



GOVERNANCE DATA:

WHO USES IT AND WHY?



Acknowledgements

This report was prepared by Samantha Custer, Dr. Takaaki Masaki, Tanya Sethi, Rebecca Latourell, Zachary Rice, and Dr. Bradley Parks from AidData.

The authors express our appreciation to those who were willing to be interviewed or advise on the preparation of this report, including: Hazel Feigenblatt (Global Integrity); Alejandro Ponce and Joel Martinez (World Justice Project); Elena Mondo (International Budget Partnership); Finn Heinrich and Coralie Pring (Transparency International); Jim Cust and Jason McMann (Natural Resource Governance Institute); Melissa Johns (World Bank); Toby Mendel (Centre for Law and Democracy); Preston Whitt (Open Government Partnership); Chris Maloney and Andria Hayes-Birchler (Millennium Challenge Corporation); Jesse Worker (World Resources Institute); and Nathaniel Heller and Caroline Poirrier (Results for Development). Llanco Talamantes and Galina Kalvatcheva were extremely helpful in the design of this publication.

This study was commissioned by the Governance Data Alliance with financial support from the William & Flora Hewlett Foundation and Omidyar Network. NORC at the University of Chicago assisted in fielding the survey upon which this report is based. This report represents the views of the authors alone and does not speak for the organizations or individuals who have contributed their insights or finances to its production.

The Governance Data Alliance is a consortium of governance data producers, users, and funders that is working together to strengthen the production, use, and impact of governance data.

The Alliance's secretariat is currently hosted by the Results for Development Institute, and the Alliance's work is supported by Omidyar Network, the Hewlett Foundation, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

1. Introduction

If institutions are the formal and informal “rules of the game” that shape how citizens and the state interact, then governance includes the “politics over rules” that determine which policies are adopted, how they are implemented, and the degree to which they advance public versus parochial interests (North, 1990; Hyden, 2011). Poorly governed countries often suffer from high levels of political instability, inefficient distribution of public resources and inequitable access to basic services (World Bank, 1989; Nanda, 2006). They also tend to produce inferior development outcomes (World Bank, 2004).

In response, various initiatives have emerged that purport to assess and promote “good governance” (UNDP, 2007; OECD, 2009a). Research institutions produce cross-country datasets to better understand the causes and consequences of different types of governance. Multilateral development banks and bilateral aid agencies sponsor and use governance assessments to inform resource allocation decisions and promote reforms in the countries where they work. Civil society groups administer “naming and shaming” exercises in order to highlight governance leaders and laggards in the hopes that the forces of inter-jurisdictional competition will set in motion a “race to the top” dynamic.

Yet, the influence of governance data on intermediate policy decisions and downstream governance outcomes is uncertain. Previous research suggests that governance assessments are among the least likely diagnostic and advisory tools to influence public sector decision-makers, as they often threaten existing power structures (Parks et al, 2015; Cruz and Keefer, 2015). We also know that the organizations responsible for producing governance assessments often have little knowledge about “who their users are and why they [do or do not] use governance data” (Reboot, 2015; Governance Data Alliance, 2015).

Who are the users of governance data? Which attributes of governance assessments make them more (or less) influential among development policymakers and practitioners? Why are some countries more interested in using governance assessments than others? To answer these questions, this report draws upon the experience of nearly 6,750 policymakers and practitioners from 126 low- and middle-income countries who participated in the 2014 *Reform Efforts Survey*, as well as interviews with representatives from several international organizations that produce governance data. Their insights speak to ongoing debates about how to make governance data “fit-for-purpose” and help to identify which types of information can most effectively spark dialogue and mobilize coalitions for policy change.

The remainder of this report is organized in seven sections. In Section 2, we discuss the perspectives of governance data producers. In Section 3, we provide an overview of our methodology, including the creation of our sampling frame and survey implementation. Sections 4 and 5 discuss key findings regarding familiarity with (and use of) governance data among our stakeholder groups and the influence of governance assessments on reform implementation. In Section 6, we examine which countries are more influenced by governance assessments and what characteristics enable or constrain such influence. Section 7 concludes with a synthesis of broad lessons learned, and directions for some near-term policy research to delve deeper into the insights that this report has generated.

2. The Producers:

Who produces governance data and why?

Governments and international organizations identify a range of different reasons why they produce governance data – from internal imperatives to manage risk and efficiently allocate resources to external aspirations to transform or otherwise inform “partner country processes” (OECD, 2009b; Wilde, 2011). While this study seeks to understand the uptake and influence of governance assessments among development policymakers and practitioners who make or shape policy decisions, it is important to bear in mind these are not the only audiences being targeted.¹

Governance data producers typically adopt one of three approaches to influence policy change within partner countries. Some producers see themselves as strictly objective providers of governance data and limit their engagement in domestic policymaking processes to confirming the accuracy of their assessments. A second group of producers indirectly raise awareness about or advocate for reform through partnerships with domestic civil society and private sector groups, which in turn place pressure on their governments. Only a few producers directly engage with host government counterparts to encourage reform based upon the content of their assessments.² Various factors influence a governance data producer’s approach, including: resource constraints, proximity to in-country stakeholders, organizational by-laws, and underlying theories of change.

Governance data producers are more consistent in whom they consider to be their primary “targets”: senior public sector officials in the executive branches (e.g., ministry

heads, the office of the chief executive) of the countries that they assess. Some producers also identified members of the legislature and judiciary, journalists, civil society organizations, development partners, and academics as secondary targets of interest.

There are three primary ways in which the underlying data for governance assessments are collected. These data collection methods include: (1) aggregation of data from secondary sources; (2) desk research carried out by country experts or international experts with local validation (e.g., review of draft laws or published budget documents); and (3) participatory feedback via surveys, interviews or focus groups with a subset of domestic stakeholders. Producers of assessments wrestle with difficult questions and face trade-offs regarding the relative timeliness, mix and efficacy of these data collection methods.

Public sector institutions in the countries that governance data producers assess are only rarely involved in the data collection process, and producers generally agree that dissemination of assessment results is a major impediment to policy change. Most producers rely on civil society organizations, development partners, and the media to bring assessment results to the attention of government officials.

Yet, interaction with these constituencies is often episodic, and limited to short-term outreach around the publication of an assessment. Few governance data producers have a proactive strategy to conduct outreach to either domestic or

1. International journalists, advocates, investors, and the producer organizations themselves were also mentioned as governance data users. On this point, see UNDP 2008 and Kelley and Simmons 2014.

2. In order to maintain the objectivity of their assessments, when producers do engage with government actors they often employ a division of labor that insulates technical staff from interactions with officials, who often advocate for changes to their “scores”. Producers also vary in terms of whether, how and when they will allow government counterparts to have access to assessment results before publication. Some producers have clearly delineated policies for how they will engage with governments, but more often this interaction is largely “ad hoc”.

international media outlets. While a select group of governance data producers are able to leverage networks of local partners or field offices to communicate assessment results, producers generally have weak connections with in-country stakeholders.

Reflecting on the local uptake and influence of their assessments, producers identified several factors that they consider to be predictive of whether governments will change their behavior. Environmental factors over which assessment producers have relatively little control – political stability, election cycles, civic space, and domestic political support for reform – were high on the list. However, they also cited factors related

to how organizations produce, use, and disseminate assessments, including: brand recognition, whether they identify actionable solutions, the extent to which they engage in technical conversations and policy dialogue with the governments they assess, local language translation of assessments, and the presence of active civil society partners.

Do the perceptions of governance data producers match the experiences of the in-country stakeholders they seek to influence? In the remainder of this report, we identify the users of governance data, the attributes of influential governance assessments, and the environmental conditions that affect assessment uptake.³

Table 1: Assessments Measuring the Effectiveness and Quality of Governance

Assessments Produced by an Intergovernmental Organization

IFAD's Rural Sector Performance Assessment and Performance-Based Allocation System (PBAS)
The World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and PBAS
The World Bank's *Worldwide Governance Indicators*
The World Bank and International Financial Corporation's (IFC's) *Doing Business Report*

Assessments Produced by a Foreign Government

The Millennium Challenge Corporation's (MCC's) Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards
The U.S. State Department's *Trafficking in Persons Report*

Assessments Produced by an NGO, Think Tank, or CSO

The Freedom House *Freedom in the World Report*
The Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index
The *Global Integrity Report*
The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom
The Ibrahim Index of African Governance
The International Budget Partnership's Open Budget Index
The World Economic Forum's *Global Competitiveness Report*
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index

3. We use the terms "governance data" and "governance assessment" interchangeably in this report.

3. Methodology:

Identifying the users of governance data

Foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations use a wide range of instruments to influence policy change in low- and middle-income countries. These instruments often involve some explicit or implicit assessment of government performance geared towards spurring and sustaining economic, political, social, and environmental reforms.

In this study, we draw upon the insights of nearly 6,750 policymakers and practitioners that participated in the 2014 *Reform Efforts Survey* and who are knowledgeable about the formulation and implementation of government policies and programs in 126 low- and middle-income countries. Respondents were asked questions about the external assessments with which they were familiar, including: the influence of specific assessments in setting priorities or designing reforms and the reasons why certain assessments were more or less influential.

