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# Methodology

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Prior to fielding the 2014 *Reform Efforts Survey*, our research team spent nearly five years preparing a sampling frame of approximately 55,000 host government and development partner officials, civil society leaders, private sector representatives, and independent experts from 126 low- and lower-middle income countries and semi-autonomous territories. In this appendix, we provide an overview of our methodology and describe key attributes of our sampling frame construction, questionnaire design, survey implementation, and data aggregation processes.

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# Appendix A: Methodology

Prior to fielding the 2014 *Reform Efforts Survey*, our research team spent nearly five years preparing a sampling frame of approximately 55,000 host government and development partner officials, civil society leaders, private sector representatives, and independent experts from 126 low- and lower-middle income countries and semi-autonomous territories.<sup>1</sup> In this appendix, we provide an overview of our methodology and describe key attributes of our sampling frame construction, questionnaire design, survey implementation, and data aggregation processes.

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## A.1 Defining the Population of Interest

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While the *true* global population of development policymakers and practitioners is for all intents and purposes unobservable, we took painstaking efforts to identify a well-defined and observable population of interest. We define this population of interest as including those individuals who are knowledgeable about the formulation and implementation of government policies and programs in low- and lower-middle income countries at any point between 2004 and 2013. For more information on sampling frame inclusion criteria, see Appendix C.

In recognition of the need for cross-country comparability and the fact that every government consists of a unique set of institutions and leadership positions, we identified our population of interest by first mapping country-specific public sector institutions (and leadership positions within those institutions) back to an ideal-typical developing country government. This ideal-typical government consisted of 33 institution types, such as a Ministry of Finance, a Supreme Audit Institution, and a National Statistical Office (see Appendix C). We then identified functionally equivalent leadership positions within these institutions, and the specific individuals who held these positions between 2004 and 2013. For the four additional stakeholder groups that we included in our sampling frame (in-country development partners, domestic civil society and non-governmental organizations, private sector associations, and independent experts), we undertook a similar process of first mapping country-specific institutions and positions, and then identifying the individuals who held those positions between 2004 and 2013.

1. For the purposes of this study, semi-autonomous territories (e.g., Kurdistan) are treated as separate entities from the countries that contain them (e.g., Iraq). The 2014 Reform Efforts Survey was framed to ask individuals from semi-autonomous territories about reforms undertaken by the government in that semi-autonomous territory.

Identifying functional equivalents at the institution- and leadership position-level resulted in a sampling frame that enables comparison across countries. In addition, by clearly defining a population of interest and constructing a master sampling frame that is stratified by country, stakeholder group, and institution type, we managed to overcome one of the most vexing challenges associated with expert panels and opinion leader surveys: the absence of detailed demographic data and the inability to assess the representativeness of findings at various levels. The stratification of our master sampling frame by country, stakeholder group, and institution type makes it possible to generate extremely granular elite survey data that can be published at varying levels of disaggregation without compromising participant confidentiality. It also enables analysis of the factors that influence participation rates as well as the underlying sources of response bias. A more detailed description of the master sampling frame can be found in Appendix C.

## A.2 Creating the Sampling Frame

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Our ability to select individuals from the population of interest for inclusion in our final sampling frame was constrained by the availability of individual contact information. We identified the contact information of potential survey participants using publicly available resources, such as organizational websites and directories, international conference records, Who's Who International, and public profiles on LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter. We successfully identified the individual contact information of approximately 68% of the population of interest, including 65% of host government officials, 61% of private sector representatives, 77% of development partner staff, and 79% of independent country experts.<sup>2</sup> We have attempted to correct for potential biases that may result from variation in contact availability, country sample size, and participation rates by implementing the weighting system described in Section A.5.<sup>3</sup>

## A.3 Designing the Survey Questionnaire

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The methods described in Weisberg (2005) and Dillman et al. (2009) informed the design and evaluation of the questions included in the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey*. We drafted an initial set of questions based on similar surveys previously undertaken by the AsDB, WB, the IMF's IEO, and Princeton University's Task Force on the Changing Nature of Government Service (Volcker 2009; IMF 2009; and AsDB 2010). We then updated these questions according to lessons learned from the *2012 MCA Stakeholder Survey* (Parks and Rice 2013).

2. We also had an unusually high success rate (70.04%) for finding the contact information of domestic CSO/NGO representatives. This is in part because, given the small size of many CSOs and NGOs, we considered an organizational email address sufficiently specific to include a CSO/NGO individual in our sampling frame. This was not true for members of any other stakeholder group, for whom we required a personal email address.

3. This pattern in contact availability was exacerbated by stakeholder-group specific trends in survey receipt and participation rates (see Section B.1.2).

We evaluated all questions according to several criteria, including: (1) salience and clarity, (2) consistent interpretation, (3) avoiding oversimplification, (4) sufficient context, and (5) testing for potential response and non-responses biases.<sup>4</sup> The design of the survey web interface was informed by Couper (2008) and guided by the additional experience of NORC at the University of Chicago. We conducted pre-testing of English-language questionnaire drafts and a web-based survey instrument via in-person cognitive interviews with current and former development policymakers, practitioners, and scholars. Survey translations and the foreign-language online interface were tested in-person and remotely via a personalized hyperlink. For more information on survey questionnaire design, see Appendix D.

### A.4 Survey Implementation

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We administered the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey* between May and August 2014. Survey implementation was again guided by the Weisberg total survey error approach and the Dillman tailored design method.<sup>5</sup> Survey recipients were sent a tailored email invitation to participate in the survey that included a unique link to the online questionnaire. During the course of the survey administration period, survey recipients received up to three different automated electronic reminders, as well as some additional tailored reminders. Survey participants were able to take the survey in one of five languages: English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Russian.<sup>6</sup>

Of the 54,990 individuals included in the sampling frame, we successfully sent a survey invitation to the email inbox of over 43,427 sampling frame members.<sup>7</sup> From this cohort of survey recipients, 6,731 participated, yielding an overall, individual-level survey participation rate of approximately 15.5%.<sup>8</sup>

4. For example, early survey questionnaire drafts included a question on the influence of external assessments of government performance on reform *implementation* efforts. After pre-testing and evaluation, it became evident that the idea of “influence in reform implementation” did not resonate with survey recipients.

5. Parks served as the Principal Investigator. This research was approved by the PHSC of the College of William & Mary under protocol #PHSC-2013-10-17-9041-bcpark.

6. A professional translation company, Full Circle Translations—as well as several professional freelance translators and native and fluent speakers—conducted translation of the survey materials.

7. 25,919 survey recipients are currently—or have previously been—employed by developing country governments.

8. This observable figure of 15.5% is almost certainly an underestimate of the true, individual-level participation rate. At the time of survey implementation, we were unable to verify whether an intended survey recipient’s email address was currently in-use. It should also be noted that, throughout this report, we employ the terms “participant” and “participation rate” interchangeably with the terms of “respondent” and “response rate.”

To put this participation rate in its appropriate context, it should be noted that:

- Elite survey participation rates are usually not high, particularly when they are conducted online.<sup>9</sup>
- High individual participation rates are difficult to achieve in developing countries due to participation obstacles such as electricity outages, limited Internet access, weak privacy protections, and linguistic heterogeneity (Couper 2000: 474; Stecklov and Weinreb 2010).
- Our goal was to maximize survey coverage across “country-policy domain” pairs rather than to obtain a high individual-level participation rate.<sup>10</sup> Out of 3,024 possible country-policy domain pairs, the country-policy domain coverage rate was approximately 60%.<sup>11</sup> After collapsing specific policy domains into broader policy areas (i.e., economic policy, governance, social and environmental policy, and general), the country-policy coverage rate increases to above 98% (with at least 1 participant).<sup>12</sup>

## A.5 Weighting System for Data Aggregation

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In order to generate unbiased and comprehensive aggregate statistics based on individual respondent-level data, we employ a two-stage weighting scheme, as needed. The purpose of the weighting process is to give equal weight to every country-policy area (i.e. economic, governance, social and environmental, and general) pair in all aggregate statistics.

As pertains to global performance of individual development partners, unweighted statistics based on raw response data would likely exhibit bias in favor of Western development partners, assistance, and advice and against non-Western development partners, assistance, and advice. This is due to (1) uneven participant counts by country and (2) the construction of the sampling frame itself: non-Western donor staff and officials from closed and autocratic states proved more difficult to identify and contact. We expect that an average survey participant has more interaction and socialization with Western development partners than the overall population and tends to work in countries and policy areas in which Western development partners have had relatively higher presence and influence.

Pro-Western bias aside, response counts vary greatly between countries and policy areas. A dual purpose of the weighting scheme is to ensure that our global statistics accurately capture (1) the global influence of an individual development partner as measured in an average country and (2) the performance of an average development partner in a single country as measured across *multiple* policy areas.

9. Individual-level participation rates to email surveys are typically low (Sheehan 2006; Shih and Fan 2008). Elite survey participation rates also tend to be low, falling in the 10 to 30% range (Gabre-Madhin and Haggblade 2001; Bishin et al. 2006; Jones et al. 2008; Ban and Vandenabeele 2009; Volcker 2009; Gray and Slapin 2012; Ellinas and Suleiman 2012; Pew Research Center 2012; Hafner-Burton et al. 2014; and Avey and Desch 2014).

10. By mapping institution types to expected policy domains, we were able to send targeted outreach and reminder messages to survey recipients during the survey activation period. This helped us to maximize our survey coverage, measured by participation at the level of country-policy domain dyad.

11. This figure includes foreign policy as a 24th policy domain. Foreign policy experts were treated as policy generalists for the purposes of the survey questionnaire.

12. Survey participants were asked about their experience within in one of 23 policy domains, which were then aggregated into four policy areas: economic (macroeconomic management; finance, credit, and banking; trade; business regulatory environment; investment; labor; energy and mining; and infrastructure), governance (land, decentralization, anti-corruption and transparency, democracy, civil service, justice and security, tax, customs, and public expenditure management), social and environmental (health, education, family and gender, social protection and welfare, environmental protection, and agriculture and rural development), and general (foreign policy and general policy).

Here is a specific example. To counteract expected pro-Western bias and provide truly global measures of individual development partner performance, we conduct a separate, two-stage weighting process using data and response counts specific to each development partner. In the first stage, we up-weight all responses so that each country receives equal weight in the calculation of our global statistics. These country-level weights are calculated by finding the inverse proportion of the number of responses from a country against the maximum number of responses found in a single country across all sample countries.

In the second stage, we give equal weight to all policy area responses within each sample country. In-country policy area weights are calculated using the inverse proportion of the number of responses from a policy area within a country against the maximum number of responses found in a single policy area in that same country. In-country policy area weights are then incorporated into global development partner performance statistics via a two-step procedure. First, they are multiplied by the appropriate country-level weights from the first stage of the overall weighting process. Then the product of the two weights is rescaled to ensure that countries still receive equal weight in the global statistics.

Country-level data aggregation requires in-country policy area weighting, but not weighting across countries. This is because country-level statistics do not combine data from multiple countries and, therefore, only involve in-country policy area weighting. Thus, to compute the performance estimate of an average development partner working in a single country, we first calculate each individual development partner's performance using in-country policy area weighting. Then we compute the average of these performance estimates across all development partners.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Depending on the applicable level of aggregation, all other survey-based statistics used in this report employ a version of this weighting scheme.

# The Sampling Frame and Survey Participation

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One of the unique characteristics of the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey* is the degree to which it provides data on the demographic, professional, and educational attributes of sampling frame members, survey recipients, and survey participants.

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# Appendix B: The Sampling Frame and Survey Participation

One of the unique characteristics of the 2014 *Reform Efforts Survey* is the degree to which it provides data on the demographic, professional, and educational attributes of sampling frame members, survey recipients, and survey participants. Given the systematic way in which the sampling frame was constructed, we are able to evaluate the overall representativeness of the sample of survey participants on three dimensions: sex, stakeholder group, and country. Data collected through the survey itself then provides additional insight into the professional and educational backgrounds and associations of survey participants.

## B.1 The Representativeness of the Survey Participant Sample

The true global population of development policymakers and practitioners is factually unobservable. Thus, we are unable to evaluate the extent to which the sampling frame, recipient, or participant sample is representative of the global population. However, we can investigate the extent to which three demographic characteristics of survey recipients: sex, stakeholder group, and country, may have impacted the likelihood of survey participation. In this section, we compare the survey participant sample against both the recipient sample and master sampling frame.

### B.1.1 Survey Recipient and Participant Distribution by Sex

Table B.1 indicates that the global recipient sample included 30,926 male and 12,513 female survey recipients, a ratio of roughly 247 males per every 100 females. This ratio, though significantly higher than the 101:100 male-to-female ratio in the general world population, almost certainly reflects the patriarchalism of public sector staffing in developing countries (World Bank 2011, 2014). Despite significant differences in male and female participation rates, the male-to-female ratio among survey participants was only slightly higher than that of both sampling frame members and survey recipients. 4,968 males and 1,763 females participated in the survey, yielding a male-to-female ratio among participants of 282:100.

**Table B.1:**  
The Sex of Sampling Frame Members, by Level of Participation in Survey

	Sampling Frame		Recipient Sample		Participants	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Female	15412	28.03%	12513	28.81%	1763	26.19%
Male	39578	71.97%	30926	71.19%	4968	73.81%

## B.1.2 Survey Recipient and Participant Distribution by Stakeholder Group

Table B.2 shows the distribution and number of sampling frame members, survey recipients, and survey participants by each of the five stakeholder groups: host government officials, development partner staff, NGO/CSO leaders, private sector representatives, and independent country experts. Analysis of the participant sample vis-à-vis the recipient sample finds that we have lower than expected participation rates among host government officials and private sector representatives, and higher than expected participation rates among development partner staff, CSO/NGO leaders, and independent experts. Despite this, the overall distribution of survey participants by stakeholder group suggests that, at the stakeholder group level, our sample of survey participants is representative of the sampling frame.

**Table B.2:**  
Sampling Frame Members,  
Survey Recipients, and  
Survey Participants

	# in Sampling Frame	% of Sampling Frame	# in Recipient Sample	% of Recipient Sample	# of Participants	% of Participants
<b>Overall</b>	54,990		43,439		6,731	
<b>Host Government</b>	33,723	61.33%	25,919	59.67%	3,400	50.51%
<b>Development Partners</b>	9,728	17.69%	8,371	19.27%	1,469	21.82%
<b>CSO/NGO</b>	4,416	8.03%	3,362	7.74%	737	10.95%
<b>Private Sector</b>	3,204	5.83%	2,610	6.01%	318	4.72%
<b>Independent Experts</b>	3,919	7.13%	3,177	7.31%	807	11.99%

For example, while 59.67% of the survey recipient sample is made up of host government officials, 50.51% of the participants in the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey* are from this same stakeholder group. Whereas development partner officials make up 19.27% of the survey recipient sample, they represent 21.82% of the survey participant sample. A similar pattern is observed among civil society representatives. Additionally, rather than suggest bias, our survey results indicate that we managed to secure the participation of a broad and representative cross-section of development policymakers and practitioners across each of the five different stakeholder groups.

## B.1.3 Survey Recipient and Participant Distribution by Country

Table B.3 indicates the count and share of sampling frame members, survey recipients, and survey participants by country. As shown in Figure B.1, the distribution of survey recipients by country demonstrates a roughly normal distribution with a country mean of 345 and a median of 359.5 survey recipients. The five largest recipient sample country strata include Ecuador (784), Afghanistan (768), Indonesia (690), Morocco (667), and Georgia (573). Small islands (e.g., Cape Verde), semi-autonomous states (e.g., Puntland, Somaliland, and Zanzibar), and repressive regimes (e.g., Turkmenistan and North Korea) account for the smallest sample countries.

The distribution of survey participants by country largely mirrors this pattern. The five countries with the largest number of survey participants include Afghanistan (196), Georgia (131), Jordan (131), Haiti (113), and Liberia (109), while the five countries with the smallest number of survey participants include Zanzibar (3), Equatorial Guinea (9), Puntland (9), Somaliland (12), and Cuba (13). The correlation between the percent of survey recipients and the percent of survey participants by country is both strong ( $r=0.767$ ) and significant ( $p<0.01$ ).

The results in Table B.3 demonstrate that we did obtain relatively high numbers of responses from nearly all sample countries. Between the overall survey recipient and participant samples, the coefficient of variation in country-specific sample size increases from 44.18% to 55.49%; however, we find no evidence that this result owes its explanation to low levels of response in smaller sample countries.<sup>14</sup> Nor do we find that the variation in participant country sample size is attributable to unusually high levels of response from already large sample countries.

Fig. B.1: The Distribution of Survey Recipients by Sample Country




Table B.3: Sampling Frame Members, Survey Recipients, and Participants by Country<sup>15</sup>

ISO-3 Country	# in Sampling Frame	% in Sampling Frame	# of Recipients	% of Recipients	# of Participants	% of Participants	% Change: Sampling Frame to Participants
AFG Afghanistan	927	1.69%	768	1.77%	196	2.91%	+72.30%
ALB Albania	505	0.92%	373	0.86%	59	0.88%	-4.72%
DZA Algeria	365	0.66%	298	0.69%	40	0.59%	-9.96%
AGO Angola	504	0.92%	365	0.84%	46	0.68%	-25.72%
ARM Armenia	532	0.97%	414	0.95%	93	1.38%	+42.44%
AZE Azerbaijan	500	0.91%	364	0.84%	45	0.67%	-26.53%
BGD Bangladesh	550	1.00%	466	1.07%	68	1.01%	+1.03%
BLR Belarus	210	0.38%	206	0.47%	24	0.36%	-6.17%
BLZ Belize	225	0.41%	163	0.38%	39	0.58%	+41.32%
BEN Benin	440	0.80%	338	0.78%	40	0.59%	-25.72%
BTN Bhutan	251	0.46%	192	0.44%	43	0.64%	+38.88%
BOL Bolivia	511	0.93%	487	1.12%	63	0.94%	+0.64%
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina	501	0.91%	417	0.96%	78	1.16%	+27.34%
BWA Botswana	272	0.49%	249	0.57%	24	0.36%	-27.23%
BRA Brazil	568	1.03%	461	1.06%	53	0.79%	-23.55%
BGR Bulgaria	410	0.75%	365	0.84%	54	0.80%	+6.97%
BFA Burkina Faso	537	0.98%	415	0.96%	64	0.95%	-2.98%
BDI Burundi	497	0.90%	366	0.84%	54	0.80%	-10.86%

14. We find an insignificant correlation of -0.166 between the size of a sample country recipient stratum and that country's participation rate. This suggests that smaller sample countries did not, on average, have lower participation response rates than larger sample countries, and that larger countries did not have higher participation rates than smaller sample countries.

15. Green shading indicates a higher than expected receipt or participation rate at  $p < 0.05$ , based on the overall receipt and participation rates of 79.0% and 15.5%, and given the country distribution of sampling frame members. Red shading indicates a lower than expected receipt or participation rate.

16. The figures shown in this column are equal to the relative change in the share of each sample accounted for by individuals in the indicated country [(% of Participants - % of Sampling Frame)/% of Sampling Frame].

