

Appendix for “Elite and Mass Support for Foreign Aid Versus Government Programs: Experimental Evidence from Uganda”

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This appendix reports on design features as well as additional results not contained in the paper.

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Design Details

Text of the Education Project

For the other project the question was: “The Post Primary Education and Training Adaptable Program Lending Project seeks to increase access to lower secondary education, improve the quality of lower secondary education, and enhance primary education and training. The project may require your community to providing funding for maintenance in the future. [This project will be funded by the {RANDOMLY ASSIGNED FUNDER}]. How much would you support this project?”

Text of the Petition

Dear Sir/Madam

I have learned about the Electricity Sector Development Project through participating in a survey project with **[University Name Redacted]**. I understand that this project will improve the reliability of and increase access to electricity and that one major aspect of the project is to extend electricity to those who do not yet have access to it. I am signing this letter to voice my [support/opposition] to this project’s implementation in Uganda.

Signed:

_____ Date: _____

_____ Date: _____

Study Sample

To maximize the number of responses in the MP survey, we attempted to conduct a census of all current MPs and achieved a 72 percent response rate. In addition, we also contacted as many former MPs as possible (from the previous parliament) and obtained a 55 percent response rate. While key aspects of the experimental instruments were kept identical for each group to facilitate comparisons, the citizen survey was lengthier. The former MP response rate is lower because former MPs are scattered through the country and not as easily accessible.

Given time constraints in the MP survey, we were unable to obtain as much demographic data on MPs. Beyond the comparisons in outcome data explored below, we can identify some comparisons. For example, the MP sample has more men, and has a higher proportion of NRM than the mass sample.

Table A1. Comparison of MP sample to the actual 9th parliament

| | Sample | 9 th Parliament |
|------------------------|--------|----------------------------|
| Gender | | |
| % Male | 67 | 65 |
| % Female | 33 | 35 |
| Party | | |
| % NRM | 74.6 | 73.5 |
| % Independents | 10.2 | 11.2 |
| % FDC | 8.5 | 8.8 |
| % DP | 3.1 | 3.4 |
| % UPC | 3.1 | 2.6 |
| % CP | 0.25 | 0.25 |
| % JEEMA | 0.25 | 0.25 |
| Region | | |
| % from Central | 28 | 25 |
| % from Eastern | 28 | 27 |
| % from Northern | 18 | 22 |
| % from Western | 26 | 26 |
| MP Type | | |
| % Constituency MPs | 59 | 62 |
| % District Women MPs | 28 | 29 |
| % Special Interest MPs | 6 | 7 |
| % Ex-Officio MPs | 8 | 2 |

Randomization Checks

Table A2. Randomization checks for masses and MPs

| Assignment to Treatment | Mass b/se | MP b/se |
|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Education | 0.017 (0.015) | |
| Male | -0.051 (0.100) | 0.093 (0.205) |
| Age | 0.002 (0.004) | |
| NRM | -0.089 (0.103) | -0.036 (0.225) |
| Christian | 0.828 (0.537) | |
| Muslim | 1.021* (0.553) | |
| Poverty (dichotomous) | 0.122 (0.106) | |
| Knowledge (dichotomous) | 0.032 (0.121) | |
| Foreign media exposure | -0.047 (0.182) | -0.099 (0.358) |
| Runyankole | 0.034 (0.165) | -0.374 (0.264) |
| Nationalist2 | 0.010 (0.115) | -0.207 (0.211) |
| Western region | 0.183 (0.146) | |
| Eastern region | 0.118 (0.160) | |
| Northern region | -0.063 (0.141) | |
| _cons | 0.657 (0.575) | 1.512*** (0.252) |
| N | 3251 | 696 |

Results for those Passing Manipulation Check


Table A3. Citizen preferences for government versus aid projects: mass respondents passing manipulation

| | Citizen Outcomes | | | | | |
|---------------|------------------|---------|-----------------|---------|----------------|----------|
| | Strong Support | Tell | Willing to sign | Signed | Willing to SMS | Sent SMS |
| <i>Masses</i> | | | | | | |
| Govt | 0.68 | 0.88 | 0.78 | 0.72 | 0.54 | 0.03 |
| N | 349 | 341 | 349 | 357 | 357 | 149 |
| Aid | 0.82 | 0.96 | 0.85 | 0.83 | 0.68 | 0.06 |
| N | 1887 | 1874 | 1888 | 1893 | 1893 | 852 |
| Difference | 0.13*** | 0.07*** | 0.08*** | 0.10*** | 0.15*** | 0.03* |