The survey was sent to approximately 55,000 individuals in the sampling frame that supported the 2014 *Reform Efforts Survey*⁴ which was constructed using a rigorous institution-mapping process to identify country-specific institutions and leadership positions between 2004 and 2013.⁵ We achieved a survey participation rate of 15.3%.⁶

Survey participants include representatives from five stakeholder groups, including: (1) senior and mid-level executive branch government officials who formulate and execute policies and programs in a variety of policy domains; (2) representatives of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and foreign embassies who dialogue with government authorities regarding policy choices and program priorities; (3) leaders of domestic civil society organizations who advocate for reforms; (4) leaders and members of business associations who are knowledgeable about government programs and the domestic policy-making process; and (5) independent country experts who monitor reform patterns and processes and donor relationships with host governments.⁷

Of the 100+ assessments covered by the 2014 *Reform Efforts Survey*, we selected 14 assessments that explicitly measure the effectiveness and quality of governance (see Table 1). Many of these assessments (e.g., the *Global Integrity Report*, the *Open Budget Index*, and the *Worldwide Governance Indicators*) are produced by members of the Governance Data Alliance (GDA).

4. Of the 55,010 individuals originally included in the sampling frame, we successfully sent a survey invitation to the email inbox of over 44,055 people. From this cohort of survey recipients, 6,731 participated. Throughout this report, we have attempted to correct for potential biases that may result from variation in contact availability, country sample size, and participation rates by employing non-response weights, which adjust for survey non-response.

5. We identified our population of interest by first mapping country-specific public sector institutions (and leadership positions within those institutions) back to an ideal-typical developing country government. This ideal-typical government consisted of 33 institution types (e.g., Ministry of Finance, a Supreme Audit Institution, and a National Statistical Office). We then identified functionally equivalent leadership positions within these institutions, and the specific individuals who held these positions between 2004 and 2013. For the four other stakeholder groups, we undertook a similar process of first mapping country-specific institutions and positions, and then identifying the individuals who held those positions between 2004 and 2013. Identifying functional equivalents at the institution- and leadership position-level resulted in a sampling frame that enables comparison across countries. See the Appendix of the *Marketplace of Ideas for Policy Change* report for more details.

6. Our ability to select individuals from the population of interest for inclusion in our final sampling frame was constrained by the availability of individual contact information. We identified the contact information of potential survey participants using publicly available resources, such as organizational websites and directories, international conference records, Who's Who International, and public profiles on LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter.

7. Among the variables used to construct our non-response weights, we gathered data on the sex, country, stakeholder group, and institutional affiliation of sampling frame members. In addition, among survey participants, we collected a significant amount of demographic data on professional and educational background, area of policy expertise, and roles and responsibilities in the workplace. See Appendix B for more details on how non-response weights were constructed.

4. The Users:

Who are the likely users of governance data?


Who are the likely users of governance data? Of the 4,271 participants in the 2014 *Reform Efforts Survey* who answered questions about external assessments, approximately 69% (2,931) indicated that they were familiar with at least one of the 14 governance assessments included in our analysis.⁸ Using a participant's familiarity with these governance assessments as an indication that he or she is a likely user of governance data, we can identify three patterns about who is – and is not – using governance assessments.⁹

4.1. Government and civil society representatives are least familiar with governance data. Regardless of whether a producer seeks to influence government officials directly or indirectly via civil society

organizations, governance assessments do not appear to be making a lasting impression. Government and civil society representatives only indicated familiarity with governance assessments 28% and 31% of the time, respectively (see Figure 1). Consistent with anecdotal evidence shared by several producers, private sector and development partner representatives are more familiar with governance assessments, 40% and 34% of the time, respectively. This pattern suggests that the most active users of governance assessments are those who use them to inform investment and resource allocation decisions.

Figure 1: Government and Civil Society Representatives are Least Familiar with Governance Data

Notes: Likelihood of familiarity refers to the average proportion of respondents who indicated their familiarity with the set of governance assessments they were asked to evaluate via the 2014 *Reform Efforts Survey*. Standard errors are indicated by error bars.



8. See Table A-1, Table A-2 and Table A-3 in Appendix A for a distribution by stakeholder group, education level and proportion of time spent on political issues for each of these assessments


9. While familiarity with an assessment does not necessarily constitute use, it is arguably an important prerequisite and presents an initial baseline for analysis (Parks et al. 2015).

4.2. Senior government officials are more familiar with governance data than are technocrats.¹⁰ High-level government officials or leaders (e.g., heads of state, minister, vice minister) are more likely to be familiar with governance assessments than lower-level technical specialists and program managers, on average (see Figure 2). Nearly 34% of respondents from top executive positions were familiar with governance data, while the corresponding numbers for program or technical staff and administrative managers are lower (29% and 26%, respectively).¹¹

Since mid-level reformers are unlikely to succeed without support from the chief executive, greater awareness of governance assessments among senior public sector leaders could signal openness to making policy changes (Custer et al, 2015). However, leaders may also be uniquely sensitive to the reputational benefits and risks associated with governance assessments. Also, awareness does not constitute meaningful use of governance data. Leaders may have perverse incentives to adopt shallow reforms or to implement narrow, technical fixes to their “scores” (Buch et al, 2015; Pritchett et al, 2013).

Figure 2. Senior Government Officials are More Familiar with Governance Data Than Technocrats

Notes: Likelihood of familiarity refers to the average proportion of respondents who indicated their familiarity with the set of governance assessments they were asked to evaluate via the 2014 *Reform Efforts Survey*. Standard errors are indicated by error bars.



10. We identified three broad categories of positions held by the government officials who responded to the survey, including: top executives, administrative managers, and programmatic and technical staff. Top executives refer to high-level government leadership positions including the head of state or government (e.g., President, Prime Minister, King), vice head of state or government (e.g., Vice President, Deputy Prime Minister), head of a ministry/agency/commission, and vice minister or deputy/assistant/state minister. Administrative managerial positions include senior-level managerial positions such as chief of staff, advisor, or assistant to head of state or minister. Programmatic and technical staff cover lower-level government positions like technical specialist, consultant, or project manager/coordinator.

11. We find the same pattern when we disaggregate the information on position-type: Heads of state and higher-level political appointees (e.g., senior adviser, chief of staff, ministry head) were on average most likely familiar with governance data (42%). See Figure A-1 in Appendix A.


4.3. Policymakers from poorly governed countries are less familiar with governance data.

Familiarity with governance assessments varies significantly along two dimensions of the quality of a country’s governance: political regime type¹² and government effectiveness.¹³ Whereas 35% of participants from democratic countries were familiar with governance assessments, 30% of their counterparts from non-democratic countries were similarly familiar (see Figure 3).¹⁴

Furthermore, participants from countries with effective governments were more familiar with governance assessments than those from countries with less effective governments, and by a similar margin (see Figure 4). This finding poses a dilemma for governance data producers. Policymakers in countries with weak governance – often the main targets of governance assessments – are substantially less likely to engage with the diagnostic and advisory content of governance assessments than their counterparts in well-governed countries.¹⁵

Figure 3: Participants from Democratic Countries More Familiar with Governance Data

Notes: Likelihood of familiarity refers to the average proportion of respondents who indicated their familiarity with the set of governance assessments they were asked to evaluate via the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey. Standard errors are indicated by error bars.



12. We use a country’s level of democracy as a proxy for this based upon a Polity2 score of 6 as a threshold to draw a line between democratic and non-democratic countries (Carbone et al. 2012).

13. Using the World Bank’s WGI of government effectiveness, which ranges from -2.5 (least effective) to 2.5 (effective), we divide countries into four different groups depending on whether they fall into the top 25 percentile, the top 25-50 percentiles, the 50-75 percentiles, or the bottom 25 percentile in terms of their WGI scores on government effectiveness. We then compute and compare the average rate of familiarity for respondents from these four country groups (the top dot in Figure 4 corresponds to the estimated average at the top 25 percentile while the bottom dot corresponds to the estimated average at the bottom 25 percentile).


This captures perceptions of the quality of public services, civil service, independence from political pressures, policy formulation and implementation, as well as the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2015). Countries with most effective governments are those in the top quartile. These country-level indicators are averaged for the period of 2004-2013, a period for which survey participants were asked to evaluate governance data in the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey.

14. The percentage point difference is relatively small, but statistically significant ($p < 0.01$).

15. We also tested whether this positive relationship between respondents’ familiarity with a governance assessment and governance performance holds for each individual assessment (See Table A-4 in Appendix A). Overall, we find that respondents belonging to countries that score higher on governance performance than the median score as measured by a particular assessment tend to be more familiar with that assessment (e.g., if Lesotho was above median score on government performance in the Global Integrity Index, respondents in Lesotho would be likely to be more familiar with the *Global Integrity Report* than respondents in a country that scored below median in the index).

Figure 4: Greater Familiarity with Governance Data in Countries with Effective Governments

Notes: Likelihood of familiarity refers to the average proportion of respondents who indicated their familiarity with the set of governance assessments they were asked to evaluate via the 2014 *Reform Efforts Survey*. Standard errors are indicated by error bars. See footnote 13 for details.



Local stakeholders in non-democratic countries face chronic challenges of shrinking civic space and reprisal for communicating “governance deficits” (Wilde, 2011; Carothers and Brechenmacher, 2014). Yet, those in democratic countries are only marginally more aware of governance assessments, which may reflect insufficient dissemination of governance data or relatively weak governance reform coalitions (Oia, 2011).

