the working language, which is French, to communicate the messages more effectively to the populations, the communication approach taken by the community radio stations was based on about ten local languages (Baoulé, Bété, Malinké, Senoufo, Yacouba, Guéré, Yoruba, Moré, Wobè and Peulh). In contexts characterized by social heterogeneity, such an approach offered the advantage of taking social diversity into account.

However, aside from these advantages, the Evaluation Team observed that, out of the seven (7) local radio stations sampled for the evaluation, SFCG's communication methodology, within the context of the agreement with the radio stations, is essentially bottom-up. It is probably safe to say that this observation can be broadened to include other radio stations. The round tables that operate based on inviting "local elites"⁹ and broadcast-ready programs are just enjoyed by the communities without causing them to really recognize themselves in the shows. Through the proposed radio media, an effort has been made to connect with the communities. However, the shows proposed through the JMP program are in no way perceived as local shows by the communities. However, several broadcasts, such as the "Wô rô Wô rô Tour," which are broadcast-ready programs, are very well-liked for their comedic nature. The round tables that feature local personalities expressing themselves from the studio are perceived as "elitist" because they in no way promote actual participation in the discussion by ordinary local citizens. Awareness-raising shows involving the general public are almost non-existent. The consequence of this strategy, which more closely resembles an information policy than a communication policy, is that there remains a low level of ownership.

Participatory Theater

In the execution of the participatory theater program, frequent cash flow difficulties sometimes led to improvisation, delays and disruptions in keeping up with the schedules.

Although the participatory theater methodology seems to be well established, the methodological limitation pointed out above limits its scope. In addition to this methodological weakness, there is difficulty in mobilizing the protagonists in the same place in order for them to share the messages being conveyed around

"Nothing is clear yet about this reconciliation we're talking about. Nor is anything clear about cohesion. Those who come to perform their plays, who come to raise awareness, they do their job well. Only, I cannot lie, they do it well, they show that well, in theory, but in practice it doesn't work. For me, I would like to ask you to tell them to take their mission further, because there are large camps. Go there, talk. And if you will permit me to say so, go to the government, too, tell them to decrease the soldiers. There are too many of them!" - **Z.O.M., Guitrozon**

a controversial topic. To put it clearly, the effort to choose a so-called "neutral space" to perform the play seems to take precedence over the necessary thinking about the best strategy for mobilizing the protagonist communities around the event when it addresses a matter of conflict. The result is that the plays, in which the messages are supposed to address various protagonists, are most of the time performed only for the party that is close to the chosen site, while the other, absent party is unaware of its existence and therefore its advantages. Plays pertaining, for example, to land

⁹ For the round tables, for example, the general tendency is to invite community leaders, religious leaders, leaders of opposing political parties, stakeholders from civil society, etc. to participate in the discussions.

ownership conflicts between sedentary farmers versus pastoralists or between indigenous people and those who are not originally from that place are generally performed in the presence only of the farmers and native people to the community. The pastoralists and people non-native to the community generally live outside of the villages where the troupe performs and do not in fact benefit from these shows and the messages they promote.

Consequently, the messages conveyed through the participatory theater, like those promoted through the mobile cinema, do not reach the middle class or even the lower-middle class of the localities in which the project is deployed. The little mobilization reported through the very low participation rates observed in the “residential” neighborhoods of these localities is a testament to this. This also led SFCG to orient its activities much more toward the working-class neighborhoods and the villages where these events respond to a lack of entertaining activities.

As for the topics addressed by the theater, the Evaluation Team observed that there is a feeling of weariness among the communities targeted by the awareness campaigns regarding reconciliation. The communities feel that they are already aware of it, except that the true problems with which they are faced every day are not taken into account. Most of the time, these include a lack of security, unemployment among the youth and the high cost of living, which are issues SFCG, through its participatory plays, is not able to address. Responses that pertain more to public policies do not fall within the scope of authority of NGOs such as SFCG. The Evaluation Team concludes that through tools such as participatory theater, beyond a certain threshold, SFCG no longer has the resources to address the causes of the problems in question. It only addresses their effects. Thus, beyond what the communities call “viewing pleasure,” or in other words, special events, what is intended to be fun becomes off-putting and remains ineffective with regard to communication.

Mobile Cinema

In the practical implementation of mobile cinema, the programming is determined by the service provider. The choice of localities for the program is made in agreement with the field agent, based on the problems encountered there. The episodes shown are chosen depending on the situation that exists there at the time the activity is held. Information about the mobile cinema sessions is publicized through several channels: community leaders, local media, letters to the authorities, posters and banners. SFCG is responsible for the logistical aspects.

Just like for participatory theater, leaders criticize the fact that the cinema-based awareness campaign does not always reach all the real stakeholders in the conflicts and related human security actors, such as politicians and armed groups.

Although it appears to be an important local tool, the mobile cinema is not very flexible and offers less opportunity for adapting to the issues faced in the local contexts, due to its standard nature. Like its content, the language used remains another limiting factor that makes it difficult to adapt to the multiple and diverse contexts and audiences targeted.

QUANTITATIVE OBJECTIVES: MEDIA COMPONENT

Radio

Out of the four sites sampled for the evaluation, the proportion of the JMP project's quantitative objectives that were met is satisfactory.

TABLE 4: Round Table Completion Rate by Radio Station

Partner station	Locality	Expected number of RTs	Number of RTs held
Radio Phénix	Bouaké	20	18
Radio Nobel FM	Djébonoua (Bouaké)	20	20
Radio Tchrato	Daloa	20	20
Daloa FM	Daloa	20	20
La Voix du Guémon	Duékoué	20	20
Radio Amitié	Yopougon (Abidjan)	20	20
Radio Arc en Ciel	Abobo (Abidjan)	20	20

Source: Survey by the Evaluation Team, December 2013

Among the participating radio stations, aside from Radio Phénix in Bouaké, which had a score of eighteen round tables out of twenty (18/20), all of the other stations managed to attain the score of twenty round tables, as requested by SFCG. The result is that a grand total of 98% of the quantitative objectives of the project for the use of radio were met.

Fulfillment of Participatory Theatre and Mobile Cinema Targets

The quantitative objectives set for participatory theater and cinema were also reached. The 200 mobile cinema sessions and 100 participatory theater productions scheduled were indeed held. According to the statistical data produced by SFCG, the count was 42,565 participants instead of 24,000, which is 18,565 more people than expected. As for the participatory theater, it nearly tripled the expected number of audience members that it planned for. Again according to SFCG's statistics, there were 27,786 participants, which is 17,786 more people than the expected 10,000.

IMPACT OF THE MEDIA ACTIVITIES

IMPACT OF RADIO PROGRAM

Impact of Training Radio Journalists on Local Media Capability

The result of the training provided to the radio hosts was summarily evaluated through their own perception of this training, and through the influence that it had on the way they address the information.