A negative difference means that the proportion of support for projects in the control condition (government) is larger than the proportion under the treatment condition (aid), implying the government condition is preferred to the aid one. Note that if a subject stated s/he did not want to sign the petition (third column) we still presented them the possibility of signing the petition (fourth column). The higher Ns for willingness to SMS in the fifth column (e.g., 538 and 3017) are a result of subject refusals to answer the petition questions (where corresponding Ns are lower: 528 and 3008). That is, if a subject refused to answer petition questions, we still asked about SMS and fewer subjects declined to answer SMS questions. Also, the Ns decrease in the “Sent SMS” condition (relative to “Willing to SMS”) because we only calculate Sent SMS for subjects who owned a phone.

One Observation per MP

Figure A1. Analysis when limiting the sample to only one observation per MP




Probing Alternative Mechanisms

Foreign Media Effect


Mass respondents could be more likely to voice their support for a project when it is associated with a foreign donor rather than when it is a domestic source. Citizens and elites that prefer foreign media are more likely to be biased in favor of foreign projects because those projects are referenced favorably in the foreign media. We thus separated masses and MPs by the extent to which they prefer foreign media over Ugandan media. See Figures A2 and A3. The results generally are in consistent and weak. For the masses that do not prefer foreign media (A2), there is a preference for foreign aid over government assistance, though the results are not consistently significant. The direction of this effect cuts against a foreign media effect hypothesis, moreover. MPs who do not prefer foreign media expressed more support for government assistance, but likewise the significance of the results is weak. For the masses preferring foreign media (Figure A3), there is again a preference for foreign aid. But again the results are not statistically strong. On the other hand, MPs that prefer foreign media express stronger support for government projects, and a number of these results are statistically significant, though in the opposite direction from what a media effect argument would predict. As an additional test of this mechanism, we also separated respondents into those who indicated that they had *heard* of at least two of the foreign donors used in the experiments (USAID, World Bank, etc.) and those who had not. We assume that prior knowledge of the donors that were used as treatment conditions is correlated with a stronger media effect for foreign donors. Importantly, we only asked these knowledge questions of voters, and can only test this mechanism among them, as we did not want to patronize the MPs by asking such question as “Have you heard of the World Bank”. We find that citizens who had heard of at least two of the donors *were not* more likely to prefer foreign aid over government funds. These results are largely robust to using “only heard of one aid donor” as the cutoff point. The only change is that those who have heard of at least one donor are significantly more likely to sign a petition for an aid-funded project ($p < 0.05$).

Figure A2. Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who do not prefer to watch foreign media



Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that masses who prefer local media still support aid, though the results are not strong statistically. The results for MPs do not suggest any clear lessons.

Figure A3. Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who prefer to watch foreign media



Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that masses who prefer foreign media support aid, though the results are not strong statistically. The results for MPs suggest that those that prefer foreign media still support government assistance, contrary to expectations of a media effect argument.

Partisanship

Partisanship has played an important role in Ugandan politics at both the citizen and elite levels, revolving around the NRM-opposition split. However, recently, the NRM has faced important opposition not just from opposition parties, who are fractured and currently only hold 16% of the seats in parliament, but mainly from within the NRM's own ranks. In the run-up to the 2011 parliamentary elections, for example, the NRM primaries were hotly contested (in many instances more contested than the general elections). Ballot boxes were stuffed and elections rigged to ensure that party-leader favorites won the NRM party nomination (Malinga, 2010). This led to wide discontent among the losers of the primaries. Many of these individuals then ran as independents in 2011, and now the current parliament has more independents than any single opposition party, which makes the role of partisanship more complicated and less predictable.


One might expect that ruling-party NRM MPs and mass NRM partisans would be strong supporters of their government's own projects, but it is also possible that NRM MPs and supporters favor foreign aid because it shows that the government is capable of attracting funds from abroad. One might also expect MPs and masses who support the opposition to favor foreign projects simply because they are not run completely by the NRM. Thus, for partisanship to explain the divergent findings across MPs and voters, there must be significant differences between NRM and opposition support for government vs. aid projects, and the difference in differences must favor government projects for MPs and aid projects for citizens. In other words, NRM MPs must prefer government more than opposition MPs prefer aid, and opposition supporters among the citizenry must prefer aid more than NRM supporters prefer government.