Countries with effective governments may not only have political leaders who are more mindful of external sources of analysis and advice, but also more technocrats who are willing to pursue promising policy solutions (Sidel, 2014; Kosack and Fung, 2014). Domestic, non-governmental actors may also be more inclined to share governance data with their government counterparts if they expect to find a listening ear.


5. The Data:

Which governance data is most influential and why?

Which attributes of governance assessments make them more or less influential? In this report, we measure agenda-setting influence on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means “no influence at all” and 5 means “maximum influence”. Participants in the 2014 *Reform Efforts Survey* rated the agenda-setting

influence of 14 governance assessments and the results indicate that some governance assessments are clearly more influential than others (see Figure 5).¹⁶ However, looking beyond the rankings, we can identify three assessment attributes that correlated with policy influence.

Figure 5: Ranking of Governance Assessments by Agenda-Setting Influence



The average agenda-setting scores of the *Freedom in the World Report* (Freedom House), the Freedom of the Press Index (Freedom House), and the Index for Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation) are 2.505, 2.389, and 2.244, respectively. We exclude them here since less than 10 respondents evaluated each of these assessments. Due to very few respondents (4 for the *Freedom in the World Report*; 4 for the Freedom of the Press Index; and 6 for the Index of Economic Freedom), the estimated scores for these assessments should be interpreted with caution. Agenda-setting influence is on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means “No influence at all” and 5 means “Maximum influence”. Error bars indicate standard errors and the number of observations is in brackets.

16. Our unit of analysis is a participant-assessment dyad. Thus, if a given survey participant evaluated two different assessments, it counts as two observations. On average, each survey participant evaluated 2.5 of the 14 governance assessments. Our scores for Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, The Freedom House's *Freedom in the World Report* and Freedom of the Press Index, and the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom should be interpreted with caution. They are likely to suffer from upward bias, as only respondents who cited them as having influenced their government's policy reforms evaluated their performance. See the [Appendix](#) of the *Marketplace of Ideas for Policy Change* report for more details on the content of the survey questionnaire


5.1. Governance data produced by intergovernmental organizations appears to exert greater influence.

The average agenda-setting influence of governance assessments produced by intergovernmental organizations (2.710) is significantly higher than those produced by governmental (2.592) and non-governmental organizations (2.166) (see Figure 6).¹⁷ Intergovernmental organizations may have

a comparative advantage in this market because of their in-house technical expertise, less politicized interactions with partner governments, and brand recognition (Rodrik 1996; Parks et al, 2015). It is also possible that the governing structures and by-laws of intergovernmental organizations predispose them to produce less controversial governance assessments that are politically palatable to domestic policymakers.

Figure 6: Governance Data Produced by Intergovernmental Organizations Most Influential

Notes: Agenda-setting influence is on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means “No influence at all” and 5 means “Maximum influence”. Error bars indicate standard errors



5.2. Governance data with “actionable” content is more influential.

An actionable assessment pairs its diagnosis of governance problems with potential solutions – practices, policies, activities, guidelines – that policymakers can implement (UNDP 2008; Andrews 2013; Kelley and Simmons 2014). Agenda-setting influence is higher (2.730), on average, for assessments that recommend both “input-based changes” (e.g., establishing legal or institutional

arrangements) and “output-based changes” (e.g., intermediate changes that new legal or institutional arrangements are supposed to facilitate), rather than those that exclusively focus on outputs (2.388) (see Figure 7). Similarly, assessments that prescribe a concrete set of policy recommendations had, on average, higher levels of agenda-setting influence (2.695) than those without such content (2.338) (see Figure 8).

17. See Appendix A for more details on how the attributes of assessments have been coded for this report.

Figure 7: Governance Data Focusing on Inputs and Outputs More Influential

Notes: Agenda-setting influence is on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means “No influence at all” and 5 means “Maximum influence”. Error bars indicate standard errors.





Figure 8: “Prescriptive” Governance Data More Influential

Notes: Agenda-setting influence is on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means “No influence at all” and 5 means “Maximum influence”. Error bars indicate standard errors.



These findings do not speak to the full range of consequences that may result from governments pursuing actionable solutions; it only indicates that assessments with more specific recommendations appear to have greater policy influence than those that do not. Governance data producers should be

mindful that an overemphasis on adopting international norms or making input-based changes could have negative, unintended consequences if they distract or displace attention away from efforts to solve de facto governance problems (Pritchett et al, 2010; Buch et al., 2015; Brockmyer and Fox, 2015).

5.3. Governance assessments based upon primary data and local knowledge are more influential than those that rely on secondary sources alone.

Two aspects of how producers collect data may influence whether their assessments are likely to affect policy change: (a) if they rely on primary or secondary data, and (b) if they involve domestic actors in the governance assessment process. Assessments that rely

on primary data are more influential (2.695) than those that use secondary data (2.338), on average (see Figure 9). In addition, the average agenda-setting influence of assessments that incorporate local knowledge through interviews, information exchanges or surveys is greater than those that rely on secondary sources or external expert opinion (2.749 vs. 2.321, respectively) (see Figure 10).

Figure 9: Governance Data Based on Primary Data More Influential

Notes: Agenda-setting influence is on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means “No influence at all” and 5 means “Maximum influence”. Error bars indicate standard errors.





Figure 10: Governance Data Incorporating Local Knowledge More Influential

Notes: Agenda-setting influence is on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means “No influence at all” and 5 means “Maximum influence”. Error bars indicate standard errors.



Failure to adequately take into account local conditions on the ground likely undermines the resonance and credibility of an assessment’s advisory content (World Bank, 2001; Andrews, 2013). Assessments that use composite indicators of government performance often provide insufficient information about what they are measuring and how governments

can improve their performance (UNDP, 2008; Hyden, 2011). Greater reliance upon primary data and participatory approaches in the process of diagnosing governance challenges and identifying policy solutions may enhance the salience and usability of governance assessments (Oia, 2011; UNDP 2008).

6. The Environment:

What enables or undermines the policy influence of governance data?


In which regions or countries does governance data prove most influential? Under what circumstances do governance assessments lead to the adoption of policy and institutional reforms? What are the structural forces (e.g., political, socioeconomic) that enhance or undermine the impact of governance data? Each participant who rated the agenda-setting influence of the 14 governance assessments belongs to one of 125 countries. Using this information, we can identify the regions and countries where governance data appears to have the most influence on policy reforms – and why.

6.1. Governance assessments are more influential in Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The perceived level influence of governance data on policy reform varies significantly across different regions (see Figure 11).

Governance assessments were perceived to be most influential in Europe and Central Asia (2.755), East Asia and the Pacific (2.575), and Sub-Saharan Africa (2.514). On the other hand, survey participants indicated that they were generally less influential in Latin America and the Caribbean (2.330), the Middle East and North Africa (2.214), and South Asia (1.962).

While this broad pattern remains largely consistent across individual governance assessments, some assessments still appear to break through and capture the attention of policymakers, even in regions that are less influenced by assessments overall (see Figure 12). *The Doing Business Report*, for example, has attained moderate influence in South Asia, as well as in Middle East and North Africa.¹⁸

Figure 11: Regional Ranking of Governance Assessments by Agenda-Setting Influence



Notes: Agenda-setting influence is on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means “No influence at all” and 5 means “Maximum influence”. Error bars indicate standard errors.

18. We have interpreted findings for those assessments that have a large enough sample (greater than 75 observations in this case).

Figure 12: Regional Ranking by Individual Assessment¹⁹

| The Global Integrity Report | The Ibrahim Index of African Governance | The International Budget Partnership's Open Budget Index | IFAD's Rural Sector Performance Assessment and PBAS |
|--|--|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. East Asia and Pacific (2.622) [74] 2. Sub-Saharan Africa (1.970) [132] 3. Europe and Central Asia (1.905) [74] 4. Middle East and North Africa (1.613) [62] 5. Latin America and the Caribbean (1.167) [24] 6. South Asia (1.143) [28] | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Middle East and North Africa (1.542) [24] 2. Sub-Saharan Africa (1.488) [447] | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. East Asia and Pacific (2.867) [15] 2. Europe and Central Asia (2.294) [17] 3. Middle East and North Africa (2.273) [11] 4. Sub-Saharan Africa (2.000) [33] 5. South Asia (1.917) [12] | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sub-Saharan Africa (2.508) [126] 2. Europe and Central Asia (2.333) [15] 3. Middle East and North Africa (2.136) [22] 4. South Asia (2.000) [13] 5. East Asia and Pacific (1.895) [19] 6. Latin America and the Caribbean (1.868) [38] |
| The MCC's Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards | Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index | The U.S. State Department's "Trafficking in Persons" Report | The World Economic Forum's "Global Competitiveness Report" |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sub-Saharan Africa (2.740) [504] 2. East Asia and Pacific (2.531) [143] 3. Latin America and the Caribbean (2.464) [166] 4. Europe and Central Asia (2.385) [200] 5. Middle East and North Africa (2.115) [96] 6. South Asia (1.652) [69] | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. East Asia and Pacific (3.950) [20] 2. Sub-Saharan Africa (3.242) [33] 3. Europe and Central Asia (2.735) [34] 4. Latin America and the Caribbean (2.500) [10] 5. Middle East and North Africa (2.250) [12] | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Europe and Central Asia (3.276) [29] 2. Sub-Saharan Africa (2.560) [25] 3. Latin America and the Caribbean (2.450) [20] 4. Middle East and North Africa (1.200) [10] | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. East Asia and Pacific (2.553) [188] 2. Europe and Central Asia (2.535) [273] 3. Sub-Saharan Africa (2.236) [415] 4. Latin America and the Caribbean (2.192) [281] 5. Middle East and North Africa (2.114) [166] 6. South Asia (1.670) [115] |
| The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report | The World Bank's CPIA and PBAS | The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators | |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Europe and Central Asia (3.382) [254] 2. Sub-Saharan Africa (3.061) [391] 3. East Asia and Pacific (2.844) [135] 4. Middle East and North Africa (2.532) [126] 5. Latin America and the Caribbean (2.471) [155] 6. South Asia (2.188) [80] | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sub-Saharan Africa (2.815) [314] 2. East Asia and Pacific (2.549) [71] 3. Europe and Central Asia (2.537) [82] 4. Middle East and North Africa (2.450) [20] 5. South Asia (2.295) [78] 6. Latin America and the Caribbean (2.182) [44] | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Europe and Central Asia (2.433) [150] 2. Sub-Saharan Africa (2.432) [266] 3. East Asia and Pacific (2.348) [115] 4. Latin America and the Caribbean (2.236) [110] 5. South Asia (1.857) [77] 6. Middle East and North Africa (1.856) [111] | |