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KHM	Cambodia	713	1.30%	529	1.22%	97	1.44%	+10.85%
CMR	Cameroon	453	0.82%	361	0.83%	37	0.55%	-32.96%
CPV	Cape Verde	306	0.56%	255	0.59%	31	0.46%	-17.76%
CAF	Central African Republic	331	0.60%	259	0.60%	30	0.45%	-25.72%
TCD	Chad	286	0.52%	208	0.48%	24	0.36%	-31.43%
CHN	China	467	0.85%	360	0.83%	29	0.43%	-49.31%
COL	Colombia	586	1.07%	562	1.29%	68	1.01%	-5.58%
COM	Comoros	292	0.53%	237	0.55%	26	0.39%	-27.12%
COD	DRC	546	0.99%	406	0.93%	67	1.00%	+0.54%
COG	Congo- Brazzaville	327	0.59%	255	0.59%	24	0.36%	-39.57%
CIV	Côte D'Ivoire	463	0.84%	359	0.83%	38	0.56%	-32.79%
CUB	Cuba	210	0.38%	205	0.47%	13	0.19%	-49.17%
DJI	Djibouti	256	0.47%	204	0.47%	22	0.33%	-30.46%
DOM	Dominican Republic	393	0.71%	376	0.87%	64	0.95%	33.92%
ECU	Ecuador	801	1.46%	784	1.80%	44	0.65%	-55.23%
EGY	Egypt	548	1.00%	454	1.05%	71	1.05%	+5.48%
SLV	El Salvador	316	0.57%	303	0.70%	53	0.79%	+38.14%
GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	110	0.20%	106	0.24%	9	0.13%	-33.15%
ERI	Eritrea	194	0.35%	142	0.33%	22	0.33%	-6.62%
ETH	Ethiopia	626	1.14%	469	1.08%	84	1.25%	+9.47%
FJI	Fiji	259	0.47%	148	0.34%	31	0.46%	-2.01%
GMB	The Gambia	365	0.66%	283	0.65%	46	0.68%	+3.55%
GEO	Georgia	714	1.30%	573	1.32%	131	1.95%	+49.71%
GHA	Ghana	758	1.38%	557	1.28%	83	1.23%	-10.64%
GTM	Guatemala	352	0.64%	332	0.76%	64	0.95%	+48.57%
GIN	Guinea	498	0.91%	359	0.83%	34	0.51%	-44.49%
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	244	0.44%	187	0.43%	31	0.46%	+4.67%
GUY	Guyana	273	0.50%	222	0.51%	39	0.58%	+15.88%
HTI	Haiti	611	1.11%	492	1.13%	113	1.68%	+51.24%
HND	Honduras	539	0.98%	511	1.18%	75	1.11%	+13.70%
IND	India	486	0.88%	427	0.98%	47	0.70%	-20.65%
IDN	Indonesia	832	1.51%	690	1.59%	108	1.60%	+6.26%
IRN	Iran	514	0.93%	393	0.90%	36	0.53%	-42.49%
IRQ	Iraq	510	0.93%	428	0.99%	98	1.46%	+56.55%
JAM	Jamaica	281	0.51%	213	0.49%	44	0.65%	+28.17%
JOR	Jordan	694	1.26%	519	1.19%	131	1.95%	+54.46%
KAZ	Kazakhstan	391	0.71%	378	0.87%	26	0.39%	-45.60%
KEN	Kenya	670	1.22%	488	1.12%	71	1.05%	-13.54%
KIR	Kiribati	120	0.22%	83	0.19%	20	0.30%	+35.06%
PRK	North Korea	121	0.22%	94	0.22%	23	0.34%	+55.32%
XKX	Kosovo	547	0.99%	336	0.77%	87	1.29%	+30.56%
KUI	Kurdistan	125	0.23%	106	0.24%	27	0.40%	+74.40%
KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	515	0.94%	474	1.09%	79	1.17%	+24.86%

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LAO	Laos	385	0.70%	274	0.63%	36	0.53%	-23.59%
LSO	Lesotho	289	0.53%	170	0.39%	19	0.28%	-46.74%
LBR	Liberia	653	1.19%	512	1.18%	109	1.62%	+36.08%
MKD	Macedonia	527	0.96%	418	0.96%	71	1.05%	+9.88%
MDG	Madagascar	551	1.00%	408	0.94%	91	1.35%	+35.20%
MWI	Malawi	619	1.13%	492	1.13%	96	1.43%	+26.22%
MDV	Maldives	281	0.51%	207	0.48%	28	0.42%	-18.43%
MLI	Mali	520	0.95%	415	0.96%	62	0.92%	-3.04%
MHL	Marshall Islands	154	0.28%	126	0.29%	26	0.39%	+37.95%
MRT	Mauritania	449	0.82%	364	0.84%	56	0.83%	+1.46%
FSM	Micronesia	130	0.24%	86	0.20%	20	0.30%	+23.81%
MDA	Moldova	545	0.99%	378	0.87%	94	1.40%	+41.06%
MNG	Mongolia	490	0.89%	304	0.70%	48	0.71%	-19.87%
MNE	Montenegro	387	0.70%	288	0.66%	40	0.59%	-15.10%
MAR	Morocco	839	1.53%	667	1.54%	77	1.14%	-25.23%
MOZ	Mozambique	739	1.34%	553	1.27%	67	1.00%	-25.72%
MMR	Myanmar	341	0.62%	277	0.64%	58	0.86%	+38.98%
NAM	Namibia	531	0.97%	395	0.91%	49	0.73%	-24.95%
NPL	Nepal	595	1.08%	444	1.02%	95	1.41%	+30.68%
NIC	Nicaragua	516	0.94%	483	1.11%	68	1.01%	+7.47%
NER	Niger	544	0.99%	404	0.93%	51	0.76%	-23.47%
NGA	Nigeria	756	1.37%	557	1.28%	77	1.14%	-16.50%
PAK	Pakistan	509	0.93%	414	0.95%	65	0.97%	+3.84%
PSE	Palestine	432	0.79%	348	0.80%	94	1.40%	+76.78%
PNG	Papua New Guinea	289	0.53%	196	0.45%	21	0.31%	-41.13%
PRY	Paraguay	330	0.60%	318	0.73%	51	0.76%	+26.28%
PER	Peru	530	0.96%	513	1.18%	73	1.08%	+12.97%
PHL	Philippines	569	1.03%	439	1.01%	98	1.46%	+41.35%
PSM	Puntland	88	0.16%	62	0.14%	9	0.13%	-16.43%
ROU	Romania	397	0.72%	308	0.71%	40	0.59%	-17.46%
RWA	Rwanda	633	1.15%	530	1.22%	58	0.86%	-25.07%
WSM	Samoa	229	0.42%	197	0.45%	32	0.48%	+13.19%
STP	Sao Tome and Principe	188	0.34%	156	0.36%	20	0.30%	-12.61%
SEN	Senegal	548	1.00%	453	1.04%	53	0.79%	-21.26%
SRB	Serbia	472	0.86%	229	0.53%	45	0.67%	-22.26%
SLE	Sierra Leone	479	0.87%	356	0.82%	52	0.77%	-11.20%
SLB	Solomon Islands	260	0.47%	208	0.48%	27	0.40%	-14.65%
SOM	Somalia	332	0.60%	256	0.59%	54	0.80%	+33.71%
SSM	Somaliland	52	0.09%	42	0.10%	12	0.18%	+98.09%
ZAF	South Africa	630	1.15%	520	1.20%	52	0.77%	-32.82%
SSD	South Sudan	290	0.53%	220	0.51%	26	0.39%	-27.12%
LKA	Sri Lanka	431	0.78%	330	0.76%	44	0.65%	-16.19%
SDN	Sudan	426	0.77%	315	0.73%	58	0.86%	+11.91%

SUR	Suriname	253	0.46%	210	0.48%	31	0.46%	+0.12%
SWZ	Swaziland	234	0.43%	196	0.45%	17	0.25%	-41.26%
SYR	Syria	592	1.08%	374	0.86%	73	1.08%	+0.42%
TJK	Tajikistan	369	0.67%	348	0.80%	53	0.79%	+17.52%
TZA	Tanzania	745	1.35%	515	1.19%	55	0.82%	-39.47%
THA	Thailand	664	1.21%	538	1.24%	41	0.61%	-49.66%
TLS	Timor-Leste	571	1.04%	448	1.03%	73	1.08%	+4.28%
TGO	Togo	336	0.61%	268	0.62%	38	0.56%	-7.45%
TON	Tonga	219	0.40%	143	0.33%	26	0.39%	-3.43%
TUN	Tunisia	377	0.69%	333	0.77%	45	0.67%	-3.11%
TUR	Turkey	545	0.99%	439	1.01%	52	0.77%	-21.97%
TKM	Turkmenistan	83	0.15%	73	0.17%	17	0.25%	+68.38%
TUV	Tuvalu	156	0.28%	100	0.23%	23	0.34%	+22.04%
UGA	Uganda	709	1.29%	520	1.20%	71	1.05%	-18.23%
UKR	Ukraine	440	0.80%	328	0.76%	49	0.73%	-9.00%
UZB	Uzbekistan	286	0.52%	226	0.52%	40	0.59%	+14.28%
VUT	Vanuatu	228	0.41%	165	0.38%	50	0.74%	+81.18%
VNM	Vietnam	451	0.82%	362	0.83%	39	0.58%	-29.34%
YEM	Yemen	565	1.03%	455	1.05%	105	1.56%	+51.45%
ZMB	Zambia	737	1.34%	534	1.23%	77	1.14%	-14.63%
EAZ	Zanzibar	52	0.09%	37	0.09%	3	0.04%	-50.48%
ZWE	Zimbabwe	475	0.86%	361	0.83%	51	0.76%	-11.90%
Coefficient of Variation		42.94%		44.18%		55.49%		

## B.2 Other Survey Participant Characteristics

We also collected a significant amount of demographic data from those individuals who participated in the survey. Unfortunately, we do not have comparable demographic data for our non-participants that would allow us to draw inferences about the representativeness of our sample on these dimensions. However, it is important to understand the professional and educational backgrounds of our survey participants, irrespective of the degree to which they are representative of the individuals in the master sampling frame.

## B.2.1 The Professional Backgrounds of Survey Participants

**Table B.3: Sampling Frame Members, Survey Recipients, and Participants by Country<sup>5</sup>**

Position	# of Participants	% of Stakeholder Group
<b>Host Government</b>		
Head of State or Government	49	1.68%
Vice Head of State or Government	19	0.65%
Chief of Staff, Adviser, or Assistant to Head of State or Government or Vice Head of State or Government	67	2.30%
Head of a Government Ministry/Agency/Commission	268	9.20%
Vice Minister, Deputy Minister, Assistant Minister, State Minister, Joint Secretary, Deputy Commissioner	144	4.95%
Secretary General, Permanent Secretary, or Director General	196	6.73%
Chief of Staff, Chief of Cabinet, Adviser/Assistant to Head of a Government Ministry/Agency/Commission	89	3.06%
Director/Head of Technical Unit, Department, or Office Within the Government Ministry/Agency/Commission	1019	34.99%
Technical Specialist, Adviser, or Consultant	457	15.69%
Program Manager, Project Manager, Program Coordinator, Project Coordinator	270	9.27%
Other	267	9.17%
Don't Know	67	2.30%
<b>Development Partners</b>		
Head of Organization	29	2.31%
Chief of Staff, Adviser, or Assistant to Head of Organization	43	3.43%
Ambassador, Mission Director, Country Director, Country Representative, Head of Mission/Country Office	244	19.47%
Chargé, Deputy Chief of Mission, Deputy/Assistant Resident Representative, Deputy/Assistant Country Director, Deputy Country Representative, Deputy Head of Mission/Country Office	108	8.62%
Director/Head of Technical Unit, Department, or Office within the Mission/Embassy/Country Office	140	11.17%
Program Manager, Project Manager, Program Coordinator, Project Coordinator	228	18.20%
Technical Specialist, Adviser, or Consultant	330	26.34%
Country Desk Officer or Specialist at Development Partner Headquarters	45	3.59%
Other	86	6.86%
Don't Know	11	0.88%
<b>CSO/NGO</b>		
Leader of the Organization	393	58.48%
Technical Specialist, Adviser, or Consultant	66	9.82%
Program Manager, Project Manager, Program Coordinator, Project Coordinator	145	21.58%

## Appendix B

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Other	60	8.93%
Don't Know	8	1.19%
<b>Private Sector</b>		
Chairperson, CEO	120	51.06%
Board Member	41	17.45%
Technical Specialist, Adviser, or Consultant	21	8.94%
Program Manager, Project Manager, Program Coordinator, Project Coordinator	24	10.21%
Other	24	10.21%
Don't Know	5	2.13%

**Table B.5: Survey Participant Years of In-Country Experience, by Stakeholder Group**

Years	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
0-4 years	1004	15.27%	247	7.47%	625	43.28%	43	5.88%	50	16.45%	39	4.93%
5-9 years	1392	21.17%	586	17.73%	437	30.26%	154	21.07%	77	25.33%	138	17.45%
10-14 years	1286	19.56%	645	19.51%	199	13.78%	201	27.50%	74	24.34%	167	21.11%
15-20 years	1065	16.20%	576	17.42%	105	7.27%	164	22.44%	48	15.79%	172	21.74%
20 year+	1829	27.81%	1252	37.87%	78	5.40%	169	23.12%	55	18.09%	275	34.77%

**Table B.6: Survey Participant Policy Domain Expertise, by Stakeholder Group**

	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts <sup>17</sup>	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
<b>Economic Policy</b>												
Macroeconomic Management	489	8.43%	220	7.60%	60	4.75%	7	1.05%	5	2.08%	197	26.88%
Business Regulatory Environment	394	6.79%	103	3.56%	38	3.01%	4	0.60%	63	26.25%	186	25.38%
Infrastructure	322	5.55%	133	4.59%	39	3.09%	2	0.30%	7	2.92%	141	19.24%
Trade	316	5.45%	101	3.49%	25	1.98%	5	0.75%	30	12.50%	155	21.15%
Finance, Credit, and Banking	297	5.12%	101	3.49%	20	1.58%	6	0.90%	19	7.92%	151	20.60%
Investment	281	4.85%	92	3.18%	11	0.87%	2	0.30%	18	7.50%	158	21.56%
Energy and Mining	251	4.33%	68	2.35%	12	0.95%	11	1.65%	7	2.92%	153	20.87%
Labor	158	2.72%	36	1.24%	10	0.79%	8	1.20%	7	2.92%	97	13.23%
<b>Governance</b>												
Democracy	750	12.93%	57	1.97%	107	8.47%	155	23.20%	2	0.83%	429	58.53%
Anti-Corruption and Transparency	587	10.12%	126	4.35%	42	3.33%	93	13.92%	4	1.67%	322	43.93%
Justice and Security	495	8.54%	104	3.59%	66	5.23%	52	7.78%	0	0.00%	273	37.24%
Public Expenditure Management	377	6.50%	142	4.91%	49	3.88%	16	2.40%	3	1.25%	167	22.78%
Civil Service	340	5.86%	156	5.39%	14	1.11%	8	1.20%	2	0.83%	160	21.83%
Decentralization	306	5.28%	42	1.45%	27	2.14%	14	2.10%	1	0.42%	222	30.29%
Tax	165	2.85%	45	1.55%	3	0.24%	2	0.30%	3	1.25%	112	15.28%
Land	142	2.45%	35	1.21%	8	0.63%	5	0.75%	2	0.83%	92	12.55%
Customs	103	1.78%	37	1.28%	1	0.08%	0	0.00%	2	0.83%	63	8.59%

17. While members of the other stakeholder groups were asked to identify one particular area of expertise, independent experts were instructed to select *any and all* of the policy domains in which they worked.



<b>Table B.8: Number of Participants who Interacted with Specific Development Partners</b>	United States (2794)	AsDB (676)	South Africa (179)	CDB (54)
	World Bank (2715)	China (649)	OFID (178)	Libya (51)
	EU (2527)	Spain (456)	Saudi Arabia (147)	Russia (43)
	UNDP (2394)	IADB (407)	Global Fund (140)	Finland (41)
	United Nations (1951)	Turkey (362)	UAE (137)	Ireland (39)
	Germany (1825)	Sweden (356)	Austria (120)	Luxembourg (37)
	United Kingdom (1676)	India (312)	GEF (114)	Greece (34)
	Japan (1598)	Brazil (300)	BADEA (109)	Taiwan (34)
	France (1326)	Netherlands (296)	CAF (83)	GAVI Alliance (17)
	UNICEF (1311)	Norway (281)	CABEI (79)	AFESD (7)
	IMF (1256)	EBRD (280)	New Zealand (79)	Poland (5)
	Canada (1195)	IsDB (270)	Iran (77)	Bulgaria (2)
	AfDB (809)	Belgium (257)	Portugal (73)	Bolivarian Alliance (1)
	Australia (722)	South Korea (248)	AMF (65)	
		Switzerland (245)	Qatar (61)	
		Kuwait (185)	IFAD (59)	
	Denmark (179)	Venezuela (58)		
<b>Table B.9: Number of Participants who Worked for Specific Development Partners</b>	United States (901)	Australia (113)	CAF (14)	South Korea (7)
	World Bank (878)	IMF (111)	Norway (13)	IFAD (7)
	UNDP (842)	France (89)	Kuwait (13)	GEF (6)
	United Nations (527)	Spain (38)	OFID (13)	CDB (5)
	EU (466)	Switzerland (30)	New Zealand (13)	Portugal (2)
	Germany (310)	EBRD (29)	AMF (13)	Venezuela (2)
	United Kingdom (272)	Belgium (27)	UAE (12)	Finland (2)
	UNICEF (263)	Sweden (24)	Saudi Arabia (11)	Greece (2)
	AsDB (172)	IsDB (24)	BADEA (10)	Libya (1)
	Canada (163)	Netherlands (23)	South Africa (8)	Ireland (1)
	AfDB (162)	China (16)	Austria (8)	Taiwan (1)
	Japan (133)	Turkey (15)	CABEI (8)	Bolivarian Alliance (1)
	IADB (116)	India (14)	Iran (8)	
		Denmark (14)	Qatar (8)	
		Global Fund (14)	Brazil (7)	
	<b>Table B.10: Number of Host Government Officials who Worked for Development Partners</b>	World Bank (449)	Japan (72)	Turkey (9)
UNDP (411)		IMF (69)	AMF (8)	Saudi Arabia (4)
United States (305)		Canada (60)	China (8)	South Korea (4)
United Nations (245)		Australia (41)	Global Fund (7)	Austria (3)
EU (231)		France (36)	CABEI (6)	Brazil (3)
Germany (153)		IsDB (18)	India (6)	Denmark (3)
UNICEF (140)		Spain (18)	Netherlands (6)	Iran (3)
AfDB (99)		Belgium (14)	New Zealand (6)	CDB (2)
United Kingdom (98)		EBRD (14)	Norway (6)	ALBA (1)
AsDB (92)		Sweden (14)	OFID (6)	GEF (1)
IADB (72)		Switzerland (14)	IFAD (5)	Libya (1)
		BADEA (9)	South Africa (5)	Portugal (1)
		CAF (9)	UAE (5)	Venezuela (1)
		Kuwait (9)		

## B.2.2 The Educational Backgrounds of Survey Participants

Table B.11: Where Participants Earned their Highest Degrees, by Stakeholder Group

Location	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
In Country	1299	32.65%	798	39.94%	66	7.76%	233	54.88%	52	35.62%	130	24.90%
Out of Country	2679	67.35	1200	60.06%	785	92.24%	208	45.12%	94	64.38%	392	75.10%

Table B.12: Survey Participant Education, by Stakeholder Group

Education Level	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Primary	2	0.05%	1	0.05%	1	0.11%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Secondary	13	0.31%	6	0.29%	1	0.11%	4	0.80%	1	0.64%	1	0.18%
Technical/Vocational	48	1.15%	13	0.63%	6	0.68%	20	3.98%	5	3.21%	4	0.73%
College/University	834	20.00%	426	20.51%	110	12.40%	172	34.26%	62	39.74%	64	11.68%
Postgraduate	2370	56.83%	1259	60.62%	596	67.19%	249	49.60%	77	49.36%	189	34.49%
Doctorate	903	21.65%	372	17.91%	173	19.50%	57	11.35%	11	7.05%	290	52.92%

Table B.13: Years since Participants Earned their Highest Degree, by Stakeholder Group

Years	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
0-4 years	492	12.33%	280	13.93%	51	5.99%	76	16.45%	13	8.90%	72	13.79%
5-9 years	620	15.53%	353	17.56%	69	8.11%	88	19.05%	17	11.64%	93	17.82%
10-14 years	725	18.17%	392	19.50%	154	18.10%	75	16.23%	28	19.18%	76	14.56%
15-19 years	555	13.91%	285	14.18%	132	15.51%	63	13.64%	17	11.64%	58	11.11%
20 or more years	1599	40.07%	700	34.83%	445	52.29%	160	34.63%	71	48.63%	223	42.72%

## B.2.3 The Employment Status of Survey Participants in 2014

Table B.14: Where Survey Participants Worked in 2014, by Stakeholder Group

Location	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
In Country	2688	73.46%	1608	89.38%	240	30.93%	428	92.64%	130	93.53%	282	58.39%
Out of Country	1362	37.22%	365	20.29%	575	74.10%	121	26.19%	35	25.18%	266	55.07%

Table B.15: Survey Participant Employment Status in 2014, by Stakeholder Group<sup>18</sup>

Employer	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Government institution or program	1840	50.29%	1304	72.48%	350	45.10%	88	19.05%	27	19.42%	71	14.70%
Development partner	978	26.73%	347	19.29%	460	59.28%	87	18.83%	23	16.55%	61	12.63%
Civil society program	471	12.87%	160	8.89%	32	4.12%	196	42.42%	22	15.83%	61	12.63%
Non-governmental organization	839	22.93%	280	15.56%	60	7.73%	306	66.23%	49	35.25%	144	29.81%
Private sector council, chamber, or association	446	12.19%	239	13.29%	40	5.15%	39	8.44%	90	64.75%	38	7.87%
Labor union or workers association	77	2.10%	36	2.00%	4	0.52%	18	3.90%	9	6.47%	10	2.07%
The media	229	6.26%	60	3.34%	12	1.55%	54	11.69%	13	9.35%	90	18.63%
University or think tank	965	26.37%	426	23.68%	74	9.54%	110	23.81%	26	18.71%	329	68.12%

18. Green shading indicates that at least 25% of survey participants from the indicated stakeholder group worked for the indicated organization. Yellow shading indicates at least 10%, while red indicates less than 10%.

## B.2.4 Survey Questionnaire Language

Table B.16: Survey Questionnaire Language, by Stakeholder Group

Language	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
English	5021	74.60%	2286	67.24%	1332	90.67%	478	64.86%	234	73.58%	691	85.63%
Spanish	457	6.79%	293	8.62%	31	2.11%	66	8.96%	32	10.06%	35	4.34%
French	824	12.24%	547	16.09%	81	5.51%	111	15.06%	38	11.95%	47	5.82%
Portuguese	195	2.90%	147	4.32%	9	0.61%	26	3.53%	4	1.26%	9	1.12%
Russian	234	3.48%	127	3.74%	16	1.09%	56	7.60%	10	3.14%	25	3.10%

# Sampling Frame Inclusion Criteria

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Few efforts had been made to conduct large-n cross-country elite survey research in a systematic manner. In a recent literature review, Hoffmann-Lange (2007) notes that while “elite” and “opinion leader” surveys abound only three “truly comparative elite surveys” have ever been conducted and even these studies disclose little information about the composition of their samples or sampling frames.

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# Appendix C: Sampling Frame Inclusion Criteria

Few efforts had been made to conduct large-n cross-country elite survey research in a systematic manner. In a recent literature review, Hoffmann-Lange (2007) notes that while “elite” and “opinion leader” surveys abound only three “truly comparative elite surveys” have ever been conducted and even these studies disclose little information about the composition of their samples or sampling frames.

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As such, defining the population of interest for inclusion in the sampling frame for the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey* was a crucial first step to provide a basis for evaluating the representativeness of our sample. If appropriate care had not been taken to ensure that survey population strata were comparable, our research team could have easily introduced a significant source of bias (i.e. coverage error).