Self-perceived indicators of improved capacities of the local media

Overall, it is apparent in the testimonies gathered from nearly all of the trained radio hosts we encountered during the evaluation, that the training received was very well liked. The Evaluation Team attempted to assess the participants' perception both of the helpfulness and the quality of the training. The ratings given by the participants, all partner radio stations combined, was on average approximately four (4) out of five (5) on a rating scale of zero (0) to five (5).

They unanimously acknowledge; (i) the unexpected influence of the training on their perception of conflicts, (ii) an improvement in their ability to conduct discussions, particularly on the issue of nationwide reconciliation, and (iii) an improved mastery of radio broadcasting data processing, as compared to their colleagues at public radio stations.

The financial support (1 million CFA francs) and equipment (headsets, computers, H4 recorders) from SFCG was also well appreciated by the community radio stations. It was even more greatly appreciated by stations such as *La Voix du Guémon* (Duékoué) and *Arc-en-Ciel* (Abobo), whose equipment had been looted during the post-election crisis. However, the radio stations believed that this level of support was insufficient in light of the significance and scope of the radio's mission to repair the social fabric in a post-crisis context, and in light of the precarious conditions in which most of the local radio hosts are working.

Indicators of Improved Performance

One of the great successes of the JMP project's media activity is the training given to the radio hosts.

The hosts who received the training feel that they improved their ability to listen, their ability to remain impartial in a debate between several parties, and even their ability to reconcile opposing viewpoints during heated discussions. In the eyes of the beneficiaries, they gained important skills, especially in light of the volatility of the

political situation and the persistent resentment and mistrust within the social structure with which they are communicating from their studios.

Changes perceived by listeners of Radio Broadcasts

Despite what the radio hosts say that they took away from the training they received, the effects of this acquired knowledge the feelings and perceptions of radio listeners don't reflect changes in their communication strategies. This observation was revealed through a number of individual and group interviews conducted by the Evaluation Team at the marketplaces among merchants, *grins*, high school students and university students, youth organizations, farmers and taxi drivers selected on the basis of the method indicated above. Among all the individuals surveyed, none of the people surveyed were able to clearly express changes that occurred as a result of the shows broadcast on the radio. One possible

“Before, we did the shows like that. But with the training we received, in any case, I learned a lot [...] Especially about listening, even when you do not necessarily agree with the person you're talking to. I also learned to be impartial. All of that, we didn't do that before! Search also taught us to promote a common interest. I remember one time I invited a leader from the RDR and one from the FPI to a debate. In the beginning, it was heated! Very heated, even. But in the end, the two found a common interest. Despite their opposing viewpoints, they realized that their common interest was the country, Côte d'Ivoire...” - **K. C., Radio Phénix in Bouaké**

“I remember the chief of the village of Carrefour who had a phobia of *dozos*. Because after the crisis, they were seen as mercenaries, people who killed. He didn't even want to be anywhere near them. One day, I went to see the *dozos* to ask them if they would agree to come on the radio to say who they really were. Because people think that they are the ones doing evil. They said it was no problem. And I told them to come in customary *dozo* attire that day. And I went to see the chief of the village to ask him if he would come on the radio to talk about the *dozos*. He said it was no problem. In addition to them, I brought together a few community leaders and a few people from civil society. But when the *dozos* entered the studio, the chief stood up. He wanted to leave. But I said to him, “Papa, you're the chief. If you leave, that means that you are not setting an example for others! They came so that you could talk to one another.” And I gave each person their turn to speak. And I'm telling you, toward the end, the chief's wall of fear and mistrust regarding the *dozos* was broken. They shook hands. The chief even invited the *dozos* to his home for a drink (...)” - **E. M., Radio La Voix du Guémon**

explanation is that more listeners listen to variety shows than to those that address the topics of reconciliation, social cohesion and peace.

Moreover, the Evaluation Team also observed that, aside from certain professions such as taxi drivers, the other social categories listen to local radio stations relatively little. In Bouaké, Daloa, Duékoué, and Abidjan, respectively only 20/62, 27/68, 23/67, and 25/70 (including both Yopougon and Abobo) respondents listen to community radio stations broadcasting SFCG programs. They prefer religious radio stations or RFI (Radio France Internationale), or variety shows. It was also observed that, the further one goes out into rural zones (such as Bouaké and Duékoué), the smaller the

audience is for community radio stations. The people interviewed attribute this to the incompatibility between the time the shows are broadcast and their agricultural activities.

More than three quarters of the people interviewed, regardless of their social/ethnic affiliations, seem to be receptive to the message of nationwide reconciliation and the restoration of peaceful coexistence.” but many indicated these messages to have been needlessly repetitive. Most of them expressed the view that they are more preoccupied by their immediate problems such as insecurity, the lack of decent jobs and poverty than by the specific problems they perceive as being linked to conflict and peace.

IMPACT OF PARTICIPATORY THEATRE

Indicators of how well the messages were received

The statistical data compiled by SFCG and the testimonies gathered during the evaluation despite the methodological outlined above indicate that the participatory theater was well-received, Out of a total of 100 participatory theater productions, according to the internal evaluation done by SFCG, only six had an audience of less than 100 people. For the rest, the number of participants ranged up to 800 people. How well the messages were received was also measured, according to the directors of the theater troupes we met, by the spontaneous reactions of the participants. It was also assessed based on the actual participation of the populations in the discussions during the performances.

“I say that reconciliation is a complex thing. It’s at the political level. What didn’t we do or say in 2001? After everything that’s happened here, if we haven’t made peace, I say that it’s not worth it (...),” **A university student studying English at Université Alassane Ouattara in Bouaké**

“Reconciliation is good because people need to reconcile after everything that’s happened [...] I have no problem with those people [non-indigenous people], but the problem I have is that there are thefts. It has worsened, burglaries, hold-ups in Djébonoua, in the villages. And when people talk about reconciliation, can it really lead to that reconciliation, where people stop robbing us? They take from you, they kill you, they take from you, they kill you. At any time, there’s a theft! Even when they go to prison, they next day they are out and every time it happens again. So that does nothing to encourage this reconciliation we’re talking about. So that’s my problem (...),” **A young farmer in the farmers’ association in Djébonoua.**

“Reconciliation? It’s not possible! There can be no reconciliation. It’s not a matter of pessimism, but I am sure that war will return. The people who go on the radio there, they are required not to tell the truth, because if you are too candid, as soon as you’re done talking, people are going to kill you (...),” **Miss N., school student in her final university-preparatory year at the City High School of Abobo**

Troupe managers also reported that during these discussions they sometimes saw the involvement of community leaders or protagonists in the conflicts come to a

peaceful resolution of their disputes. Evoking such unexpected behavior made one participant say to a theater troupe manager that “participatory theater has the ability to instantaneously transform mentalities.” (- B. M., Manager of the troupe “Les ambassadeurs d’Abidjan”)

In some cases two months after the troupe had come it was still possible to detect echoes of what the plays had effectively introduced. Without diminishing the subjective evaluations of those involved the testimonials gathered from troupe managers and the quantitative data collected from SFCG do not constitute objective measures of the appreciation and impact of this program. Rather they need to be validated through an evaluation that includes more objective indicators.