The difference in means tests comparing preferences for foreign aid versus government funds among both MPs and masses who are and are not members of the NRM are reported in Figures A4-A5 in the Appendix. Figure A4 shows that among the public, opposition supporters have stronger preferences for aid-funded projects (in 3 of 6 conditions), whereas opposition MPs have stronger preferences for government funded projects (in 4 of 9 conditions) although the number of MPs in that cell is very small. Figure A5 shows that NRM supporters in the citizenry are not significantly more likely to prefer one type of project over another. NRM MPs are likewise not significantly more likely to prefer either type of funding. It is puzzling that NRM MPs and masses do not support their own government projects most of all, but given the divisions within the NRM this may be understandable. Overall, partisanship does not seem to explain the main results about differences between elites and masses.

Our follow-up qualitative interviews with MPs shed some light on this counterintuitive finding. The null results regarding NRM MP preferences are likely due to an even balance of MPs preferring government and aid. In our follow-up interviews ten NRM MPs preferred to work with government on the proposed project and nine NRM MPs preferred to work with an aid donor. This is not particularly surprising given that the NRM is a large umbrella party. Importantly, the logics of these two groups are clearly distinct: those who support working with the government do so because the government is mandated to do so, the government should take ownership over development projects, and government projects enjoy more flexible implementation. NRM MPs who would prefer aid projects argue that aid projects are less susceptible to corruption and are better managed. It seems that some NRM MPs are willing to overlook corruption for ownership and more flexibility while others are not.


It is a bit more difficult to parse out the opposition MPs' stance of preferring government projects, but once again our follow-up interviews provide some incite. The logic of the non-NRM MPs regarding their support for aid or government projects from the follow-up interviews are the same as the logics of the NRM MPs described above, but more of the opposition MPs prefer the government (6 prefer government while only 2 prefer aid). This could be the case because the MPs are responding to different perceptions of voter preferences. The majority of opposition MPs in our follow-up interviews said that citizens preferred government projects while the NRM MPs seemed much less clear as to which types of projects the citizen's preferred (9 said aid, 6 said government, and 3 said they were not sure). While this is only conjecture given the suggestive nature of this evidence, the difference in MP preferences by partisanship could be due to both divergent preferences within the large ruling party and different perceptions of voter preferences.

Figure A4. Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not belong to the ruling NRM party



Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. Thus, for non-NRM members the masses appear to support foreign aid more than the MPs who appear to support government funding. The results are significant in a few cases, but not consistently across most conditions.

Figure A5. Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not belong to the ruling NRM party.



Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that NRM masses and MPs do not consistently support aid or government funding over each other.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity is also important in the Ugandan political context. Critically, shared ethnicity with the chief executive of the country has important political and developmental consequences in that the leader's co-ethnics are likely to benefit (Franck and Rainer, 2012). In Uganda, it is commonly understood that when Northerners such as President Milton Obote were in power, the Northern region of the country received the most benefits in terms of development, government employment, and other material goods. Now, under President Museveni, many citizens argue that the Western region, especially those areas in which his fellow Muryankole are dominant, receive the new roads, schools, and clinics. Whether or not this is in fact true, citizens tend to operate under these assumptions (see Posner, 2005).

Thus another possible explanation for the divergent preferences between MPs and masses is co-ethnic identity with the president. On the one hand, ethnicity is often understood to be a vehicle for clientelism or patronage (Posner, 2005; Franck and Rainer, 2012) and may therefore be associated with mass and MP support for the government. According to this logic, masses and MPs who are of the same ethnicity as the President should prefer government spending over aid. But this would not present a possible explanation for the divergent preferences that we actually observe in the data. Instead, it would have to be the case that co-ethnic masses had a different set of preferences relative to co-ethnic MPs. While we question whether this could be the case, we want to conjecture about ethnic explanations that can account for the divergent preferences.

One possibility would be to tie into the logic of descriptive representation benefits for voters (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Barreto et al., 2004). By this argument, Museveni's fellow Muryankole citizens¹ receive sufficient benefits from having one of their own in the highest office in the country such that they do not necessarily expect material benefits from the government and therefore might prefer aid projects. Co-ethnic MPs, on the other hand, expect greater favor, access to more funds, and cabinet positions from the president *because* they are from the same ethnic group as the president. Thus, these MPs should be more likely to support government funds because they should be the ones most likely to directly benefit.