Notes: Agenda-setting influence (in parentheses) is on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means "No influence at all" and 5 means "Maximum Influence". The numbers of observations are in brackets. Only those countries with at least 10 observations are included

19. Some governance assessments had very few respondents who evaluated them (e.g., 10 respondents from the Middle East and North Africa evaluated the U.S. State Department's *Trafficking in Persons* report) and our estimates of agenda-setting influence for those assessments may suffer from imprecision for that reason. Thus, these rankings should be interpreted with caution.

6.2. The agenda-setting influence of governance data varies significantly by country.

Democratic countries appear to be more familiar with governance assessments. Does familiarity also imply more influence on policy reforms? We find that the five countries where governance assessments are the most influential are full-fledged democracies (except Sri Lanka)²⁰, and the democracy score tends to decrease as we move down the list (see Figure 13). Similarly, we find that countries least influenced by governance assessments also have poor scores on democracy as well, though exceptions do exist (e.g., Brazil). This lends support to a point raised


by several producers of governance data: when domestic policymakers are unwilling to engage in policy reform, there is little room for external assessments to influence change.

Even in countries where governance data has yet to gain visibility and salience, there are some assessments that respondents perceived to be highly influential. For example, MCC's Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards are highly influential in El Salvador, as is the World Bank's CPIA and PBAS in Rwanda.²¹ These two assessments were also rated as "highly influential" by the largest number of countries – 16 and 22 countries, respectively (see Figure 14).

20. Defined as those with a Polity2 score higher than 6.

21. These estimates should be interpreted with caution, given the small number of respondents that evaluated these assessments.

Figure 13: Ranking of Counties by Agenda-Setting Influence of Governance Assessments



Notes: Agenda-setting influence is on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means “No influence at all” and 5 means “Maximum Influence”. The number of observations is reported in brackets. Only those countries with at least 10 observations are included.

Figure 14: Assessment-wise Country Ranking by Agenda-Setting Influence

| The Global Integrity Report | The Ibrahim Index of African Governance | The MCC's Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards | The World Economic Forum's "Global Competitiveness Report" | The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report | The World Bank's CPIA and PBAS | The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators |
|---|--|---|--|---|--|--|
| <p>1. Philippines (3.33) [27]</p> | <p>1. Sierra Leone (2.350) [20] 2. Namibia (2.308) [13] 3. Mozambique (2.083) [12] 4. Tanzania (2.000) [12]</p> | <p>1. Burkina Faso (3.778) [18] 2. Salvador (3.76) [22] 3. Philippines (3.589) [20] 4. Cuba (3.570) [19] 5. Barb (3.619) [21] 6. Sierra Leone (3.500) [14] 7. Côte D'Ivoire (3.462) [13] 8. Vanuatu (3.412) [17] 9. Morocco (3.308) [13] 10. Senegal (3.286) [14] 11. Niger (3.273) [22] 12. Madagascar (3.267) [30] 13. Albania (3.250) [12] 14. Georgia (3.147) [34] 15. Mali (3.143) [14] 16. Tanzania (3.118) [17] 17. Ghana (3.038) [28] 18. Liberia (3.024) [41]</p> | <p>1. Kazakhstan (3.638) [11] 2. Macedonia (3.58) [22] 3. Philippines (3.589) [20] 4. Turkey (3.563) [11] 5. Sierra Leone (3.500) [14] 6. Montenegro (3.231) [13] 7. Tunisia (3.087) [15]</p> | <p>1. Laos (3.00) [10] 2. Rwanda (3.14) [4] 3. Uganda (3.120) [25] 4. Liberia (3.083) [12]</p> | <p>1. Philippines (3.179) [28] 2. Georgia (3.176) [7] 3. Liberia (3.083) [12]</p> | |
| <p>2. Liberia (2.636) [11] 3. Indonesia (2.583) [24] 4. Nigeria (2.653) [16] 5. Malawi (2.200) [10] 6. Kenya (2.083) [12]</p> | <p>19. Moldova (3.000) [28] 20. Namibia (2.846) [13] 21. Mozambique (2.833) [12] 22. Jordan (2.808) [26] 23. Guatemala (2.789) [19] 24. Peru (2.769) [13] 25. Zambia (2.767) [30] 26. Malawi (2.750) [28] 27. Paraguay (2.719) [14] 28. Honduras (2.639) [22] 29. Armenia (2.633) [38] 30. Ethiopia (2.627) [15] 31. Kyrgyzstan (2.500) [16] 32. Burundi (2.467) [15] 33. Guyana (2.462) [31] 34. Serbia (2.182) [11] 35. Indonesia (2.143) [21] 36. Timor-Leste (2.091) [11] 37. Bangladesh (2.087) [15] 38. Kenya (2.063) [16] 39. Mongolia (2.000) [13]</p> | <p>8. Egypt (3.000) [16] 9. Jamaica (3.000) [14] 10. Morocco (3.000) [13] 11. Senegal (3.000) [10] 12. Armenia (2.957) [23] 13. Indonesia (2.952) [42] 14. Peru (2.950) [20] 15. Bulgaria (2.909) [11] 16. Rwanda (2.882) [17] 17. Paraguay (2.842) [19] 18. Thailand (2.800) [10] 19. Georgia (2.752) [12] 20. Nigeria (2.671) [31] 21. Moldova (2.625) [24] 22. Serbia (2.533) [15] 23. Kenya (2.519) [21] 24. Colombia (2.526) [19] 25. Dominican Republic (2.526) [19] 26. Jordan (2.526) [38] 27. Guatemala (2.467) [30] 28. Uganda (2.412) [17] 29. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2.385) [13] 30. Malawi (2.286) [14] 31. Ghana (2.231) [13] 32. Liberia (2.200) [15] 33. Honduras (2.190) [21] 34. Ethiopia (2.167) [18] 35. Turkey (2.136) [22] 36. Cambodia (2.133) [15] 37. Haiti (2.115) [28] 38. Nicaragua (2.111) [18] 39. Mongolia (2.077) [13] 40. Palestine (2.063) [16] 41. El Salvador (2.000) [20]</p> | <p>1. Georgia (4.077) [26] 2. Kazakhstan (4.000) [35] 3. Macedonia (4.000) [10] 4. Turkey (4.000) [21] 5. Senegal (3.938) [16] 6. Burkina Faso (3.765) [17] 7. Philippines (3.759) [28] 8. Armenia (3.750) [20] 9. Tanzania (3.700) [10] 10. DRC (3.667) [12] 11. Kyrgyzstan (3.500) [14] 12. Liberia (3.500) [24] 13. Tajikistan (3.471) [17] 14. Sierra Leone (3.455) [11] 15. Moldova (3.409) [22] 16. Zambia (3.368) [18] 17. Nigeria (3.313) [16] 18. Rwanda (3.278) [18] 19. Colombia (3.273) [11] 20. Peru (3.167) [12] 21. Kosovo (3.074) [27]</p> | <p>6. Ethiopia (2.938) [16] 7. Ghana (2.938) [16] 8. Burundi (2.909) [11] 9. Honduras (2.833) [12] 10. Malawi (2.800) [15] 11. Armenia (2.700) [10] 12. Zambia (2.625) [16] 13. Nigeria (2.611) [18] 14. Kenya (2.417) [12] 15. Kosovo (2.417) [12] 16. El Salvador (2.727) [11] 17. Burundi (2.692) [13] 18. Yemen (2.588) [18] 19. Afghanistan (2.400) [20] 20. Mexico (2.333) [18] 21. Malawi (2.182) [11] 22. Tunisia (2.169) [11] 23. Kosovo (2.176) [17] 24. Brazil (2.000) [10] 25. Kenya (2.000) [12]</p> | <p>21. Sudan (1.800) [10] 22. Bangladesh (1.727) [11] 23. DRC (1.700) [10] 24. Pakistan (1.687) [12] 25. Haiti (1.300) [10]</p> | |
| <p>7. Jordan (1.800) [10] 8. Guatemala (1.288) [14] 9. Bangladesh (1.288) [14] 10. Yemen (1.154) [13] 11. Iraq (0.923) [15]</p> | <p>40. Yemen (1.867) [15] 41. Mauritania (1.769) [13] 42. Rwanda (1.706) [17] 43. Nigeria (1.300) [10] 44. Tajikistan (1.300) [10] 45. Haiti (1.162) [11] 46. Afghanistan (1.000) [22] 47. Nepal (1.000) [11]</p> | <p>46. Bangladesh (1.846) [13] 47. Syria (1.071) [14] 48. Iraq (0.632) [19]</p> | <p>46. Bangladesh (1.846) [13] 47. Syria (1.071) [14] 48. Iraq (0.632) [19]</p> | <p>21. Sudan (1.800) [10] 22. Bangladesh (1.727) [11] 23. DRC (1.700) [10] 24. Pakistan (1.687) [12] 25. Haiti (1.300) [10]</p> | <p>22. Ethiopia (1.909) [11] 23. Angola (1.900) [10] 24. Timor-Leste (1.800) [10] 25. Yemen (1.789) [19] 26. Jordan (1.643) [14] 27. Nepal (1.636) [11] 28. Haiti (1.598) [10] 29. PRC (1.584) [11] 30. Bulgaria (1.143) [14] 31. Pakistan (1.100) [10] 32. Nepal (0.875) [16]</p> | |
| <p>High Influence (>3)</p> | <p>Moderate Influence (2 - 3)</p> | <p>Low Influence (<2)</p> | | | | |