Indicators of message acceptance

Respectively 19, 20, 22, and 34 individuals were interviewed about the words, the scenes promoting social cohesion, and the styles of the actors that most impressed them at the end of the plays. In the 5 towns combined, only 6 respondents referred, and then only vaguely, to the peace promotion message conveyed by those plays. It seems that the audience attracted by the participatory theater has been more drawn to the show and entertainment value of the participatory theatre. In the working-class neighborhoods where this type of opportunity is rare, people seize the opportunity to go to the mobile cinema and the participatory theater to have fun and sometimes to satisfy their curiosity, without necessarily accepting the messages promoted. The discrepancy between the awareness of messages and the realities experienced cause people to sometimes make ironic comments about the theater:

“The NGOs come to show off their theater, but to put it kindly, when someone tells you something, what you are doing there is theater, it’s just that it doesn’t make any sense [in real life].” (- Z. O. M., Guitrozon)

IMPACT OF MOBILE CINEMA

Indicators of message receipt

Taking into account the quantitative data to which we had access, none of the public screening sessions had less than 100 participants. The number of participants sometimes reached up to 1421 audience members. Thus, an analysis of the focus group transcriptions of the in-theater screenings for community leaders shows that this category of participants who are already in favor of promoting peace and reconciliation is a minority segment of the population.

Indicators of message acceptance

Everywhere it was screened, the mobile cinema contributed to physically bringing together the populations in space and time for the showing. For example, in the Banco neighborhood in Bouaké, women who did not wish to join an association due

to the ethnicity of the president ended up doing so after having taken part in the mobile cinema in their neighborhood. It is important to remember that in several localities, the mobile cinema was held within the context of an election. Thus, in the 5 towns, a few respondents (9/19 in Bouaké, 6/20 in Daloa, 5/20 in Duékoué, 6/34 in Abobo and Yopougon) stated that the activity significantly contributed to decreasing the tension between rival sides. Again in Bouaké, some people even credit the mobile cinema with mobilizing their village to receive the President of the Republic on his State visit to the region of *Gbèkè*. These effects, which are for the most part probably short-term, are also limited in the same ways as the participatory theater.

CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE MEDIA PROGRAM

With regard to the media activities, including training for radio hosts, raising awareness through participatory theater and mobile cinema, on a quantitative level the project met its overall objectives.

On a qualitative level, the training dispensed to the radio hosts was appreciated. According to testimonials from the beneficiaries, the Evaluation Team found that it fostered the acquisition of new skills that allowed them to communicate differently. However, the partnership between SFCG and the local radio stations did not seem to lead at the community level to a better reception of the broadcasts produce. A few of the broadcasts such as *Wôrô Wôrô* Tour were well liked but the broadcasts supported by SFCG did little to involve the local community. What seems to have led to this disinterest was a preference for variety shows.

As for participatory theater, SFCG developed a structure that, in the Ivorian context, gives it a comparative advantage with regard to social communication on topics related to social cohesion. The evaluation however revealed that the main weakness that limits the effectiveness of this tool with respect to the objective of broadening the dialogue on tolerance and togetherness, resides primarily in the methodological difficulties experienced by the troupes in identifying the local problems to be addressed, and the preference of the local population for plays on subjects other than peace and reconciliation.

Like the participatory theater, the mobile cinema also seems to draw crowds. Whether with local radio shows, participatory theater or mobile cinema, the communities seem to be saturated in awareness campaigns on nationwide reconciliation and togetherness, in a context of deadlocked political dialogue. At the end of the day, the impact of the media activities as contributors to the promotion of social cohesion at the community level is barely noticeable.

To reinvigorate the power of communication on this issue it may be necessary to change the approach. This change could take place at three levels:

The systemic approach to communication as developed by SFCG may have reached its limits and needs to be more fully integrated as part of a package that addresses the concrete basic limitations expressed by the communities. Without this socioeconomic initiative aspect, the media mobilization and community leader training aspect does not appear to generate the desired social transformations. An extension of this project or another of the same type should give some thought as to how to incorporate concrete development initiatives into its communication policy.

The policy of partnership with local radio stations also needs to be rethought so that there can be a better mixture of pre-packaged programs and programming that gives the microphone to the local communities.

As regards the participatory theatre it is necessary to develop a better mechanism that can address problems that the local communities identify.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM MEDIA PROGRAMMING

1. The Project's Approach

The approach that SFCG promoted in this project to promote peace and reconciliation was designed to build up the capacities of community leaders in the area of conflict management which was to help resolve a few local conflicts and bolster the national discussion on nationwide reconciliation. Direct beneficiaries, the selected community leaders and media communicators expressed the view that this approach met their expectations by broadening their knowledge base. In addition, holding solidarity events around community togetherness initiatives, screening films followed by discussions through the mobile cinema and the participatory theater created moments of "communion" between the communities.

The appropriateness of the SFCG approach can be addressed at two levels. First, for the direct beneficiaries (leaders, communicators and theater troupes who received training), any offering that builds capacities for peace mediators is helpful in the post-crisis context in Côte d'Ivoire. From the point of view of the leaders trained, and according to the concept they have of their duties, this training "gives them a mission within their communities." However, these leaders raised questions about the lack of post-training follow-up which limited their ability to fulfill their mandate to their communities. For the indirect beneficiaries, the communities, the training offered their leaders and the involvement of the community in a few solidarity events could not, by themselves address the real driving forces behind the conflicts, such as

poverty and the involvement of stakeholders and political actors. It is necessary to go further with support to the initiatives of community toward reconciliation. If this project were to be extended or another of the same type to replace it, it would be critical to stock a training strategy and a systematic policy of communication with concrete actions to favor more cooperation in these social environments that where the memory of violent conflict barely three years old still feed the imagination and nourish the lack of trust.

At the level of the indirect beneficiaries, i.e. the communities, the offer of training and the organization of solidarity events are insufficient to address the real causes of conflict, notably the poverty and the involvement of the stakeholders in political competition. It is necessary to have a broader approach in which structural initiatives are added to the activities of the project. This is an observation that the Evaluation Team frequently heard from the population to explain why the activities of the mobile cinema and participatory theatre had reached their limits.

2. Project Effectiveness

In all of its “community activity” and “media activity” facets, the “J’aime Mon Pays” project was effective to the extent that the planned activities were carried out. Thus, on a quantitative level, the project performed well. However, as mentioned above, it is difficult to perceive and measure the social change that they project implicitly aspired to achieve.

3. Sustainability

The rigid project format and the limitations on following through with the initiatives greatly threaten the sustainability of the project. The two year lifespan of the project seems too brief to hope to effect the societal changes that constituted the project’s implicit higher level objectives. Already, during the project execution period community togetherness initiatives did not receive assistance from SFCG. This approach greatly discouraged these initiatives and deflected the participants’ interest in the project.