If co-ethnicity provides descriptive benefits to the masses and financial benefits to MPs, then co-ethnic masses should have a stronger preference for aid and co-ethnic MPs should prefer government funds. The results of the difference of means test comparing co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic masses as well as MPs are reported in Figures A6 and A7. The results show that neither non-co-ethnic masses nor MPs have a clear and consistent preference for one funding source over another (Figure A6 – non-coethnic),

¹ Runyankole is the language that Muryankole speak, which are the President's ethnic group and language.

² Nationalism and its relationship to ethnicity are often debated and a full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. See fuller treatments elsewhere including Calhoun (1993) and Chandra (2006).


which at best partially supports the argument. However, Figure A7 (co-ethnic) shows this same trend: neither co-ethnic masses nor MPs have a clear preference for either source of funding. Thus, there is no clear evidence that ethnicity is driving the main effects.

Figure A6. Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not share the same ethnicity as President Museveni.



Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that non-coethnic masses support aid more than government, though the result is not statistically strong. Non-coethnic MPs support government funding more but likewise the result is not strong statistically.

Figure A7. Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who share the same ethnicity as President Museveni



Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that coethnic masses and coethnic MPs have no strong preferences for foreign aid or government.

Nationalism

Related to the ethnicity argument, an alternative explanation for the results could be that MPs are nationalistic and resent relying on outside donors for development interventions. They should thus be averse to supporting what appears to be charity from outsiders. While some citizens may also hold nationalistic views, they may be less nationalistic than MPs who serve in national office. We specifically question whether individuals who feel a strong sense of commitment to a national or state identity as opposed to a particular ethnic group view foreign involvement differently.²


Following other surveys, we measured attachment to nation vs. ethnic group by asking individuals to respond to the following: “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being Ugandan and being [insert respondent’s ethnic identity].” Response options range from feeling exclusively Ugandan, to mostly Ugandan, to equally Ugandan and a member of one’ ethnic group, to mostly ethnic, to exclusively ethnic. In Sub-Saharan Africa, tribal affiliations are the most salient competitor to national ones so we think this question gets at the core of nationalist sentiment in that region. We then measured whether those who feel more Ugandan behave differently from those who feel greater attachment to their own

² Nationalism and its relationship to ethnicity are often debated and a full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. See fuller treatments elsewhere including Calhoun (1993) and Chandra (2006).

ethnic group. In our data, relative to the masses, Ugandan MPs report higher levels of attachment to Uganda as a national identity than they do to their particular ethnic category.


For individuals who do not consider themselves nationalist (see Figure A8), masses prefer foreign aid whereas MPs prefers government spending, though the results are not consistently significant. For those individuals who considered themselves more nationalist (see Figure A9), there are no consistent patterns of support for aid or government spending. Moreover, there are no consistent differences between masses and MPs among nationalist respondents. The evidence for a nationalist explanation is thus weak at best.

Figure A8. Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who feel a stronger attachment to tribe than to a larger Ugandan nationality



Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that non-nationalist masses prefer foreign aid over government funding, though the result is not consistently significant. The direction of the results for the non-nationalist MPs is opposite, but again the results are not consistently significant.

Figure A9. Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who feel a stronger attachment to a larger Ugandan nationality than to their own tribe




Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that neither nationalist masses nor MPs have strong preferences for aid or government funds.

Incumbency Bias


Related to the nationalism claim, MPs may simply be more likely to prefer government programs because they are part of the government. To test this, we took advantage of a unique aspect of our study: we surveyed 78 former MPs. If being in the government matters, then we should see greater levels of support for government-funded projects among current MPs compared to former MPs. The difference-in-means tests that compare former and current MPs are reported in Figures A10 and A11. These figures show that there is almost no difference between current and former MPs, thus casting doubt on this alternative claim that actual presence in government drives the pro-government bias.

Figure A10. Difference in means tests for former MPs



Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that former MPs have no strong preferences for aid over government or vice versa.

Figure A11. Difference in means tests for current MPs




Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that current MPs prefer government funds over aid, though the result is only significant in one condition.

Parliamentary Leadership


We test whether parliamentary leaders have significantly different preferences for government and/or donor funds than the rank and file. The results are reported in Figures A12 and A13 and show that while backbenchers do not have a clear preference for one form of funds over another, MPs in the leadership are more willing to sign both the donor and president petitions when they receive the control (government) condition. The effects follow the same pattern, meaning roughly the same outcomes are significant in both cases, as the main corruption effects, but are not as strong.