Our research team sought to improve upon previous efforts by carefully constructing sampling frames for each country that applied a standardized and explicit set of inclusion criteria (detailed below in Tables C.1-C.5), while accounting for the fact that every government and non-governmental organization has a unique set of organizational structures and leadership positions.

We focused on identifying “functional equivalents” at both the institution and leadership position level. For example, almost every country in the world has some version of a “supreme audit institution” that oversees the government’s management of public finances, yet there is significant diversity in how institutions are structured to perform this function. Some countries have an independent Auditor General that periodically submits audit reports to a Public Accounts Committee in the legislature. Other countries have a Court of Accounts within the judicial branch that oversees the use of public funds and operates independently of the executive and legislative. Still other countries use a Board or Collegiate model in which some type of governing board or “college” produces and submits audit reports to Parliament. For the purposes of the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey*, our objective was to identify institutional functional equivalents and map them across the 126 countries included in our sample. Tables C.1-C.5 provide a list of the “ideal type” institutions to which country-specific institutions were mapped.

We also sought to identify functionally equivalent leadership positions within these institutions. For example, in most developing countries, every line ministry has a non-partisan senior civil servant—usually called a “Permanent Secretary” or “Secretary General”—who is responsible for day-to-day management and leading the ministry during times of government transition. However, in other countries, no such position exists and a “Deputy Minister” or “Vice Minister” effectively performs this function. We therefore sought to map job titles—as best as possible—to functional responsibilities. Finally, with support from 15 regional and country specialists, we drew on a wide variety of print and web-based information sources to identify the individuals who met the inclusion criteria. These sources, detailed in Tables C.1-C.5, include the 2004-2013 editions of the *Country Background Notes* produced by the U.S. Department of State, the 2004-2013 editions of the *Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments* published by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Africa Confidential’s *Who’s Who Database*, various editions of the *International Who’s Who* publication, and the U.S. Department of State’s Staff Directory.

Another innovation of the 2014 *Reform Efforts Survey* is its scope. Rather than drawing a random sample, we have sought to survey all individuals in the master sampling frame (i.e., the entire identifiable population), which we believe will significantly strengthen the generalizability of our empirical claims. Five primary stakeholder groups comprise the sampling frame for each of the 126 countries included in the survey: (1) senior and mid-level executive branch government officials (e.g. ministers, vice ministers, chiefs of staff, secretary generals, special assistants and advisors) who formulate and execute policies and programs in a specific set of policy areas; (2) representatives of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and foreign embassies (DFID, World Bank, UNDP, IADB, USAID, etc.) who maintain a policy and programmatic dialogue with government authorities; (3) leaders of domestic civil society organizations (CSOs); (4) leaders and members of business associations who are knowledgeable about government programs and the domestic policy-making process; and (5) independent country experts who monitor reform patterns and processes and donor relationships with host governments. The population was further restricted to individuals who occupied such positions between 2004 and 2013.

We believe that this methodological approach represents a significant improvement over previous cross-country elite surveys in that it is more transparent, systematic, and replicable. However, we also acknowledge that it is not possible to make definitive claims about the representativeness of our sample or sampling frame. Though we took great care to clearly define a population of interest, identifying the entire true (unobservable) population of development policymakers, practitioners, and experts (i.e. constructing a truly comprehensive sample frame without any errors of omission or commission) is almost certainly not possible. At the same time, we believe the methodological approach outlined here offers several major advantages—most notably, the transparent and systematic manner in which the sampling frame was constructed (to ensure some minimum level of representativeness within and across countries).

**Table C.1: Host Government Inclusion Criteria**

Institution	Inclusion Criteria	Sources	# in Sampling Frame
<b>Overall</b>			<b>33,723</b>
Ministry of Finance/Economy	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Chief of Staff, Special Assistant to the Minister, Senior Advisor, Chief Economist, Accountant General, Deputy Accountant General, Head of Department (e.g. Tax, Customs, Budget, Debt Management, Public Procurement, Internal Audit, Public Investment, External Finance, Research and Policy Analysis, Public Enterprise Reform)	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Government, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Register of participants World Bank/IMF, AsDB, AfDB, and IADB Board of Governor meetings; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; The International Association of Treasury Services (AIST) Conference Records; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	4,100

Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ International Cooperation	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Chief of Staff, Special Assistant to the Minister, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. North America, Europe, IFIs, United Nations, International Organizations, External Finance, Research and Policy Analysis)	UN General Assembly Conference Records; U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	2,047
Ministry of Natural Resources/ Environment	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. Monitoring and Evaluation, Research and Policy Analysis), UNFCCC Designated National Authority, CBD National Contact, GEF Political Focal Point, GEF Operational Focal Point	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; GEF Political Focal Points and Operational Focal Points; Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) National Contacts; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Designated National Authorities); Asian Development Bank’s PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Members of IADB Regional Policy Dialogue; various ministry websites	2,036
Ministry of Health	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Chief Public Health Officer, Head of Department (e.g. Primary Health Care, Health Systems Reform, Epidemiology and Immunization, Research and Policy Analysis, Monitoring and Evaluation, HIV/AIDS, Malaria); Accounts	Global Fund Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) “Key Contacts”; WHO Ministerial Conference Records; U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank’s PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	1,942

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Ministry of Planning/ National Planning Commission	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Director General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Chief Economist, Head of Department (e.g. External Finance and International Cooperation, Monitoring and Evaluation, Policy and Research)	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; various Ministry and National Planning Commission websites	1,916
Office of President/ Prime Minister	President, Prime Minister, Cabinet Secretary, Secretary General of Government, Minister without Portfolio, Charge de Mission, Chef de Service, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments; List of Delegations to the annual UN General Assembly, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Office of the Presidency National Websites; Office of the Prime Minister National Websites	1,830
Ministry of Industry/Trade/ Commerce/ Competitiveness	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, WTO Accession Focal Point; Head of Department (e.g. Customs, Business Environment Reform Unit); Director of Commerce, Director of Industry	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; WTO National Focal Points, various editions; Participants in Ministerial Conferences on Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation; Participants in World Export Development Forum; Participants in International Workshop on Public Private Dialogue; Members of IADB Regional Policy Dialogue; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	1,816

Ministry of Education	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. Early Childhood Education, Primary Education, Secondary Education, Tertiary Education), EFA National Coordinator, UNESCO Representative	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; UNESCO Directory of National “Education for All” (EFA) Directors; Participants in High Level Group Meetings on Education For All (HLG5); Asian Development Bank’s PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Members of IADB Regional Policy Dialogue; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	1,380
Ministry of Agriculture/Rural Development/ Land Reform/Food Security	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank’s PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	1,329
Ministry of Labor/ Social Security/ Social Welfare/ Social Protection	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank’s PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	1,289

Central Bank	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Department	Register of participants from World Bank/IMF, AsDB, AfDB, and IADB Board of Governor meetings; Members of the Central Bank Governance Forum; Conference records from annual meetings of the Association of African Central Banks (AACB); Members of Latin American Network of Central Banks and Finance Ministries; various central bank websites (from the Bank for International Settlements’ “Central Bank Hub”)	1,288
Ministry of Justice/ Office of the Attorney General	Minister, Deputy Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisors, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Prosecutor General/Chief Prosecutor, Solicitor General	Membership directory of The International Association of Prosecutors (IAP); Participants in various Third World Summits of Prosecutor Generals, Attorney Generals, and Chief Prosecutors; Ibero-American Association of Prosecutor’s Offices; Participants in the Intergovernmental Expert Working Group on Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption; List of participants in International Anti-Corruption Conferences (IACC); Members of the Ibero-American Legal Assistance Network (IberRed); various Ministry of Justice and Attorney General websites	1,172
Ministry of Public Works/Transport	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Department	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank’s PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	1,013

Ministry of Energy/ Oil/Mineral Resources	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department, National EITI Focal Point; Member of EITI Steering Committee	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments,; Participants in IAEA annual meetings, various editions; EITI online register of National EITI Focal Points and Steering Committee Members; GEF Political Focal Points and Operational Focal Points; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	963
Civil Service Agency/ Commission	Head of Agency; Deputy Head of Agency, Department Head, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Membership lists from the United Nations Online Network in Public Administration (UNPAN); the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD); African Management Development Institutes’ Network (AMDIN); the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM); Regional School of Public Administration (RESPA); Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) initiative; UN Program for Innovation in the Euro- Mediterranean Region (INNOVMED); the Arab Administrative Development Organization (ARADO); Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration (EROPA); Caribbean Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD); Centro Latinoamericano de Administración para el Desarrollo (CLAD); The Instituto Centroamericano de Administración Pública (ICAP); various government agency websites	929

National Statistical Office	Director General, Deputy Director General, Senior Advisor	International Statistical Institute's (ISI) Directory of Official Statistical Agencies & Societies; National Statistical Office information from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) website; Managing for Development Results (MFDR) network of experts; statistical experts associated with the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA); the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP); United Nations Statistical Institute for Asia and the Pacific (SIAP); the Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century (PARIS21); The Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC); Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); and Observatoire économique et statistique d'Afrique Subsaharienne (AFRISTAT); various Statistical Office websites	869
Anti-Corruption Agency/Ministry/Commission/Council/ Task Force	Minister, Deputy Minister, Executive Director, Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior Adviser, Head of Department (e.g. Investigations, Corruption Prevention and Education, Income and Asset Verification, Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering)	Membership registry of International Association of Anti-Corruption Agencies (IAACA); List of participants in various International Anti-Corruption Conferences (IACC); Participants in Global Forum V on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity; UNCAC Conference Records; Intergovernmental Expert Working Group on Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption; Participants in AsDB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific; International Center for Asset Recovery Country Profiles; Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAM) National Contact Points; Members of the East African Association of Anti Corruption Authorities (EAAACA); National Focal Points for Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO); Members of Research Network of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ANCORAGENET); Members of OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies; various anti-corruption institution websites	795

Embassy officials stationed in the United States	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, First Secretary/Counselor, Second Secretary/Counselor, Third Secretary/Counselor, Senior Advisor	Various Editions of the “Diplomatic List” from the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Chief of Protocol	713
Embassy officials stationed at the United Nations in New York or Geneva	Ambassador and Permanent Representative, Deputy Permanent Representative, First Secretary/Counselor, Second Secretary/Counselor, Third Secretary/Counselor, Senior Advisors	United Nations Office of Protocol “List of Permanent Representatives and Observers to the United Nations in New York”; Permanent Mission websites at <a href="http://www.un.org">www.un.org</a>	661
Investment Promotion Agency	Head of the Agency, Deputy Head of the Agency, Senior Advisor	Membership records from World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA); Participants in the Investment Committee For South East Europe Working Group on Investment Promotion; Participants in various World Export Development Forum meetings; various national investment promotion agency websites	619
Aid Effectiveness and Coordination Units/Directorates	Head of Unit/Directorate; Senior Advisors	Participants in the OECD Aid Effectiveness Working Group, various years; Participants in OECD Surveys on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, various years; List of Accra High-Level Conference Participants; Members of African Community of Practice (AfCoP) and the Asian Pacific Community of Practice (CoP-MfDR Asia Pacific) on Managing for Development Results (MfDR); various ministry websites	591
Ministry of Family/Gender	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Foreign Governments, various editions; Department	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank’s PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	569

<p>Ministry of Interior</p>	<p>Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. Economic and Financial Crimes, Criminal Investigations, Anti-Human Trafficking)</p>	<p>U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank’s PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites</p>	<p>568</p>
<p>Supreme Audit Institution</p>	<p>Auditor/Inspector General, Deputy Auditor/Inspector General, Comptroller, Head of the Court of Account, Deputy Head of the Court of Account, Member of the Public Accounts Committee, Senior Advisor</p>	<p>Membership list from the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), the African Organization of English-Speaking Supreme Audit Institutions (AFROSAI-E), The Organization of Latin American and Caribbean Supreme Audit Institutions (OLACEFS), European Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (EUROSAI), South Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions (SPASAI), Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions (PASAI), The Asian Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (ASOSAI), and The Arab Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (ARABOSAI); various Supreme Audit Institution websites</p>	<p>473</p>

Independent Human Rights Commission/Office of the Ombudsman	Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior Advisor, Ombudsman, Deputy Ombudsman, Head of Department	Membership Directory of International Ombudsman Association; Membership records from Network of National Human Rights Institutions, including the Asia Pacific Forum (APF) of National Human Rights Institutions, the Ibero American Federation of the Ombudsman (FIO); OmbudsNet (Sistema Integrado de Información y Comunicación para las oficinas de Ombudsman en América Latina y el Caribe), La Red de Instituciones Nacionales para la Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos del Continente Americano (Rindhca), and the European Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions; List of Participants in OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meetings; various Human Rights Commission and Ombudsman websites	464
Local Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Implementation Units and Eligibility Task Forces	CEO, Deputy CEO, Project Director, Government Board Member, Head of MCC Eligibility Task Forces	MCC website; MCA country websites	447
Ministry of Lands/Property Registrar	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department, Property Registrar, Deputy Property Registrar	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes,” various editions; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Doing Business Online Database of Local Partners; UN-HABITAT annual conference registration records; various Ministry and Property Registrar websites	362
Public Procurement Agency	Head of Agency; Deputy Head of Agency, Senior Advisor	The European Public Procurement Network (PPN); Commonwealth Public Procurement Network (CPPN); Asia Pacific Procurement Forum; National Partners of the United Nations Procurement Capacity Development Centre; various public procurement agency websites	350

Ministry of Public Service/Public Administration	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Department	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Membership lists from the United Nations Online Network in Public Administration (UNPAN); the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD); African Management Development Institutes’ Network (AMDIN); the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM); Regional School of Public Administration (RESPA); Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) initiative; UN Program for Innovation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region (INNOVMED); the Arab Administrative Development Organization (ARADO); Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration (EROPA); Caribbean Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD); Centro Latinoamericano de Administración para el Desarrollo (CLAD); The Instituto Centroamericano de Administración Pública (ICAP); Red de Líderes de Gobierno Electrónico de América Latina y El Caribe (Red GEALC); various ministry websites	328
Independent Electoral Institution	Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior Advisor, Director of Elections, Deputy Director of Elections	Members of ACE Electoral Knowledge Network; various election commission websites	318

Poverty Reduction Units/Directorates	Head of Unit/Directorate; Senior Advisors	Participants in the OECD Aid Effectiveness Working Group, various years; List of Accra High-Level Conference Participants; Forum on National Plans as Poverty Reduction Strategies in East Asia; Members of African Community of Practice (AfCoP) and the Asian Pacific Community of Practice (CoP-MfDR Asia Pacific) on Managing for Development Results (MfDR); various ministry websites	250
Business Registration Office	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	State Department Investment Climate Statements; U.S. Country Commercial Guide; Doing Business Online Database of Local Partners; Participants in International Workshops on Public Private Dialogue; Business registry websites	148
Office of the Vice President/Deputy Prime Minister	Vice President, Secretary General, Minister without Portfolio, Charge de Mission, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments; List of Delegations to the annual UN General Assembly; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Office of the Vice Presidency National Websites	148

**Table C.2: Development Partner Inclusion Criteria**

Institution	Inclusion Criteria	Sources	# in Sampling Frame
<b>Overall</b>			<b>9,728</b>
U.S. Embassy Staff	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Political/Econ Chief, Political Officer, Economic Officer	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes,”; Council of American Ambassadors Membership Records; US Embassy websites	1,592
UNDP/United Nations Missions	Country Director, Resident Representative, Deputy Resident Representative, Project Manager, Lead Economist, Adviser, Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General; Deputy Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General	United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Country Team Database	1,582

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USAID	Mission Director, Deputy Mission Director, Office Director, Senior Advisor, Program Officer	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; Federal Executive Yellow Book; USAID Mission websites	1,277
World Bank	Country Director, Country Manager, Lead Economist, Sector Specialist, Desk Economist	United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Country Team Database; World Bank website	1,063
Other Foreign Embassies, International Organizations, and Development Finance Institutions with an In-country Presence	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Country Director, Deputy Country Director, Project/Program Director, Adviser, Country Economist	Various Development Partner websites	937
European Commission	Head of the EC Delegation, Project Director, Adviser	EC Website	553
UK Embassy/DFID	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Country Director, Economist, Adviser	UK Online Directory of Overseas Missions; various DFID websites	408
German Embassy/GIZ/GTZ/KfW	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Country Director, Deputy Country Director, Project/Program Director, Adviser, Country Economist	GTZ, BMZ, and KfW websites	355
WHO/PAHO	Country Representative, Adviser	United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Country Team Database	327
French Embassy/AFD	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Country Director, Deputy Country Director, Project/Program Director, Adviser, Country Economist	Various French Embassy and AFD websites	268
State Department Headquarters/National Security Council Staff	Assistant Secretary, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office Director, Desk Officer	Federal Executive Yellow Book; State Department website; various conference proceedings	232
IMF	Resident Representative, Lead Economist, Special Advisor to the Government, Desk Economist	United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Country Team Database; IMF website	215

JICA/JBIC/Japanese Embassy	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Country Representative, Deputy Country Representative, Project/Program Director, Adviser, Country Economist	Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) website	210
MCC	Resident Country Director, Deputy Resident Country Director, Program Officer	Federal Executive Yellow Book; MCC website	133
Australian Embassy/AUSAID/DFAT	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Country Director, Deputy Country Director, Project/Program Director, Adviser, Country Economist	AUSAID, Embassy/DFAT websites	126
AsDB	Country Director, Lead Economist, Sector Specialist	United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Country Team Database; AsDB website	118
UNESCO	Country Representative, Adviser	United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Country Team Database	113
AfDB	Country Director, Lead Economist, Sector Specialist	AfDB website	99
IADB	Country Representative, Lead	IADB website	82
EBRD	Economist, Sector Specialist, Desk Economist, Country Director, Economist	EBRD website	38

**Table C.3:**  
**Civil Society and**  
**Non-Governmental**  
**Organization Inclusion**  
**Criteria**

Institution	Inclusion Criteria	Sources	# in Sampling Frame
<b>Overall</b>			<b>4,416</b>
Social Sector NGOs (e.g. health, education)	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Project Director	Global Fund CCM Country websites; Membership records of national consortium/association of NGOs	1,551
Democracy and Human Rights NGOs	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Project Director	The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance's (IDEA) NGO Directory; Membership records from Network of National Human Rights Institutions; Membership records of national consortium/association of NGOs	1,033
Anti-Corruption and Transparency NGOs	Executive Director, Country Director, Program Manager, and Country Expert	Transparency International Annual Reports; national Transparency International chapter websites; Open Budget Partnership's Country Researchers; Publish What You Fund National Contacts; Open Society Institute (OSI) Directory of Experts; Soros Foundation Directory of Experts; Asia Foundation Directory of Experts	768

Environmental NGOs	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Project Director	Environment Encyclopedia and Directory (multiple editions); Caucasus Environmental NGO Network (CENN); GEF and World Bank conference proceedings	408
Independent Journalist Associations	Executive Director, Secretary General	Country-specific press unions (e.g. Union Des Journalistes Privés Nigériens, Gambia Press Union); CIA Factbook list of “political pressure groups and leaders”; State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices	353
National Coalition/ Consortium/ Association of NGOs	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	CIA Factbook list of “political pressure groups and leaders”; World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations; International Forum of National NGO Platforms; Local Newspapers; country-specific online sources	303

**Table C.4:**  
**Private Sector Inclusion**  
**Criteria**

Institution	Inclusion Criteria	Sources	# in Sampling Frame
<b>Overall</b>			<b>3,204</b>
National Chambers of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	World Bank Directory of Private Sector Liaison Officers; Participants in International Workshops on Public Private Dialogue	698
Finance and Banking Associations/ Institutions	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-Specific Finance and Banking Association Websites	450
Sectoral Business Associations/ Institutions	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-Specific Sectoral Business (e.g. textiles, agriculture, manufacturing) Association Websites	443
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	U.S. Commercial Service “Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies”; Local U.S. Chamber of Commerce chapter websites	266
Export-Import Associations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-Specific Export-Import Association Websites	228
Small-/Medium-Sized and Young Entrepreneurs Business Associations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-Specific Websites for Small-/Medium-Sized and Young Entrepreneurs Business Associations	224
Western European Chamber of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	World Bank Directory of Private Sector Liaison Officers; various websites	215

International Chamber of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	International Chamber of Commerce websites	194
Labor Unions and Workers Associations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-Specific Websites for Labor Unions and Workers Associations	169
Women's Business Associations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-Specific Websites for Women's Business Associations	153
Other Domestic Private Sector Organizations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Various websites	122
Other International Private Sector Organizations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Various websites	42

**Table C.5:**  
**Independent Country**  
**Expert Inclusion Criteria**

Institution	Inclusion Criteria	Sources	# in Sampling Frame
<b>Overall</b>	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Professor, Research Fellow, Analyst	Freedom House Directory of Think Tanks in Central and Eastern Europe; Think Tank Initiative Directory; NIRA's World Directory of Think Tanks (NWDTT), Harvard Library's Think Tank Search, Various University Websites	<b>3,919</b>
In-Country Think Tanks, Policy Institutes, and Universities	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Professor, Research Fellow, Senior Analyst, Analyst	Country researchers and policy analysts from the Bertelsmann Foundation; Eurasia Group, Inter-American Dialogue, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Congressional Research Service, Economist Intelligence Unit, International Crisis Group, Global Insight, Freedom House, Global Integrity, Human Rights Watch, the Atlantic Council, Middle East Policy Council; Royal Institute of International Affairs; Chatham House; Various University Websites	2,309
International Think Tanks, Policy Institutes, Risk Rating Agencies and Universities	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Professor, Research Fellow, Senior Analyst, Analyst	Country researchers and policy analysts from the Bertelsmann Foundation; Eurasia Group, Inter-American Dialogue, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Congressional Research Service, Economist Intelligence Unit, International Crisis Group, Global Insight, Freedom House, Global Integrity, Human Rights Watch, the Atlantic Council, Middle East Policy Council; Royal Institute of International Affairs; Chatham House; Various University Websites	1,610

# *2014 Reform Efforts Survey Questionnaire*

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The questionnaire text provided in Appendix D corresponds to that seen by the average Host Government survey respondent.