4. Results

Overall, the project has produced some positive results for the direct beneficiaries. Under the terms of reference of the project, the goal was to train community leaders in order to achieve conflict transformation and the Evaluation Team found that most of them seem to have understood the content of the training as a whole. The Evaluation Team also noted that the conflict transformation skills/knowledge of the community leaders who were the beneficiaries of the training were strengthened. Thus, on this level, we can assert that one objective of the project was met. However, at the societal level the results remain limited because the knowledge that was acquired could not be used sufficiently to influence the communities to bring about

the hoped for transformation in the culture of conflict and in the behavior of communities in conflict. Part of the problem was that the objective of producing social and behavioral change was never clearly articulated or measured in the performance monitoring plan and this created a misunderstanding between the donor and SFCG. In brief, the project was launched with a plan that lacked clarification as to what could be expected in the way of social change.

5. Coherence/ Complementarity

The project « J'aime Mon Pays » made sense placed in the national context. It followed directly from the problematic that national leaders called for in order to promote peace. The various components of the project complemented each other. Together they effectively force a dialogue process. The offer of training was followed by feed-back sessions and solidarity events at the community level. The film showings by the mobile cinema were followed by debates. Participatory theatre started from the principal of identifying the issues that divided the community which was followed by the dynamic of acting the play. At this stage, the population was invited to give its opinions and then invited to play a role in working toward a happy ending, thus creating greater social cohesion. Only in external relations did the intervention as a whole lack complementarity. The SFCG's approach did not sufficiently link to the other projects and structures that periodically got communities together to undertake a solidarity activity or see a movie and to stimulate dialogue and work together. One weakness of the SFCG program was that it did not adequately link up with structures such as the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and with other NGOs with whom it could have coordinated its efforts on objectives that were quite similar.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the information above, the Evaluation Team recommends:

1. Situate Peace and Reconciliation programming in a broader context. If this program is to have a reasonable chance to improve the conduct of conflict in Côte d'Ivoire today, it must be situated in a broader context, one which addresses the underlying sources of conflict, and which begins to address them as part of an overall strategy for reducing the mistrust and hatred still present in the memory of violent conflicts that occurred only three years ago.

2. Provide more assistance to community initiated initiatives. A future project of this sort should consider providing assistance to initiatives that bring the community together through more post-training follow up and more support for community initiatives. The evidence that the evaluation team was able to gather indicates that performing a few solidarity events is not enough to transform local conflicts. For the indirect beneficiaries, the communities and the people interviewed it is clear that leader training and the solidarity events are not enough to address the real driving forces behind the situations of conflict, such as poverty and the impact of stakeholders and political actors. Therefore, it is necessary to have a broader approach in which initiatives that provide structure, such as income-generating activities, are added to the activities and the policies associated with the process of reconciliation and social cohesion.
3. Develop a strategy for linking training and a systemic communication policy to concrete measures that can promote more cooperation in social environments.
4. Communicate more fully with local administrative authorities. In the course of its research the evaluation team found, that in some localities, SFCG did not report its activities to the local administrative authorities, which makes both the activities of SFCG and the donors' efforts invisible in the eyes of the government authorities. This gap needs to be corrected.
5. Work more closely with government in implementing the communication strategy. A future project must situate its communication strategy in the context of working much more closely with a package of governmental programs that address the needs expressed by the communities. Without these programs the media mobilization and community leader training aspect will not be sufficient to generate the desired social transformations.
6. Improve the sustainability of the project and improve its external coherence with similar initiatives by coordinating and harmonizing the competencies and comparative advantages of the NGOs working in the same localities and by developing platforms for cooperation between humanitarian NGOs in clusters, in order to attain objectives that are very often similar.
7. Increase quantitatively and qualitatively the presence of women in the conflict resolution process.
8. Strengthen the CDVR process to go beyond the phase of hearing victims to deal more fully with dialogue by supporting the continued functioning of the local CDVR commissions even after the mandate of the national CDVRs expires.

ANNEXES

Annex A. Complete List of Persons Interviewed

BOUAKE- Community Activities

No.	Last and First Names	Title/Organization
1	[REDACTED]	Malinke Community, president of the association Lanaya (mutual trust)
2	[REDACTED]	Union of women with disabilities in the region of Gbeke
3	[REDACTED]	Burkinabe Community
4	[REDACTED]	Association of United Women of Houphouet-Ville , Ex Banco 2 espérance
5	[REDACTED]	Representative of COSIM
6	[REDACTED]	Sakassou CIMLK
7	[REDACTED]	"Minankro" notable person
8	[REDACTED]	National Committee of Alliances
9	[REDACTED]	Community Youth Secretary General
10	[REDACTED]	Local President of the CDVR
11	[REDACTED]	1st vice president of the local CDVR Manager of the UFDCI
12	[REDACTED]	2nd vice president of the local CDVR. Secretary General of the great Imam of Bouake, vice president of the forum of the religious people of Bouaké

13	[REDACTED]	Secretary General CDVR, region of Gbeke
14	[REDACTED]	Deputy Secretary General of the local CDVR
15	[REDACTED]	Economic Operator
16	[REDACTED]	Launderer
17	[REDACTED]	Carpenter
18	[REDACTED]	Student
19	[REDACTED]	Student
20	[REDACTED]	President of the association YEKO
21	[REDACTED]	President of the association YEKO
22	[REDACTED]	Member of the association LANAYA
23	[REDACTED]	Vice-president of the association LANAYA

BOUAKE-Radio

No.	Last and First Names	Title/Organization
1	[REDACTED]	Director Nobel FM
2	[REDACTED]	Radio Show Host at Nobel FM
3	[REDACTED]	
4	[REDACTED]	Program Director Radio Phoenix
5	[REDACTED]	Field Agent SFCG

6	[REDACTED]	Shop owners
7	[REDACTED]	President of the farmers' association
8	[REDACTED]	Treasurer of the farmers' association
9	[REDACTED]	Member farmers' association
10	[REDACTED]	Member farmers' association
11	[REDACTED]	President of the veterans' association
12	[REDACTED]	Vice-President of the veterans' association
13	[REDACTED]	Deputy Vice-President of the veterans' association
14	[REDACTED]	SGO Vice-President of the veterans' association
15	[REDACTED]	Veteran
16	[REDACTED]	Veteran
17	[REDACTED]	Veteran
18	[REDACTED]	President of the union of taxis
19	[REDACTED]	Vice President union of taxis
20	[REDACTED]	SGO union of taxis
21	[REDACTED]	SGC
22	[REDACTED]	Vice president
23	[REDACTED]	Law Student
24	[REDACTED]	Law Student
25	[REDACTED]	Student
26	Touré Karidja	Law Student

27	Diomandé Yaya	Law Student
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BOUAKE-Mobile cinema and participatory theater