Figure A12. Difference in means tests for MP parliamentary leaders



Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that leaders in parliament do have a slight preference for government funds over aid.

Figure A13. Difference in means tests for MP Backbenchers in parliament




Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that backbenchers in parliament have no strong preferences for aid over government or vice versa.

Socio-demographic Factors: MPs Differ from Masses


A final alternative explanation for the differences between MPs and masses regarding their preferences for aid versus government-funded projects could simply be due to the fact that MPs are different in terms of class, wealth, education, status, etc. Simply by being an MP, one develops a different perspective on development funding (and other issues). Thus, corruption and clientelism are not the driving factors but rather the fact that we have two very distinct samples of individuals. To test this possibility we divide the mass sample into two types: high and low types. High types are those individuals who, among the masses, are relatively similar to the MP population. High types are those who pay taxes, are in the top 25 percent in terms of education, are urban, and are highly informed. We then run the same analysis testing for differential effects across these sub-groups. If we find that the high types do in fact have preferences more similar to the MPs and thus different from the masses then we have some evidence that socio-demographic factors that are common among MPs are stronger drivers of funding preferences. Figures A14 and A15 illustrate that there are only slight differences between the low and high types among the masses. The high type mass preferences are much more similar to the rest of the masses than to MP preferences. The estimates for high types have large standard errors because the sample size is small ($N = 262$). However, for both high and low types the coefficients are consistently positive indicating a stronger preference for aid even if these estimates are not statistically significant (except in the case of the SMS and voicing support for low types). Therefore, the lack of difference between high types, who are relatively more similar to MPs in terms of information, income, and education, and low types signals that access to information or other qualities unique to MPs are not likely driving the effects found regarding different preferences across MPs and masses. There is something about being in a position of power with access to resources that alters individuals' preferences for aid relative to government funds.

Figure A14. Difference in means tests for mass high types



Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that high types tend to prefer aid but these findings are not statistically significant. There are no error bars associated with the “Send SMS” outcomes because there was no variation in this outcome for high types: no high types sent an SMS.

Figure A15. Difference in means tests for mass low types



Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that low types tend to prefer aid but these findings are only statistically significant in one of the six outcomes.

Trust and Conditionality

Table A4. Trust in international institutions

| | Mass | MPs | Difference | t-score |
|-------------------|------|------|------------|---------|
| US AID | 3.38 | 3.55 | -0.18*** | 5.38 |
| World Bank | 3.34 | 3.57 | -0.23*** | 7.38 |
| UNDP [^] | 3.29 | 3.67 | -0.38 | 1.77 |
| ADB [^] | 3.15 | 4 | -0.85*** | -32.75 |

[^] Only 6 MPs responded


Table A5. Conditionality

| | | Mass | MPs | Difference | t-score |
|-------------------------------|-----------|------|------|------------|---------|
| Conditions help (5-point) | All | 2.97 | 2.52 | 0.45*** | 7.09 |
| Conditions help (dichotomous) | All | 0.52 | 0.38 | 0.14*** | 6.53 |
| Conditions help (5-point) | Treatment | 2.97 | 2.56 | 0.41*** | 6.02 |
| Conditions help (dichotomous) | Treatment | 0.52 | 0.40 | 0.12*** | 5.28 |

Note: 5 point variable is 1 = strongly agree conditions hurt; 2 = agree conditions hurt; 3 = agree with neither; 4 = agree conditions help; 5 = strongly agree conditions help. Dichotomous = 1 if 5 point variable was 4 or 5.


Corruption Results with One Observation per MP

Figure A16. Difference in means for corruption/clientelism mechanism: one observation per MP



Corruption Results for Mass Respondents Passing Manipulation Check

Figure A17. Difference in means for corruption/clientelism mechanism: Mass respondents passing manipulation check



Determinants of Corruption Perceptions

Table A6a. Mass only

Correlation = -0.16

| | Not NRM | NRM |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| No corruption | 223 16.5% | 619 30.6% |
| Corruption | 1132 83.5% | 1404 69.4% |

Table A6b. MP only

Correlation = -0.07

| | Not NRM | NRM |
|---------------|-------------|--------------|
| No corruption | 98 60.5% | 302 68.0% |
| Corruption | 64 39.5% | 142 32.0% |