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# Appendix D: 2014 Reform Efforts Survey Questionnaire<sup>19</sup>

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Q1 Over your entire career, for approximately how many years have you worked with or for the Government <<of.countrylong>>?

- 0-4 years (1)
- 5-9 years (2)
- 10-14 years (3)
- 15-20 years (4)
- 20 or more years (5)

Q2 It is our understanding that, since 2004, you have held at least one position with <<Org.l.1>> <<in.countryshort>>. Are our records correct that you have held at least one position with <<Org.s.1>>?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q3 We believe the experiences you gained while working with <<Org.s.1>> give you an important perspective on policies and programs <<in.countryshort>>. Do you feel that you are able to accurately answer questions about your time with <<Org.s.1>>?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q4 Thinking of all of the professional assignments you have held <<in.countryshort>> since 2004, are you able to answer questions about your experience with a government institution or program other than <<Org.s.1>>?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q5 Please write the full name of this other institution or program in the space below. (Do not provide an acronym.)

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Q6 While with <<Org.s.1>>, did you work with any development partners (i.e., international organizations, foreign embassies, and development finance agencies)?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

19. The questionnaire text provided in Appendix D corresponds to that seen by the average Host Government survey respondent. Please contact the research team for information concerning the alternative questions wordings and/or additional questions provided to members of other surveyed stakeholder groups. Red text indicates a questionnaire item number (i.e., question, sub-question, response option, etc.), while green text refers to personal information pulled from the sampling frame and purple text refers to text provided by the respondent in response to another, earlier survey question. Page breaks have been omitted.

Q7 Please think of the one position you held with <<Org.s.1>> in which you had the most interaction with development partners working <<in.countryshort>>. (The questions in this survey will ask you about the experiences you gained while working in this position.)

(1) What was the name of this position? (E.g., Director)

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(2) In which of the following years did you hold this position? (Please select all that apply.)

- 2004 (1)
- 2005 (2)
- 2006 (3)
- 2007 (4)
- 2008 (5)
- 2009 (6)
- 2010 (7)
- 2011 (8)
- 2012 (9)
- 2013 (10)

Q9 Thinking of your time spent working as <<pos.Q7.1>> with <<Org.s.1>>, which of the following best describes your primary area of focus? (Please select one issue area.)

- Macroeconomic management (1)
- Finance, credit, and banking (2)
- Trade (3)
- Business regulatory environment (4)
- Investment (5)
- Health (6)
- Education (7)
- Family and gender (8)
- Social protection and welfare (9)
- Labor (10)
- Environmental protection (11)
- Agriculture and rural development (12)
- Energy and mining (13)
- Land (14)
- Infrastructure (15)
- Decentralization (16)
- Anti-corruption and transparency (17)
- Democracy (18)
- Public administration (19)
- Justice and security (20)
- Tax (21)
- Customs (22)
- Public expenditure management (23)
- Foreign policy (24)
- I did not have a particular area of focus. (25)

Q10 Thinking of an average day working as <<pos.Q7.1>>, did you usually participate in each of the following activities?  
(Please select all that apply.)

- Research and analysis (1)
- Agenda setting (2)
- Advocacy (3)
- Consultation (4)
- Coordination (5)
- Resource mobilization (6)
- Policy formulation (7)
- Policy implementation (8)
- Policy monitoring and evaluation (9)
- Program design (10)
- Program implementation (11)
- Program monitoring and evaluation (12)

Q11 On an average day working as <<pos.Q7.1>>, approximately what percentage of your time would you say was spent on each of the following:

Political matters (1)

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Technical issues (2)

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Administrative tasks (3)

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Total (Values must sum to 100.)

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The remaining questions in this survey refer to the period of time you spent as <<pos.Q7.1>> with <<Org.s.1>> between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>>.

Q12 Thinking of your time as <<pos.Q7.1>>, please select all of the development partners (i.e., international organizations, foreign embassies, and development finance agencies) that you worked directly with on <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>>.  
(Please select all that apply.)

- <<Organization 1>> (1)
  - <<Organization 2>> (2)
  - ...
  - <<Organization N>> (n)
  - Other (Please indicate): (n+1 to n+3)
- 
- (n+1)
- 
- (n+2)
- 
- (n+3)
- I did not work with any development partners. (n+4)

**Q13** During your time as <<pos.Q7.1>>, approximately how often did you communicate with each of the following development partners about <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>>? We are interested in any of the following forms of communication: phone, video, email, or face-to-face.

*(Please refer to the year(s) in which you communicated most often with each development partner.)*

	Once a year or less (1)	2 or 3 times a year (2)	About once a month (3)	2 or 3 times a month (4)	About once a week (5)	Almost daily (6)
<<Organization 1>> (1)	•	•	•	•	•	•
<<Organization 2>> (2)	•	•	•	•	•	•
...	•	•	•	•	•	•
<<Organization N>> (n+3)	•	•	•	•	•	•

**Q14** Please take a moment to think about any advice that you may have received from each of the following development partners on issues related to <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>>. Approximately how often did this advice contain useful information about ways to address <<issue domain 16>> <<in.countryshort>>?

	Almost never (1)	Less than half the time (2)	About half the time (3)	More than half the time (4)	Almost always (5)
<<Organization 1>> (1)	•	•	•	•	•
<<Organization 2>> (2)	•	•	•	•	•
...	•	•	•	•	•
<<Organization N>> (n+3)	•	•	•	•	•

**Q15** To what extent did development partners coordinate their positions on specific policy issues with those of other development partners?  
*(Please select the statement that best reflects your views.)*

Development partners never made efforts to coordinate their positions on policy issues with those of other development partners. (1)

Development partners occasionally made efforts to coordinate their positions on policy issues with those of other development partners, but were rarely able to do so because of conflicting interests. (2)

Development partners often made efforts to coordinate their positions on policy issues with those of other development partners, but were only sometimes able to do so because of conflicting interests. (3)

Development partners consistently coordinated their positions on policy issues with those of other development partners. (4)

Before you move on to the next section of the survey, we would like to ask you a couple a brief questions about the specific activities of <<Org.s.1>> <<in.countryshort>> between <<startyear.Q7.b>> and <<endyear.Q7.b>> / in <<startyear.Q7.b>>.

Q16 You have indicated that you were in regular communication with <<Organization A>>. Between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / In <<startyear.Q7.2>>, how often did <<Organization A>> do the following:

	Never (1)	Rarely (2)	Frequently (3)	Almost always (4)	Don't know / Not sure (5)
Provide the Government <<of. countryshort>> with information about the successful <<issue domain 4>> adopted by other countries (1a)	.	.	.	.	.
Provide the Government <<of. countryshort>> with data or empirical evidence for use in decision-making (1b)	.	.	.	.	.
Provide Government <<of. countryshort>> staff and officials with professional training opportunities (2a)	.	.	.	.	.
Invest in the creation of new positions for additional government staff (2b)	.	.	.	.	.
Modernize the government's technical equipment and information systems (2c)	.	.	.	.	.
Contract with local experts to provide short-term technical assistance to the government (3a)	.	.	.	.	.
Contract with international experts to provide short-term technical assistance to the government (3b)	.	.	.	.	.
Hire local experts to provide long-term technical assistance to the government (3c)	.	.	.	.	.
Hire international experts to provide long-term technical assistance to the government (3d)	.	.	.	.	.
Provide general budget support to the Government <<of. countryshort>> (4a)	.	.	.	.	.
Deliver program funds through the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s public procurement or financial management systems (4b)	.	.	.	.	.

	Never (1)	Rarely (2)	Frequently (3)	Almost always (4)	Don't know / Not sure (5)
Ensure that the <<issue domain 4>> supported by <<Organization A>> aligned with the government's national development strategy (5a)	•	•	•	•	•
Pay the government upon the achievement of pre-agreed outputs or outcomes (5b)	•	•	•	•	•
Request that the government set up a separate unit in charge of program implementation (5c)	•	•	•	•	•
Ask the government to identify problems that <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> should try to solve (6a)	•	•	•	•	•
Ask local communities to identify problems that <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> should try to solve (6b)	•	•	•	•	•
Seek government input during the design of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6c)	•	•	•	•	•
Seek local community input during the design of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6d)	•	•	•	•	•
Involve the government in the implementation of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6e)	•	•	•	•	•
Involve local communities in the implementation of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6f)	•	•	•	•	•

Q17 How useful do you think each of the following practices were to the development efforts of <<Organization A>> <<in.countryshort>>? (Please use the slider to answer on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 means not at all useful and 5 means extremely useful. You can use any number between 0 and 5.)

- \_\_\_\_\_ Providing the Government <<of.countryshort>> with information about the successful <<issue domain 4>> adopted by other countries (1a)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Providing the Government <<of.countryshort>> with data or empirical evidence for use in decision-making (1b)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Providing Government <<of.countryshort>> staff and officials with professional training opportunities (2a)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Investing in the creation of new positions for additional government staff (2b)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Modernizing the government's technical equipment and information systems (2c)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Contracting with local experts to provide short-term technical assistance to the government (3a)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Contracting with international experts to provide short-term technical assistance to the government (3b)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Hiring local experts to provide long-term technical assistance to the government (3c)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Hiring international experts to provide long-term technical assistance to the government (3d)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Providing general budget support to the Government <<of.countryshort>> (4a)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Delivering program funds through the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s public procurement or financial management systems (4b)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Ensuring that the <<issue domain 4>> supported by <<Organization A>> were aligned with the government's national development strategy (5a)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Paying the government upon the achievement of pre-agreed outputs or outcomes (5b)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Requesting that the government set up a separate unit in charge of program implementation (5c)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Asking the government to identify problems that <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> should try to solve (6a)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Asking local communities to identify problems that <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> should try to solve (6b)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Seeking government input during the design of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6c)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Seeking local community input during the design of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6d)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Involving the government in the implementation of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6e)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Involving local communities in the implementation of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6f)

Now we would like you to think about the major <<issue domain 20>> that the Government <<of.countryshort>> attempted between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>>.

Q18 To the best of your knowledge, how much <<issue domain 17>> did the Government <<of.countryshort>> attempt between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>>?

- No reform at all (1)
- Minor reform (2)
- Substantial reform (3)
- Comprehensive reform (4)

Q19 Given the political, economic, and social realities <<in.countryshort>> between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>>, do you think the Government <<of.countryshort>> attempted too much <<issue domain 17>>, too little reform, or about the right amount?

- Too much reform (1)
- Too little reform (2)
- About the right amount (3)
- Don't know / Not sure (4)

Q20 What specific <<issue domain 16>> did the reforms pursued by the Government <<of.countryshort>> try to solve?  
(Please list up to three problems.)

Problem 1: \_\_\_\_\_  
Problem 2: \_\_\_\_\_  
Problem 3: \_\_\_\_\_

Q21 To the best of your knowledge, how much influence did each of the following development partners have on the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s decision to pursue reforms focused on these particular <<issue domain 16>>?  
(Please answer on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 means no influence at all and 5 means a maximum influence. You can use any number between 0 and 5.)

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization 1>> (1)  
\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization 2>> (2)  
\_\_\_\_\_ ...  
\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization N>> (n+3)

Q22 How much influence did each of the following development partners have on the design of the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s <<issue domain 18>>?  
(Please answer on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 means no influence at all and 5 means a maximum influence. You can use any number between 0 and 5.)

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization 1>> (1)  
\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization 2>> (2)  
\_\_\_\_\_ ...  
\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization N>> (n+3)

Q23 How much progress did the reforms pursued between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>> make towards solving each of the following problems <<in.countryshort>>?

(1) <<Q20.Sub 1>>

- No progress at all (1)
- Only a little progress (2)
- A moderate amount of progress (3)
- A great deal of progress (4)

(2) <<Q20.Sub 2>>

- No progress at all (1)
- Only a little progress (2)
- A moderate amount of progress (3)
- A great deal of progress (4)

(3) <<Q20.Sub 3>>

- No progress at all (1)
- Only a little progress (2)
- A moderate amount of progress (3)
- A great deal of progress (4)

Q24 To the best of your knowledge, which of the following development partners were involved in the implementation of the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s <<issue domain 18>>?

*(Please select all that apply.)*

- <<Organization 1>> (1)
- <<Organization 2>> (2)
- ...
- <<Organization N>> (n+3)
- Other (Please indicate): (n+4 to n+6)

\_\_\_\_\_ (n+4)

\_\_\_\_\_ (n+5)

\_\_\_\_\_ (n+6)

No development partners were involved in reform implementation efforts. (n+7)

Don't know / Not sure (n+8)

Q25 When involved, how helpful do you think each of the following development partners was to the implementation of the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s <<issue domain 18>>?

*(Please answer on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 means not at all helpful and 5 means extremely helpful. You can use any number between 0 and 5.)*

- \_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization 1>> (1)
- \_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization 2>> (2)
- \_\_\_\_\_ ...
- \_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization N>> (n+6)

Q26 In your opinion, did the reforms pursued between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>> focus on the most critical <<issue domain 16>> <<in.countryshort>>?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q27 What critical <<issue domain 16>> did the government's reform efforts overlook? (Please list up to three problems.)

Problem 1: \_\_\_\_\_

Problem 2: \_\_\_\_\_

Problem 3: \_\_\_\_\_

Q28 Why do you think the <<issue domain 20>> pursued by the Government <<of.countryshort>> were not focused on these problems?

(Please select any and all statements that apply.)

- Development partners did not express support for the requisite reforms. (1)
- Development partners expressed support for the requisite reforms, but did not provide the assistance needed for implementation. (2)
- The government lacked the necessary technical expertise. (3)
- The government did not have enough time to design and implement the requisite reforms. (4)
- The national leadership <<of.countryshort>> did not support the requisite reforms. (5)
- Legislators <<in.countryshort>> did not support the requisite reforms. (6)
- Government staff responsible for execution of policies and programs did not support the requisite reforms. (7)
- Domestic stakeholders outside of the Government <<of.countryshort>> did not support the requisite reforms. (8)
- International best practices did not provide sufficient guidance for addressing these problems. (9)
- Issues of corruption or undue personal influence <<in.countryshort>> prevented these problems from being addressed. (10)
- Influential domestic political actors <<in.countryshort>> did not fully understand the critical nature of these problems. (11)
- Other problems were viewed by the Government <<of.countryshort>> as more important. (12)

Now we would like to ask you a few questions about external assessments of government performance and their influence on <<issue domain 18>> <<in.countryshort>>.

**Q29** Are you familiar with any of the following assessments of government performance?

*(Please select all that apply. Note that the list provided below may include performance-based aid, trade, or debt relief programs. All of these programs involve either explicit or implicit assessments of government performance.)*

- <<Assessment 1>> (1)
- <<Assessment 2>> (2)
- <<Assessment 3>> (3)
- <<Assessment 4>> (4)
- <<Assessment 5>> (5)
- <<Assessment 6>> (6)
- <<Assessment 7>> (7)
- <<Assessment 8>> (8)
- <<Assessment 9>> (9)
- <<Assessment 10>> (10)
- <<Assessment 11>> (11)
- <<Assessment 12>> (12)
- ...
- <<Assessment 31>> (31)
- <<Assessment 32>> (32)
- <<Assessment 33>> (33)
- <<Assessment 34>> (34)
- <<Assessment 35>> (35)
- <<Assessment 36>> (36)

**Q30** From your experience with <<Org.s.1>>, can you think of any other external assessments of government performance that may have informed the <<issue domain 18>> of the Government <<of.countryshort>> between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>>?

- Yes (Please list up to three assessments): (1)

Assessment 1: \_\_\_\_\_

Assessment 2: \_\_\_\_\_

Assessment 3: \_\_\_\_\_

- No (2)

**Q31** Earlier you indicated that the Government <<of.countryshort>> undertook reforms to address these specific <<issue domain 16>>:

(1) <<Q20.Sub 1>>

(2) <<Q20.Sub 2>>

(3) <<Q20.Sub 3>>

How much influence did each of the following assessments have on the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s decision to pursue <<issue domain 20>> focused on solving these particular problems?

*(Please answer on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 means no influence at all and 5 means a maximum influence. You can use any number between 0 and 5.)*

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Assessment 1>> (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Assessment 2>> (2)

\_\_\_\_\_ ...

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Assessment N>> (n+3)

**Q32** How much influence did each of the following assessments have on the design of the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s <<issue domain 18>>?

*(Please answer on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 means no influence at all and 5 means a maximum influence. You can use any number between 0 and 5.)*

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Assessment 1>> (1)  
 \_\_\_\_\_ <<Assessment 2>> (2)  
 \_\_\_\_\_ ...  
 \_\_\_\_\_ <<Assessment N>> (n+3)

**Q33** You identified <<Assessment A>> as an assessment that influenced the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s <<issue domain 18>>. In your opinion, why was <<Assessment A>> influential?

*(Please select any and all statements that apply.)*

- It created a way for the government to highlight its policy credentials to key development partners. (1)
- It created a way for the government to highlight its policy credentials to foreign investors. (2)
- It strengthened the government's legitimacy among key domestic political constituencies. (3)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of national leadership. (4)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of key legislators. (5)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of influential civil society organizations. (6)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of influential private sector groups. (7)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of technical advisors working for the government. (8)
- It helped the government clearly identify practical approaches for addressing critical <<issue domain 16>>. (9)
- It provided the government with a direct financial incentive to undertake specific <<issue domain 20>>. (10)
- It helped the authorities fully acknowledge the critical nature of <<issue domain 16>> that were not otherwise entirely understood or appreciated. (11)
- It provided the government with the flexibility needed to successfully adapt to changing circumstances during the design and implementation of <<issue domain 18>>. (12)
- It provided the government with access to the technical assistance of development partner staff. (13)
- It was seen as respecting the sovereign authority <<of.countryshort>> over final policy decisions. (14)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that complemented other existing reform efforts <<in.countryshort>>. (15)

Q34 Now, please select the one statement that you think best explains the influence of <<Assessment A>> on the government's <<issue domain 18>>.

(Please select one statement.)

- It created a way for the government to highlight its policy credentials to key development partners. (1)
- It created a way for the government to highlight its policy credentials to foreign investors. (2)
- It strengthened the government's legitimacy among key domestic political constituencies. (3)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of national leadership. (4)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of key legislators. (5)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of influential civil society organizations. (6)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of influential private sector groups. (7)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of technical advisors working for the government. (8)
- It helped the government clearly identify practical approaches for addressing critical <<issue domain 16>>. (9)
- It provided the government with a direct financial incentive to undertake specific <<issue domain 20>>. (10)
- It helped the authorities fully acknowledge the critical nature of <<issue domain 16>> that were not otherwise entirely understood or appreciated. (11)
- It provided the government with the flexibility needed to successfully adapt to changing circumstances during the design and implementation of <<issue domain 18>>. (12)
- It provided the government with access to the technical assistance of development partner staff. (13)
- It was seen as respecting the sovereign authority <<of.countryshort>> over final policy decisions. (14)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that complemented other existing reform efforts <<in.countryshort>>. (15)

Q35 We would also like you to take a moment to reflect on the overall effects of <<Assessment A>> on the <<issue domain 15>> <<in.countryshort>>. To what extent do you feel that <<Assessment A>> had each of the following effects?

*(Please answer on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 means not at all and 5 means very strongly. You can use any number between 0 and 5.)*

\_\_\_\_\_ It focused the government's attention on critical <<issue domain 16>>. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ It drew the government's attention away from important <<issue domain 16>>.

(2)

\_\_\_\_\_ It enabled civil society organizations and journalists to more effectively advocate for <<issue domain 20>>. (3)

\_\_\_\_\_ It helped development partners coordinate their <<issue domain 10>> with that of the government. (4)

\_\_\_\_\_ It helped the government measure its own <<issue domain 14>>. (5)

\_\_\_\_\_ It limited the policy autonomy of the government in a negative manner. (6)

\_\_\_\_\_ It strengthened the government's resolve to successfully implement its <<issue domain 18>>. (7)

\_\_\_\_\_ It increased the likelihood that the government would build upon previously adopted <<issue domain 8>>. (8)

\_\_\_\_\_ It helped reformers within the government weaken opposition to <<issue domain 17>>. (9)

\_\_\_\_\_ It helped reformers within the government build domestic coalitions of support for <<issue domain 17>>. (10)

\_\_\_\_\_ It helped the government to better monitor the implementation of development partner projects. (11)

\_\_\_\_\_ It empowered the government to more effectively design and implement its own <<issue domain 20>>. (12)

Before we conclude, we would like to ask you a couple of questions about the domestic policy environment <<of.countryshort>> between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>>.

Q36 Please indicate how often each of the following statements applied to the <<issue domain 15>> <<in.countryshort>> between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>>.

	Almost never (1)	Less than half the time (2)	About half the time (3)	More than half the time (4)	Almost always (5)	Don't know / Not sure (6)
The government clearly defined its <<issue domain 13>> (1a)	•	•	•	•	•	•
A majority of domestic political actors agreed with the government's <<issue domain 9>> (1b)	•	•	•	•	•	•
The government's <<issue domain 9>> were supported by sound empirical evidence (1c)	•	•	•	•	•	•
National leadership prevented differences of opinion on <<issue domain 12>> from becoming irreconcilable conflicts (1d)	•	•	•	•	•	•
The government sought the input of civil society organizations (2a)	•	•	•	•	•	•
The government sought the input of private sector groups (2b)	•	•	•	•	•	•
The government sought the input of development partners (2c)	•	•	•	•	•	•
The government sought the input of local communities (2d)	•	•	•	•	•	•

Q37 To the best of your memory, which of the following groups expended substantial time, effort, or resources to promote <<issue domain 17>> <<in.countryshort>>? (Please select all that apply.)