No.	Last and First Names	Title/Organization
1	[REDACTED]	President of the youth association of Tolakouadiokro
2	[REDACTED]	Theater and cinema Tchelekro
3	[REDACTED]	Responsible for the theater group Humour-Plus Bouaké
4	[REDACTED]	Field agent of SFCG Bouaké
5	[REDACTED]	President of the Association of United Women of Houphouet-Ville theater and cinema
6	[REDACTED]	Mobile cinema and participatory theater
7	[REDACTED]	Mobile cinema and participatory theater
8	[REDACTED]	Representative of the leader
9	[REDACTED]	Mobile cinema and participatory theater
10	[REDACTED]	Mobile cinema and participatory theater
11	[REDACTED]	Mobile cinema and participatory theater
12	[REDACTED]	Mobile cinema and participatory theater
13	[REDACTED]	Mobile cinema and participatory theater
14	[REDACTED]	Notable of the village
15	[REDACTED]	Mobile cinema

16		Mobile cinema
17		Mobile cinema
18		Mobile cinema
19		Mobile cinema

DALOA- Community Activities

No.	Last and First Names	Title/Organization
1		Bété Community, president of the NGO OCJUDCI (Christian Organization of Young People United for the law in Cote d'Ivoire)
2		Representative of the association "Get Up, Woman"
3		Malinke Community
4		President of the collective of the Youth of Daloa, responsible of the cultural service of the city hall responsible for the insertion of youth
5		Leader of women

6		President of young people of the RDR of Daloa, director of the Mayor's office
7		Sub-prefect central of Daloa
8		Head of the village of Zakoua
9		Sub-head of the village of Zakoua
10		Head of household
11		Head of household
12		President of the youth
13		Member of the community
14		President of land management
15		Land owner
16		Member of the community
17		Member of the community
18		Notable
19		Pastor
20		Sub-head
21		Notable
22		Federal JFPI of Daloa
23		President
24		Member
25		Member
26		Member
27		Member
28		Member
29		Member
30		Treasurer

31		Vice-chairperson
32		Member
33		Member

DALOA- Radio

No.	Last and First Names	Title/Organization
1		Manager SFCG Daloa
2		Field Agent SFCG
3		Malinke Community
4		Malinke Community
5		Malinke Community
6		Malinke Community
7		Christian Community
8		Christian Community
9		Christian Community
10		Christian Community

11	[REDACTED]	Christian Community
12	[REDACTED]	Member of grin
13	[REDACTED]	Member of grin
14	[REDACTED]	Member of grin
15	[REDACTED]	Member of grin
16	[REDACTED]	Member of grin
17	[REDACTED]	Director Radio Tchrato
18	[REDACTED]	Director of Radio Daloa FM

DALOA- Mobile cinema and participatory theater

No.	Last and First Names	Title/Organization
1	[REDACTED]	Manager of the theater group of Daloa
2	[REDACTED]	Field Agent SFCG
3	[REDACTED]	President of AJUS
4	[REDACTED]	Mobile Cinema
5	[REDACTED]	Mobile Cinema
6	[REDACTED]	Mobile Cinema
7	[REDACTED]	Mobile Cinema
8	[REDACTED]	Mobile Cinema

9	██████████	Mobile Cinema
10	██████████████	Mobile Cinema
11	██████████	Participatory Theater
12	██████████████	Participatory Theater
13	██████████	Participatory Theater
14	██████████████	Participatory Theater
15	██████████████████	Participatory Theater
16	██████████	Mobile Cinema/ Member of grin
17	██████████	Mobile Cinema/ Member of grin
18	██████████████	Mobile Cinema/ Member of grin
19	██████████	Mobile Cinema/ Member of grin
20	██████████	Mobile Cinema/ Member of grin

DUEKOUE- Community Activities

No.	Last and First Names	Title/Organization
1	██████████	President
2	██████████████	Member
3	██████████	Safety Manager

4	██████████	Member
5	██████████████	Member
6	██████████████	Secretary general
7	██████████	Member
8	██████████████	Wisdom Committee
9	██████████████	Wisdom Committee
10	██████████████	Member
11	██████████	Security
12	██████████████	Member
13	██████████	Member
14	██████████	Member
15	██████████████	Communication Manager, Trained community leader
16	██████████████	Logistics Manager
17	██████████	Wisdom Committee
18	██████████████	Communication Manager of the association "living together"
19	██████████████	Neighborhood Chief
20	██████████████ ██████████████	President of the women of the neighborhood Carrefour
21	██████████	Secretary of the neighborhood chief, notable
22	██████████	Secretary of the committee for peace

23	[REDACTED]	Secretary of the chiefdom of Guitrozon
24	[REDACTED]	
25	[REDACTED]	Deputy secretary-general
26	[REDACTED]	Assessor
27	[REDACTED]	Organization
28	[REDACTED]	
29	[REDACTED]	
30	[REDACTED]	President central youth
31	[REDACTED]	President of Council
32	[REDACTED]	Notable
33	[REDACTED]	President of Council
34	[REDACTED]	Notable
35	[REDACTED]	
36	[REDACTED]	Village Chief
37	[REDACTED]	
38	[REDACTED]	President of Council
39	[REDACTED]	

40	[REDACTED]	Land management leader
41	[REDACTED]	Assessor
42	[REDACTED]	
43	[REDACTED]	Secretary general of the village chief
44	[REDACTED]	President of Council
45	[REDACTED]	
46	[REDACTED]	
47	[REDACTED]	Assessor

DUEKOUE- Radio

No.	Last and First Names	Title/Organization
1	[REDACTED]	Member of the United Nations grin
2	[REDACTED]	Member of the United Nations grin
3	[REDACTED]	Member of the United Nations grin
4	[REDACTED]	Member of the United Nations grin
5	[REDACTED]	Chairman of the United Nations grin

6	██████████	Pupil
7	██████████	Pupil
8	██████████	Pupil
9	██████████	Pupil
10	██████████	Pupil
11	██████████	Pupil
12	██████████	Pupil
13	██████████	Pupil
14	██████████	Pupil
15	██████████	Member
16	██████████	Member
17	██████████	Member
18	██████████	Member
19	██████████	Member
20	██████████	Member
21	██████████	Member
22	██████████	President of the young people of central district
23	██████████	Member
24	██████████	Member

25	██████████	Member
26	██████████████	Member
27	██████████	Member
28	██████████	Assistant Accountant
29	██████████████	Accountant
30	██████████████████	President of the association of women fighters
31	██████████	Member
32	██████████████████	Radio voice of the Guemon
33	██████████	Radio voice of the Guemon
34	██████████	Radio voice of the Guemon

DUEKOUE- Mobile cinema and participatory theater

No.	Last and First Name	Title/Organization
1	██████████	Participatory Theater
2	██████████████	Participatory Theater
3	██████████████	Deputy Chief
4	██████████████	Participatory Theater
5	██████████	Chairperson of women of Niambly
6	██████████████	Participatory Theater
7	██████████	Participatory Theater