Notes: Agenda-setting influence is on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means "No influence at all" and 5 means "Maximum influence". Error bars indicate standard errors and the number of observations in brackets.

Based upon the experience of governance data producers and the broader literature on governance reforms in low- and middle-income countries, we tested various possible country characteristics that might drive the agenda-setting influence of a governance assessment. We find three environmental factors that influence a country’s use of governance data: breadth of domestic support for reform, high-level commitment to reform, and performance against governance indicators.²²

6.3. Governance assessments are more likely to exert influence on the direction and content of reform in countries with broad-based domestic coalitions of support for governance reform.


The presence of a broad coalition of governance reform supporters is often cited as a key factor that conditions the likelihood

of reform success (Andrews, 2015). The reason is simple. Successful implementation and institutionalization of governance reform usually requires mobilizing the efforts of many different types of actors: political authorizers, funders, implementers, coordinators, bridge-builders, evaluators, and so forth (Andrews, 2013).

We find that the agenda-setting influence of governance assessments increases with the number of domestic political groups identified by survey participants as actively promoting reform in their country (see Figure 15). Those respondents who indicated the presence of broad-based domestic support for reform, on average, reported governance assessments to be more influential in shaping public sector reform priorities.²³

Figure 15: Domestic Support for Governance Reform is Positively Associated with the Influence of Governance Assessments

Notes: Agenda-setting influence is on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means “No influence at all” and 5 means “Maximum influence”. Standard errors are indicated by error bars.



22. Using a series of OLS regressions, we identified the respondent-specific and country-specific factors that condition and mediate the influence of governance data on policy reforms. The results from our OLS regressions are reported in Table A-10 in Appendix A.

23. DOMESTIC SUPPORT is based upon the total number of domestic social and political groups (outside of the chief executive) identified by respondents as having expended substantial resources to support reform efforts. We find the breadth of domestic support for reform to be positively correlated with our measure of agenda-setting influence.


6.4. Governance data is more influential in countries that are demonstrably committed to governance reform.

Attempts to improve a country’s governance are unlikely to gain traction without reform-minded policymakers who are willing and able to devote adequate time, effort and resources to overcome passive or active resistance to change (Kosack and Fung, 2014; Sidel, 2014).²⁴ We find that agenda-setting

influence of governance data positively correlates with the reform commitment of the authorities. Participants rated the average influence score of governance assessments 0.6-0.9 points higher in countries where the government was reported to have attempted substantial or comprehensive governance reform, compared with those where the government only attempted minor reform (see Figure 16).

Figure 16: Commitment to Reform is Positively Associated with Influence of Governance Data

Notes: Agenda-setting influence is on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means “No influence at all” and 5 means “Maximum influence”. Standard errors are indicated by error bars.



6.5. Governance data has greater influence in countries that perform well on governance indicators.

Survey participants from countries that are strong performers on government effectiveness rate governance assessments as more influential than their counterparts in poorly-governed countries, on average. Respondents who worked in a country with a WGI government effectiveness score in

the top 25th percentile rated a governance assessment 0.5 points higher than those who worked in a country with a WGI score in the bottom 25th percentile (Figure 17).²⁵ Therefore, as governance data producers seek opportunities for expanded policy influence, they will likely have more success by engaging with reasonably well-governed countries that still have room for improvement.²⁶


24. The effects of SUBSTANTIAL REFORM and COMPREHENSIVE REFORM are both positive and significant (p<0.01). These variables are based upon whether a respondent reported that the government had attempted substantial or comprehensive reform in their policy domain.

25. We also used the WGI’s two other metrics of governance to see if we identify a similar pattern using variant measures of governance: rule of law (RULE OF LAW) and control of corruption (CONTROL OF CORRUPTION). We find that the effects of these variables on the perceived influence exerted by governance data are positive and significant at the conventional level (except for CONTROL OF CORRUPTION). Across all three indicators, respondents from the top quartile of countries found governance data to be much more influential.

26. We also tested if this positive relationship between the perceived influence of a governance assessment and countries’ governance performance holds for each individual assessment (See Table A-5 in the Appendix A). Overall, we find that respondents belonging to countries that score higher on governance performance than the median score as measured by a particular assessment tend to perceive that assessment as more influential (e.g., if the Philippines was above median score on government performance in the Global Integrity Index, respondents in the Philippines would perceive the Global Integrity Report to be more influential than respondents in a country that that scored below median in the index).

Figure 17: Governance Data More Influential in Countries with Effective Governments

Notes: Agenda-setting influence is on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means "No influence at all" and 5 means "Maximum influence". Standard errors are indicated by error bars. See footnote 13 for details.



In this section, we have examined several country-level drivers of governance data influence: domestic support for reform, commitment to reform, and governance performance. Probing further, we also analyzed which of these factors are most likely to affect the influence of specific assessments. We find broadly similar results:

the breath of domestic support for reform and the reform commitment exhibited by a partner country’s government are the two country attributes most likely to positively impact the ability of a governance assessment to influence the reform agenda (see Figure A-2 in Appendix A).

7. Conclusion:

How can producers of governance data improve uptake and impact?

Producers of governance data have substantially different motivations, tools and processes for assessing the quality of governance in countries around the world (Wilde, 2011). This report has drawn upon the experience of nearly 6,750 policymakers to better understand how governance data is – or is not – being used, by whom and to what end.

Three broad lessons emerge for governance data producers that want to maximize their ability to affect policy change. First, make assessment content as actionable as possible without shifting attention and effort away from solving de facto governance problems. Second, engage in-country actors in a more participatory process of diagnosing problems

and identifying innovative solutions. Finally, craft dissemination strategies to help create an enabling environment for reform – through direct engagement with reform-minded governments and by broadening reform coalitions where government is resistant to change.

As governance data producers look to operationalize these lessons in practice, they will need to adopt an approach of rapid iteration and adaptive learning. With this in mind, AidData and the Governance Data Alliance plan to field a snap poll in early 2016 that will build upon these early lessons with real-time feedback from domestic stakeholders that governance data producers seek to influence and support.

Appendices

Appendix A: Supplementary Tables and Figures

Table A-1. The Number of Respondents who Indicated their Familiarity with Each Governance Assessment, by Stakeholder Group

| Assessment Name | Host Government Officials | Development Partners | CSO/NGO | Private Sector | Country Expert | Totals |
|---|---------------------------|----------------------|-------------|----------------|----------------|--------|
| IFAD's Rural Sector Performance Assessment and PBAS | 137 (51.3%) | 56 (21.0%) | 25 (9.4%) | 7 (2.6%) | 42 (15.7%) | 267 |
| The Global Integrity Report | 123 (28.2%) | 104 (23.9%) | 98 (22.5%) | 4 (0.9%) | 107 (24.5%) | 436 |
| The Ibrahim Index of African Governance | 215 (40.6%) | 127 (24.0%) | 82 (15.5%) | 15 (2.8%) | 91 (17.2%) | 530 |
| The International Budget Partnership's Open Budget Index | 25 (25.0%) | 25 (25.0%) | 50 (50.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 100 |
| The MCC's Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards | 542 (41.5%) | 384 (29.4%) | 160 (12.3%) | 47 (3.6%) | 173 (13.3%) | 1306 |
| The U.S. State Department's "Trafficking in Persons" Report | 51 (54.8%) | 28 (30.1%) | 14 (15.1%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 93 |
| The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report | 459 (39.0%) | 305 (25.9%) | 83 (7.1%) | 74 (6.3%) | 256 (21.8%) | 1177 |
| The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators | 288 (31.5%) | 289 (31.6%) | 107 (11.7%) | 19 (2.1%) | 211 (23.1%) | 914 |
| The World Bank's CPIA and PBAS | 311 (45.5%) | 227 (33.2%) | 66 (9.7%) | 11 (1.6%) | 68 (10.0%) | 683 |
| The World Economic Forum's "Global Competitiveness Report" | 711 (45.0%) | 397 (25.1%) | 151 (9.6%) | 82 (5.2%) | 240 (15.2%) | 1581 |