- Office of the President, King, etc. (1)
- Office of the Prime Minister (2)
- The legislature (3)
- The judiciary (i.e., the courts) (4)
- Specific government ministries, offices, or agencies (Please indicate which ones): (5) \_\_\_\_\_
- Think tanks, policy institutes, or research institutions (Please indicate which ones): (6) \_\_\_\_\_
- Non-governmental or civil society organizations (Please indicate which ones): (7) \_\_\_\_\_
- Specific businesses (Please indicate which ones): (8) \_\_\_\_\_
- Private sector councils, chambers, or associations (Please indicate which ones): (9) \_\_\_\_\_
- Labor unions or workers associations (Please indicate which ones): (10) \_\_\_\_\_
- The military (11)
- Specific political parties (Please indicate which ones): (12) \_\_\_\_\_
- Other (Please indicate): (13) \_\_\_\_\_
- None of these (14)
- Don't know / Not sure (15)

Q38 Which of the following groups expended substantial time, effort, or resources to obstruct <<issue domain 17>> <<in.countryshort>>? (Please select all that apply.)

- Office of the President, King, etc. (1)
- Office of the Prime Minister (2)
- The legislature (3)
- The judiciary (i.e., the courts) (4)
- Specific government ministries, offices, or agencies (Please indicate which ones): (5) \_\_\_\_\_
- Think tanks, policy institutes, or research institutions (Please indicate which ones): (6) \_\_\_\_\_
- Non-governmental or civil society organizations (Please indicate which ones): (7) \_\_\_\_\_
- Specific businesses (Please indicate which ones): (8) \_\_\_\_\_
- Private sector councils, chambers, or associations (Please indicate which ones): (9) \_\_\_\_\_
- Labor unions or workers associations (Please indicate which ones): (10) \_\_\_\_\_
- The military (11)
- Specific political parties (Please indicate which ones): (12) \_\_\_\_\_
- Other (Please indicate): (13) \_\_\_\_\_
- None of these (14)
- Don't know / Not sure (15)

To close, we would like to learn a little bit more about your education and professional background.

Q42 What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- Primary (1)
- Secondary (2)
- Technical/Vocational (3)
- College/University (4)
- Postgraduate (5)
- Doctorate (6)

Q43 Please provide the following information about your most advanced degree:

(1) Name of degree (e.g., Bachelor of Arts in Economics):

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(2) Year degree earned: <<Drop down list 1940 - 2014>>

(3) Name of university (e.g., University of London):

---

(4) Country of university: <<Global list of countries, sorted by continent, with headers by continent>>

Q45 Do you currently work for any of the following organizations or groups, either <<in.countryshort>> or in another country?

(Please check all boxes that apply, if any.)

	<<in.countryshort>> (1)	In another country (2)
Government institution or program (1)	•	•
Development partner (2)	•	•
Civil society organization (3)	•	•
Non-governmental organization (4)	•	•
Private sector council, chamber, or association (5)	•	•
Labor union or workers association (6)	•	•
The media (7)	•	•
University or think tank (8)	•	•

Q46 About how long have you held your current position?

(If you hold more than one position, please refer to your primary position in your response.)

- 0-6 months (1)
- 7-12 months (2)
- 1-2 years (3)
- 3-4 years (4)
- 5 or more years (5)

**Q47** Have you ever worked as a full-time employee, part-time employee, or consultant or in any other capacity for any of the following international organizations or development partners?

*(Please check all boxes that apply, if any.)*

	Full-time (1)	Part-time (2)	Consultant (3)	Other (4)
<<Organization 1>> (1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<<Organization 2>> (2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<<Organization N>> (n)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other <i>(Please indicate)</i> : (n+1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other <i>(Please indicate)</i> : (n+2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other <i>(Please indicate)</i> : (n+3)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this survey. We value your insights and opinions. Later this year we will send you a summary of our findings. We will also post the survey results at <http://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/index.php>.

**Q48** In the future, would you be willing to consider participating in a follow-up survey or interview? We are interested in receiving your updated views about the role that development partners and external assessments play in the policy-making process of countries <<like.countryshort>>.

- Yes, you can contact me at the following e-mail address: (1)  
\_\_\_\_\_
- No (2)

# Supplemental Information


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# Appendix E: Supplemental Information

**Table E.1: The Development Partners Evaluated in this Report, by Type**

Multilaterals	DAC Bilaterals	Non-DAC Bilaterals
1. AfDB	1. Australia	1. Brazil
2. CAF	2. Austria	2. Bulgaria
3. BADEA	3. Belgium	3. China
4. AFESD	4. Canada	4. India
5. AMF	5. Denmark	5. Iran
6. AsDB	6. Finland	6. Kuwait
7. ALBA	7. France	7. Libya
8. CDB	8. Germany	8. Qatar
9. CABEL	9. Greece	9. Russia
10. EBRD	10. Ireland	10. Saudi Arabia
11. EU	11. Japan	11. South Africa
12. GAVI Alliance	12. Luxembourg	12. Taiwan
13. GEF	13. Netherlands	13. Turkey
14. Global Fund	14. New Zealand	14. United Arab Emirates
15. IADB	15. Norway	15. Venezuela
16. IFAD	16. Poland	
17. IMF	17. Portugal	
18. IsDB	18. South Korea	
19. OFID	19. Spain	
20. United Nations	20. Sweden	
21. UNICEF	21. Switzerland	
22. UNDP	22. United Kingdom	
23. World Bank	23. United States	

**Fig. E.1: Development Partners Implementing Reform in the Same Countries and Sectors**



Note: This graph depicts the network of development partner involvement in reform implementation, as reported by host government officials. Each tie between a pair of development partners is weighted according to the number of host government survey participants who indicated that both development partners were involved in the implementation of policy-domain specific reforms in their country. Colors (red, green, and blue) indicate communities of development partners.

**Table E.2: Country Engagement and Receptivity to Development Partners (Full Version)<sup>20</sup>**

Engagement (0-10) <sup>21</sup>	Usefulness of Advice (1-5)	Agenda-Setting Influence (0-5)	Helpfulness during Reform Implementation (0-5)
1. Tanzania [9.377]	1. Kazakhstan [4.867] (17)	1. Lesotho [3.495] (48)	1. Kiribati [4.244] (37)
2. Rwanda [8.695]	2. Belarus [4.262] (11)	2. Vietnam [2.954] (128)	2. Romania [4.013] (55)
3. Kenya [8.658]	3. Serbia [4.17] (113)	3. Kurdistan [2.864] (84)	3. Somaliland [4] (17)
4. DRC [8.575]	4. Botswana [4.121] (61)	4. Laos [2.845] (179)	4. Lesotho [3.95] (24)
5. Bangladesh [8.565]	5. Nigeria [4.089] (167)	5. Marshall Islands [2.841] (78)	5. Tanzania [3.946] (114)
6. Guatemala [8.39]	6. Tanzania [4.028] (141)	6. Ghana [2.715] (350)	6. Bhutan [3.929] (62)
7. Peru [8.257]	7. Mauritania [3.928] (144)	7. Nicaragua [2.666] (185)	7. Kazakhstan [3.929] (11)
8. Cape Verde [8.255]	8. Lesotho [3.922] (34)	8. Cameroon [2.646] (185)	8. Philippines [3.835] (157)
9. Paraguay [8.221]	9. Kurdistan [3.908] (96)	9. Tajikistan [2.641] (187)	9. Paraguay [3.798] (114)
10. Serbia [8.088]	10. Benin [3.9] (114)	10. Guinea [2.62] (140)	10. El Salvador [3.791] (96)
11. Mozambique [7.997]	11. Kenya [3.844] (220)	11. Moldova [2.595] (384)	11. Cape Verde [3.79] (69)
12. Sierra Leone [7.953]	12. Ukraine [3.783] (59)	12. Tonga [2.582] (121)	12. Macedonia [3.775] (169)
13. Afghanistan [7.731]	13. Macedonia [3.772] (276)	13. Serbia [2.538] (247)	13. Montenegro [3.757] (32)
14. Mongolia [7.62]	14. Montenegro [3.764] (88)	14. Solomon Islands [2.534] (99)	14. Marshall Islands [3.722] (17)
15. Sri Lanka [7.613]	15. Sri Lanka [3.742] (84)	15. Mozambique [2.505] (308)	15. Mauritania [3.671] (110)
16. Guyana [7.608]	16. Fiji [3.733] (50)	16. Comoros [2.492] (141)	16. Samoa [3.627] (61)
17. Philippines [7.542]	17. Burkina Faso [3.713] (247)	17. Paraguay [2.475] (297)	17. Honduras [3.617] (63)
18. Myanmar [7.385]	18. Samoa [3.651] (112)	18. Puntland [2.474] (33)	18. Laos [3.59] (33)
19. South Sudan [7.296]	19. Philippines [3.624] (352)	19. Kiribati [2.463] (80)	19. Ukraine [3.577] (33)
20. Macedonia [7.198]	20. Kyrgyzstan [3.602] (175)	20. Timor-Leste [2.462] (327)	20. Kenya [3.561] (153)
21. Central African Republic [7.179]	21. Maldives [3.601] (50)	21. Kyrgyzstan [2.462] (256)	21. Gambia [3.56] (65)
22. Kosovo [7.051]	22. Cape Verde [3.579] (99)	22. Tanzania [2.453] (240)	22. Nicaragua [3.549] (54)
23. Mauritania [6.958]	23. Zimbabwe [3.567] (103)	23. Kosovo [2.449] (426)	23. Vanuatu [3.547] (86)
24. Bosnia and Herzegovina [6.869]	24. Swaziland [3.556] (48)	24. Cote D'Ivoire [2.411] (237)	24. Vietnam [3.546] (28)
25. Angola [6.781]	25. Namibia [3.527] (102)	25. Montenegro [2.381] (135)	25. Malawi [3.539] (191)
26. Comoros [6.35]	26. Guinea [3.524] (101)	26. Sierra Leone [2.375] (245)	26. Cote D'Ivoire [3.53] (55)
27. Colombia [6.268]	27. Romania [3.512] (118)	27. Burundi [2.366] (284)	27. Benin [3.53] (70)
28. Tuvalu [6.184]	28. Tuvalu [3.498] (109)		28. Madagascar [3.525] (220)
29. Nepal [6.145]	29. Somaliland [3.479]		29. Rwanda [3.523] (134)
30. Haiti [6.134]			30. Colombia [3.505] (36)
31. Mali [6.068]			31. Guinea-Bissau [3.503] (52)
32. Ethiopia [5.987]			32. Moldova [3.499] (153)
33. Georgia [5.965]			33. Kyrgyzstan [3.495] (93)
34. Vanuatu [5.889]			34. Mozambique [3.494] (149)
35. Burundi [5.877]			
36. Burkina Faso [5.799]			

20. Point estimates are in brackets. The number of observations for a given country is in parentheses.

21. Engagement is equal to the average percentile rank of a country on two dimensions, rescaled from 0 to 10: (1) the number of development partners with which an average host government survey participant interacted; and (2) the average frequency of communication between a host government official and a development partner. This procedure allows us to put equal weight on both the breadth of interaction and the frequency of communication between host government officials and development partners.

Engagement (0-10) <sup>21</sup>	Usefulness of Advice (1-5)	Agenda-Setting Influence (0-5)	Helpfulness during Reform Implementation (0-5)
37. Gambia [5.699]	(24)	28. Cambodia [2.362]	35. Kosovo [3.493] (129)
38. Nigeria [5.678]	30. Kosovo [3.467] (223)	(585)	36. Guyana [3.493] (32)
39. Dominican Republic [5.658]	31. Comoros [3.46] (135)	29. Palestine [2.326]	37. Mongolia [3.447] (86)
40. Palestine [5.521]	32. Chad [3.446] (46)	(437)	38. Guatemala [3.426] (119)
41. Moldova [5.511]	33. Tajikistan [3.443] (28)	30. Macedonia [2.323]	39. Georgia [3.418] (199)
42. Liberia [5.481]	34. Eritrea [3.4] (15)	(426)	40. Swaziland [3.417] (28)
43. Malawi [5.422]	35. Bosnia and Herzegovina [3.398]	31. Albania [2.318] (224)	41. Tajikistan [3.413] (27)
44. Namibia [5.404]	(178)	32. Bosnia and Herzegovina [2.313] (294)	42. Timor-Leste [3.412] (57)
45. Benin [5.374]	36. Suriname [3.38] (75)	33. Mali [2.31] (390)	43. Fiji [3.406] (29)
46. Niger [5.348]	37. Algeria [3.38] (43)	34. Sri Lanka [2.305] (176)	44. Suriname [3.395] (37)
47. Armenia [5.308]	38. Zambia [3.379] (273)	35. Papua New Guinea [2.287] (79)	45. Sri Lanka [3.391] (38)
48. Kurdistan [5.223]	39. Malawi [3.345] (334)	36. Bulgaria [2.28] (160)	46. Cambodia [3.37] (215)
49. Djibouti [5.186]	40. Mongolia [3.342]	37. Swaziland [2.272] (76)	47. Papua New Guinea [3.357] (41)
50. Pakistan [5.168]	(185)	38. Romania [2.254] (130)	48. Belize [3.346] (58)
51. Guinea [5.163]	41. Cameroon [3.338]	39. Zimbabwe [2.252]	49. Sao Tome and Principe [3.324] (26)
52. Senegal [5.143]	(101)	(294)	50. Morocco [3.317] (108)
53. Cote D'Ivoire [5.135]	42. Belize [3.327] (192)	40. Chad [2.244] (114)	51. Guinea [3.314] (39)
54. Morocco [5.062]	43. Djibouti [3.312] (54)	41. Equatorial Guinea [2.225] (14)	52. Albania [3.305] (76)
55. Lesotho [4.974]	44. Ethiopia [3.255] (167)	42. Benin [2.213] (247)	53. Djibouti [3.303] (30)
56. El Salvador [4.9]	45. Central African Republic [3.252] (88)	43. Belize [2.209] (237)	54. Niger [3.282] (152)
57. Honduras [4.881]	46. Cote D'Ivoire [3.218]	44. Suriname [2.206]	55. Jamaica [3.275] (49)
58. Guinea-Bissau [4.762]	(99)	(94)	56. Peru [3.256] (104)
59. Maldives [4.732]	47. Haiti [3.214] (306)	45. Nigeria [2.198] (284)	57. Myanmar [3.246] (49)
60. Romania [4.647]	48. Gambia [3.191] (132)	46. Mongolia [2.19] (234)	58. Kurdistan [3.236] (14)
61. Jordan [4.642]	49. Georgia [3.186] (355)	47. Philippines [2.19]	59. Burundi [3.218] (147)
62. Tonga [4.614]	50. Uganda [3.178] (228)	(588)	60. Botswana [3.216] (34)
63. Ghana [4.607]	51. Papua New Guinea [3.167] (61)	48. South Sudan [2.186]	61. Sudan [3.211] (79)
64. Belize [4.46]	52. Vanuatu [3.135] (176)	(137)	62. DRC [3.203] (104)
65. Bolivia [4.417]	53. Guyana [3.127] (91)	49. Guinea-Bissau [2.175]	63. Dominican Republic [3.193] (166)
66. Uganda [4.324]	54. Moldova [3.12] (210)	(171)	64. Bulgaria [3.186] (45)
67. Sudan [4.278]	55. Bhutan [3.118] (107)	50. Burkina Faso [2.175]	65. Jordan [3.18] (203)
68. Yemen [4.163]	56. Myanmar [3.117] (141)	(349)	66. Solomon Islands [3.156] (64)
69. Timor-Leste [4.081]	57. Jamaica [3.107] (109)	51. Botswana [2.165] (63)	67. Azerbaijan [3.155] (28)
70. Bhutan [4.063]	58. Colombia [3.095]	52. Vanuatu [2.146] (245)	68. India [3.146] (22)
71. Solomon Islands [4.026]	(129)	53. Somalia [2.146] (153)	69. Mali [3.145] (90)
72. Madagascar [3.861]	59. Timor-Leste [3.082]	54. Afghanistan [2.136]	70. Ecuador [3.083] (28)
73. Zambia [3.821]	(134)	(923)	71. Uganda [3.076] (131)
74. Marshall Islands [3.753]	60. Thailand [3.076] (62)	55. Colombia [2.13] (249)	72. Bosnia and Herzegovina [3.075] (90)
75. Iraq [3.615]	61. Kiribati [3.054] (64)	56. Uganda [2.13] (397)	73. Tonga [3.065] (63)
76. Cambodia [3.53]	62. El Salvador [3.048]	57. Peru [2.127] (326)	74. Turkey [3.043] (46)
77. Suriname [3.508]	(211)	58. Cape Verde [2.125]	
78. Turkey [3.406]	63. Mozambique [3.038]	(192)	

Engagement (0-10) <sup>21</sup>	Usefulness of Advice (1-5)	Agenda-Setting Influence (0-5)	Helpfulness during Reform Implementation (0-5)
79. Egypt [3.368]	(270)	59. Central African Republic [2.104] (196)	75. Maldives [3.033] (42)
80. Montenegro [3.144]	64. Sierra Leone [3.033] (119)	60. Gambia [2.07] (191)	76. Syria [3.031] (33)
81. Kyrgyzstan [2.844]	65. Mali [3.029] (200)	61. Tuvalu [2.057] (112)	77. Serbia [3.025] (60)
82. Somalia [2.717]	66. DRC [3.028] (232)	62. El Salvador [2.049] (343)	78. Palestine [3.016] (148)
83. Brazil [2.66]	67. Paraguay [3.014] (216)	63. Djibouti [2.046] (101)	79. Haiti [3.01] (187)
84. Cameroon [2.624]	68. Ghana [3.003] (192)	64. Honduras [2.036] (283)	80. Indonesia [3.005] (140)
85. Indonesia [2.566]	69. Marshall Islands [2.995] (46)	65. Bhutan [2.029] (119)	81. Ghana [3.003] (129)
86. India [2.537]	70. Bangladesh [2.995] (190)	66. Namibia [2.012] (181)	82. South Africa [2.998] (46)
87. Nicaragua [2.519]	71. South Sudan [2.982] (118)	67. DRC [2.012] (330)	83. Algeria [2.993] (24)
88. Kiribati [2.513]	72. Guinea-Bissau [2.982] (97)	68. Kazakhstan [2.007] (167)	84. Namibia [2.991] (47)
89. Azerbaijan [2.332]	73. Guatemala [2.965] (292)	69. Guyana [2.004] (203)	85. Brazil [2.989] (67)
90. Tunisia [2.17]	74. Peru [2.956] (274)	70. Kenya [2.003] (422)	86. Comoros [2.972] (83)
91. Ukraine [2.151]	75. Azerbaijan [2.949] (70)	71. Bolivia [1.996] (261)	87. Somalia [2.967] (24)
92. Samoa [1.902]	76. Albania [2.915] (153)	72. Maldives [1.996] (65)	88. Zimbabwe [2.95] (55)
93. Togo [1.85]	77. Tonga [2.909] (97)	73. Guatemala [1.995] (325)	89. Nigeria [2.936] (103)
94. Syria [1.847]	78. Puntland [2.889] (12)	74. Armenia [1.989] (398)	90. Sierra Leone [2.929] (79)
95. South Africa [1.633]	79. Nepal [2.877] (248)	75. Azerbaijan [1.988] (163)	91. Angola [2.917] (45)
96. Albania [1.417]	80. Madagascar [2.872] (329)	76. Bangladesh [1.965] (348)	92. Congo-Brazzaville [2.903] (36)
97. Botswana [1.417]	81. Laos [2.861] (82)	77. Haiti [1.953] (561)	93. Ethiopia [2.899] (107)
98. Bulgaria [1.412]	82. Iraq [2.857] (112)	78. Sao Tome and Principe [1.941] (105)	94. Chad [2.897] (39)
99. Ecuador [0.979]	83. Armenia [2.8] (118)	79. Liberia [1.926] (615)	95. Thailand [2.89] (30)
100. Zimbabwe [0.839]	84. Bulgaria [2.782] (112)	80. Dominican Republic [1.915] (318)	96. Senegal [2.865] (118)
101. Jamaica [0.628]	85. Vietnam [2.769] (64)	81. Rwanda [1.909] (316)	97. Burkina Faso [2.846] (164)
102. Thailand [0.623]	86. Yemen [2.745] (240)	82. Sudan [1.908] (300)	98. Cameroon [2.8] (74)
	87. Afghanistan [2.739] (668)	83. Myanmar [1.904] (165)	99. Zambia [2.774] (138)
	88. Sao Tome and Principe [2.734] (33)	84. Malawi [1.889] (466)	100. Central African Republic [2.771] (49)
	89. Honduras [2.708] (192)	85. Iraq [1.874] (329)	101. Tunisia [2.729] (62)
	90. Indonesia [2.705] (320)	86. Mauritania [1.869] (292)	102. Liberia [2.721] (232)
	91. Liberia [2.702] (381)	87. Angola [1.861] (210)	103. Armenia [2.709] (54)
	92. Angola [2.684] (102)	88. Samoa [1.851] (157)	104. Togo [2.637] (68)
	93. Rwanda [2.683] (183)	89. Yemen [1.846] (484)	105. Yemen [2.605] (168)
	94. Sudan [2.653] (181)	90. Georgia [1.844] (539)	106. Tuvalu [2.571] (49)
	95. Burundi [2.639] (199)	91. Belarus [1.829] (59)	107. Nepal [2.567] (173)
		92. Algeria [1.806] (67)	108. South Sudan [2.554] (94)
			109. Afghanistan [2.537] (330)
			110. Pakistan [2.522] (79)
			111. Egypt [2.474] (98)
			112. Federated States of