Table A7. Logit results predicting perceptions of corruption

| | Mass | | | MP | | |
|---------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Educated | -0.054 (0.096) | | -0.052 (0.096) | | | |
| Poverty | 0.208** (0.087) | | 0.193** (0.088) | | | |
| Knowledge | 0.049 (0.101) | | 0.054 (0.102) | | | |
| Male | 0.005 (0.083) | | 0.001 (0.083) | | 0.396 (0.177) | 0.404 (0.177) |
| Foreign Media | | -0.075 (0.146) | -0.116 (0.149) | 0.574 (0.294) | 0.551 (0.295) | 0.575 (0.298) |
| NRM | -0.839*** (0.092) | -0.824*** (0.089) | -0.839*** (0.093) | -0.340 (0.183) | -0.302 (0.184) | -0.263 (0.186) |
| Runyankole | | 0.299** (0.121) | -0.077 (0.145) | -0.741* (0.268) | -0.751** (0.269) | -0.741* (0.270) |
| Nationalist | | 0.110 (0.095) | 0.115 (0.096) | -0.008 (0.183) | -0.018 (0.184) | -0.010 (0.185) |
| Minister | | | | | | -0.465 (0.257) |
| Committee | | | | | | 0.132 (0.385) |
| East | 0.377*** (0.113) | | 0.389*** (0.114) | | | |
| West | 0.740*** (0.117) | | 0.788*** (0.137) | | | |
| Central | 0.585*** (0.118) | | 0.581*** (0.120) | | | |
| N | 3332 | 3362 | 3316 | 344 | 344 | 344 |

Note: minister includes cabinet minister, state minister and deputy speaker. Committee includes committee vice chairperson and committee chairperson.

Multivariate Regression Analysis

To test the robustness of the main corruption results, we run regression analysis that controls for key variables for both the Masses and the MPs. For each set of respondents, we run logit regression predicting the outcomes for which we find significant effects in the main analysis. We do not run analysis on the “Coordinate with Peers” outcomes because only 18 of the 703 observations take the value of 0 on this outcome, which prevents the logit from converging. We predict support for the development project by sub-groups: those who perceive corruption and those who do not. We do this in order to make the results easily comparable to the main analysis. Tables A8-A11 report these results, which largely support the main findings regarding corruption. For the MP analysis, we cluster the standard errors at the MP level (given that each MP is in the regression twice). For the Mass analysis we cluster at the district level. For the masses, four of the five outcomes remain significant once we control for covariates. For these outcomes, those who perceive corruption are significantly more likely to support the aid-funded project. For MPs, we detect a significant effect for those who perceive corruption in terms of willingness to sign the donor petition regardless of the covariates we control for. However, a significant effect for the outcome willingness to sign the petition to the President depends on the covariates that are included in the analysis.

Table A8. Regression analysis on MPs who do not perceive corruption

| | Willing to Sign | Willing to Sign | Willing to Sign Pres. | Willing to Sign Pres. |
|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Aid Treatment | -0.389 (0.33) | -0.389 (0.336) | -0.644 (0.441) | -0.652 (0.446) |
| NRM | -0.873* (0.467) | -0.874* (0.468) | -0.709 (0.44) | -0.704 (0.445) |
| Male | -0.474 (0.366) | -0.122 (0.548) | -0.402 (0.342) | -0.086 (0.527) |
| West | -0.424 (0.464) | -0.413 (0.469) | -0.439 (0.405) | -0.445 (0.413) |
| East | -0.701 (0.49) | -0.69 (0.49) | -0.011 (0.442) | -0.004 (0.442) |
| North | -0.27 (0.576) | -0.308 (0.57) | 0.405 (0.533) | 0.365 (0.528) |
| Foreign News | -0.169 (0.618) | -0.121 (0.626) | -0.088 (0.695) | -0.037 (0.684) |
| Backbencher | | 0.516 (0.361) | | 0.554 (0.348) |
| Constituency MP | | -0.456 (0.527) | | -0.415 (0.508) |
| Constant | 3.221*** (0.708) | 2.890*** (0.757) | 2.581*** (0.636) | 2.225*** (0.666) |
| N | 456 | 456 | 229 | 229 |

Note that N's are smaller in the second set of models because each MP was asked to sign two donor petitions (first set of models) and only one petition to the president (the second set of models). Also, the "Backbencher" control variable takes the value of 1 if the MP is not a minister or shadow cabinet member (shadow cabinet members are opposition MPs) and 0 otherwise. Likewise the "Constituency MP" variable takes a value of 1 if the MP represents a Parliamentary constituency and takes on a value of 0 otherwise (thus 0 on this variable includes Youth, Worker, Army (UPDF), People with Disability, Ex-officio, and District Women MPs; we control for MP type in this way because the modal MP is a "Constituency MP").