Notes: We do not report information for assessments for which we did not have more than 10 respondents. These are *Freedom in the World Report* (Freedom House), *Freedom of the Press Index* (Freedom House), and *Index for Economic Freedom* (Heritage Foundation). These, along with *Corruption Perceptions Index* (Transparency International) were not routed in the survey but written in by respondents as assessments that informed the government's reform decisions

Table A-2. The Number of Respondents who Indicated their Familiarity with Each Governance Assessment, by Education Level

| Assessment Name | Secondary | Technical/ Vocational | College/ University | Postgraduate | Doctorate | Totals |
|---|-----------|--------------------------|------------------------|--------------|-------------|--------|
| IFAD's Rural Sector Performance Assessment and PBAS | 1 (0.4%) | 1 (0.4%) | 49 (20.9%) | 133 (56.8%) | 50 (21.4%) | 234 |
| The Global Integrity Report | 1 (0.3%) | 5 (1.3%) | 73 (18.4%) | 208 (52.4%) | 110 (27.7%) | 397 |
| The Ibrahim Index of African Governance | 1 (0.2%) | 3 (0.6%) | 89 (19.1%) | 256 (54.8%) | 118 (25.3%) | 467 |
| The International Budget Partnership's Open Budget Index | 0 (0.0%) | 1 (1.1%) | 24 (26.4%) | 53 (58.2%) | 13 (14.3%) | 91 |
| The MCC's Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards | 6 (0.5%) | 4 (0.3%) | 207 (17.7%) | 704 (60.2%) | 248 (21.2%) | 1169 |
| The U.S. State Department's "Trafficking in Persons" Report | 0 (0.0%) | 3 (3.5%) | 14 (16.3%) | 57 (66.3%) | 12 (14.0%) | 86 |
| The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report | 2 (0.2%) | 7 (0.7%) | 190 (17.9%) | 631 (59.4%) | 233 (21.9%) | 1063 |
| The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators | 2 (0.2%) | 6 (0.7%) | 120 (14.7%) | 446 (54.6%) | 243 (29.7%) | 817 |
| The World Bank's CPIA and PBAS | 2 (0.3%) | 1 (0.2%) | 93 (15.3%) | 382 (62.6%) | 132 (21.6%) | 610 |
| The World Economic Forum's "Global Competitiveness Report" | 2 (0.1%) | 6 (0.4%) | 214 (15.0%) | 871 (61.1%) | 333 (23.4%) | 1426 |

Notes: We do not report information for assessments for which we did not have more than 10 respondents. These are *Freedom in the World Report* (Freedom House), *Freedom of the Press Index* (Freedom House), and *Index for Economic Freedom* (Heritage Foundation). These, along with *Corruption Perceptions Index* (Transparency International) were not routed in the survey but written in by respondents as assessments that informed the government's reform decisions

Table A-3. The Number of Respondents who Indicated their Familiarity with Each Governance Assessment, by the Proportion of Time Spent on Political Issues

| Assessment Name | 1/3≥Pr | 2/3≥Pr>1/3 | 1≥Pr>2/3 | Totals |
|---|-------------|-------------|------------|--------|
| IFAD's Rural Sector Performance Assessment and PBAS | 156 (70.3%) | 53 (23.9%) | 13 (5.9%) | 222 |
| The Global Integrity Report | 176 (54.5%) | 104 (32.2%) | 43 (13.3%) | 323 |
| The Ibrahim Index of African Governance | 315 (72.9%) | 96 (22.2%) | 21 (4.9%) | 432 |
| The International Budget Partnership's Open Budget Index | 60 (60.6%) | 33 (33.3%) | 6 (6.1%) | 99 |
| The MCC's Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards | 692 (61.7%) | 330 (29.4%) | 99 (8.8%) | 1121 |
| The U.S. State Department's "Trafficking in Persons" Report | 58 (63.0%) | 26 (28.3%) | 8 (8.7%) | 92 |
| The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report | 557 (61.3%) | 257 (28.3%) | 94 (10.4%) | 908 |
| The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators | 396 (57.4%) | 215 (31.2%) | 79 (11.5%) | 690 |
| The World Bank's CPIA and PBAS | 433 (72.2%) | 151 (25.2%) | 16 (2.7%) | 600 |
| The World Economic Forum's "Global Competitiveness Report" | 857 (65.0%) | 359 (27.2%) | 102 (7.7%) | 1318 |

We do not report information for assessments for which we did not have more than 10 respondents. These are *Freedom in the World Report* (Freedom House), Freedom of the Press Index (Freedom House), and Index for Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation). These, along with Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International) were not routed in the survey but written in by respondents as assessments that informed the government's reform decisions. The second column ("1/3≥Pr") shows the number of respondents who spent less than a third of their time on political issues on an average work day. The third and fourth column corresponds to the number of respondents who spent between a third and two-thirds of their time, or greater than two-thirds of their time on political issues respectively.

Table A-4 shows the likelihood of familiarity depending on whether countries scored above or below the median score on government performance as evaluated by the assessment in question. We also conduct a simple difference-in-means test to evaluate whether respondents from a country with a score of a given assessment above its median score tend to be more familiar with the assessment than those respondents from a country with a score below its median. For instance, the average likelihood of familiarity for those respondents from a country that scored below median on the Global Competitiveness Report (3.727) is 34.8%

while the corresponding average for those respondents from a country with an index score above the median is 45.6% (See last row in Table A-4). This percentage difference (10.7%) is statistically significant ($p\text{-value}=0.000$). We find that for most assessments (except for the *Doing Business Report*), respondents tend to be more familiar with a governance assessment if they are from countries with higher-than-median scores. The differences in the likelihood of familiarity are especially pronounced for the *Global Integrity Report* (Global Integrity) and *Global Competitiveness Report* (World Economic Forum).

Table A-4: Assessment-wise Familiarity By Government Performance Score

| Assessment Name | <Median | ≥Median | Difference | p-value |
|--|---------|---------|------------|---------|
| The Global Integrity Report | 0.200 | 0.242 | 0.041 | 0.060 |
| The Ibrahim Index of African Governance | 0.350 | 0.376 | 0.026 | 0.352 |
| The International Budget Partnership's Open Budget Index | 0.218 | 0.235 | 0.017 | 0.699 |
| The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report | 0.560 | 0.543 | -0.017 | 0.492 |
| The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators | 0.339 | 0.351 | 0.012 | 0.572 |
| The World Bank's CPIA and PBAS | 0.228 | 0.246 | 0.018 | 0.296 |
| The World Economic Forum's "Global Competitiveness Report" | 0.348 | 0.456 | 0.107 | 0.000 |

Notes: This table presents the likelihood of familiarity for each assessment, comparing respondents in countries that received a score below or above the median score by the assessment in question. The average likelihoods reported in Column 2 ("<Median") shows the average proportion of respondents who indicated their familiarity with a given assessment if they were from a country with a score of the assessment below its median. Column 3 refers to the corresponding likelihood for respondents from countries with a score of the same assessment above the median. Column 4 reports the difference between these two likelihoods and Column 5 shows p-values associated with a difference-in-means test conducted on the likelihood differential. Included in this table are those assessments that produce a numerical index score which can then be used to compute the median. The following indices are used for this table: the Global Integrity Index (for the Global Integrity Report), overall Ibrahim Index score (for the Ibrahim Index of African Governance), Open Budget Index (for the Open Budget Index), Ease of Doing Business Index (for the Doing Business Report), WGI score in government effectiveness (for the World Governance Indicators), IDA Resource Allocation Index (for CPIA and PBAS), and Global Competitiveness Index (for the Global Competitiveness Report).

Table A-5 is a mirror image of Table A-4 but presents the average agenda-setting influence score of each governance assessment depending on whether countries scored above or below the median score on government performance as evaluated by the assessment in question.

We also conduct a simple difference-in-means test to evaluate whether respondents from a country that scores below the median score on an assessment perceive the assessment in question to be less influential, compared to respondents from a country with a score below the median. We find this to be the case.

For instance, those respondents who worked in a country with a score of the Global Integrity Index below the global median (64.351), on average, rated the agenda-setting influence of the Global Integrity Report at 1.784, 0.300 points below the average agenda-setting influence among those from a country with the index score above its median (2.084). The same pattern generally applies to the rest of the governance assessments (except for the Doing Business Report and the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index where the differentials are negative).