Usefulness of Advice (1-5)	Agenda-Setting Influence (0-5)	Helpfulness during Reform Implementation (0-5)
96. India [2.617] (55)	93. Indonesia [1.777] (512)	Micronesia [2.45] (18)
97. Nicaragua [2.612] (112)	94. Uzbekistan [1.76] (137)	113. Bangladesh [2.442] (151)
98. Palestine [2.609] (365)	95. Somaliland [1.757] (48)	114. Bolivia [1.776] (29)
99. Morocco [2.602] (283)	96. Nepal [1.756] (395)	115. Iraq [1.603] (46)
100. Dominican Republic [2.59] (239)	97. Niger [1.736] (308)	
101. Solomon Islands [2.59] (108)	98. Zambia [1.716] (400)	
102. Iran [2.531] (15)	99. Madagascar [1.698] (466)	
103. Syria [2.524] (91)	100. Fiji [1.696] (115)	
104. China [2.522] (25)	101. Togo [1.676] (186)	
105. Jordan [2.522] (452)	102. Jamaica [1.664] (136)	
106. Brazil [2.473] (184)	103. Egypt [1.664] (219)	
107. Togo [2.46] (129)	104. Ethiopia [1.647] (321)	
108. Tunisia [2.457] (104)	105. Brazil [1.64] (169)	
109. Pakistan [2.448] (159)	106. Eritrea [1.619] (61)	
110. South Africa [2.427] (101)	107. Ukraine [1.613] (153)	
111. Cambodia [2.318] (280)	108. Senegal [1.588] (354)	
112. Niger [2.314] (246)	109. Jordan [1.571] (486)	
113. Congo-Brazzaville [2.197] (59)	110. Pakistan [1.569] (265)	
114. Senegal [2.179] (184)	111. India [1.562] (104)	
115. Equatorial Guinea [2.125] (11)	112. South Africa [1.556] (164)	
116. Ecuador [2.084] (116)	113. Ecuador [1.523] (126)	
117. Egypt [2.051] (194)	114. China [1.482] (33)	
118. Somalia [2.037] (50)	115. Iran [1.454] (28)	
119. Federated States of Micronesia [2.013] (44)	116. Syria [1.449] (205)	
120. Turkey [1.828] (99)	117. Morocco [1.426] (333)	
121. Bolivia [1.718] (81)	118. Tunisia [1.391] (204)	
	119. Congo-Brazzaville [1.387] (83)	
	120. Turkmenistan [1.358] (75)	
	121. Thailand [1.237] (84)	
	122. Cuba [1.083] (18)	
	123. Turkey [1.079] (145)	
	124. North Korea [0.865] (33)	
	125. Federated States of Micronesia [0.721] (53)	

**Table E.3: Development Partner Communication and Performance (Full Version)<sup>22</sup>**

Frequency of Communication (1-6)	Usefulness of Advice (1-5)	Agenda-Setting Influence (0-5)	Helpfulness during Reform Implementation (0-5)
1. Global Fund [3.897] (68)	1. GAVI Alliance [4.038] (14)	1. World Bank [3.207] (2174)	1. Ireland [4.146] (11)
2. Ireland [3.333] (16)	2. CDB [3.958] (36)	2. IADB [3.143] (321)	2. GAVI Alliance [3.857] (15)
3. UNDP [3.144] (1358)	3. Global Fund [3.931] (61)	3. IMF [3.063] (999)	3. IMF [3.771] (437)
4. GAVI Alliance [3.143] (15)	4. Finland [3.76] (14)	4. EU [2.955] (1982)	4. Global Fund [3.667] (36)
5. United Nations [3.023] (1028)	5. World Bank [3.697] (1486)	5. GAVI Alliance [2.875] (16)	5. World Bank [3.602] (1208)
6. IFAD [3.014] (40)	6. Luxembourg [3.683] (18)	6. AsDB [2.689] (548)	6. AsDB [3.52] (240)
7. UNICEF [2.976] (689)	7. IMF [3.638] (642)	7. Global Fund [2.684] (114)	7. IFAD [3.519] (18)
8. IADB [2.944] (253)	8. Austria [3.617] (73)	8. GEF [2.647] (85)	8. GEF [3.5] (26)
9. World Bank [2.874] (1633)	9. UNDP [3.573] (1227)	9. UNDP [2.606] (1892)	9. IADB [3.482] (163)
10. Denmark [2.821] (98)	10. UNICEF [3.57] (621)	10. United Nations [2.559] (1527)	10. New Zealand [3.477] (49)
11. Taiwan [2.809] (27)	11. Ireland [3.514] (14)	11. Luxembourg [2.551] (39)	11. CDB [3.458] (17)
12. EU [2.783] (1290)	12. Sweden [3.485] (174)	12. CDB [2.534] (47)	12. EU [3.438] (833)
13. Netherlands [2.713] (121)	13. Switzerland [3.466] (108)	13. United States [2.472] (3417)	13. Taiwan [3.438] (11)
14. Sweden [2.695] (192)	14. Denmark [3.453] (87)	14. EBRD [2.443] (227)	14. UNICEF [3.43] (361)
15. Finland [2.692] (17)	15. United Nations [3.442] (918)	15. AfDB [2.402] (657)	15. Sweden [3.391] (103)
16. Norway [2.667] (137)	16. Netherlands [3.421] (107)	16. UNICEF [2.377] (1041)	16. CAF [3.375] (13)
17. Russia [2.648] (18)	17. AsDB [3.394] (338)	17. Sweden [2.366] (340)	17. United Nations [3.349] (493)
18. Luxembourg [2.627] (21)	18. EBRD [3.349] (119)	18. New Zealand [2.317] (86)	18. Denmark [3.311] (57)
19. Portugal [2.581] (42)	19. EU [3.332] (1154)	19. Denmark [2.29] (158)	19. EBRD [3.296] (57)
20. New Zealand [2.547] (70)	20. IADB [3.332] (231)	20. Netherlands [2.284] (234)	20. UNDP [3.283] (772)
21. United States [2.528] (2192)	21. New Zealand [3.32] (69)	21. Taiwan [2.282] (34)	21. Netherlands [3.282] (71)
22. GEF [2.513] (74)	22. AfDB [3.287] (443)	22. Portugal [2.265] (68)	22. AfDB [3.237] (315)
23. South Korea [2.494] (218)	23. South Korea [3.251] (195)	23. Ireland [2.264] (32)	23. United States [3.212] (1096)
24. Spain [2.489] (316)	24. United States [3.221] (1947)	24. South Korea [2.175] (241)	24. Germany [3.203] (603)
25. AsDB [2.458] (374)	25. Norway [3.193] (117)	25. Switzerland [2.166] (219)	25. Luxembourg [3.15] (10)
26. Switzerland [2.425] (121)	26. Taiwan [3.185] (24)	26. Germany [2.082] (2097)	26. IsDB [3.129] (65)
27. Germany [2.365] (1433)	27. GEF [3.159] (63)	27. Norway [2.071] (248)	27. United Kingdom [3.108] (448)
28. Belgium [2.345] (194)	28. Germany [3.139] (1236)	28. IFAD [2.069] (50)	28. Belgium [3.077] (76)
29. IMF [2.315] (704)	29. United Kingdom [3.122] (846)	29. CAF [2.052] (54)	29. Japan [3.054] (485)
30. AfDB [2.288] (499)	30. IFAD [3.04] (38)	30. United Kingdom [2.015] (1673)	30. Norway [3.038] (67)
31. Japan [2.267] (1336)	31. Japan [3.036] (1162)	31. Spain [2.006] (457)	31. Switzerland [3.034] (52)
32. CDB [2.251] (37)			32. Austria [3.022] (30)
			33. AMF [3] (10)
			34. Canada [2.946] (255)
			35. Australia [2.938] (198)
			36. Spain [2.887] (117)
			37. BADEA [2.882] (21)
			38. CABI [2.875] (11)

22. Point estimates are in brackets. The number of observations for a given development partner is in parentheses.

Frequency of Communication (1-6)	Usefulness of Advice (1-5)	Agenda-Setting Influence (0-5)	Helpfulness during Reform Implementation (0-5)
33. United Kingdom [2.249] (942)	32. South Africa [2.967] (85)	32. Japan [1.832] (1717)	39. Portugal [2.838] (21)
34. South Africa [2.167] (107)	33. Qatar [2.942] (28)	33. Austria [1.794] (112)	40. Brazil [2.827] (46)
35. France [2.16] (855)	34. Portugal [2.853] (35)	34. Belgium [1.748] (262)	41. China [2.727] (126)
36. Saudi Arabia [2.125] (132)	35. Spain [2.817] (267)	35. France [1.704] (1324)	42. France [2.714] (319)
37. China [2.114] (586)	36. IsDB [2.805] (168)	36. AMF [1.688] (46)	43. Turkey [2.688] (40)
38. Greece [2.1] (24)	37. Turkey [2.776] (222)	37. Canada [1.651] (1184)	44. Venezuela [2.683] (10)
39. CABI [2.092] (64)	38. India [2.774] (194)	38. South Africa [1.646] (140)	45. OFID [2.676] (18)
40. India [2.087] (241)	39. Belgium [2.773] (174)	39. Qatar [1.645] (41)	46. South Korea [2.664] (76)
41. Australia [2.076] (491)	40. Canada [2.765] (612)	40. IsDB [1.641] (212)	47. UAE [2.615] (17)
42. BADEA [2.059] (91)	41. Russia [2.688] (17)	41. Finland [1.586] (32)	48. India [2.58] (45)
43. Qatar [2.058] (40)	42. France [2.625] (728)	42. China [1.56] (601)	49. Saudi Arabia [2.521] (18)
44. EBRD [2.05] (137)	43. Brazil [2.601] (205)	43. Australia [1.535] (772)	50. South Africa [2.5] (19)
45. IsDB [2.024] (198)	44. Saudi Arabia [2.568] (101)	44. CABI [1.512] (62)	51. Kuwait [2.388] (31)
46. UAE [1.951] (110)	45. China [2.566] (484)	45. Brazil [1.483] (295)	
47. Turkey [1.95] (266)	46. Australia [2.561] (425)	46. Venezuela [1.473] (58)	
48. OFID [1.922] (137)	47. AMF [2.553] (29)	47. Turkey [1.367] (312)	
49. Brazil [1.92] (243)	48. Venezuela [2.534] (51)	48. India [1.354] (258)	
50. Canada [1.919] (720)	49. BADEA [2.437] (59)	49. BADEA [1.324] (85)	
51. Venezuela [1.911] (62)	50. UAE [2.414] (87)	50. OFID [1.302] (134)	
52. Iran [1.91] (56)	51. Kuwait [2.313] (133)	51. Saudi Arabia [1.079] (142)	
53. Austria [1.909] (87)	52. CAF [2.299] (44)	52. Russia [1.039] (33)	
54. CAF [1.903] (51)	53. CABI [2.299] (57)	53. Kuwait [1.038] (161)	
55. Kuwait [1.759] (169)	54. OFID [2.189] (107)	54. Greece [1.032] (33)	
56. Libya [1.753] (52)	55. Iran [2.157] (48)	55. UAE [1.016] (113)	
57. AMF [1.687] (36)	56. Libya [1.942] (37)	56. Iran [0.848] (57)	
	57. Greece [1.69] (19)	57. Libya [0.552] (44)	
<b>Multilaterals [2.541] (8776)</b>	<b>Multilaterals [3.206] (7855)</b>	<b>Multilaterals [2.370] (12273)</b>	<b>Multilaterals [3.350] (5129)</b>
<b>DAC Bilaterals [2.455] (9643)</b>	<b>DAC Bilaterals [3.126] (8427)</b>	<b>DAC Bilaterals [2.009] (14745)</b>	<b>DAC Bilaterals [3.125] (4144)</b>
<b>Non-DAC Bilaterals [2.083] (2109)</b>	<b>Non-DAC Bilaterals [2.602] (1716)</b>	<b>Non-DAC Bilaterals [1.313] (2289)</b>	<b>Non-DAC Bilaterals [2.697] (363)</b>

**Table E.4: The Country-Level Determinants of Development Partner Performance**

Models	Usefulness of Advice			Agenda-Setting Influence			Helpfulness during Reform Implementation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Threshold for Inclusion in Sample	n>=10	n>=10	n>=5	n>=10	n>=10	n>=5	n>=10	n>=10	n>=5
Non-Executive Reform Support	0.087 (0.136)	0.140 (0.189)	0.080 (0.109)	0.224 (0.069)***	0.317 (0.087)***	0.195 (0.072)***	0.056 (0.092)	0.134 (0.111)	0.085 (0.082)
Executive Opposition	-1.065 (1.068)	-1.656 (1.343)	-0.631 (0.844)	-1.355 (0.413)***	-1.659 (0.595)***	-1.292 (0.522)**	0.421 (0.519)	-0.301 (0.700)	0.258 (0.450)
Government Effectiveness	-0.159 (0.191)	-0.269 (0.304)	-0.036 (0.144)	-0.190 (0.098)*	-0.218 (0.111)*	-0.166 (0.085)*	0.294 (0.163)*	0.074 (0.264)	0.294 (0.141)**
GDP per capita (Thousands)	-0.124 (0.0980)	-0.115 (0.116)	-0.126 (0.0813)	-0.086 (0.043)*	-0.057 (0.041)	-0.096 (0.046)**	-0.139 (0.056)**	-0.139 (0.062)**	-0.146 (0.053)***
Population (ln)	-0.151 (0.062)**	-0.023 (0.150)	-0.191 (0.056)***	-0.113 (0.031)***	-0.048 (0.055)	-0.112 (0.039)***	-0.083 (0.043)*	0.003 (0.093)	-0.102 (0.043)**
Net ODA (% of GNI) [ln]	-0.173 (0.089)*	-0.132 (0.121)	-0.140 (0.069)**	-0.019 (0.045)	0.035 (0.053)	-0.004 (0.052)	-0.124 (0.057)**	-0.108 (0.078)	-0.072 (0.055)
CPA (% of ODA) [ln]	0.069 (0.101)	0.107 (0.161)	0.067 (0.079)	0.028 (0.049)	0.038 (0.053)	0.082 (0.056)	-0.075 (0.060)	0.007 (0.087)	-0.031 (0.058)
Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP) [ln]	0.029 (0.081)	-0.005 (0.135)	-0.017 (0.056)	0.074 (0.038)*	0.102 (0.053)*	0.021 (0.035)	-0.090 (0.055)	-0.148 (0.109)	-0.071 (0.042)*
Fragmentation	0.002 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.011)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.003)
Polityz	-0.013 (0.019)	0.003 (0.024)	0.008 (0.011)	0.002 (0.009)	0.003 (0.011)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.028 (0.014)*	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.010)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)
OECD Education	-0.262 (0.389)	-0.197 (0.557)	-0.299 (0.324)	-0.216 (0.161)	-0.396 (0.179)**	-0.326 (0.169)*	-0.025 (0.244)	-0.028 (0.349)	-0.013 (0.209)
DP Work History	-0.687 (0.403)*	-0.710 (0.569)	-1.157 (0.366)***	-0.067 (0.259)	0.125 (0.353)	-0.125 (0.310)	-0.450 (0.375)	-0.626 (0.453)	-0.543 (0.333)











**Table E.6: Executive Support for Reform has No Effect on Development Partner Influence**

	Agenda Setting Influence		
Models	(1)	(2)	(3)
Threshold for Inclusion in Sample	n>=10	n>=10	n>=10
Executive Reform Support	-0.315 (0.422)	-0.214 (0.432)	-0.367 (0.422)
Government Effectiveness	-0.013 (0.123)	-0.067 (0.108)	-0.049 (0.115)
GDP per capita (Thousands)	-0.078 (0.056)	-0.095 (0.050)*	-0.092 (0.058)
Population (ln)	-0.068 (0.032)**	-0.112 (0.033)***	-0.057 (0.032)*
Net ODA (% of GNI) [ln]	0.044 (0.047)	0.012 (0.047)	0.025 (0.050)
CPA (% of ODA) [ln]	-0.010 (0.068)	-0.017 (0.060)	-0.007 (0.067)
Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP) [ln]	-0.011 (0.034)	0.039 (0.040)	-0.017 (0.035)
Fragmentation	-0.000 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)
Polity2	0.007 (0.012)	0.005 (0.010)	0.009 (0.012)
Trade (% of GDP)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
OECD Education	-0.193 (0.203)	-0.176 (0.187)	-0.213 (0.199)
DP Work History	-0.008 (0.276)	-0.090 (0.277)	0.067 (0.283)
Non-Executive Reform Support		0.236 (0.077)***	
Non-Executive Reform Opposition			-0.115 (0.104)
CONSTANT	3.841 (0.666)***	3.663 (0.689)***	3.839 (0.635)***
Region Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	0.500	0.572	0.513
N	69	69	69

Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10

Table E.7: Summary  
Statistics for Country-Level  
Model Variables

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<b>DEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>					
Usefulness of Advice*	121	3.081	0.557	1.718	4.867
Agenda-Setting Influence*	125	2.043	0.433	0.721	3.495
Helpfulness during Reform Implementation*	115	3.215	0.438	1.603	4.244
<b>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>					
Change in BTI	93	0.101	0.274	-0.443	1.683
CPA (% of ODA) [ln]	117	4.224	1.055	0.393	7.240
DP Work History*	86	17.49	11.92	0	60
Executive Opposition*	119	0.107	0.104	0	0.640
Executive Reform Support*	119	0.412	0.144	0.019	0.775
Fragmentation	117	30.05	12.98	5.714	70.86
GDP per capita (Thousands)	116	1.967	1.897	0.150	13.24
Government Effectiveness	120	-0.648	0.548	-2.250	0.537
Natural Resources Rent (% of GDP) [ln]	115	1.694	1.535	-3.433	4.186
Net ODA (% of GNI) [ln]	115	1.098	1.738	-3.672	4.295
Non-Executive Opposition*	119	1.313	0.541	0.167	2.843
Non-Executive Reform Support*	121	3.071	0.670	0.938	5.155
OECD Education*	84	40.01	20.20	0	100
Polity2	107	2.321	5.775	-10	10
Population (ln)	120	15.83	1.991	9.188	21.01
Solubility	125	-0.114	0.208	-0.670	0.356
Trade (% of GDP)	114	83.95	34.88	0.309	202.6


\*Survey-based variables have a minimum country-level sample size of  $n \geq 10$  observations.