Table A9. Regression analysis on MPs who perceive corruption

| | Willing to Sign | Willing to Sign | Willing to Sign Pres. | Willing to Sign Pres. |
|-----------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Aid Treatment | -1.420* (0.744) | -1.349* (0.801) | -1.959* (1.141) | -1.786 (1.225) |
| NRM | 0.493 (0.565) | 0.399 (0.61) | 0.880* (0.519) | 0.807 (0.541) |
| Male | -0.089 (0.567) | 0.346 (1.164) | 0.093 (0.532) | 0.457 (0.872) |
| West | -0.893 (0.651) | -1.119* (0.636) | -0.28 (0.596) | -0.428 (0.609) |
| East | 0.585 (0.757) | 0.703 (0.801) | 1.198* (0.665) | 1.274* (0.666) |
| North | 1.276 (1.11) | 1.183 (1.2) | 1.656* (0.852) | 1.590* (0.927) |
| Foreign News | 1.535 (1.147) | 1.369 (1.056) | 0.398 (0.859) | 0.296 (0.855) |
| Backbencher | | 1.537** (0.643) | | 1.128** (0.537) |
| Constituency MP | | -0.418 (1.215) | | -0.419 (0.909) |
| Constant | 2.745*** (0.93) | 1.786* (1.031) | 1.979* (1.055) | 1.168 (1.251) |
| N | 239 | 239 | 121 | 121 |

Note that N's are smaller in the second set of models because each MP was asked to sign two donor petitions (first set of models) and only one petition to the president (the second set of models). Also, the "Backbencher" control variable takes the value of 1 if the MP is not a minister or shadow cabinet member (shadow cabinet members are opposition MPs) and 0 otherwise. Likewise the "Constituency MP" variable takes a value of 1 if the MP represents a Parliamentary constituency and takes on a value of 0 otherwise (thus 0 on this variable includes Youth, Worker, Army (UPDF), People with Disability, Ex-officio, and District Women MPs; we control for MP type in this way because the modal MP is a "Constituency MP").

Table A10. Regression analysis on masses who do not perceive corruption

| | Strong Support | Tell | Signed | Willing to SMS | to SMS |
|------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Aid Treatment | -0.270 (0.273) | 0.269 (0.468) | -0.155 (0.311) | -0.302 (0.239) | 0.306 (0.611) |
| NRM | 0.452* (0.248) | 0.415 (0.318) | 0.439** (0.197) | 0.261 (0.177) | -1.112*** (0.415) |
| Education | 0.063** (0.027) | -0.030 (0.043) | 0.066** (0.026) | 0.104*** (0.021) | 0.057 (0.059) |
| Knowledge | 0.005 (0.036) | -0.020 (0.035) | -0.003 (0.027) | 0.075*** (0.020) | -0.073 (0.052) |
| Relative Poverty | -0.154 (0.098) | 0.100 (0.185) | 0.206** (0.097) | 0.429*** (0.126) | 0.099 (0.206) |
| Male | 0.490*** (0.166) | 1.007*** (0.314) | 0.289** (0.147) | 0.186 (0.144) | -0.066 (0.404) |
| Rural | 0.190 (0.218) | 0.980 (0.631) | 0.465 (0.355) | 0.088 (0.263) | 0.588 (1.361) |
| West | 0.081 (0.287) | 0.578 (0.456) | 0.433 (0.345) | 0.180 (0.347) | 15.933*** (0.442) |
| East | 0.523 (0.359) | -0.350 (0.341) | 0.603 (0.431) | 0.354 (0.343) | 15.529*** (0.514) |
| North | 0.004 (0.319) | -0.072 (0.381) | 0.189 (0.360) | -0.275 (0.282) | 14.800*** (0.591) |
| Constant | 0.782 (0.645) | 2.013*** (0.758) | 0.023 (0.543) | -1.861*** (0.538) | -18.210*** (0.912) |
| N | 822 | 815 | 828 | 828 | 828 |