8	[REDACTED]	Participatory Theater
9	[REDACTED]	Participatory Theater
10	[REDACTED]	Participatory Theater
11	[REDACTED]	Participatory Theater
12	[REDACTED]	Participatory Theater
13	[REDACTED]	Participatory Theater
14	[REDACTED]	Participatory Theater
15	[REDACTED]	Deputy Chief
16	[REDACTED]	Mobile Cinema
17	[REDACTED]	Mobile Cinema
18	[REDACTED]	President of the young people of the Guéré neighborhood
19	[REDACTED]	Mobile Cinema
20	[REDACTED]	Responsible for the theater troupe production Bisam

ABIDJAN-community Activities

No.	Last and First Name	Title/Organization
1	[REDACTED]	Seamstress
2	[REDACTED]	Manager of phone booth
3	[REDACTED]	Hairdresser
4	[REDACTED]	Seamstress

5		Unemployed
6		Hairdresser
7		Unemployed
8		President of the Coalition of Young Patriots for Peace
9		President of the MOSAG
10		Association Leader
11		Secretary General
12		President of the association ECOWAS Diaspora, 3rd age Member of the local office of the CDVR
13		In charge of transportation
14		President of the association of Dan
15		Manager
16		Representative of the Yaosehi neighborhood
17		Assistant at PASU

ABIDJAN- Radio

No.	Last and First Name	Position/Organization
1.		Program Content Manager, Radio Friendship
2.		Director radio Arc-en-ciel
3.		Student at Abobo Municipal High School
4.		Pupil at René Caillié school
5.		Pupil at René Caillié school

6.	[REDACTED]	Pupil at René Caillié school
7.	[REDACTED]	Student at Abobo Municipal High School
8.	[REDACTED]	Student at Abobo Municipal High School
9.	[REDACTED]	Student at Abobo Municipal High School
10.	[REDACTED]	Student at Abobo Municipal High School
11.	[REDACTED]	Student at Abobo Municipal High School
12.	[REDACTED]	Student at Abobo Municipal High School
13.	[REDACTED]	President of the association of young people of Abobo PK 18
14.	[REDACTED]	Imam of Abobo Gare
15.	[REDACTED]	Federal President of listening clubs
16.	[REDACTED]	Member
17.	[REDACTED]	Member
18.	[REDACTED]	Member
19.	[REDACTED]	Member
20.	[REDACTED]	Member

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No.	First and Last Names	Title/Organization
1	[REDACTED]	Responsible for the theater group the ambassadors of Abidjan
2	[REDACTED]	Mobile Cinema
3	[REDACTED]	Mobile Cinema
4	[REDACTED]	Mobile Cinema

5			Mobile Cinema
6			Mobile Cinema
7			Mobile Cinema
8			Mobile Cinema
9			Mobile cinema and participatory theater
10			Mobile cinema and participatory theater
11			Mobile cinema and participatory theater
12			Mobile Cinema and Theater
13			Mobile cinema and participatory theater
14			Mobile cinema and participatory theater
15			Mobile cinema and participatory theater
16			President of the Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS diaspora
17			APDL Manager (mobile cinema actor)
18			Participatory Theater
19			Participatory Theater
20			Participatory Theater
21			Participatory Theater
22			Participatory Theater
23			Participatory Theater
24			President of the AJUAS 5
25			Participatory Theater
26			Participatory Theater
27			Participatory Theater
28			Participatory Theater
29			Mobile Cinema
30			President of the UJDCI
31			Mobile Cinema

32		Mobile Cinema
33		Mobile Cinema
34		Mobile Cinema

Institution	Name and Title
USAID	Jeanne Briggs, development adviser, Representative
	Benjamin Olagboye, Specialist Democracy and Governance
	William Coulibaly, Program Manager
	Leah Kaplan, Specialist Democracy and Governance (DG Officer)
Search for Common Ground (SFCG)	Quentin Kanyatsi, Country Director
	Joel Kangha, Program Coordinator
	Aliou Traore, Training Manager
	Hermann Kouassi, Technician, Production Manager
Yopougon Radio	Inza Diomande, Director General Ladji Sangare, Director of Programs
Radio Friendship (Yopougon)	Marcel Tansia, Director of Programs
Radio Arc-en-ciel	Emile Ako Essan
SFCG	Sylvie Lonan, Field Agent
Préfecture	MR. Djandelorng, Deputy-prefect
National Union of professional drivers of Cote d'Ivoire	Ali Kone, President
	Boniface Oulai, Secretary General
"Grin Sorbonne"	- Mamadou Toure: Manager of mobilization and communication with unions - Adama Ouattara, vice president - Ladji Karamoko, Communication and Disputes Manager - Karamoko Sylla and Adama Doumbia, members

Grin "Square to the left"	Sekou Kone, leader of the grin Aboubacar Sidiki Bamba, Diakaridia Berthe, Yacouba Konate, members
Radio Phoenix	Cheick Kone, JMP Show Producer
Nobel Radio FM	Sylvain Konan, Executive Director
SFCG	Stephanie Tohibo: Media Coordinator and head of the Office
	Dominique Kouamé, Field Agent
	Constant Angbeni, M&E Assistant
	Youssouf Bamba, Show Producer
Radio Tchrato	Idrissa Traore, Director
Radio Daloa	Jean Die, Director, first producer of round tables
SFCG	Constant Ahmed, field Agent
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)	Diele NGapiechon, Office Director,
International Rescue Committee (IRC)	Kassoum Coulibaly
UNOCI	Jean-Emile NKiranuya, Civil Society Manager
	Michele Wabo, Civil Society Manager
Radio The Voice of the Guemon	Amidou Koukou, Director,
	Didier Sery, Technician, producer of round tables

Annex B. Evaluation Matrix

Community Activities						
Objective 1: To strengthen the capacity of community leaders in the management of conflicts and the participation in the national reconciliation						
Key Issues	Subsidiary Questions	Types of information	Sources	Instrument of collection	Method of analysis	Part of the plan concerned
1. Quality of human resources (skills, uses of resources) of SFCG for the training of the leaders?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mode of recruitment? - Qualities of people recruited by report to the objective of the project - Have they been trained? If yes, number of days, content, quality of the training ? - What logistical means allocated to the personnel for the execution of tasks ? - How are programd activities on lands ? - Sources of dissatisfaction on the pane quality of human resources ? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Normative Descriptive Normative Descriptive 	Program Manager	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews Reports / Evaluations of training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document Analysis project Content Analysis 	