**Table E.8: Characteristics of Modeled vs. Un-Modeled Countries**

	Countries in Models 1, 4, and 7 (Mean)	Countries not in Models 1, 4, or 7 (Mean)	Difference
Usefulness of Advice	2.989	3.202	-0.213**
Agenda-Setting Influence	2.013	2.080	-0.067
Helpfulness during Reform Implementation	3.189	3.255	-0.066
Non-Executive Reform Support	3.186	2.919	0.267**
Executive Opposition	0.102	0.114	-0.012
Government Effectiveness	-0.540	-0.795	0.256**
GDP per capita (Thousands)	1.674	2.398	-0.725**
Population (ln)	16.297	15.196	1.101***
Net ODA (% of GNI) [ln]	1.147	1.023	0.125
CPA (% of ODA) [ln]	4.517	3.804	0.712***
Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP) [ln]	1.871	1.429	0.442
Fragmentation	32.418	26.649	5.769**
Polity2	4.213	-1.113	5.325***
Trade (% of GDP)	78.038	93.022	-14.984**
OECD Education	0.467	0.408	0.059
DP Work History	0.183	0.180	0.003
Solubility	-0.106	-0.123	0.017
Change in BTI	0.120	0.066	0.054
Executive Reform Support	0.400	0.429	-0.029
Non-Executive Reform Opposition	1.398	1.196	0.201**

Notes: \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Fig. E.2: Government Effectiveness Accounts for Income's Effect on Helpfulness



**Table E.9: Trade Openness  
Positively Impacts the  
Helpfulness of DAC  
Bilaterals**

	Helpfulness of DAC Bilaterals		
Models	(1)	(2)	(3)
Threshold for Inclusion in Sample	n>=10	n>=10	n>=5
Non-Executive Reform Support	0.144 (0.140)	0.109 (0.159)	0.123 (0.120)
Executive Opposition	0.953 (0.605)	0.0225 (0.937)	0.614 (0.625)
Government Effectiveness	0.629 (0.173)***	0.342 (0.226)	0.536 (0.201)***
GDP per capita (Thousands)	-0.255 (0.081)***	-0.255 (0.084)***	-0.189 (0.080)**
Population (ln)	-0.036 (0.080)	-0.011 (0.128)	-0.060 (0.069)
Net ODA (% of GNI) [ln]	-0.117 (0.097)	-0.162 (0.122)	-0.031 (0.083)
CPA (% of ODA) [ln]	-0.121 (0.069)*	-0.065 (0.089)	-0.042 (0.079)
Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP) [ln]	0.038 (0.058)	0.008 (0.081)	-0.056 (0.065)
Fragmentation	0.007 (0.007)	0.003 (0.009)	0.000 (0.005)
Polity2	-0.025 (0.017)	-0.023 (0.021)	0.002 (0.015)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.009 (0.003)***	0.009 (0.003)***	0.005 (0.002)**
OECD Education	0.112 (0.355)	0.362 (0.441)	0.0300 (0.334)
DP Work History	-0.743 (0.625)	-1.276 (0.631)*	-0.884 (0.571)
Solubility		0.483 (0.387)	
Change in BTI		-0.339 (0.177)*	
CONSTANT	3.742 (1.459)**	3.256 (2.097)	4.205 (1.387)***
Region Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	0.583	0.635	0.372
N	63	56	89

Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10

**Table E.10: DP Work History  
Negatively Impacts the  
Perceived Usefulness of  
Non-DAC Advice**

Usefulness of Non-DAC Bilateral Advice			
Models	(1)	(2)	(3)
Threshold for Inclusion in Sample	n>=10	n>=10	n>=5
Non-Executive Reform Support	0.085 (0.206)	-0.068 (0.242)	0.006 (0.195)
Executive Opposition	-1.121 (2.526)	-1.880 (2.486)	-0.296 (1.653)
Government Effectiveness	-0.456 (0.335)	-0.339 (0.411)	-0.048 (0.236)
GDP per capita (Thousands)	-0.099 (0.225)	-0.145 (0.253)	-0.215 (0.130)
Population (ln)	-0.009 (0.126)	0.156 (0.241)	-0.170 (0.094)*
Net ODA (% of GNI) [ln]	-0.374 (0.168)**	-0.417 (0.175)**	-0.242 (0.148)
CPA (% of ODA) [ln]	-0.298 (0.216)	-0.472 (0.292)	-0.033 (0.145)
Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP) [ln]	-0.023 (0.132)	-0.088 (0.263)	-0.129 (0.095)
Fragmentation	0.026 (0.0112)**	0.012 (0.020)	0.013 (0.008)
Polity2	-0.023 (0.037)	-0.027 (0.059)	0.001 (0.022)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.009 (0.006)	0.012 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.004)
OECD Education	1.295 (0.682)*	1.863 (0.745)**	-0.328 (0.537)
DP Work History	-2.545 (1.114)**	-2.718 (1.218)**	-1.965 (0.924)**
Solubility		0.054 (0.724)	
Change in BTI		-0.300 (0.361)	
CONSTANT	1.582 (2.899)	0.523 (4.016)	6.117 (1.622)***
Region Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	0.492	0.521	0.303
N	49	43	76

Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10

**Table E.11: The Impact of Development Partner Attributes on Performance (Bivariate)**

	Usefulness of Advice	Agenda-Setting Influence	Helpfulness during Reform Implementation
ALIGNMENT	0.213 (0.130); N=30	0.368*** (0.111); N=30	0.163** (0.077); N=28
TIED AID	-0.007 (0.005); N=39	-0.006 (0.005); N=39	-0.007*** (0.002); N=37
TECHNICAL	-0.011* (0.006); N=44	-0.011** (0.004); N=44	-0.008** (0.004); N=41
SPECIALIZATION	0.021 (0.110); N=42	0.127 (0.111); N=42	0.074 (0.076); N=39

Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table E.12: The Impact of Development Partner Attributes on Performance (Multivariate)**

Models	Usefulness of Advice			Agenda-Setting Influence			Helpfulness during Reform Implementation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)			
ALIGNMENT	0.036 (0.151)	0.062 (0.156)	0.219 (0.108)*	0.205 (0.088)**	0.009 (0.107)	0.050 (0.115)			
TIED AID	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.006 (0.002)**	-0.006 (0.003)*	-0.005 (0.003)			
TECHNICAL	-0.016 (0.005)***	-0.016 (0.005)***	-0.016 (0.004)***	-0.011 (0.004)***	-0.009 (0.003)***	-0.007 (0.005)			
SPECIALIZATION	-0.080 (0.114)	-0.095 (0.143)	-0.022 (0.123)	-0.162 (0.124)	0.008 (0.096)	-0.068 (0.102)			
DONOR SIZE		-0.044 (0.050)		0.014 (0.057)		-0.078 (0.059)			
MULTI		-0.018 (0.206)		0.502 (0.226)**		0.190 (0.152)			
CONSTANT	3.295 (0.347)***	3.691 (0.458)***	2.382 (0.346)***	1.668 (0.624)**	3.454 (0.267)***	3.918 (0.600)***			
R <sup>2</sup>	0.482	0.493	0.594	0.707	0.368	0.471			
N	29	29	29	29	28	28			

Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table E.13: Summary  
Statistics for Development  
Partner Models**

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<b>DEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>					
Usefulness of Advice*	49	3.109	0.514	1.690	4.048
Agenda-Setting Influence*	49	2.074	0.588	1.016	3.207
Helpfulness during Reform Implementation*	46	3.178	0.374	2.388	4.146
<b>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>					
ALIGNMENT	30	0.019	0.748	-1.607	1.979
TIED AID	40	8.204	19.224	0.000	89.78
TECHNICAL	47	11.465	15.893	0.000	70.71
SPECIALIZATION	45	-2.141	0.808	-3.442	-0.193
DONOR SIZE	44	8.858	1.956	0.039	11.992
MULTI	52	0.385	0.491	0.000	1.000

\*Survey-based variables have a minimum country-level sample size of  $n \geq 10$  observations.

**Table E.14: Development Partner Performance (Agency-Level)<sup>23</sup>**

Usefulness of Advice (1-5)	Agenda-Setting Influence (0-5)	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation (0-5)
1. GAVI Alliance [4.038] (14)	1. World Bank [3.207] (2174)	1. GAVI Alliance [3.857] (15)
2. CDB [3.958] (36)	2. IADB [3.143] (321)	2. IMF [3.771] (437)
3. Global Fund [3.931] (61)	3. IMF [3.063] (999)	3. Global Fund [3.667] (36)
4. LuxDev [3.861] (13)	4. EU [2.955] (1982)	4. New Zealand Embassy [3.639] (17)
5. Finland Embassy [3.76] (14)	5. GAVI Alliance [2.875] (16)	5. Sweden Embassy [3.603] (26)
6. SIDA [3.751] (125)	6. Danida [2.874] (83)	6. World Bank [3.602] (1208)
7. SDC [3.724] (62)	7. AsDB [2.689] (548)	7. Danida [3.569] (39)
8. World Bank [3.697] (1486)	8. Global Fund [2.684] (114)	8. NZAID [3.522] (32)
9. IMF [3.638] (642)	9. Luxembourg Embassy [2.659] (16)	9. AsDB [3.52] (240)
10. Austria Embassy [3.625] (41)	10. GEF [2.647] (85)	10. IFAD [3.519] (18)
11. Danida [3.611] (57)	11. UNDP [2.606] (1892)	11. GEF [3.5] (26)
12. New Zealand Embassy [3.594] (26)	12. LuxDev [2.598] (23)	12. IADB [3.482] (163)
13. UNDP [3.573] (1227)	13. United Nations [2.559] (1527)	13. CDB [3.458] (17)
14. UNICEF [3.57] (621)	14. NZAID [2.546] (49)	14. EU [3.438] (833)
15. United Nations [3.442] (918)	15. SIDA [2.536] (232)	15. UNICEF [3.43] (361)
16. Netherlands Embassy [3.421] (107)	16. CDB [2.534] (47)	16. AusAID [3.378] (143)
17. GIZ [3.418] (612)	<b>17. USAID [2.491] (1721)</b>	17. CAF [3.375] (13)
<b>18. MCC [3.418] (325)</b>	18. SDC [2.479] (137)	18. Taiwan Embassy [3.375] (10)
19. NZAID [3.411] (43)	<b>19. US Embassy [2.452] (1162)</b>	19. SIDA [3.367] (77)
20. Denmark Embassy [3.407] (30)	20. EBRD [2.443] (227)	20. ADA [3.365] (17)
21. AsDB [3.394] (338)	21. New Zealand Embassy [2.435] (37)	21. Belgium Embassy [3.361] (22)
22. EBRD [3.349] (119)	22. AfDB [2.402] (657)	22. United Nations [3.349] (493)
23. EU [3.332] (1154)	23. Ireland Embassy [2.392] (18)	23. GIZ [3.323] (341)
24. IADB [3.332] (231)	24. UNICEF [2.377] (1041)	24. EBRD [3.296] (57)
25. Taiwan Embassy [3.288] (19)	25. GIZ [2.314] (979)	25. UNDP [3.283] (772)
26. AfDB [3.287] (443)	26. Netherlands Embassy [2.284] (234)	26. Netherlands Embassy [3.282] (71)
<b>27. USAID [3.273] (984)</b>	27. Taiwan Embassy [2.275] (28)	<b>27. USAID [3.281] (617)</b>
28. Switzerland Embassy [3.254] (46)	28. Portugal Embassy [2.265] (68)	28. JBIC [3.278] (22)
29. KOICA [3.214] (113)	<b>29. MCC [2.265] (534)</b>	29. KfW [3.262] (139)
30. Norad [3.201] (35)	30. KOICA [2.237] (133)	30. AfDB [3.237] (315)
31. DFID [3.2] (495)	31. Sweden Embassy [2.153] (108)	<b>31. MCC [3.218] (177)</b>
32. Sweden Embassy [3.197] (49)	32. AECID [2.132] (250)	<b>32. US Embassy [3.18] (302)</b>
33. Norway Embassy [3.182] (78)	33. Norad [2.129] (62)	33. BTC [3.131] (54)
34. ADA [3.17] (32)	34. Irish Aid [2.125] (14)	34. IsDB [3.129] (65)
35. JICA [3.159] (703)	35. DFID [2.114] (925)	35. SDC [3.123] (34)
36. GEF [3.159] (63)	36. Denmark Embassy [2.081] (75)	36. JICA [3.122] (353)
37. JBIC [3.057] (97)	37. IFAD [2.069] (50)	37. Norway Embassy [3.117] (49)
38. South Korea Embassy [3.053] (82)	38. South Korea Embassy [2.061] (108)	38. Spain Embassy [3.117] (35)
39. British Embassy [3.05] (351)	39. ADA [2.059] (58)	39. ABC [3.115] (17)
		40. DFID [3.106] (317)
		41. British Embassy [3.06] (131)

23. Point estimates are in brackets. The number of observations for a given development partner agency is in parentheses.

Usefulness of Advice (1-5)	Agenda-Setting Influence (0-5)	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation (0-5)
40. KfW [3.046] (290)	40. Norway Embassy [2.057] (180)	42. Denmark Embassy [3.042] (18)
41. IFAD [3.04] (38)	41. CAF [2.052] (54)	43. AECID [3.041] (82)
42. AECID [3.025] (140)	42. Germany Embassy [2.037] (664)	44. Japan Embassy [3.028] (110)
<b>43. US Embassy [3.019] (638)</b>	43. Switzerland Embassy [2.03] (82)	45. AMF [3] (10)
44. BNDES [2.975] (15)	44. Belgium Embassy [2.024] (122)	46. Germany Embassy [2.985] (123)
45. South Africa Embassy [2.967] (85)	45. Spain Embassy [1.992] (207)	47. Canada Embassy [2.969] (71)
46. Qatar Embassy [2.942] (28)	46. JICA [1.987] (1011)	48. Norad [2.967] (18)
47. Germany Embassy [2.94] (334)	47. KfW [1.973] (454)	49. CIDA [2.957] (184)
48. India Embassy [2.886] (167)	48. British Embassy [1.946] (748)	50. Switzerland Embassy [2.925] (18)
49. Portugal Embassy [2.853] (35)	49. JBIC [1.938] (135)	51. Turkey Embassy [2.912] (22)
50. Japan Embassy [2.839] (362)	50. ABC [1.928] (82)	52. BADEA [2.882] (21)
51. AFD [2.827] (331)	51. AFD [1.882] (556)	53. CABEL [2.875] (11)
52. Turkey Embassy [2.813] (127)	52. AusAID [1.811] (460)	54. China Embassy [2.853] (91)
53. IsDB [2.805] (168)	53. BTC [1.805] (140)	55. Portugal Embassy [2.838] (21)
54. BTC [2.783] (104)	54. PetroCaribe [1.774] (21)	56. South Korea Embassy [2.824] (30)
55. CIDA [2.773] (382)	55. Japan Embassy [1.753] (571)	57. China Em-Im Bank [2.786] (23)
56. AusAID [2.767] (266)	56. Canada Embassy [1.706] (477)	58. AFD [2.77] (175)
57. TIKKA [2.761] (95)	57. France Embassy [1.702] (768)	59. France Embassy [2.765] (144)
58. Spain Embassy [2.731] (127)	58. AMF [1.688] (46)	60. KOICA [2.743] (46)
59. China Em-Im Bank [2.699] (102)	59. BNDES [1.673] (22)	61. ChinaDB [2.682] (12)
60. Venezuela Embassy [2.699] (25)	60. China Embassy [1.659] (427)	62. OFID [2.676] (18)
61. Saudi Arabia Embassy [2.692] (41)	61. CIDA [1.654] (707)	63. Brazil Embassy [2.635] (26)
62. Russia Embassy [2.688] (17)	62. South Africa Embassy [1.646] (140)	64. Australia Embassy [2.612] (55)
63. PetroCaribe [2.646] (19)	63. Qatar Embassy [1.645] (41)	65. Austria Embassy [2.569] (13)
64. ABC [2.627] (68)	64. IsDB [1.641] (212)	66. India Em-Im Bank [2.55] (11)
65. ADFD [2.617] (42)	65. Venezuela Embassy [1.628] (29)	67. TIKKA [2.531] (18)
66. France Embassy [2.607] (397)	66. Austria Embassy [1.621] (54)	68. SFD [2.521] (18)
67. SFD [2.583] (60)	67. Finland Embassy [1.586] (32)	69. India Embassy [2.519] (34)
68. Canada Embassy [2.575] (230)	68. Turkey Embassy [1.549] (196)	70. South Africa Embassy [2.5] (19)
69. AMF [2.553] (29)	69. Australia Embassy [1.518] (312)	71. KFAED [2.487] (26)
70. China Embassy [2.542] (326)	70. CABEL [1.512] (62)	
71. Australia Embassy [2.525] (159)	71. Brazil Embassy [1.437] (191)	
72. Brazil Embassy [2.461] (122)	72. ChinaDB [1.37] (61)	
73. Belgium Embassy [2.454] (70)	73. China Em-Im Bank [1.368] (113)	
74. BADEA [2.437] (59)	74. India Embassy [1.359] (216)	
75. ChinaDB [2.423] (56)	75. India Em-Im Bank [1.341] (42)	
76. UAE Embassy [2.397] (45)	76. BADEA [1.324] (85)	
77. KFAED [2.367] (94)	77. OFID [1.302] (134)	
78. Kuwait Embassy [2.354] (39)	78. TIKKA [1.264] (116)	

Usefulness of Advice (1-5)	Agenda-Setting Influence (0-5)	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation (0-5)
79. India Em-Im Bank [2.337] (27)	79. SFD [1.264] (70)	
80. CAF [2.299] (44)	80. LFADA [1.167] (12)	
81. CABEL [2.299] (57)	81. UAE Embassy [1.14] (59)	
82. OFID [2.189] (107)	82. KFAED [1.07] (105)	
83. Iran Embassy [2.157] (48)	83. Saudi Arabia Embassy [1.05] (72)	
84. Libya Embassy [2.139] (26)	84. Russia Embassy [1.039] (33)	
85. Embassy of Greece [1.69] (15)	85. Embassy of Greece [1.009] (28)	
86. LFADA [1.364] (11)	86. Kuwait Embassy [0.989] (56)	
	87. ADFD [0.985] (54)	
	88. Iran Embassy [0.848] (57)	
	89. Libya Embassy [0.365] (32)	

**Table E.15: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Macroeconomic Management**

Ranking	Donor Name	Score
N=35 Policy Advice Usefulness		
1	International Monetary Fund	4.285
2	InterAmerican Development Bank	4.117
3	World Bank	4.041
4	Asian Development Bank	3.984
5	Australian Agency for International Development	3.926
6	KfW	3.619
7	Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.483
8	Millennium Challenge Corporation	3.449
9	United Nations Development Program	3.436
10	African Development Bank	3.412
11	European Union	3.388
12	Department for International Development	3.261
13	United Nations	3.208
14	United Nations Children's Fund	3.167
15	US Agency for International Development	3.095

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N=39 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	International Monetary Fund	3.977
2	World Bank	3.666
3	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.340
4	Asian Development Bank	3.040
5	Australian Agency for International Development	2.979
6	European Union	2.930
7	African Development Bank	2.755
8	Department for International Development	2.734
9	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation	2.536
10	US Agency for International Development	2.529
11	Millennium Challenge Corporation	2.476
12	United Nations Development Program	2.433
13	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	2.282
14	Agence Française de Développement	2.264
15	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	2.186

N=18 Helpfulness in Reform Implementation		
1	International Monetary Fund	3.971
2	World Bank	3.884
3	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.783
4	Asian Development Bank	3.694
5	Australian Agency for International Development	3.667
6	African Development Bank	3.559
7	United Nations	3.361
8	European Union	3.359
9	Millennium Challenge Corporation	3.342
10	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.263
11	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.250
12	US Agency for International Development	3.237
13	United Nations Development Program	3.231
14	Department for International Development	3.149
15	Embassy of France	3.000

**Table E.16: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Finance, Credit, and Banking**

N=25		
	Policy Advice Usefulness	
1	Asian Development Bank	4.394
2	International Monetary Fund	4.195
3	World Bank	4.193
4	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.786
5	Department for International Development	3.591
6	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.563
7	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	3.556
8	US Agency for International Development	3.373
9	European Union	3.205
10	U.S. Embassy	3.059
11	KfW	3.053
12	United Nations Development Program	3.028
13	United Nations	2.962
14	Millennium Challenge Corporation	2.955
15	Japan International Cooperation Agency	2.933

N=28		
	Agenda Setting Influence	
1	World Bank	3.521
2	International Monetary Fund	3.514
3	Asian Development Bank	2.810
4	InterAmerican Development Bank	2.722
5	Millennium Challenge Corporation	2.597
6	Department for International Development	2.333
7	US Agency for International Development	2.208
8	European Union	2.189
9	African Development Bank	2.188
10	United Nations Development Program	2.062
11	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	2.056
12	Japan Bank for International Cooperation	1.909
13	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	1.755
14	Islamic Development Bank	1.750
15	United Nations	1.725

N=8 Helpfulness in Reform Implementation		
1	International Monetary Fund	3.877
2	World Bank	3.809
3	Asian Development Bank	3.450
4	African Development Bank	2.938
5	KfW	2.889
6	European Union	2.786
7	United Nations Development Program	2.727
8	US Agency for International Development	2.654
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**Table E.17: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Trade**

N=19 Policy Advice Usefulness		
1	World Bank	3.949
2	Chinese Embassy	3.821
3	European Union	3.816
4	Department for International Development	3.625
5	Millennium Challenge Corporation	3.611
6	African Development Bank	3.500
7	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.486
8	U.S. Embassy	3.475
9	United Nations Development Program	3.435
10	British Embassy	3.417
11	US Agency for International Development	3.339
12	Asian Development Bank	3.233
13	International Monetary Fund	3.175
14	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.059
15	Embassy of Japan	3.048

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N=25 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.633
2	World Bank	3.516
3	European Union	3.352
4	US Agency for International Development	2.991
5	International Monetary Fund	2.773
6	Asian Development Bank	2.771
7	U.S. Embassy	2.759
8	United Nations Development Program	2.581
9	Department for International Development	2.406
10	Canadian International Development Agency	2.182
11	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	2.171
12	African Development Bank	2.139
13	British Embassy	2.125
14	Chinese Embassy	2.115
15	Australian Agency for International Development	1.963

N=7 Helpfulness in Reform Implementation		
1	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.750
2	European Union	3.357
3	World Bank	3.333
4	United Nations	3.333
5	United Nations Development Program	3.233
6	US Agency for International Development	2.814
7	International Monetary Fund	2.682
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**Table E.18: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Business Regulatory Environment**

N=20	Policy Advice Usefulness	
1	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	3.900
2	World Bank	3.715
3	International Monetary Fund	3.524
4	US Agency for International Development	3.367
5	Department for International Development	3.357
6	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.333
7	British Embassy	3.324
8	Millennium Challenge Corporation	3.308
9	European Union	3.266
10	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.222
11	United Nations Development Program	3.222
12	United Nations	3.200
13	Canadian International Development Agency	3.167
14	U.S. Embassy	3.154
15	Asian Development Bank	3.091
N=30	Agenda Setting Influence	
1	International Monetary Fund	3.511
2	World Bank	3.499
3	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.417
4	US Agency for International Development	2.916
5	Australian Agency for International Development	2.833
6	Millennium Challenge Corporation	2.826
7	Department for International Development	2.780
8	European Union	2.737
9	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	2.692
10	Asian Development Bank	2.667
11	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	2.588
12	U.S. Embassy	2.552
13	African Development Bank	2.500
14	United Nations Development Program	2.491
15	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	2.364

N=7	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation	
1	International Monetary Fund	4.208
2	European Union	3.920
3	US Agency for International Development	3.812
4	United Nations Development Program	3.625
5	World Bank	3.610
6	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.200
7	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	2.964
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**Table E.19: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Investment**

N=27	Policy Advice Usefulness	
1	African Development Bank	4.063
2	World Bank	3.981
3	US Agency for International Development	3.920
4	United Nations	3.717
5	United Nations Children's Fund	3.700
6	European Union	3.462
7	U.S. Embassy	3.452
8	Islamic Development Bank	3.450
9	United Nations Development Program	3.441
10	International Monetary Fund	3.348
11	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.318
12	Embassy of India	3.222
13	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.217
14	KfW	3.182
15	British Embassy	3.147

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N=32 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	World Bank	3.307
2	International Monetary Fund	3.219
3	African Development Bank	3.184
4	European Union	3.170
5	Millennium Challenge Corporation	3.150
6	Asian Development Bank	3.091
7	US Agency for International Development	2.973
8	U.S. Embassy	2.929
9	InterAmerican Development Bank	2.917
10	United Nations Development Program	2.481
11	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	2.448
12	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	2.417
13	Agence Française de Développement	2.324
14	Australian Agency for International Development	2.300
15	British Embassy	2.269