Table A11: Regression Analysis on Masses who Perceive Corruption

| | Strong Support | Tell | Signed | Willing to SMS | to SMS |
|------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Aid Treatment | 0.335*** (0.123) | 0.410** (0.194) | 0.162 (0.129) | 0.248** (0.104) | 0.628* (0.353) |
| NRM | 0.144 (0.148) | 0.730*** (0.152) | 0.327** (0.135) | 0.142 (0.100) | 0.047 (0.279) |
| Education | 0.038*** (0.013) | 0.072** (0.030) | 0.103*** (0.015) | 0.110*** (0.013) | 0.047 (0.037) |
| Knowledge | 0.021 (0.017) | 0.019 (0.039) | -0.015 (0.025) | 0.054** (0.023) | 0.011 (0.032) |
| Relative Poverty | 0.084 (0.084) | 0.245** (0.099) | 0.150* (0.080) | 0.071 (0.071) | -0.143 (0.126) |
| Male | -0.138* (0.071) | -0.107 (0.131) | -0.005 (0.081) | 0.214*** (0.080) | 0.802*** (0.280) |
| Rural | -0.046 (0.151) | 0.141 (0.360) | 0.424* (0.240) | 0.099 (0.167) | 0.216 (0.458) |
| West | -0.136 (0.217) | 0.947*** (0.246) | 0.722*** (0.173) | 0.343* (0.206) | 0.926** (0.369) |
| East | 0.832*** (0.258) | 0.816*** (0.295) | 1.196*** (0.266) | 0.775*** (0.255) | 0.906*** (0.340) |
| North | -0.143 (0.222) | -0.038 (0.211) | 0.523** (0.223) | 0.010 (0.205) | 0.088 (0.496) |
| Constant | 0.063 (0.358) | 0.434 (0.463) | -0.434 (0.373) | -1.652*** (0.368) | -5.119*** (0.585) |
| N | 2471 | 2436 | 2480 | 2480 | 2480 |

Tax Payers vs. Non-Tax Payers

Table A12. T-tests of means by mass respondents who pay/do not pay taxes

| | Aid | | | Govt | | | Diff-in-diff |
|--------------------------|--------|------|---------|--------|------|--------|--------------|
| | No tax | Tax | Diff. | No tax | Tax | Diff | |
| Strong support | 0.77 | 0.79 | 0.02 | 0.73 | 0.77 | 0.04 | -0.02 |
| Tell of support | 0.94 | 0.94 | -0.00 | 0.92 | 0.88 | -0.03 | 0.03 |
| Willing to sign petition | 0.83 | 0.83 | 0.00 | 0.82 | 0.81 | -0.01 | 0.01 |
| Signed petition | 0.80 | 0.82 | 0.01 | 0.77 | 0.76 | -0.01 | 0.02 |
| Willing to send SMS | 0.61 | 0.75 | 0.14*** | 0.57 | 0.69 | 0.03** | 0.02 |
| Sent SMS | 0.06 | 0.03 | -0.03* | 0.03 | 0.02 | -0.01 | -0.02 |

Control Condition: Calculated vs. Stated

As mentioned in the discussion section of the paper, we omitted explicit reference of a donor in the control condition to signal that the government would sponsor the program. We would later ask respondents in the control condition who they thought was sponsor of the program. This provides us with the necessary information to estimate what support for the program may have looked like if respondents had been told that the government had indeed been the sponsor.

As we have outlined in the paper, estimation of the mean level of support for each group is straightforward, but estimation of the standard errors is comparatively more complicated. We know that the standard error is the standard deviation divided by the square root of N. The standard error for the control will be comprised of the standard error of the respondents who believed the government was the donor and those who believed that it was a foreign donor:


$$SE_{control} = \frac{\frac{S_{Gov}}{\sqrt{(N_{Gov})}} + \frac{S_{For}}{\sqrt{(N_{For})}}}{2}$$

Again we can rearrange the formula to calculate the standard deviation of the government respondents:

$$S_{Gov} = \left(2 * SE_{Control} - \frac{S_{For}}{\sqrt{N_{For}}} \right) * \sqrt{N_{Gov}}$$

Since the standard error is just the standard deviation divided by the square root of N, we can calculate $\frac{S_{Gov}}{\sqrt{N_{Gov}}}$ to get the standard errors of the government respondents.

Figure A18. The value of the control if government was named



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