	- What possible remedial measures for the future?					
2. Quality of the training of trainers of community leaders?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Assessment on the timing of issuance (number of days) of the training? - Assessment on the availability of learners? - Sources of dissatisfaction? - Possible remedial measures? 	Normative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Report of activities on the training of trainers Trainers Trainers Responsible for programs Beneficiaries (agents of the project) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews Report/ Evaluation of training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Content Analysis Document Analysis project 	
3. The criteria for the selection of the communities/community leaders are they relevant?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Criteria for the selection of the communities? Criteria for the selection of the community leaders to train? Level of involvement of young people and women in training (representativeness)? Sensitivity to the specificities of the context? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Descriptive Statistics (decline in %) Normative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Responsible for the program Dedicated Agents to this activity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews Focus groups Report/ Evaluation of training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gender Approach Content Analysis Analysis of the speech 	3.A.1
4. The content of the media and of the pedagogical material has he allowed to	Topics covered? Are the themes gender-specific? On what basis were they selected? How have	Descriptive	Project Document for training	Report/ Evaluation of training	Analysis project documents	3.A.2

<p>achieve the objectives of the project?</p>	<p>they taken account of political diversity in the issuance of the message?</p> <p>What is the medium used?</p> <p>The content of the media and educational materials has he helped to provide the tools of transformation (learn to restore the bonds of trust)? If yes, which?</p> <p>The learners have they now the skills conducive to the promotion of reconciliation? How was it expressed specifically after the training?</p>	<p>Normative</p> <p>Descriptive</p> <p>Normative</p> <p>Descriptive</p> <p>Normative</p>	<p>Evaluation Report of the training</p> <p>Trainers (agents of the project)</p> <p>Beneficiaries</p> <p>The listeners animated by the communicators forms (on the observed changes or not in the way that the communicators speak of conflicts, of the live-together and reconciliation after their training with SFCG)</p>	<p>Interviews + Focus group</p>	<p>+ Content Analysis</p>	
<p>5. Conditions for issuing the training (if training issued by external service</p>	<p>Time allocated to the issuance of the training (satisfactory)?</p>	<p>Normative</p>	<p>Program Manager</p>	<p>Report of training</p>		

providers) dedicated to the community leaders and communicators	<p>Availability of learners? If not, why? Corrective Measures to make?</p> <p>Sources of dissatisfaction with these courses?</p> <p>Corrective measures to bring the conditions of issuance of training (</p>	<p>Statistics (rate of presence/ meeting)</p> <p>Normative</p>	Trainer of communicators	<p>activity</p> <p>Interview</p>		
6. The programming of activities: Was it relevant?	<p>The activities were performed in accordance with the planning which has been made? If not, why? And what are the corrective measures provided (in situation)? What are your sources of dissatisfaction on this?</p> <p>If the project were to continue, what are the possible remedial measures on the programming?</p>	<p>Normative</p> <p>Normative</p>	<p>Program Manager</p> <p>Agents of the project</p> <p>Beneficiaries</p>	<p>Interviews</p> <p>+</p> <p>Focus group</p>	<p>Analysis project documents</p> <p>Content Analysis</p>	3.A.4
7. The effects of proposed training on the beneficiaries	People chosen at random in the environment: Have you noted a	Descriptive / Normative	Agents of the project	<p>Focus group</p> <p>+</p>	Content Analysis	3.A.5 and 3.a.6

of the project?	<p>change in the way in which the leaders address (i) the conflicts, (ii) the issue of the live-together, (iii) the question of reconciliation?</p> <p>People chosen at random in the environment: Do you think that the community leaders are able to foster more cooperation and to reduce the confrontations?</p> <p>If yes, give examples.</p> <p>Beneficiaries of the training: What is it that has changed in your approach (i) conflict, (ii) the issue of the live-together, (iii) the question of the reconciliation</p>	<p>Normative</p> <p>Descriptive / Normative</p>	<p>Beneficiaries</p> <p>People living in the environment of the beneficiaries of the training</p>	Interviews	Analysis of the speech	
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Media Activities

Objective 2: To increase the national debate on tolerance and unity in diversity within populations

<p>The policy of targeting of beneficiaries (communicators) is it relevant?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Criteria for the selection of beneficiaries to train? - Representativeness of young people and women in this training? - Does it take into account the 	<p>Descriptive</p> <p>Statistics (decline in %)</p>	<p>Project Document for training / Assessment of the training</p> <p>Responsible for the</p>	Interviews	<p>Content Analysis</p> <p>Analysis of speech</p>	3.B.1
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	diversity of the sensibilities of the middle?	Normative	program			
			Beneficiaries of the training			
The content of the media and of the pedagogical material has he allowed to achieve the objectives of the project?	<p>Topics covered? On what basis were they selected? How have they taken account of the specificities of the context? Y a -t- he themes gender-specific?</p> <p>What media and teaching methods have been used in the course of this training</p> <p>The content of the media and educational materials has he placed the emphasis on the communication oriented toward conflict transformation (learn to restore links of trust)? If yes, how?</p> <p>The learners have they now the skills (i) to speak about conflicts (without the poison) (ii) rather</p>	<p>Descriptive</p> <p>Descriptive</p> <p>Descriptive</p> <p>Normative</p> <p>Descriptive</p>	<p>Trainers (agents of the project)</p> <p>Beneficiaries</p> <p>Persons not beneficiaries of the project (on new things in the way that the leaders now manage conflicts or speak of reconciliation after their training with SFCG)</p>	<p>Interviews</p> <p>+</p> <p>Focus group</p>	<p>Analysis project documents</p> <p>+</p> <p>Content Analysis</p>	3.A.2

	<p>favorable to the promotion of the live-set of reconciliation?</p> <p>If yes, give concrete examples which the way it is-it expressed specifically after the training?</p>					
<p>The programming of activities was it relevant?</p>	<p>The activities were performed in accordance with the planning which has been made? If yes, or no why?</p> <p>The listeners were-they assiduous? (Rate of presence by meeting)</p> <p>If not, why? And what are the corrective measures provided (in situation)?</p> <p>What are your sources of dissatisfaction on the training of communicators?</p> <p>If the project were to continue, what are the possible remedial measures on the programming?</p>	<p>Normative</p> <p>Statistics /Normative</p> <p>Normative</p> <p>Normative</p>	<p>Project Documents / Activity Reports</p> <p>Responsible of the program</p> <p>Trainers (agents of the project)</p> <p>Beneficiaries</p>	<p>Interviews + Focus group</p>	<p>Analysis project documents</p> <p>Content Analysis</p>	<p>3.A.4</p>
<p>Media: Radio / participatory theater / cinema mobile</p>						