N=10 Helpfulness in Reform Implementation		
1	World Bank	4.036
2	US Agency for International Development	3.969
3	United Nations	3.727
4	European Union	3.725
5	International Monetary Fund	3.688
6	African Development Bank	3.643
7	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.636
8	United Nations Development Program	3.476
9	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.429
10	U.S. Embassy	3.300
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**Table E.20: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Health**

N=34 Policy Advice Usefulness		
1	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	4.208
2	United Nations	3.983
3	Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria	3.967
4	United Nations Children's Fund	3.912
5	World Bank	3.862
6	US Agency for International Development	3.723
7	Embassy of Germany	3.615
8	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	3.611
9	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.457
10	United Nations Development Program	3.424
11	Embassy of Turkey	3.400
12	Belgian Development Agency	3.364
13	European Union	3.346
14	Department for International Development	3.328
15	Embassy of France	3.326

N=40 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	Embassy of Belgium	3.545
2	World Bank	3.408
3	United Nations Children's Fund	3.192
4	United Nations	3.072
5	Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria	2.967
6	InterAmerican Development Bank	2.950
7	US Agency for International Development	2.934
8	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	2.933
9	European Union	2.914
10	Asian Development Bank	2.909
11	Department for International Development	2.832
12	Embassy of the Netherlands	2.758
13	Belgian Development Agency	2.733
14	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	2.708
15	Embassy of Spain	2.639

N=20	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation	
1	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	4.000
2	Belgian Development Agency	3.692
3	Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria	3.674
4	United Nations Children's Fund	3.666
5	World Bank	3.666
6	United Nations	3.489
7	Australian Agency for International Development	3.472
8	US Agency for International Development	3.455
9	Embassy of Japan	3.417
10	Asian Development Bank	3.389
11	U.S. Embassy	3.197
12	European Union	3.181
13	Department for International Development	3.024
14	United Nations Development Program	3.020
15	Japan International Cooperation Agency	2.914

**Table E.21: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Education**

N=27	Policy Advice Usefulness	
1	World Bank	3.944
2	United Nations Children's Fund	3.761
3	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.725
4	Canadian International Development Agency	3.696
5	British Embassy	3.510
6	Australian Agency for International Development	3.469
7	European Union	3.413
8	KfW	3.400
9	Embassy of Germany	3.382
10	United Nations Development Program	3.351
11	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.346
12	US Agency for International Development	3.344
13	Embassy of India	3.288
14	Agence Française de Développement	3.274
15	Korea International Cooperation Agency	3.273

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N=35 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	World Bank	3.585
2	Asian Development Bank	3.172
3	United Nations Children's Fund	3.148
4	European Union	3.142
5	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.125
6	Belgian Development Agency	3.057
7	Embassy of Norway	2.893
8	Embassy of Belgium	2.750
9	US Agency for International Development	2.747
10	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	2.708
11	Australian Agency for International Development	2.625
12	Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit	2.583
13	United Nations	2.581
14	Department for International Development	2.557
15	Canadian International Development Agency	2.494

N=16 Helpfulness in Reform Implementation		
1	Asian Development Bank	3.800
2	Australian Agency for International Development	3.796
3	World Bank	3.790
4	United Nations Children's Fund	3.673
5	European Union	3.500
6	Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.344
7	US Agency for International Development	3.333
8	Department for International Development	3.308
9	United Nations	3.229
10	Agence Française de Développement	3.212
11	Canadian International Development Agency	3.147
12	U.S. Embassy	3.051
13	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.043
14	United Nations Development Program	2.958
15	African Development Bank	2.571

**Table E.22: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Family and Gender**

N=6 Policy Advice Usefulness		
1	United Nations Development Program	3.826
2	United Nations Children's Fund	3.717
3	United Nations	3.604
4	World Bank	3.500
5	US Agency for International Development	3.400
6	European Union	3.233
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N=9 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	United Nations Children's Fund	3.380
2	United Nations	3.362
3	European Union	3.300
4	United Nations Development Program	3.271
5	World Bank	3.269
6	U.S. Embassy	3.182
7	Canadian International Development Agency	2.750
8	US Agency for International Development	2.733
9	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	2.038
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N=4	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation	
1	United Nations	3.800
2	United Nations Development Program	3.763
3	United Nations Children's Fund	3.417
4	European Union	3.333
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**Table E.23: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Social Protection and Welfare**

N=13	Policy Advice Usefulness	
1	Department for International Development	4.190
2	United Nations Children's Fund	4.118
3	World Bank	4.005
4	United Nations Development Program	3.862
5	European Union	3.609
6	United Nations	3.593
7	International Monetary Fund	3.583
8	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.188
9	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.179
10	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.176
11	US Agency for International Development	3.167
12	U.S. Embassy	3.133
13	Canadian International Development Agency	2.600
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N=23 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	World Bank	3.991
2	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.646
3	European Union	3.333
4	Department for International Development	3.290
5	United Nations Children's Fund	3.225
6	U.S. Embassy	3.139
7	United Nations Development Program	2.958
8	International Monetary Fund	2.929
9	United Nations	2.921
10	US Agency for International Development	2.850
11	Embassy of the Netherlands	2.813
12	Asian Development Bank	2.759
13	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation	2.704
14	Embassy of Germany	2.444
15	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	2.361

N=8 Helpfulness in Reform Implementation		
1	World Bank	4.117
2	United Nations Children's Fund	4.073
3	Department for International Development	3.833
4	United Nations	3.679
5	US Agency for International Development	3.654
6	United Nations Development Program	3.607
7	European Union	3.437
8	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.042
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**Table E.24: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Labor**

N=6 Policy Advice Usefulness		
1	World Bank	3.688
2	United Nations Development Program	3.688
3	United Nations Children's Fund	3.636
4	European Union	3.375
5	US Agency for International Development	3.000
6	United Nations	3.000
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N=7 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	World Bank	3.556
2	European Union	2.868
3	U.S. Embassy	2.600
4	United Nations Development Program	2.579
5	US Agency for International Development	2.154
6	United Nations Children's Fund	2.150
7	United Nations	2.118
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N=4	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation	
1	United Nations Development Program	3.611
2	World Bank	3.455
3	European Union	3.417
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**Table E.25: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Environment Protection**

N=24	Policy Advice Usefulness	
1	Embassy of the Netherlands	4.063
2	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	4.005
3	United Nations Development Program	3.874
4	Global Environment Facility	3.705
5	United Nations	3.640
6	World Bank	3.602
7	Australian Agency for International Development	3.600
8	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.481
9	United Nations Children's Fund	3.455
10	KfW	3.425
11	Millennium Challenge Corporation	3.417
12	African Development Bank	3.404
13	US Agency for International Development	3.396
14	Department for International Development	3.369
15	European Union	3.319

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N=29	Agenda Setting Influence	
1	Global Environment Facility	3.675
2	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.500
3	United Nations Development Program	3.487
4	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.321
5	World Bank	3.296
6	United Nations	3.209
7	European Union	3.160
8	Australian Agency for International Development	3.000
9	KfW	2.979
10	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	2.938
11	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation	2.938
12	Embassy of Australia	2.857
13	Department for International Development	2.789
14	Embassy of Germany	2.652
15	African Development Bank	2.618

N=17	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation	
1	Global Environment Facility	3.781
2	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.694
3	Embassy of Germany	3.545
4	United Nations	3.500
5	United Nations Development Program	3.395
6	European Union	3.338
7	World Bank	3.329
8	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.253
9	Canadian International Development Agency	3.222
10	KfW	3.200
11	Embassy of Japan	3.125
12	Asian Development Bank	2.955
13	Department for International Development	2.926
14	Millennium Challenge Corporation	2.875
15	US Agency for International Development	2.765

**Table E.26: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Agriculture and Rural Development**

N=28 Policy Advice Usefulness		
1	International Fund for Agricultural Development	4.000
2	World Bank	3.644
3	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.606
4	African Development Bank	3.500
5	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.444
6	Millennium Challenge Corporation	3.376
7	United Nations	3.367
8	United Nations Development Program	3.299
9	KfW	3.167
10	European Union	3.073
11	US Agency for International Development	3.049
12	United Nations Children's Fund	3.000
13	Asian Development Bank	2.972
14	Agence Française de Développement	2.929
15	Embassy of Japan	2.921
N=33 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	African Development Bank	3.188
2	International Fund for Agricultural Development	3.133
3	World Bank	3.126
4	Embassy of the Netherlands	3.125
5	Asian Development Bank	3.026
6	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.025
7	International Monetary Fund	2.952
8	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	2.890
9	European Union	2.823
10	Millennium Challenge Corporation	2.750
11	US Agency for International Development	2.711
12	United Nations	2.542
13	United Nations Development Program	2.445
14	Department for International Development	2.380
15	KfW	2.357

N=12	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation	
1	Millennium Challenge Corporation	3.788
2	International Fund for Agricultural Development	3.700
3	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.681
4	World Bank	3.589
5	Asian Development Bank	3.469
6	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.353
7	US Agency for International Development	3.173
8	United Nations	3.158
9	European Union	3.156
10	United Nations Development Program	3.056
11	African Development Bank	3.056
12	Agence Française de Développement	2.917
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**Table E.27: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Energy and Mining**

N=16	Policy Advice Usefulness	
1	Asian Development Bank	3.950
2	World Bank	3.893
3	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.676
4	US Agency for International Development	3.622
5	African Development Bank	3.528
6	Embassy of India	3.500
7	United Nations Development Program	3.478
8	International Monetary Fund	3.467
9	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.333
10	Embassy of Japan	3.300
11	U.S. Embassy	3.125
12	United Nations	3.045
13	KfW	3.000
14	Department for International Development	3.000
15	European Union	2.900

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N=18 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	World Bank	3.645
2	Asian Development Bank	2.875
3	US Agency for International Development	2.778
4	International Monetary Fund	2.735
5	U.S. Embassy	2.714
6	African Development Bank	2.708
7	United Nations Development Program	2.630
8	European Union	2.583
9	KfW	2.550
10	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	2.406
11	Department for International Development	2.222
12	Embassy of Germany	2.100
13	Embassy of Japan	1.769
14	Japan International Cooperation Agency	1.750
15	United Nations	1.654

N=5 Helpfulness in Reform Implementation		
1	World Bank	3.896
2	US Agency for International Development	3.800
3	United Nations Development Program	3.750
4	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.444
5	European Union	3.308
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**Table E.28: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Land**

N=3 Policy Advice Usefulness		
1	United Nations	4.042
2	World Bank	3.233
3	European Union	3.156
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N=6 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	Millennium Challenge Corporation	3.050
2	World Bank	2.799
3	United Nations	2.742
4	United Nations Development Program	2.500
5	European Union	2.379
6	US Agency for International Development	2.286
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N=1	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation	
1	World Bank	3.111
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**Table E.29: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Infrastructure**

N=30	Policy Advice Usefulness	
1	Millennium Challenge Corporation	4.122
2	InterAmerican Development Bank	4.071
3	African Development Bank	3.978
4	World Bank	3.727
5	United Nations Children's Fund	3.636
6	Japan Bank for International Cooperation	3.500
7	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	3.444
8	Agence Française de Développement	3.441
9	Department for International Development	3.406
10	European Union	3.403
11	Islamic Development Bank	3.364
12	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.333
13	Embassy of Japan	3.324
14	US Agency for International Development	3.310
15	United Nations	3.304

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N=32 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	World Bank	3.562
2	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.469
3	Asian Development Bank	3.386
4	Millennium Challenge Corporation	3.332
5	African Development Bank	3.225
6	European Union	3.207
7	Australian Agency for International Development	2.806
8	Embassy of Japan	2.722
9	Japan Bank for International Cooperation	2.542
10	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	2.397
11	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	2.389
12	Embassy of Germany	2.367
13	U.S. Embassy	2.356
14	United Nations	2.287
15	Japan International Cooperation Agency	2.277

N=14 Helpfulness in Reform Implementation		
1	Millennium Challenge Corporation	4.500
2	Asian Development Bank	4.139
3	World Bank	3.894
4	European Union	3.828
5	Embassy of Japan	3.750
6	Agence Française de Développement	3.704
7	KfW	3.633
8	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.604
9	Australian Agency for International Development	3.563
10	African Development Bank	3.532
11	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.364
12	Islamic Development Bank	3.313
13	US Agency for International Development	3.188
14	United Nations Development Program	3.100
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**Table E.30: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Decentralization**

N=7 Policy Advice Usefulness		
1	United Nations Development Program	4.107
2	United Nations	4.100
3	World Bank	3.889
4	European Union	3.618
5	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.500
6	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.000
7	US Agency for International Development	2.923
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N=13 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	US Agency for International Development	3.108
2	United Nations	3.059
3	Department for International Development	3.058
4	European Union	2.962
5	World Bank	2.958
6	Asian Development Bank	2.913
7	United Nations Development Program	2.883
8	Australian Agency for International Development	2.625
9	United Nations Children's Fund	2.595
10	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	2.594
11	Japan International Cooperation Agency	2.407
12	U.S. Embassy	2.273
13	Canadian International Development Agency	2.258
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N=4	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation	
1	European Union	3.700
2	United Nations Development Program	3.528
3	World Bank	3.313
4	US Agency for International Development	3.100
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**Table E.31: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Anti-Corruption and Transparency**

N=18	Policy Advice Usefulness	
1	Department for International Development	3.792
2	Millennium Challenge Corporation	3.722
3	United Nations Development Program	3.671
4	British Embassy	3.590
5	United Nations	3.520
6	International Monetary Fund	3.417
7	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.412
8	World Bank	3.405
9	U.S. Embassy	3.358
10	European Union	3.350
11	US Agency for International Development	3.278
12	Australian Agency for International Development	3.028
13	Asian Development Bank	3.015
14	African Development Bank	2.917
15	Embassy of France	2.727

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N=26 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	World Bank	3.348
2	European Union	3.101
3	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	3.083
4	Millennium Challenge Corporation	3.078
5	U.S. Embassy	3.037
6	US Agency for International Development	2.961
7	United Nations Development Program	2.842
8	International Monetary Fund	2.816
9	Embassy of Norway	2.727
10	Asian Development Bank	2.664
11	United Nations	2.557
12	Australian Agency for International Development	2.555
13	British Embassy	2.554
14	Embassy of the Netherlands	2.433
15	Department for International Development	2.417

N=11 Helpfulness in Reform Implementation		
1	British Embassy	3.688
2	Department for International Development	3.650
3	US Agency for International Development	3.489
4	World Bank	3.482
5	United Nations Development Program	3.464
6	European Union	3.431
7	Millennium Challenge Corporation	3.350
8	U.S. Embassy	3.157
9	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.154
10	United Nations	3.125
11	Asian Development Bank	2.727
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**Table E.32: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Democracy**

N=11 Policy Advice Usefulness		
1	United Nations Development Program	3.620
2	US Agency for International Development	3.588
3	U.S. Embassy	3.433
4	European Union	3.370
5	Embassy of Canada	3.333
6	United Nations	3.122
7	World Bank	3.077
8	United Nations Children's Fund	3.077
9	British Embassy	3.063
10	Embassy of Germany	3.000
11	Embassy of France	2.818
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N=38 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	U.S. Embassy	3.322
2	European Union	3.262
3	World Bank	3.081
4	United Nations	2.966
5	Asian Development Bank	2.962
6	InterAmerican Development Bank	2.881
7	United Nations Development Program	2.857
8	International Monetary Fund	2.846
9	US Agency for International Development	2.823
10	Millennium Challenge Corporation	2.816
11	Embassy of South Africa	2.733
12	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	2.667
13	British Embassy	2.635
14	Department for International Development	2.619
15	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	2.536

N=6	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation	
1	US Agency for International Development	4.000
2	United Nations Development Program	3.475
3	U.S. Embassy	3.389
4	European Union	3.100
5	World Bank	3.083
6	United Nations	2.833
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**Table E.33: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Public Administration**

N=25	Policy Advice Usefulness	
1	Asian Development Bank	3.694
2	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation	3.679
3	United Nations Development Program	3.621
4	British Embassy	3.611
5	African Development Bank	3.556
6	World Bank	3.553
7	Department for International Development	3.545
8	Canadian International Development Agency	3.406
9	European Union	3.308
10	United Nations	3.306
11	International Monetary Fund	3.219
12	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.208
13	Japan International Cooperation Agency	3.167
14	Australian Agency for International Development	3.125
15	Embassy of France	3.088

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N=26 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	World Bank	3.607
2	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	3.574
3	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.250
4	European Union	3.138
5	International Monetary Fund	3.094
6	Department for International Development	3.078
7	British Embassy	3.028
8	United Nations Development Program	2.980
9	Embassy of Germany	2.933
10	African Development Bank	2.833
11	Asian Development Bank	2.750
12	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	2.725
13	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation	2.667
14	Canadian International Development Agency	2.590
15	United Nations	2.581

N=13 Helpfulness in Reform Implementation		
1	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.708
2	World Bank	3.440
3	International Monetary Fund	3.364
4	Department for International Development	3.348
5	United Nations Development Program	3.348
6	European Union	3.304
7	African Development Bank	3.269
8	United Nations	3.179
9	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.150
10	Canadian International Development Agency	3.147
11	US Agency for International Development	3.021
12	Asian Development Bank	2.833
13	Japan International Cooperation Agency	2.800
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**Table E.34: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Justice and Security**

N=15 Policy Advice Usefulness		
1	United Nations Children's Fund	4.060
2	Department for International Development	3.806
3	United Nations Development Program	3.716
4	United Nations	3.557
5	British Embassy	3.524
6	U.S. Embassy	3.507
7	US Agency for International Development	3.424
8	World Bank	3.257
9	European Union	3.187
10	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.182
11	Embassy of Germany	3.093
12	Embassy of France	2.965
13	Embassy of Canada	2.833
14	Canadian International Development Agency	2.750
15	Australian Agency for International Development	2.450

N=24 Agenda Setting Influence		
1	U.S. Embassy	3.480
2	US Agency for International Development	3.254
3	European Union	3.189
4	United Nations	3.012
5	Department for International Development	2.940
6	British Embassy	2.901
7	United Nations Development Program	2.877
8	United Nations Children's Fund	2.856
9	Embassy of Norway	2.833
10	International Monetary Fund	2.718
11	Embassy of the Netherlands	2.689
12	Embassy of Germany	2.546
13	World Bank	2.526
14	Embassy of Australia	2.452
15	Embassy of Canada	2.406

N=12	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation	
1	European Union	3.640
2	United Nations Children's Fund	3.611
3	United Nations Development Program	3.467
4	U.S. Embassy	3.422
5	United Nations	3.421
6	British Embassy	3.250
7	US Agency for International Development	3.240
8	World Bank	3.208
9	Canadian International Development Agency	2.979
10	Department for International Development	2.975
11	Embassy of France	2.886
12	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	2.389
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**Table E.35: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Tax**

N=4	Policy Advice Usefulness	
1	International Monetary Fund	4.383
2	World Bank	3.367
3	US Agency for International Development	3.259
4	United Nations Development Program	2.111
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N=7	Agenda Setting Influence	
1	International Monetary Fund	4.206
2	European Union	3.333
3	World Bank	2.785
4	US Agency for International Development	2.536
5	African Development Bank	2.438
6	U.S. Embassy	2.125
7	United Nations Development Program	1.278
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N=2	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation	
1	International Monetary Fund	4.294
2	World Bank	3.000
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**Table E.36: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Customs**

N=6	Policy Advice Usefulness	
1	United Nations	4.300
2	International Monetary Fund	3.808
3	US Agency for International Development	3.792
4	World Bank	3.357
5	European Union	3.292
6	United Nations Development Program	3.111
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N=6	Agenda Setting Influence	
1	European Union	3.045
2	United Nations	2.950
3	International Monetary Fund	2.767
4	World Bank	2.639
5	US Agency for International Development	2.583
6	United Nations Development Program	2.125
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N=4	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation	
1	United Nations	3.825
2	International Monetary Fund	3.650
3	World Bank	3.423
4	European Union	3.222
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**Table E.37: Rankings of Development Partners in the Policy Domain of Public Expenditure Management**

N=23	Policy Advice Usefulness	
1	InterAmerican Development Bank	4.571
2	World Bank	4.072
3	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	4.000
4	International Monetary Fund	3.950
5	Asian Development Bank	3.692
6	Millennium Challenge Corporation	3.643
7	European Union	3.530
8	US Agency for International Development	3.514
9	Australian Agency for International Development	3.500
10	United Nations Development Program	3.477
11	Department for International Development	3.261
12	Agence Française de Développement	3.200
13	United Nations Children's Fund	3.196
14	United Nations	3.180
15	African Development Bank	3.175

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N=31	Agenda Setting Influence	
1	International Monetary Fund	4.000
2	World Bank	3.697
3	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.531
4	Australian Agency for International Development	3.250
5	European Union	3.018
6	Department for International Development	2.928
7	Embassy of the Netherlands	2.750
8	Asian Development Bank	2.743
9	African Development Bank	2.573
10	U.S. Embassy	2.482
11	US Agency for International Development	2.454
12	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	2.403
13	United Nations Development Program	2.243
14	Agence Française de Développement	2.233
15	British Embassy	2.188

N=11	Helpfulness in Reform Implementation	
1	International Monetary Fund	4.164
2	World Bank	3.956
3	InterAmerican Development Bank	3.952
4	Department for International Development	3.607
5	US Agency for International Development	3.567
6	European Union	3.564
7	African Development Bank	3.563
8	Asian Development Bank	3.275
9	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	3.250
10	United Nations Development Program	3.106
11	Japan International Cooperation Agency	2.222
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