Table A-5: Assessment-wise Agenda-Setting Influence by Government Performance Score

| Assessment Name | <Median | ≥Median | Difference | p-value |
|---|---------|---------|------------|---------|
| The Global Integrity Report | 1.784 | 2.084 | 0.300 | 0.084 |
| The Ibrahim Index of African Governance | 1.508 | 1.638 | 0.130 | 0.370 |
| The International Budget Partnership's Open Budget Index | 2.116 | 2.248 | 0.132 | 0.709 |
| The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report | 3.130 | 2.873 | -0.257 | 0.013 |
| The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators | 2.233 | 2.480 | 0.247 | 0.033 |
| The World Bank's CPIA and PBAS | 2.725 | 2.771 | 0.046 | 0.719 |
| The World Economic Forum's "Global Competitiveness Report" | 2.261 | 2.649 | 0.387 | 0.000 |
| The Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index | 3.137 | 3.019 | -0.118 | 0.685 |

Notes: This table presents the agenda-setting influence score of each assessment, compared below or above its median score. The average likelihoods reported in Column 2 ("<Median") shows the average agenda-setting influence score of governance assessment among respondents from a country with a score of the assessment below its median. Column 3 refers to the corresponding agenda-setting influence score from countries with a score of the same assessment above its median. Column 4 reports the difference between these two likelihoods and Column 5 shows p-values associated with a difference-in-means test conducted on the likelihood differential. Included in this table are those assessments that produce an numerical index score which can then be used to compute the median. The following indices are used for this table: the Global Integrity Index (for the Global Integrity Report), overall Ibrahim Index score (for the Ibrahim Index of African Governance), Open Budget Index (for the Open Budget Index), Ease of Doing Business Index (for the Doing Business Report), WGI score in government effectiveness (for the World Governance Indicators), IDA Resource Allocation Index (for CPIA and PBAS), Global Competitiveness Index (for the Global Competitiveness Report), and the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (for the Transparency International). The Ease of Doing Business Index was only available for 2014.

Table A-6: Inputs and Outputs, by Assessment

A given assessment is coded as “Inputs and Outputs” if the assessment assesses both the existence of any inputs (i.e., official law, policy, rule, regulation, or institution) as part of its evaluation of governance performance and outcomes of such inputs (i.e., levels of corruption, inflation control, access to public services, etc.). An assessment is coded as “Outputs Only” if the assessment measures only the latter.

| Inputs and Outputs |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index The Global Integrity Report The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom The International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index The U.S. State Department’s “Trafficking in Persons” Report The World Bank and IFC’s Doing Business Report |
| Outputs Only |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> IFAD’s Rural Sector Performance Assessment and PBAS The Freedom House Freedom in the World Report The Ibrahim Index of African Governance The MCC’s Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards The World Bank’s CPIA and PBAS The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators The World Economic Forum’s “Global Competitiveness Report” Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index |

Table A-7: Prescriptive and Descriptive Assessments

A given assessment is coded as “prescriptive” if the assessment contains one or more explicit policy recommendations that relate how the government being assessed can improve its performance on the assessment. If not, the assessment is coded as “descriptive.”

| Prescriptive |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> IFAD’s Rural Sector Performance Assessment and PBAS The Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index The Global Integrity Report The International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index The U.S. State Department’s “Trafficking in Persons” Report The World Bank’s CPIA and PBAS The World Bank and IFC’s Doing Business Report |
| Descriptive |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Freedom House Freedom in the World Report The Ibrahim Index of African Governance The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom The MCC’s Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators The World Economic Forum’s “Global Competitiveness Report” Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index |

Table A-8: Primary Data and Secondary Data, by Assessment

A given assessment is coded as “Primary Data” if the assessment involves original data collection and does not rely exclusively on any secondary data. If the assessment is based exclusively on secondary data that are created by individuals or organizations other than those involved in the production of the assessment, it is coded as “Secondary Data.”

| Primary Data |
|--|
| IFAD’s Rural Sector Performance Assessment and PBAS The Freedom House Freedom in the World Report The Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index The Global Integrity Report The International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index The U.S. State Department’s “Trafficking in Persons” Report The World Bank’s CPIA and PBAS The World Bank and IFC’s Doing Business Report |
| Secondary Data |
| The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom The Ibrahim Index of African Governance The MCC’s Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators The World Economic Forum’s “Global Competitiveness Report” Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index |

Table A-9: Local Knowledge and Secondary Data (or External Experts), by Assessment

A given assessment is coded as “Local Knowledge” if it takes into account local stakeholders’ opinions or views by directly engaging with them (through interviews, questionnaires, forms, reports, etc.) in performance measurement or data collection; and coded as “Secondary Data or External Experts” otherwise.

| Local Knowledge |
|---|
| The Global Integrity Report The International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index The U.S. State Department’s “Trafficking in Persons” Report The World Bank’s CPIA and PBAS The World Bank and IFC’s Doing Business Report Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index |
| Secondary Data or External Experts |
| IFAD’s Rural Sector Performance Assessment and PBAS The Freedom House Freedom in the World Report The Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom The Ibrahim Index of African Governance The MCC’s Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators The World Economic Forum’s “Global Competitiveness Report” |

Table A-10: Drivers of Agenda-setting Influence of Governance Data

A given assessment is coded as “Primary Data” if the assessment involves original data collection and does not rely exclusively on any secondary data. If the assessment is


based exclusively on secondary data that are created by individuals or organizations other than those involved in the production of the assessment, it is coded as “Secondary Data.”

| Model | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|-------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Respondent-level Model | | | | | | |
| DOMESTIC | 0.093 | 0.092 | 0.093 | | 0.095 | 0.103 |
| SUPPORT | (0.016)*** | (0.016)*** | (0.016)*** | | (0.015)*** | (0.021)*** |
| CIVILIAN | | | | 0.276 | | |
| SUPPORT | | | | (0.093)*** | | |
| EXECUTIVE | -0.162 | -0.162 | -0.173 | -0.168 | -0.126 | -0.017 |
| OPPOSITION | (0.099) | (0.099) | (0.099)* | (0.101)* | (0.089) | (0.158) |
| SUBSTANTIAL | 0.400 | 0.401 | 0.400 | 0.436 | 0.337 | 0.345 |
| REFORM | (0.085)*** | (0.085)*** | (0.085)*** | (0.084)*** | (0.075)*** | (0.127)*** |
| COMPREHENSIVE | 0.539 | 0.547 | 0.541 | 0.620 | 0.509 | 0.432 |
| REFORM | (0.127)*** | (0.127)*** | (0.127)*** | (0.128)*** | (0.116)*** | (0.167)*** |
| I(1/3<POLI≤2/3) | 0.066 | 0.065 | 0.062 | 0.097 | 0.092 | 0.045 |
| | (0.082) | (0.082) | (0.082) | (0.082) | (0.074) | (0.120) |
| I(2/3<POLI≤1) | 0.055 | 0.060 | 0.059 | 0.066 | 0.084 | 0.450 |
| | (0.172) | (0.171) | (0.171) | (0.173) | (0.146) | (0.251)* |
| SEX | -0.006 | 0.006 | 0.003 | -0.008 | 0.012 | -0.026 |
| | (0.084) | (0.083) | (0.084) | (0.082) | (0.074) | (0.120) |
| Ph.D. | -0.339 | -0.335 | -0.336 | -0.281 | -0.256 | -0.380 |
| | (0.115)*** | (0.115)*** | (0.116)*** | (0.113)** | (0.106)** | (0.154)** |
| MA | -0.043 | -0.046 | -0.036 | -0.021 | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| | (0.091) | (0.091) | (0.090) | (0.089) | (0.083) | (0.124) |
| OECD | -0.221 | -0.219 | -0.219 | -0.247 | -0.222 | -0.177 |
| EDUCATION | (0.078)*** | (0.078)*** | (0.078)*** | (0.078)*** | (0.071)*** | (0.092)* |
| Country-level Model | | | | | | |
| POLITICAL | -0.026 | -0.075 | -0.006 | -0.020 | | -0.113 |
| INSTABILITY | (0.071) | (0.079) | (0.073) | (0.072) | | (0.095) |
| GOVT | 0.241 | | | 0.255 | | 0.135 |
| EFFECTIVENESS | (0.108)** | | | (0.108)** | | (0.148) |
| RULE OF LAW | | 0.310 | | | | |
| | | (0.123)** | | | | |
| CONTROL OF | | | 0.155 | | | |
| CORRUPTION | | | (0.121) | | | |
| POLITY2 | 0.006 | 0.003 | 0.008 | 0.010 | | 0.009 |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | | (0.012) |
| REGIME | 0.089 | 0.082 | 0.104 | 0.107 | | 0.117 |
| DURABILITY (ln) | (0.052)* | (0.052) | (0.052)** | (0.052)** | | (0.071) |

| Country-level Model | | | | | | |
|------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------|--------------------|
| ODA/GNI (ln) | 0.001 (0.004) | 0.000 (0.004) | -0.000 (0.004) | 0.001 (0.004) | | -0.001 (0.004) |
| POP (ln) | -0.045 (0.039) | -0.037 (0.038) | -0.021 (0.038) | -0.049 (0.039) | | -0.063 (0.053) |
| GDP PER CAPITA (ln) | -0.114 (0.061)* | -0.100 (0.060)* | -0.097 (0.062) | -0.130 (0.062)** | | -0.036 (0.082) |
| TRADE/GDP | -0.001 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.002) | | -0.000 (0.002) |
| FDI/GDP (ln) | 0.119 (0.043)*** | 0.104 (0.044)** | 0.110 (0.044)** | 0.105 (0.043)** | | 0.123 (0.056)** |
| R ² | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.21 | 0.30 | 0.21 |
| N | 4,258 | 4,258 | 4,258 | 4,383 | 4,702 | 2,080 |

Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses are all clustered by respondent. All the regression models control for policy-domain, region, position, and stakeholder fixed effects while Model (5) includes country-fixed effects instead of region-fixed effects. Models 1-5 include all respondents and Model 6 is restricted to host government officials only. Respondent-level variables included in the models are as follows: the sheer number of domestic stakeholder groups, as indicated by a respondent, that expended substantial resources to support reforms (DOMESTIC SUPPORT); a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a given respondent indicated that at least one of the civilian stakeholder groups (e.g., NGO/CSO or private sector councils) expended substantial resources to support reforms and 0 otherwise (CIVILIAN SUPPORT); a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a given respondent indicated that the executive branch (e.g., the head of the state, prime minister) expended resources to obstruct reforms (EXECUTIVE OPPOSITION) and 0 otherwise; a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a given respondent indicated that the government attempted substantial or comprehensive reforms (SUBSTANTIAL REFORM and COMPREHENSIVE REFORM, respectively) and 0 otherwise; a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a given respondent indicated that expended resources to obstruct a dummy variable coded 1 if the share of work time allocated to deal with political issues is greater 1/3 and less than or equal to 2/3 and 0 otherwise ($I(1/3 < POLI \leq 2/3)$); a dummy variable that is coded 1 if the share of allocated time is greater than 2/3 and less than or equal to 1 and 0 otherwise ($I(2/3 < POLI \leq 1)$); a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a given respondent is female and 0 otherwise (SEX); a dummy variable coded 1 if a given respondent held a Ph.D. and 0 otherwise (Ph.D.); a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a given respondent held a master's degree and 0 otherwise (MA); and lastly a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a given respondent received his/her highest degree in OECD countries and 0 otherwise (OECD EDUCATION). We also include the following country-level variables: WGI on absence of political violence, government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption (NO POLITICAL VIOLENCE, GOVT EFFECTIVENESS, RULE OF LAW, and CONTROL OF CORRUPTION, respectively); polity2 rating of democracy (Polity2); the natural log of the longevity of a given regime or the number of years since last regime change (REGIME DURABILITY); log of the share of ODA in GNI (ODA/GNI (ln)); log of population (POP (ln)); log of GDP per capita (GDP PER CAPITA (ln)); trade as a percentage of GDP (TRADE/GDP); log of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP (FDI/GDP (ln)). * <0.10 ; ** <0.05 ; *** <0.01 . All country-level variables are averaged for the period 2004-13.

Figure A-1. Senior Government Officials Are More Familiar with Governance Data than Technocrats



Notes: Likelihood of familiarity refers to the average proportion of government respondents who indicated their familiarity with the set of governance assessments they were asked to evaluate via the 2014 *Reform Efforts Survey*. Standard errors are indicated by error bars.

Figure A-2: Main Findings from Econometric Model, by Assessment

| | Domestic Reform Support | Reform Commitment | Government Effectiveness | FDI/GDP (<i>ln</i>) |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| The Global Integrity Report [237] | Blue | Grey | Grey | Grey |
| The Ibrahim Index of African Governance [322] | Blue | Grey | Grey | Grey |
| IFAD's Rural Sector Performance Assessment and PBAS [145] | Grey | Grey | Grey | Grey |
| The MCC's Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards [795] | Blue | Blue | Blue | Grey |
| The World Economic Forum's "Global Competitiveness Report" [995] | Blue | Blue | Blue | Grey |
| The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report [680] | Blue | Blue | Blue | Grey |
| The World Bank's CPIA and PBAS [421] | Blue | Blue | Grey | Grey |
| The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators [474] | Blue | Grey | Grey | Grey |

Notes: Blue shading indicates a positive effect at $p < 0.05$.

The number of observations contained in each assessment-specific multivariate model is indicated in brackets.

The models run here are identical to our baseline model (Model 1 in Table A.10 in the Appendix A) for all governance data, just re-run for each individual assessment. Assessments with fewer than 100 observations are excluded from the table, as our results are somewhat sensitive to sample size. Reform Commitment is a combination of Substantial Reform and Comprehensive Reform model results, which are identical at $p < 0.05$.

Appendix B: Weighting System for Data Aggregation

In order to generate unbiased and comprehensive aggregate statistics based on the individual respondent-level data, we employ non-response weights to account for unit non-response (or survey non-response). As discussed in the main text, the rate of survey response was approximately 15%, which cast doubt on the representativeness of our sample. To generate non-response weights, we take the following steps. First, we estimate the probability of survey response by using a logistic regression. For all members of our sampling frame, we have

information on their gender, country or type of institution in which they worked, and stakeholder groups they belonged to (e.g., host government officials, development partners, etc.). We use all these predictors to estimate the probability of survey response for each member of the sampling frame (as each of them turns out to be significant in predicting survey response). Second, we take the inverse of the estimated probability to arrive at the final non-response weights used for our analysis.

Appendix C: References

Andrews, M. (2013). *The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Andrews, M. (2015). Explaining Positive Deviance in Public Sector Reforms in Development. *World Development*, 74, 197-208.

Brockmyer, B. & J. Fox. (2015). *Assessing the Effectiveness: The Effectiveness and Impact of Public Governance-Oriented Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives*. Open Society Foundation.

Buch, B., M. Buntaine, & B. Parks. (2015). *Aiming at the Wrong Targets: The Difficulty of Improving Domestic Institutions with International Aid*. AidData Working Paper #4. Williamsburg, VA: AidData. Available at <http://aiddata.org/aiddata-working-paper-series>

Burnside, C. & D. Dollar. (2000). Aid, Policies, and Growth. *American Economic Review*, 90(4): 847-868.

Carothers, T. & S. Brechenmacher. (2014). *Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights Support Under Fire*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Carbone, G., Memoli, V., & L. Quartapelle (2012). Are lions democrats? The impact of democratization on economic growth in Africa, 1980-2010. Paper to be presented at the XXVI Congress of the Società Italiana di Scienza Politica.

Cruz, C. & P. Keefer. (2015). *Political Parties, Clientelism and Bureaucratic Reform*. IDB Working Paper Series: 604. Inter-American Development Bank.

Custer, S., Rice, Z., Masaki, T., Latourell, R. & B. Parks. (2015). *Listening to Leaders: Which Development Partners Do They Prefer and Why?* Williamsburg, VA: AidData. <http://aiddata.org/listening-to-leaders>.

Governance Data Alliance. (2015). Vision Paper.

Hyden, G. (2011). Making the State Responsive: Rethinking Governance Theory and Practice. In: Making the State Responsive: Experience with Democratic Governance Assessments. Goran Hyden and John Samuel (Eds.) New York: UNDP.

Kaufmann, D. & A. Kraay. (2015). Worldwide Governance Indicators. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx>

Kelley, Judith G. and Beth A. Simmons. 2014. The Power of Performance Indicators: Rankings, Ratings and Reactivity in International Relations. Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 27-September 1, 2014, Washington DC

Kosack, S. & A. Fung. (2014). Does Transparency Improve Governance? Annual Review of Political Science, 17: 65-87.

Milner, H. V. (2006). Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-Agent Problems. In Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney (Eds.), Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Minoiu, C. & S. G. Reddy. (2008). Development Aid and Economic Growth: A Positive Long-Run Relation. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 50(2): 27-39.

Nanda, V. P. (2006). The "Good Governance" Concept Revisited. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 603(1): 269-283.

North (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

OECD. (2009). Donor Approaches to Governance Assessments. 2009 Sourcebook. <http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance/govassessment>.

----- (2009). Donor Approaches to Governance Assessments: Guiding Principles for Enhanced Impact, Usage and Harmonisation.

Oia, I. (2011). Squaring Governance Assessments with the Accountability Agenda. Rethinking Governance Theory and Practice. In: Making the State Responsive: Experience with Democratic Governance Assessments. Goran Hyden and John Samuel (Eds.) New York: UNDP.

Parks, B., Z. Rice, & S. Custer. (2015). Marketplace of Ideas for Policy Change: Who do Developing World Leaders Listen to and Why? Williamsburg, VA: AidData and The College of William and Mary. Available at <http://www.aiddata.org/marketplace-of-ideas-for-policy-change>

Pritchett, L., Woolcock, M. & M. Andrews. (2010). Capability Traps? The Mechanisms of Persistent Implementation Failures. Center for Global Development Working Paper: 234. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.

Reboot. (2015). Using Data to Influence Government Decisions: Opportunities and Challenges for User-Centered Design to Improve Governance Data Impact. New York: Reboot.

Rodrik, D. (1996). Why Is There Multilateral Lending? In Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Sidel, J. T. (2014). Achieving Reforms in Oligarchical Democracies: The Role of Leadership and Coalitions in the Philippines. Research Working Paper: 27. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham.

UNDP. (2007) Governance Indicators: A Users' Guide (2nd Ed.). Oslo, Norway: UNDP Oslo Governance Centre.

----- (2008). A Users' Guide to Measuring Corruption. Oslo, Norway: UNDP Oslo Governance Centre.

Van De Walle, N. (2001). African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

World Bank. (1989). From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long Term Perspective Study. Washington, DC: World Bank.

----- (2001). World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty. Washington, DC: World Bank.

----- (2004). World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for the Poor. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Wilde, A. (2011). The Democratization of Governance Assessments. Rethinking Governance Theory and Practice. In: Making the State Responsive: Experience with Democratic Governance Assessments. Goran Hyden and John Samuel (Eds.) New York: UNDP.



GOVERNANCE
DATA ALLIANCE