<p>The supply of communication on tolerance and unity in diversity has it achieved its objectives?</p>	<p>What is it that has argued in favor of the choice of the</p> <p>(i) Radio, (II) the mobile cinema and the (III) participatory theater as a support for communication on these issues?</p>	<p>Normative</p> <p>Normative</p>	<p>Report of Activities Responsible for the program</p> <p>Project Officers</p> <p>Community Leaders/Members of the community</p>	<p>Interviews</p> <p>Focus group</p>	<p>Content Analysis</p>	
<p>Questions (radio)</p>						
<p>The issues addressed by each educational support and the manner of dealing with were relevant?</p>	<p>How is the choice of topics to be dealt with at the level of the Radio? The mobile cinema, theater participatory?</p> <p>Theater and cinema : how and on what basis is the choice of the topics to be dealt with at the level of each communication medium?</p> <p>Theater and cinema: <i>Spirit of scripts</i> (message issued) and adequacy with the problmeatiques (i) tolerance, (ii) unity in diversity (iii)</p>	<p>Descriptive</p> <p>Descriptive</p>	<p>Program Manager</p> <p>Project Officers</p>	<p>Report of Radio Activity</p> <p>Participatory Theater</p> <p>Mobile Cinema</p> <p>Interviews</p>	<p>Content Analysis</p>	

	reconciliation					
The communicative approach chosen was it relevant?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What are the languages that have been chosen to convey the message to the people? - Criteria for the selection of these languages ? - These choices of languages took account of the specificities of contexts? - These languages have they allowed to touch all the communities ? 	<p>Descriptive</p> <p>Normative</p>	<p>Project Officers</p> <p>Community Leaders/members of communities</p>	<p>Interviews</p> <p>Focus group</p>	<p>Analysis project documents</p> <p>Content Analysis</p>	
5. Conditions for the preparation of the activity participatory theater (if training issued by external service providers) dedicated to the community leaders and communicators	<p>Conditions of contractual arrangements satisfactory?</p> <p>Time allocated to the issuance of the training (satisfactory) ?</p> <p>Availability of learners? If not, why? Corrective Measures to make?</p> <p>Sources of dissatisfaction with these courses?</p>	<p>Normative</p> <p>Statistics (rate of presence / meeting)</p> <p>Normative</p>	<p>Program Manager</p> <p>Trainer of communicators</p>	<p>Report of training activity</p> <p>Interview</p>		

	Corrective measures to bring the conditions of issuance of training (
5. Conditions for issuing the training (if training issued by external service providers) dedicated to the community leaders and communicators	Time allocated to the issuance of the training (satisfactory) ? Availability of learners? If not, why? Corrective Measures to make? Sources of dissatisfaction with these courses? Corrective measures to bring the conditions of issuance of training (Normative Statistics (rate of presence / meeting) Normative	Program Manager Trainer of communicators	Report of training activity Interview		
The programming of activities was it relevant?	How is made the programming of (i) cinema activities (ii) of participatory theater The ethno-linguistic groups chosen are they stakeholders part of the programming?	Descriptive Normative	Project Officers Community Leaders/members of communities	Interviews Focus group	Content Analysis	
The effects of training on the communicators	Radio: What are the radios in close proximity the most shortened? The one who is supported in the locality in fact-it part? What are the changes perceived by the communities in	Normative Descriptive	The sociological minorities (the groups are perceiving it as victim after the	Focus group	Content Analysis Content Analysis	

	<p>the way to communicate on (i) the tolerance (ii) unity in diversity (iii) the live-together (iv).</p> <p>What are the words and the questions which often come back to the radio?</p> <p>Do you have the feeling that the radios you more afraid or reassure better?</p>		<p>crisis in the locality)</p> <p>Project Officers</p> <p>Community Leaders</p> <p>Member of the community who had not participated in the training courses and selected at random</p>			
<p>What are the effects (social change) awareness campaigns by the cinema and the theater on the communities?</p>	<p>The words and the styles being projected by the theater and cinema and been appropriated within the communities ?</p> <p>The new behaviors or attitudes observed</p>	<p>Normative</p>	<p>Community Leaders</p> <p>Member of the community who had not participated in the training courses and selected at random</p> <p>Agents of the project</p>	<p>Interview</p> <p>Focus group</p>	<p>Content Analysis</p>	

Prospects for communication in favor of peace	Between the radio, theater and film, say, by order of importance, which has the most positive impact on the populations ?	Normative	Member of the community chosen at random Community Leaders Agents of the project	Focus group	Content Analysis	
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Add-ins of questions to journalists and radio presenters

Point 4 relating to the achievement of the objectives of the project on the basis of the contents of media and educational materials.

- ✓ What appreciation do you make of the quality of the training received on the part of SFCG? Give your answer on a scale from 0 to 5.

0 1 2 3 4 5



Annex C. Communities Targeted by SFCG

Yopougon and Abobo: In the District of Abidjan, these two communities are archetypes of the exacerbation of violence during the pre- and post-election crisis. To observers of the Ivorian political scene and in the collective imagination, Yopougon and Abobo are emblems of the political polarity experienced in Côte d'Ivoire. Because each one is perceived as the bastion of each of the two main protagonists in the crisis, with pockets of sympathizers for the opponent within them. Yopougon is perceived as being the stronghold for those who are pro-Gbagbo, while Abobo is designated as being an area with a predominant concentration of Ouattara supporters. During the crisis, this co-habitation led to the perpetration of many violent crimes and even greater tension in community relations. In Yopougon, the post-training involvement of some young political leaders who were close to the former power in raising the awareness of the populations was even presented to the Evaluation Team as an example of appropriation of project.

Duékoué: Well known for its violent inter-community conflicts, Duékoué has become almost a pre-requisite for studying occurrences of violent conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. The ethno-spatial territorialization of pockets of violence and the fact that they were anchored around the "Carrefour" and "Kôkôman" neighborhoods, are indicative of a solidification of the community identity causing a cycle of violence for which not all of the motivations have yet been addressed. Indeed, in each of these neighborhoods, the populations have grouped themselves into communities and cultivate mistrust and distrust that often leads to inter-community confrontations.

Daloa: This locality is an economic draw for migrants, due to the attractiveness of its agriculture and forestry potential. For a long time now, Daloa has been inundated by sizeable Ivorian and foreign populations, attracted by opportunities for land ownership and the local dynamic of an agricultural plantation economy. On a geostrategic level, Daloa is at the intersection between two hot spots of the Ivorian crisis: the main road between Duékoué-Logoualé-Man and the one between Vavoua-Séguéla. These roads experience particularly heavily military traffic. The city of Daloa was, itself, an important military garrison. Despite its conflict-generating characteristics, the level of violence has not reached the intensity that has been observed in neighboring localities such as Duékoué and Vavoua. However, the risk of violence related to the return of displaced people is no less significant.

Bouaké: Headquarters of the former rebellion, Bouaké is experiencing problems of rising tensions in the community, where there is cohabitation between the indigenous Baoulé populations, motivated by strong resentment toward the Malinké populations, who are considered to have been complicit with the armed rebellion, for having caused them to be bullied throughout nearly a decade of crisis. In this locality, the involvement of traditional and religious leaders is presented as an example of

success by SFCG. Media activities there are also touted as having attracted sizeable crowds in certain neighborhoods such as Banco 2. From the point of view of the SFCG agents, with regard to community activities, the connection established between two women's associations was also held up as a success story.

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